Volume 9 — LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL.

Speeches in the Senate, on the Bill To authorize the President, in all Domestic or Foreign Wars, to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal, February 14 and 17, 1863.

At the close of the preceding session of Congress, Mr. Grimes introduced a bill concerning Letters of Marque and Reprisal, but he was unable to secure the action of the Senate upon it. January 7, 1863, he again asked for its consideration, when, on motion of Mr. Sumner, it was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. January 20th, it was reported from the Committee by Mr. Hale, with amendments. February 14th, Mr. Grimes moved to proceed with its consideration. In opposing this motion, Mr. Sumner said:—

Mr. President,—It seems to me that this bill is in all respects a misconception. There is nothing now to justify letters of marque and reprisal; and when Senators say that Massachusetts is interested in their issue, I repel the suggestion. Sir, Massachusetts is interested in putting down the Rebellion. She is also interested in clearing the sea of pirates. Such is her open and unquestionable interest, and to this end she is concerned in the employment of all possible agencies consistent with the civilization of our day. Massachusetts is interested in the enlargement of the marine, national and private, and I add, also, in the present enlistment of the private marine in the national service; but this is very different from the issue of letters of marque.

…

I think the Senator from Iowa is misled by a phrase. He speaks of the militia of the sea. It is a captivating phrase, I admit; but the meaning is not entirely clear. The Senator finds it in privateers,—that is, private armed ships, belonging to private individuals, under the command of private persons, cruising against private commerce, and paid exclusively by booty. Such is his idea of a sea militia. I confess this is not very captivating to me. My idea of a sea militia is different. It is all the ships of the country, if the occasion require, under the national flag, in the service of the country as national ships, with the character of national ships, enjoying everywhere the immunities of national ships, and free from the suspicions always attaching to the privateer, wherever it appears. An enactment, authorizing the employment of the mercantile marine in the national service as part of the national navy, would be practical and reasonable. Such a marine might justly be called the militia of the sea; but I must protest against the deceptive militia of the Senator.

The bill was taken up by a vote of 31 yeas and 6 nays; but, after ordering the printing of amendments, it was postponed.

February 17th, it was taken up again, when Mr. Sumner spoke in reply to Mr. Grimes.

MR. PRESIDENT,—The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Grimes], who has just taken his seat, ingeniously and elaborately vindicates a bill which, at least in one feature, is an innovation upon the original policy of our country; and, strange to say, while doing so, he pleads for what he calls our traditional policy. I, too, plead for our traditional policy, but not the policy of the Senator. And I plead also for a policy which, whether traditional or not, will provide for the national defence according to that best economy which takes counsel of prudence as well as of courage.

The Senator, with seeming triumph, asks if we can afford to declare that our whole private marine shall rot at the wharf. Clearly not, and nobody proposes to declare so, although we might as well do this as recklessly provoke war which must drive our commerce from the ocean,—if in no other way, by the increased rates of insurance. I would secure for our private marine the amplest opportunity, that it may continue without interruption to plough every sea with its keels, and that, wherever it appears, it may find its accustomed welcome. The policy of the Senator has no such promise.

All will concur in any practical measure at this time for the increase of our strength on the ocean. To this end my vote shall not be wanting. But to my mind it is clear to demonstration that the measure proposed is not practical in character, that it promises no result which cannot be reached better in another way, while it is almost sure to bring upon the country additional embarrassment. It may be bold, but I am sure it is not prudent, nor is there in it economy of any kind.

This bill is entitled, “Concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes, and Prize Goods.” The title is borrowed from the two statutes of 1812 and 1813. It is, in plain terms, a bill to authorize Privateers,—that is, private armed vessels licensed to cruise against the commerce of an enemy, and looking to booty for support, compensation, and salary. It is by booty that owners, officers, and crews are to be paid. Booty is the motive power and life-spring. Such is this bill on its face, without going into detail. Surely a bill of this character ought not to pass without strong reason.

Looking at the bill more closely, it is found to have two distinct features: first, as a new agency against the Rebellion; secondly, as a provision for privateers in any future war. I regard these two features as distinct. They may be considered separately. One may be right, and the other wrong. One may be adopted, and the other rejected.

