PART III. (continued 5)

8. From the right of magistracy, flows the magistratical relation, which is necessary to have a bottom, before we can build the relative duties thereon. This brings it under the fifth commandment, which is the rule of all relative duties between inferiors and superiors, requiring honour to be given to fathers, masters, husbands, &c. and to rightful magistrates, who are under such political relations, as do infer the same duties; and prohibiting not only the omission of these duties, but also the committing of contrary sins; which may be done, not only by contrary acts, as dishonouring and rebelling against fathers, magistrates, &c. but also by performing them to contrary objects, as by giving the father's due to the father's opposite, and the magistrates due to tyrants who are their opposites. Certainly this command, prescribing honour, does regulate to whom it should be given; and must be understood in a consistency with that duty and character of one that hath a mind to be an inhabitant of the Lord's "holy hill," Psal. xv. 4. "In whose eyes a vile person is contemned, but he honoureth them that fear the Lord." So that we sin against the fifth command, when we honour them that we are obliged to contemn by another command. Hence I argue, if owning or honouring of tyrants be a breach of the fifth command, then we cannot own their authority: but the former is true: therefore the latter. I prove the assumption: a honouring the vile, to whom no honour is due, and who stand under no relation of fathers as fathers, is a breach of the fifth command; but the owning of tyrants authority is a honouring the vile, to whom no honour is due, and who stand under no relation of fathers, and is yet a honouring them as fathers: therefore the owning of tyrants authority is a breach of the fifth command. The major is clear: for if the honouring of these to whom no honour is due, were not a breach of the fifth command, that precept could neither be kept at all or broken at all. It could not be kept at all; for, either it must oblige us to honour all indefinitely, as fathers, and other relations, which cannot be; or else it must leave us still in suspense and ignorance, who shall be the object of our honour; and then it can never be kept: or finally, it must astrict our honouring to such definite relations, to whom it is due; and then our transgression of that restriction shall be a breach of it. Next, if it were not so, it could not be broken at all: for if prostituting and abusing honour be not a sin, we cannot sin in the matter of honour at all; for if the abuse of honour be not a sin, then dishonour also is not a sin: for that is but an abuse of the duty, which is a sin as well as the omission of it. And what should make the taking away of honour from the proper object to be sin, and the giving it to a wrong object to be no sin? Moreover, if this command do not restrict honour to the proper object, we shall never know who is the object. How shall we know who is our father, or what we owe to him, if we may give another his due? The minor also is manifest: for if tyrants be vile, then no honour is due to them, according to that, Psal. xv. 4. and yet it is a honouring them as fathers; if they be owned as magistrates; for magistrates are in a politic sense fathers; but certain it is, that tyrants are vile, as the epithets and characters they get in scripture prove. But because, in contradiction to this, it may be said, though fathers be never so wicked, yet they are to be honoured, because they are still fathers; and though matters be never so vile and froward, yet they are to be subjected unto, 1 Pet. ii. 18-20. and so of other relations, to whom honour is due by this command; therefore though tyrants be never so vile, they are to be owned under these relations, because they are the higher powers in place of eminency, to whom the apostle Paul commands to yield subjection, Rom. xiii. and Peter to give submission and honour, 1 Pet. ii. 13, 17. Therefore it must be considered, that as the relative duty of honouring the relations to whom it is due, must not interfere with the moral duty of contemning the vile, who are not under these relations; so this general moral of contemning the vile, must not cassate the obligation of relative duties, but must be understood with a consistency therewith, without any prejudice to the duty itself. We must contemn all the vile, that are not under a relation to be honoured, and these also that are in that relation, in so far as they are vile. But now tyrants do not come under these relations at all, that are to be honoured by this command. As for the higher powers that Paul speaks of, Rom. xiii. they are not those which are higher in force, but higher in power, not in authority, but in power, not in a celsitude of prevalency, but in a pre-excellency of dignity; not in the pomp and pride of their posterity, and possession of the place, but by the virtue and value of their office, being ordained of God not to be resisted, the ministers of God for good, terrors to evil doers, to whom honour is due; those are not tyrants but magistrates. Hence it is a word of the same root which is rendered authority, or an authorized power, 1 Tim. ii. 2. and from the same word also comes that supreme, to whom Peter commands subjection and honour, 1 Pet. ii. 13. Now these he speaks of have the legal constitution of the people, being the ordinance of man, to be subjected to for the Lord's sake, and who sends other inferior magistrates for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well, who are to be honoured as kings or lawful magistrates; this cannot be said of tyrants. But more particularly, to evince that tyrants and usurpers are not to be honoured according to this command, and that it is a breach of it so to do; let us go through all these relations of superiority, that come under the obligation of this command, and we shall find tyrants and usurpers excluded out of all. First, They cannot come under the parental relation: we are indeed to esteem kings as fathers, though not properly, but by way of some analogy, because it is their office to care for the people, and to be their counsellors, and to defend them, as fathers do for children: but roaring lions and ranging bears, as wicked rulers are, Prov. xxviii. 15. cannot be fathers. But kings cannot properly be owned under this relation, far less tyrants (with whom the analogy of fathers cannot consist) there being so many notable disparities betwixt kings and fathers. 1. A father may be a father to one child; but a king cannot be a king or politic father to one only, but his correlate must be a community; a tyrant can be a father to none at all in a politic sense. 2. A father is a father by generation to all coming out of his loins; a king not so, he doth not beget them, nor doth their relation flow from that; a tyrant is a destroyer, not a pro-creator of people. 3. A father is the cause of the natural being of his children, a king only of the politic well being of his subjects; but tyrants are the cause of the ill being of both. 4. A father, once a father, as long as his children live, retains still the relation, though he turn mad and never so wicked; a king turning mad may be served as Nebuchadnezzar was, at least all will grant in some cases the subjects may shake off the king; and if in any case, it is when he turns tyrant. 5. A father's relation never ceases, whithersoever his children go; but subjects may change their relation to a king, by coming under another king in another kingdom; a tyrant will force all lovers of freedom to leave the kingdom where he domineers. 6. A father's relation never changes, he can neither change his children, nor they change their father; but a king may naturalize new subjects, and subjects may also change their sovereign. Royalists will grant a state or commonwealth may make a king, and there is great reason sometimes that a monarchy be turned into a commonwealth; but a tyrant changes those that are under him, expels the natives, brings in foreigners, and all good patriots do pant for a change of him every day. 7. A father hath no power of life and death over his children; a king hath it over his subjects according to law; a tyrant usurps it over the innocent against law. 8. A father is not a father by consent of his children; as a king is by consent of his subjects; a tyrant is neither a father with it nor without it. 9. A father is not made by the children, as a king is by his subjects, as was shewed: a tyrant is neither a natural, nor by compact, but a self created power. 10. A father is not chosen conditionally upon compact, as a king is by the free suffrages of the community; a tyrant in this differs from a king that he is not chosen, and in tyranny from a father. 11. Children wanting a father cannot choose whom they will to be their father; as subjects wanting a king may choose whom they will, and what form they please; but though they can, yet if they be rational, they will never choose a tyrant, nor a tyrannical form of government. 12. Children cannot restrict their father's power to what degrees they please; as subjects may limit their kings, at their first erection; but a tyrant, though he ought, yet he will not be limited, and if he might, he should be restrained. 13. Children cannot set bounds how long they will have their fathers to continue; subjects may condescend upon the time, in making laws how long such an one shall be their sovereign, during life, or while faultless, according as the fundamental law is made at first; tyrants ought every day to be repressed that they should not continue at all. Yet giving and not granting, that a king were to be owned under the relation of a father; though every man be bound to own and maintain his father's parental authority, yet let the case be put, that the father turns a robber, murderer, an avowed enemy to God and the country, is his person and authority in that case to be owned, to the dishonour of God, and hurt and hazard of the country? or ought he not rather to be delivered up even by the son to justice? Much more then will it follow, that a king who turns the more dangerous, because the more powerful robber, and legal murderer, and enemy to God and the country, cannot be owned seeing the relation between father and son is stronger and stricter as having another original, than can be betwixt king and subjects, and stands unremoved as long as he is father, though turning such, they ought to contribute, (in moral duty, to which their relative duty must cede) that he should no more be a father, nor no more a living man, when dead by law. Secondly, They cannot come under the herile or masterly relation, though analogically also sometimes they are stiled so, and subjects are called servants, by reason of their subjection, and because it is the office of kings to command, and subjects to obey, in this there is some analogy. But kings cannot properly be owned under this relation, as masters over either persons or goods of subjects, far less tyrants, yea kings assuming a masterly power turn tyrants. Now that the magistratical relation is not that of a master, is clear from many disparities and absurdities, whether we consider the state of hired servants or slaves. For hired servants, the difference is vast betwixt them and subjects. 1. The hired servant gets reward for his service, by compact; the subjects none, but rather gives the royal reward of tribute to the king for his service; the tyrant exacts it to maintain his tyranny. 2. The hired servant is maintained by his master; the subjects maintain the king; the tyrant robs it from them by force. 3. The hired servant bargains only for a time, and then may leave him; the subject cannot give up his covenanted allegiance, at that rate and for these reasons as the servant may his service; a tyrant will make nor keep no such bargain. 4. The hired servant must have his master's profit mainly before his eyes, and his own secondarily; but the magistrates power is primarily ordinated to the public good of the community and only consequentially to the good of himself. 5. The master hath a greater power over the hired servant, to make and give out laws to him, which if they be lawful he must obey; than the king hath over the nation, to which he is the sole lawgiver, as is shewed. 6. The hired servant's subjection is mercenary and servile; but the subject's subjection is civil, free, voluntary, liberal, and loving to a lawful king. Again for slaves, the difference between them and subjects is great. 1. Slavery, being against nature, rational people would never choose that life, if they could help it; but they gladly choose government and governors. 2. Slavery would make their condition worse than when they had no government, for liberty is always preferable; neither could people have acted rationally in setting up government, if to be free of oppression of others they had given themselves up to slavery, under a master who may do what he pleases with them. 3. All slaves are either taken in war, or bought with money, or born in the house where their parents were slaves, as Abraham and Solomon had of that sort; but subjects are neither captives, nor bought, nor born slaves.—4. Slavery is not natural, but a penal fruit of sin, and would never have been if sin had not been; but government is not so, but natural and necessary. 5. Slaves are not their master's brethren, subjects are the king's brethren, "over whom he must not lift up himself," Deut. xvii. 20. 6. Masters might purchase and sell their slaves, Abimelech took sheep and men servants and gave them unto Abraham, Gen. xx. 14. Jacob had maid-servants, and men-servants, and asses, Gen. xxx. 43. no otherwise than other goods, Solomon got to himself servants and maidens, and servants born in his house, Eccles. ii. 7. a king cannot do so with his subjects. 7. Princes have not this power to make the people slaves, neither from God, nor from the people: from God they have none, but to feed and to lead them, 2 Sam. v. 2. to rule them so as to feed them, 1 Chron. xi. 2. Psal. lxxviii, 71, 72. From the people they have no power to make slaves, they can give none such. 8. Slavery is a curse: it was Canaan's curse to be a servant of servants, Gen. ix. 25. but to have magistrates is a promised blessing, Jer. xvii. 25. 9. To be free of slavery is a blessing, as the redemption from Egypt's bondage is every where called, and the year of redemption was a jubilee of joy, so the freedom of release every seven years a great privilege, Jer. xxxiv. 9. but to be free of government is a judgment, Isa. iii. 4, 5. 'tis threatened, "Israel shall abide without a king and without a prince;" Hos. iii. 4. In the next place, they cannot be owned as masters or proprietors over the goods of the subjects; though in the case of necessity, the king may make use of all goods in common, for the good of the kingdom; for, 1. The introduction of kings cannot overturn nature's foundation; by the law of nature property was given to man, kings cannot rescind that. 2. A man had goods ere ever there was a king; a king was made only to preserve property, therefore he cannot take it away. 3. It cannot be supposed that rational people would choose a king at all, if he had power to turn a great robber to preserve them from lesser robberies and oppressions; would rational men give up themselves for a prey to one, that they might be safe from becoming a prey to others? 4. Then their case should be worse, by erecting of government, if the prince were proprietor of their goods, for they had the property themselves before. 5. Then government should not be a blessing, but a curse, and the magistrate could not be a minister for good. 6. Kingdoms then should be among the goods of fortune, which the king might sell and dispone as he pleased. 7. His place then should not be a function, but a possession. 8. People could not then, by their removes, or otherwise, change their sovereigns. 9. Then no man might dispose of his own goods without the king's consent, by buying or selling, or giving alms; nay, nor pay tribute, for they cannot do these things except they have of their own. 10. This is the very character of a tyrant, as described, 1 Sam. viii. 11. "He will take your sons," Zeph. iii. 3. "Her princes are roaring lions, her judges are evening wolves." 11. All the threatnings and rebukes of oppression condemn this, Isa. iii. 14, 15, Ezek. xlv. 9. Mic. iii. 2, 3. Ahab condemned for taking Naboth's vineyard. 12. Pharaoh had not all the land of Egypt, till he bought it, Gen. xlii. 20. So the land became Pharaoh's not otherwise. Yet giving, and not granting that he were really a master in all these respects; notwithstanding if he turn to pursue me for my life, because of my fidelity to my master and his both, and will withdraw me from the service of the supreme universal master, I may lawfully withdraw myself from his, and disown him for one, when I cannot serve two masters. Sure he cannot be master of the conscience. Thirdly, they cannot come under the conjugal relation, though there may be some proportion between that and subjection to a lawful ruler, because of the mutual covenant transacted betwixt them; but the tyrant and usurper cannot pretend to this, who refuse all covenants.

