THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES

Throughout the fighting of the Fourth Army during October, the Sixth Army under Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria had remained on the offensive on the line Arras-La Bassée—east of Armentières;[48] but although fresh reinforcements had been sent up to that part of the front by the German General Staff, a break-through had not been possible. Both sides had gradually changed their objectives and now merely sought to prevent any movement of the opposing forces from that front to the decisive zone of operations between Nieuport and Ypres. Any weakness in the enemy’s line, however, was utilised to gain new and improved positions from which another effort to break through might be made as soon as possible. Owing to the failure of the offensive south of Nieuport, a decision under the conditions existing there could not be hoped for; the German General Staff therefore began considering a plan for concentrating a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and the Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the Army Cavalry, and for breaking through with it on the front Werwicq-Warneton, south of Ypres.

On 27th October Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn arrived at the Headquarters of the Sixth Army to discuss this operation. The plan was arranged and orders were issued accordingly. A new ‘Army Group’ was to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the command of General von Fabeck, commander of the XIII Würtemburg Corps.[49] It would consist of the II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up from the south to join the Sixth Army), the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (still in reserve to the Fourth Army), and the 26th Würtemburg Division (of the Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by the 48th Reserve Division recently arrived from the Fifth Army). In addition to these formations all the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would be brought up to assist, and if necessary the attacks further south would be partially discontinued. The offensive was to take place on the 30th October from the general line Werwicq-Deulemont in a north-easterly direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division of the II Corps was also to be brought up by rail to Lille. The orders of the German General Staff pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was an essential condition for the success of the operation. Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing and centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding attacks, and Duke Albert of Würtemburg ordered a general attack of his Army for the 30th October.

How the flooding of the Yser on the front of the right wing of the Fourth Army brought the offensive of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to a standstill has already been described. From the 1st November the 4th Ersatz Division took over the protection of the line of the flooded area from the coast to Tervaete, whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved southwards to the district Zarren-Staden in order to reinforce the XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation might require.[50] To the XXII Reserve Corps was allotted the task of holding the two French divisions stationed in the Dixmude bridge-head, which formed a constant threat to the German front. The Corps carried out this task admirably.

On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps advanced to the attack as ordered. The first-named under General von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the ruins of Bixschoote. After five hours’ desperate fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve Infantry Regiments entered the devastated village which had been occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-lying situation, and the hopelessness of finding cover among the battered houses, resulted in the victorious German regiments being exposed to a very heavy artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties in the village were greater than during the assault. In consequence the commander decided to withdraw and take up a line along the northern edge of Bixschoote, leaving in the village itself only sufficient outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The division on the left wing of the Corps also made progress and reached the main road Bixschoote-Langemarck in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked Langemarck with its right wing, but was unable to take it. In spite of gallant efforts only a few hundred yards of ground were gained by the evening of the 31st, when these useless attacks were stopped by order. The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps were held to their positions by superior hostile artillery fire, and also by mass attacks of the British and French during the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had just arrived, and in the presence of General Joffre an attempt to break through our line was to be made on this sector of the front.[51] The German defenders, however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus enabled the offensive of the Army Group of General von Fabeck to take place. In conjunction with this the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, under its new commander, General von Schubert, simultaneously advanced in the direction of Gheluvelt.

During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th Infantry Division was relieved in its battle-position west of Lille by the 48th Reserve Division, and by the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army Group Fabeck was completed without disturbance.

The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the Army Group consisted of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each of 3 batteries, and a 30·5 cm. coast defence mortar.[52] In addition to the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, the four Jäger battalions of the Army Cavalry and the 11th Landwehr Brigade were put under the command of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th October this new army of attack relieved the two northern Cavalry Corps, and took over their outpost lines. On the following morning the offensive began.[53] The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked south of the Menin-Ypres road, with its left wing on Zandvoorde, the II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with its left wing on Wambeke; further south again was the 26th Infantry Division with its left wing on Messines. In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with the 4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened by two battalions of the XIX Saxon Corps, which was attacking to the left of it, was ordered to advance on St. Yves and Ploegsteert Wood. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division moved to the line Menin-Werwicq. The Army Cavalry which had been relieved was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth Army, one Cavalry Corps being placed behind the right wing of the Army to be at hand to fill up a slight gap which existed between the Fourth Army and the Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary.