So far as the bill promises substantial help in putting down the Rebellion without more than countervailing mischief, it may properly be entertained. But what can it do against the Rebellion? And where is the policy or necessity on which it is founded? If Senators think that the bill can do any good now, I am sure they listen to their hopes rather than to the evidence. Why, Sir, the Rebels, against whom you would cruise, are absolutely without commerce. Pirate ships they have, equipped in England, armed to the teeth, and unleashed upon the sea to prey upon us; but there is not a single bottom of theirs that can afford the booty which is the pay and incentive of the privateer. It would be hardly more irrational to enlist private armed ships against the King of Dahomey.

I know it is said that our navy is too small, and that more ships are needed, not only for transportation, but also to increase and strengthen the blockade, or to cruise against pirates. Very well. Hire them, and put them in commission as Government ships, with the immunities, the responsibilities, and the character of such ships. There can be no difficulty in this; and, better still, there will be no difficulty afterwards. This is simple and practical.

But, while I see no probable good from launching privateers upon the ocean to cruise against a commerce that does not exist, and to be paid by a booty that cannot be found, I see certain evils which I am anxious to avoid for the sake of my country, especially at this moment. I think that I cannot be mistaken in this anxiety.

It is well known, that, according to ancient usage and the Law of Nations, every privateer is entitled to belligerent rights, one of which is that most difficult, delicate, and dangerous right, the much disputed Right of Search. There is no Right of War with regard to which nations are more sensitive,—and no nation has been more sensitive than our own, while none has suffered more from its exercise. By virtue of this right, every licensed sea-rover is entitled on the ocean to stop and overhaul all merchant vessels under whatever flag. If he cannot capture, he can at least annoy. If he cannot make prize, he can at least make trouble, and leave behind a sting. I know not what course the great neutral powers may adopt, nor do I see how they can undertake to set aside this ancient right, even if they smart under its exercise. But when I consider that these powers have already by solemn convention—I refer, of course, to the Congress of Paris in 1856—renounced the whole system of privateers among themselves, I confess my fears that they will not witness with perfect calmness the annoyance to which their commerce will be exposed. And now, Sir, mark my prediction. Every exercise upon neutral commerce of this terrible Right of Search will be the fruitful occasion of misunderstanding, bickering, and controversy, at a moment when, if my voice could prevail, there should be nothing to interfere with that accord, harmony, and sympathy which are due from civilized states to our Republic in its great battle with Barbarism. Even if we are not encouraged to expect these things from Europe, I hope that nothing will be done by us to put impediments in their way. Justly sensitive with regard to our own rights, let us respect the sensibility of others.

It is not enough to say that we have an unquestioned right to issue letters of marque. Rights, when exercised out of season or imprudently, may be changed into wrongs. It was a maxim of ancient jurisprudence, Sic utere tua, ut alienum non lædas, and I think that this maxim, at least in spirit, is applicable to the present occasion. Our right may be clear; but, if its exercise would injure or annoy others, especially without corresponding advantage to ourselves, we shall do well, if we forbear to exercise it.

Thus far I have considered that part of the bill which provides for privateers against the Rebels; but I cannot quit this branch of the question without calling attention again to the scenes that must ensue, if these privateers are let loose. Picture to yourselves the ocean traversed by licensed rovers seeking prey. The Dutch admiral carried a broom at his mast-head as the boastful sign that he swept the seas. The privateer might carry a scourge. Wherever a sail appears, there is chase; the signal gun is fired, and the merchantman submits to visitation and search. Delay is the least of the consequences. Contention, irritation, humiliation ensue, all calculated to engender ill-feeling, which, beginning with individuals, may embrace country and government. I do not say that such an act, even harshly exercised upon neutral commerce, will bring upon us further war, but I would not try the experiment. The speaking-trumpet of a reckless privateer may contribute to that discord which is the herald of bloodshed itself.

But, Sir, even if you think it worth while to authorize privateers against the Rebels, to cruise against an imaginary commerce, in quest of an imaginary booty, why not stop there? The measure would not be wise, but it might find seeming apology in the present condition of affairs. The bill of the Committee, and also the amendment of the Senator from Iowa, go much further. It is a general bill, authorizing privateers, not merely against the Rebels, but also against foreign nations in future wars, in the discretion of the President. I quote from the bill of the Committee.

“That, whenever war exists or has been declared between the United States and any other nation, and during the present Rebellion, the President of the United States is hereby authorized to issue to private vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he may think proper.”

