PART III. (continued 3)

8. It will be yielded very readily by us, that a magistrate is not to be disowned, merely for his differing in religion from us: yea, though he were a heathen. We do not disown our pretended rulers merely upon that account, but cheerfully do grant and subscribe to that truth in our Confession of Faith, chap. xxiii. sect. 4. That infidelity, or difference in religion, doth not make void the magistrate's just and legal authority, nor free the people from their due obedience to him: on which our adversaries have insulted, as if our principle and practice were thereby disproved. But it is easy to answer, 1. Let the words be considered, and we are confident, 'That no sober man will think, the acknowledgement of just and legal authority, and due obedience a rational ground to infer, that tyranny is thereby either allowed or privileged,' Napht. p. 60 prior edition. 2. Though infidelity or difference of religion, does not make void authority, where it is lawfully invested; yet it may incapacitate a person, and lawfully seclude him from authority, both by the word of God, which expressly forbids to set a stranger over, who is not our brother, Deut. xvii. 15. which includes as well a stranger of a strange religion, as one of a strange country, and by the laws of the land, which do incapacitate a papist of all authority, supreme or subordinate. And so, if this James VII. II. had been king before he was a Roman Catholic, if we had no more to object, we should not have quarrelled his succession. 3. We both give and grant all that is the confession, to wit, that dominion is not founded in grace: yet this remains evident, that a prince, who not only is of another religion, but an avowed enemy to, and overturner of the religion established by law, and intending and endeavouring to introduce a false, heretical, blasphemous and idolatrous religion, can claim no just and legal authority, but in this case the people may very lawfully decline his pretended authority; nay, they are betrayers of their country and posterity, if they give not a timeous and effectual check to his usurpings, and make him sensible that he hath no such authority. Can we imagine, that men in the whole of that blessed work so remarkably led of God, being convocate by a parliament of the wisest and worthiest men that ever were in England, whom they did encourage, by writing and preaching, and every way to stand fast in their opposition to the then king displaying a banner for his prerogative (a court dream) against religion and liberty, should be so far left, as to drop that as a principle and part of our religion, which would sacrifice religion itself to the lust of a raging tyrant? Must we believe, that a religion destroying tyrant is a righteous ruler? And must we own him to be a nursing father to the church? Shall we conclude, that the common bounds and limits, whereby the Almighty hath bounded and limited mankind, are removed by an article of our Confession of Faith, which hereby is turned into a court creed: Then welcome Hobs de cive, with all the rest of Pluto's train, who would babble us into a belief, that the world is to be governed according to the pleasure of wicked tyrants. I would fain hope at length the world would be awakened out of such ridiculous dreams, and be ashamed any more to own such fooleries. And it may be, our two royal brothers have contributed more to cure men of this moral madness than any who went before them. And this is the only advantage, I know, that the nations have reaped by their reign.

9. Though we deny that conquest can give a just title to a crown; yet we grant, in some cases, that by the peoples after-consent it may be turned into a just title. It is undeniable, when there is just ground of the war, if a prince subdue a whole land, who have justly forfeited their liberties, when by his grace he preserves them, he may make use of their right now forfeited, and they may resign their liberty to the conqueror, and consent that he be their king, upon fair and legal, and not tyrannical conditions. And even when the war is not just, but successful on the invading conquerors side, this may be an inducement to the conquered, if they be indeed free and unengaged to any other, to a submission, dedition, and delivery up of themselves to be the subjects of the victor, and to take him for their sovereign: as it is like the case was with the Jews in Caesar's time, whose government was translated by dedition to the Roman power; in the translation, when a-doing, there was a fault, but after it was done, it ceased; though the beginning was wrong, there was a post-fact, which made it right, and could not be dissolved, without an unjust disturbance of public order. Whence, besides what is said above, in answer to that much insisted instance of Christ's paying tribute, and commanding it to be paid to Caesar, the difficulty of that instance may be clearly solved. That tribute which he paid, Matth. xvii. 14. &c. and that about the payment whereof he was questioned, Matth. xxii. 21. seem to be two different tributes. Many think, very probably, they were not one and the same tribute. It is a question, for whom, and by whom that of Matth. xvii. was gathered; it is most likely, it was gathered by the officers of the temple for its service: however, the payment was made, with such caution (tacitely declining the strict right to exact it from him, but to avoid offence, in an act in itself unobliging) that their claim is left as much in the dark, as if the question had never been moved. The other, Matth. xxii. was exacted for Caesar: but to that captious question our Lord returns such an answer, as might both solve it, and evade the snare of the propounder, giving a general rule of giving to God and to Caesar each their own, without defining which of them had the right to the payment in question; whether Caesar should have it, or whether it should be paid only for the temple's use: upon which they marvelled, which they needed not do, if they had understood in his words an express and positive declaration of an obligation to make that payment to Caesar; for then they would have obtained one of their ends, in making him odious to the people, who were not satisfied with the payment of it. But however, the knot is loosed, by considering that they were now lawfully subject to the Roman Emperors, as their governors, to whom they were obliged (I do not say Christ was) to pay tribute. For they had yielded themselves unto, and owned the Roman dominion in Pompey, Caesar Augustus and Tiberius, ere this question about tribute paying was proposed to our Saviour; and therefore they who stuck at the payment of it, were a seditious party, dissenting from the body of the nation; else it is not supposeable readily, that their dominion in Judea could have been exercised long without some consent, sufficient to legitimate it to the present rulers; and this is the more likely, if we consider the confession of the Jews themselves, disavowing the power of capital punishment. It is not lawful for us to put any man to death, and owning Caesar as their king, with an exclusive abrenunciation of all other, we have no king but Caesar; as Paul also acknowledges, he ought to be judged at Caesar's bar, in his appeal to Caesar. It is also acknowledged by very good authors, that this was the tribute which Judas the Galilean stood up to free the people from; and that the sedition of those Jews that followed him, mentioned Acts v. 37. who mutinied upon this occasion, was, according to Gamaliel's speech, disallowed by that Sanhedrim, or council of the Jews. And it may be gathered out of Josephus, that the Jews of Hircanus' party came under the Roman power by consent and dedition, while they of Aristobulus' party looked upon the Romans as usurpers. Which difference continued till our Saviour's time, when some part of them acknowledged the Caesarean authority, some part looked upon it as an usurpation; and of this generally were the Pharisees. To confirm this, Calvin's testimony may be adduced, upon Matth. xxii. who saith, 'The authority of the Roman emperors was by common use approved and received among the Jews, whence it was manifest, that the Jews had now of their own accord imposed on themselves a law of paying the tribute, because they had passed over to the Romans the power of the sword.' And Chamiers panstrat. tom. 2 lib. 15. cap. 16. p. 635. 'What then? if Caesar's authority was from bad beginnings, did therefore Christ untruly say it was from above? Can no power, at first unjust, afterward become just? if that were so, then either none, or very few kingdoms would be just.'

