PART III. (continued 4)

Then was it that we may conceive, as Buchanan says, de jure regni apud Scot. 'The time was when men dwelt in cottages and caves, and as strangers did wander to and fro without laws, and such as could converse together of the same language, assembled together as their humours did lead them or as some common utility did allure them, a certain instinct of nature did oblige them to desire converse and society.' But this confusion of languages, and communion of language, in several divided parcels, could not incorporate these several parties into communities; that behoved to be the effect of some other cause: and what should that be, but the joint will, consent and agreement of the severally languaged? It could not be by consanguinity; for there is no direction from nature for a confinement of that into such and such degrees, to make out the bonds of a common-wealth, or possibility of knowing all within such degrees; besides all within these degrees might not be of the same language. Now, the scripture says, they "were divided every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations," Gen. x. 5. Next, it could not be by cohabitation: for how that must go to be the boundaries of a common-wealth, inclusively, or exclusively, is not defined by nature, nor can it be otherwise determined, than by human choice. Then, it could not be by mens belonging to such a sovereign: for, after that division and confusion, they could not all be under one sovereign, nor under the same that they were subject to before; and a sovereign cannot be before the aggregation of the subjects whereof he is head, they must first be a commonwealth before they can belong to it. Again, it cannot be founded upon the right of fatherhood: for, in that scattering, such a right could not be uninterruptedly preserved: and then Noah should also have been the universal magistrate, which he could not be in these multiplied secessions. And further, if it be refounded on the right of fatherhood, either every company had one common father over all, or every father made a commonwealth of his own children: the latter cannot be said, for that would multiply commonwealths in infinitum: neither can the first be said; for, if they had one common father, either this behoved to be the natural father of all the company, which none can think was so happily ordered by Babel's confusion: or else the eldest in age, and so he might be incapable for government, and the law of nature does not direct that the government should alway be astricted to the eldest of the community: or else, finally, he behoved to be their political father, by consent. For, before this consent, they were unengaged as to common order of government; none of the community having any legal claim to sovereignty more than the rest. When therefore they were forced to conclude upon association, for their mutual preservation, they must be thought to act rationally, and not to make their condition worse, but rather better by that conclusion; and if they found it worse, to resume their radical right which they had conferred upon men subject to law, not to tyrannize over them: and in this case, certainly they had the power of choosing what kind of government suited most to their advantage, and would best preserve their liberties, and how far this should be extended, and who should be affirmed into this combination; still with a reservation of the privilege to their own safety, if their associates should not do their duty: and so they might also reserve to themselves a liberty to alter the form, when they found it productive of more prejudice than advantage, and never to leave their condition remediless; and to pitch upon this way of succession, and not another, the way of free election of every successor, or of definite election limited to one line, or to the nearest in line; and e contra, with a reserve still of their primeve privileges, to secure themselves from the inconveniences of that determination, or to change it; and to make choices of such a family and line, and not another, and whether the eldest always of that family, or the fittest is to be chosen; and however it be, yet still by the peoples consent: and in all this to have respect to some good, great and necessary ends, which, if they should be disappointed of, and find these means useless or destructive to, they were to be loosed from their obligation to use or to own them. See Jus populi vindicat. chap. 5. p. 80, &c. 2. If we consider how nature determines the peoples interest in the constitution of governors: whence comes it that this man, and not that man, this race and family, and not that, is invested with that title? It will be found there is no title on earth now to the crowns, to families, to persons, but the peoples suffrage: for the institution of magistracy in general does not make James Stewart a king, no more than John Chamberlain: neither do qualifications make one, otherwise there might be many better than is this day extant; for there are many men better qualified: and there is no prophetical or immediate callings to kingdoms now: and as for conquest without consent, and having no more for a title, it is no better than royal Latrociny.

It is certain, God would not command us to obey kings, and leave us in the dark, that we should not know him that hath a real call to it. And if he have not the peoples call, where shall we find another? It remains therefore they must have it from the people, who have it to give radically and virtually, having a power to preserve themselves, and to put it in the hands of one or more rulers, that they may preserve themselves by them. All men are born alike as to civil power (no man being born with a crown on his head) and yet men united in society may give it to this man, and not to that man; therefore they must have it virtually, for they cannot give what they have not. And as cities have power to choose their magistrates, so many cities have power to create an universal ruler over them all. The people also have power to limit the magistrates power with conditions; so that the present ruler shall not have so much prerogative as his predecessor, as royalists cannot deny, therefore they must have given that power which they can limit. See Lex Rex, quest. 4. p. 10. &c. 2dly, The scripture also gives light in this particular. 1. In giving directions and rules about their orderly calling their governors, impowering them to "take wise men, and understanding, and known among their tribes, to be made rulers," Deut. i. 13. "To make judges and officers in all their gates," Deut. xvi. 18. "To set one among their brethren king over them, and not a stranger," Deut. xvii. 15. To what purpose are these rules given them, if they had no interest to choose their magistrates? Would God command them to set a king over them, if they had not power to do it? And to set such a man over them, and not such an one, if they had no influence in making one at all? And accordingly that wise statist says very well, 2 Sam. xvi. 18. Hushai to Absalom, nay, but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide. Which will also hold in the negative, whom the Lord and the people, and all the men of the kingdom do not choose, his we will not be, nor with him will we abide. 2. The scripture expressly attributeth the making of kings to the people. All the people of Judah took Azariah, and made him king, instead of his father Amaziah, whom they had executed, 2 Kings xiv. 21. They came with a perfect heart to make David king in Hebron, 1 Chron. xii. 38. So they made Joash king, 2 Chron. xxiii. 11. 3. Even these that were particularly designed of God, and chosen to be rulers, yet were not formally invested with power, before the people conferred it upon them. Gideon was called of God to it, but was not judge, till the people said, Rule thou over us, both thou and thy son, giving him an hereditary right for his children, Judg. viii. 12. Saul was appointed to be king, and therefore Samuel honoured him, because he was marked out of God to be king, 1 Sam. ix. 24. and anointed him with oil, 1 Sam. x. 1. after which he was gifted and qualified for government. God gave him another heart, vers. 9. yet all this did not make him king, till the people met for his inauguration, vers. 17. &c. and crowned him, and made him king in Gilgal, 1 Sam. xi. last verse. David was anointed by Samuel, and yet was a persecuted fugitive for several years, and never acknowledged formally king, till the men of Judah came and anointed him, 2 Sam. ii. 4. for if he had been king before, then there were two kings in Israel at one time, and David failed of his royal duty, in not punishing the murderer Saul; whereas himself says, he would not touch the Lord's anointed. Therefore the people made all kings, and that by choice and consent, without which they were no kings. Hence I argue, if the consent and choice of the people be so essentially necessary to the making of kings, then they who set up themselves against the consent of the body of the land, and without the choice of any, must be usurpers, not to be acknowledged for lawful kings; but the former is true, as is proven above: therefore.——Now plain it is, that this duke set up himself against the consent of the body, being excluded from the government by the representatives of England, and generally hated of all; who disdaining to wait upon the formal choice of any, but after he had paved his passage to the throne upon his brother's blood, did usurp the title without all law.

5. The second thing necessary for the legal constitution of a king by the people, is their compact with him: which must either be express or tacit, explicit or implicit. Two things are here to be proven, that will furnish an argument for disowning both the brothers. First, that there must be a conditional reciprocally obliging covenant between the sovereign and the subjects, without which there is no relation to be owned. Secondly, that when this compact is broken in all or its chiefest conditions by the sovereign, the peoples obligation ceases. The first I shall set down, in the words of a famous author, our renowned countryman Buchanan, in his dialogue 'de jure regni apud scotos. There is then (or there ought to be) a mutual compact between the king and his subjects', &c. That this is indispensibly necessary and essential to make up the relation of sovereign and subjects, may be proved both from the light of nature and revelation.

First, It may appear from the light of natural reason. 1. From the rise of government, and the interest people have in erecting it by consent and choice (as is shewed above) if a king cannot be without the peoples making, then, all the power he hath must either be by compact or gift: if by compact, then we have what we proposed: and if by gift: then if abused, they may recal it; or if they cannot recover it, yet they may and ought to hold their hand, and give him no more that they may retain, that is, no more honour or respect, which is in the honourer before the honoured get it. Can it be imagined, that a people acting rationally, would give a power absolutely, without restrictions, to destroy all their own rights? Could they suppose this boundless and lawless creature, left at liberty to tyrannize, would be a fit mean to procure the ends of government? for this were to set up a rampant tyrant to rule as he listeth, which would make their condition a great deal worse than if they had no ruler at all, for then they might have more liberty to see to their safety. See jus populi, chap. 9. pag. 96, 97. 2. This will be clear from the nature of that authority, which only a sovereign can have over his subjects; which, whatever be the nature of it, it cannot be absolute, that is against scripture, nature, and common sense, as shall be proven at more length.