Mark the language, “whenever war exists.” I am not ready to say that these words give the President power to declare the existence of war without the intervention of Congress; but I object to the whole clause on account of its generality. And the substitute of the Senator is obnoxious to the same objection. It says:—

“That, in all domestic and foreign wars, the President of the United States is authorized to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper.”

This is a general provision, by which the President is authorized to issue letters of marque, not only to aid in putting down the present Rebellion, but also “in all domestic and foreign wars” which may occur hereafter. I will not say that any such general, prospective provision, although clearly a departure from that traditional policy which the Senator professes to uphold, is positively unconstitutional; but I am sure that it is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. To me it seems obvious that the Constitution contemplated the special action of Congress on every occasion for the exercise of this power. This was the safeguard against excess or blunder. Such a power was not to be exercised hastily or inconsiderately, but with full and special consideration. It was not to be exercised all at once and in the lump, but as the exigency occurred in individual cases. And Congress, which was empowered to declare war, had the further power, in the same way and with similar solemnities, to give the war this additional feature, if, under the circumstances, it thought best. This great power was not handed over indefinitely to the President, to be wielded at will, but was lodged in Congress. If Congress is not insensible to the spirit of the Constitution, it will never hand it over to the President, as now proposed.

Even in England, where the power to declare war is lodged with the sovereign in council, it seems that in point of fact letters of marque are regulated by special Acts of Parliament on the breaking out of war. This is stated by Chitty, in his work on the Prerogatives of the Crown.

“By various statutes, enacted during every war, the Lord High Admiral, or the Commissioners of the Admiralty, are empowered to grant commissions, or, as they are also called, letters of marque and reprisals, to the owners of ships, enabling them to attack and take the property of his Majesty’s enemies, which statutes contain, also, various provisions as to the prizes captured. (See 29 George II. c. 34; 19 George III. c. 67; 43 George III. c. 160; 45 George III. c. 72.)”[140]

Obviously recognizing this principle, which is so entirely consistent with reason and that wisdom which is the strength of nations, our country thus far in its history has declined to pass any general prospective law authorizing letters of marque. This is our traditional policy, which the Senator seeks to overturn. The statute authorizing letters of marque in 1812 expired with the war. It was not general or prospective. Is there any reason now that we should depart from this policy? Is there any good to be accomplished by such departure? It is strange that at this moment, when other nations renounce privateering, we should rush forward and ostentatiously declare it part of our political system,—I might almost say, an element of our political life. Pray, if this declaration were of such importance, why has it been so long postponed? Generations, jealous guardians of all our national rights, have passed away, leaving the statute-book without any such voice. It did not occur to them that the national defence or the national honor required it. And yet the discovery is suddenly made that this is a mistake, or that our predecessors were all wrong, especially in not announcing to the world that in the event of war privateers will be let loose.

As there is no foreign war in which we are now engaged, this provision is prospective and minatory, so far as foreign nations are concerned. It is notice to avoid any question with us, under penalty of depredations by privateers. If not a menace, it is very like one. I do not know that it will be so interpreted by those to whom it is addressed, but I am sure that it can do no good; and just in proportion as it is so interpreted, it will be worse than useless. A menace is as ill-timed between nations as between individuals.

I do not dwell now on the irrational character of privateering, but I seize the occasion to declare my deliberate judgment that our country may yet find, to its cost, that this cherished weapon is a two-edged sword. A nation with an extensive commerce cannot afford to invite the hazard of its employment. Thus, in the event of war with a power inferior to ourselves in commerce, as Portugal, or Spain, or France, the increased rates of insurance would make it impossible for us to keep our ships afloat, while all our profits on the ocean would be appropriated by those nations happily still at peace. The very superiority of our commerce would be a disadvantage, inasmuch as we should be more exposed. For instance, in a war with Portugal or Spain we should stake gold against copper, and even in a war with France it would be gold against silver. If this prospect pleases, then Senators will vote for a measure which may be called Privateering made easy; or, how to do it without Congress.

Nor do I discuss the immorality and brutality too naturally engendered by a system whose inspiration is booty. Here I content myself with the words of General Halleck, in his excellent summary of International Law.