10. As tyranny is a destructive plague to all the interests of men and Christians; to anarchy, the usual product of it, is no less pernicious, bringing a community into a paroxysm as deadly and dangerous. We must own government to be absolutely necessary, for the constitution and conservation of all societies. I shall not enter into a disquisition, let be determination of the species or kind of magistracy, whether monarchy aristocracy or democracy, be preferable. My dispute, at present, is not levelled against monarchy, but the present monarch: not against the institution of the species (though I believe, except we betake ourselves to the divine allowance and permission; we shall be as puzzled to find out the divine original of it, as cosmographers are in their search of the spring of Nilus, or theologues of the Father of Melchizedeck) but the constitution of this individual monarchy established among us, which, in its root and branch, spring and streams, in its original, nature, ends and effects, is diametrically opposite to religion and liberty; and because its contagion, universally converting and corrupting all the ends and orders of magistracy, doth affect and infect all the subordinate officers, deriving their power from such a filthy fountain; we must also subtract and deny their demanded acknowledgments as any way due, so long as they serve the pride and projects of such a wicked power: and do not reckon ourselves obliged by covenant, or any otherwise (though, in the third article of the solemn league, we are bound to preserve the rights and privileges of our parliaments, and consequently the honour and deference that's due to our peers, or other parliament-men, acting according to the trust committed to them, but not when they turn traitors engaged in a conspiracy with the tyrant) to own or defend a soulless shadow of a court cabal, made up of persons who have sold themselves to work wickedness, in conspiring with this throne of iniquity against the Lord, which is all we have for a parliament, whom we can in no ways own as our representatives, but must look upon them as perjured and perfidious traitors to God and their country, which they have betrayed into the hands of a tyrant; and therefore divested of that power and authority, which they had of the people as their representatives, which now is returned to the fountain. And therefore we must act as we can against them, and also what is necessary for securing of ourselves, religion and liberty, without them. We would think nobles, ennobled with virtue, a great mercy and encouragement; and if they would concur in the testimony for religion and liberty, we would be glad that they should lead the van, and prove themselves to be powers appointed by God, in acting for him in his interest. But for the want of their conduct, we must not surcease from that duty that they abandon, nor think that the concurrence of peers is so necessary to legitimate our actions, as that without that formality our resolutions to maintain the truth of God on all hazards, in a private capacity, were unlawful in the court of God and nature: but, on the contrary, must judge that their relinquishing or opposing their duty, which before God they are obliged to maintain, preserve, and promove, is so far from loosing our obligation, or exeeming us from our duty that it should rather press us to prosecute it with the more vigour, without suspending it upon their precedency. For now they can pretend to no precedency, when they do not answer the end of their own private advantage, they cease to be the ministers of God and of the people, and become private persons. And reason will conclude, 'That when the Ephori or trustees betray their trust, and sell, or basely give away the liberties and privileges of the people, which they were entrusted with, the people cannot be brought into a remediless condition; if a tutor waste and destroy the pupils estate, the law provides a remedy for the pupil, Jus popu. vind. cap. 15. page 335, 336.' 'The remedy, in this case, can only be, as every one must move in his own sphere, while all concur in the same duty; so if any, in higher place, become not only remiss, but according to the influence of their power would seduce others into their apostasy, it is their duty to resist and endeavour their reformation or removal: and if these more eminently entrusted shall turn directly apostates, and obstructive and destructive to common interests, the people of an inferior degree may step forward to occupy the places, and assert the interests, which they forefault and desert. Neither is this a breach of good order; for order is only a mean subordinate to, and intended for the glory of God, and the peoples good, and the regulation thereof must only be admitted as it is conducible, and not repugnant to these ends. A general's command to his soldiers in battle, does not impede the necessity of succession, in case of vacancy of any charge, either through death or desertion, even of such as in quality may be far inferior to those whose places they step into, Naphtali, page 151. first edition.' I do not assert this for private peoples aspiring into the capacity of primores of peers; but that they may do that which the peers desert, and dare not, or will not do, if the Lord put them in a capacity to do it. And more plainly I assert, that if the peers of the land whose duty it is principally to restrain and repress tyranny, either connive at it, or concur with it, and so abandon or betray their trust, then the common people may do it; at least are obliged to renounce, reject, and disown allegiance to the tyrant, without the peers. For which I offer these reasons. 1. Because all men have as much freedom and liberty by nature as peers have, being no more slaves than they; because slavery is a penal evil contrary to nature, and a misery consequent of sin, and every man created according to God's image, is a sacred thing; and also no more subjects to kings, &c. than they; freedom being natural to all (except freedom from subjection to parents, which is a moral duty, and most kindly and natural, and subjection of the wife to the husband, &c.) but otherwise as to civil and politic subjection, man, by nature, is born as free as beasts; no lion is born king of lions, nor no man born king of men; nor lord of men, nor representative of men, nor rulers of men, either supreme or subordinate; because none, by nature, can have those things that essentially constitute rulers, the calling of God, nor gifts and qualifications for it, nor the election of the people. 2. The original of all that power, that the primores or representatives can claim, is from the people, not from themselves; from whence derived they their being representatives, but from the people's commission or compact? when at the first constitution of parliaments, or public conventions for affairs of state, necessity put the people, who could not so conveniently meet all, to confer that honour and burden upon the best qualified, and who had chief interest by delegation. Hence, if the people give such a power, they may wave it when perverted, and act without their own impowered servants. 3. The people's power is greater than the power of any delegated or constituted by them; the cause is more than the effect; parliament-men do represent the people, the people do not represent the parliament: they are as tutors and curators unto the people, and in effect their servants deputed to oversee their public affairs, therefore if their power be less the people can act without them. 4. It were irrational to imagine, the people committing the administration of their weighty affairs unto them, did denude themselves of all their radical power; or that they can devolve upon them, or they obtain any other power but what is for the good and advantage of the people; therefore they have power to act without them, in things which they never resigned to them; for they cannot be deprived of that natural aptitude, and nature's birth-right, given to them by God and nature, to provide the most efficacious and prevalent means for the preservation of their rights and liberties. 5. As the people have had power before they made peers, and have done much without them; so these primores could never do without them, therefore in acts of common interest, the peers depend more upon the people than the people do upon them. 6. All these primeve rights, that gave rise to societies, are equal to both people and peers, whereof the liberty to repress and reject tyranny is a chief one. The people as well as peers have a hand in making the king, and other judges also, as is clear from Deut. xvii. 14. Judg. ix. 6. 1 Sam. xi. 15. 2 Kings xiv. 21. therefore they may unmake them as well as they. To seek to preserve the ends of government, when they are overturned, is essentially requisite to all societies, and therefore common and competent to all constituents of these societies, superiors or inferiors. The glory of God and security of religion, the end of all Christian government, doth concern all equally. As every one equally is bound to obey God rather than man, so violence in this case destroys both the commonwealth, and maketh the end and means of government, and the injured persons obligation thereto to cease; and this equally to every man of private or public capacity. In the concern of religion at least, we must not think because we are not nobles, or in authority, that the care of it, or reformation thereof does nothing pertain to us; nay in that, and carrying on the work thereof, there is an equality: as in the erection of the Old Testament tabernacle, all the people were to contribute alike half a shekel, Exod. xxx. that it might be for a remembrance before the Lord. Hence it follows, if we disown the supreme ruler, and the inferior confederate with him, and cannot have the concurrence of others: 'now through the manifest and notorious perversion of the great ends of society and government, the bond thereof being dissolved, we liberated therefrom, do relapse into our primeve liberty and privilege: and accordingly, as the similitude of our case, and exigence of our cause doth require, may, upon the very same principles, again join and associate, for our better defence and preservation, as we did at first enter into societies,' Nap. p. 150. yet, whatever we may do in this case, we are not for presumptuous assumptions of authority which maleversers have forefaulted: neither are we for new erections of government, but are for keeping the society, of which we are members, entire, in an endeavour to have all our fellow members united unto God, and to one another, in religion and liberty, according to the bond of the solemn league and covenant. Certain it is, that greater societies, under one government, may in some cases make a secession, and divide into lesser, without sedition: or else, how would there be so many distinct commonwealths in the world? seeing at first all was under one head: and how comes it to pass, that there are so many kingdoms in Europe, when it can be instanced, when all, or the most part, were under one Roman emperor? But this, in our circumstance, is noway expedient, neither was it ever in projection. But our aim is to abstract ourselves inoffensively, and maintain our rights that remain unrobbed, and to adhere closely to the fundamental constitutions, laws, and laudable practices of our native kingdom.