Yet hence it cannot be inferred, that because the wife may not put away her husband, or renounce him, as he may do her in the case of adultery; therefore the people cannot disown the king in the case of the violation of the royal covenant. For the king's power is not at all properly a husband's power, 1. The wife, by nature, is the weaker vessel, but the kingdom is not weaker than the king. 2. The wife is given as an help to the man; but here the man is given as an help to the common-wealth. 3. The wife cannot limit the husband's power; as subjects may limit their sovereigns. 4. The wife cannot prescribe the time of her continuing under him; as subjects may do with their sovereigns. 5. The wife cannot change her husband; as a kingdom can do their government. 6. The husband hath not power of life and death; but the sovereign hath it over malefactors. Yet giving, and not granting, his power were properly marital: if the case be put, that the man do habitually break the marriage-covenant, or take another wife, and turn also cruel and intolerable in compelling his own wife to wickedness; and put the case also, that she should not get a legal divorce procured, who can doubt but she can disown him, and leave him? For this case is excepted out of that command, 1 Cor. vii. 10. Let not the wife depart from her husband, meaning for mere difference in religion, or other lesser causes; but adultery doth annul the marriage relation. See Pool's Synopsis critic, in locum. So when a prince breaks the royal covenant and turns tyrant, or without any covenant commits a rape upon the common-wealth, that pretended relation may and must be disowned. Hence, we see, there is no relation can bring a king or ruler under the object of the duty of the fifth command, except it be that of a fiduciary patron, or trustee, and public servant: for we cannot own him properly either to be a father, or a master, or a husband. Therefore what can remain, but that he must be a fiduciary servant? Wherefore if he shall either treacherously break his trust, or presumptuously refuse to be entrusted, upon terms and conditions to secure and be accountable for, (before God and man) religion and liberty, we cannot own his usurped authority. That metaphor which the learned Buchanan uses, de jure regni, of a public and politic physician, is not a relation different from this of a fiduciary servant; when he elegantly represents him as entrusted with the preservation and restoration of the health of the politic body, and endowed with skill and experience of the laws of his craft. If then he be orderly called unto this charge, and qualified for it, and discharges his duty faithfully, he deserves, and we are obliged to give him the deference of an honoured physician; but if he abuse his calling, and not observe the rules thereof, and instead of curing, go about wilfully to kill the body he is entrusted with, he is no more to be owned for a physician: but for a murderer.

9. If we enquire further into the nature of this relation between a king, (whose authority is to be owned) and his subjects; we can own it only as it is reciprocal in respect of superiority and inferiority; that is, whereby in some respects the king is superior to the people, and in some respects the people is inferior to him. The king is superior and supreme as he is called, 1 Pet. ii. 13. In respect of formal sovereignty, and executive authority, and majestic royal dignity, resulting from the peoples devolving upon him that power, and constituting him in that relation over themselves, whereby he is higher in place and power than they, and in respect of his charge and conduct is worth ten thousands of the people, 2 Sam. xviii. 3. and there is no formally regal tribunal higher than his; and though he be lesser than the whole community, yet he is greater than any one, or all the people distributively taken; and though he be a royal vassal of the kingdom, and princely servant of the people; yet he is not their deputy, because he is really their sovereign, to whom they have made over their power of governing and protecting themselves irrevocably, except in the case of tyranny; and in acts of justice, he is not accountable to any, and does not depend on the people as a deputy.

