Part 2 — CHAPTER III CONFESSION

Article I ESSENCE, NECESSITY, AND PROPERTIES OF CONFESSION

19. Essence and Necessity of Confession.

Though contrition is the most important of the dispositions which a penitent must bring to the Sacrament, the confessing of the sins is the most prominent feature to ordinary observers; hence the Sacrament is often simply called confession, as in the very earliest ages of the Church it was known simply as confessio (in Greek exomologesis).

Sacramental confession is the self-accusation of sins committed after Baptism and not yet remitted in the Sacrament, and it is made by the penitent to a priest having the necessary faculties and with the object of obtaining absolution.

Hence it is not a sacramental confession when the sins are told enarratione mere historica; such a recital would not be an accusation, nor would it be done with the view of acknowledging one’s self a sinner or of obtaining absolution. Moreover, it is not a sacramental confession if sins are revealed to a priest to obtain counsel or help from him, or if they are told to the priest merely in derision, for there would be no accusation in this, at least it would not be done with a view of obtaining absolution. On the contrary, a confession invalid through any defect whatever would be sacramental if it was made in order to obtain absolution.

If, however, a man began by simply relating his sins to an authorized priest without any idea of making a sacramental confession, and then in order to obtain absolution accuses himself in general terms to the same priest of those same sins, the confession would be sacramental, for then a formal accusation would be made of those sins to the priest as judge, in order that absolution might be given.

The necessity of this confession for all mortal sins committed after Baptism is a dogma of the Church, and rests on the divine institution of the Sacrament. The proof is to be sought in dogmatic treatises. In the divine institution of this Sacrament, as a necessary means for obtaining forgiveness of sin by confession to a priest, is included the divine command of confessing sin, which binds all who have committed mortal sin after Baptism. We have already spoken of this in treating of the duty of approaching the Sacrament, since confession is one of the acts required of the penitent on receiving this Sacrament.⁠[214]

There remains yet another point which shows the necessity of confession. Perfect contrition, as we have seen above, remits sin apart even from the Sacrament, but it does not remove the obligation of mentioning the sins so remitted to a duly authorized priest. The obligation remains, because by Christ’s command every mortal sin committed after Baptism must be submitted by confession to the power of the keys. This follows from the words of Our Lord (John xx. 23); hence the Council of Trent teaches that for those who have fallen into mortal sin after Baptism confession is as necessary as Baptism is to those who have not been baptized.⁠[215]

20. The Properties of Confession.

The necessary properties of confession have their origin in its nature and object. The primary object of the confession is to put the confessor, who is bound to act in his office as a judge, not as a despot, in a position to form a judicial sentence, so that he may be able to decide whether the sinner be worthy or unworthy of absolution, and also that he may be able to impose a suitable penance. To succeed in this the confession must be such as to allow the confessor a view of the whole moral state of the penitent, hence it must be complete. This property, however, being of very great importance, will be treated in a separate division. The other necessary feature, the contrition, has been already dealt with. The remaining properties are of secondary importance and not essential; they turn partly on the integrity and partly on the contrition and have been summarized in the following verses:—

Though these properties are not so essential that the want of any one of them nullifies the confession, they are all useful in their several ways to instruct a penitent how to make a good confession. For this reason we will treat of them:—

1. Simplex. The confession should be simple, straightforward, short, and clear; the penitent will therefore avoid all unnecessary, superfluous words, all prolix narrations and remarks which have no connection with the matter; at the same time he will avoid the use of all unintelligible expressions or such as are misleading and ambiguous; let his accusation be so worded that he may take it for granted that the priest will understand both the number and species of the sins. Thus, too, he must not accuse himself in a vague and general manner, as, “I have had bad thoughts”; for the confessor cannot judge from this whether a mortal or a venial sin, or indeed any sin at all, has been incurred; let him use such words as describe clearly the sins he has committed, making use of the proper and specific terms. Finally, he should avoid unnecessary repetitions of sins which differ only in number, not recounting them separately because they were committed at different times or on different occasions; all the sins should be grouped under their specific names and the number given. It is the duty of the priest, in the case of penitents who fail in this respect, to instruct them, at the same time taking into account the peculiarities of the penitent and showing great patience. St. Antoninus gives a very useful piece of advice on this subject. Penitents, says he, who need consolation in their trials or advice in their doubts should defer their difficulties till after they have confessed and received absolution; otherwise, if they dilate on these subjects during the confession of their sins, there is danger of their contrition being weakened.

2. Humilis. Let the confession be humble, for a man approaches the tribunal as a penitent, as one guilty of crime, as one accusing himself to his judge and seeking grace and mercy; of such a one humility and lowliness are to be expected. Surely the knowledge of one’s sins and sinfulness revealed by an honest examination of the conscience, the remembrance of repeated unfaithfulness and ingratitude to God, are reason enough for being humble. Let this humility fill the heart, pervade the accusation, be manifested in the whole exterior; then let the penitent go into the confessional, kneeling, with head uncovered, like the publican in the Gospel, who remained by the door of the Temple and dared not to raise his eyes to heaven, but struck his breast and prayed: “God, be merciful to me a sinner.” The words used by some are very appropriate as an introduction to the confession: “I, a poor sinner, confess and acknowledge to God, and to you, reverend father, in God’s place, that I have sinned often and grievously by thought, word, deed, and omission,” etc. Others, again, use the words of the Confiteor: “I confess to almighty God, to Blessed Mary, ever a virgin, ... that I have sinned exceedingly in thought, word, and deed,” etc.

3. Pura. The confession should be made with the object of gaining pardon of sin and the grace of the Sacrament. If it were made with any wicked and gravely sinful intention, it would be a sacrilegious and invalid confession; if the penitent had any venially sinful object in view, e.g. to gain esteem, the confession would be valid though the penitent would incur the guilt of venial sin by it. If the penitent’s principal intention is to be reconciled to God, though at the same time there be present other motives not altogether forbidden, the confession is unimpaired; the same may easily happen in other good works, and secondary motives do not exclude the principal one.

4. Fidelis (seu verax). The confession should be truthful and candid, without lies and deceit. Hence the penitent must not conceal the sins he has committed, nor confess those which he has not committed; neither may he confess as certain what is doubtful, nor what is doubtful as certain. It is disputed whether every lie in confession is a mortal sin and renders the confession null. There are indeed theologians who maintain that every lie told in confession is a mortal sin, because of the sin being committed in the very act of receiving a Sacrament. This view, however, is wrong. It is true that any lie told in confession is more sinful than the same lie told under other circumstances would be, on account of the irreverence to the Sacrament; but mortal sin would be incurred only by a lie in confession when the lie concerns the materia necessaria of confession; in such a case the confession is invalid, for the judge is deceived about the case, and that is gravely wrong. If the penitent lies to the confessor in a matter which does not pertain to the Sacrament, there is no mortal sin, for such a lie does not mislead the judge nor imply a grave irreverence to the Sacrament, since still there is real matter for the Sacrament and a sufficient disposition to obtain the grace of the Sacrament. Accordingly, if the lie told in confession has nothing to do with the confession itself, it is mortal or venial on its own merits quite apart from the circumstances of its being told in confession.

From what has been said it follows that a penitent incurs venial sin by a lie told in confession when (1) he accuses himself falsely of a venial sin or denies having committed a venial sin; except where this venial sin forms the sole matter of confession, for then he would sin mortally, not on account of the lie, but on account of the grave irreverence done to the Sacrament in offering to the priest insufficient matter, for sins falsely stated can never be matter for absolution.

(2) Moreover, it is only a venial sin if the penitent denies having committed a mortal sin which he is not bound hic et nunc to disclose, either because he has already revealed it in a valid confession or because he has pressing reasons for not disclosing it hic et nunc. Indeed it is possible that there is no sin at all when a penitent makes use of mental reservation. The confessor has no right to put questions which have no connection with the materia necessaria, and the penitent is not bound to answer such questions; to avoid a lie he may use a mental reservation by choosing an ambiguous expression which contains the truth, leaving the confessor to judge for himself. If, on the contrary, the priest has a right to inquire of the penitent whether he has committed some grave sin which has been already confessed, and the penitent denies the charge, he would sin mortally.⁠[216]

(3) If the penitent is questioned by the priest as to his home, his condition, or his relatives or friends, and answers not according to the truth, knowing that these questions have no bearing on the nature of his sins, such untruths are only venial; for if a lie told in confession with respect to venial sins, although these may be matter of confession, be only a venial sin, a lie with respect to other things which have no connection with the accusation of the sins is still less likely to be mortal.