II. We own the obligation of our sacred covenants, unrepealably and indispensibly binding to all the duties of christian subjection to magistrates. But we deny, that hereby we are bound either to maintain monarchy, especially thus perverted; nor to own the authority of either of the two monarchs that have monarchized or tyrannized over us these twenty-seven years past. For as to the first, we assert, That that which is in its own nature mutable, cannot be simply sworn unto to be maintained and preserved, but hypothetically at most, else it were simply sinful; since it were to make things in their own nature, and in the providence of God changeable, unchangeable; yea it were a downright swearing not to comply with, but to spurn against, the various vicissitudes of divine providence, the great rector of the universe. And it is unquestionable, that when things alterable and unalterable are put in the same oath, to make the engagement lawful the things must be understood, as they are in their own nature, and no otherwise: else both the imposer and the taker grievously transgress; the former, in taking upon him what is in the power of no mortal, and a contradiction to the prerogative of the immortal God; and the other, in owning that power as just. Hence when these two fall to be in the same oath, they must be so understood as it may not be made a snare to the conscience of the swearer. For it may fall so out in the providence of God, that the preservation of both is in all respects made impossible: and an adhesion to the one, may so far interfere with the preservation of the other, as if the mutable and that which hath no objective obligation to be stuck to the other, which with the loss of all interests we are to maintain, must be abandoned; yea, that which was sworn to be maintained as a mean only, and a mutable one too, may not only cease to be a mean, but may actually destroy the main end, and then it is to be laid aside, because then it inverts the order of things. Hence also it may be questioned, if it were not more convenient, to leave out those things that are alterable in themselves, out of the same oath with things unalterable, and put them in a distinct oath or covenant by themselves; as we see Jehojadah did 2 Kings xi. 17. 'He made a covenant between the Lord, and the king, and the people, that they should be the Lord's people; between the king also and the people.' Here are two distinct covenants; the one made with God, about things eternally obligatory, wherein the king and people engage themselves upon level ground to serve the Lord, and Joash the king, his treacherous dealing with God in that matter, brought the curse of that covenant upon him: the other covenant was civil, about things alterable relating to points of government and subjection. And as he, by virtue of that prior covenant, had obliged himself, under the pain of the curse thereof, to carry as one covenanted to God with the people, and so not to tyrannize over his brethren: so, the people, by virtue of that same covenant, were to yield obedience, but in nothing to acknowledge him, as having power or authority to countermand God's command; neither had it been an act of disloyalty, to have broken down his groves, which he had, with the addition of the guilt of perjury, set up, and to have bound his ungrateful hands from the blood of the gracious Zechariah: a perfect parallel to our case under the former dominator, save that it was outdone as to all dimensions of wickedness by him. To speak more plainly, the religious part of our covenant is of an eternal obligation; but as to the civil part, it is impossible it can ever be so, unless it be well and cautiously understood; that is, unless instead of any species of government, as monarchy, &c. we put in magistracy itself. For this is that power which is of God; but monarchy, &c. is only a human creature, about the creation whereof men take a liberty, according to what suits them best in their present circumstances. And as to this species of monarchy; men are never left at liberty to clothe therewith any inept or impious person. And they are perfectly loosed from it. 1. When that species of government becomes opposite to the ends of government, and is turned tyranny, especially when a legal establishment is pretended, then it affects with its contagion the very species itself: the house is to be pulled down, when the leprosy is got into the walls and foundation. 2. When it is exercised, it is turned inept for answering the ends of its erection, and prejudicial to the main thing for which government is given, to wit, the gospel and the coming of Christ's kingdom: hence it is promised to the church, Isa. xlix. 23. 'Kings shall be nursing fathers to the church:'——And Isa. lii. 15. It is promised to the Mediator that 'Kings shall shut their mouths,'——i.e. never a word in their head, but out of reverence and respect to his absolute sovereignty, they shall take the law from him, without daring to contract, far less to take upon them to prescribe in the house of God, as they in their wisdom think fit. 3. When providence, without any sinful hand, makes that species impossible to be kept up, without the ruin of that for which it was erected: when things comes to this push, whosoever are clothed with the power, are then under an obligation to comply with that alteration of providence, for the safety of the people; else they declare themselves unworthy of rule, and such who would sacrifice the interest of their people to their particular interest; in which case the people may make their public servant sensible, he is at his highest elevation but a servant. Hence now, when this species named in the covenant, viz. monarchy, is by law so vitiate, as it becomes the mean and instrument of the destruction of all the ends of that covenant, and now by law transmitted to all successors as a hereditary, pure, perfect and perpetual opposition to the coming of Christ's kingdom, so that as long as there is one to wear that crown, (but Jehovah will in righteousness execute Coniah's doom upon the race, Jer. xxii. ult. 'Write this man childless'——) and enter heir to the government as now establishment, he must be an enemy to Christ; there is no other way left, but to think on a new model moulded according to the true pattern. As to the second, we are far less obliged to own and acknowledge the interest of any of the two monarchs, that we have been mourning under these many years, from these sacred covenants. For, as to the first of them, Charles II. Those considerations did cassate his interest, as to any covenant obligation to own him. 1. In these covenants we are not sworn absolutely to maintain the king's person and authority, but only conditionally, in the preservation and defence of religion and liberties. Now, when this condition was not performed, but, on the contrary, professedly resolved never to be fulfilled; and when he laid out himself to the full of his power and authority, for the destruction of that reformed religion and liberties of the kingdom, which he solemnly swore to defend when he received the crown, only in the terms that he should be a loyal subject to Christ, and a true and faithful servant to the people, in order to which a magistrate is chosen, and all his worth, excellency, and valuableness, consists in his answering that purpose; for the excellency of a mean, as such, is to be measured from the end, and its answerableness thereunto: we were not then obliged, to maintain such an enemy to these precious interests. 2. Because, as the people were bound to him, so he was bound to them by the same covenant, being only on these terms entrusted with the government, all which conditions he perfidiously broke, whereupon only his authority and our allegiance were founded; and thereby we were loosed from all reciprocal obligation to him by virtue of that covenant. 3. Though he and we stood equally engaged to the duties of that covenant, only with this difference, that the king's capacity being greater, he was the more obliged to have laid out that power, in causing all to stand to their covenant engagements, as Josiah did, 2 Chron. xxxiv. 31, 32, 33. (but alas! there was never a Josiah in the race,) yet he rose up to the height of rebellion against God and the people, in heaven daring insolency, and not only brake, but burnt that covenant, and made laws to cass and rescind it, and made a not-concurring in this conspiracy, a note of incapacity for any trust in church or state.

Therefore to plead for an owning of him in this case, were only concludent of this, that the generation had dreamed themselves into such a distraction, as may be feared will be pursued with destruction, and make such dreamers the detestation of posterity, and cause all men proclaim the righteousness of God, in bringing ruin upon them by that very power and authority they owned in such circumstances. 4. It is a known maxim, 'He that does not fulfil the conditions, falls from the benefit of it, and whoso remits the obligation of the party obliged upon condition, cannot exact it afterwards.' So then it is evident, that the subjects of Scotland were by king Charles II. his consent, yea express command, disengaged from so much of that covenant as could be alledged in favours of himself: so that all that he did, by burning and rescinding these covenants, and pursuing all who endeavoured to adhere to them, was a most explicit liberating his subjects from, and remission of their allegiance to him, (and in this we had been fools if we had not taken him at his word;) yea he rescinded his very coronation, by an act of his first parliament after his return, which did declare null and void all acts, constitutions and establishments, from the year 1633 to that present session, not excepting those for his own coronation, after which he was never recrowned, and therefore we could not own that right, which himself did annul. But as for his royal brother, James the VII. and II. we cannot indeed make use of the same reasons and arguments to disown him, as we have now adduced; yet, as we shall prove afterwards, this covenant does oblige to renounce him. So it is so clear, that it needs no illustration, that there lies no obligation from this covenant to own him. 1. Because, as he is an enemy to the whole of our covenant, and especially to these terms upon which authority it is to be owned therein: so he will not come under the bond of this covenant, nor any other compact with the people, but intrude himself upon the throne, in such a way as overturns the basis of our government, and destroys all the liberties of a free people, which by covenant we are bound to preserve, and consequently, as inconsistent therewith, to renounce his usurpation. For, a prince that will set himself up without any transactions with the people, or conditions giving security for religion and liberty, is an usurping tyrant, not bounded by any law but his own lusts. And to say to such an one, reign thou over us, is all one as to say, come thou and play the tyrant over us, and let thy lust and will be a law to us: which is both against scripture and natural sense. If he be not a king upon covenant terms, either expresly or tacitely, or general stipulations according to the word of God, and laws of the land, he cannot be owned as a father, protector, or tutor, having any fiduciary power entrusted to him over the common wealth, but as a lawless and absolute dominator, assuming to himself a power to rule or rage as he lists: whom to own were against our covenants: for there we are sworn to maintain his majesty's just and lawful authority, and by consequence not to own usurpation and tyranny, stated in opposition to religion and liberty, which there also we are engaged to maintain. Sure, this cannot be lawful authority which is of God, for God giveth no power against himself; nor can it be of the people, who had never power granted them of God to create one over them, with a liberty to destroy them, their religion and liberty, at his pleasure. 2. As he is not, nor will not be our covenanted and sworn king (and therefore we cannot be his covenanted and sworn subjects;) so he is not nor cannot be our crowned king, and therefore we must not be his liege subjects, owning fealty and obedience to him. For, 'according to the national covenant, as all lieges are to maintain the king's authority, consistent with the subjects liberties; which, if they be innovated or prejudged, such confusion would ensue, as this realm could be no more a free monarchy;—so for the preservation of true religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom, it is statute by the 8th act, parl. 1. repeated in the 99th act, parl. 7th, ratified in the 23d act, parl. 11th, and 14th act, parl. 12th of king James VI, and 4th act. of king Charles I. that all kings and princes, at their coronation and reception of their princely authortity, shall make their faithful promise by their solemn oath, in the presence of the eternal God, that enduring the whole time of their lives, they shall serve the same eternal God, to the uttermost of their power, according as he hath required in his most holy word, contained in the Old and New Testaments; and according to the same word, shall maintain the true religion of Christ Jesus, the preaching of his holy word, the due and right ministration of the sacraments, now received and preached within this realm (according to the confession of faith immediately preceding) and shall abolish and gainst and all false religion, contrary to the same; and shall rule the people committed to their charge, according to the will and command of God, revealed in his foresaid word, and according to the laudable law and constitutions received in this realm, no ways repugnant to the said will of the eternal God; and shall procure, to the uttermost of their power, to the kirk of God, and whole Christian people, true and perfect peace in all time coming, and that they shall be careful to root out of their empire all hereticks, and enemies to the true worship of God, who shall be convicted by the true kirk of God of the foresaid crimes.' Now, this coronation oath he hath not taken, he will not, he cannot take; and therefore cannot be our crowned king according to law. As there be also many other laws, incapacitating his admission to the crown, being a professed papist, and no law for it at all, but one of his own making, by a packed cabal of his own complices, a parliament, wherein himself presided as commissioner, enacting materially his succession, and rescinding all these ancient laws: which act of succession (which is all the legal right he can pretend to in Scotland) because it cannot be justified, therefore his right cannot be owned, which is founded upon the subversion of our ancient laws. But as he cannot be our legally crowned king, so he is not so much as formally crowned. And therefore before his inauguration, whatever right to be king (whom the representatives may admit to the government) he may pretend to, by hereditary succession, yet he cannot formally be made king, till the people make a compact with him, upon terms for the safety of their dearest and nearest liberties, even though he were not disabled by law. He might, as they say, pretend to some right to the thing, but he could have no right in the thing. The kings of Scotland, while uncrowned, can exercise no royal government; for the coronation in concrete, according to the substance of the act, is no ceremony (as they, who make conscience itself but a ceremony, call it) nor an accidental ingredient in the constitution of a king, but as it is distinctive, so it is constitutive: it distinguished Saul from all Israel, and made him from no king to be a king; it is dative, and not only declarative; it puts some honour upon him that he had not before. 3. Though the laws should not strike against his coronation, and though the representatives legally should take the same measures with him that they took with his brother, and admit him upon the terms of the covenant; yet after such doleful experiences of such transactions with these sons of Belial, who must not be taken with hands, nor by the hand, it were hard to trust, or entrust them with the government, even though they should make the fairest professions; since they, whose principles is to keep no faith to heretics (as they call us) and who will be as absolute in their promises as they are in their power, have deservedly forfeited all credit and trust with honest men; so that none could rationally refer the determination of a half crown reckoning to any of them, far less own them and their government in the management of the weightiest affairs of state, since their malversations are written in such bloody characters, as he that runs may read them. At least it were wisdom, and is our duty, to take our measures from the general assembly's procedure with the other brother, before his admission to the government, to suspend our allegiance to him, until authority be legally devolved upon him, and founded upon, and bounded by terms, giving all security for religion and liberty.