But, on the other hand, the people is superior to the king, in respect of their fountain power of sovereignty, that remains radically and virtually in them, in that they make him their royal servant, and him rather than another, and limit him to the laws for their own good and advantage, and though they give to him a politic power for their own safety; yet they keep a natural power which they cannot retract, the power of justice to govern righteously, yet it is not so irrevocably given away to him, but that when he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, they may wrest a sword out of a mad man's hand, though it be his own sword, and he hath a just power to use it for good, but all fiduciary power abused may be repealed. They have not indeed sovereignty, or power of life and death formally; yet, in respect, they may constitute a magistrate with laws, which if they violate they must be in hazard of their lives, they have this power eminently and virtually. Hence, in respect, that the king's power is, and can be only fiducial, by way of trust reposed upon him, he is not so superior to the people, but he may and ought to be accountable to them in case of tyranny; which is evident from what is said, and now I intend to make it further appear. But, first, I form the argument thus; we can own no king that is not accountable to the people: ergo, we cannot own this king. To clear the connexion of the antecedent and consequent, I add; either he is accountable to the people, or he is not: if he be accountable to all, then he is renouncible by a part, when the community is defective as to their part, it is the interest of a part, that would, but cannot, do their duty, to give no account to such as they can get no account from for his maleversations. This is all we crave: if he be not accountable, then we cannot own him, because all kings are accountable: for these reasons, 1. The inferior is accountable to the superior; the king is inferior, the people superior: ergo, the king is accountable to the people. The proposition is plain; if the king's superiority make the people accountable to him in case of transgressing the laws; then, why should not the peoples superiority make the king accountable to them, in case of transgressing the laws? Especially, seeing the king is inferior to the laws: because the law restrains him, and from the law he hath that whereby he is king; the law is inferior to the people, because they are as it were its parent, and may make or unmake it upon occasion: and seeing the law is more powerful than the king, and the people more powerful than the law, we may see before which we may call the king to answer in judgment, Buchan. jure regni apud Scot. That the king is inferior to the people is clear on many accounts: for these things which are institute for others sake, are inferior to those for whose sake they are required or sought; a horse is inferior to them that use him for victory; a king is only a mean for the peoples good; a captain is less than the army, a king is put a captain over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Sam. x. 1. He is but the minister of God for their good, Rom. xiii. 4. Those who are before the king, and may be a people without him: let the king be considered either materially as a mortal man, he is then but a part inferior to the whole; or formally under the reduplication as a king, he is no more but a royal servant, obliged to spend his life for the people, to save them out of the hand of their enemies, 2 Sam. xix. 9: A part is inferior to the whole, the king is but a part of the kingdom: a gift is inferior to them to whom it is given, a king is but a gift given of God for the peoples good: that which is mortal, and but accidental, is inferior to that which is eternal, and cannot perish politically; a king is but mortal, and it is accidental to government that there be a succession of kings; but the people is eternal, one generation passeth away, and another generation cometh, Eccl. i. 4. especially the people of God, the portion of the Lord's inheritance, is superior to any king, and their ruin of greater moment than all the kings of the world; for, if the Lord for their sake smite great kings, and slay famous kings, as Sihon and Og, Psal. cxxxvi. 17,—20. if he give kings and famous kingdoms for their ransom, Isa. xliii. 3, 4. then his people must be so much superior than kings, by how much his justice is active to destroy the one, and his mercy to save the other. All this proves the people to be superior in dignity; and therefore, even in that respect, it is frivolous to say, the king cannot be accountable to them, because so much superior in glory and pomp; for they are superior every way in excellency; and though it were not so, yet judges may be inferior in rank considered as men, but they are superior in law over the greatest as they are judges, to whom far greater than they are accountable.

The low and mean condition of them to whom belongs the power of judgment, does not diminish its dignity; when the king then is judged by the people, the judgment is of as great dignity as if it were done by a superior king; for the judgment is the sentence of the law. 2. They are superior in power: because every constituent cause is superior to the effect, the people is the constituent cause, the king is the effect, and hath all its royalty from them, by the conveyance God hath appointed; so that they need not fetch it from heaven, God gives it by the people, by whom also his power is limited, and, if need be, diminished from what they gave his ancestors: hence, if the people constitute and limit the power they give the king, then they may call him to an account, and judge him for the abuse of it; but the first is true, as is proven above: ergo.——The major is undeniable, for sure they may judge their own creature, and call him to an account for the power they gave him, when he abuses it, though there be no tribunal formally regal above him, yet, in the case of tyranny, and violating his trust, there is a tribunal virtual eminently above him, in them that made him, and reposed that trust upon him, as is said. 3. The fountain power is superior to the power derived: the people, though they constitute a king above them, yet retain the fountain power, he only hath the derived power: certainly the people must retain more power eminently, than they could give to the king, for they gave it, and he receives it with limitations; if he turn mad or incapable, they may put curators or tutors over him; if he be taken captive, they may appoint another to exercise the power; if he die, then they may constitute another, with more or less power; so then if they give away all their power, as a slave selleth his liberty, and retain no fountain power or radical right, they could not make use of it to produce any of these acts: they set a king above them only with an executive power for their good, but the radical power remains in the people, as in an immortal spring, which they communicate by succession to this or that mortal man, in the manner and measure they think expedient; for otherwise, if they gave all their power away, what shall they reserve to make a new king, if this man die? What if the royal line surcease, there be no prophets now sent to make kings; and if they have power in these cases, why not in the case of tyranny? 4. If the king be accountable by law, for any act of tyranny done against one man, then much more is he accountable for many against the whole state: but the former is true; a private man may go to law before the ordinary judges, for wronging his inheritance, and the king is made accountable for the wrong done by him. Now, shall the laws be like spiders webs, which hold flies, but let bigger beasts pass through? Shall sentence be past for petty wrongs against a man, and none for tyrannizing over religion, laws, and liberties of the kingdom? Shall none be past against parricide or fratricide, for killing his brother, murdering the nobles, and burning cities? Shall petty thieves be hanged for stealing a sheep; and does the laws of God or man give impunity for robbing a whole country of the nearest and dearest interests they have, to crowned heads, for the fancied character of royalty, which thereby is forfeited? 5. If there be judges appointed of God independently, to give out and execute the judgment of the Lord on all offenders, without exception of the highest; then the king also must be subject to that judgment; but there are judges appointed of God independently, to give out and execute the judgment of the Lord on all offenders, without exception of the highest. Two things must be here proved; first, that in giving judgment they do not depend on the king, but are the immediate vicars of God. Secondly, that the king is not excepted from, but subject to their judgment, in case he be criminal.

First, They cannot depend upon the king, because they are more necessary than the king; and it is not left to the king's pleasure whether there be judges or not. There may be judges without a king, but there can be no king without judges, nor no justice, but confusion; no man can bear the people's burden alone, Numb. xi. 14, 17. If they depended on the king, their power would die with the king; the streams must dry up the fountain; but that cannot be, for they are not the ministers of the king, but of the kingdom, whose honour and promotion, though by the king's external call, yet comes from God, as all honour and promotion does, Psal. lxxv. 7. The king cannot make judges whom he will, by his absolute power, he must be tied to that law, Deut. i. 13. To take wise men and understanding, and known: neither can he make them during pleasure; for if these qualifications remain, there is no allowance given for their removal. They are gods, and the children of the most high, appointed to defend the poor and fatherless, as well as he, Psal. lxxxii. 3, 6. They are ordained of God for the punishment of evil doers, in which they must not be resisted, as well as he, Rom. xiii. 1, 2. By me (saith the Lord) rule—all the judges of the earth, Prov. viii. 16. To them we must be subject for conscience sake, as being the ministers of God for good; they must be obeyed for the Lord's sake, as well as the king; though they are sent of him, yet they judge not for man, but for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. hence they sit in his room, and are to act as if he were on the bench; the king cannot say, the judgment is mine, because it is the Lord's; neither can he limit their sentence (as he might, if they were nothing but his deputies) because the judgment is not his: nor are their consciences subordinate to him, but to the Lord immediately; otherwise if they were his deputies, depending on him, then they could neither be admonished, nor condemned for unjust judgment, because their sentence should neither be righteous nor unrighteous, but as the king makes it; and all directions to them were capable of this exception, do not so or so, except the king command you; crush not the poor, oppress not the fatherless, except the king command you; yea, then they could not execute any judgment, but with the king's licence, and so could not be rebuked for their not executing judgment.

Now all this is contrary to scripture, which makes the sentence of the judges undeclinable, when just, Deut. xvii. 11. The Lord's indignation is kindled, when he "looks for judgment, and behold oppression, for righteousness, and behold a cry," Isa. v. 7. Neither will it excuse the judges to say, the king would have it so; for even they that are subservient to "write grievousness, to turn aside the needy from judgment," &c. are under the wo, as well as they that prescribe it, Isa. x. 1, 2. The Lord is displeased when "judgment is turned away backward, and judgment stands afar off,"——and when there is no judgment, whatever be the cause of it, Isa. lix. 14, 15. The Lord threatens he will be "avenged on the nation," when a man is "not found to execute judgment," Jer. v. 1, 9. And promises, if they "will execute judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor," he will give them righteous magistrates, Jer. xxii. 3, 4. but if they do not, he will send desolation, ibid. He rebukes those that "turn judgment to wormwood, and leave off righteousness in the earth," Amos v. 7. He resents it, when "the law is slacked, and judgment doth not go forth" freely, without overawing or over-ruling restraint, Hab. i. 4.

