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Bismarck, some secret pages of his history (Vol. 2 of 3)

Chapter II · (continued 2)

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June 22nd.—Under instructions from the Chief utilised in the press the main ideas of a memorandum written by Bucher on the Paris Commune, and the reasons why it was not supported in the provinces. This document, which was dated the 17th instant, was forwarded to Vienna. (...)

The following appears in the Volkszeitung to-day: “We have been requested to publish the following letter: ‘Desiring an audience of his Serene Highness Prince Bismarck, I addressed him as he was passing in the street, for the purpose of obtaining permission to present myself. Hardly had I spoken to the Prince before two detectives laid hold of me by both arms and wanted to arrest me. In spite of my protest that I was under no obligation to accompany two civilians, and moreover that I had committed no offence, I was dragged through the streets to the police station in the Taubenstrasse. I was then taken in charge of a policeman to the Molkenmarkt, where I was kept in custody for the whole night, being liberated at 11 o’clock next morning, with the remark that my arrest was doubtless due to a misunderstanding. I leave the whole affair to the judgment of the public. H. L. Back.’”

June 23rd.—Called this morning to the Chief, who showed me the above letter. He was in good humour, and while dressing he gave me the following account of the incident. “As I was leaving the Reichstag on my way home an exceptionally greasy individual, evidently a Jew, came up and said he wished to have an audience of me. I declined, but he remained at my side and kept on talking to me, I would surely not refuse a German writer such a request, as he had something of importance to communicate to me. Yes, but I do though, I replied, I never give audiences to German authors. He continued to follow me, however (with the fly-like persistence, obtrusiveness and foolhardiness of the young Jew), and while he kept on talking he pressed so close to me that he trod on one of my spurs, breaking it off. I wheeled round and was about to chastise him physically, when the two policemen took him in charge. He really was exceptionally greasy, one could have scraped the pot-house fat off him.” Wrote a paragraph on the subject for the papers.

Called again to the Minister later on, and received instructions for an article on certain pretended revelations of a M. de Vallon in the Versailles Assembly, which had been commented upon in the National Zeitung. He read through and corrected this article before it was sent off. In giving me the information, he said: “Favre has here made several erroneous statements. He gave an inaccurate account of the facts in his speech of the 19th instant, in which he referred to Vallon’s assertion that he, Favre, had told him I had been disposed at Ferrières to conclude peace on the cession of Strassburg and its environs. He declared that at that time there had been no negotiations respecting peace, though M. de Bismarck had, indeed, told him that it would be possible to negotiate on the conditions indicated by M. de Vallon in the National Assembly. Say, with reference to that point, that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had thereby given evidence of a defective memory. Or, better still, say: It is quite conceivable that all the details of several long interviews have not been retained with equal clearness by all those concerned in them. According to the reports now before us, the question of the armistice occupied the first place, as a means of preparing the way for peace through the convocation of a National Assembly; but the peace itself was also discussed. M. Favre himself says this in his report of September last to the Government of National Defence, describing the occurrences at Haute Maison. There we read: ‘After I had made known the intentions of the French Government by means of a circular, I desired to ascertain those of the Prussian Minister. It seemed to me out of the question that two nations, without first ascertaining each other’s views, should continue a war which, notwithstanding its advantages for the victor, would be a cause of great suffering. Brought about by the will of one individual, this war had no longer any raison d’être when France had again become her own mistress. I vouched for her love of peace, and at the same time for her resolve not to accept any conditions which would transform this peace into a short and threatening armistice. M. de Bismarck replied that if he were convinced of the possibility of such a peace, he would sign it immediately.’

“On this occasion M. Favre also ascertained the conditions put forward by Germany, and these were by no means restricted to the cession of Strassburg and its environs. M. Favre’s above-mentioned report goes on to say: ‘On my pressing him very strongly with respect to the conditions, he told me plainly that the security of his country imposed upon him the necessity of retaining the territory which would guarantee the same. He repeated several times: Strassburg is the key of the house. (I said our house.) I begged him to speak still more plainly. That is useless, he replied, as we cannot come to an understanding; that is a matter that can be settled later. I requested him to do so immediately. (The following is given in italics in the article.) He then said to me that the departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine and a portion of the Moselle department, with Metz, Château Salins, and Soissons (incorrect, it was Saargemund which was mentioned) were indispensable to him, and that he could not forego them.’”