12. As I said, before wary prudence, in waving such an impertinent and ticklish question, cannot be condemned; since whatever he may be in conscience, no man in law can be obliged, so far to surrender the common privilege of all mankind, to give an account of all his inward thoughts, which are always said to be free. And as in nothing they are more various, so in nothing they can be more violented, than to have our opinion and sentiments of the current government extorted from us, a declining of which declaration of thoughts, where no ouvert act in project or practice can be proven against it, cannot be treason in any law in the world: so a cautelous answer, in such a ticklish, and intrapping imposition, cannot be censured in point of lawfulness or expediency, even though much be conceded, to stop the mouths of these bloody butchers, gaping greedily after the blood of the answerer; if he do not really own, but give them to understand, he cannot approve of this tyranny. But as these poor faithful witnesses, who were helped to be most free, have always been honoured with the most signal countenance of the Lord in a happy issue of their testimony: so those that used their prudentials most, in seeking shifts to shun severity, and studying to satisfy these inquisitors with their stretched concessions, were ordinarily more exposed to snares, and found less satisfaction in their sufferings even though they could say much to justify, or at least extenuate their shiftings. I knew one, who had proof of this, who afterwards was ashamed of this kind of prudence. A short account of whose managing of answers to this question, because it may conduce somewhat to the explication of it, may here be hinted. The question moved after the usual form, was, do ye own the authority of king James VII. In answer to which, he pleaded first, for the immunity of his thoughts, which he said were not subject to theirs or any tribunal. When this could not be an evasion from their extortions, he objected the ambiguity of the terms in which the question was conceived, being capable of divers senses: and enquired, what they meant by authority? What, by owning authority? By authority, whether did they mean the administration of it as now improved? If so, then he was not satisfied with it: or the right, as now established? If so, then he was not clear to give his opinion of it, as being neither significant nor necessary; and that it was fitter for lawyers and those that were better acquaint with the secrets of government, than for him to dispute it.

Again he asked, what they meant by owning? Either it is passive subjection, that he did not decline; or active acknowledgment of it and that he said he looked upon as all the suffrage he could give to its establishment in his station, which he must demur upon some scruple. The replies he received were very various, and some of them very rare, either for ignorance or imposture. Sometimes, it was answered: to own the king's authority, is to take the oath of allegiance; this he refused. Some answered, it is to engage never to rise in arms against the king, upon any pretence whatsoever; this he refused likewise. Others explained it to be, to acknowledge his right to be king: to his he answered, when the authority is legally devolved upon him by the representatives of both kingdoms, it was time enough for him to give account of his sentiments. Others defined it, to own him to be a lawful king by succession. To this he answered, he did not understand succession could make a man formally king, if there were not some other way of conveyance of it; it might put him in the nearest capacity to be king, but could not make him king.

Some did thus paraphrase upon it, that he must own him to be his sovereign Lord under God, and God's vicegerent, to be obeyed in all things lawful. To this he answered, whom God appoints, and the people choose according to law, he would own. When those shifts would not do, but from time to time being urged to a categorical answer; he told them, he was content to live in subjection to any government providence set up; but for owning the present constitution as of God, and according to law, he durst not acknowledge it, nor own any mortal as his lawful sovereign, but in terms consistent with the covenant securing religion and liberty. This not satisfying, when he came to a more pinching trial; he declared, he owned all lawful authority according to the word of God, and all authority that was the ordinance of God by his preceptive will, and he could be subject to any; but further to acknowledge it, he behoved to have more clearness; for sometimes a nation might be charged with that, 'Ye have set up kings, and not by me,' &c. Further he conceded, he owned his providential advancement to the throne; he owned as much as he thought did oblige him to subject himself with patience; he owned him to be as lawful, as providence possessing him of the throne of his ancestors, and lineal succession, as presumed next in blood and line, could make him: but still he declined to own him as lawful king, and alledged that was all one, whether he was lawful or not, he refused not subjection, distinguishing it always from allegiance.

But all these concessions did not satisfy them, and alledged he might say all this of a tyrant; and therefore commanded him to give it under hand, to own not only the lineal, but the legal succession of king James VII. to the crown of Scotland; which he did, upon a fancy, that legal did not import lawful, but only the formality of their law; withal protesting, he might not be interpreted to approve of his succession. But this was a vain protestation against fact. However, by this we see, what is owning this authority, in the sense of the inquisitors.

The result of all is, to acknowledge allegiance to the present possessor, and to approve his pretended authority as lawful, rightful and righteous; which indeed is the true sense of the words, and any other, that men can forge or find out, is strained. For, to speak properly, if we own his authority in any respect, we own it to be lawful: for every authority, that is owned to be authority indeed, is lawful; authority always importing authorization, and consisting in a right or call to rule, and is formally and essentially contradistinct to usurpation: where ever the place of power is merely usurped, there is no authority but according to his word; a stile without truth, a barely pretended nominal equivocal authority, no real denomination: if we then own this man's authority, we own it to be lawful authority: and if we cannot own it so, we cannot own it all. For it is most suitable, either to manly ingenuity, or Christian simplicity, to speak properly, and to take words always in the sense, that they to whom they are speaking will understand them, without equivocating.

These preliminaries being thus put by, which do contribute to clear somewhat in this controversy, and both furnish us with some arguments for, and solutions in most of the objections against my thesis, in answer to the questions above stated. I set it down thus: A people long oppressed with the encroachments of tyrants and usurpers, may disown all allegiance to their pretended authority, and when imposed upon to acknowledge it, may and must rather chuse to suffer, than to own it. And consequently we cannot, as matters now stand, own, acknowledge, or approve the pretended authority of king James VII. as lawful king of Scotland; as we could not, as matters then stood, own the authority of Charles II. This consequence is abundantly clear from the foregoing deduction, demonstrating their tyranny and usurpation. In prosecuting of this general thesis, which will evince the particular hypothesis, I shall, 1. Adduce some historical instances, whence it may be gathered, that this is not altogether without a precedent, but that people have disowned allegiance to tyrants and usurpers before now. 2. Deduce it from the dictates of reason. 3. Confirm it by scripture arguments.

I. Albeit, as was shewed before, this question, as now stated, is in many respects unprecedented; yet the practice, which in our day hath been the result of it, to disown, or not to own prevailing dominators usurping the government, or abusing it, is not so alien from the examples of history, but that by equivalency or consequence it may be collected from and confirmed by instances.