On the other hand, a mortal sin is incurred (1) when a penitent accuses himself of having committed a mortal sin which he has never committed, or denies having fallen into a mortal sin which he has incurred and which has never been validly confessed, and which besides he has no valid reason for concealing, or if he conceals a mortal sin which he is bound to mention.

(2) When he gives the number of his mortal sins as greater than is really the case. Here, however, ignorant and untaught penitents may be excused, because they honestly think it better to give a large number in preference to a small one. Besides,—

(3) A penitent sins mortally who confesses mortal sin as doubtful which he is certain of having committed, or confesses as certain mortal sins of which he has doubts. In such cases the penitent would be unsettling the judgment of the confessor in a very grave matter.

(4) Moreover, it would be a mortal sin if the penitent confesses a recent mortal sin, either explicitly or equivalently, as an old one already confessed, for the priest is thus prevented from giving a correct sentence and imposing the proper penance. It is another case when the accusation leaves it doubtful whether the sin is an old or recent one, or whether it has been already confessed or not, even if the penitent intend that the confessor be persuaded that the sin is an old one.

(5) Finally, the penitent incurs a mortal sin if he denies the existence of a habit of sin, or of a relapse or the existence of an occasion of sin, or if he avoids any avowal on the subject so as to mislead the confessor. It would accordingly be a mortal sin for a penitent to accuse himself of a recent mortal sin at the end of his confession by using a formula of this kind: “I accuse myself of the sins of my past life, in particular of this sin ...”; for this formula by universal consent implies only past sins already confessed. On the other hand, it would not be a mortal sin in a general confession to mingle old with recent sins, as long as the confessor knows that not all the mortal sins have been already confessed; if the priest is persuaded that he ought to gain a clearer knowledge, he may ask; if he believe that he may let the matter rest there, it is his affair (and perhaps in many cases this may be the prudent course). Still less is it a mortal sin, indeed it may be counselled or obligatory in certain cases, for a penitent to say that such or such sin has not yet been confessed, making the accusation in such a way that the confessor does not suspect that the sin has been recent. Such an expedient may be necessary when a priest himself confesses sins committed in hearing confessions, not wishing to violate the seal of confession.⁠[217]

In addition, the confessor must remember that the faithful in general are persuaded that a lie in confession is a very grave sin, so that he must judge of its gravity according to the conscience of the penitent.⁠[218]

5. Frequens. Confession ought to be frequently made (see above, § 3). This includes also the repeated confession of sins already confessed and absolved (see above, § 6).

6. Nuda. The penitent ought not to hide his sins by ambiguous words or expressions which veil the hatefulness of the sin, in order to make them appear less in the eyes of the confessor. A penitent who thus veils his sins cannot have real contrition; there still remains in his heart that false shame which confuses the intellect, and his soul is not yet released from sin. Such conduct is in reality no less sinful than concealing the sin entirely, for what is the difference between total silence and answering so obscurely that the questioner is left in doubt? Just as a penitent makes a bad confession who conceals what he ought to tell, so does he who answers his confessor in such obscure terms that the latter does not understand or is led to take a view which the penitent knows to be wrong.

The conditional accusation is no better, as when, for example, a penitent says: “If I have given way to impure thoughts, I accuse myself of them,” etc. Such a confession is not an accusation of sins, nor is it a sign of absolute aversion from them.

7. Discreta. The confession should be prudent, i.e. so worded that the reputations of others do not suffer; hence the sins of others ought not to be revealed except in so far as is necessary for the declaration of one’s own sins. Not a few penitents prefer to tell the sins of others rather than their own: wives, for instance, tell the sins of their husbands, servants the sins of their masters. Such penitents must be seriously admonished by their confessor for the future not to reveal the sins of others lest they incur the guilt of detraction and God’s anger in the very tribunal of His mercy. The question as to the partner in sin, whether and under what circumstances he is to be revealed in confession, is relegated to a later portion of the treatise.

The penitent’s own good sense will tell him to be as discreet and decorous as possible in confessing his sins, especially those against purity, without detracting from the completeness of the confession, without being gross, and at the same time without failing in the reverence due to the Sacrament; hence he should tell only what is necessary for the integrity of the confession, and that as cautiously and becomingly as is possible, quite briefly, in clear and intelligible language; the confession must be perfect and at the same time chaste. The confessor also must exercise great discretion and prudence in this dangerous matter.⁠[219]

Finally, a prudent penitent will choose a suitable and virtuous confessor who unites real piety and prudent zeal to solid knowledge and a wide experience.

Not only is it advisable and wholesome to have a regular confessor, but it is absolutely necessary. Of course as far as the absolution is concerned it is always valid, provided that the priest who gives it has the requisite faculties; but as for the spiritual direction of the penitent, it is by no means an indifferent matter who the confessor is; if ever there is an occasion in which there is need of a trusty, reliable friend, guide, and adviser, it is in making a confession. On this point St. Francis of Sales writes: “When Tobias was about to send his son to Rages, and the latter explained that he did not know the way, ‘Go, then,’ said his father, ‘and seek a man who knows the way, that he may guide you.’ This is my advice to you, Philothea; if you really desire to tread the way of perfection, seek out above all things a man of experience to guide you and show you the way: this is the most important lesson of all.”⁠[220] And after treating the subject in his usual way, he quotes the remarkable words which the great St. Louis shortly before his death addressed to his son: “Confess often, and choose for your confessor a man of experience, who has not only wisdom and science, but also zeal for souls, and learn from him what you ought to do.” The priest as God’s vicar is not a judge only, he is a physician, and it is not hard to understand how one physician can differ from another. For a soul which is anxious to get rid of sin, to be established in virtue, and to make progress in Christian perfection, as all Christians are bound to do, there is required not only the application of the Sacrament, but guidance as well. The direction of souls goes much farther than a mere dispensing of the Sacrament. There are many things in which a soul eager for salvation must be anxious for further instruction; the methods of combating with success different evil inclinations, the methods of prayer, the performance of certain good works, the way of carrying out the duties of one’s state of life with more zeal and merit, and the attainment of perfection. An approved confessor and director is undoubtedly very useful, nay, necessary, and the penitent should pick out such a one. In a choice of this kind he should have no other object but his salvation and spiritual progress, and hence he should choose a well-instructed, experienced, and holy man to lead him in the way of God in the interior life, one who knows the penitent’s condition, one whose heart is full of love, one who is as far removed from a feeble indulgence as from a repelling strictness. Firmness and gentleness should be united in him, a firmness which does not crush and a gentleness which will not allow presumption; he should inspire confidence so that the penitent has no difficulty in unfolding his heart to him. To seek an ignorant and inexperienced confessor is, as theologians express it, to choose a sure guide to hell; and, according to the teaching of Suarez, etc., it is a mortal sin when done with the intention of obtaining absolution by fraud.⁠[221] But a good confessor is a “faithful friend, a strong defense; and he that hath found him hath found a treasure; ... and they that fear the Lord shall find him.”⁠[222] St. Francis of Sales directs Philothea to make choice of a confessor after constant prayer, and assures her that God will grant her this most important of petitions and send her a man after his own heart.

When the penitent has made choice of his confessor in accordance with those rules of common sense which great spiritual writers enjoin, his duty is then to love him as his spiritual father, to fear him as the judge of his conscience, to follow him as his guide in the path of virtue, to take his advice as his physician in the maladies, affections, and sufferings of his soul. He should follow him, as though he were an angel leading the way to heaven; give him his whole confidence; deal with him in all openness and frankness; disclose to him all the good and evil in his soul without dissembling or reserve, and at the same time entertain a respect for him which does not weaken his confidence in him.⁠[223]

Having once chosen a good confessor, the penitent should cling to him and not change about from one to another; nothing is more harmful or more foolish than such conduct; unstable and wandering penitents of this kind give sufficient proof that all they want is to be absolved and not to be helped and guided, and there is reason to suspect that their purpose of amendment is by no means sincere. Should a penitent, however, be in such a condition that to confess to his regular confessor would be too great a difficulty and involve risk of making sacrilegious confession, it would be better to look out for some other priest and confess to him.