That is to set up a tyrant, one who is free from all conditions, a roaring lion and a ranging bear to destroy all if he pleases. It must be granted by all, that the sovereign authority is only fiduciary, entrusted by God and the people with a great charge: a great pledge is impawned and committed to the care and custody of the magistrate, which he must take special care of, and not abuse, or waste, or alienate, or sell: (for in that case, royalists themselves grant he may be deposed.) He is by office a patron of the subjects liberties, and keeper of the law both of God and man, the keeper of both tables. Sure, he hath no power over the laws of God, but a ministerial power, he may not stop and disable them as he pleases; of the same nature is it, over all other parts of his charge. He is rather a tutor, than an inheritor and proprietor of the commonwealth, and may not do what his pupil's interest, what he pleases. In a word, the nature and whole significancy of his power lies in this, that he is the nation's public servant, both objectively in that he is only for the good of the people, and representatively in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their power to do royal service. The scripture teaches this, in giving him the titles of service, as watchmen, &c. allowing him royal wages for his royal work, Rom. xiii. he is God's minister attending continually on this thing.

There is his work, for this cause pay you tribute also. There is his wages and maintainance. He is called so in that transaction with Rehoboam; the old men advised him to be a servant unto the people, then they should be his servants, 1 Kings xii. 7. There was a conditional bargain proposed: as to be a servant, or tutor, or guardian upon trust, always implies conditions and accountableness to them that entrust them. 3. It must needs be so, otherwise great absurdities would follow. Here would be a voluntary contracted relation, obliging us to relative duties, to a man that owed none correlative to us, and yet one whom we set over us. It were strange, if there were no condition here; and no other voluntarily suscepted relations can be without this, as between man and wife, master and servant, &c. This would give him the disposal of us and ours, as if both we and what we have were his own, as a man's goods are, against which he does not sin whatever he doth with them. So this would make a king that could not sin against us; being no ways obliged to us, for he can no otherwise be obliged to us, but upon covenant conditions; he may be obliged and bound in duty to God otherwise, but he cannot be bound to us otherwise: and if he be not bound, then he may do what he will, he can do no wrong to us to whom he is noways bound. This also is point blank against the law of God, which is the second way to prove it, by the light of revelation or scripture. 1. In the very directions about making and setting up of kings, the Lord shews what conditions shall be required of them, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. and in all directions for obeying them, the qualifications they should have are rehearsed, as Rom. xii. 3, 4. Therefore none are to be set up but on these conditions, and none are to be obeyed but such as have these qualifications. 2. In his promises of the succession of kings, he secures their continuation only conditionally, to establish the kingdom, if they be constant to do his commandments and judgments, 1 Chron. xxviii. 7. There shall not fail a man to sit upon the throne, yet so that they take heed to their way to walk in God's law, as David did, 2 Chron. vi. 16.

Now he was not otherwise to perform these promises, but by the action and suffrage of the people setting him up, (which he had appointed to be the way of calling kings to thrones,) if therefore the Lord's promise be conditional, the people's actions also behoved to be suspended upon the same conditions. 3. We have many express covenants between rulers and subjects in scripture. Jephthah was fetched from the land of Tob, and made the head of the Gileadites by an explicit mutual stipulation, wherein the Lord was invocated as a witness, Judg. xi. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11. So all the elders of Israel came to make David king; and king David made a league with them in Hebron before the Lord, and then they anointed him over Israel, 2 Sam. v. 3. he made there a covenant with them before the Lord, 1 Chron. xi. 3.

He was no king before this covenant, and so it was a pactional oath between him and the kingdom, upon terms according to the law, Deut. xvii. He was only a king in fieri; one who was to be king, but now actually inaugurate a covenanted king upon terms that sanctified them. It is true, they came to recognosce Rehoboam's rights, and came to Shechem to make him king, 1 Kings xii. 1. and yet when he would not enter in covenant-terms with them, to satisfy their just demands, the people answered the king, saying, what portion have we in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse, to your tents, O Israel, vers. 16. They refused to acknowledge such an usurper, and we find no prophets ever condemning them for it. So when Jehoash or Joash was crowned, Jehoiada made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people, between the king also and the people, 2 Kings xi. 17. 2 Chron. xxiii. 11, 16. From all these reasons and scriptures, it is clear, there must be a mutual compact between the subjects and every sovereign they own subjection to, which if he refuse, and usurp the sword, they are under an anterior obligation to subtract their allegiance, and to make use of their sword, if they be in capacity to pull it out of his hands, and use it against him. And of this we are put in mind by the motto of our old coronation pieces, which have these words about the sword, 'for me, but, if I deserve, against me:' and surely to him that hath it now in his hands, it may be said, thou hast deserved, and as yet deserves. We see then, the allegiance that this usurper alledges is his due, wants a bottom, to wit, a compact with the people. Whence I argue, if there must of necessity be a compact between the king and the people, when he is advanced to the government: then he that advances himself, without and against this compact, is an usurper not to be owned; but the former is true: therefore he that advances himself without and against this compact, is an usurper not to be owned. And who more notoriously deserving such a signature, than James VII. and II. who hath made horns of his own strength, or the Pope's bulls, to push his brother out and himself into the throne, upon no terms at all, or any security for religion and liberty. One objection is to be removed here: can the customs of the Jews be binding to all nations? The kings of Judah made such covenants, shall therefore all kings do so? Answ. Why not this custom, as well as crowning, which they used likewise? These rules are not typical or ceremonial, nor only so judicial as to be peculiarly judicial, but are matters of moral equity, bearing a standing reason founded upon that law, Deut. xvii. 15. &c. limiting the prince to stand to conditions. If we cast at divine laws for rules of government where will we find better laws? It is recorded of the first of the British kings who was Christian, that writing to Eleutherius bishop of Rome, (before Antichrist took that seat) for the Roman laws, he received this answer: 'By divine clemency ye have received the law and faith of Christ, you have the Old and New Testaments, out of them in God's name by counsel of your states take laws, and govern your kingdom.' And of another, that he began his laws thus. God spake all these words, &c. And so repeated the laws of God. The second thing I undertook to prove, is that assertion of Buchanan ubi supra, de Jure Regni. 'There being a paction between the king and subjects, he who first recedes from what is covenanted, and doth counteract what he hath covenanted, he looses the contract; and the bond being loosed which did hold fast the king with the people, whatever right did belong to him by virtue of that compact, he looses it, and the people are as free as before the stipulation.' Which is also asserted by the author of Jus populi, chap. 6. pag. 112. 'It is no less clear, that when the sovereign doth not perform the principal, main, and most necessary conditions, condescended and agreed upon, by right he falleth from his sovereignty: and pag. 117. when the prince doth violate his compact, as to all its conditions, or as to its chief, main, and most necessary condition, the subjects are by right free from subjection to him, and at liberty to make choice of another.' This is so clear that it needs no labour to prove it, that, upon this head, we were loosed from all allegiance to the former tyrant, who was admitted upon terms of an explicit covenant, the conditions whereof he did as explicitly break.