Can these scriptures consist with the judges dependence on the king's pleasure, in the exercise and execution of their power? therefore, if they would avoid the Lord's displeasure, they are to give judgment, though the king should countermand it. Secondly, That the king is not excepted from their judgment, is also evident from the general commands, Gen. ix. 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed:" there is no exception of kings or dukes here: and we must not distinguish where the law distinguisheth not, Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses,—ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer which is guilty of death, but he shall be surely put to death. What should hinder then justice to be awarded upon a murdering king? Shall it be for want of witnesses? It will be easy to adduce thousands. Or, shall this be satisfaction for his life, that he is a crowned king? The law saith, there shall be no satisfaction taken. The Lord speaketh to under judges, Levit. xix. 5. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty. If kings be not among the mighty, how shall they be classed? Deut. i. 17. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment, but you shall hear the small as well as the great; you shall not be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment is God's. If then no man's face can outdare the law and judgment of God, then the king's majestic face must not do it; but as to the demerit of blood, he must be subject as well as another. It is no argument to say, the Sanhedrim did not punish David for his murder and adultery; therefore it is not lawful to punish a king for the same; a reason from not doing is not relevant. David did not punish Joab for his murder, but authorized it, as also he did Bathsheba's adultery; will that prove, that murders connived at, or commanded by the king, shall not be punished? Or that whores of state are not to be called to an account? Neither will it prove, that a murdering king should not be punished; that David was not punished, because he got both the sin pardoned, and his life granted from the Lord, saying to him by the mouth of the prophet Nathan, Thou shalt not die. But as for the demerit of that fact, he himself pronounced the sentence out of his own mouth, 2 Sam. xii. 15. "As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die." 'So every king condemned by the law, is condemned by his own mouth: for the law is the voice of the king. Why then do we so much weary ourselves concerning a judge, seeing we have the king's own confession, that is, the law?' Buchanan de jure regni.

And there needs be no other difficulty to find a tribunal for a murdering king, than to find one for a murderer; for a judgment must acknowledge but one name, viz. of the crime. If a king then be guilty of murder, he hath no more the name of a king, but of a murderer, when brought to judgment; for he is not judged for kingship, but for his murder; as when a gentleman is judged for robbery, he is not hanged, neither is he spared, because he is a gentleman, but because he is a robber. See Buchanan above. 6. If the people's representatives be superior to the king in judgment, and may execute judgment without him, and against his will, then they may also seek account of him; for if he hath no power but from them, and no power without them to act as king, (no more than the eye or hand hath power to act without the body) then his power must be inferior, fiduciary, and accountable to them; but the former is true, the peoples representatives are superior to the king in judgment, and may execute judgment without him, and against his will. In scripture we find the power of the elders and heads of the people was very great, and in many cases superior to the king; which the learned Dr. Owen demonstrates in his preliminary exercitations on the epistle to the Hebrews, and proves out of the Rabbins, that the kings of the Jews might have been called to an account, and punished for transgressing of the law. But in the scripture we find, (1.) They had a power of judgment with the supreme magistrate in matters of religion, justice and government. Hamor and Shechem would not make a covenant with Jacob's sons, without the consent of the men of the city, Gen. xxxiv. 20. David behoved to consult with the captains of thousands, and every leader, if it seemeth good to bring again the ark of God, 1 Chron. xiii. 1, 2, 3. So also Solomon could not do it without them, 1 Kings viii. 1. Ahab could not make peace with Benhadad against the consent of the people, 1 Kings xx. 8. The men of Ephraim complain that Jephthah, the supreme magistrate, had gone to war against the children of Ammon without them, and threatned to burn his house with fire, which he only excuses by the law of necessity, Judges xii. 1, 2, 3. The seventy elders are appointed of God, not to be the advisers only and helpers of Moses, but to bear a part of the burden of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased, Numb. xi. 14, 17. Moses upon his sole pleasure, had not power to restrain them in the exercise of judgment given of God.

They were not the magistrate's depending deputies, but in the act of judging, they were independent, and their consciences as immediately subjected to God as the superior magistrate, who was to add his approbative suffrage to their actings, but not his directive nor imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure, but only according to the law; he might command them to do their duty, but he could do nothing without them. (2.) They had power, not derived from the prince at all, even a power of life and death. The rebellious son was to be brought to the elders of the city, who had power to stone him, Deut. xxi. 18, 24. They had power to punish adultery with death, Deut. xxii. 21. They had power to cognosce whom to admit into, and whom to seclude from the cities of refuge: so that if the king had commanded to take the life of an innocent man, they were not to deliver him, Josh. xx. throughout. But besides the elders of cities, there were the elders and heads of the people, who had judicial power to cognosce on all criminal matters, even when Joshua was judge in Israel we find they assumed this power, to judge of that matter of the two tribes and the half, Josh. xxii. 30. And they had power to make kings, as Saul and David, as was shewed: and it must needs follow, they had power to unmake them in case of tyranny. (3.) They had power to conveen, even without the indiction of the ruler, as in that, Josh. xxii. They conveen without him; and without advice or knowledge of Samuel, the ruler, they conveen to ask a king, 1 Sam. viii. And without any head or superior, they conveen and make David king, notwithstanding of Ishbosheth's hereditary right. Without and against tyrannous Athaliah's consent, they conveen and make Joash king, and cared not for her Treason, treason, 2 Kings xi. But now the king alone challenges the prerogative power of calling and dissolving parliaments as he pleases, and condemns all meetings of estates without his warrant, which is purely tyrannical; for, in cases of necessity, by the very law of nature, they may and must conveen. The power is given to the king only by a positive law, for order's sake; but otherwise, they have an intrinsical power to assemble themselves. All the forecited commands, admonitions, and certifications, to execute judgment, must necessarily involve and imply a power to conveen, without which they could not be in a capacity for it: not only unjust judgment, but no judgment, in a time when truth is fallen in the streets, and equity cannot enter, is charged as the sin of the state; therefore they must conveen to prevent this sin, and the wrath of God for it: God hath committed the keeping of the commonwealth, not to the king's only, but also to the people's representatives and heads. And if the king have power to break up all conventions of this nature, then he hath power to hinder judgement to proceed, which the Lord commands: and this would be an excuse, when God threatens vengeance for it. We would not execute judgment, because the king forbade us. Yet many of these forementioned reproofs, threatnings, and certifications were given, in the time of tyrannous and idolatrous kings, who, no doubt, would inhibit and discharge the doing of their duty; yet we see that was no excuse, but the Lord denounces wrath for the omission. (4.) They had power to execute judgment against the will of the prince. Samuel killed Agag against Saul's will, but according to the command of God, 1 Sam. xv. 32. Against Ahab's will and mind Elijah caused kill the priests of Baal, according to God's express law, 1 Kings xviii. 40. It is true it was extraordinary, but no otherwise than it is this day; when there is no magistrate that will execute the judgment of the Lord, then they who have power to make the magistrate, may and ought to execute it, when wicked men make the law of God of none effect. So the princes of Judah had power, against the king's will, to put Jeremiah to death, which the king supposes, when he directs him what to say to them, Jer. xxxviii. 25. They had really such a power, though in Jeremiah's case it would have been wickedly perverted. See Lex Rex, q. 19, 20. (5.) They had a power to execute judgment upon the king himself, as in the case of Amaziah and Uzziah, as shall be cleared afterwards. I conclude with repeating the argument: if the king be accountable, whensover this account shall be taken, we are confident our disowning him for the present will be justified, and all will be obliged to imitate it: if he be not, then we cannot own his authority, that so presumptuously exalts himself above the people.