1. To begin at home, besides many passages related already for confirmation, we may add, (1.) That for about 1025 years, the people had in their choice whom to own, or admit to succeed in the government, 'Even though the kingdom was hereditary; and used to elect, not such who were nearest in blood and line, but these that were judged most fit in government, being of the same progeny of Fergus,' Buchanan's History of Scotland, book vi. pag. 195. in the life of Kenneth III. This continued until the days of Kenneth III. who to cover his villainous murder of his brother's son Malcolm, and prevent his, and secure his own son's succession, procured this charter for tyranny, the settlement of the succession of the next in line from the parliament: which, as it pretended the prevention of many inconveniencies, arising from contentions and competitions about the succession; so it was limited by laws, precluding the succession of fools or monsters, and preserving the people's liberty to shake off the yoke when tyranny should thereby be introduced: otherwise it would have been not only an irrational surrender of all their own rights, and enslaving the posterity, but an irreligious contempt of providence, refuting and anticipating its determination in such a case. However it is clear, before this time, that as none but the fittest were admitted to the government; so if any did usurp upon it, or afterwards did degenerate into tyranny, they took such order with him, as if he had not been admitted at all; as is clear in the instances of the first period, and would never own every pretender to hereditary succession. (2.) As before Kenneth's days, it is hard to reckon the numerous instances of kings that were dethroned, or imprisoned, or slain, upon no other account than that of their oppression and tyranny; so afterwards they maintained the same power and privilege of repressing them, when ever they began to encroach. And although no nation hath been more patient towards bad kings, as well as loyal towards good ones; yet, in all former times, they understood so well the right they had, and the duty they owed to their own preservation, as that they seldom failed of calling the exorbitantly flagitious to an account. And albeit, instead of condoling or avenging the death of the tyrannous, they have often both excused and justified it, yet no kingdom hath inflicted severer punishments upon the murders of just and righteous princes: and therefore, though they did neither enquire after, nor animadvert upon those that slew James III. a flagitious tyrant, yet they did, by most exquisite torments, put them to death who slew James the I. a virtuous monarch. Hence, because these and other instances I mind to adduce of deposing tyrants, may be excepted against, as not pertinent to my purpose, who am not pleading for exauctoration and deposition of tyrants, being impracticable in our case: I shall once for all remove that, and desire it may be considered, (1.) That though we cannot formally exauctorate a tyrant; yet he may, by law itself, fall from his right, and may exauctorate himself, by his laws by whom kings reign; and this is all we plead for as a foundation of not owning him. (2.) Though we have not the same power, yet we have the same grounds, and as great and good, if not greater and better reasons to reject and disown our tyrant, as they, whose example is here adduced, had to depose of their tyrannizing princes. (3.) If they had power and ground to depose them, then a fortiori, they had power and ground to disown them; for that is less, and included in the other, and this we have. (4.) Though it should be granted, that they did not disown them before they were deposed; yet it cannot be said that they did disown them only because they were deposed: for it is not deposition that makes a tyrant; it only declares him to be justly punished for what he was before. As the sentence of a judge does not make a man a murderer or thief, only declares him convict of these crimes, and punishable for them; it is their own committing them that makes him criminal: and, as before the sentence, having certain knowledge of the fact, we might disown the man's innocency or honesty; so a ruler's acts of tyranny and usurpation make him a tyrant and usurper, and give ground to disown his just and legal authority; which he can have no more than a murderer or thief can have innocency or honesty. (3.) We find also examples of their disowning kings undeposed; as king Baliol was disowned with his whole race, for attempting to enslave the kingdom's liberties to foreign power. And if this may be done for such an attempt, as the greatest court parasites, and sycophants consent; what then shall be done for such as attempt to subject the people to domestic or intestine slavery? shall we refuse to be slaves to one without, and be, and own ourselves contented slaves to one within the kingdom? It is known also that king James the I. his authority was refused by his subjects in France, so long as he was a prisoner to the English there, though he charged them upon their allegiance, not to fight against the party who had his person prisoner: they answered, They owned no prisoner for their king, nor owned no allegiance to a prisoner. Hence princes may learn, though people submit to their government; yet their resignation of themselves to their obedience is not so full, as that they are obliged to own allegiance to them, when either morally or physically they are incapacitate to exercise authority over them. They that cannot rule themselves cannot be owned as rulers over a people.

2. Neither hath there been any nation, but what at one time or other hath furnished examples of this nature. The English history gives account, how some of their kings have been dealt with by their subjects, for impieties against the law and light of nature, and encroachments upon the laws of the land. Vortigern was dethroned for incestuously marrying his own sister. Neither did ever blasphemies, adulteries, murders, plotting against the lives of innocents, and taking them away by poison or razor, use to escape the animadversion of men, before they were priest-ridden unto a belief that princes persons were sacred. And if men had that generosity now this man that now reigns might expect some such animadversion. And we find also king Edward, and Richard the II. were deposed, for usurpation upon laws and liberties, in doing whereof the people avowed, They would not suffer the laws of England to be changed.

Surely the people of England must now be far degenerate, who having such laws transmitted to them from their worthy ancestors, and they themselves being born to the possession of them without a change, do now suffer them to be so encroached upon, and mancipate themselves, and leave their children vassals to popery, and slaves to tyranny.

3. The Dutch also, who have the best way of guiding of kings of any that ever had to do with them (witness their having so many of them in chains, now in Batavia in the East Indies) are not wanting for their part to furnish us with examples. When the king of Spain would not condescend to govern them according to their ancient laws, and rule for the good of the people, they declared him to be fallen from the seigniory of the Netherlands, and so erected themselves into a flourishing common-wealth. It will not be amiss to transcribe some of the words of the edict of the states general to this purpose. It is well known, (say they) 'That a prince and lord of a country is ordained, by God, to be sovereign and head over his subjects, to preserve and defend them from all injuries, force, and violence; and that if the prince therefore faileth therein, and instead of preserving his subjects, doth outrage and oppress them, depriveth them of their privileges and ancient customs, commandeth them, and will be served of them as slaves; they are no longer bound to respect him as their sovereign lord, but to esteem of him as a tyrant, neither are they bound to acknowledge him as their prince, but may abandon him, &c.' And with this agrees the answer William, prince of Orange, to the edict of proscription, published against him by Philip the II. There is, says he, 'A reciprocal bond betwixt the lord and his vassal; so that if the lord break the oath, which he hath made unto his vassal, the vassal is discharged of the oath made unto his lord.' This was the very argument of the poor suffering people of Scotland, whereupon they disowned the authority of Charles the II.

4. The monarchy of France is very absolute; yet there also the state hath taken order with their tyrants; not only have we many instances of resistances made against them, but also of disowning, disabling, and invalidating their pretended authority, and repressing their tyranny. So was the two Childerici served: so also Sigebertus, Dagabertus, and Lodowick the II. kings of France.

5. The great body of Germany moves very slowly, and is inured to bear great burdens: yet there also we find Joanna of Austria, mother of Charles V. was put to perpetual imprisonment: which example is adduced by the earl of Morton, in his discourse to the queen of England (whereof I rehearsed a part before) vindicating the deposing and disowning queen Mary of Scotland. 'If, saith he, we compare her with Joanna of Austria—what did that poor wretch commit, but that she could not want a little lustful pleasure as a remedy necessary for her age? and yet, poor creature, she suffered that punishment, of which our dame, convicted of most grievous crimes, now complains.'—Buchanan's History of Scotland, book xx. p. 748. The duke of Saxon, the landgrave of Hesse, and the magistrates of Magdeburgh, joined in a war against her son Charles V. and drew up a conclusion by resolution of lawyers, wherein are these words——'Neither are we bound to him by any other reason, than if he keep the conditions on which he was created emperor. By the laws themselves it is provided, That the superior magistrate shall not infringe the right of the inferior, and if the superior magistrate exceed the limits of his power, and command that which is wicked, not only we need not obey him, but if he offer force we may resist him.' Which opinion is confirmed by some of the greatest lawyers, and even some who are patrons of tyranny, Grotius none of the greatest enemies of tyrants, de jure belli. lib. 1. chap. 4. p. 11. saith out of Barclaius, and with him, That the king doth lose his power when he seeketh the destruction of his subjects. It was upon the account of the tyranny of that bloody house of Austria over the Helvetians, that they shook off the rule and government of that family, and established themselves into a republic. And at this present time, upon the same accounts, the tyranny and treachery of this imperial majesty, the Hungarians have essayed to maintain and justify a revolt in disowning the emperor, now for several years.

6. Poland is an elective kingdom, and so cannot but be fertile of many instances of casting off tyrants. Henricus Valesius, disowned for fleeing, and Sigismundus for violating his faith to the states, may suffice. Lex Rex, q. 24. p. 217.

7. In Denmark, we find Christiernus their king, was, for his intolerable cruelty, put from the kingdom, he and all his posterity, and after twenty years did end his life in prison.

8. In Swedland, within the compass of one century, the people deposed and banished the two Christierns, and dethroned and imprisoned Ericus, for their oppressions and tyranny, and for pursuing the destruction of their subjects.

9. The Portuguese, not many years ago, laid aside and confined Alphonsus their king, for his rapines and murders.

10. Some dukes of Venice have been so disowned by these commonwealths men, that laying aside their royal honours as private men, they have spent their days in monasteries. Buchan. de jure regni apud Scotos.