There are two cases wherein subjects are loosed from covenanted allegiance to their princes. 1. When the prince remits the obligation of the subjects, and refuses allegiance upon that basis; then he can no more demand it by virtue of that compact. He that remits, and will not have that allegiance, that the subjects covenanted upon such and such conditions to him, these subjects should not give it that they so covenanted, for they should not prostitute it to a refuser and remitter: but Charles the II. remitted and would not have that allegiance, which we covenanted upon such and such conditions, viz. upon the terms of the covenant, which he cassed and annulled and made criminal to own: therefore to him we should not have given it, which we so covenanted. 2. When the prince doth enter into a mutual covenant with the people upon mutual conditions, and does not only cease to perform the conditions, but simply denies all obligation to do it, and makes it a quarrel to insinuate so much, yea persecutes all who dare assert the obligation of that covenant; and yet demands allegiance, not upon the obligation of that covenant which he hath remitted, but absolutely upon the grounds of his prerogative: in this case it will be evident also, the subjects are not bound either to own their formerly covenanted allegiance to him, or that which he demands on other grounds. Grotius de Jure belli, is clear as to this, lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 12. 'If there be such a clause or condition in the very devolution of the government upon a prince, as if he do so and so, the subjects shall be loosed from all bonds of obedience, then, when he does so, he becomes a mere private person.' Grotius there supposes the power is transferred upon a resolutive condition; that is, if he transgress the condition, the power shall be resolved into its first fountain: much more if it be transferred expresly also upon a suspensive condition, that he shall continue to maintain the ends of the covenant, defend religion and the liberties of the subjects, in the defence whereof we shall own allegiance to him, otherwise not. In that case, if he do not maintain these ends, plain it is, our obligation ceases; for how can it stand upon a conditional obligation, when his performance of the condition sists? But whatever be the conditions mutual, it flows natively from the nature of a mutual compact, 'That he who doth not perform the conditions agreed upon, hath no right to the benefit granted upon condition of performance of these conditions; especially if he perform not, or violate these conditions upon supposition whereof he would not have gotten the benefit: it were very absurd to say in a mutual conditional compact, one party shall still be found to perform his conditions, though the other perform none, but break all. Were it the act of rational creatures to set up a sovereign, upon conditions he shall not play the tyrant, and yet be bound to him though he tyrannize never so much? We have the name of mutual compacts in the spies covenant with Rahab, Josh. ii. 20. "If thou utter this our business, then we will be quit of thine oath, which thou hast made us to swear:" if she should break, condition, then the obligation on their part should cease. But next, all the stress will ly in proving that the covenant, on such and such conditions between a prince and subjects, doth equally and mutually oblige both to each other: for if it equally oblige both, then both are equally disengaged from other by the breach on either side, and either of them may have a just claim in law against the other for breach of the conditions. But royalists and court slaves alledge, that such a covenant obliges the king to God, but not to the people at all: so that he is no more accountable to them, than if he had none at all. But the contrary is evident: for, (1.) If the compact be mutual, and if it be infringed on one side, it must be so in the other also; for in contracts, the parties are considered as equals, whatever inequality there may be betwixt them otherwise: I speak of contracts among men. (2.) If it be not so, there is no covenant made with the people at all: and so David did no more covenant with Israel, than with the Chaldeans: for to all with whom the covenant is made it obliges them to it. Otherwise it must be said, he only made the covenant with God, contrary to the text: for he made it only before the Lord as a witness, not with him as a party. Joash's covenant with the Lord is expresly distinguished from that with the people. (3.) If it be not so, it were altogether nonsense to say, there were any covenant made with the king on the other hand: for he is supposed to be made king on such and such terms: and yet, by this, after he is made king he is no more obliged unto them, than if there had been no compact with him at all. (4.) If he be bound as king, and not only as a man or Christian, then he is bound with respect to the people; for with respect to them he is only king: but he is bound as king, and not only as a man or Christian, because it is only with him as king that the people covenant, and he must transact with them under the same consideration. Next, that which he is obliged to, is the specifical act of a king, to defend religion and liberty, and rule in righteousness; and therefore his covenant binds him as a king. Again, if he be not bound as king, then as a king he is under no obligation of law or oath, which is to make him a lawless tyrant; yea, none of God's subjects. It would also suppose that the king as king could not sin against the people at all, but only against God: for as king he could be under no obligation of duty to the people, and where there is no obligation, there is no sin; by this he would be set above all obligations to love his neighbour as himself, for he is above all his neighbours, and all mankind, and only less than God; and so by this doctrine, he is loosed from all duties of the second table, or at least he is not so much obliged to them as others. But against this it is objected: both prince and people are obliged to perform their part to each other, and both are obliged to God, but both are not accountable to each other; there is not mutual power in the parties to compel one another to perform the promised duty; the king hath it indeed over the people, but not the people over the king, and there is no indifferent judge superior to both, to compel both, but God. Ans. 1. What if all this should be granted? Yet it doth not infringe the proposition: what if the people have not power to compel him? Yet, if by law, he may fall from his sovereignty, though, indeed, he is not deposed: he loses his right to our part, when he breaks his part. 2. There is no need of a superior arbiter: for as in contracting they are considered as equal, so the party keeping the contract is superior to the other breaking it. 3. There may be mutual co-active power, where there is no mutual relation of superiority and inferiority: yea, in some cases, inferiors may have a co-active power by law, to compel their superiors failing in their duty to them; as a son wronged by his father, may compel him to reparation by law; and independent kingdoms, nothing inferior to each other, being in covenant together, the wronged may have a co-active power to force the other to duty, without any superior arbiter. 4. The bond of suretiship brings a man under the obligation to be accountable to the creditor, though the surety were never so high, and the creditor never so low: Solomon says, in general, without exception of kings; yea, including them because he was a king that spake it, Prov. vi. 1, 2. "My son, if thou be surety for thy friend,——thou art snared with the words of thy mouth." Now a king's power is but fiduciary; and therefore he cannot be unaccountable for the power concredited to him. And if this generation had minded this, our stewards should have been called to an account for their stewardship ere now. Hence I argue, if a covenanted prince, breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his right to the subjects allegiance, then they are no more to own him as their sovereign; but the former is proved, that a covenanted prince, breaking all the conditions of his compact, doth forfeit his right to the subjects allegiance: Therefore——And consequently when Charles II. expresly bound by covenant to defend and promote the covenanted reformation and liberties of the kingdom, to whom only we were bound in the terms of his defending and promoting the same, did violently and villainously violate and vilify these conditions, we were no more bound to them. Somewhat possibly may be objected here, 1. If this be the sense of the covenant, then it would seem that we were not bound to own the king, but only when and while he were actually promoting and carrying on the ends of the covenant. Ans. It does not follow, but that we are obliged to preserve his person and authority in these necessary intervals, when he is called to see to himself as a man; for we must preserve him as a mean, because of his aptitude and designation for such an end, albeit not always formally prosecuting it: we do not say, that we are never to own him, but when actually exercised in prosecuting these ends: but we say, we are never to own him, when he is tyrannically and treacherously abusing his authority for destroying and overturning these ends, and violating all the conditions of his compact. It may be. Object. 2. Saul was a tyrant, and a breaker of his royal covenant, and persecutor of the godly, and murderer of the priests of the Lord, usurper upon the priest's office, and many other ways guilty of breaking all conditions: and yet David and all Israel owned him as the anointed of the Lord. Ans. 1. Saul was indeed a tyrant, rejected of God, and to be ejected out of his kingdom in his own time and way, which David, a prophet knowing, would not anticipate. But he was far short, and a mere bungler in acts of tyranny in comparison of our grassators: he broke his royal covenant in very gross particular acts, but did not cass and rescind the whole of it, did not burn it, did not make it criminal to own its obligation, nor did he so much as profess a breach of it, nor arrogate an absolute prerogative, nor attempt arbitrary government, nor to evert the fundamental laws, and overturn the religion of Israel, and bring in idolatry as ours have done: he was a persecutor of David upon some private quarrels, not of all the godly upon the account of their covenanted religion: he murdered 85 priests of the Lord, in a transport of fury, because of their kindness to David; but he did not make laws adjudging all the ministers of the Lord to death, who should be found most faithful in their duty to God and his church, as ours have done against all field preachers: he usurped upon the priest's office, in one elicit act of sacrificing: but he did not usurp a supremacy over them, and annex it as an inherent right of his crown. 2. He was indeed such a tyrant, as deserved to have been dethroned and brought to condign punishment, upon the same accounts that Amaziah and Uzziah were deposed for afterwards: and in this the people failed in their duty, and for it they were plagued remarkably. Shall their omission be an argument to us? 3. As the question was never put to the people, whether they owned his authority as lawful, or not? So we do not read, either of their universal owning him, or their positive disowning him: however, that is no good argument, which is drawn from a not doing to a doing; because they did it not, therefore it must not be done. 4. They owned him; but how? As the minister of God, not to be resisted or revolted from under pain of damnation? (as all lawful magistrates ought to be owned, Rom. xiii. 2, 4.) This I deny: for David and his six hundred men resisted him resolutely; and though the body of the nation did long lazily ly and couch as asses under his burden, yet, at length, weary of his tyranny, many revolted from under him, and adjoined themselves to David at Ziklag, "while he kept himself close, because of Saul the son of Kish," 1 Chron. xii. 1. who are commended by the Spirit of God for their valour, verse. 2. &c. "and many out of Manasseh fell to him, when he came with the Philistines against Saul, to battle," verse 19. This was a practical disowning of the tyrant, before the Lord deposed him. 5. David did indeed pay him and his character some deference, as having been the anointed of the Lord; yet perhaps his honouring him with that title, the Lord's anointed, 1 Sam. xxiv. 1 Sam. xxvi. and calling him so often his Lord the King, cannot be altogether justified, no more than his using that same language to Achish king of Gath, 1 Sam. xxix. 8. I shewed before how titles might be allowed; but this so circumstantiate, does not seem so consistent with his imprecatory prayer, for the Lord's avenging him on him, 1 Sam. xxiv 12. and many other imprecations against him in his Psalms. In some of which he calls the same man, whom here he called, Psal. lix. 63, 14. and the evil, violent and wicked man, Psal. cxl. 1, 4. and the vilest of men, Psal. xii. ult. However it be, there can be no argument from hence, to own the authority of tyrants and usurpers.