10. If we will further consider the nature of magistracy, it will appear what authority can conscientiously be owned, to wit, that which is power, not authorised power, not might or force; moral power, not merely natural. There is a great difference betwixt these two: natural power is common to brutes, moral power is peculiar to men; natural power is more in the subjects, because they have more strength and force; moral power is in the magistrate, they can never meet adequately in the same subject; natural power can, moral only may warrantably exercise rule; natural power is opposed to impotency and weakness, moral to illicitness or unlawfulness; natural power consists in strength, moral in righteousness; natural power may be in a rout of rogues making an uproar, moral only in the rulers; they cannot be distinguished by their acts, but by the principle from which the acts proceed; in the one from mere force, in the other from authority. The principle of natural power is its own might and will, and the end only self; moral hath its rise from positive constitution, and its end is public safety. The strength of natural power lies in the sword, whereby its might gives law; the strength of moral power is in its word, whereby reason gives law, unto which the sword is added for punishment of contraveeners: natural power takes the sword, Matth. xxvi. 52. Moral bears the sword, Rom. xiii. 4. In natural power the sword is the cause; in moral it is only the consequent of authority; in natural power the sword legitimates the sceptre; in moral the sceptre legitimates the sword: the sword of the natural is only backed with metal, the sword of the moral power is backed with God's warrant: natural power involves men in passive subjection, as a traveller is made to yield to a robber; moral power reduces to conscientious subordination. Hence the power that is only natural, not moral authority, not power, cannot be owned; but the power of a tyrant's and usurper's is only natural, not moral, authority, not power: Ergo it cannot be owned. The major cannot be denied; for it is only the moral power that is ordained of God, unto which we must be subject for conscience sake. The minor also; for the power of tyrants is not moral, because not authorized, nor warranted, or ordained of God by his preceptive ordinance, and therefore no lawful magistratical power. For the clearer understanding of this, let it be observed, there are four things required to the making of a moral or lawful power; the matter of it must be lawful, the person lawful, the title lawful, and the use lawful. 1. The matter of it, about which it is exerted, or the work to be done by it, must be lawful and warranted by God: and if it be unlawful it destroys its moral being. As the pope's power, in dispensing with divine laws, is null and no moral power; and so also the king's power, in dispensing with both divine and human laws is null. Hence that power, which is, in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by God, cannot be owned; but absolute power, which is the power of tyrants and usurpers, (and particularly of this of ours) is in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by God: Ergo—2. The person holding the power must be such as not only is capable of, but competent to the tenure of it, and to whom the holding of it is allowed; and if it be prohibited, it evacuates the morality of the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themselves the office of the priesthood, this power was prohibited to them, their power then was a nullity. As therefore a person that should not be a minister, when he usurps that office is no minister; so a person that should not be a magistrate, when he usurps that office, is no magistrate. Hence, a person that is incapable and incompetent for government cannot be owned for a governor; but the duke of York is such a person, not only not qualified as the word of God requires a magistrate to be, but by the laws of the land declared incapable of rule, because he is a papist, a murderer, an adulterer, &c. 5. There must be a moral power, a lawful title and investiture, as is shewed above; which, if it be wanting, the power is null, and the person but a scenical king, like John of Leyden. This is essentially necessary to the being of a magistrate; which only properly distinguishes him from a private man; for when a person becomes a magistrate, what is the change that is wrought in him? what new habit or endowment is produced in him? he hath no more natural power than he had before, only now he hath the moral power, right and authority to rule, legally impowering him to govern. Let it be considered, what makes a subordinate magistrate, whom we own as such; it must be only his commission from a superior power, otherwise we reject him; if one come to us of his own head, taking upon him the stile and office of a bailiff, sheriff or judge, and command our persons, demand our purses, or exact our oaths; we think we may deny him, not taking ourselves to owe him any subjection, not owning any bond of conscience to him; why? because he hath no lawful commission. Now, if we require this qualification in the subordinate, why not in the supreme? Hence, that magistrate, that cannot produce his legal investiture, cannot be owned; but the duke of York cannot produce his legal investiture, his admission to the crown upon oath and compact, and with the consent of the subjects, according to the laws of the land, as is shewed above: therefore——4. There must also be the lawful use of the power; which must be not only legal for its composure, but right for its practice; its course and process in government must be just, governing according to law, otherwise it is mere tyranny: for what is government, but the subjecting of the community to the rule of governors, for peace and order's sake, and the security of all their precious interests? and for what end was it ordained, and continued among men, but that the stronger may not domineer over the weaker? and what is anarchy, but the playing the rex of the natural power over the moral? Hence, that power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection; but the power of the king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion and liberties, giving his power and strength unto the beast, and making war with the Lamb, Rev. xvii. 13, 14. is a power contrary to law, evil and tyrannical: therefore it can tie none to subjection: wickedness by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. It is objected by some, from Rom. xiii. 1. There is no power but of God; the usurping power is a power: therefore it is of God, and consequently we owe subjection to it. Ans. 1. The original reading is not universal, but this: for there is no power if not from God: which confirms what I plead for, that we are not to own any authority, if it be not authorized by God.

The words are only relative to higher powers, in a restricted sense and at most are but indefinite, to be determined according to the matter; not all power simply, but all lawful power. 2. It is a fallacy from what is said according to a certain thing, there is no power but of God, that is no moral power, as universal negatives use to be understood, Heb. v. 4. No man taketh his honour unto himself, but he that is called of God; which is clear, must not be understood for the negation of the fact, as if no man at all doth or ever did take unto himself that honour, for Korah did it, &c. but, no man taketh it warrantably, with a moral right and God's allowance without God's call: so also the universal imperative, in that same text, must not be taken absolutely without restriction; for if every soul without exception were to be subject, there could be none left to be the higher powers; but it is understood with restriction to the relation of a subject. So here, no power but of God, to be understood with restriction to the relation of a lawful magistrate. It is also to be understood indiscriminately, in reference to the divers species, sorts and degrees of lawful power, supreme and subordinate, whether to the king as supreme, or to governors, &c. as Peter expresses it: or whether they be Christian or pagan; it cannot be meant of all universally, that may pretend to power, and may attain to prevailing potency; for then by this text, we must subject ourselves to the papacy now intended to be introduced; and indeed if we subject ourselves to this papist, the next thing he will require will be that. 3. To the minor proposition, I answer, the usurping power is a power; it is power, I grant, that it is power, or authority, I deny.

Therefore it is of God by his providence, I concede; by his ordinance, I deny. Consequently we owe subjection to it, I deny. We may be subject passively, I grant. Actively, out of conscience, I deny. But some will object, 2. Though the power be usurped, and so not morally lawful in all these respects; yet it may do good, its laws and administrations may be good. Answ. I grant all is good that ends well, and hath a good beginning. This cannot be good which hath a bad principle, good from the entire cause. Some government for constitution good, may, in some acts, be bad; but a government for constitution bad cannot, for the acts it puts forth, be good. These good acts may be good for matters but formally they are not good, as done by the usurper: they may be comparatively good, that is better so than worse; but they cannot be absolutely, and in a moral sense good: for to make a politic action good, not only the matter must be warrantable, but the call also. It may indeed induce subjects to bear and improve to the best, what cannot be remedied; but cannot oblige to own a magistratical relation.

II. The nature of the power thus discovered, let us see the nature of that relative duty, which we owe and must own as due to magistrates, and what sort of owning we must give them; which, to inquire a little into, will give light to the question. All the duty and deference the Lord requires of us, towards them whom we must own as magistrates, is comprehended in these two expressions, honour required in the fifth command, and subjection required in Rom. xiii. 1. &c. 1 Pet. ii. 13. &c. Whomsoever then we own as magistrates, we must own honour and subjection as due to them: and if so be, we cannot, upon a conscientious ground, give them honour and subjection, we cannot own them as magistrates. The least deference we can pay to magistrates is subjection, as it is required in these words; Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and, submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake. But this cannot be given to tyrants and usurpers; therefore no deference can be paid to them at all: and consequently they cannot be owned. That this subjection, which is required to the higher powers, cannot be owned to tyrants, will be apparent, if we consider, 1. The subjection required is orderly subjection to an orderly power, that we be regularly under him that is regularly above; but usurpation and tyranny is not an orderly power, orderly placed above us; therefore we cannot be orderly under it. This is gathered from the original language, where the powers to be subjected to, are ordained of God and the ordinance of God, and he that resisteth the power is counter-ordered, or contrary to his orderly duty; so the duty is to be subject. They are all words coming from one root, which signifies to order; so that subjection is to be placed in order under another relative to an orderly superiority; but, to occupy the seat of dignity unauthorized, is an ataxy, a breaking of order, and bringing the commonwealth quite out of order. Whereby it may appear, that, in relation to an arbitrary government, there can be properly no orderly subjection. 2. The thing itself must import that relative duty which the fifth command requires; not only a passive stooping endurance, or a feigned counterfeit submission, but a real active duty including obedience to lawful commands; and not only so, but support and maintenance; and that both to the acts of his administration, and to his standing and keeping his station, assisting him with all our abilities, both human and Christian; and not only as to the external acts of duties, but the inward motions of the heart, as consent, love, reverence, and honour, and all sincere fealty and allegiance.

