Afternoon Session (continued 2)
Reading edition
RAEDER: At that moment I had the impression, when he made such serious accusations and when he considerably contradicted his previous judgments, that maybe he wanted to get rid of me, and I therefore considered that that was a particularly favorable moment to leave.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question of successors was solved by your naming a few people to Hitler.
RAEDER: Yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: And among them was the Defendant Dönitz. Did you mention his name?
RAEDER: Yes. I mentioned his name. I informed the Führer of that in writing, first Carls, second, in case he wanted to concentrate on submarine warfare, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who was the highest authority in that field.
COL. POKROVSKY: And does it not seem to you, after your answer to my questions, that the answer which you gave to Dr. Laternser on 18 May, when you mentioned the absolute impossibility of resigning from the general staff, was not a proper answer? It was possible to resign, was it not?
RAEDER: Yes, but in this case, of course, there were two prerequisites. The first was that Hitler himself did not like me any more and I knew it, so that it would not be insubordination if I threw up my post for some reason or other.
Secondly, because it was possible, as I pointed out in that conversation, for the change to take place under peaceful conditions so that the Navy would not suffer by it. If I had left because of a quarrel, then that would have had a very bad effect on the Navy because it might have meant a certain split between the Navy and Hitler, and I had particularly to preserve unity, at that critical moment of the war.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to understand my question correctly.
RAEDER: Yes, I understand...
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about the prerequisites which might have been required for granting an application for resignation. I am asking you a question in principle:
Was it possible or was it not possible to resign? After all, you did resign. You resigned from your post as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
RAEDER: Yes, but I had been in the service for 15 years, and I could tell him, “If that is the way you yourself judge me, then there is no sense in your continuing to work with me.” That was a favorable opportunity which made it permissible for me to ask him to release me. But what one could not do was to throw up the job and give the impression of being insubordinate. That had to be avoided at all costs, I would never have done that. I was too much of a soldier for that.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have already heard what I wanted to hear from you in reply to my question.
Now, I will pass on to the next question. You maintain that all the time you were striving towards normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, is that correct?
RAEDER: I am sorry; I could not understand what you said.
COL. POKROVSKY: You maintain that during your service you always strove to make the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union quite normal, is that not so?
RAEDER: I was always in favor of the Bismarck policy, that we should have a common policy with Russia.
COL. POKROVSKY: If I understood your testimony correctly the day before yesterday and on Friday, in 1940, already, you had knowledge of the fact that Hitler intended to attack the Soviet Union.
RAEDER: In September 1940 for the first time I heard certain statements from Hitler himself that he was thinking of a war with Russia, given certain circumstances. Even in the directive he mentioned one of these prerequisites, one of these circumstances. He did not say to me at that time that in any circumstances he wanted to wage war, but that we had to be prepared, as it says in Paragraph 1, that before crushing England we might have to fight against Russia. And from September on I began to make objections to him.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was there not a case of an incident when you maintained that the explanations which had been given by official governmental organs or agencies for an attack on the Soviet Union gave you and the others the impression that it was a deliberate propaganda, and in fact they were quite repulsive in their effect? Do you remember that?
RAEDER: The propaganda made by Hitler made an impression? I did not quite get it...
COL. POKROVSKY: I believe that you once expressed in writing the view that the OKW and the Foreign Ministry explained to the German people the reasons for attacking the Soviet Union in such a way as to give the impression that it was deliberate propaganda, and the total effect was repulsive. Do you not remember it?
RAEDER: Oh, you mean the broadcasts emanating from the Foreign Office when the war started? Yes, that was Hitler’s propaganda to make the German people understand the reason for this war. That is right. As regards breaking the Pact...
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at one document. This is a document written by you, and I would like you to tell us whether this document contains the precise subject matter of my question.
RAEDER: Where is it?
COL. POKROVSKY: “The propagandistic...”
RAEDER: “The propagandistic”—shall I read it?