6. Though this necessary conditional compact, which must always be in the constitution of lawful rulers, be not always express and explicit, so that a written authentic copy of it cannot be always produced; yet it is always to be understood, implicitly at least, transacted in the ruler's admission to the government, wherein the law of God must regulate both parties; and when he is made ruler, it must be understood that it is upon terms to be a father, feeder, and protector, and not a tyrant, murderer and destroyer. All princes are so far pactional, that they are obliged by the high and absolute Sovereign from whom they derive their authority, to reign for the peace and profit of the people. This is fixed unalterably by the laws of the supreme legislator, and solemnly engaged unto at the coronation: and whosoever declines or destroys this fundamental condition, he degrades and deposes himself. It is also not only the universal practice, but necessary for the constitution and conservation of all commonwealths, to have fundamental laws and provisions about government, both for the upholding, and transmitting and transferring it, as occasion calls, and preventing and punishing violations thereof, that there be no invasion or intrusion upon the government; and if there be any entrance upon it not according to the constitution, that it be illegitimated, and the nation's liberties always secured. This doth infer and regulate a conditional compact with all that are advanced to the government, albeit it should not be expressed. For it is undeniable that in the erection of all governors, the grand interests of the community must be seen to, by legal securities for religion and liberty, which is the end and use of fundamental laws. Now, how these have been unhinged and infringed, by the introduction and present establishment by law of that monster of the prerogative, enacted in Parliament anno 1661, the apologetic relation doth abundantly demonstrate, lect. 10. Concerning the King's civil supremacy, enhancing all the absoluteness that ever the Great Turk could arrogate, and yet far short of what hath been usurped since, and impudently proclaimed to the world; especially by him who now domineers, in his challenges of sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and absolute power, which all are to obey without reserve; whereby the whole basis of our constitution, and bulwark of our religion, laws and liberty, is enervated, and we have security of no law but the king's lust. Hence I argue, those princes that, contrary to their virtual compact (at least) at their coming to the crown, overturned all fundamental laws: Ergo they cannot be owned. The major is plain; for they that overturn fundamental laws are no magistrates; thereby all the ends of government being subverted, and the subverter cannot be owned as a father or friend, but an open enemy to the commonwealth, nor looked upon as magistrates doing their duty, but as tyrants, seeking themselves with the destruction of the commonwealth. And in this case, the compact, the ground of the constitution, being violated, they fall from their right, and the people are liberated from their obligation; and they being no magistrates, the people are no subjects; for the relation is mutual, and so is the obligation, Jus populi, chap. 9. page 183. The minor is manifest, both from the matter of fact, and the mischiefs framed into laws, by the sovereign authority, prerogative royal, and absolute power foresaid: whereby what remains of our fundamental constitutions, either in religious or civil settlements, unsubverted as yet, may be subverted when this absolute monarch pleases. Which absolute authority we cannot in conscience own, for these reasons, taken both from reason and scripture. First, It is against reason, 1. A power contrary in nature cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for that which takes away, and makes the people to give away their natural power of preserving their lives and liberties, and sets a man above all rule and law, is contrary to nature: such is absolute power, making people resign that which is not in their power to resign, an absolute power to destroy and tyrannize. 2. A power contrary to the first rise of its constitution cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for the first rise of the constitution is a people's setting a sovereign over them, giving him authority to administer justice over them: but it were against this, to set one over them with a power to rage at random, and rule as he lists. It is proven before, a king hath no power but what the people gave him; but they never gave, never could give an absolute power to destroy themselves. 3. That power which is against the ends of government cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for that which will make a people's condition worse than before the constitution, and that mean which they intended for a blessing to turn a plague and scourge to them, and all the subjects to be formal slaves at the prince's devotion, must needs be contrary to the ends of government; but absolute power is such: for against the exorbitance thereof, no means would be left to prevent it obstructing all the fountains of justice, and commanding laws and lawyers to speak; not justice, righteousness, and reason; but the lust and pleasure of one man, turning all into anarchy and confusion: certainly it could never be the intention either of the work or workers, at the constitution of government, to set up a power to enslave the people, to be a curse to them, but their ends were to get comfort, safety and liberty, under the shadow of government. 4. That power which invalidates, and is inconsistent with the king's compact with the people, cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for the tenor of that is always to secure laws and liberties, to rule according to law; but to be absolute invalidates, and is inconsistent with that: that which were an engagement into contradictories cannot consist with that compact; but to engage to be absolute, and yet to rule by law, is an engagement into contradictories, which no people could admit for a security. It is inconsistent with this compact, to give the king absolute power to overturn religion and liberty; and to assume that which was never given, were to invalidate this compact, and to make himself no king; but to restore unto the people the power they conferred upon him for the defence of religion and liberty. 5. That power which is not from God, nor of God, cannot be owned; but absolute power is not of God; because it is a power to tyrannize and sin, which, if it were of God, he should be the author of sin; for if the moral power be of God, so must the acts be; but the acts of absolute power being lawless, cannot be from God: Ergo, neither the moral power to commit these acts. 6. That ruler who cannot be God's minister for the people's good, cannot be owned; (for that is the formal reason of our conscientious subjection to rulers, Rom. xiii. 4, 5.) But absolute sovereigns are such as cannot be God's ministers for the people's good; for if they be God's ministers for good, they must administer justice, preserve peace, rule by law, take directions from their master; and if so, they cannot be absolute. 7. A tyrant in the signal act and exercise cannot be owned; but an absolute prince is such; being a power that may play the tyrant if he pleases, and by law as king; and so if kings be by action tyrants, then people are by action slaves; and so royal power cannot be a blessing to them; yea, a lawless breaker of all bonds, promises, and oaths, cannot be owned as lawful power; but absolute power is such: for, it cannot be limited by these obligations, at least people cannot have any security by them. 8. A lawless power is not to be owned; an absolute power is a lawless power: ergo, not to be owned. The major is plain. Cicero says, lib. 2. 'The reason of making laws was the same, as of the creation of kings.' And Buchanan, de Jure Regni, very excellently, when 'the lust of kings was instead of laws, and being vested with an infinite and immoderate power, they did not contain themselves within bounds.——The insolency of kings made laws to be desired; for this cause laws were made by the people, and kings constrained to make use, not of their licentious wills in judgment, but of that right and privilege which the people had conferred upon them, being taught by many experiences, that it was better that their liberty should be concredited to laws, than to kings; better to have the law, which is a dumb king, than a king, who is not a speaking law.' If then laws be necessary for the making of kings, and more necessary than kings, and the same cause requires both, then a king without laws is not to be owned. A king must be a speaking and living law, reducing the law to practice. So much then as a king hath of law, so much he hath of a king; and he who hath nothing of the law, hath nothing of a king. Magna charta of England saith, 'The king can do nothing but by law, and no obedience is due to him but by law.' Buchanan rehearses the words of the most famous emperors, Theodosius and Valentinianus, to this effect, 'It is,' say they, 'a word worthy of the majesty of a king, to confess he is a tied prince to the laws; and indeed it is more to submit a principality to the laws, than to enjoy an empire.' But now that an absolute power must be a lawless power, is also evident; for that is a lawless power that makes all laws void, needless and useless; but such is absolute power: for it cannot be confined to the observance of laws. 9. That power which is destructive to the people's liberties cannot be owned; absolute power is such: for such a licentious freedom as is absolute cannot consist with the people's liberties; for these may infringe when he pleases. Now these, in their own nature, and in all respects, being preferable to the king's prerogative, and it being no prerogative which is not consistent with, yea in its own nature adapted to, the precious interests of religion and liberty: when the king's absolute authority is stated in contradictory terms to these, we cannot own that authority; for now he hath another authority than could be given him for the preservation of these interests; in the preservation whereof he can only have an authority to be owned, seeing he claims a power to destroy them, if he please. 10. If we should own absolute authority, then we should own a royal prerogative in the king to make and dispense with laws: now that cannot be owned; for, it would infer that the king had a masterly dominion over his subjects, to make laws, and inflict penalties without their consent.