The penitent ought not at the same time be so dependent on his confessor as to be quite bewildered when a change becomes necessary. Discouragement or sadness on this account, or a less frequent use of the Sacraments would be a sign that this dependence was due to some undesirable cause and could not be any longer regarded as confidence in the director.

What is to be thought of those penitents who have two confessors, one to whom they are well known and whose good opinion they enjoy, and another to whom they are not well known, using the former to tell him their more frequent and smaller sins, and the latter for the confession of graver faults, in order that they may thereby keep up their good reputation with the first? Such conduct is certainly not per se forbidden when there is good reason for it, as may happen when any one is unwilling or does not dare to reveal to his ordinary confessor some very shameful fall.

Still the practice is not without danger and so cannot be unconditionally recommended, for it is a sign that a penitent is more anxious about his good name than his progress in the spiritual life; indeed he might incur grievous sin if such conduct exposed him to the danger of falling into mortal sin, as would be the case if in pursuing this course he never intended seriously to give up his sin. Such is the predicament of those penitents who seek out inexperienced or easy-going confessors, or of those who habitually fall into mortal sins, confessing them only to a priest who, they know, will take the matter very quietly, while they reveal their less grievous sins to some pious and strict confessor. On the other hand, the case above quoted presents quite another aspect when a penitent has on rare occasions fallen into a grave and shameful sin and shrinks from revealing it to his ordinary confessor.⁠[224]

8. Libens. The confession ought to be voluntary; the penitent should approach the sacred tribunal spontaneously, not prompted by prayers or threats, nor prevailed upon by promises, nor driven by fear of temporal losses; he should willingly acknowledge his sins to the priest as the minister of Christ Our Lord appointed to forgive sin and distribute His graces. A man might of course be influenced by those exterior motives to receive the Sacrament; and if he made an earnest act of contrition and carried out the other requisites, he would make a valid confession. There is, however, as Laymann observes, a real danger for a man who goes to the Sacrament under compulsion that he will make his confession invalid through want of contrition or through a deficient accusation of his sins. It frequently happens that such penitents, giving way to external pressure, perform their Easter confession, doing it only to keep up appearances; they make no act of contrition, they are unwilling to tell all that lies on their conscience, they are ready to make a bad confession and communion. A prudent confessor may detect their insincerity and sometimes will prevail upon them to make a good confession.

9. Verecunda. The penitent should make his confession with confusion at the number and greatness of his sins, his ingratitude and infidelity to God his Lord and Father; this confusion should fill his soul and reveal itself even in the self-accusation and in the whole bearing of the penitent. Between this real shame of every good penitent and the false shame which arises from pride and self-love is a great gulf; the latter, unless overcome, will cause the penitent to be dishonest in his accusation and to make a sacrilegious confession. The confessor should be very considerate of the weakness of such penitents and encourage them, helping them to make a candid avowal if he suspects false shame, and he should be careful not to frighten and shock them by hard words or untimely threats.

10. The other property of the confession, its integrity, will, on account of its great importance, be reserved for a thorough discussion in another paragraph.

11. Secreta. The accusation should be in secret. It should be made so as to be heard only by the priest and not by others. Christ did not institute public confession; and if in the early Church those who had committed grave public sin and given public scandal were compelled after private confession to make a public avowal of their offenses, this was only part of the then existing discipline. As a matter of fact the practice was productive of as much harm as good, and so the Church put an end to it.⁠[225] Confession by an interpreter would, however, be valid, as well as a confession which had been overheard by others. There is no obligation to confess through an interpreter if one happens to be in a country of which he does not know the language, supposing there is no priest to whom one can make himself understood, for the Lateran Council⁠[226] prescribes confessio secreta made to a priest only (soli sacerdoti facienda), and to employ an interpreter for confession would be very onerous.⁠[227] Such an obligation would exist only if a dying man had doubts as to the perfection of his contrition, for the wish to save our souls obliges us to avoid all risk. Then, however, it would be sufficient to name one or two sins and make a general accusation of the rest.⁠[228]

Moreover, a sufficiently perfect confession may be made even through an interpreter without the latter acquiring any knowledge of the sins. The confessor, for example, in the case of the sick, may arrange through the interpreter a system of signs, such as pressure of the hand, motion of the head or eyes, by which the invalid may answer the questions put by the priest through the interpreter, who may be placed with his back to the priest and penitent; by a method of this kind even the number of sins may be ascertained. Of course in a case like this the confessor must be careful not to betray the penitent’s replies by the nature of his questions. If a male penitent express a wish to confess in this manner, he may be allowed to do so.⁠[229]

A confession made in writing is per se valid; on the other hand, as we have already seen, absolution conveyed per literas is null. The custom, however, of making the confession by word of mouth must be strictly adhered to (hence many theologians add to the other properties of a good confession that it should be vocalis), and unless there are pressing reasons for the contrary practice the confession should not be made by writing or by any other system of signs; a sufficiently good reason for allowing it would be great shame in mentioning certain sins or a defect in speech. In such cases the priest would read the writing and the penitent make some acknowledgment by word of mouth, such as, “I accuse myself of all contained in the paper.” If the whole confession without any good reason were made by writing or by signs, it would be invalid, for the penitent would have sinned gravely by such an action unless he had acted bona fide.⁠[230]

A dumb penitent who can write and has no other way of making his confession is, according to the sententia communis et probabilior, obliged to make his confession in writing, for this would not be burdensome to him. The opponents of this view insist on the danger of the confession being revealed and, in consequence, deny the obligation of making the confession in writing. Such a risk, as experience shows, is not usually to be feared and may easily be avoided. There are indeed not a few penitents who to secure their own peace of mind always write their confessions and read them off to the priest. If, however, in a particular case there is danger of revelation or any other serious inconvenience to the penitent in consequence of his writing, there is no obligation. So teaches St. Thomas, and with him are Suarez, Lugo, Sporer, Salmanticenses, etc.⁠[231]

12. Lacrimabilis. The confession should be made with real sorrow. It is not necessary that it be accompanied by tears or sighs and other external signs of the kind, but it is required that there be a real sorrow and horror of sin. The internal sorrow should become sensibilis or evident by the confession so as to form materia sacramenti. The sentiment of contrition can always be roused by grace, while tears are not in our power.

13. Accelerata. The confession should be prompt; there should be no delay in making it after mortal sin has been committed. This is not of precept, but it is a counsel which should be readily followed by any one who realizes the horror of sin and its consequences.

14. Fortis. The confession should be made with great courage, all hindrances to a candid avowal of one’s sins being put aside, especially false shame and the fear of losing the good esteem of the priest. It is the delight of the devil, not before, but after entrapping a soul into sin, to work upon the feeling of shame so vehemently that the penitent is tempted to conceal sins which are particularly shameful. In this case the penitent must use all his courage, and by reflecting on God’s command and the awful consequences of a bad confession get the victory over this false shame. He must put into practice Tertullian’s maxim, Pereat pudor, ne pereat anima.

15. Accusans. The confession should be an accusation and not a series of excuses. Thus the penitent ought to impute the sins to himself and not to other causes, temptations of the devil, the passions, natural weakness, etc., nor to the companions by whose advice or orders he has gone astray. There may be of course occasions where what is objectively a mortal sin may become only venial or perhaps no sin at all, through inculpable forgetfulness or absent-mindedness or inadvertence.

16. Parere paratus. The penitent should be disposed to obey the priest’s advice and commands; hence he should be ready to adopt the means suggested for his improvement, to follow out the advice given, to avoid the occasions of sin which are pointed out to him, and to accept the penance which is imposed on him.

Article II THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONFESSION

21. Necessity of the Integrity of Confession.

The confession is complete when the penitent reveals all the sins which he is bound to tell. A distinction is drawn between material and formal integrity. A confession is materially complete when a penitent discloses all the mortal sins committed since Baptism which have not yet been submitted to the keys, together with their number and species. On the other hand, the confession is formally complete when he confesses all the mortal sins which he is morally able and bound to reveal hic et nunc.⁠[232] From this definition it is clear that where there is material integrity there is also formal integrity; a confession, however, which is formally complete need not on this account be materially so.