The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French Corps between the 7th Division of the IV British Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before the advance of von Fabeck’s Army; the II and IX French Corps had also recently arrived[54] on the northern side of the Ypres salient.[55] Again, therefore, the enemy had a numerical superiority[56] in what was the second and severest part of the battle on the Yser. The British in their reports have added together all the German Corps which were brought up piecemeal for the fighting on the Yser and at Ypres, both at this period and later on; and they describe the situation so as to give the impression that they had held up with inferior numbers the simultaneous attacks of all these Corps from the outset. They go further and use the figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat into a victory. They boast of having held out against great odds, gladly forgetting that their original intention both before and during the battle had been to overrun our positions and drive us back to the Rhine.

The character of the fighting which began with the appearance of the new German Army Group on the scene had almost the savagery of the Middle Ages in it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and every wall into a strong point, and each of them had to be stormed by our men with heavy loss. Even when the first line of these fortifications had been taken they were confronted by a second one immediately behind it; for the enemy showed great skill in taking every advantage of the ground, unfavourable in any case to the attacker. To the east and south-east of Ypres, even more developed than in the north, there were thick hedges, wire fences and broad dykes. Numerous woods also of all sizes with dense undergrowth made the country almost impassable and most difficult for observation purposes. Our movements were constantly being limited to the roads which were swept by the enemy’s machine-guns. Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments the villages were mostly in ruins by the time the infantry reached them, but the enemy fought desperately for every heap of stones and every pile of bricks before abandoning them. In the few village streets that remained worthy of the name the fighting generally developed into isolated individual combats, and no description can do adequate justice to the bravery of the German troops on such occasions. Our men advanced to the attack as if they were back on the barrack square, and an Englishman writes: ‘They advanced towards us singing patriotic songs and with their bands playing.’ There was such enthusiasm that even the weakest were carried along by it, and made regardless of losses. The battle of Ypres in the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long remain a source of inspiration for the historian and the poet.

By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the importance of the attacks developing from the south-east against Ypres. They threatened his position along the high ground on the line Gheluvelt-Passchendaele and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way to, the town, the pivot on which all the Franco-British offensive plans rested. On this day, therefore, the British commander sent up the 7th Division into the line again, although it had only just been relieved owing to its heavy losses.[57]

Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty. Our heavy guns began the bombardment of the enemy’s well-constructed lines at about 7.45 A.M., but observation was made very difficult by the weather conditions, and could only be carried out from the foremost infantry lines. The telephonic communication rendered necessary was frequently cut by the enemy’s shells; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries were able to make such excellent practice that at the most vital points of the enemy’s position the spirit of the defenders appeared to be completely broken. The high ground about Zandvoorde offers a typical case. Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of the British defence and one of the main observation posts for the artillery. At 9 A.M. our troops charged the hostile position there, and by 11 A.M. Zandvoorde itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Division; the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian Jäger battalions of the Army Cavalry took a great share in the success. Soon afterwards the high ground north-east and immediately west of the village fell into German hands. Two whole British squadrons with their machine-guns lay, dead and wounded, completely annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.[58] Further south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British cavalry supported by part of the III British Corps. After a severe hand-to-hand encounter it took possession of the château, and finally also of the village of Hollebeke. The left wing of the Corps pushed forward as far as the Wambeke stream, north of the village of the same name, but had here to put in all its reserves to hold its ground against strong hostile counter-attacks.[59]