11. If we will resolve the old Roman histories, we shall find no small store of such examples, both in the time of their kings, consuls, and emperors. Their seventh king Tarquinius Superbus was removed by the people, for his evident usurpation: saith Livius, 'That is, for he had nothing for a right to the government, but mere force, and got the rule neither by the people's consent and choice, nor by the authority of the senators.' So afterwards the empire was taken from Vitellius, Heliogabulus, Maximinus, Didius, Julianus, Lex Rex, ubi supra.

12. But it will be said, Can there be any instances of the primitive christians adduced? Did ever they, while groaning under the most insupportable tyranny of their persecuting emperors, disown their authority, or suffer for not owning it? To this I answer, 1. What they did, or did not of this kind, is not of moment to enquire.: seeing their practice and example, under such disadvantages, can neither be known exactly, nor what is known of it be accommodated to our case: for (1.) They were never forced to give their judgment, neither was the question ever put to them, whether they owned their authority or not? If they transgressed the laws, they were liable to the punishment, they craved no more of them. (2.) They confess themselves to be strangers, that had no establishments by law; and therefore they behoved to be passively subject, when in no capacity to resist; there was no more required of them. Yet Lex Rex Quest. 35. page 371. cites Theodoret affirming, 'Then evil men reigned through the unmanliness of the subjects.' (3.) Their examples are not imitable in all things; they were against resistance, which we doubt not to prove is lawful against tyrannical violence: many of them refused to flee from the fury of persecutors: they ran to martyrdom, when neither cited nor accused; and to obtain the crown thereof they willingly yielded up their lives and liberties also to the rage of tyrants. We cannot be obliged to all these. 2. Yet we find some examples not altogether unapplicable to this purpose. When Barochbach, the pretended king of the Jews, after the destruction of Jerusalem, set himself as king in Bitter, a city in Arabia; the Christians that were in his precincts, refused to own him as king; which was one great cause of his persecuting them. It is true he persecuted them also for other things, as for their not denying Christ; so are we persecuted for many other things, than for our simple disowning of the king: yet this is reckoned as a distinct cause of their suffering, by Mr. Mede, on the Revel. Part. 1. Page 43. Gees Magist. Origin. Chap. 10. Sect. 7. Page 361. The same last cited author shews, that when Albinus, Niger, and Cassius, successively usurped the empire, having none of them any legal investiture, the Christians declined the recognition of their claim, and would not own them; and that upon this Tertullian says, That is, the Christians could never be found to be Albinians, or Nigrians, or Cassians, meaning they were never owners of these men for magistrates. And so may we say, We may be ashamed to be found amongst the Charlites and Jacobites of these times. Not unlike is the passage of Ambrose, who, in favours of Valentinian the rightful governor, contested against Maximus the tyrant, and not only disowned him, but excommunicated him, for which he was threatened with death. And yet it is observable, that when Maximus offered to interpose his power in defence of Ambrose, that he might not be banished by Justina the empress, he would not accept of the help of Maximus, whose power he disallowed and disowned. Whence I observe, that it is not without a precedent for a minister to disown a tyrant, to refuse favour from him: yea, and to excommunicate him, yea, even without the concurrence of his fainting brethren; for all which some of our faithful ministers have been much condemned in our day, especially Mr. Donald Cargil for excommunicating Charles the II, and James, Duke of York, as if such a thing had never been done before: whereas, we see what Ambrose did to Maximus. And this same faithful minister, Ambrosius minister at Milan, in Italy, did also hold out of the assembly of the Christians Theodosius the emperor, though a most virtuous prince, for that grievous scandal committed by him, against the innocent people at Thessalonica in killing so many of them in a passionate transport. But, 3. since this objection of primitive Christians is much insisted on, both against this and the head of defensive arms: I shall further take notice of several distinctions, that do make the difference between their case and ours very vast. (1.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince of the common religion of his subjects, but distinct from some of them, whom yet he does not seek to entice to his religion, but gives them liberty, and the benefit of the law as other subjects: which was the case of many in these primitive times sometimes. And a prince, by all means, both foul and fair, pressing to a revolt from the true, and to embrace a false religion. In this case (which is ours with a witness) it must be granted we should be wary, that we neither engage with him, nor own allegiance to him, when he would withdraw us from our allegiance to God. (2.) There is a great difference betwixt a prince persecuting the true religion, which only a few of his subjects here and there did profess, who in regard of their paucity were never in capacity to be looked upon as the body of the people, impowering him as their public servant; (which was their case) and a prince persecuting that religion, which was professed by the body of the nation, when they set him up. In this latter case, men of great sense have denied he should be owned for a prince, because then he is stated against the common good. This was our case under the former king, and yet under this, though all professors be not now persecuted, the public religion and ancient reformation is persecuted in a few, whom he intends to destroy, and in their destruction to bury it. (3.) There is a difference betwixt a prince persecuting religion, publicly owned and received of his subjects, yet never approved nor confirmed by law (as it was not in the primitive times) and a prince persecuting religion ratified and established by the laws of the land, which is our case. It will seem clear to every soul, not benighted with court darkness, that he then of course, and by law, falleth from his right in this case, because now he is not only stated against the common good, but against the very laws by which the subjects must be ruled. Then he ruleth not as a prince, to whom the law giveth his measures and bounds, but rageth as a tiger and tyrant, and ought to be carried towards as such. (4.) There is a difference betwixt a prince suppressing that religion established by law, which he never professed, nor never gave his consent to these laws (as might be the case of some of the Arian emperors) though it be unlawful for any people to set up any mortal over them, who is not in this case bound to the good behaviour; and a prince, opposing and oppressing that religion, which himself hath professed, and is ratified by laws with his own consent: which was our case under the former king, who did give the most solemn ratification of them that ever was given, but afterwards most perfidiously retracted it.

As also this apostate papist, did sometime profess himself protestant, and consented to the laws establishing it, and the penal statutes against papists, though now he is going about to raze all, and ruin that alone valuable treasure of our nation, religion. (5.) There is a difference betwixt a prince consenting to laws establishing religion which he now persecuteth (which might have been the case of Julian the apostate) and a prince, who not only consented to these laws, but who did upon these very terms, and no other, get and receive his crown and sceptre, that he should preserve the religion as reformed, and protect as a father the professors thereof, and maintain the laws establishing it, which yet he, perfidiously, being once settled in the government, breaks, casts, cassates and overturns (which was done by Charles) or, and a prince who will be bounded by the laws consented to, nor be bound to the observation of any laws whatsoever; but challenges it as his prerogative royal, to be absolute above all laws, and denying all security upon terms, is free to destroy religion and liberty, and all the valuable interests of the nation, when he pleases. This is James's character. (6.) There is a difference betwixt a prince breaking the main and only article of his covenant, in a fit of fury and rage being transported upon some mistakes (which was the case of Theodosius the emperor) and a prince not only violating this upon deliberation, but plainly declaring, that neither oath nor declaration can or will bind him; but these being made void, he will destroy without restraint all these covenanted privileges (this was the case of Charles) or, and a prince who, as he never will come under the bond of a covenant with his people: so tho' he makes never so many fair promises with the greatest solemnities, maintains a principle, that he will keep no promises, but when, and with whom he pleases, and can get a dispensation to break all when he likes. (This is James's ingenuity.) Sure in this case, such as are characterized, declare themselves so far from being princes, that they profess before the world, they are no more men to be conversed with: for if neither their words, writs, vows, promises, oaths, declarations, nor protections can bind them, what society can be had with them? Are they not to be looked upon, and carried towards as common enemies of morality, religion, righteousness, liberty, humanity, yea even of mankind itself? Now then, let the world be judge, if the people of Scotland can be judged in conscience, reason, prudence, policy, or any imaginable way, bound to own their authority, being so stated, and by the act rescissory all human ground rescinded, that ever it shall be otherwise; let them go seek other slaves where they can find them, for we will not sell ourselves and posterity to tyrants as slaves, nor give up our religion and the exercise of it to the mouldings of the court.

II. In the second place, it being clear from these forementioned instances, that tyrants and usurpers have been disowned; and it being also as clear as light can make any thing, from the foregoing account of their government, and all the characters of truculency, treachery and tyranny, conspicuously relucent therein, that these two gentlemen, whose authority we are pressed to own, were tyrants and usurpers: it remains therefore to prove from all dictates of reason about government, that their pretended authority could not nor cannot be owned.

For the argument runs thus; the authority of tyrants and usurpers cannot be owned; but the authority of Charles and James was and is the authority of tyrants and usurpers, therefore their authority cannot be owned. Now it is the major of this syllogism that I undertake to prove, the minor being so clear from their history, that to prove it by witnesses were to do what is already done.