About the same time, probably shortly before the above article was written, the following communiqué was prepared for the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung under instructions from the Chief, who also saw and corrected it before it was sent to the press. He struck out the portions within brackets, although they were almost literally his own words: “Reports reach us daily of bad treatment and serious prejudice to their rights to which the Germans in France, and particularly those in Paris, are subjected. Bankers dismiss German clerks who have served them long and faithfully; manufacturers announce that they will no longer employ German workpeople; even academies and institutions, centres of French learning (and, as one would wish to think, of French wisdom), indulge in anti-German demonstrations, and decline in future to elect any corresponding members from among the German citizens of the Universal Republic of Letters. All these, more or less petty expressions of bitter resentment, may be merely regarded as symptoms of a feeling which is of significance for the future, and against which we must secure ourselves. But the French, and particularly the Parisians, have gone further in the petty warfare, which they carry on in continuation of the great war now concluded. Incited by an unbridled press, they have permitted themselves to adopt towards those Germans who have returned to France, either to put their affairs in order, or to reopen business, an attitude which would be regarded by civilised nations as improper, even in time of war. They have prevented Germans from opening their shops, and have wrecked German establishments. They have prohibited other Germans from attending the Bourse, and have arrested harmless German subjects, simply because they were Germans. That is not an affair of the future, but of the immediate present, and demands immediate redress. We have concluded peace, and we honestly and sincerely desire to maintain it, but of course, on the assumption that the French people preserve this peace, which was sought for and demanded by their Government. If the offences in question are not (speedily and thoroughly) checked, and if the French Government does not protect peaceful and law-abiding Germans, we must, in the interest of German subjects, and in view of the honour of Germany, decide upon the reprisals to be exercised. We should not be surprised if, then, for every German illegally arrested and not released immediately upon representations being made, arrests of French citizens were ordered in those districts of France which we temporarily occupy. We should not consider it out of order, if the evacuation of certain departments were postponed until these passions had calmed down, and indeed, according to circumstances, these regrettable occurrences might lead to fresh action against Paris, which is the seat of the evil.”

June 24th.—Wrote the following article for Brass from materials supplied by the Chief, whose attention was called to the matter by an article in the Schlesische Zeitung, on “Napoleon and the Men of the 4th of September”: “Trochu’s attempt to exculpate himself before the bar of public opinion has failed conclusively. His speech only confirmed the fact that he had betrayed the Emperor by using, in order to bring about his fall, the forces entrusted to him. It was principally through the men on the 4th of September that he came to the head of affairs. He was chiefly responsible for the continuation of the war from that date. And in addition to his treason came his incapacity. He was constantly giving assurances that he had plans which would infallibly succeed, and yet when they were carried out not one of them was really successful. When he finally, however, with brazen impudence charges the Prussians with having supported the Commune and with complicity in the scenes of terror enacted since the outbreak of the Socialist conspiracy, it may be pointed out (1) that German policy would have incurred no reproach before Europe if it had shown a certain readiness to meet the Commune during the first weeks following the 18th of March, when it had not as yet disclosed its true nature, particularly as there appeared to be very little good will and very considerable equivocation on the other side; (2) that there has been no question of any kind of complaisance on the part of the Germans towards the Commune, to say nothing of an understanding or of support, and that, on the contrary, everything which was permissible in the circumstances was done to assist the Versailles Government in its preparations to suppress the rising, and during the fighting itself. It is therefore to be expected that the members of the French Government, who are better informed, will contradict the assertions of the General, which if not mendacious are at least utterly erroneous. We still await such a correction. If this disavowal were not made we should consider it desirable that the matter should be taken up on the German side and that those diplomatic documents should be published which show that assistance was really given and in what manner, and that this was done at the wish and request of the Versailles Government.”