On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Division was engaged in heavy fighting, the position confronting it being a particularly strong one. It lay along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet high,[60] running north and south, eastwards of Mount Kemmel, and gave the enemy an extensive view eastwards over our lines. The defence of this ridge was greatly facilitated by the villages of Wytschaete and Messines on it. These had been turned into fortresses, and were connected by deep trenches protected by broad wire entanglements.[61] Owing to observation difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing the airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was unable from its positions in the valley to bring a sufficiently heavy bombardment on the enemy’s lines; and, though the Würtemburg troops attacked with great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for the assault. On the right wing the 122nd Fusilier Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria) took the fortified village of Wambeke, and on the left wing the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly towards Messines. The ridge north-east of the last-named village was stormed, but the assault on the locality itself, which was to have been delivered at 7.10 in the evening, could not get on owing to heavy enfilade fire from the south which held back the attackers some hundred yards away from its edge.[62] The Cavalry Corps[63] had gained ground at first, but, in consequence of their weakness in artillery, they had been unable to take St. Yves or to make progress against the strongly fortified wood south-west of it. The same story describes the day’s work of the XIX Corps[64] fighting to the south of the cavalry.

On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also the attack on the 30th October had not had the success expected. The combined efforts of the 54th Reserve Division and the right wing of the 30th Division had not been able to carry us into Gheluvelt.[65] General von Deimling and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn went forward themselves into the front line to encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions desperately, and held on firmly to the main points of his line. Another artillery bombardment was therefore considered necessary.

From the enemy’s point of view, however, the situation was anything but rosy on the evening of the 30th October. The entry of General von Deimling’s troops into Zandvoorde endangered the southern side of the Ypres salient, and the capture of Hollebeke brought the Germans within three miles of Ypres itself. Ypres was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal French had put Indian troops into the fighting line on the 30th, and he now brought all the available British and French reserves towards the line Zandvoorde-Hollebeke in order to support the 7th British Division, which had been fought to a standstill.[66] During the night, therefore, the fighting never ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued along the whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable Würtemburg troops again tried to storm Messines.

On the 31st October the Germans had at first but few fresh troops to meet the enemy’s reinforcements;[67] so the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was brought up in readiness north of the Lys behind the II Bavarian Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset realised that the Wytschaete-Messines ridge was of decisive importance, and that every effort must be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector of attack of the II Bavarian Corps.

According to the enemy’s accounts the 31st October 1914 was one of the most critical days at his headquarters. For us it was a day of great glory, and the British state unreservedly in their reports of the fighting, that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. It is true that this last October day of the first war-year did not give us Ypres, but our semicircle around the town became so reduced that it was brought within range of our artillery from three sides, and there could be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on the Ypres district. The fact that neither the enemy’s commanders nor their troops gave way under the strong pressure we put on them, but continued to fight the battle round Ypres, though their situation was most perilous, gives us an opportunity to acknowledge that there were men of real worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly.

At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, a heavy artillery bombardment of the new hostile positions was begun on a front of ten and a half miles. The enemy’s batteries were not long in replying; being so difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the previous fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout the morning, the British and French shells fell long distances behind our lines, blocking streets and bridges, and devastating the villages as far back as the Lys, so that any regular transport of supplies became impossible. At Gheluvelt, however, the important northern corner of the Army Group Fabeck, the enemy’s hail of shells had but little result, because our capture of the high ground at Zandvoorde had made the work of observation very difficult.

After sufficient artillery preparation the British stronghold of Gheluvelt was to be attacked from south and east simultaneously. Colonel von Aldershausen, commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, was to direct the attack from the east. Besides two battalions of his own regiment, there were placed under his command the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the 54th Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th Reserve Regiment and the 26th Reserve Jäger Battalion. The 99th Infantry Regiment was to make the attack from the south.[68] During the morning, in spite of the heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated attacks were repulsed by British counter-movements. At about 11 A.M. our converging attack was begun. The commanders of the 54th Reserve and 30th Infantry Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as the general commanding the XV Corps, were again in the foremost lines, though the last, General von Deimling, was wounded almost at once by a shell-splinter. Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. His Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle headquarters of the Sixth Army, watched the infantry working its way through the maze of the enemy’s obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported by artillery, some of the guns being moved forward with the front line. The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how,[69] and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it was all of no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. More hostile strongholds were constantly being discovered; even all the points known to be of importance could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery, so that many attacks had to be delivered against fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments untouched by our guns.[70] Many of our gallant men were killed, and the officers, who were the first to rise in the assault, were the special target of the enemy’s sharpshooters, well trained in long colonial wars.[71] Once our troops entered an enemy’s position, the resistance was only slight, and the German showed his superiority in single combat. It was only the enemy’s counter-attacks, delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that regained some of his lost ground, but they did not, however, compromise the general success of the day. The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the dense woods near Reutel,[72] which were defended by a strong system of obstacles and by a quantity of machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in trees.[73]