And plain it is, they that make kings must have a co-ordinate power to make laws also; but the people, in their representatives, make kings, as is proven. Next, a prerogative to dispense with laws, except such laws as are in their own nature dispensable, without prejudice to any law of God or liberties of men, cannot be owned: for any power to dispense with reason and law, not grounded on any other reason but mere will and absolute pleasure, is a brutish power. It cannot be a right annexed to the crown, to do so; for a king, as a king, can do nothing but what he may do by law. Nay, this is not only a brutish power, but a blasphemous power, making him a kind of god on earth, illimited, that can do what he pleases: and to dispute it further, were to dispute whether God hath made all under him slaves by their own consent? or, whether he may encroach on the prerogative of God or not? By this prerogative, he arrogates a power to dispense with the laws of God also, in pardoning murderers, &c. which no man hath power to do; the law of God being so peremptorily indispensible. Gen. ix. 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. "Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death——Moreover, ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer, but he shall be surely put to death." These pardons are acts of blood to the community. If the judgment be God's, as it is, Deut. i. 17. and not for man, but for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. then no king can arrogate a power to dispense with it, no more than an inferior judge can dispense with the king's laws; for the king is but a minister, bearing the sword, not in vain, but as a revenger, to execute wrath upon them that do evil, Rom. xiii. 4. They are but bastard kings who give out sentences out of their own mouth, contrary to God's mind.

And if he may do acts of grace by prerogative above law, then may he also do acts of justice (so pretended) by the same prerogative; and so may murder innocents, as well as pardon murderers; he may condemn the just, as well as justify the wicked; both which are alike abomination to the Lord, Prov. xvii. 15. This power cannot be owned in any man. 11. To own absolute power, were to recognosce the king as the proper and sole interpreter of the law. This Buchanan shews to be very absurd, 'When you grant the interpretation of laws to a king, you give him such a license, that the law should not speak what the lawgiver meaneth, but what is for the interpreter's interest; so that he may turn it to all actions, as a Lesbian rule, for his own advantage; and so what he pleases the law shall speak, and what he will not, it shall not speak.' Now the king's absolute pleasure can no more be the sense of the law, than it can be the law itself: he is king by law, but he is not king of law; no mortal can make a sense to a law, contrary to the law; for it involves a contradiction: the true meaning is only the law. This also would take away the use of all laws; for they could not declare what were just and unjust, but as the king pleased: their genuine sense could not be the rule. 12. If we own the law to be above the king, then we cannot own the king to be absolute; but the former is true; for he must be under it several ways: (1.) Under its directive power; that will not be denied. (2.) Under its constitutive power; he is not a king by nature, but by constitution and law: therefore the law is above the king; because it is only from the law that there is a king, and that such a man and not another is king, and that the king must be so and so qualified, and they that made him a king, may also unmake him by the same law. (3.) Under its limiting and restrictive power, as a man he cannot be absolute, nor as a king by law. (4.) Under its co-active power. A lawmaker, said king James the VI. should not be a law-breaker: but if he turn an overturner of the fundamental laws, that law or covenant that made him king, doth oblige to unmake him. Whatever power he hath, it is only borrowed fiduciary power, as the nation's public servant: and that which was lent him in pledge or pawn may be reclaimed, when abused by him.

Especially if he turn parricide, kill his brother, murder his nobles, burn cities, then he may and ought to be punished by law. Otherwise God should have provided better for the safety of the part than of the whole, though that part be but a mean for the safety of the whole: for if he turn a tyrant in his absoluteness, the people must be destroyed, if they may not repress him: thus he is secured, and the whole exposed to ruin. Yea, if he be a man, as well as a king, he must be under rule of law; and when he transgresses, either his transgressions are punishable by men, or they are not transgessions with men. See many arguments to this purpose in Lex Rex, quest. 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27. But secondly, I prove it by scripture, 1. Even as a king he is regulated by law, not to multiply horses, nor wives, nor money, but to keep the words of the law, and not lift up himself above his brethren, Deut. xvii. 16, 17, 19, 20. he must observe to do according to the law, and not turn from it to the right hand or to the left, Josh. i. 7. therefore he must not be absolute. 2. He is certainly under that law, Matth. vii. 12. Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do you even so to them: which is the universal fundamental law. If then he would have us keeping in our line of subordination to him, he must keep his line, and so cannot be absolute. 3. What is God's due and peculiar prerogative, can be owned in no mortal; but absolute power is God's due and peculiar prerogative. He alone does whatsoever pleases him, Psal. cxv. 3. He alone worketh all, things after the counsel of his own will, Eph. i. 11. Acts or commands founded upon the sole pleasure of the agent, are proper to God. It is God's will and not the creature's that can make things good or just. It is blasphemy therefore to ascribe absolute power to any creature. 4. That which the Spirit of God condemned as a point of tyranny in Nebuchadnezzar, that is no prerogative to be owned; but the Spirit of God condemned this in him, proceeding from absolute power, that whom he would he slew, and whom he would he kept alive, whom he would he set up, and whom he would he put down. And his heart was lifted up, Dan. v. 19, 20. 5. That which God condemns and threatens in tyrants in the word in general, cannot be owned; but absolute power God condemns and threatens in the word in general; that they "turned judgment into gall," and said, "Have we not taken to us horns by our own strength?" Amos vi. 12, 13. 6. The word of God speaks nothing of the king's absolute prerogative, to make laws as he will. It is plain the king of Judah had it not: but the Sanhedrim had a great part of the legislative power, and of the punitive power in a special manner: the princes and people had it by Jeremiah's acknowledgement, Jer. xxvi. 14. And Zedekiah confesses to them, The king is not he that can do any thing against you, Jer. xxxviii. 5. 7. We find the king in scripture had not an absolute power, to expone or execute the law as he would; Saul made a law, 1 Sam. xiv. 24. Cursed be the man that eats any food until the evening. But exponing it, and thinking to execute it after a tyrannical manner, he was justly resisted by the people, who would not let him kill innocent Jonathan. 8. Nor had he the sole power of interpreting it; for inferior judges were interpreters, who are no less essential judges than the king who are set to judge for the Lord, and not for the king, 2 Chron xix. 6. and therefore they were to expone it according to their own conscience, and not the king's. They were to speak righteousness and judge uprightly, Psal. lviii. 1. hence called gods as well as kings, Psal. lxxxii. 1.

There was no essential difference between a king of God's approving, and a judge; there being but one law to both, Deut. xvii. 9. He was subject to judgment as well as others: for being but a brother, even while on the throne, who was not to lift up his heart above his brethren, Deut. xvii. ult. When this cause was to be judged, his person, though never so great, was not to be respected: nor were they to be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment was God's, Deut. i. 17. therefore the judges were to give out sentence in judgment, as if the Lord were to give it out: there was no exception of kings there. Yea we find, according to common law, they judged and punished offending kings, as shall be made appear: 10. If they were under church censures, then they were not absolute; but we find kings were under church censures; not only rebuked sharply to their face, of which we have many instances; but also subjected to church discipline, as Uzziah shut up for his leprosy.

And certainly at all times this must be extended to all: for the king is either a brother, or not: if not, then he should not be king, according to the scripture, Deut. xvii. 15. then also he is not a Christian, nor can he say the Lord's prayer: if he be, then if a brother offend, he is subject to the church, Matth. xviii. there is no exceptions of kings there. The objection from Eccles. viii. 3, 4.—he doth whatsoever pleaseth him, where the word of a king is, there is power, and who may say unto him, What dost thou? is of no significancy here. For, 1. This argument will enforce absolute obedience, if the power be to be taken absolutely; for it is obedience that is there commanded: and so we must not only own the absolute authority, but obey it without reserve, which never any yet had the impudence to plead for, until James the unjust claimed it in a Scots proclamation: but we answer, It is better to obey God than man. 2. If he may do whatsoever pleases him, then he may turn priest, then he may kill whom he pleases, and take possession; and yet for Saul's usurpation Samuel could say more than what dost thou? even to tell him, he had done foolishly, and his kingdom should not continue, 1 Sam. xiii. 13, 14. And for Ahab's tyranny, Elijah could tell him, the dogs shall lick thy blood, even thine, 1 Kings xxi. 19, And Ezekiel, thou profane wicked prince of Israel, Ezek. xxi. 25. 3. The meaning is then only this; that a righteous king's just power may not only be controlled: he is armed with power that may not be resisted, for he beareth not the sword in vain, and therefore we must not stand in an evil matter against them. I conclude then this argument, with the word of an ingenious author, upon this same subject, both in thesi and hypothesi: 'Whosoever shall offer to rule arbitrarily, does immediately cease to be king by right, seeing by the fundamental, common and statute laws of the realm, we know none for supreme magistrate and governor but a limited prince, and one who stands circumscribed and bounded in his power and prerogative. Ill effects of animosities,' page 17.