But can a subjection of this extent be paid to a tyrant or usurper? Can we support those we are bound to suppress? Shall we love the ungodly, and help those that hate the Lord? Can we consent, that we and our posterity should be slaves? Can we honour them who are vile, and the vilest of men; how high soever they be exalted? 3. The ground of this subjection is for conscience sake, not for wrath, that is, so far and so long as one is constrained by fear, and, to avoid a greater evil, to stoop to him, but out of conscience of duty, both that of piety to God who ordained magistracy, and that of equity to him who is his minister for good, and under pain of damnation if we break this orderly subjection, Rom. xiii. 2, 5. But can it be imagined, that all this is due to a tyrant and usurper? Can it be out of conscience, because he is the Lord's minister for good? The contrary is clear, that he is the devil's drudge serving his interest: Is resistance to tyrants a damnable sin? I hope to prove it to be a duty. 4. If subjection to tyrants and usurpers will inveigle us in their snares, and involve us in their sin and judgment, then it is not to be owned to them; but the former is true; therefore the latter. In the foregoing head I drew an argument, for withdrawing from and disowning the prelatic ministers, from the hazard of partaking in their sin, and of being obnoxious to their judgment, because people are often punished for their pastor's sins; Aaron and his sons polluting themselves, would have brought wrath upon all the people, Lev. x. 6. because the teachers had transgressed against the Lord, therefore was Jacob given to the curse, and Israel to reproaches, Isa. xliii. 27, 28. and all these miseries lamented by the church, were inflicted for the sins of her prophets, and the iniquities of her priests, Lam. iv. 13. the reason was, because they owned then, followed them, countenanced them, complied with them, or connived at them, or did not hinder, or else disown them. The same argument will evince the necessity of withdrawing our subjection from, and disowning, usurping, and tyrannical rulers, when we cannot hinder their wickedness, nor give any other testimony against them, to avert the wrath of the Lord. If the defections of ministers will bring on the whole nation desolacing judgments; then much more have we reason to fear it, when both magistrates and ministers are involved in, and jointly carrying on, and caressing and encouraging each other in promoting a woful apostasy from God: when the heads of the house of Jacob and princes of the house of Israel, abhor judgment, and pervert all equity. The heads judge for reward, and the priests teach for hire, and the prophets divine for money, and yet lean upon the Lord, and say, is not the Lord among us: none evil can come upon us. Then we can expect nothing, but that Zion for their sake shall be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest, Mic. iii. 9, 11, 12. Certain it is, that subjects have smarted sore for the sins of their rulers: for Saul's sin, in breaking covenant with the Gibeonites, the land suffered three years famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1. and the wrath of the Lord could not be appeased, till seven of his sons were hanged up unto the Lord. What then shall appease the wrath of God, for the unparalleled breach of covenant with God in our days? For David's sin of numbering the people, 70,000 men died by the pestilence, 2 Sam. xxiv. 5. For Jeroboam's sin of idolatry, who made Israel to sin, the Lord threatens to give Israel up, because of the sins of Jeroboam, I Kings xiv. 16. only they escaped this judgment, who withdrew themselves and fell into Judah. For Ahab's sin of letting go a man whom the Lord had appointed to utter destruction, the Lord threatens him, thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people, 1 Kings xx. 42. Because Manasseh, king of Judah, did many abominations, therefore the Lord threatened to bring such evil upon Jerusalem and Judah, that whosoever heard it, his ears should tingle, &c. 2 Kings xxi. 11, 12. and notwithstanding of his repentance and the reformation in the days of Josiah, notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations that Manasseh had provoked him withal, 2 Kings xxiii. 26. which was accomplished by the hands of the Chaldeans, in Jehoiakim's time. Surely, at the commandment of the Lord, came this upon Judah, to remove them out of his sight, for the sins of Manasseh according to all that he did, and also for the innocent blood which he shed,——which the Lord would not pardon, 2 Kings xxiv. 3, 4. And Jeremiah further threatens, that they should be removed into all kingdoms of the earth, because of Manasseh for that which he did in Jerusalem, Jer. xv. 4. Certainly passages were recorded for our learning, Rom. xv. 4. and for our examples, to the intent we should not do as they did, 1 Cor. x. 6. and for our admonition, ver. 11. Whence we may be admonished, that it is not enough to keep ourselves free of public sins of rulers; many of those then punished, were free of all actual accession to them; but they became accessory to, and involved in the guilt of them, when they did not endeavour to hinder them, and bring them to condign punishment for them, according to the law of God, which respecteth not persons; or, at least, because they did not revolt from them, as Libnah did: there might be other provocations on the peoples part, no doubt, which the Lord did also punish by these judgments; but when the Lord specifies the sin of rulers as the particular procuring cause of the judgment; it were presumption to make it the occasion only of the Lord's punishing them: for plain it is, if these sins of rulers had not been committed, which was the ground of the threatening and execution, the judgment would have been prevented; and if the people had bestirred themselves as became them, in repressing and restraining such wickedness, they had not so smarted; and when that sin, so threatened and punished, was removed, then the judgment itself was removed or deterred. It is just and necessary, that the subjects, being jointly included with their rulers in the same bond of fidelity to God, be liable to be punished for their rebellion and apostacy, when they continue under the bond of subjection to them. But how deplorable were our condition, if we should stand obnoxious to divine judgments, for the atheism, idolatry, murders, and adulteries of our rulers, and yet be neither authorized nor capacitated to hinder it, nor permitted to withdraw ourselves from subjection to them? But it is not so; for, the Lord's making us responsible for their debt, is an impowering us either to repress their wickedness when he gives us capacity, or at least to save ourselves harmless from their crimes, by disowning them; that being the only way of standing no longer accountable for their souls.

12. It remains to consider the ends for which government was institute by God, and constitute by men; from whence I argue, that government, that destroys the ends of government, is not to be owned; but tyranny, and especially this under which we howl, destroys all the ends of government; therefore it is not to be owned. The minor I prove thus, That government, that destroys all religion and safety, destroys all the ends of government; but this popish and arbitrary absolute power, destroys religion and safety; therefore—it is evident, both from the laws of nature and revelation, that the ends of government are the glory of God, and the good of mankind. The first is the glory of God, the ultimate end of all ordinances; to which whatever is opposite, is not to be owned by them that fear him: whatever power then is destructive to religion, and is applied and employed against the glory of the universal King, and for withdrawing us from our fealty and obedience to him, is nothing but rebellion against the supreme Lord and Lawgiver, and a traiterous conspiracy against the Almighty, and therefore not to be owned: and they are enemies to religion, or strangers to it, who are not sensible this hath been the design of the present government, at least these twenty-seven years, to overturn the reformed covenanted religion, and to introduce popery. Hence, seeing a king at his best and highest elevation, is only a mean for preserving religion, and for this end only chosen of the people to be keeper of both tables of the law, he is not to be regarded, but wholly laid aside, when he not only moves without his sphere, but his motion infers the ruin of the ends of his erection, and when he employs all his power for the destruction of the cause of Christ, and advancement of antichrist, giving his power to the beast; he is so far from deserving the deference of the power ordained of God, that he is to be looked upon, and treated as a traitor to God, and stated enemy to religion and all righteousness. The second end of government is the good of the people, which is the supreme and cardinal law; the safety of the people is the supreme law. Which cannot be denied, if it be considered, 1. For this only the magistrate is appointed of God to be his minister for the people's good, Rom. xiii. 4. and they have no goodness but as they conduce to this end: for all the power they have of God is with this proviso, to promote his people's prosperity. (It were blasphemy to say, they are his authorised ministers for their destruction) to which if their conduct degenerate, they degrade themselves, and so must be disowned. He is therefore, in his institution, no more than a mean for this end; and himself cannot be either the whole or half of the end; for then he should be both the end and the mean of government; and it is contrary to God's mould to have this for his end, to multiply to himself silver and gold, or lift up himself above his brethren, Deut. xvii. 17, 20. If therefore he hath any other end than the good of the people, he cannot be owned as one of God's moulding, 2. This only is the highest pitch of good princes ambition, to postpone their own safety to the peoples safety. Moses desired, rather than the people should be destroyed, that his name should be razed out of the book of life. And David would rather the Lord's hand be on him and his father's house, than on the people, that they should be plagued, 1 Chron. xxi. 17. But he that would seek his own ambitious ends, with the destruction of the people, hath the spirit of the devil, and is to be carried towards as one possessed with that malignant spirit. 3. Originally their power is from the people, from whom all their dignity is derived, with reserve of their safety, which is not the donative of kings, nor held by concession from them, nor can it be resigned or surrendered to the disposal of kings; since God hath provided, in his universal laws, that no authority make any disposal, but for the good of the people. This cannot be forfeited by the usurpation of monarchs, but being always fixed in the essential laws of government, they may reclaim and recover it when they please. Since then we cannot alienate our safety, we cannot own that authority which is inconsistent with it. 4. The attaining this end was the main ground and motive of peoples deliberating to constitute a government, and to choose such a form, because they thought it most conducible for their good; and to admit such persons as fittest instuments for compassing this end; and to establish such a conveyance, as they thought most contributive for this end. When therefore princes cease to be what they could be constitute for, they cease to have an authority to be owned; but ceasing to answer these ends of government, they cease to be what they could be constitute for. 5. For no other end were magistrates limited with conditions, but to bound them, that they might do nothing against the peoples good and safety.