“The propagandistic, political and military announcements given out at the beginning of the war by the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Armed Forces, which were to justify the breaking of the Pact because of breaches by the Soviet Union, found very little credence among the people as well as among the Armed Forces. They showed too clearly that they were propaganda for a certain purpose and had a repulsive effect.” (USSR-460.)
I know that at that time Hitler himself drafted these documents, together with Goebbels.
COL. POKROVSKY: In connection with this question I have another question for you. Am I to understand you in this way; that your divergence of opinion with Hitler over foreign policy, and in particular in regard to aggressive wars, was less strongly defined than your difference of opinion about the question of the marriage of a naval officer with a certain girl? Did you understand me?
RAEDER: No, they were two quite different things. Those were military questions where the political decisions remained with the Führer. I was very insistent about the moral issues also, where they concerned the Pact, but I did not send him any written ultimatum because in this matter it would have been unsoldierly. I did not have the final decision, he had it; whereas in the case of Albrecht, it was up to me to decide—to say yes or no—and not to sign that which I was supposed to sign.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are saying now that this is a question of morals. Does it not seem to you that an unprovoked attack on a country with which Germany had a nonaggression treaty—do you not think that such a question is always connected with the question of morals?
RAEDER: Of course; that is what I said myself, that in this case too I laid special stress on the moral issue. But in spite of that, as the highest man of the Navy, I was not in a position to hold out the threat of resignation at that moment. I was too much of a soldier to be able to do that, to be able to leave the Navy at a moment like that.
COL. POKROVSKY: In answer to questions put to you by your counsel here in this courtroom you testified that your speech, which was delivered by you on 12 March 1939—that is Page 169 of the Russian text in the Raeder document book, My Lord—the speech where you praised Hitler and Hitler’s policies—you mentioned that this speech was not in accord with your true opinion. Is it so or is it not?
RAEDER: No, that is not correct. I said that we had had the experience that the Communists and Jews, from 1917 to 1920, had strongly undermined our power of resistance, and that for this reason it could be understood, if a National Socialist government took certain measures against both of them in order to stem their influence, which was excessive. That was the sense of my statements and I made absolutely no mention of any further steps which might come into question.
COL. POKROVSKY: In short, you are saying now that when you delivered that speech on 12 March 1939, that this speech was fully in accord with your ideas and your views. Is that correct?
RAEDER: Yes, it was, or I would not have made it. It was in accord insofar as I had to recognize that the National Socialist Government had in some way to stem that influence which was generally recognized to be excessive, and as I said yesterday, the National Socialist Government had issued the Nuremberg Laws, which I did not entirely approve of where they went to extremes. But if the Government was so disposed, it was not possible for me in an official public speech, which I gave on the orders of that Government, to express my personal views which were different. That had to be considered within this address to the nation.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish in a very few moments? It is now five minutes past five.
COL. POKROVSKY: I think, My Lord, that only about 10 minutes will be sufficient for me. I have only about three or four more questions left.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
COL. POKROVSKY: [Turning to the defendant.] In order to save time I am not going to argue with you in regard to the motives which made you deliver the speech. It was important for me that you should confirm what you said, and that is, that this speech was in accord with your views and ideas. Now I will pass on to the next question.
On 29 September 1941, your Chief of Staff, Admiral Fricke—do I pronounce his name correctly? Is it Fricke or Fricker?
RAEDER: Fricke, yes, Chief of the Staff of the Naval Operations Staff.
COL. POKROVSKY: Admiral Fricke published a directive in regard to the future fate of Leningrad. Do you know what document I mean, or must this document be shown to you?
RAEDER: No. I know that document very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: This directive was published with your consent?
RAEDER: I did not give a specific order for it because there was no necessity for passing it on. May I just explain briefly how it was. I had...
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, and I would like you to be brief.