7. From what is said, this is the result, that it is essentially necessary to a moral power and authority, to have a right and title, without which we can own none, but as a tyrant without a title. For what is authority, but a right to rule? if then it have not a right, it is not authority. This will be undeniable, if we consider, that as private dominion, or property, consists in a right to enjoy; so public dominion, in a right to rule. Some things indeed are exposed to the common and arbitrary use of every man, and also at the beginning, by reason of the fewness of mankind, dominion was not reduced to distinct property; yet now, upon the multiplication of occupants, of necessity it must be stated by peculiar appropriation, from the law of nature, and by the grant of the supreme king, who hath given the earth to the children of men, Psal. cxv. 16. not to be catched up as the food of beasts, which the stronger seize, and the weaker get only what the other leave them, but divided by right as an inheritance, by him who separated the sons of Adam, and set the bounds of the people, Deut. xxxii. 8. Especially public dominion cannot be without a foundation, for its relation to the subjected, and must be so tied up, that it may be said, this man is to command, and these are to obey. I shew, that authority is from God, both by institution and constitution; so that the subjects are given to understand, such an one is singled out by God to sustain this authority, by prescribing a rule for men's entry into the authoritative relation, whereby he communicates that power to them which is not in others, and which otherwise would not be in them. Hence it is, that orderly admittance that must give the right, and upon men's having or not having such an entrance to it, depends the reality or nullity of the power they challenge.

Where therefore there is no lawful investiture, there is no moral power to be owned; otherwise John of Leyden's authority might have been owned: the unlawfulness of such a power consists in the very tenor itself; and if we take away the use or holding of it, we take away the very being of it: it is not then the abuse of a power lawfully to be used, but the very use of it is unlawful. But in the usurpation of this man, or monster rather, that is now mounted the throne, there is no lawful investiture in the way God hath appointed as is shewed above; therefore there is no moral power to be owned. To clear this a little further, it will be necessary to remove the ordinary pretences, pleaded for a title to warrant the owning of such as are in power, which are three chiefly, to wit, possession, conquest, and hereditary succession. The first must be touched more particularly, because it hath been the originate error, and spring of all the stupid mistakes about government, and is the pitiful plea of many, even mal contents, why this man's authority is to be owned, asserting, that a person attaining and occupying the place of power (by whatsoever means) is to be owned as the magistrate. But this can give no right: for, 1. If providence cannot signify God's approbative ordination, it can give no right; for without that there can be no right; but providence cannot signify his approbative ordination, because that, without the warrant of his word, cannot signify either allowance or disallowance, it is so various, being often the same to courses directly contrary, and oftentimes contrary to the same course; sometimes savouring it, sometimes crossing it, whether it be good or bad, and the same common providence may proceed from far different purposes, to one in mercy, to another in judgment; and most frequently very disproportionable to men's ways. Providence places sometimes "wickedness in the place of judgment, and iniquity in the place of righteousness," Eccl. iii. 16. that is, not by allowance. By providence it happens to the just according to the work of the wicked, and to the wicked according to the work of the righteous, Eccl. viii. 14. No man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them. All things come alike to all, there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, Eccl. ix. 1, 2. It were a great debasing of the Lord's anointed, to give him no other warrant than sin hath in the world, or the falling of a sparrow. 2. Either every providential possession, in every case, gives a title; or, God hath declared it as a law, that it shall be so in this particular matter of authority only.

The first cannot be said: for that would justify all robbery: nor the second, for where is that law found? Nay, it were impious to alledge it; for it would say, there is no unjust possessor or disorderly occupant, but if he were once in the possession, he were right enough, and then usurpation would be no sin. 3. If none of the causes of magistracy be required to the producing of this possessory power, then it cannot give or have any right; for without the true causes it cannot be the true effect, and so can have no true right to be owned: but none of the causes of magistracy are required to the production of this; neither the institution of God, for this might have been, if magistracy had never been instituted; nor the constitution of men, for this may usurp without that. 4. That which must follow upon the right, and be legitimated by it, cannot be owned as the right, nor can it give the title: but the possession of the power, or the exercise thereof, must follow upon its right, and be legitimated by it: therefore.——A man must first be in the relation of a ruler, before he can rule; and men must first be in the relation of subjects, before they obey.

The commands of public justice, to whom are they given but to magistrates? They must then be magistrates, before they can be owned as the ministers of justice: he must be a magistrate, before he can have the power of the sword: he cannot, by the power of the sword, make himself magistrate. 5. That which would make every one in the possession of the magistracy a tyrant, cannot be owned: but a possessory occupation giving right, would make every one in possession a tyrant; for, that which enervates, and takes away that necessary distinction between the king's personal capacity and his legal capacity, his natural and his moral power, will make every king a tyrant (seeing it makes every thing that he can do as a man, to be legally done as a king) but a possessory occupation giving right, would enervate and take away that distinction: for how can these be distinguished in a mere possessory power? The man's possession is all his legal power; and if possession give a right, his power will give legality. 6. What sort or size of possession can be owned to give a right? Either it must be partial or plenary possession: not partial, for then others may be equally entitled to the government, in competition with that partial possessor, having also a part of it: not plenary, for then every interruption or usurpation on a part, would make a dissolution of the government. 7. Hence would follow infinite absurdities; this would give equal warrant, in case of vacancy, to all men to step to, and stickle for the throne, and expose the commonwealth as a booty to all aspiring spirits: for they needed no more to make them sovereigns, and lay a tie of subjection upon the consciences of people, but to get into possession: and in case of competition, it would leave people still in suspense and uncertainties whom to own; for they behoved to be subject only to the uppermost, which could not be known until the controversy be decided: it would cassate and make void all pre-obligations, cautions, and restrictions from God about the government: it would cancel and make vain all other titles of any, or constitutions, or provisions, or oaths of allegiance: yea, to what purpose were laws or pactions made about ordering the government, if possession gave right, and laid an obligation on all to own it? Yea, then it were sinful to make any such provisions, to fence in and limit the determination of providence, if providential possession may authorize every intrusive acquisition to be owned: then also in case of competition of two equal pretenders to the government, there would be no place left for arbitrations.

If this were true, that he has the power that is in possession, the difference were at an end; no man could plead for his own right then; in this also it is inconsistent with itself, condemning all resistance against the present occupant, yet justifying every resistance that is but successful to give possession. 8. That which would oblige us to own the devil and the pope, cannot be a ground to own any man; but if this were true, that possession gave right, it would oblige us to own the devil and the pope. Satan we find claiming to himself the possession of the world's kingdoms, Luke iv. 6. which as to many of them is in some respect true, for he is called the god of this world, and the prince of this world, John xiv. 30. 2 Cor. iv. 4. Are men therefore obliged to own his authority? or shall they deny his, and acknowledge his lieutenant, who bears his name, and by whom all his orders are execute, I mean the man that tyrannizes over the people of God? For he is the devil that casts some into prison, Rev. ii. 10. Again, the pope, his captain-general, lays claim to a temporal power and ecclesiastic both, over all the nations, and possesses it over many; and again, under the conduct of his vassal the duke of York, is attempting to recover the possession of Britain: shall he therefore be owned. This cursed principle disposes men for popery, and contributes to strengthen popery and tyranny both on the stage, to the vacating of all the promises of their dispossession. 9. That which would justify a damnable sin, and make it a ground of a duty, cannot be owned; but this fancy of owning a very power in possession would justify a damnable sin and make it the ground of a duty; for, resistance to the powers ordained of God is a damnable sin, Rom. xiii. 2. But the resisters having success in providence, may come to the possession of the power, by expelling the just occupant; and, by this opinion, that possession would be ground for the duty of subjection for conscience sake. 10. If a self-created dignity be null and not to be owned, than a mere possessory is not to be owned; but the former is true: as Christ saith, John viii. 54. If I honour myself my honour is nothing. 11. That which God hath disallowed possession without right, Ezek. xxi. 27. I will overturn, overturn, overturn it, until he come whose right it is, Hos. viii. 4. They have set up kings and not by me, Matth. xxvi. 52. All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword; by this the usurper of the sword is differenced from the true owner. 12. Many scripture examples confute this; shewing that the possession may be in one, and the power with right in another.