Whosoever then breaking through all legal limitations, shall become injurious to the community, lists himself in the number of enemies, and is only to be looked upon as such. 6. For this end all laws are ratified or rescinded, as they conduce to this end, which is the soul and reason of the law: then it is but reason, that the law establishing such a king, which proves an enemy to this, should be rescinded also. 7. Contrary to this end no law can be of force; if then, either law or king be prejudicial to the realm, they are to be abolished. 8. For this end, in cases of necessity, kings are allowed sometimes to neglect the letter of the laws, or private interests, for the safety of the community: but if they neglect the public safety, and make laws for their own interests, they are no more trustees but traitors. 9. If it were not for this end, it were more eligible to live in desarts, than to enter into societies. When therefore a ruler, in direct opposition to the ends of government, seeks the ruin, not only of religion, but also of the peoples safety, he must certainly forfeit his right to reign. And what a vast, as well as innocent number, have, for religion, and their adherence to their fundamental rights, been ruined, rooted out of their families possessions, oppressed, persecuted, murdered, and destroyed by this and the deceased tyrant, all Scotland can tell, and all Europe hath heard. If ever the ends of government were perverted and subverted in any place. Britain is the stage where this tragedy has been acted.

13. I may argue from the covenant, that to own this authority is contrary to all the articles thereof. 1. That authority which overturns the reformation of religion in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, which we are sworn to preserve against the common enemies thereof, in the first article, cannot be owned; but the present pretended authority overturned (and continues more to overturn) the reformation of religion, &c. therefore it cannot be owned. For against what common enemy must we preserve it, if not against him that is the chief enemy thereof? And how can we own that authority, that is wholly employed and applied for the destruction of religion? 2. If we are obliged to extirpate popery, without respect of persons, lest we partake in other mens sins; then we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons; and consequently the head of them. (For how otherwise can popery be extirpated? Or how otherwise can we cleanse the land of their sins?) But in the 2d article we are obliged to extirpate popery without respect of persons, lest we partake in others mens sins: therefore we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons, and consequently the crowned Jesuit, and therefore cannot own him: for how can we own him, whom we are bound to exstirpate? 3. If we be engaged to preserve the rights and liberties of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms, then we cannot own his authority, when it is inconsistent with, opposite to, and destructive of all these precious interests, as now it is with a witness. But in the 3d article we are engaged to preserve the rights and privileges of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms: therefore all allegiance that we can own to any man, must stand perpetually thus qualified, in defence of religion and liberty; that is, so far as it is not contrary to religion and liberty, and no further; for if it be destructive of these, it is null. If we should then own this man, with this restricted allegiance, and apply into his own authority (as we must apply it to all authority that we can own) it were to mock God and the world, and own contradictions: for can we maintain the destroyer of religion, in defence of religion, and the destroyer of all our rights and liberties, and all our legal securities for them, in the preservation of these rights and liberties? That were pure nonsense. 4. If we be obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c. be brought to condign punishment, then we cannot own the authority of the head of these incendiaries and malignant enemies; but in the fourth article, we are obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c. be brought to condign punishment: therefore——The connexion of the major cannot well be doubted, for is it imaginable, that the head of that unhallowed party, the great malignant enemy, who is the spring, and gives life unto all these abominations shall be exempted from punishment, or owned for a sacred majesty? shall we be obliged to discover, and bring to justice the little petty malignants, and this implacably stated enemy to Christ escape with a crown on his head? Nay, we are by this obliged, if ever we be in case, to bring these stated enemies to God and the country to condign punishment, from the highest to the lowest: and this we are to do, as we would have the anger of the Lord turned away from us, which cannot be, without hanging up their heads before the Lord against the sun, as was done in the matter of Peor, Numb. xxv. 4. For hath not he and his accomplices made the kingdom a curse? and we, with our own consent, have made ourselves obnoxious to it, if we do not procure, each in our capacities, and pursue these traitors and rebels, that the judgment of the Lord be executed upon the accursed. 5. No wilful opposer of peace and union between the kingdoms is to be owned; but, according to the 5th article, we are obliged to endeavour, that justice be done upon him: but this man and his brother have been wilful opposers of peace and union between the kingdoms, all true peace and union, except an union in confederacy against the Lord; for they have taken peace from both the kingdoms, and destroyed and annulled that which was the bond of their union, to wit, the solemn league and covenant. 6. If we are obliged to assist and defend all those that enter into this league and covenant, in the maintaining and pursuing thereof, and never to suffer ourselves to be divided, to make defection to the contrary part, &c. According to the 6th article then, we must not owt the butcher of our covenanted brethren, who hath imbrued his hands in their blood, in maintaining and pursuing thereof, and would have us withdrawn into so detestable a defection; for we cannot both own him as he requires to be owned, and as God requires every magistrate to be owned (so as not to resist him under pain of damnation, Rom. xiii. 2.) and assist our brethren too in refilling his murders: and our owning of him were a dividing of ourselves from our brethren that oppose him, into a defection to the contrary part, whereof he is head and patron. Lastly, In the conclusion, we are obliged to be humbled for the sins of these kingdoms, and to amend in a real reformation; whereof this is one to be mourned for, that after the Lord had delivered us from the yoke of this tyrannical family, we again joined in amity with the people of these abominations, and took these serpents into our bosom again, which hath bit us so sore, and wherewith the Lord hath scourged us severely. And if it was our sin to engage with them at first, then it is our sin to continue under their subjection; and is not consistent with that repentance, that the Lord's contendings call for, to continue owning that power which was our sin to own at first.

III. In the third place, I promised to confirm my thesis from more express scripture arguments. Therefore I shall endeavour to gather them as briefly as may be. 1. From scripture inferences, nearly and natively consequential. 2. From scripture assertions. 3. From scripture precepts. 4. From scripture practices. 5. From scripture promises. 6. From scripture threatnings. 7. From scripture prayers.

First, I shall offer some arguments deduced by way of immediate inference, from the grounds laid before us in scripture about government: wherein I shall confine my self to these particulars.

1. Let us consider the characters of a magistrate, laid down in scripture; and we may infer, if tyrants and usurpers are not capable of these characters, then they cannot be owned for magistrates. For if they be not magistrates, they cannot be owned as magistrates; but if they be not capable of the characters of magistrates, they are not magistrates: Ergo, if they be not capable of the characters of magistrates, they cannot be owned as magistrates. To find out the characters of magistrates, we need seek no further than that full place, Rom. xiii. Which usually is made a magazine of objections against this truth; but I trust to find store of arguments for it from thence, not repeating many that have been already deduced therefrom. We find, in this place, many characters of a magistrate, that are all incompatible with a tyrant or usurper. 1. He is the higher power, verse 1. Authorities supereminent, signifying such a pre-excellency as draweth towards it a recognition of honour; but this is not competent to tyrants and usurpers; for they are the vilest of men, let them be never so high exalted, Psal. xii. last verse, and if they be vile then they are to be contemned, Psal. xv. 4. and no more to be regarded than Herod was by Christ, when he called him a fox, Luke xiii. 32. But more particularly, let us consider what is the highness, or dignity of magistrates, set forth in scripture. They are stiled gods, not to be reviled, Exod. xxii. 28. among whom God judgeth, Psal. lxxxii. 1. so called, because the word of God came unto them, John x. 35. But tyrants are rather devils, as one of them is called Lucifer, Isa. xiv. 12. and they that persecute and imprison the people of God, because actuated by the devil, and acting for him, do bear his name, Rev. ii. 10. They are devils that cast the Lord's witnesses into prison. The magistrate's judgment is God's judgment, Deut. i. 17. because it is not for man, but for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. and therefore Solomon is said to have sat on the throne of the Lord, 1 Chron. xxix. 23. But it were blasphemy to say, That tyrants judgment, usurping the place without his warrant, and giving forth judgment against his laws, and cause, and people, is the Lord's judgment, or for him, or that they sit on the throne of the Lord. A throne of iniquity is not the throne of the Lord, for he hath no fellowship with it; the tyrant's throne is a throne of iniquity, Psal. xciv. 20. Magistrates are truly to be subjected to and obeyed, as principalities and powers, Tit. iii. 1. it is a sin to speak evil of them, verse 2. for it is presumption to despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities, 2 Pet. ii. 10. Jude 8. But tyrants are very catechrestically and abusively principalities and powers, no otherwise then the devils are so termed, Eph. vi. 12. and there is no argument to own or obey the one more than the other: for if all principalities and powers are to be subjected to and owned, then also the devil must, who gets the same title. To speak truth of tyrants indignities, cannot be a speaking evil of dignities; for truth is no evil, nor is tyranny a dignity. Hence they that are not capable of the dignity of rulers, as these places prove: Ergo——Against this it is objected. That Paul did apply this character to the tyrannical high priest Ananias, whom, after he had objurated for manifest injustice, he honours with that apology, that he wist not that he was the high priest, for it is written, thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people, Acts xxiii. 5. Ans. Though all should be granted that is in this objection, yet our argument would not be enervated: for grant we should not speak evil of tyrants, that does not evince that we should hold them us rulers; for we should bless our persecutors, Rom. x. 14. and speak evil of no man, Tit. iii. 2. that does not say, We should hold every man, or our persecutors, to be rulers. The meaning must be, he knew not that he was the high-priest; that is, he did not acknowledge him to be either high priest or ruler, he could acknowledge or observe nothing like one of that character in him: for as the high-priest's office was now null and ceased, so this Ananias was only an usurper of the office, in place of Ismael and Joseph, who had purchased it by money: and Paul had learned from his master Gamaliel, Tit. Talmud. of the Sanhedrim. That a judge who hath given money for purchasing this honour, is neither a judge, nor to be honoured as such, but to be held in place of an ass. And it was common among the Jews to say, If such be gods, they are silver gods, not to be honoured, as is quoted by Pool's synopsis criticorum, &c. on the same place. And that this must be the sense of it is plain; for he could not be ignorant that he was there in place of a judge, being called before him, and smitten by him authoritatively, whom therefore he did threaten with the judgment of God; it were wicked to think, that he would retract that threatning which he pronounced by the Spirit of God. And therefore this place confirms my thesis: if a tyrannical judge, acting contrary to law, is not to be known or acknowledged to be a ruler, but upbraided as a whited wall; then a tyrant is not to be known or acknowledged as such; but the former is true, from this place: therefore also the latter. Paul knew well enough he was a judge, and knew well enough what was his duty to a judge, that he should not be reviled; but he would not acknowledge this priest to be a judge, or retract his threatning against him.