While this was in progress the last assault on Gheluvelt was taking place. The attacks from east and south both broke into the village, and by 3 P.M. the whole place with its château and park was in German possession.[74] Colonel von Hügel took his storming parties of the 54th Reserve Division northwards through and beyond the village, while Captain Reiner galloped his batteries close up to it. It was then, however, that fresh hostile reserves were launched against Gheluvelt. The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was hurried up to meet them, its gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a hero’s death during the movement. For a short time our own artillery fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: for the men were wearing caps and were thus mistaken for British troops. Nevertheless the enemy’s counter-attack failed and Gheluvelt became and remained ours, and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 men, and 3 guns.[75] The enemy prevented our further advance beyond Gheluvelt by a heavy fire from a new and strong position along the edge of the woods west of Gheluvelt. Here a new fortress had been made, which would have to be broken down by our artillery before it could be attacked. On the left wing of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in front of some small woods which had been turned into strong points; the 39th Infantry Division was able to advance only some 500 yards, though it took a number of prisoners.[76] The artillery of the XV Corps had an accidental success on this day which must have interfered with the enemy’s staff work for some time. During the bombardment of Hooge, a direct hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st British Division were working: one general and several staff officers were killed.[77] After heavy fighting at close quarters the II Bavarian Corps gained ground along the whole of its wide sector of attack on the 31st October. The right wing took possession of the edges of the woods west of Hollebeke, whilst the left of the Corps advanced as far as Oosttaverne. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into line immediately south of it, in order to make the attack on Wytschaete.

We now come to the most vital point of the battle: who was to be the victor in the fight for the Wytschaete-Messines ridge? The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had worked forward by daylight towards Wytschaete, regardless of the heavy artillery fire directed from the high ground on our troops moving up from the valley.[78] At nightfall the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite of this the Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make its attack. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment was to enter Wytschaete from the east and the 21st from the south. All the preparations had been carefully made. The men wore white arm-bands as a distinguishing mark when at close quarters with the enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed away in the haversacks; rifles were unloaded and bayonets fixed. It was hoped to take the enemy by surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in the assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened during the night, but frequent star-shells lighted up the darkness and showed that our opponents were keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have helped them to see our movements. At 2 A.M. (1st Nov.) the Bavarians advanced from their assembly positions, taking little notice of the enemy’s artillery which began to open on them. The general direction of the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, which was clearly outlined in the moonlight against the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment under Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the village and pushed through to the western exit. The surprise had succeeded, and numbers of the enemy who still held out in isolated ruins were either killed in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.[79] Unfortunately, however, our own guns continued to bombard the village, as the news of the victory of the 17th Regiment was not communicated to them sufficiently quickly. At about 6 A.M. Colonel Hofmann therefore decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily to the eastern edge of Wytschaete, and to reorganise there. It so happened that the 21st Reserve Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village at this moment, its advance having been delayed by a heavy enfilade fire from the south-west. When the men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim light of dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running eastwards among the ruins, they immediately opened fire on them. Nevertheless, in spite of the losses incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. The error was quickly remedied by singing patriotic songs and by flag-signals, and communication was regained with the neighbouring infantry and with the artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now made by six regiments of the XVI French Corps, which had arrived during the night, and the gallant 17th had slowly to withdraw again from the high ground.

