Book 2 — Economic-Geographical Survey of Ukraine (continued 2)

Quite analogous conditions prevail, also, in the railroad traffic of the Ukraine. In this respect, too, the Austrian Ukraine surpasses the Russian Ukraine by far, despite the backward condition of the former. Galicia, for instance, has 5 kilometers of railroad for 100 square kilometers of surface, the Russian Ukraine barely 1 kilometer. Besides the loose mesh of the railway-net of the Ukraine, there is the additional disadvantage that its lines tend toward foreign centers, and consider the local needs of Ukrainian traffic only in rare cases. Galicia, separated from the rest of Austria-Hungary by the natural boundary of the Carpathians, has had to develop an independent system of railways, with the main junction at Lemberg. In the Russian Ukraine all the main lines were built only for the convenience of the Moscow center and the Baltic ports. Hence, there is no direct railway line between Kiev and Odessa, for instance, or to Kharkiv, while there exist almost straight line connections between Romen and Libau, between Sevastopol and Kharkiv and Moscow. Besides that, strategic factors were the deciding ones in the building of the railroads (particularly in Western Ukraine), and the economic life of the country often has had to suffer for it.

A third disadvantageous aspect of the Russian Ukrainian railway system is its tariff regulations, the purpose of which is to concentrate the greatest possible amount of traffic on the railroads of Central Russia and the Baltic provinces, and thus redound to their advantage. As a result of this tariff policy of the Russian Government, it happens that it is sometimes cheaper to transport goods from the Ukraine to the most distant Baltic ports, than to the adjacent ports of the Black Sea. Thus, the tariff rates for grain from Romen to Libau (1077 versts) are 21 kopeks per pud, from Romen to Mikolaiv (429 kilometers) 18 kopeks. It costs more money and trouble to transport coal from the Donetz region to the Black Sea ports than to the ports of the Baltic, which, of course, are far more distant. Naturally Pontian navigation suffers above all from this cause, but all Ukrainian trade in general suffers likewise.

As a result of the loose web of the net of railroads, and the destination of all the railroad lines in the Ukraine to foreign centers, there are almost no important railway centers in the Ukraine. The only center of European proportions is Lemberg, where nine main and local lines meet. Striy, Stanislaviv, Kolomia and Ternopil are smaller junctions, with five converging lines. In the Russian Ukraine, only Berestia and Kharkiv deserve the name of railway junction, in the strict sense of being a point of intersection of at least two main lines; the same is true of Poltava and Rostiv. The dependence of the Ukrainian railway lines upon foreign centers is the cause of the fact that frequently very important crossings lie beyond large towns, near to some miserable little village, as for example, Sarni, Bakhmach, Kosiatin, Zmerinka, etc. The only concentrated district of the Ukrainian railroad system with numerous local junctions, lies in the Donetz Plateau.

We shall now enumerate several railroads of the Ukraine which are most important for the traffic of the country. The Ukraine is connected with the Black Sea by means of seven main lines: Lemberg-Odessa, Znamenka-Mikolaiv, Kharkiv-Sevastopol (with a branch to Kerch), Katerinoslav-Berdiansk, Donetz Plateau-Mariupol, Donetz Plateau-Tahanroh, Katerinodar-Novorossysk. Direct railroad connections with Roumania exist via Tiraspol to Yassy, and from Lemberg by way of Czernowitz to Bukarest. The following lines lead into Hungary: Stanislaviv-Sihot, Lemberg-Mukachiv, Lemberg-Uzhorod-Peremishl-Uihely. The connection with Austrian-Poland (Western Galicia) is formed by the Lemberg-Cracow and Stanislaviv-New-Sandetz lines, the connection with Russian-Poland by the lines of Kovel-Lublin-Warsaw and Berestia-Sidletz-Warsaw. The lines of Berestye-Bilostok, Rivne-Vilna, and Romen-Minsk-Libau lead north to White Russia, Lithuania and the Baltic. The Ukraine is connected with the north and northeast (Great Russia) by the lines of Kiev-Kursk, Kharkiv-Moscow, Kupiansk-Penza-Samara, and Donetz Plateau-Voroniz. Eastward, the railroad lines run from the Donetz region and Katerinodar to the bend of the Volga, and from Rostiv along the Caucasus to Baku.