David was the magistrate, and yet Absalom possessed the place, 2 Sam. xv. xvi. xvii. xviii. xix. chap. Sheba also made a revolt and usurped the possession in a great part, and yet David was king, 2 Sam. xx. 2. Adonijah got the start in respect of possession, exalting himself saying, I will be king: yet the kingdom was Solomon's from the Lord, 1 Kings 1. The house of Ahaziah had not power to keep still the kingdom, 2 Chron. xxii. 9. and Athaliah took the possession of it, yet the people set up Joash, xxiii. 3. Next we have many examples of such who have invaded the possessor, witness Jehoram and Jehoshaphat's expedition against Mesha, king of Moab, Elisha being in the expedition, 2 Kings, iii. 4, 5. Hence we see the first pretence removed.

The second is no better; which Augustine calls Magnum Latrocinium, a great robbery; I mean conquest, or a power of the sword gotten by the sword; which, that it can give no right to be owned, I prove That which can give no signification of God's approving will, cannot give a title to be owned: but mere conquest can give no signification of God's approving will, as is just now proven about possession: for then the Lord should have approven all the unjust conquests that have been in the world. 2. Either conquest as conquest must be owned, as a just title to the crown, and so the Ammonites, Moabites, Philistines, &c. prevailing over God's people for a time, must have reigned by right, or as a just conquest. In this case, conquest is only a mean to the conquerors seizing and holding that power, which the state of the war entitled him unto; and this ingress into authority over the conquered, is not grounded on conquest but on justice, and not at all privative, but inclusive of the consent of the people; and then it may be owned; but without a compact, upon conditions of securing religion and liberty, and posterity, cannot be subjected without their content; for whatever just quarrel the conqueror had with the present generation, he could have none with the posterity, the father can have no power to resign the liberty of the children. 3. A king as king, and by virtue of his royal office, must be owned to be a father, tutor, protector, shepherd, and patron of the people; but a mere conqueror, without consent cannot be owned as such.

Can he be a father and a patron to us against our will, by the sole power of the sword? A father to these that are unwilling to be sons? An head over such as will not be members? And a defender thro' violence? 4. A king, as such, is a special gift of God, and blessing, not a judgment: but a conqueror, as such, is not a blessing, but a judgment, his native end being not peace, but fire and sword. 5. That which hath nothing of a king in it, cannot be owned to make a king; but conquest hath nothing of a king in it: for it hath nothing but violence and force, nothing but what the bloodiest villain that was never a king may have, nothing of God's approving and regulating will, nothing of institution or constition; and a plain repugnancy to the ordination of God, for God hath said, Thou shalt not kill; conquest says, I will kill, and prosper, and reign. 6. A lawful call to a lawful office may not be resisted; but a call to conquest, which is nothing but ambition or revenge, ought to be resisted; because not of God's preceptive will, otherwise he should be the author of sin. 7. That power which we must own to be the ordinance of God, must not be resisted, Rom. xiii. 2.

But conquest may be resisted in defence of our king and country: therefore it must not be owned to be the ordinance of God. 8. That which God condemns in his word, cannot be owned; but dominion by the sword God condemns in his word, Ezek. xxxii. 26. "Ye stand upon the sword,——and shall possess the land," Amos vi. 13. "Ye rejoice in a thing of naught, which say, Have we not taken to us horns by our own strength?" Habbak. ii. 5, 6.——"Wo to him that encreaseth that which is not his, how long," &c. 9. We have many examples of invading conquerors; as Abraham, for the rescue of Lot, pursued the conquering kings unto Dan, Gen. iv. 4. "Jonathan smote a garrison of the conquering Philistines," 1 Sam. xiii. 3. The Lord owning and authorising them so to do. The people did often shake off the yoke of their conquerors in the history of the judges: but this they might not do to their lawful rulers. What is objected from the Lord's people conquering Canaan, &c. is no argument for conquest: for he, to whom belongs the earth and its fulness, disponed to Israel the land of Canaan for their inheritance, and ordained that they should get the possession thereof by conquest; it followeth not therefore, that kings now, wanting any word of promise, or divine grant to any lands, may ascend to the thrones of other kingdoms than their own, by no better title than the bloody sword. See Lex Rex, quest. 12. The third pretence of hereditary succession remains to be removed; which may be thus disproven, 1. This classes with the former, though commonly asserted by royalists.

For either conquest gives a right, or it does not; if it does, then it looses all allegiance to the heirs of the crown dispossessed thereby: if it does not give a right, then no hereditary succession founded upon conquest can have any right, being founded upon that which hath no right: and this will shake the most part of hereditary successions that are now in the world. 2. If hereditary succession have no right but the people's consent; then of itself it can give none to a man that hath not that consent; but the former is true. For, it is demanded, how doth the son or brother succeed? By what right? It must either be by divine promise; or by the father's will, or it must come by propagation from the first ruler, by a right of the primogeniture; but none of these can be. For the first, we have no immediate divine constitution tying the crown to such a race, as in David's covenant: it will easily be granted, they fetched not their charter from heaven immediately, as David had it, a man of many peculiar prerogatives, to whose line the promise was astricted of the coming of the Messias, and Jacob's prophecy that the sceptre should not depart from Judah until his coming, Gen. xlix. 10. was restricted to his family afterwards: wherefore he could say, The Lord God of Israel chose me before all the house of my father, to be king over Israel for ever; for he hath chosen Judah to be the ruler; and of the house of Judah, the house of my father; and among the sons of my father, he liked me to make me king over Israel; and of all my sons he hath chosen Solomon, 1 Chron. xxviii. 4, 5. All kings cannot say this; neither could Saul say it, tho' immediately called of God as well as David: yet this same promise to David was conditional, if his children should keep the Lord's ways, 2 Chron. vi. 16. Next, it cannot be said this comes from the will of the father; for according to the scripture, no king can make a king, though a king may appoint and design his son for his successor, as David did Solomon, but the people make him. The father is some way a cause why his son succeedeth, but he is not the cause of the royalty conferred upon him by line: for the question will recur, who made him a king, and his father, and grandfather, till we come up to the first father? Then, who made him a king? Not himself; therefore it must be resounded upon the people's choice and constitution: and who appointed the lineal succession, and tied the crown to the line, but they? It is then, at the best, the patrimony of the people, by the fundamental law of the kingdom, conferred upon the successor by consent.

And generally it is granted, even where the succession is lineal, he that comes to inherit, he does not succeed by heritage, but by the force of law; the son then hath not his kingdom from his father, but by law, which the people made and stand to, as long as it may consist with the reasons of public advantage, upon which they condescended to establish such a family over them. Neither can it be said, it is by a right of primogeniture, propagated from the first ruler; for this must either be Adam the first of the world or Fergus for example, the first of this kingdom. It could not come from Adam as a monarch and father of all: for that behoved to be, either by order of nature, or his voluntary assignment: it could not be transferred by order of nature; for besides the difficulty to find out Adam's successor in the universal monarchy, and the absurdity of fixing it on Cain, (who was a cursed vagabond, afraid of every man and could not be an universal monarch, yet Adam's first born.) It will be asked, how this passed from him unto others? Whether it went by fatherhood to all the sons, fathers to their posterity? Which would multiply as many commonwealths, as there have been fathers since: or if it went, by primogeniture, only to the first-born, that he alone could claim the power which would infer the necessity of an universal monarchy, without multiplication of commonwealths.