The fighting around Messines on the 31st had been equally severe. On the 30th the 26th Infantry Division under Duke William of Urach had already got its patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any assault could be made an artillery preparation was required, especially against the northern sector. On the morning of the 31st October our howitzers and trench-mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches, and by 10.30 A.M. the moment had arrived for the Würtemburg troops to advance.

The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge north of Messines, along which runs the road to Wytschaete, whilst the 125th Infantry Regiment was to advance against Messines itself, and the 119th Grenadier Regiment against the enemy’s trenches immediately south of it. The hostile position was so strong that a force greatly inferior in strength would be able to hold it against an attack coming up from the valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and only a few hedges limited the field of view, so that every advance and assembly position for miles round could be seen. A strong British garrison held Messines: the trenches had been well made, and were covered by a continuous and broad system of obstacles.[80]

The way in which the Swabian troops[81] broke down the enemy’s resistance was indeed a masterpiece. Neither the enemy’s artillery fire, which imperilled the advance of the reserves, nor the British machine-guns, a large number of which enfiladed the attack from the south, could restrain the dash of the Würtemburg troops. At 11 A.M. the 125th Stuttgart Infantry Regiment had got possession of the north-east corner of Messines. The road entering the village from Gapaard was blocked by a barricade; and after storming it, another one, a hundred yards further inside the village, closed the way. The streets could not be used for our advance, being choked with debris, and under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers had to make their way through or over the walls. There are a number of large, well-built houses in Messines, which the enemy had turned into a succession of strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up by our sappers. The convent looked especially impregnable with its walls a yard thick, and strong towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired frantically. Captain Heinrich’s Würtemburg battery of the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was therefore brought up, the men dragging the guns through the streets, as horses could not move along them, and the infantry carrying up the ammunition. The convent was soon in flames, burying its stubborn defenders under its ruins. Lieutenant Mösner of the 125th Infantry Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens and backyards, was the first to make an entry into the market-square. With a few stout-hearted followers he occupied a large building there which he defended without any support till the evening against great odds. Not until nightfall were others of his regiment able to reach him, and secure the position he had held so courageously. This day of street fighting had cost very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of Messines had also had to be directed on to the village, and by the evening a continuous line had been successfully formed through the centre of it. Isolated fighting continued throughout the night, and in order to keep up communication amidst the ruins and recognise one another in the dark, the Würtemburg troops sang folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with the rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the streets, and the crackle of the burning and falling houses, all combined to make a magnificent and unsurpassed piece of battle-music.

North of the village the left wing of the 122nd Infantry Regiment established itself on the Messines-Wytschaete road: but its right wing was unable to capture the high ground, as Wytschaete itself was still in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered severely: the progress of the other regiment of their brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment, had roused their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their ranks from the south where the Cavalry Corps were still unable to advance. They were compelled by heavy losses to be content with the task of securing the left flank of their division.

On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers were rewarded for their deeds of immortal fame by a message of warm praise from the Emperor.

The final objective, however, had not yet been attained, although in the south the high ground had been reached and artillery observers sent forward there, so that the enemy’s positions could be accurately ranged on right up to Mount Kemmel. The main pressure of the attack would therefore have to be continued here, on the left wing of the Army Group Fabeck.

During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division arrived in the area Comines-Warneton, north of the Lys, as reserve to the Army Group.

On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist lay over the country, so that the infantry got a few hours’ rest before the continuous shelling of the enemy’s artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared, the battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the north the Saxon and Würtemburg divisions of the XXVII Reserve Corps further extended their successes of the previous days. The line was advanced up to the château of Poezelhoek, which was taken from the 1st British Division after a heavy fight.[82]

The divisions of Deimling’s XV Corps attacked with the right wing on the Gheluvelt-Ypres main road and the left on Klein Zillebeke. They advanced but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small, dense woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again made progress very difficult. The 30th Division managed to reach the eastern edge of the Herenthage Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division, supported by infantry, was in position. The wood north of Zandvoorde gave exceptional trouble, but it was finally outflanked on both sides, and its defenders taken prisoner.[83]