1. All authority to be owned of men must be of God, and ordained of God: for so the apostle teacheth expresly, Rom. xiii. 1. &c. which is the alone formal reason of our subjection to them, and that which makes it a damnable sin to resist them; because it is a resisting the ordinance of God. The Lord owns himself to be the author of magistrates, Prov. viii. 15. By me kings reign and princes decree justice.

As he is the author of man, and hath made him a sociable creature, so he is the author of the order of human society, which is necessary for the preservation of mankind, he being the God of order and not of confusion.

And this must hold not only of the supreme authority, but of subordinate magistrates also; for they must be included in the higher powers, to whom we must be subject, Rom. xiii. and they that resist them, resist God's ordinance too. Their judgment is God's, as well as the judgment of the supreme magistrate, Deut. i. 17. 2 Chron. xix. 6, 8. They are called gods among whom the Lord judgeth, Psal. lxxxii. 1. He speaketh not there of a congregation of kings.

We are to be subject to them for the Lord's sake, as well as to the supreme magistrate, 1 Pet. ii. 13. therefore all magistrates, superior and inferior, are ordained of God in the respective places. It is true, Peter calls every degree of magistracy an ordinance of man, not that he denies it to be an ordinance of God for so he would contradict Paul, Rom. xiii. but terms it so emphatically, to commend the worth of obedience to magistrates, though but men, when we do it for the Lord's sake: not effectively, as an invention of men, but subjectively, because exercised by men, and created and invested by human suffrages, considered as men in society, and objectively, for the good of man, and for the external peace and safety of man, thereby differenced from the ministry, an ordinance of Christ, for the Spiritual good of mens souls. Hence, those rulers that are not of God, nor ordained of God, cannot be owned without sin; but tyrants and usurpers are the rulers, that are not of God, nor ordained of God, but are set up, and not by him, &c. Hos. viii. 1.-4. therefore they cannot be owned without sin.

I refer it to any man of conscience and reason to judge, if these scriptures, proving magistracy to be the ordinance of God, for which alone is to be owned, can be applied to tyrants and usurpers. How will that, Rom. xiii. read of tyrants? Let every soul be subject to tyrants, for they are ordained of God as his ministers of justice, &c. and are a terror to good works, and a praise to the evil. Would not every man nauseate that as not the doctrine of God? Again, how would that sound, Prov. viii. By me tyrants reign, and usurpers decree injustice? Harsh to Christian ears. Can they be said to be gods among whom the Lord judgeth? If they be, they must be such as the witch of Endor saw, gods coming out of the earth, when she raised the devil; in a very catechrestical meaning, as the devil is called the god of this world. And indeed they have no more power, nor otherwise to be owned, than he hath: for this is a truth, tyranny is a work of satan, and not from God; because sin, either habitual or actual, is not from God; tyranny is sin in habit and act: therefore——The magistrate, as magistrate, is good in nature and end, being the minister of God for good, a tyrant as a tyrant, is quite contrary. Lex Rex saith well, 'A power ethical, politic or moral, to oppress, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power, and no more from God, but from sinful nature, and the old serpent, than a licence to sin,' quest. 9. p. 59. Hence sin, a licence to sin, a licentious sinning, cannot be from God; but tyranny, usurpation, absolute power enaroaching upon all liberties, laws, divine and human, is sin, a licence to sin, a licentious sinning: therefore——But, to make this clear, and to obviate what may be said against this, let it be considered, how the powers that be are of God, and ordained of God. Things are said to be of God and ordained of God, two ways; by his purpose and providence, and by his word and warrant.

Things may be of God, either of his hand working, or bringing them about, ordaining and ordering them to be to his glory, either by a holy over-ruling providence, as Samson's desire of a wife was of God, Judg. xiv. 4. and Amaziah's insolent and foolish rejection of Joash's peaceable overture, 2 Chron. xxv. 20. or by a powerful effective providence; so Rom. xi. 36. Of him and through him are all things, 1 Cor. viii. 6. One God, of whom are all things. Or things be of God, of his word warranting and authorizing. So we are commanded to try the spirits; whether they be of God (1 John iv. i.) So in this sense, sin, tentation, lust, corruptions of the world are not of God, Jam. i. 13, 1 John ii. 16.

Again, things are ordained of God, ether by the order of his counsel or providential will; either effectively, by way of production, or direction; or permissively, by way of non-impedition: or they are ordained by the order of his word and preceptive will. The former is God's rule, the latter is ours: the former is always accomplished, the latter is often contradicted: the former orders all actions, even sinful; the latter only that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God: by the former Israel rejected Samuel, by the latter they should have continued Samuel's government, and not sought a king: by the former Athaliah usurped the government, by the latter she should have yielded obedience, and resigned the government to the posterity of Ahaziah: by the former, all have a physical subordination to God at creatures, subject to his all disposing will; by the latter, those whom he approves have a moral subordination to God, as obedient subjects to his commanding will. Now magistrates are of God, and ordained by him both these ways, tyrants but one of them. I say, magistrates, the higher powers, to whom we owe and must own subjection, are of God both these ways; both by his purpose and providence; and that not merely eventual, but effective and executive of his word, disposing both of the title and right, and possession of the power, to them whom he approves, and bringing the people under a conscientious subjection, and by his word and warrant. So Adonijah the usurper (though he had the pretence of hereditary right, and also possession by providence) was forced to own king Solomon in these terms, upon which only a magistrate may be owned: 'the kingdom' says he, 'was mine, and all Israel set their faces on me that I should reign: howbeit the kingdom is turned about, and become my brother's, for it was his from the Lord,' 1 Kings ii. 15. He had both providence turning about the kingdom to him, and also the warrant of the Lord's approbative and preceptive will. But tyrants and usurpers are only of God, and ordained of God, by his over-ruling purpose and permissive providence, either for performing his holy purpose towards themselves, as Rehoboam's professing he would be a tyrant, and refusing the lawful desires of the people was of God, 2 Chron. x. 15. or for a judgement and vengeance upon them that are subject to them, Zech. xi. 6. whereby they get a power in their hand, which is the rod of the Lord's indignation, and a charge and commission against a hypocritical nation, Isa. x. 5, 6. This is all the power they have from God, who 'gives Jacob to the spoil, and Israel to the robbers, when they sin against him,' Isa. xlii. 24. This doth not give these robbers any right, no more than they whose 'tabernacle prosper, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly,' Job xii. 6. Thus all robbers, and the great legal robbers, tyrants and their authorized murderers, may be of God, viz. by his providence. Hence those that are not ordained of God's preceptive will, but merely by his providential will; their authority is not to be owned; but tyrants and usurpers are not ordained of God's preceptive, but merely by his providential will. The minor needs no proof, yet will be cleared by many following arguments, the major will be afterwards more demonstrated. Here I shall only say, they that have no other ordination of God impowering them to be rulers, than the devil hath, must not be owned; but they that have no other than the ordination of providence, have no other ordination of God impowering them to be rulers, than the devil hath: therefore they that have no other than the ordination of providence, must not be owned.

2. But let us next consider what is comprehended in the ordination of that authority which is to be owned as of God: and it may be demonstrated, there are two things in it, without which no authority can be owned as of God, viz. institution and constitution so as to give him, whom we must own as God's minister, authority both in the abstract and concrete, that is, that he should have magistracy by God's ordination, and be a magistrate by and according to the will of God. All acknowledge that magistracy hath God's institution, for the powers that be are ordained of God: which contains not only the appointment of it, but the qualification and form of it. That government is appointed by divine precept all agree, but whether the precept be moral natural, or moral positive, whether it was appointed in the state of innocency, or since disorder came into the world, whether it be primario or secundario, from the law of nature, is not agreed upon. It may possibly be all these ways; government in the general may be from the law and light of nature appointed in innocency, because all its relative duties are enjoined in the fifth command, and all nations naturally have an esteem of it, without which there could be no order, distinction, or communion in human societies but the specification or individuation may be by a postnate, positive and secondary law, yet natural too, for though there be no reason in nature why any man should be king and lord over another, being in some sense all naturally free, but as they yield themselves under jurisdiction the exalting of David over Israel is not ascribed to nature, but to an act of divine bounty, which took him from following the ewes, and made him feeder of the people of Israel, Psal. lxxviii. 70, 71. yet nature teacheth, that Israel and other people should have a government, and that this should be subjected to. Next, not only is it appointed to be, but qualified by institution, and the office is defined, the end prescribed, and the measures and boundaries thereof are limited, as we shall hear. 'Again, the forms of it though politically, they are not stinted, that people should have such a form and not another; yet morally, at least negatively, whatever be the form it is limited to the rules of equity and justice, and must be none other than what hath the Lord's mould and sanction. But there is no institution any of these ways for tyranny. Hence, that power hath no institution from God, cannot be owned as his ordinance; but the power of tyrants is that power, being contrary in every respect to God's institution, and a mere deviation from it, and eversion of it: Ergo—To the minor it may be replied; though the power which tyrants may exercise, and usurpers assume, may be in concrete contrary to God's institution, and so not to be owned; yet, in the abstract, it may be acknowledged of God. It is but the abuse of the power, and that does not take away the use. We may own the power, though we do not own the abuse of it. I answer, 1. I acknowledge the distinction as to magistrates is very pertinent; for it is well said by the congregation in a letter to the nobility, Knox's History of Scotland, Book 2. 'That there is a great difference betwixt the authority, which is God's ordinance, and the persons of these who are placed in authority; the authority and ordinance of God can never do wrong, for it commandeth that vice be punished, and virtue maintained; but the corrupted person placed in this authority may offend.'