With respect to the obligation of the integrity of confession we may lay down the following propositions:—

I. It is of divine precept to confess all mortal sins committed after Baptism. 1. This follows from the words by which Christ instituted the Sacrament; by them He gave the Sacrament a judicial character. So teaches the Council of Trent.⁠[233] From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance “the universal Church has always recognized that the complete confession of sins was also instituted by Our Lord, and is necessary jure divino for all who have sinned after Baptism. For Our Lord Jesus Christ when about to ascend into heaven left the priests as His vicars and judges, by whom all mortal sins into which the faithful had fallen were to be judged, that in virtue of the power of the keys they might pronounce sentence of forgiveness or retention.” The priest is therefore a judge, and as judge should pronounce the absolution. But the sentence of a judge is valid only when it turns on the facts of the case; hence a knowledge of the latter is required on the part of the judge. In consequence the confessor, in order to pronounce a valid sentence, must know intimately the facts of the case, the state of the sinner. Now the facts of the case are the mortal sins of the penitent; hence the confessor must be made acquainted with these; and as he can only learn them from the penitent himself, the latter is bound to make a complete statement of them.

2. The essential object of this Sacrament is the forgiveness of sins that have been confessed. But one mortal sin cannot be forgiven apart from the rest, since forgiveness is the result of the influx of sanctifying grace, which does not remove sin as stains might be rubbed from a metal surface, but at once raises man from a state of sin to a state of grace, from being an enemy of God to being His friend. Moreover, sanctifying grace and mortal sin cannot exist together in the soul. From this it follows that all sins must be told without exception, in order that they may all be remitted.

3. Add to this the essential connection between the judicial power of the priest in the Sacrament and his power of punishing sin or imposing a penance for it; but since the penance must be proportioned to the misdeeds, the priest cannot exercise his powers properly unless, at least, the mortal sins have been fully confessed. If, as must happen at times, it is inopportune or, in fact, quite impossible to assign a penance bearing any proportion to the number and magnitude of the sins, that is quite per accidens and the decision of the question is the affair of the judge, not of the penitent. That Christ gave His Church the power of punishing sin is abundantly proved by the practice of so many centuries during which definite penances were assigned to certain sins. Since, therefore, the Church of divine right can mete out just punishment for sin, the penitent is bound by divine precept to submit himself to the Church by an entire confession of all mortal sins. From the fact that the confessor must pronounce sentence and impose a suitable penance, the Council of Trent concludes “that all mortal sins of which the penitent is conscious after diligent search must be confessed, even though they be quite secret sins and only against the last two commandments of the decalogue.”

4. Finally, the Sacrament of Penance has of its very nature another end in view, that of preventing relapse. Thus the confessor is at the same time the physician of the soul, empowered and obliged to prescribe the means of reform. This duty can be effectually carried out only when he knows intimately the penitent’s state of soul, so that the latter is obliged to submit to his healing art all the mortal wounds of the soul.

Hence the Council of Trent anathematizes all who teach “that for remission of sins in the Sacrament of Penance it is not necessary jure divino that all and every mortal sin be confessed of which a man is conscious after faithful and diligent search.”⁠[234]

II. The material integrity, however, is not always necessary for the validity of confession and for obtaining its benefits. At times it is morally and even physically impossible, either through inculpable forgetfulness or for other reasons. Now God does not command impossibilities. Hence the Council of Trent teaches: “The remaining sins which escape the diligent inquiry of the penitent are considered as included in the same accusation,” and so are forgiven, as though they had been confessed. Hence it is abundantly clear that the material integrity of the confession is not always necessary.

III. The formal integrity is, on the other hand, always necessary for the validity of the Sacrament, and belongs to its essence. A penitent, for instance, who out of shame conceals a mortal sin, transgresses Christ’s command which obliges us to submit all mortal sins by a sincere confession to the power of the keys, incurring at the same time a mortal sin by his bad confession; such a confession cannot be valid nor have any good effect. This is also taught by the Council of Trent⁠[235] in the following words: “While the faithful earnestly endeavor to confess all the sins of which they are conscious, they present them to the Divine Mercy that they may all be forgiven; those, however, who do otherwise and knowingly conceal sins, present nothing to God’s goodness to be forgiven through the priest. If the sick man is ashamed to show his wounds to the physician, the latter cannot cure what is unknown to him.”⁠[236]

To have a perfect understanding of the preceding, we must distinguish between what is of the essence of the Sacrament and that which flows as a consequence of the divine command. When anything is wanting to the essence of the Sacrament, though the defect may be due to no fault on the part of the person, the Sacrament is invalid; if, on the contrary, there be wanting some requirement of divine precept, making the defect culpable, the Sacrament is indirectly invalid because contrition is wanting, since contrition cannot exist in any one who is in the very act of sin; if, however, the defect be inculpable, the result of forgetfulness or ignorance, the Sacrament is valid; the sins which were omitted through no fault of the penitent are indirectly forgiven by the infusion of sanctifying grace. There remains, however, the obligation of making good the defect afterwards, as we shall see later.

22. Extent of the Integrity of Confession.

For a complete confession it is necessary to state clearly and precisely not only all mortal sins, but their number and species and the circumstances which change the species. This is the doctrine of the Council of Trent when it enjoins the confession of each and every sin; to do this a man must give the number of the mortal sins committed. One who has missed Mass ten times and merely confesses, “I have missed Mass,” has not confessed each and every sin, for an indeterminate number, by the very fact of being undetermined, does not necessarily mean the number ten; it may mean ten, but that possibility does not indicate the number. With regard to the confession of the species and of the circumstances changing the species, the Council teaches expressly that the circumstances which change the kind (species) of sin ought to be confessed. Since those circumstances are to be expressed which change the kind of sin, nothing can be clearer than that, in accordance with the decision of the Council, the sins are to be confessed according to their species.⁠[237]

The reasons which the Council⁠[238] gives for insisting on the duty of confessing the species of sin are that otherwise the sins would not be perfectly revealed by the penitent or understood by the judge, and that without a knowledge of the species of the sin the judge would be unable to pronounce on the gravity of the sin and to inflict a suitable punishment for it.

Thus the reasons which hold for the completeness of the confession require also the species and number of the sins; without them the confession has not the completeness which is demanded for it. The confessor is a judge who must have the most accurate knowledge of his penitent in order to pronounce sentence and inflict the necessary penalty. Now he cannot know the state of his penitent unless he is acquainted with the number and species of his sins, for it is the species which determines the nature or essence of the sin. Besides, the sins ought to be confessed according to their malice, but this can be estimated only from the kind of sin and the number of times it has been committed. Not all sins against the sixth commandment have the same malice or belong to the same species, for to the special malice of impurity may be added that of sacrilege or adultery if the sinner be consecrated by vow to God or in the married state. And there is no doubt that one who has committed a crime ten times is more deserving of punishment than he who has fallen only once.

The penitent must confess the species infima, the ultimate species of his sin, for this is what is ordinarily understood by the species, and the Council of Trent insists upon this obligation. Hence it is not enough to say, “I have sinned in thought, word, and deed,” or, “I have broken the commandments of the Church”; the penitent must add the species, the particular commandment broken, the observance of Sunday, fasting, yearly confession, etc., and in addition the penitent must give the species infima, whether he has missed Mass or broken his fast or abstinence. Nor is the following accusation sufficient: “I have sinned against the sixth commandment,” “I have been wanting in purity,” or the like; the species must be given, defining whether the sin be incest or adultery, etc., or whether by thoughts, words, etc. So, too, when a penitent accuses himself of sin against faith, it is not sufficient; he should state the particular act by which he has sinned, whether by heresy, by unbelief, by indifference, etc.

Supposing the penitent cannot remember the species infima of a sin which he has committed, he must state against what virtue he has sinned; or if he cannot remember this, but has only a recollection of having sinned mortally, he must confess this. This is the opinion of all theologians (communis et certa doctrina).

To indicate fully the species of the sin, one must also tell whether the sinful acts were external and whether the evil effects have been retracted.