The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on both sides of the Comines-Ypres canal, and drove the enemy back as far as the sharp bend in it. The left wing captured the small wood west of Oosttaverne which was defended by Indian and British troops. The treacherous methods of the Indians greatly exasperated our men: crouching in the hedges, and with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated Asiatics allowed our troops to pass them, and then got up and stabbed them in the back with their knives.[84] The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn, on the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of the previous evening, and at midday began its attack once more. Confidence and enthusiasm served to obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and the dense lines now rose simultaneously from their positions as if on parade. Very many of their dead or wounded still lay at the foot of the heights, but the gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by 4 P.M. had reached the eastern edge of Wytschaete. It was not possible to push up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire, and at this moment the enemy counter-attacked with two fresh divisions.[85] The Bavarians, who had become disorganised during the assault, were forced to evacuate the village again under cover of darkness, after having actually entered it at about 5 P.M. They had suffered very heavily during the attack, being fired at from flank and rear, for the right wing of the 26th Infantry Division was unable to take all the high ground north-west of Messines until the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fighting had gone on in Messines throughout the day, till finally the Würtemburg troops gained the upper hand and cleared the enemy out of the village to its western edge. The British were driven back down the western slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in the valley, losing heavily in the operation. As soon as its right wing reached the Messines-Wytschaete road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the preliminary condition for the capture of Wytschaete was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, however, was not able to carry out a third assault without assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night of the 1st-2nd therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian Division from its assembly area Wambeke-Garde Dieu into the fighting line, in order to carry forward the attack through and beyond Wytschaete towards Kemmel.

After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened again on the morning of the 2nd November along the whole front of the Army Group Fabeck. His indefatigable troops, some of whom had already endured twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken place in the campaign, attacked their strongly entrenched opponent once more. The enemy was at least as strong as they were in fighting units on the battle-front, and besides was able to bring up reinforcements of newly arrived British and French troops.[86]

On the eastern side of the Ypres salient General von Deimling attacked on a front of nearly four miles. His Corps, which had won its laurels in Alsace, in Lorraine and in Northern France, again, in spite of heavy casualties, continued its advance of the previous days. The 30th Division entered Veldhoek and established itself firmly in the north-eastern corner of the Herenthage Wood.[87] The attack had been facilitated by a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps, which had pressed forward some hundred yards north of Veldhoek. Von Deimling’s left wing had advanced in the direction of Klein Zillebeke, but was held up by the difficult wooded country east of Zwarteleen. It had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring troops on its left.

The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on the morning of the 2nd November by strong hostile counter-attacks in the sector west of Hollebeke. They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was even able to make a slight advance on the right wing during the day.

Wytschaete was again the centre of the heaviest fighting on this day.[88] The Bavarian Reserve Division was, at its own request, to attack the village; the enemy’s position immediately south of it was allotted as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry Regiment and an Abtheilung (3 batteries) of the 17th Field Artillery Regiment remained in Army Reserve. At 7 A.M. a fierce artillery duel began, and the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening him, hurried up strong reserves to Wytschaete. Kiefhaber’s brigade of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division rose to the assault. Under a hail of shrapnel the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern slopes of the Wytschaete ridge for the third time, though with considerable loss, the enemy’s machine-guns causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon as the foremost of them had reached the windmill the enemy launched a counter-attack; but this time the Bavarians were not content with simply holding their ground; their supports were brought up at the critical moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious street fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having to deal with every house became greatly disorganised. Taking advantage of this the British and French commanders sent forward fresh masses into the line, trying to turn the balance in their favour at this important point by employing every available man. It was 3.10 P.M. when a cry for help reached the Pomeranian (3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours, and it was not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the Stettin Grenadier Regiment had captured the long-coveted high ground south-west of Wytschaete, the struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been especially severe. Without possession of this the south flank of the village could not be held. Count Gneisenau’s Colberg Grenadiers were then sent forward to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable to hold out in Wytschaete against the rifle-butts and bayonets of the united Pomeranians and Bavarians. Soon after 5 P.M. the village, as far as its western edge, was in German hands, although the fighting continued till well into the night among the ruins with detachments of the enemy who would not surrender.