June 30th.—During the last few days again read a number of interesting documents despatched and received. Tauffkirchen, the Bavarian representative at the Curia, reported from Rome on the 21st inst. that the Pope had spoken to him on the previous day of the danger by which society was threatened by the Communists. “They are,” he said, as he drove away some flies from his table, “like these insects. It is no use to kill a few, still less to drive them away. General measures must be taken to prevent their entrance and propagation.” Respecting the removal of the Italian Government to Rome, a recent despatch says that if the King proceeds thither the foreign representatives will follow him in accordance with diplomatic custom. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs were to reside there without the sovereign, it would then depend upon the requirements of business whether, and for how long, an envoy would go to Rome for purposes of personal communication. France and Austria had instructed their representatives to follow the Minister to Rome, irrespective of the circumstance whether Victor Emmanuel went there or not; in that case, however, they were to take leave of absence, leaving a substitute in charge. A despatch from Waldersee, dated the 25th instant, contains the following sentence: “It is not in the interest of the Empire that the different Federal States should maintain separate envoys abroad. We may, however, await their gradual disappearance as a work of time, and as the result of the Budget debates in the several States.” According to a report from Tauffkirchen, Prince Löwenstein-Heubach, who has gone to Rome on behalf of the Clericals, threatened Cardinal Antonelli with the consequences of any disavowal of the Centre party in the Reichstag.

July 2nd.—The Chief asked me yesterday if I had not, in accordance with his instructions, informed Brass[4] that he should cease his attacks upon the French Government. I replied: “Yes, several times, both by letter and verbally.” He then said: “That must be put a stop to. But I believe he is paid by Napoleon.” To-day he wished me to send Brass the following article, for which he gave me the ideas. “There has been much discussion of the question, whether the war indemnity imposed upon France by Germany is too high, and whether the former will be able to bear the burden of those five milliards. Some answer the question in the affirmative, some in the negative, while others remain in doubt. Now, however, we may consider the point as settled, by the programme which M. Thiers has submitted to the National Assembly, first, as regards the loan and the financial position of France, and then with respect to the future of the country in general. Undoubtedly France is obliged to exercise greater economy than she has hitherto done. She must increase the productiveness of her resources, and administer them with the utmost care. Notwithstanding this, M. Thiers has no idea whatever of reducing the army or the navy, which nevertheless offer the largest field for economies. On the contrary he desires to bring both up to the highest figure they have yet reached, and to keep them at that point, and what is more, he wishes to have the army reinforced by a reserve of 900,000 men. This clearly proves to us that the idea of France being entitled to dominate Europe has by no means been given up in Government circles at Versailles, and that now, as formerly, they hold fast to the statement in which M. Thiers during his autumn tour expressed the hope and self-confidence of the French politician: ‘L’Europe ne veut pas changer de maître.’ Indeed, now that the French Government thinks of submitting the same military Budget, and the French seem to consider that they can bear their old military burdens even under more unfavourable conditions than prevailed formerly, the indemnity demanded must be regarded rather as too low than too high. Moreover, France is nowhere endangered or threatened, and these formidable armaments can therefore only betray aggressive aspirations, the expression of which must be looked upon as a direct threat to her neighbours. On both these grounds there ceases in our opinion to be any moral obligation to show indulgence in the matter of the indemnity.”

July 5th.—This afternoon Keudell brought down from the Chief an article which appeared in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the 2nd inst., which began with the words “Der Telegraph.” The Chief had written on the margin, “This article is contrary to the instructions given. The Minister of the Interior is to be written to respecting a warning to the editorial staff, or the withdrawal of all favours. Strict daily supervision necessary.” Keudell said the Chancellor was furious with Brass, and almost believed that he was paid by Napoleon to make mischief between ourselves and Versailles. He then begged me to write the necessary letter to the Minister of the Interior.

The article of the 2nd of July was the last which I wrote for the Foreign Office from the direct personal instructions of the Chancellor. From that time forward the direct intercourse with the Chancellor, which I had hitherto enjoyed, was transferred to the new “Press Councillor,” Aegidi, who had been here for some weeks, but had not been received by the Prince until eight or ten days after his arrival, and who, even then, was not employed immediately.