Since the sins themselves are the particular matter of the sacramental tribunal, they must, as Lehmkuhl shows, be confessed secundum specificam distinctionem, i.e. according to their specific differences. This is not at all the same thing as the obligation of confessing the specific malice (specifica malitia). Sins are human acts (actus humanus), and so they may be classed in specie actus as well as in specie malitiæ; to desire to steal and to steal are acts having the same specific malice, but they are not specifically the same act. Indeed no one would maintain that one might confound the two sins in confession by merely confessing the specific malice.⁠[239] Hence the actus externus which completes the internal act⁠[240] as a sin and on that account is in se opposed to right order and morality must be mentioned expressly in confession. The actus externus is either commissio or omissio (sin of commission or omission). Thus, for example, the absence from Mass on a Sunday or a holyday of obligation must be confessed, whether it happen through indifference or love of study or idleness, because the absence from Mass is what is objectively opposed to the law and what has been voluntarily incurred. The wounding and killing of a man are external actions which in ratione peccati complete the sinful act of the will, and so it is not enough to confess, “I had the desire to wound.” If he has inflicted a wound, it is enough to say, “I have dealt a wound,” for he has sufficiently indicated by that avowal the internal act. If, again, a man wounded another intending to kill, it is not enough to say, “I intended to kill,” but he must add, “and I wounded the man.”⁠[241]

With regard to the obligation of confessing the effect⁠[242] of a mortal sin theologians are not of one mind, since it is not always clear whether the evil effect flowing from a cause voluntarily chosen is in sese a sin or not. It is certain that the malus effectus of a sinful action must be confessed if such effect fall under a reservation, or under a censure, or if the question of restitution is to be settled. However, it is certain that if such effects were not at all foreseen, there is no obligation to confess them. Thus a murder committed under the influence of drink need not be confessed, supposing that such a consequence had been altogether unforeseen.

As to the other cases, those theologians who deny that the malus effectus voluntarius in causa is a sin, because the effect is no longer in se voluntary or, being beyond the control of the will, is desired only in its cause (voluntarius in causa est), maintain that such an effect need not be confessed. Other theologians, as St. Thomas, Suarez, Soto, Sanchez, etc., make a distinction, teaching that the malus effectus is no sin, when the evil will has been retracted by contrition and repentance before the act has taken place whose effect cannot be hindered; if, however, the evil will lasts, the effect is a sin. Hence a priest who, to escape saying his office, would throw his breviary into the sea, but repent of his act immediately after, is not obliged to confess the omission of his office, since the omission was not a sin, but only the evil effect of a sin already repented of. So, too, a man who has given another poison and, before death takes place, confesses his crime with sorrow is not obliged, after death has taken place, to accuse himself again of murder. On the other hand, the evil effects which take place when the will did not retract must be confessed, since they are at least the completion of the external sin and share in the malice of the cause. Mazzotta makes a distinction here which is very apt. He says: if an effect follows from a sinful act, and though it may be prevented, is not so prevented, the penitent must confess the effect because it completes his neglect in so far as this is an external sin; if the effect cannot be hindered, there is no obligation per se loquendo to confess the malus effectus, for it is neither a sin in se nor does it externally complete the sin.⁠[243]

To the preceding we add two observations:—

1. Since the duty of making a complete confession rests on a command, we are not obliged per se to confess what is probabiliter not enjoined by the precept, for, in accordance with sound principles of probabilism, a doubtful law has no binding force. To this we may add, that a confession is valid in which the penitent omits nothing through any grievous fault of his own, that is, knowingly or through culpable ignorance and carelessness. Now the principles of probability furnish a practically safe conscience with regard to the limits of a command; hence in this case the confession is entire, at least formally entire, and that is sufficient for the validity and grace of the Sacrament.

2. If the penitent, through forgetfulness or for some lawful reason, without any blame attaching to him, omits to mention something which is necessary for the integrity of the confession, he is bound to disclose it on the next occasion; for, by the decision of the Council of Trent, each and every mortal sin of which one is conscious must be mentioned, that it may be directly remitted; hence if sins occur to the mind which have not yet been confessed, they must be submitted to the power of the keys. Thus Alexander VII condemned the proposition: Sins which have been forgotten or omitted in confession on account of instant danger to life or for any other reason, need not be mentioned in the next confession (cf. Prop. 11 damn.).

23. The Number of Sins in Confession.

The declaration of the number of sins is another feature completing the Sacrament. The penitent must give the number of his mortal sins so far as he can; if he knows exactly how often he has fallen into a mortal sin, he must state that number of times, neither increasing nor diminishing; if, despite careful examination and reflection he cannot arrive at the real number, he must give it as near as possible, adding the words “about” or “at least”; in so doing he fulfills his obligation, for he has done what he could, which is sufficient to enable a judgment to be pronounced humano modo. Should the penitent, after having thus confessed in all good faith, discover later on a more accurate number than that confessed, he is not obliged to make another confession to supply this number; nor should he disquiet himself, for the round numbers given in the first confession included everything; it is only when the newly discovered number is considerably greater than the vague estimate of his first confession that he is obliged to confess again, because the number, and, in consequence, the sin, was not perfectly confessed, since a far greater number cannot be considered as included in his former round estimate.⁠[244]

The question naturally arises what the confessor is to understand by a numeral qualified by “about” or “at least.” As a general rule the greater the number expressed, the greater is the number that may be understood as implied; for instance, “about three times” would mean from two to four times; “about five times,” from four to six times; “about ten times,” from eight to twelve times; “about one hundred times,” at most from ninety to one hundred and ten times. It is clear from this general appreciation of theologians that the numbers implied by the term “about” increase in proportion to the actual number mentioned. If the penitent discovers that he has mentioned a number considerably less than the truth, he must remedy the defect; if he has erred by giving too large a number, he need not correct the mistake, because the larger number includes the less. Moreover, it is advisable, instead of using high numbers, to state how often the sin has been committed in the course of a week or a month, etc., especially with regard to frequent or interior sins. Indeed with habitual sinners it suffices to state how long they have indulged the evil habit, and that they have given willful consent more or less daily whenever occasion offered; this is enough, when the actual number of sins is so doubtful that there would always be a grave risk of a mistake in trying to determine it. “The confessor, when he knows the period over which the accusation extends, may easily and safely form his opinion in the case of a penitent whose will is habitually inclined to sin, that the penitent has sinned as often as there were necessary interruptions to his sin.”⁠[245] This method in determining the number of sins is as well founded as the other, for in this case, too, all is done that is morally possible. Hence the confessor should never force his penitent to give a determinate number, for this is in most cases impossible. On the other hand, the confessor should help the penitent to state the number in the way we have indicated.⁠[246]

Hence a prostitute makes a sufficient statement in confessing how often she has been accustomed to sin each day or week, at the same time telling the species, or at least the more general species, of the sins so far as possible; she would make a perfect confession by an accusation such as follows: “I have spent so many years in this state of sin, and as occasion offered I sinned with all who came, married and unmarried, and also with those who were bound by vow.” Penitents must always give at least the more general specific characters of their sins, and the number of times per day or week they have sinned.⁠[247]

A similar difficulty is presented in the case of those who have a deeply rooted habit of sin—those, for example, who constantly entertain impure desires with regard to women whom they chance to meet; it is very difficult in such a case to give any number. Such people make a perfect confession by stating that they are given to this habit, adding whether they indulge frequently in the day or week; besides this they should mention at least the more general specific characters, whether they indulge these desires with regard to married people or relations or persons consecrated to God.⁠[248]

The same difficulty arises with regard to uneducated and ignorant people who have to accuse themselves of impure conversations carried on at their work during the whole day, on all sorts of subjects and before all kinds of companions. They, too, may confess the number and species of their sins as we have indicated above.⁠[249]

Lugo and Sporer would also admit the confession as valid and give absolution to a thief who accuses himself as follows: “Since I was ten years old I have been so addicted to stealing that whenever a chance was offered—and that happened very frequently—I stole what I could; besides I have stolen sacred objects of considerable value on five occasions or, if I mistake not, six.”⁠[250]

Though the accusation of the species in confession usually offers more difficulty than that of the number, yet Lugo advises the more learned confessors in particular to refrain from being too exacting in demanding the classification from their penitents. As the less-trained confessor may fail in this respect by defect, the more learned confessor is exposed to the danger of excess. The penitent must give the species of the sin, and the confessor is bound to inquire with due regard to the penitent’s ability and the knowledge which he had at the time of sinning; for a man cannot do evil of which he is ignorant; moreover, it is sufficient to have a general consciousness of grave malice.