By the capture of Wytschaete a fine commanding position had been obtained, but the village itself, once so pleasant to the view, was now terrible to look upon. The church was in flames, and the windmill flared like a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded side by side among the smouldering ruins. The enemy was fully aware of the importance of Wytschaete, but he had been so weakened that he was unable to recover for another big counter-attack. He therefore contented himself with small and fruitless efforts, only one of which succeeded in temporarily entering the village during the 3rd. Nevertheless for the next few days it lay under the constant fire of heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not allow this to interfere with their work.

Many of the inhabitants still remained in Wytschaete, as in Messines, and it was pathetic to see how they clung to their devastated patches of ground, regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from the Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with their last scrap of property, preferring to die by the shell that destroyed their homes.

A small wood north-west of Wytschaete, called the Park, was still a dangerous point. This dense copse was surrounded by a system of trenches and several rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully sited flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it had been turned into an almost impregnable stronghold, and cost us many days of heavy fighting before it was finally taken.

The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of Messines, immediately put the high ground into a state of defence. Its left brigade, the 51st, which was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November by the 11th Landwehr Brigade, and sent back to the Army Reserve. The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing of the division, in co-operation with the 3rd Infantry Division, advanced across the Steenbeek stream. However, no progress of importance could be made there, as every movement could be immediately brought under most effective artillery fire from the commanding positions on Mount Kemmel.[89]

On the 3rd November the formation of a ‘Group Urach’ was ordered, consisting of the 3rd and 26th Infantry Divisions, to continue the attack against the high ground east of Kemmel; but in the following days it was unable to make any essential alteration in the general situation in this sector.

A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south of, and co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, in spite of the small force of artillery and engineers included in it. On the 2nd November it made a surprise attack on foot against the farm Klein Douve with complete success.[90] On the 4th November the I Cavalry Corps was relieved by the II, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions.

In the early days of November the conduct of the enemy’s operations against the Army Group Fabeck underwent a very noticeable change. The German attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the big offensive movement which had been planned. The British troops, especially the I and IV Corps,[91] were so played out that they had to be relieved by parts of the French Army. The enemy’s commanders, however, realised that even these fresh troops would be unable to make much headway against our men, and they therefore decided to remain on the defensive and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The heavy fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, or at least had badly damaged them. The civil population and all other available labour, therefore, were now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward positions for a long way westwards.[92] These preparations were soon discovered by our airmen.

During the early days of November the commander of the Sixth Army came to the conclusion that the offensive of the Army Group Fabeck could lead to no decisive results. The forces available were still too weak to break through the enemy’s strongly entrenched positions, particularly as he was continually bringing up fresh reinforcements to the battle-front.

If the attempt to break through south of Ypres was not to be entirely abandoned, and a purely defensive war on the Western Front thereby avoided, more troops would have to be brought up for the Ypres battle from other sectors of the front. As a beginning the 2nd and the Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, the Bavarian Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. The German General Staff also placed the II Corps and the 4th Infantry Division at the disposal of General von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at Lille on the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth Army, west of Lille; and this was followed by an order on the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the Guard Corps available from their positions, and for their sector of the front to be taken over by the IV Corps at Arras. Accordingly a composite Division of the Guard Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th Guard Infantry Brigades, under Lieutenant-General von Winckler, marched for Roubaix, which was reached on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed over to the Army Group Fabeck, and, in addition, all the artillery ammunition allotted to the Sixth Army. The intention of the German General Staff, communicated to the commander of the Sixth Army on the 4th November, was: to push the attack to the immediate north (of the elbow) of the Comines-Ypres canal, and to put in all available forces to break through there. In the meantime, however, General von Fabeck, in accordance with instructions previously issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, had placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division on the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, and had there formed a Group Gerok, to which the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for the offensive north of the Comines-Ypres canal there were left the II Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division and the mixed Division of von Winckler), besides the XV Corps which was already in position there. The fighting continued along the front of the Army Group until the 10th, when these troops were ready to attack. No time was to be given the enemy to recover, or to strengthen his positions.