It is certain, higher powers are not to be resisted; but some persons in power may be resisted. The powers are ordained of God; but kings commanding unjust things are not ordained of God to do such things; but to apply this to tyrants, I do not understand. Magistrates in some acts may be guilty of tyranny, and yet retain the power of magistracy; but tyrants cannot be capable of magistracy, nor any one of the scripture-characters of righteous rulers. They cannot retain that which they have forfeited, and which they have overturned; and usurpers cannot retain that which they never had. They may act and enact some things materially just, but they are not formally such as can make them magistrates, no more than some unjust actions can make a magistrate a tyrant. A murderer, saving the life of one and killing another, does not make him no murderer: once a murderer ay a murderer, once a robber ay a robber, till he restore what he hath robbed: so once a tyrant ay a tyrant, till he makes amends for his tyranny, and that will be hard to do. 2. The concrete does specificate the abstract in actuating it, as a magistrate in his exercising government, makes his power to be magistry; a robber, in his robbing, makes his power to be robbery; an usurper in his usurping makes his power to be usurpation; so a tyrant in his tyrannizing, can have no power but tyranny. As the abstract of a magistrate is nothing but magistracy, so the abstract of a tyrant is nothing but tyranny. It is frivolous then to distinguish between a tyrannical power in the concrete, and tyranny in the abstract; the power and the abuse of the power: for he hath no power as a tyrant, but what is abused. 3. They that object thus, must either mean, that power in it general notion is ordained of God, but this particular power abused by tyrants, and assumed by usurpers, is not ordained: or they must mean, that the very power of tyrants and usurpers is ordained of God, but the way of holding it and using it, is not of God. If the first be said, they grant all I plead for; for though the power in general be ordained, yet what is this to tyrants and usurpers? would not this claim be ridiculous for any man to soy, God hath ordained governments to be, therefore I will challenge it? God hath ordained marriage, therefore any may cohabit together as man and wife, without formal matrimony. If the second be alledged, that the power of these prevailing dominators is ordained, but not their holding and using of it: this is nonsense, for how can a power be ordained, and the use of it be unlawful? For the abuse and use of tyrannical power is all one and reciprocal: an usurper cannot use his power but by usurpation.

Again, is it not plain, that the abstract and the concrete, the act or habit, and the subject wherein it is, cannot have a contrary denomination? if drunkenness and theft, lying or murder, be of the devil; then the drunkard, the thief, the liar, and the murderer, are of the devil too: so if tyranny and usurpation, or the use or abuse of tyrants and usurpers be of the devil, then most the tyrants and usurpers also be of him: none can say, the one is of the devil, and the other of God. Wherefore it is altogether impertinent to use such a distinction, with application to tyrants or usurpers, as many do in their pleading for the owning of our oppressors; for they have no power, but what is the abuse of power.

3. As that authority which is God's ordinance must have his institution; so it must have his divine constitution from himself and by the people. Wherever then there is authority to be owned of men, there must be these two, constitution from God and constitution from the people. For the first, God hath a special interest in the constitution of authority, both immediately and mediately. Immediately, he declares such and such forms of government to be lawful and eligible, and does order whom, and who, and how people shall direct governors. And so, he confers royal graces, and endowments, and gifts for government on them, as on Joshua and Saul: so they become the Lord's anointed, placed and set on the throne of the Lord, 1 Chron. xxix. 23. and honoured with majesty, as his deputes and vicegerants, having their crown let on by God, Psal. xxi. 3. But in regard now he doth not by any special revelation determine, who shall be the governors in this or that place; therefore he makes this constitution by meditation of men, giving them rules how they shall proceed in setting them up. And seeing, by the law of nature, he hath enjoined government to be, but hath ordered no particular in it with application to singulars he hath committed it to the positive transaction of men, to be disposed according to certain general rules of justice. And it must needs be so; for first, without this constitution, either all or none would be magistrates: if he hath ordained civil power to be, and taken no order in whom it shall be, or how it shall be conveyed, any might pretend to it; and yet none would have it, more than another. If then he hath affixed it to a peculiar having and holding, by virtue whereof this man is enstated and entitled to the office, and not that man, there must be a law for constituting him in authority, which will discover in whom it is. 2. If it were not so, then resisting of a particular magistrate would not be a resisting of the ordinance of God, if a particular magistrate were not constitute of God, as well as magistracy is institute of God: for still it would be undetermined, who were the owner; and so it would be left as free and lawful for the resister to take the place, as for the resisted to hold it; the institution would be satisfied if any possessed it: therefore there must be constitution to determine it. 3. No common law of nature can put in practice, without particular constitution regulating it. That wives and children own their superior relations, is the law of nature; but there must be such a relation first fixed by human transaction, before they can own them; there must be marriage authorized of God, there must be children begotten, and then the divine ordination of these relative duties take place. So the judges of Israel for four hundred and fifty years were given of God, Acts xiii. 20. not all by an immediate express designation, but a mediate call from God by men, as Jephthah; Judg. xi. 6, 11. Inferior judges also are magistrates appointed by God, yet they have their deputation from men. Our Saviour speaks of all magistrates, when he applies that of the 82 psalm to them, I said ye are gods; and shews how they were gods, because unto them the word of God came, John x. 35. that is, by his word and warrant he authorized them, not by immediate designation in reference to the most of them, but the word of God comes to them, or his constitution is past upon them, who are advanced by men according to his word. When men therefore do act according to the divine rule, in the moulding and erecting of government and governors, there the constitution is of God, though it be not immediate. And where this is not observed, whatever power (so named or pretended) there may be, or whatsoever persons there be that take upon them to be the power, and are not thereto appointed or therein instated, and do exercise such a power as God hath not legitimated, they are not a power ordained of God. Hence, whatsoever power hath no constitution from God, either immediate or mediate, cannot be owned: but the authority of tyrants and usurpers, is a power that hath no constitution from God, either immediate or mediate; therefore it cannot be owned. The major is cleared above. The minor is also undeniable: for, either they must pretend to an immediate constitution by revelation, that James duke of York a vassal of antichrist, had, by all his plots and pranks, merited the crown of Britain, and therefore must be constitute king; and this I hope they will not pretend to, except the Pope hath gotten such a revelation from Pluto's oracle; or they must have recourse to the mediate constitution by men: and if so, then either this mediate constitution of God is left undetermined, indefinitely and absolutely giving way to any that will assume what power they please and can: and then, I confess tyrants may have a constitution; but this constitution cannot be of God; or else it is fixed by a rule, regulating the succession or constitution of the governors, and obliging the people to own the government so constituted, with exclusion and disallowance of any other. And so, if in that constitution there be a substantial deviation from the rule, as when incompetent or unallowed persons be the advancers of themselves, or others, into that place by illegal and sinistrous means, in as much as in that case there is the divine disapprobation, it may be said there is no ordinance of God, but a contradiction and contra-ordination to God's order. Gee's magist. origin. chap. 5. sect. 4. subject 3 page 135. This will shake off this of ours, and all other tyrants and usurpers, that come into the government, and hold it not according to God's rule.

4. It is clear also in the second place, that the authority which we can own out of conscience, must have constitution by the people. The special way by which men should be called into the place of sovereign power, may perhaps not be found so expresly defined in scripture, as mens call to the other ordinance of the ministry is; yet in this two things are essentially necessary to the constitution of a magistrate, the peoples consent and compact either formal and virtual. And without these we can own conscientious subjection and allegiance to no man living. That the first is necessary will be evident, from the law of nature and nations, and from scripture. First, The light and law of nature dictates, that the right and interest of constituting magistrates is in the elective vote or suffrage of the people. This will appear, 1. If we consider the original of government among men, especially after they were so multiplied, that there was a necessity of a reduction into diverse communities; which, whatever was before the flood, yet after it, behoved to be by a coalition with consent under an elective government. The scripture makes it more than probable, that the partition of commonwealths was in Peleg's days, in whole time the earth was divided, Gen. x. 2. occasioned by the confusion of "languages at Babel, which did dissolve their union, and scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth," Gen. xi. 9.