If it was by his voluntary assignment, to whom, and in what proportion, he pleased; then the universal monarchy died with himself, and so could not be conveyed at all: for, either he behoved to give each son a share, to be conveyed downwards to their children in that proportion; or whole and solid to one: so also the former dilemma recurs, for if the first be said, it will make as many little kingdoms as there have been sons of Adam; if the second, the world should be but still one kingdom. But however it be, this could never be the way that God appointed, either for raising a magistratical power where it is wanting, or deriving a right to any in being; considering the multiplication, division, confusion, and extinction of families that have been. If it be from Fergus the first of his line; then either it comes from him as a king, or as a father: not the first, for the reason above hinted: nor as a father; for a father may defraud his son of the heritage, a king cannot divide the kingdom among his sons; it must then be length refounded on the peoples consent. 3. If even where lineal succession is constituted by law, for eviting the inconveniencies of frequent elections, people are not tied to admit every first born of that line; then that birth-right, where there is no more, cannot make a king; but the former is true; for they are tied only conditionally, so he be qualified, and have a head to sit at the helm, and not a fool or monster; neither are they free to admit murderers or idolaters by the laws of God, and of the land: it is not birth then, but their admission being so qualified, that makes kings. Hence, 4. That which takes away the peoples birth-right, given them of God to provide for their liberties in the fittest government, and that is not to be owned; but to make birth alone a title to the crown, takes away the peoples birth-right given them of God of providing for their liberties in the fittest government, fetters their choice to one destructive to these. Certainly where God hath not bound the conscience, men may not bind themselves nor their posterity; but God hath never fettered men to a choice of a government or governing line; which, contrary to the intention of the oath, may prove destructive to the ends thereof. Nor can the fathers leave in legacy, by oath, any chains to fetter the after wits of posterity to a choice destructive to religion and liberty. Israel was bound, by covenant, not to destroy the Gibeonites; but if they had risen to cut off Israel, Who can doubt but they were loosed from that obligation? For to preserve cut-throats was contrary to the intention of the oath: so when either monarchy, or the succeeding monarch, proves destructive to the ends of government, the choice, law, or oath of our fathers, cannot bind us. 5. If we are tied to the hereditary succession, not for the right the successor hath by birth, but for our covenanted allegiance to them whose successor he is; then cannot his birth-right be the ground of our allegiance, and consequently hereditary succession cannot make a king; but the former is true; for in hereditary crowns, the first family being chosen by the suffrages of the people, for that cause the hereditary successor hath no privilege or prerogative, but from him who was chosen king: therefore the obligation to the son, being no greater than the obligation to the father, which is the ground of that, if the father then was owned only because he was chosen, and qualified for government, the son cannot be owned for any other cause, but as chosen in him, and also qualified and admitted with consent. We cannot choose the father as qualified, and tie ourselves to the successors, be what they will. 6. If a king be not born heir of a kingdom, then is he not king by birth; but he is not born heir of a kingdom; for, a mean cannot be born to inherit the end, the king is but a mean for the kingdom's preservation. If the kingdom be his, by birth, as an inheritance, why may he not upon necessary occasions sell his inheritance? But if he sell it, then all confess he is no more king. 7. If that which makes a king cannot be transmitted from father to son; then succession, by birth, cannot make a king; but the former is true. The royal faculty of governing cannot be transmitted: Solomon asked it from God, he had it not from his father: nor can he be born to the honour of a king, because not born with either the gift or honour to be a judge. God maketh high and low, not birth. Nor can the call and constitution of a king, according to the will of God, be transferred from father to son, for that cannot be in God's way without the intervening consent of the people, that cannot make him a born king. 8. If no dominion can come by nature, as is proven before, then can no man be a born king: nature and birth cannot give them a sceptre in their hand, nor kingly majesty, they must have that alone from God and the people, and may only expect honour from their own good government: kings (as Plutarch says) must be like dogs that are best hunters, not these who are born of best dogs. 9. The peculiar prerogative of Jesus Christ must not be ascribed to any other; but this is his peculiar prerogative, to be born a king, of whom it might be truly said, Where is he that is born king of the Jews? And for this end was he born, who came out of the womb with a crown on his head, which no creature can bear. 10. In scripture we find that a king was to be so and so qualified, not a stranger, but a reader of God's word, &c. Deut. xvii. 15, &c. he was not qualified by naked birth. Hence, if all the qualifications requisite in an heir cannot make a king qualified according to the institution of God, then his being heir cannot make him king: but the first is true, an heir may be an heir without these qualifications. 11. We find in the scripture, the people were to make the kings by that law, Deut. xvii. 15. Thou shalt choose him whom the Lord chooseth: yea, neither Saul nor David were kings, till the people met to make them: therefore birth never made them kings, even though the kingdom was tied to David's line. That was only a typical designment by special promise, because Christ was to come of that line; it was therefore established in David's family for typical reasons, that cannot be now alledged. 12. We find in the disposal of government among brethren, this birth order was not seldom inverted; as when Jacob was preferred before Esau, Judah before all the elder sons of Jacob, Ephraim before Manasseh, Solomon before Adonijah. Hence if this gentleman, now regnant, have no better pretences than these now confuted, we cannot recognize his right to reign; yea, though this last were valid, yet he cannot plead it, it being expresly provided in our laws against the succession of a papist. But there is one grand objection against all this. The Jews and other nations are commanded to bring their necks under the yoke of the king of Babylon, and to serve him, and yet he had no other right to these kingdoms; than the Lord's providential disposal, because the Lord had "given all these lands into his hand," Jer. xxvii. 6, 7, 12. Ans. 1. He was indeed an unjust usurper, and had no right but the Lord's providential gift; which sometimes makes "the tabernacles of robbers prosper, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly, Job xii. 6. And gives Jacob sometimes for a spoil, and Israel to the robbers, Isa. xlii. 24. And giveth power to the beast to continue forty and two months, and to have power over all kindreds, and tongues, and nations," Rev. xiii. 5, 7. His tyranny also was very great extensively, in respect of his oppressions and usurpations by conquest; but it was not so great intensively, as our robbers and spoilers may be charged with; he was never such a perverter of all the ends of government, nor a treacherous overturner of all conditions, he was never a persecutor of the Jewish religion, he never oppressed them upon that account, nor endeavoured its extirpation, he never enacted such mischiefs by law. The Lord only made use of him to bring about the holy ends of the glory of his justice and wisdom, in which respect alone he is called his servant, as elsewhere his rod and hammer, having given him a charge against an hypocritical nation, to trample them down in his holy providence; and accordingly there was no resistance could prevail, they must be trampled upon, no help for it; but no subjection was required, acknowledging his magistratical right by divine ordinance, but only a submissive stooping to the holy disposal of divine providence; no owning was exacted either of the equity of that power, or of fealty to the administrator. 2. This behoved to be a particular command, by positive revelation given at that time, not binding to others in the like condition; which I refer to the judgment of the objectors: put the case, and make it run parallel, if the king of England were in league with the king of France, and breaking that league, should provoke that aspiring prince, growing potent by many conquests to discover his designs, make preparations and give out threatnings for the conquest of England and all Britain; were the people of England bound to surrender themselves as servants and tributaries to him for 70 years, or for ever, under pain of destruction, if they should not? This were one of the most ridiculous inferences that ever was pleaded; nay, it would make all refusal of subjection to invaders unlawful. 3. I will draw an argument from this to confirm my plea: for these commands of subjection to Babylon, were not delivered, until after the king of Judah had surrendered to Nebuchadnezzar, and entred into covenant with him to be subject to him, 2 Kings xxiv. chap. in keeping which covenant the kingdom might have stood, and after he had rebelled against him, and broken that covenant, "when lo, he had given his hand," after which he could "not prosper, or escape, or be delivered," Ezek. xviii. 14, 15, 18, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 13. Then the commandment came, that they should disown their own king Zedekiah, now forfeiting his right by breach of covenant, and be subject to Nebuchadnezzar, whence I argue, if people are commanded to disown their covenant-breaking rulers, and subject themselves to conquerors, then I have all I plead for; but the former is true, by the truth of this objection: therefore also the latter. There is a 2d Objection from Rom xiii. 1. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, the powers that be are ordained of God;" yet the Roman emperor, to which they were to be subject, was an usurper. Ans. It cannot be proven, that the apostle intendeth here the Roman emperor as the higher power: there were at this time several competitions for the empire, about which Christians might have their own scruples whom to own; the apostle does not determine their litigations, nor interest himself in parties but gives the general standard of God's ordinance they had to go by. And the best expositors of the place do alledge, the question and doubt of Christians then was not so much in whom the supremacy was, as whether Christians were at all bound to obey civil power, especially Pagan? Which the apostle resolves, in giving general directions, to obey the ordinance of magistracy, conform to its original, and as it respects the end for which he had and would set it up: but no respect is there had to tyrants. 2. It cannot be proven, that the supreme power then in being was usurped, there being then a supreme Senate, which was a lawful power; nor that Nero was then an usurper, who came in by choice and consent, and with the good liking of the people. 3. The text means of lawful powers, not unlawful force, that are ordained of God by his preceptive will, not merely by his providential disposal, and of conscientious subjection to magistracy, not to tyranny, describing and characterizing the powers there, by such qualifications as tyrants and usurpers are not capable of. But I mind to improve this text more fully hereafter, to prove the quite contrary to what is here objected.