RAEDER: Quite briefly, yes. I had requested Hitler when I heard that he intended in the course of the war to bombard Leningrad, that he should spare the port and dock installations because they would be useful for us later, as we had to keep moving our bases back to the East on account of the British air attacks in the Baltic. Shortly before the date which you have mentioned Admiral Fricke had been at the Führer’s headquarters—I do not know for what reason—and had there spoken with the Führer in my absence, and the Führer had explained to him that plan to bombard Leningrad, especially with aircraft, and he used those very exaggerated words which were then written down in the document. The Navy had absolutely nothing to do with the shelling of Leningrad. We received no orders for that. We were only interested in that one thing which I mentioned before, that the shipyards and port installations should be spared. The Führer had informed Fricke that unfortunately he was not in a position to do that because the attack, especially if made with aircraft, could not be directed quite so precisely. All we could do was to inform Generaladmiral Carls that Leningrad, in case it should be taken, could not be used as a base, and Generaladmiral Carls had to stop the preparations which he had already begun by allocating German workers and probably also machinery which was intended to be used in Leningrad later on. Carls had to know of that and, as the document says, the so-called Quartermaster Department of the Navy had to know about it, and that was why Admiral Fricke passed on that paper. Unfortunately he included in this paper the expressions used by Hitler, which had nothing to do with the whole affair as far as we were concerned, because we had nothing to do with the shelling. By so doing he did not assume in any way the responsibility, in the sense that he approved it. He only believed that he had to pass on Hitler’s wording of the order.
The Navy had nothing to do with the matter. It would not have been necessary to pass it on, and unfortunately and very clumsily that expression used by Hitler was entered in that document. However, nothing happened and that document was not passed on from Generaladmiral Carls to our Finland Commander. That is the whole story.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me the question is becoming more complicated. I asked you a simple question. Your Chief of Staff, Chief of Operations, published a directive. Did you know about the directive?
RAEDER: No. That is not a directive—that can be seen also from the photostat—because the letter had not been submitted to me for passing on, and that shows that it was not considered to be very important. It was not a directive to undertake any operation or anything important. It was just a directive to stop anything that might have been done with regard to bases; so that really nothing happened. Thus, when that document was passed on by Admiral Fricke, nothing happened at all. It was quite superfluous.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are talking about the destruction of one of the biggest cities of the Soviet Union. You are talking in this document about razing the city to the ground, and you maintain now that it is a more or less trifling question, that this question was not important enough to be reported to you, as Fricke’s Chief? Do you want us to believe that?
RAEDER: Of course. It is not a question of the shelling of Leningrad, with which we had nothing to do at all. It was the minor question which concerned us, the question as to whether we would later be able to establish a naval base there, and whether we could bring workers and machines and such things to Leningrad. That was a minor issue. The shelling of Leningrad was a major issue.
COL. POKROVSKY: I think that the Tribunal will be able to understand you correctly and to draw the necessary conclusions, both from this document and from your testimony.
Now, I have one last question for you. On 28 August 1945, in Moscow, did you not write an affidavit as to the reasons for Germany’s defeat?
RAEDER: Yes, I took special pains with that after the collapse.
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, we submit this document to the Tribunal in the form of excerpts, Document Number USSR-460. In order to save time I would like you to hear several excerpts from this affidavit.
[Turning to the defendant.] You will be shown where they can be found on the original, and you can say whether it was correctly read into the record and whether you acknowledge and confirm it.
“My Attitude Towards Adolf Hitler and the Party. Disastrous influence on the fate of the German State...”
Did you find this place?
RAEDER: Yes, I have it.
COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable...”
DR. SIEMERS: Would you be kind enough to give me a copy so that I can follow?
COL. POKROVSKY: “Unimaginable vanity and immeasurable ambition were his main peculiarities; running after popularity and showing off, untruthfulness, vagueness, and selfishness, which were not restrained for the sake of State or People. He was outstanding in his greed, wastefulness, and effeminate unsoldierly manner.”