24. The Confession of the Circumstances of Sins.

The circumstances under which sins are committed (conditiones quæ actus substantiam circumstant atque in ejus moralitatem influunt) are of different kinds: 1. Some change the species of the sin (speciem mutantes); for example, the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to the sin of impurity that of sacrilege or that of adultery. 2. Other circumstances are aggravating (aggravantes) in greater or less degree and gradum moralitatis mutantes or moralitatem augentes—such, for instance, as increase the malice within the limits of the same species; they are the duration of the act, its intensity, its degree, the manner of carrying it out, the particular occasion, etc. 3. Other circumstances are mitigating (minuentes, moralitatem minuentes), because they palliate the malice of the act; as, for example, want of advertence, etc.

The circumstances must be confessed:—

I. If they change the species of the sin. This is the express teaching of the Council of Trent. Hence it is not enough to confess to stealing if the property of the Church has been taken; for the stealing of a res sacra is not merely a sin of injustice but a theft from God and so a new sin. If a child curses its parents, it is not enough to mention that it cursed, for, since special reverence is due to parents, the violation of that special reverence is a new sin.

The following circumstances call for particular mention:—

1. The circumstance of the person who commits the sin, when with regard to the matter of the sin he is consecrated to God or bound by vow, as in sins against purity, or when he sins against the chastity of the married state, or when he stands in special spiritual relations towards those with whom he sins.

If a man is consecrated to God by Holy Orders or the religious state and has to confess a sin against purity, he must mention the circumstance of his state of life, since he has committed a double sin, one of impurity and another of sacrilege. Now those who are consecrated to God by Holy Orders or the religious state incur the special sin of sacrilege when they fall into impurity; the mere circumstance of the vow being simple or solemn does not constitute a new species, nor the fact of being bound to chastity by vows of religion as well as by Orders; these added details need not be confessed. Many moralists teach also that those incur sacrilege who are bound by a private vow of chastity, and St. Alphonsus admits this opinion as probable. Hence all those who have sinned against purity make a full confession when they confess the circumstance of the vow by which they are bound, without distinguishing whether the vow be private, solemn, simple, or that of Orders (votum solemne ordinis sacri).

This is the doctrine of Lugo⁠[251] and Lacroix;⁠[252] Sanchez,⁠[253] too, defends this view on the ground that the solemn vow is in substance or in se not distinct from the simple vow. His authority seems to have won over many theologians to the same opinion. Gury also holds this view; but the Ratisbon⁠[254] and Roman⁠[255] editions of his valuable manual reject it in the notes. Lehmkuhl,⁠[256] moreover, opposes it and teaches that to incur a personal sacrilege (and this is the question under discussion) the person sinning (or with whom the sin has been committed) must be consecrated to God publica auctoritate, i.e. by Holy Orders or by vows of religion. Hence by the violation of a private vow of chastity a sacrilege in its strict and proper sense is not incurred, though a sin is committed against religion by the breach of fidelity to God. Sacrilege is incurred by the abuse of a sacred object. Now that cannot be called a sacred object which is privately consecrated to God without any recognition on the part of the properly constituted authorities. A private vow cannot produce this effect, for the common teaching of all theologians, a few excepted, maintains that the breach of such a vow is a violation of fidelity, not of the reverence due to God, at least not in such a degree as to constitute a sacrilege strictly so called.⁠[257] Thus the more correct view is that of those who hold that, in confessing sins against purity, the circumstance of Holy Orders and of the religious vow is to be given; for whoever confesses as doubtful a circumstance which certainly changes the species of the sin does not fulfill the precept of confession. Such may be the case, for instance, where a priest conceals the circumstance of Holy Orders and mentions only the violation of the vow of chastity; for the violation of this vow is certainly a sacrilege for those in whom it has been solemnized by the reception of “Holy Orders,” while that of the simple vow is only doubtfully so.⁠[258]

Parish priests by scandalizing their flock, parents their children, teachers the scholars under their instruction, incur a special sin against charity. Such persons have in virtue of their office the strictest obligation to edify those intrusted to them and to keep them away from harm. The case of a confessor who gives scandal to a person who happens to be his penitent is different; but he is obliged to mention the circumstance of this relationship when he has given scandal in connection with the administration of the Sacrament; his office as confessor only imposes on him the strict duty of guiding the penitent safely in the Sacrament of Penance, and is only transitory, ending per se with each confession, while that of the parish priest and of the others mentioned above demands a constant spiritual care of those intrusted to them. Other offices involving authority do not change the species of the scandal given to subjects, though they may increase its malice, if, for example, a master leads his servant into sin. The dignity of a person does not of itself change the species of the sin of scandal given to his subjects, though it increases the gravity of a sin. If, however, a master has taken upon himself the duties of a parent, for instance, towards his servant-girl, he most certainly incurs a new and distinct sin by scandal given to her, and must mention his special relation to the girl.

2. The circumstance of the person with whom the sin has been committed, if God’s honor has suffered in any way, or if the rights of a third person or the particular respect or love which is due to the said person have been violated.

If the person with whom sin has been committed or who has been led into sin is consecrated to God or bound by a vow referring to the matter of the sin, a new and special sin is incurred against the virtue of religion (i.e. a sin either of sacrilege or at least of a violation of the vow). If any one commit a sin of impurity with a relation, it is no longer merely a sin against purity, it is incest. It is a probable opinion that the penitent is not obliged to mention the exact degree of relationship whether by blood or marriage, since that does not change the species ratione incestus, except in the first degree either of blood-relationship or marriage connection; thus sin committed between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law, mother-in-law and son-in-law, must be mentioned along with the relationship; yet there is no doubt that ratione superioritatis vel pietatis sin incurred by a father with his own daughter or his daughter-in-law, bears a different character from the sin of a son with his mother or mother-in-law.

The sin of hatred acquires a new species of sinfulness when the hatred is directed against those more closely connected, e.g. parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, and against those connected by marriage in the first degree of the direct line, such as wife, godparents, and brothers. Hatred of those most nearly related may much more easily become a grievous sin than hatred of other people.⁠[259]

3. The circumstance of place, if a sacrilege is thereby committed; thus (a) if a sacred object or something belonging to the property of the Church is stolen and taken out from a sacred building, a double sacrilege, real and local, is committed. The circumstance of the local sacrilege, that is, the fact that sin has been committed in the Church is not of itself gravely sinful; hence when a profane object which is merely accidentally in the Church is stolen, a sacrilege, though not a gravely sinful one, is added to the sin of theft.⁠[260] (b) If the immunity of a church is violated; (c) if anything is done in a church by which it is polluted in the sense of the canon law; (d) if profane occupations gravely at variance with the holiness of the place are carried on in the church, whether those occupations be in themselves sinful or not.