“But, even with these precautions, privateering is usually accompanied by abuses and enormous excesses. The use of privateers, or private armed vessels under letters of marque and reprisal, has often been discussed by publicists and text-writers on International Law, and has recently been made the subject of diplomatic correspondence and negotiation between the United States and the principal European powers. The general opinion of text-writers is, that privateering, though contrary to national policy and the more enlightened spirit of the present age, is, nevertheless, allowable under the general rules of International Law. It leads to the worst excesses and crimes, and has a most corrupting influence upon all who engage in it, but cannot be punished as a breach of the Law of Nations. The enlightened opinion of the world is most decidedly in favor of abolishing it, and recent events lead to the hope that all the commercial nations of both hemispheres will unite in no longer resorting, in time of war, to so barbarous a practice.”[141]

There is another American authority I ought not to omit. I refer to Chancellor Kent, who in his much quoted Commentaries has recorded his judgment. If I chose to cross the ocean, I might add indefinitely to this testimony; but I confine myself to our own countrymen, so that you shall see privateering as judged by Americans. Here are the words of the great jurist.

“As a necessary precaution against abuse, the owners of privateers are required, by the ordinances of the commercial states, to give adequate security that they will conduct the cruise according to the laws and usages of war and the instructions of the Government, and that they will regard the rights of neutrals, and bring their prizes in for adjudication. These checks are essential to the character and safety of maritime nations. Privateering, under all the restrictions which have been adopted, is very liable to abuse. The object is not fame or chivalric warfare, but plunder and profit. The discipline of the crews is not apt to be of the highest order, and privateers are often guilty of enormous excesses, and become the scourge of neutral commerce. They are sometimes manned and officered by foreigners, having no permanent connection with the country, or interest in its cause. This was a complaint made by the United States, in 1819, in relation to irregularities and acts of atrocity committed by private armed vessels sailing under the flag of Buenos Ayres. Under the best regulations, the business tends strongly to blunt the sense of private right and to nourish a lawless and fierce spirit of rapacity.”[142]

It is well known that these were the sentiments of the founders of our Republic, which, in its early treaty with Prussia, took the lead in denouncing the whole system of privateering. Is it not better to follow this example, until positive, irresistible exigencies of war compel us to depart from it? If we cannot do this, let us at least keep from affording new facilities to an offensive system. What our country denounced in other days should not now be proclaimed and glorified.

Mr. Grimes. The Senator will allow me to inquire when it was that this nation denounced the system of privateering.

Mr. Sumner. By the treaty of 1785.

Mr. Grimes. The Prussian treaty, I suppose.

Mr. Sumner. The Prussian treaty.

Mr. Grimes. I should like to know the purport of that denunciation. Was it not a mere stipulation that we should not prey on the commerce of that nation?

Mr. Sumner. It was a stipulation to the effect, that, in any war between the United States and Prussia, neither party should commission privateers to depredate on the commerce of the other.

Mr. Grimes. A stipulation that I suppose this Government could very easily make, because Prussia has no commerce.

Mr. Sumner. I wish the treaty had been such as to afford a stronger example; but it must be accepted as the judgment of our country at that time; and to my mind it is a practical denunciation of privateering, worthy of the illustrious character by whom it was negotiated, who was none other than Benjamin Franklin. But this treaty is not all. I do not forget how Jefferson wrote to France, “The benevolence of this proposition is worthy of the nation from which it comes, and our sentiments on it have been declared in the treaty to which you are pleased to refer, as well as in some others which have been proposed,”[143] thus testifying to our treaty and to his own sentiments; and, at a later day, that John Quincy Adams, in his instructions to Mr. Rush, of July 28, 1823, directing him to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain for the abolition of privateering, declared that this was “an object which has long been dear to the hearts and ardent in the aspirations of the benevolent and the wise, an object essentially congenial to the true spirit of Christianity”; and he adopted the earlier declaration of Franklin, “It is time, it is high time, for the sake of humanity, that a stop were put to this enormity.”[144]

Mr. Grimes. I am speaking now of the declaration which the Senator has seen fit to designate as a national denunciation of privateers, made in 1785, though the Constitution, which was made in 1787, expressly reserved to Congress the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal. Taking these two facts, the treaty made in 1785 and the Constitution made in 1787, how can it be asserted that the ancient policy of the Government is against privateering, and that we have nationally denounced it?