The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended its left wing to the Comines-Ypres canal, won ground daily, especially on the 6th November, when the 39th Division delivered a heavy attack near Klein Zillebeke and drove the recently arrived French troops from their position, capturing four hundred prisoners in the farm buildings. The troops, advancing with their bands playing, also stormed parts of Zwarteleen, a village widely scattered among the woods and meadows. The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the November mist made observation impossible at any distance. French counter-attacks and an attack by British cavalry, which attempted to make good the retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their casualties were heavy, the 1st and 2nd British Life Guards being decimated. The enemy’s counter-attacks on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, took part, had also no success. On the 8th November the 148th Infantry Regiment captured the fortified position along the western edge of Veldhoek; with a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to recover the lost ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, the gallant regimental commander, hastily gathered together all the supports within reach, including Landwehr men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward to meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally wounded at the head of his victorious followers. The French hurriedly retired, suffering considerable loss.[93]

The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed by the hostile counter-attacks near the canal; the enemy offered very stubborn resistance in order to keep possession of the high ground from which Ypres can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained their positions, but, by an irresistible attack on the 9th and 10th November, took the high ground on which St. Eloi is situated.[94] To the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. The enemy remained for a long time in the houses of St. Eloi, but the high ground was of primary, perhaps even decisive, importance; for it gave us a bird’s-eye view of the country east of Ypres, where the mass of the British field artillery was in position.

The fighting further south which the troops of the Group Gerok had in and north of Wytschaete was equally heavy. The northern edge formed the dividing line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The enemy kept the village under heavy fire in order to hinder the work of our observers, the mere sight of a man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through loopholes in the ruins or at the chimney openings, and the observers were often far safer on such lofty perches than our reserves in the cellars of the battered village. Only slow progress could be made in the woods lying to the north-west.

The Group Urach also was unable to make much headway. On its right wing, the 3rd Infantry Division struggled hard to get possession of the Park north-west of Wytschaete. After a whole day’s fighting the 34th Fusilier Regiment forced its way into the hospice, a fine old convent at the northern entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had been able to get a splendid view of our positions in the valley south of Wytschaete. In spite of a most thorough bombardment our attack was very costly, and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it was found impossible to enter it. From this patch of wood heavy enfilade fire swept the positions of the 6th Bavarian Division to the north, and the trenches of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire entanglements, the impenetrable undergrowth being entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen with machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of the trees, and they were found dead hanging from the shell-torn stumps when the Park of Wytschaete was finally stormed on the 13th November by the 21st Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Division, with the 2nd Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is a legend connected with Wytschaete Park, and the scene was worthy of it.[95]

The 26th Infantry Division during these days had advanced its lines to the western slopes of the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, and in places across the valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties, as the British on Mount Kemmel were able to watch every movement in our trenches, and could immediately bring them under the fire of field or heavy artillery, or even of long-range naval guns, and they were by no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately our losses were for the most part only in the front lines, but our shortage of ammunition compelled us to husband it.[96] Owing to the conformation of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances, we were unable to range accurately on the enemy’s artillery, and the most we could do was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their observation posts on Mount Kemmel were soon discovered, and the fight now began against the observers there as well as against those posted in the towers of Ypres. So the blame must not be laid on us for the gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of Ypres, which gave such a fine view of the whole countryside.

Further to the south no noteworthy progress was made either by the Cavalry Corps, or on the front of the Sixth Army.

Such then was the general situation when, on the 10th November, the new forces lay ready to take the offensive in their positions north of the Comines-Ypres canal. Before going further, however, the operations of the Fourth Army from the last days of October must for a moment be touched on.