4. The circumstance of time; if, for instance, the time at which the sin took place was the reason why the action in question has been forbidden, and if by the action done at some particular time a special offence is given to God. This circumstance might involve grave sin (a) if Good Friday were chosen for the performance of an obscene play; (b) if during the forbidden time a marriage were celebrated with great pomp; (c) if during the celebration of Mass or immediately after holy communion, before the sacred species had time to be altered, the communicant were to commit some outrage greatly dishonoring to the Blessed Sacrament. These are circumstances which moralists generally enumerate as constituting a new species of sinfulness. On the other hand, a sin committed on a Sunday or feast-day or on a communion-day is not per se invested with the particular malice of a sacrilege; nevertheless the fact that a man relapses into his old sins on a confession or communion day gives ground for the suspicion that his last confession was devoid of real contrition and in consequence invalid and sacrilegious.⁠[261]

5. Finally, the circumstance of the end in view is to be confessed if it is in se mortally sinful; for instance, a man who steals with the object of getting drunk is guilty of drunkenness as well as theft, and on that account must confess the purpose for which he stole.⁠[262]

Now there are many penitents who cannot judge of the circumstances which change the nature of the sin; such must be taught to mention in confession whatever increases or diminishes the malice of the sin; the rest will be supplied by the confessor, for he has the duty of asking the penitent not only about the circumstances which affect the species of sin, but everything which he considers necessary to aid him in forming a correct judgment on the spiritual state of the penitent. This right implies a duty on the part of the penitent to answer the questions put to him; these questions turn for the most part on habits of sin, relapses, and proximate occasions of sinning. Hence Innocent XI condemned the proposition⁠[263] which denies the obligation of answering when the confessor makes inquiries about habits of sin. The knowledge of a habit of sin, or of relapses, or of proximate occasions is very important in settling whether absolution should be given or deferred;⁠[264] besides it is of supreme importance to the confessor in his office as physician that he be in a position to suggest the necessary and proper means for amendment. The penitent must, therefore, if asked, mention former sins though already confessed. No one need take offense because he is thus obliged per accidens to repeat sins which have already been duly forgiven; the purpose is not to pronounce a new sentence upon them, but to enable the priest to form a correct judgment with regard to the sins just confessed by noting their relation to former sins, and thus to prescribe suitable means of correction and provide as much as possible against relapses.⁠[265]

II. Those circumstances are also to be mentioned by which sins of their own nature venial become mortal (C. aggravantes). Intemperance is not always a mortal sin, but it becomes so when it deprives a man of the use of reason; to steal a cheap tool might of itself be only a venial sin, but if the loss of it deprives a poor artisan of the means of doing a day’s work, it becomes mortal. In the same way one ought to mention the mitigating circumstances which make a mortal sin only venial or even no sin at all.

Moralists give seven cases in which circumstances may change a venial into a mortal sin:—

1. Ratione conscientiæ erroneæ, when a man through ignorance thinks a venial sin to be mortal. 2. Ratione scandali vel gravis damni, when grave scandal is given to one’s neighbor, doing spiritual or temporal harm; as, for instance, if a priest were to speak lightly of sacred things—thus St. Bernard⁠[266] says: Nugæ inter sæculares nugæ, in ore sacerdotis blasphemiæ sunt; or, again, if a priest behaved lightly with a woman or were seen the worse for drink; or if one were to address a person rather insultingly, foreseeing that he would break out into a great rage and blasphemy; or if a woman dress vainly and foresee that some young man at the sight of her will sin mortally by impious desires. 3. Ratione pravi finis graviter mali, when, for example, a small lie is told to lead a girl into sin. The evil intention may not only increase the guilt of a sinful action, but it will make an otherwise innocent action sinful. 4. Ratione formalis contemptus legis vel superioris, when a venial sin is committed out of formal contempt for the law or lawgiver, or superior, as when a Catholic on an abstinence day, and quite aware of the duty of abstaining, eats ostentatiously a little flesh-meat to show the slight regard in which he holds the law.⁠[267] 5. Ratione pravi affectus in rem alioqui leviter malam, when a man is so attached to a venial sin that he would commit it even if it were mortal, or in consequence of this attachment would be ready to commit other mortal sins,⁠[268] as, for instance, if a man chose rather to steal than to overcome his vanity or intemperance. 6. Ratione periculi seu occasionis proximæ in peccatum mortale labendi, when the venial sin is known, or can be known, as a proximate occasion of mortal sin; a man, for example, looks at a person of the other sex or entertains rather familiar relations with her though he knows that such conduct in his case is a proximate occasion of gravely sinful desires or actions. Even actions otherwise neutral or indifferent may for this reason become gravely sinful. 7. Ratione cujuscunque circumstantiæ quæ mortalem in se malitiam contineat; thus insults, proceeding from envy and desire of revenge, may be mortal sins.⁠[269] Hence these circumstances must be confessed.

The following circumstances may make sins venial which are of their own nature mortal: 1. Smallness of matter; 2. Want of full advertence; 3. Want of consent; 4. A false conscience.⁠[270]

These circumstances must be told in confession not in order to secure its integrity, but that the confessor may be able to form a correct judgment.

III. Circumstances which make but little difference in the gravity of the sin need not be confessed.

IV. Circumstances which aggravate a mortal sin within its own species to a notable degree (circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes intra eamdem speciem) need not per se loquendo be confessed; this is the common and most approved teaching of theologians; other reasons may exist which make it expedient to mention these circumstances.

At the same time theologians are not unanimous on this subject. Three opinions are current, and each one of them has its own probability and its champions of no mean repute. We may as well observe that the probability of the negative proposition (that there is no obligation) is conceded even by its opponents; hence all grant (ex omnium sententia) as probable that no one is bound to confess these circumstances, so that a penitent cannot be forced to disclose them unless some exceptional case should call for their mention.⁠[271]

Those who maintain the affirmative proposition (i.e. the duty of confessing the circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes) fall back on the reasons to which the Council of Trent appeals for the necessity of confessing circumstantias speciem mutantes, viz. in order that the confessor may make a correct judgment, impose a suitable penance, and suggest the proper means of help; for, they add, the circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes exercise a great influence on the view of the case taken by the confessor, and on that account ought to be confessed. The fact of the Council defining that only the circumstantiæ speciem mutantes need be disclosed might be easily explained by supposing that the Council defined only what was certain, and left theological views where they were, neither approving nor condemning them. The last conclusion, however, is not justified, for the Council prescribes that circumstantiæ speciem mutantes should be confessed without determining any precept for the aggravantes, and if equally cogent reason had existed for confessing both classes of circumstances, there could have been no reason for restricting the doctrine to those which change the species; for, says Lugo,⁠[272] it ought to have made the decree to embrace both classes without imposing any limiting clause.

Further demonstration is taken from the Rituale Romanum, which directs: “If a penitent has not confessed the number, species, and circumstances which ought to be given, the confessor must ask him.” By the word species should be understood the circumstantiæ speciem mutantes, and by the rest the circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes. This distinction, however, is unfounded, for by species is meant species ex parte objecti, such as stealing, impurity, etc., and under circumstantiæ necessariæ the circumstantiæ speciem mutantes or the species ex parte circumstantiarum, as when theft becomes a sacrilege, etc.⁠[273]

Appeal is made also to the Catechismus Romanus, which directs that those circumstances should be confessed “which greatly increase or diminish the malice.”⁠[274] It may be objected to this, however, that the context makes it clear that there is no necessity to interpret the passage as referring to circumstances which merely increase the degree, not the kind, of the guilt; for the Catechism continues thus: Many circumstances are so serious that in them alone lies the whole gravity of the sin, so that they ought to be confessed; but the only circumstances which can make a sin grave are those that change the moral or theological species. This is confirmed by the fact that the Ritual prescribes also that circumstances very notably diminishing the gravity of the sin should be revealed; for even the opponents grant that this has force only when the mitigating circumstances change the species.⁠[275] Moreover, the Catechism illustrates its doctrine by declaring the necessity of mentioning the circumstance of “a person consecrated to God” in a case of murder, and the circumstance of “marriage” in the case of impurity; and these belong to the circumstances which change the moral species. Finally, if the Catechism adduces the example of a theft, it is no proof that the question is not of circumstances which change the species, and when it declares that one who has stolen one gold piece is less guilty than another who has stolen a hundred pieces this may easily be understood of a circumstance which (with regard to the absolute quantity) constitutes a venial guilt and so introduces a distinct theological species.⁠[276]

This view is held, among others, by Suarez, Sanchez, Gonet, Lacroix.

Other theologians teach that there is no necessity of confessing circumstantias notabiliter aggravantes, but they make an exception with regard to the circumstance of quantity in cases of theft. St. Alphonsus, along with other theologians, however, is of opinion that this exception ought not to be granted if the quantity is described as being large; for from that the confessor can per se make a sufficiently accurate judgment. Ballerini remarks very justly that the exception should be worded thus: Except when some additional reason exists, e.g. a reservation directed against a certain kind of incest or against the theft of some given amount.

The third opinion denies absolutely the necessity of confessing circumstantias notabiliter aggravantes, and this is the more common and probable view, for which there are many and weighty reasons.