Mr. Sumner. The Senator will pardon me, if I say that I know no better denunciation than that of a treaty negotiated by Franklin. A treaty is the act of the nation, and testifies to the sentiments of the nation. If the same denunciation did not find place in more important treaties, it is reasonable to suppose that it was not acceptable to the other contracting parties. It is an historic fact, that Franklin sought to embody this denunciation in the very treaty by which our independence was acknowledged, and thus to associate it with our national being.[145] Indeed, it was a standing offer from our Government to foreign powers.[146] Unquestionably the Constitution gives Congress the power to issue letters of marque, but the reason is obvious: because privateering was recognized at that time as a proper agency of war. The framers of the Constitution did not divest the government they created of a power which belonged to other governments according to the existing usage of nations. In recognizing this power, they express no opinion upon its character. For that we must go to the treaty, and to the words and efforts of Franklin, Jefferson, and John Quincy Adams, speaking and acting officially for the nation,—all but Franklin subsequent to the Constitution.

And now, Sir, at the risk of repetition, I enumerate my objections to this bill.

1. It proposes to cruise against a non-existent commerce, for the sake of a non-existent booty.

2. It accords to private individuals the belligerent right of search, which must be fruitful of trouble in our relations with the great neutral powers.

3. It gives to the President, in his discretion, the power to issue letters of marque in any future wars, without any further authority of Congress, when this power should always wait for the special authority of Congress on the declaration of war.

4. It is in the nature of a menace to foreign nations, and therefore worse than useless.

5. It vitalizes and legalizes a system which civilization always accepted with reluctance, and our own country was one of the earliest and most persistent to denounce.

6. It will give us a bad name in history.

It does all this without accomplishing any substantial good. If it be said that ships are needed for transportation, or for the blockade, or in order to pursue pirates on the sea, then, I repeat, let the Government hire them. The way is easy, and it is also the way of peace. To this end I offer a substitute for the present bill, which will secure to the Government all the aid it can desire, without the disadvantage or shame of a measure which can be justified only by overruling necessity. I will read the substitute.

“That the Secretary of the Navy be authorized to hire any vessels needed for the national service, and, if he sees fit, to put them in charge of officers commissioned by the United States, and to give them in every respect the character of national ships.”

If Senators desire a militia of the seas, here it is,—a sea militia, precisely like the land militia, mustered into the service of the United States, under the command of the United States, and receiving rations and pay from the United States, instead of sea-rovers, not mustered into the national service, not under national command, and not receiving rations or pay from the nation, but cruising each for himself, according to his own will, without direction, without concert, simply according to the wild temptation of booty. Such a system on land would be rejected at once. Nobody would call it a militia. Do not sanction it now on the ocean; or, if you are disposed to sanction it, call it not a militia of the seas.

The bill was then amended, on motion of Mr. Sherman, by limiting it to “three years from the passage of this Act.”

Mr. Sumner then moved to strike out the words “in all domestic and foreign wars,” and to insert “to aid in putting down the present Rebellion,” so that it would read,—

“That, to aid in putting down the present Rebellion, the President of the United States is authorized to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions,” &c.

On this motion he remarked:—

Mr. President,—The question is now presented precisely, whether the Senate will confine this bill in operation to the war in which we are actually engaged for the suppression of the Rebellion, or make it prospective in character, applicable to some war in the unknown future, to some country not named, to some exigency not now understood, and therefore, in its nature, a notice or warning, if not a menace, to all countries.

This is the precise question: Shall the bill be confined to our own time, to this day, to this hour, to something we can see, to what is actually before us; or shall it be extended also to the future, to something we cannot see, to what is not actually before us, and with regard to which we can have no knowledge, unless we listen to our fears?

If the words are introduced as a menace, then are they out of place and irrational. Suppose any such words in the legislation of Great Britain or France at a moment when they might be interpreted as applicable to us, who can doubt their injurious effect upon public opinion here? A brave and intelligent people will not bend before menace, nor can any such attempt affect a well-considered national policy. All history and reason show that such conduct is more irritating than soothing. Sir, if you are in earnest, as I cannot doubt, to cultivate those relations of peace and good-will with foreign nations which are in themselves a cheap defence, you must avoid all legislation which can be misinterpreted, especially everything which looks like menace.