Then, a little further on:
“It is my conviction that Hitler very soon realized his character, but made use of him where it suited his purpose, and burdened him perpetually with new tasks in order to avoid his becoming dangerous to himself.”
On Page 24 of your document you give another characteristic:
“The Führer continued to attach importance to the fact that from the outside his relations to me seemed normal and good. He knew I was well thought of in all the really respectable circles of the German people, and that in general everybody had great faith in me. This cannot be said of Göring, Von Ribbentrop, Dr. Goebbels, Himmler and Dr. Ley.”
Now I will ask you to find Page 27.
RAEDER: But there is something missing. “In the same way, as for instance, Baron Von Neurath, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Schacht, Dorpmüller and others,” who were on the other side.
COL. POKROVSKY: Evidently it was not correctly translated to you. I will read this passage into the record. Now, on Page 27, this place is underlined in red pencil: “Dönitz’ strong political inclination to the Party...”
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] I think the Tribunal could read this themselves if the defendant says that it is true that he wrote it. Probably Dr. Siemers could check it over and see that there are no inaccuracies.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, My Lord. Then I shall have the opportunity to put a very brief question.
[Turning to the defendant.] I will ask you to take a look at a place on Page 29, which is marked with pencil, where the paragraph deals with Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl.
Will you confirm that?
RAEDER: What am I supposed to do? Yes, well...
COL. POKROVSKY: I am asking you with regard to everything that I read into the record and what you say just now in this paragraph. I would like to have an answer from you. Do you confirm all that?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I quite agree with the suggestion by the Tribunal. However, I should like to ask that the entire document be submitted. I have only short excerpts before me, and I would be grateful if I could see the entire document. I assume that Colonel Pokrovsky agrees to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Siemers, one part of the document having been put in evidence, you can refer to the remainder of the document. You can put the remainder of the document in, if you want to.
RAEDER: I said that at the time I tried to find an explanation for the cause of our collapse.
COL. POKROVSKY: First, I ask you to give the answer, yes or no.
RAEDER: Yes. On the whole, I agree entirely with this judgment. But I should like to add that I wrote those things under entirely different conditions. I do not wish to go into details, and I never expected that that would ever become public. These were notes for myself to help me form my judgment later on. I also want to ask especially that what I said about Generaloberst Jodl should also be read into the record, or where it belongs, that is, right after the statement about Field Marshal Keitel. With regard to Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to emphasize that I intended to convey that it was his manner towards the Führer which made it possible for him to get along with him for a long time, because if anybody else had been in that position, who had a quarrel with the Führer every day or every other day, then the work of the whole of the Armed Forces would have been impossible.
That is the reason and the explanation of what I wanted to express by that statement.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution has no further questions to ask the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, have you got the whole document before you? Was that the original document you had before you?
RAEDER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: In your writing?
RAEDER: No, it is typewritten. But it is signed by me.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the document can be handed to Dr. Siemers.
Dr. Siemers, do you want to re-examine beyond putting in that document? Have you any questions you want to ask in addition to putting in that document?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, on account of the cross-examination made by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I should like to re-examine, and I should like to ask for permission to do that after I have read this document, so that I can also cover the document tomorrow in this connection.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, the thought occurs to me with respect to this document—do I understand that the Tribunal will order copies to be distributed to all of the Defense Counsel? There are matters with respect to the defendants on which the Counsel might want to examine. They might be surprised.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought it was fair that Dr. Siemers should see the document.
MR. DODD: Yes. I have no objection to that. But my point is, that in the document there is reference to defendants other than the defendant represented by Dr. Siemers. And at a later date, if this document is not made known to the others by the reading of it or by the turning over to them in translated form, they may claim surprise, and lack of opportunity to examine on it.
THE PRESIDENT: I think some photostatic copies of the document should be made so that all the defendants referred to therein may be acquainted with the terms of the document.
MR. DODD: I just thought I would make that suggestion.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.