In the Ukraine itself, the main lines of the railroads should run in a direction west and northwest to east and southeast. Hence, the main paths of traffic should be the following lines: Czernowitz-Odessa, Berestye-Rivne-Berdichiv-Uman, Kovel-Kiev-Poltava-Donetz region-Rostiv, Fastiv-Katerinoslav, Novosibkiv-Sumi-Kharkiv-Donetz Plateau, etc. As a result of the railroad policy of the Russian Government, the north and south lines, which lead directly or indirectly to the Muscovite centers, are held to be more important, as for instance, the following: Berestye-Minsk-Moscow, Lemberg-Rivne-Vilna, Novoselitza-Kiev-Kursk, Vapniarka-Cherkassi-Piriatin, Mikolaiv-Kreminchuk-Romni, Balta-Kreminchuk-Kharkiv-Kursk, etc. Of greatest importance are, also, the industrial railroads which connect the iron mines of Krivi Rih with the coal-fields of the Donetz region, via Katerinoslav.

The waterways of the Ukraine were at one time the main roads of trade and commerce. The great cultural mission of the Ukrainian waterways is familiar from history; thru the course of long centuries they were the only convenient thorofares thru the difficult forest regions and the pathless steppes of the Ukraine. Traffic on the Ukrainian waterways was, in former times, much more important than at present, not only because of the lack of other convenient pathways, but also because of their former greater length and capacity. Deforestation has decreased the normal level of the rivers; mill-dams have cut off the once navigable stretches of water.

The Ukraine possesses almost no artificial waterways. The only ones in existence—the Orginski Canal (Yassiolda-Vihonivske ozero-Shchara, 54 kilometers of canal, 124 kilometers of connected watercourses) and the Dnieper-Buh Canal (Pina-Mokhavez, 81 kilometers of canal, 134 kilometers of connected watercourses)—were built back in the days of Polish rule. They are antiquated, shallow and neglected, so they can serve only occasionally, and then only for log-floating.

The total length of Ukrainian waterways exceeds 7000 kilometers, which is just as much as the length of the waterways of Austria or of England, but only one-tenth that of European Russia. In this figure, sections of rivers are included which are navigable only for smaller river vessels.

The statement of the navigability of individual rivers of the Ukraine is contained in the section which deals with the rivers of the Ukraine (v. p. 70 ff.).

The most important waterway of the Ukraine is the Dnieper system. The main river is navigable in its entire Ukrainian section by the largest river vessels. In the entire Russian river system the Dnieper system constitutes 11% of the length, 10% of the total navigable length, 16% of the length navigable by steamship-lines. The rapids section, however, as a result of the incomprehensible negligence of the Russian Government, is, to this day, accessible only to the smaller ships and rafts, and then only for sailing downstream. The canals built by the Government in the Porohi (1843–1856) are so badly placed that navigation, to this day, must still keep largely to the natural ancient “Cossack paths.” In the years 1893–1895, investigating engineering commissions determined that it was possible, without great cost, to make the Porohi section completely navigable. But the thing never went any further than that. At the beginning of the 20th Century, English engineers worked out a plan for the complete regulation of the Pohori section and the construction of a waterway, accessible even to sea-going ships, which should connect the Baltic with the Black Sea by means of the Dvina and the Dnieper. The realization of this plan, which would be of the very greatest importance to the Ukraine, is still distant, and there is no hope that the Russian Government will attack it very soon.

Thus, the rapids hinder Dnieper navigation to this day, and not least for the reason that the insurance companies will not insure vessels for the rapids section. For this reason, the river fleet of the Dnieper is separated into two parts. Above the rapids (in 1900) 208 steamboats and 1002 other ships, below the rapids (together with the inlets of the Boh) 148 steamboats and 1203 other ships were plying. The number of steamboats increased threefold above the rapids and doubled below the rapids during the last sixteen years of the last century. The total horse power in 1900 was over 16,000. In 1906 the number of steamers of the Dnieper region was 382, the number of other ships 2218.

The Dnieper ships, propelled by sails and oars, which carry lumber, grain, fruit and other goods, are of various types. The largest are called “honchaki,” and have a tonnage of up to 1400; then come the “barzi” and “barki” (900–1300 tons), “berlini” (800–1140 tons), which are the most useful, “baidaki” (650 tons), “trembaki,” “laibi,” “dubi” (130–160 tons), “lodki” (80 tons), “galari” (50 tons), and “chaiki” (30 tons). The tonnage of the river fleet of the Dnieper (not counting steamers), in 1900, was approximately 500,000 tons, hence not much less than the tonnage of the present Austro-Hungarian merchant-marine.

Besides this, the Dnieper and its tributaries are navigated by a great number of rafts. In 1910 the number of them was 15,676.

Of the river harbors of the Dnieper system, Kherson carries on the greatest exchange of goods (10 million q. in 1910). Then follow Kiev (5.3 million q.), Katerinoslav (3.1 million q.), Cherkassi (2.1 million q.), Niznodniprovsk (1 million q.), Chernihiv (0.6 million q.), and Pinsk (0.5 million q.).