I cannot pretend to foresee the future. I know not that other wars may not be in store for us, that we may not be called to confront other powers, in alliance, perhaps, with our Rebels, and to make still greater efforts. All this may come; but I pray not. If it does come, then let us meet its duties and responsibilities like Senators; but do not rush forward recklessly, like the bully with his bludgeon, ready to strike wherever there is a head. I do not believe in such legislation; nor do I believe in any legislation providing new facilities for a war, or tending to produce irritation and distrust. Prepared always for the future, I would not challenge it. Preparation and provocation are widely different. Nor would I do anything out of season. There was characteristic wisdom in the remark of the venerable Chief Justice of England, Sir Matthew Hale, when he said that “we must not jump before we get to the stile.” It seems to me that Senators who are pressing this bill forget this time-honored injunction, and try to make their country take a jump prematurely.

…

You have just listened to the Senator from California [Mr. McDougall], announcing that perhaps before the next meeting of Congress there may be foreign war; and you have not forgotten his elaborate speech only the other day, when he openly challenged war with France. I ask Senators, if, at this critical moment, they are ready to follow him in his effort to carry us in that direction. For myself, I protest against it. I am heart and soul for putting down this Rebellion without playing into the hands of Rebels. Now it must be plain to all that every word calculated to draw or drive any foreign government into alliance with the Rebellion does play into the hands of Rebels. Senators may be willing to distract the attention of the country from our single object, to impair the national force, and help surrender all to the uncertainties and horrors of accumulating war. Let me not enter into their counsels. It is not my habit to shrink from responsibility; personal risks I accept willingly; but I confess anxiety that my country should not rush abroad in quest of new dangers, whose only effect will be to increase the national calamities.

The amendment of Mr. Sumner was lost,—Yeas 13, Nays 22.

Mr. Sumner then moved to strike out the words authorizing the President to “make all needful rules and regulations,” and to insert—

“The provisions of the Act of Congress, approved on the 26th day of June, 1812, entitled ‘An Act concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods,’ and of the Act of Congress, approved on the 27th day of January, 1813, entitled ‘An Act in addition to the Act concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods,’ are hereby revived, and shall be in force in relation to all that part of the United States where the inhabitants have been declared in a state of insurrection, and the vessels and property to them belonging.”

Mr. Sumner explained the amendment.

It will be observed, that, by the amendment already adopted, the President alone, without the coöperation of Congress, is empowered to make what are called all needful rules and regulations for the government and conduct of these privateers, and for the adjudication and disposal of prizes and salvages made by them. But formerly it was not so ordered. No such large power was ever before vested in the President. By the statute of June 26, 1812, a system was provided, in seventeen sections, for the government of letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods. These sections relate to the formalities required from persons applying for letters of marque, the bonds to be given, and the sureties, how the captured property shall be forfeited, the distribution of the prize money, the distribution of salvage, how the prize shall be brought in for adjudication, regulations concerning prisoners found on board of prize vessels, instructions for the privateers, bounty for destroying the enemy’s vessels, instructions to the commanding officers of privateers to keep journals, how owners of privateers are punishable for violating the revenue laws of the United States, how offences on board private armed vessels are punishable; also the commissions of collectors and consuls upon prize goods, and the uses to which they shall be applied. Here is a statute, in itself a code, containing provisions exclusively applicable to these important matters, all determined by Congress in advance; but it is now proposed that Congress shall abdicate, leaving to the President alone this large power.

I call attention to one matter in the statute, namely, “How offences on board private armed vessels shall be punished.” It is enacted, “that all offences committed by any officer or seaman on board any such vessel having letters of marque and reprisal, during the present hostilities against Great Britain, shall be tried and punished in such manner as the like offences are or may be tried and punished, when committed by any person belonging to the public ships of war of the United States.”[147]

I would ask if it is in the power of the President merely by regulation to determine how offences on board private armed vessels shall be tried and punished? I take it that Congress must deal directly with this question. I am sure that it is unwise for Congress to renounce a duty belonging to it obviously under the Constitution, and which in former times it exercised. Senators sometimes complain that great powers are assumed by the President; but, unless I misread this bill, they are about to confer on him powers large, indeed, beyond precedent. There is, in the first place, the power to declare whether, in case of war with a foreign nation, letters of marque shall be issued,—a high prerogative, in times past reserved exclusively to Congress. But, not content with this, they would confer upon him plenary powers, as legislator, with regard to everything to be done by the letter of marque, and with regard, also, to its possible prizes. As once the French monarch exclaimed, “The State, it is I!”—so, when we have conferred these powers, one after another, on the President, I think he may make a similar exclamation.