I did not know at the time what was the reason of the change, and Bucher also was unable to explain it. He was afterwards of opinion that Aegidi was introduced by Keudell, who intended to leave the Foreign Office and take an appointment abroad, in order that he might be kept informed of what was going on here. It would be his business also to see that the press men should not cease to accord him that recognition which he, as Personal Councillor, Treasurer and Administrator of Pensions, was accustomed to receive from time to time, but that it should, on the contrary, continue to flow in a stronger and deeper stream. I cannot say whether the former surmise was correct. I will show later on, when I come to deal with Herr von Keudell himself, that the other point did not remain any mere suspicion. For the present I will only remark that the censer, which used to be swung before the latter in the press, was much more frequently in use after the arrival of his protégé in Berlin, and that the smoke of the incense recalled in a very suspicious way Aegidi’s own style. (...)

James Ludwig Carl Aegidi, a Protestant, son of a doctor in Freienwalde, was born in 1825. He studied law at Königsberg, Heidelberg and Berlin, and was married to a Fräulein von Senden, a cousin of Keudell’s.... A few days after Aegidi’s arrival Keudell, speaking of him to me, credited him with “exceptional scientific knowledge, relations with almost all literary circles, and the tact which was desirable for mediating between the Chief and the daily press.”

The following chapters will show the nature of those relations and this tact. Let one proof suffice for the moment. Some months after the appointment of the new Councillor the following was to be read in the Spenersche Zeitung, with which he had exceptionally intimate relations: “A Berlin correspondent of the Pester Lloyd, recalling the circumstance that the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which is regarded as a semi-official organ, received some sharply worded démentis during the summer of the present year, draws attention to the fact that for a short time past the journal in question has again come to be considered as official in the highest sense. The correspondent writes that, ‘Since Professor Aegidi, who is at the same time one of the most eminent and respected of German professors of law and a spirited publicist, has been in charge of the press department of the Foreign Office, much more attention has again been paid to the newspapers. He has taken care, in particular, to maintain a certain continuity of views in the official press. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung has again become the principal official organ, and since the 1st of December all the leading articles published under the heading “Political News of the Day,” dealing with foreign affairs, the affairs of the Empire, the relations of the Federal States to the President of the Council, as well as those on Church and State, may be considered as the direct expression of the views held by the highest officials of the Empire.’ The correspondent states he is informed, on trustworthy authority, that for the most part Professor Aegidi himself edits the ‘Political News of the Day,’ utilising for the purpose the information which he receives direct from the Chancellor.”

The Chief was beside himself at this article. Aegidi was summoned before him, and returned—as a gentleman in the Central Bureau remarked—looking quite crestfallen and red in the face. He denied that he had prompted the communication in the Pester Lloyd. We soon ascertained, however, that it had emanated from one Julius L., a writer of the lowest rank and the most unenviable reputation, who had formerly served Keudell, and was now intimately associated with Aegidi.

I ought, perhaps, to have now tendered my resignation. Certain considerations, however, prevented my doing so for some time. There was still something for me to learn, and I soon observed that I could yet do good service. It was also conceivable that my old relations with the Prince might be restored, as a man of Aegidi’s character, with his self-seeking, mercurial exuberance of zeal, and his almost Jewish vanity, would sooner or later render himself impossible. I therefore remained, and fell in with the wish of the Councillor to “enter into friendly relations with him,” so far as that was possible. Subsequently, however, when he attempted to give me instructions, as a kind of superior, I once and for all entered an energetic protest against such presumption, and declared that I could only carry out such instructions as he could assure me were the direct expression of the Chief’s desire, thus taking up a position towards him, not of subordination, but of equality. I did well in deciding to remain yet a while. I learnt a great deal more, as I still had access to the documents received and despatched, and became more and more intimate with Bucher. The hoped-for opportunities of serving the Chief at the same time as the representative of Keudell’s interests, and without his knowledge, occurred more frequently than I had expected, although my personal intercourse with the Chief was not renewed for the time being.

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