2. He is of God, and ordained of God; I proved before, tyrants are not capable of this; yea, it were blasphemy to say, They are authorized, or ordained of God, by his preceptive will. Hence, take only this argument. All rulers that we must own are ordained of God, do reign, and are set up by God, Prov. viii, 15. (for that and this place are parallel) but tyrants do not reign, nor are set up by God, Hos. viii. 4. They are set up (saith the Lord) but not by me: Ergo, we cannot own them to be ordained of God. 3. Whosoever resisteth this power ordained of God, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist, shall receive to themselves damnation, verse 2. This cannot be owned of a tyrant, that it is a damnable sin to resist him, for it is duty to resist, and also repress him, as is proven already, and shall be afterwards. Hence, whatsoever authority we own subjection to, we must not resist it; but we cannot own that we must not resist this authority: therefore we cannot own it at all. Again, That cannot be the power not to be resisted, which is acquired and improved by resisting the ordinance or God; but the power of usurpers and tyrants is acquired and improved by resisting the ordinance of God: Ergo, their power cannot be the power not to be resisted. The major is manifest; for when the apostle says, The resisting of the power brings damnation to the resister, certainly that resistance cannot purchase dominion instead of damnation: and if he that resists in a lesser degree, be under the doom of damnation; then certainly he that does it in a greater degree, so as to complete it, in putting himself in place of that power which he resisted, cannot be free. The minor is also undeniable; for, if usurpers acquire their power without resistance forcible and sensible, it is because they that defend the power invaded, are wanting in their duty; but however morally the tyrant or usurper is always, or in contrary order to a lawful power. 4. Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil, and they that do that which is good, shall have praise of the same, verse 3. This is the character and duty of righteous magistrates, though it be not always their administration; but an usurper and tyrant is not capable or susceptible of this character; but, on the contrary, is, and must be a terror to good works, and a praise to the evil: for he must be a terror to them that would secure their rights and liberties in opposition to his encroachments, which is a good work; and he must be a tutor, patron, and protector of such, as encourage and maintain him in his usurpation and tyranny, which is an evil work: and if he were a terror to the evil, then he would be a terror to himself and all his accomplices, which he cannot be. Therefore, that power which is not capable of the duties of magistrates, cannot be owned; but the power of tyrants and usurpers is such: Ergo—We find in scripture the best commentary on this character, where the duties of a magistrate are described; they must justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked, Deut. xxvii. 1. They must, as Job did, deliver the poor that cry, and put on righteousness as a clothing,——and be eyes to the blind, and feet to the lame, and a father to the poor——and break the jaws of the wicked, Job xxix. 12, 17. Their throne must be established by righteousness, Prov. xvi. 12. A king sitting on the throne of judgment must scatter away all evil with his eyes——then mercy and truth will preserve him, and his throne is upholden by mercy, Prov. xx. 8, 28. But tyrants have a quite contrary character; the throne of iniquity frames mischief by a law, and condemns the innocent blood, Psal. xciv. 20, 21. They judge not the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come unto them, Isa. i. 23. They build their house by unrighteousness, and their chambers by wrong, and use their neighbours service without wages, Jer. xxii. 13. They oppress the poor, and crush the needy, Amos iv. 1. They turn judgment to gall, and the fruit of righteousness to hemlock, and say, have we not taken horns to us by our own strength, Amos vi. 12, 13. These contrary characters cannot consist together. 5. He is the minister of God for good, verse 4. not by providential commission, as Nebuchadnezzar was, and tyrants may be eventually, by the Lord making all things turn about for the good of the church; but he hath a moral commission from God, and is entrusted by the people, to procure their public and political good at least.

Now, then tyranny and usurpation, are together inconsistible; for if tyrants and usurpers were ministers for good, then they would restore the public and personal rights, and rectify all wrongs done by them; but then they must surrender their authority, and resign it, or else all rights cannot be restored, nor wrongs rectified. Hence, these that cannot be owned as magistrates of God for good, cannot be owned as magistrates; but tyrants and usurpers, (and in particular this man) are such as cannot be owned as ministers of God for good: Ergo——Again, if magistracy be always a blessing, and tyranny and usurpation always a curse, then they cannot be owned to be the same thing, and the one cannot be owned to be the other; but magistracy, or the rightful magistrate, is always a blessing; tyranny and usurpation, or the tyrant and usurper, always a curse: Ergo——That the former is true, these scriptures prove it. God provides him for the benefit of his people, 1 Sam. xvi. 1. A just ruler is compared to the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, even a morning without clouds, 2 Sam. xxiii. 4. So the Lord exalted David's kingdom, for his people Israel's sake, 2 Sam. v. 12. Because the Lord loved Israel for ever, therefore made he Solomon king, to do judgment and justice, 1 Kings x. 9. When the righteous are in authority the people rejoice——The king by judgment stablished the land,——Prov. xxix. 2, 4. The Lord promises magistrates as a special blessing, Isa. i. 26. Jer. xvii. 25. And therefore their continuance is to be prayed for, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty, 1 Tim. ii. 2. And they must needs be a blessing, because to have no ruler is a misery: for when Israel had no king, every man did that which was right in his own eyes, Judges xvii. 6. And the Lord threatens it as a curse to take away the stay and the staff——the mighty man, and the man of war, the judge and the prophet, &c. Isa. iii. 1, 2. &c. And that the children of Israel shall abide many days without a king, and without a prince, Hos. ii. 4. But on the other hand, tyrants and usurpers are always a curse, and given as such: it is threatened among the curses of the covenant, that the stranger shall get up above Israel very high——and that they shall serve their enemies, which the Lord shall send against them——and he shall put a yoke of iron upon their neck, until he hath destroyed them, Deut. xxviii. 43, 48. As a roaring lion and a ranging bear, so is a wicked ruler over the poor people, Prov. xxviii. 15. and therefore, when the wicked beareth rule the people mourn, Prov. xxix. 2. The Lord threatens it as a curse, that he will give children to be their princes, and babes shall rule over them, Isa. iii. 4. And if unqualified rulers be a curse, much more tyrants. They are the rod of his anger, and the staff in their hand is his indignation, his axe, and sawe, and rod, Isa. x. 5, 15. It is one thing to call a man God's instrument, his rod, axe, sword, or hammer; another thing to call him God's minister; there is a wide difference betwixt the instruments of God's providence, and the ministers of his ordinance; those fulfil his promises only, these do his precepts. Such kings are given in the Lord's anger, Hos. xiii. 11. therefore they cannot be owned to be ministers of God for good. 6. He beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, verse 4. The apostle doth not say, He that beareth the sword is the ruler, but he is the ruler that beareth the sword. This is not every sword, for there is the sword of an enemy, the sword of a robber, the sword of a common traveller; but this as a faculty of political rule, and authoritative judgment. It is not said, He takes the sword (as the Lord expresses the usurpation of that power, Matth. xxvi. 52.) but he beareth the sword, hath it delivered him into his hand by God, by God's warrant and allowance, not in vain; to no end or without reason, or without a commission, as Paraeus upon the place expounds it. He is a revenger to execute wrath, not by private revenge, for that is condemned by Paul before, Rom. xi. 19. not by providential recompense, for when a private person so revengeth, it is the providential repayment of God; but as God's minister, by him authorized, commissionated, and warranted to this work. Now this cannot agree with a tyrant or usurper, whose sword only legitimates his sceptre, and not his sceptre his sword, who takes the sword rather than bears, and uses it without reason or warrant from God, in the execution of his lustful rage upon him that doth well, and hath no right to it from God. Hence, he that beareth the sword no other way but as it may be said of a murderer, cannot be a magistrate bearing the sword; but a tyrant and usurper beareth the sword no other way but as it may be said of a murderer: Ergo.——So much for the characters of a magistrate, which are every way inapplicable to tyrants and usurpers, and as inapplicable to this of ours as to any in the world.