This amendment was also lost.

Mr. Sumner then moved the following substitute for the pending bill:—

“That the Secretary of the Navy be authorized to hire any vessels needed for the national service, and, if he see fit, to put them in charge of officers commissioned by the United States, and to give them in every respect the character of national ships.”

The proposition on which a vote is now asked has all that is good in the pending measure, without any of the unquestionable disadvantages. I am unwilling to trespass upon the Senate, and would hope that I am not too earnest; but the question, to my mind, is of no common character.

The Senator who presses this measure seeks to employ private enterprise in all wars, domestic or foreign: I show him how it can be done. He seeks to enlist the private marine of the country in the public service: I show him how it can be done. He seeks to contribute at this moment to the national force: I show him how it can be done. Say not that I am against the employment of private enterprise. Nor say that I would allow our private marine to rot at the wharf. Nor say that I would begrudge anything needed by the national force. To this end the Senate cannot go further than I. All that the Senator would do I would do, but in a way to avoid those embarrassments and difficulties necessarily incident to privateering, and so as to be in harmony with the civilization of our age. Nor shall it be said that I shrink from any of the responsibilities which belong to us with regard to foreign nations; but I desire to say, that among the highest responsibilities which any can recognize is that of doing nothing needlessly which shall add to existing troubles or give the country a new burden.

In conclusion, let me once more remind you that every privateer upon the ocean carries the right of search. Wherever he sails, he is authorized to overhaul neutral ships in search of contraband, or, it may be, to determine if the voyage is to break the blockade. A right so delicate and grave I would reserve to the Government, to be exercised only by national ships. I cannot err, when I insist that it shall be intrusted to those only whose position, experience, and relations with the Government give assurance that it will be exercised with wisest discretion.

If, in order to secure private enterprise and to enlist all its energies, it were necessary to have privateers, then the argument of the other side might be entitled to weight. But all that you desire can be had without any such resort, and without any drawback or disadvantage. Let the Secretary of the Navy hire private ships, wherever he can find them, and put them in commission as national ships, with the rations, pay, officers, and character of national ships. This will be simple and most effective. I am at a loss for any objection to it: I can see none.

I may be mistaken, Sir, but I speak in frankness. To my mind the question between the two propositions is too clear for argument. On one side it is irrational, barbarous, and fruitless, except of trouble. On the other side you have practical strength, and the best assurance of that prudence which is the safeguard of peace. Between the two let the Senate choose.

This amendment was also lost,—Yeas 8, Nays 28.

The bill then passed the Senate,—Yeas 27, Nays 9. March 2d, it passed the House of Representatives without a division, and was subsequently approved by the President.

Failing in Congress, Mr. Sumner renewed his opposition with President Lincoln, urging upon him the impolicy of any action under the law. He advised most strenuously that no commissions should be issued, and that the law should be allowed to remain a dead letter. The President was so much impressed by these representations that he invited Mr. Sumner to attend the next meeting of his Cabinet and make them there. When Mr. Sumner doubted the expediency of such a step, as possibly giving rise to comment, the President requested him to see the members of his Cabinet individually, which he did. No commissions were ever issued, and the attempt soon subsided.

This effort to set afloat privateers created anxiety among our friends in England. Mr. Bright wrote:—

“I hope the President will remain firm against the letters of marque, so long as peace is preserved. They will do no good, and only tend to war. I was sorry your fight against the bill was in vain.”

A letter from Mr. Bates, the intelligent American partner in the London house of the Barings, confirmed the President in his determination. Another letter from the same source concurs with Mr. Bright in condemning the project.

“I am very glad that anything I have written has had any effect in stopping the issue of letters of marque, for I am convinced that their issue would have led to a war, and would have given those who in this country wish for war an opportunity through the press to make a war popular. It would, further, have been playing into the hands of the Confederates, who are doing all they can to embarrass the relations between this country and the United States. It is the last card the Confederates have to play.”

The Act of Congress authorizing letters of marque has since expired by its own limitation.