Navigation on the Don, as a result of the small volume of water, is much slighter than the Dnieper navigation, despite the absence of rapids. In 1900, the number of steamboats on the Don was 189, with 10,000 horse-power (in 1906 it was 382); the number of other ships 488, with 200,000 tonnage (in 1906 only 471 ships). The main river-harbor is Rostiv, which handles goods to the amount of 7.5 million q. annually.

A good deal smaller still is the navigation of the Dniester. Here, in 1900, there were only 9 steamers, with 200 horse-power (16 steamers in 1906), and 187 ships of other kinds with a tonnage of 22,000 tons (277 of them in 1906). The harbors of the main stream are Benderi (handles 0.7 million q. of goods) and Maiaki (0.5 million q.). On the Kuban River 69 steamers (counting in those of the Kura) and 131 other ships plied in 1906.

In general, river navigation in the Ukraine is on a very moderate scale. The negligence of the Russian Government and the low grade of culture limit the development of Ukrainian interior navigation. Thru the regulation of the Dnieper rapids and the connection of the river systems of the Dnieper and Dniester with the Baltic waters, by means of practicable canals, the waterways of the Ukraine could attain a wonderful importance.

Having come to the end of our description of Ukrainian traffic, we must still devote some attention to Ukrainian sea-navigation. Its present condition is as lamentable as the general condition of Ukrainian traffic. Of course, there is no doubt that the Black Sea has many qualities unfavorable to the development of navigation—its seclusion, the lack of good harbors, and an abundance of dangerous storms. Yet, what are these disadvantages against modern engineering? To assign all the blame to the low grade of Russian industry, as the Russian publicists are in the habit of doing, will not do. The causes of the slight development of Pontian navigation should be sought in the low cultural conditions of the ruling Russian nation and in the indolence of the government, which is not properly encouraging this navigation. The Russian steamers do not enjoy a good reputation on the Black Sea. Pontian coastwise navigation, which at the beginning of the 19th Century had a splendid start, and was carried on predominantly by Ukrainians, has not been able to develop properly under the heavy fist of the government. Today, conditions on the Black Sea are such, that the transportation of a unit by weight of goods from one Pontian harbor to another, costs just as much as the transportation of the same unit from the same port to England.

The number of steamers which sail the Black Sea under the Russian flag was, in 1901, only 316, with a tonnage of 187,000 tons, that is, 42% of the number and 52% of the tonnage of the entire steamship fleet of Russia. In 1912 the figures were 410 steamers, 223,000 tons, the percentages being 42% and 47%. The number of sailing vessels in 1901 was 635, with a total tonnage of 47,000, and in the year 1912 there were 827 sailing vessels, with over 53,000 tons. The development of Pontian navigation is thus going a very slow, if not a retrogressive course.

The Russian Black Sea steamers maintain a more or less regular service between the most important Black Sea ports—Odessa, Mikolaiv, Kherson, Sevastopol, Rostiv, Novorossysk, etc. From Sevastopol a line goes to Constantinople, from Odessa one to Alexandria and Vladivostok.

Despite this miserable condition of Pontian navigation, from a European point of view, it still has greater significance than navigation on other seas of Russia. Near the end of the past century, 70% of the total oversea exportation of Russia by weight, and 65% by value, went thru the harbors of the Ukrainian coast. To be sure, in 1896, only 7.5% of the ships which visited these ports sailed under the Russian flag. In the year of 1911 it was not much different; of the outgoing ships only 11.4%, and of the incoming ships only 13.9% carried the Russian flag!

Among the Black Sea ports, Odessa, now, as ever, takes first place. The imports of Odessa, in 1911, amounted to 19.2 million q., the exports 26.2 million q. This, by the way, is an example of the great preponderance of exportation over importation. In other ports the disparity is even greater. Thus, the imports of Mikolaiv amount to only 2.3 million q., the exports 22.8 million q. For Tahanroh the respective figures are 1.9 and 19.5, for Novorossysk 1.5 and 18.3, for Mariupol 3.1 and 16.2, for Kherson 1.1 and 11.3, for Feodosia 0.6 and 4.8, for Rostiv 2.1 and 2.4, for Berdiansk 0.3 and 3.9, for Eupatoria 0.8 and 2.9, for Akerman 0.4 and 2.0.

These figures once more bring before our eyes the ruinous effect of the economic policy of the Russian Government upon the Ukraine. The natural resources of the Ukraine are exported in enormous masses, without consideration of the needs of the Ukrainian population; the imports are to a great extent directed to other far distant coasts of the Russian Empire, and Great Russia gets the advantage of them, while the Ukraine is flooded with the inferior goods of Central Russian industry. If we consider, further, that an annual customs balance of 200 million rubles goes to the central government from the Ukraine, an amount which is then used for the development of the central provinces, we become able to understand under what unfavorable conditions the economic life of the Ukraine must develop, and how dearly its progress must be paid for.