(a) The Council of Trent by positively limiting its decision to those circumstances which change the species seems to exclude positively the obligation of confessing others. It teaches that circumstances must be mentioned because without them the sins would not be properly confessed by the penitents nor properly understood by the judge, so that he would be incapable of estimating correctly the gravity of the sins and of imposing a becoming penance. From these words of the Council it is fair to conclude that the penitent has done all that is necessary when he confesses those circumstances.

(b) Moreover, we are bound only to declare mortal sin; now the circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes within the same species evidently add no new species of a mortal sin, hence they need not be confessed. To confess them is an act of perfection, good, of course, and wholesome, just as is the practice of confessing venial sins.

(c) Moreover, many consequences of no small importance follow from the opposite doctrine. While the present opinion is calculated to set at rest the minds of both penitent and confessor, the other has quite the opposite tendency, for who could even approximately gauge how far circumstances have a notable effect upon the sin? Imagine the difficult and often fruitless inquiries a confessor would have to make with many of his penitents in order to come to a satisfactory decision. It follows, besides, from the opposite view that the circumstantiæ notabiliter minuentes would have to be confessed or else the confessor would consider some sin more serious than it actually was, and even our opponents grant that this is not necessary.

(d) Finally, the Church could not in the General Council deduce this obligation from the words of Christ, otherwise she would not have given that definite limit to the obligation; the law of confessing circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes is, therefore, at least doubtful, and a doubtful law has no binding force. Hence this opinion may be adopted in praxi with a safe conscience even though its opposite be probable, and whoever follows it does not expose the Sacrament to any danger of nullity, for to secure validity a formally entire confession is sufficient, and of that there is no doubt.

This view is taught by St. Thomas (in 4 Sentent. d. 16, Q. 3, art. 2 et Opusc. 7, Q. 6), St. Antoninus, St. Bonaventura, St. Bernardine, Lugo, Vasquez, Bonacina, Salmanticenses, and the greater number of the older theologians. Among the more recent it is quite the common doctrine; compare Gury and the different editors of his text-book, among whom Ballerini is strongly in favor of this opinion, Müller, Lehmkuhl, Aertnys, Mark, Konings, Simar, Kenrick, Gousset, Pruner, Ninzatti, etc.

It is, however, advisable to mention these circumstances, and it is necessary:—

(a) When they affect the jurisdiction of the confessor, as in the case of a censure or reservation. If one has struck a cleric, for instance, it should be mentioned whether the assault was notorious or not; in the former case it would be reserved to the Pope, in the latter to the bishop; also if the person struck were a cardinal, a bishop, apostolic nuncio, or other cleric, since the excommunication is reserved in a special manner to the Pope.

(b) When they affect the character, in law or justice, of important acts, as espousals, various contracts, restitution, etc., in order that the penitent may receive proper instruction; this is most important in cases of theft.

(c) When, finally, the confessor without a knowledge of these circumstances is unable to direct his penitent as required for his salvation.

Since these circumstances must be confessed, not because they are circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes, but on the grounds alleged, the confessor has a right to question about them and the penitent is obliged to answer as we have already observed.

Moreover, the faithful usually add these circumstances in confession because it gives greater peace of heart and more abundant fruit; besides, a better and safer guidance is thus secured and an opportunity of practicing humility.

As to the utility and advisability of confessing circumstances all theologians agree in making an exception with regard to sins against the sixth commandment; for beyond what is necessary to determine the species of the sin the confessor ought not to ask the penitent any further question nor allow him to make any further statement. Even with regard to the species theologians all teach with one accord that in so dangerous a matter where scandal may so easily be given one may at times refrain from inquiring into the species.⁠[277]

Cedreno gives useful advice for the confession of the circumstances attending sin: “If the person with whom you have sinned, the place where the sin was committed, or the manner of its accomplishment, or any other detail, gives you special remorse, then mention that point, for it will then be the confessor’s duty to decide from these indications how far they affect the species of the sin or only increase its gravity.”

25. The Confession of Doubtful Sins.

There are three points of view from which a sin may be regarded as doubtful:—

1. With regard to the existence of the sinful action, as when a man doubts whether he really committed the action.

2. With regard to the quality of the sin, as when a man knows he has sinned, but doubts whether it is a mortal or a venial sin.

3. With regard to the confession of a sin, as when a man knows he sinned grievously but doubts whether he ever confessed his sin.

The doubt may be positive or negative. A negative doubt exists when no solid reason can be given either pro or con, but only insignificant arguments for both sides, so that no decision can be arrived at. A positive doubt exists where two contradictory propositions have each solid reasons in their support.

Armed with these premises we are now in a position to set forth the doctrine with regard to the confession of doubtful sins.

I. A sin need not be confessed when there is no positive reason to suspect its existence or gravity, or when there is positive ground against believing its existence or gravity, even where there is a solid reason on the other side. In other words, a sin negatively doubtful from both points of view, or positively doubtful from both points of view, or negatively doubtful on the side affirming guilt is not necessary matter of confession; but a sin positively doubtful on the side affirming guilt and only negatively doubtful on the side denying guilt, must be confessed.

With the exception of a few rigorists, theologians are unanimous in teaching that a sin positively doubtful from both sides need not be confessed; for if there is a dubium facti which establishes the obligation of a law, liberty is in possession, i.e. there is no obligation. But in our case the fact of the sin is doubtful, thus we are not obliged to confess it. Moreover, when the existence of a law is doubtful we are not bound by it; but the law of confessing doubtful sins is uncertain; hence we are not bound by it.

If, however, a man in danger of death doubted whether he had committed a grievous sin, knowing that he had never been to confession since that doubtful act, he would be obliged, in order to avoid the risk of damnation, not indeed to confess that sin, but either to receive the Sacrament of Penance, in which he confesses other sins, that thus he might receive at least indirect absolution if his doubtful sins were really mortal, or he should at least make an act of perfect contrition. In such a case the act of perfect contrition sine voto confitendi would be sufficient, since no obligation binds him to confess the peccata dubia.⁠[278] So much for sins which are positively doubtful on both sides.

If, however, a very strong argument affirms our guilt with only very slight reason to deny it, we are obliged, according to the unanimous teaching of theologians, to confess those doubtful sins, for in such a case the conviction of our innocence does not rest on solid grounds. Of course our guilt is not conclusively proved; but in these things where evidence is often wanting we must be led by principles of sound moral certainty, even when they are unfavorable to us, since confession is not only a burden, but a Sacrament, and as such a means for greater sanctification.⁠[279] In this case one cannot argue that in dubio facti (and this undoubtedly exists) the opposing arguments cancel one another, as might two opposing witnesses; for this only takes place when the two arguments are of the same kind and quite similar, as in the case of two opposing eye-witnesses, when it is certain that one of the two is mistaken and neither can be believed since it is not known where the mistake lies. It is quite different, however, when the opposing reasons are of distinct classes and unlike, as in the case of two witnesses who do not recount what they themselves have seen, but bear witness to various conjectures pro and con; then they both deserve reasonable attention, since the conjectures on either side rest on different motives.

If a penitent doubts positively whether he has sinned in some action, and it is probable that advertence or consent, etc., was wanting, or that full deliberation or consent was absent, he is not obliged to accuse himself of this action in confession.

On the other hand, theologians are not so clear as to the obligation of confessing sins which are doubtful dubio negativo pro utraque parte. The older theologians, among whom St. Thomas and other eminent doctors are to be found (Sanchez enumerates forty), insist on the duty of confessing this class of doubtful sins. This opinion is founded on the decree of the Council of Trent declaring that all grave sins quorum conscientiam habent (sc. pœnitentes) must be confessed; thus the penitent must confess the sins as they are in themselves, those which are certain as certain and those which are doubtful as doubtful. This is the general and constant practice of the faithful, and by that fact we may consider it as proceeding from Christ’s institution.⁠[280]

Other theologians, of no small weight both by their number and authority, do not impose the obligation of confessing these doubtful sins. St. Alphonsus also defended this view in a very convincing manner on internal grounds. The Council of Trent binds penitents only to reveal those sins quorum conscientiam habent; it says nothing about uti sunt in conscientia, or telling undoubted sins as certain and doubtful as doubtful, but only quorum conscientiam habent, which means those of which they have certain knowledge; for, according to St. Bernard, conscientia is nothing more than cordis scientia and judicium practicum on the sins incurred. Now doubtful knowledge is neither knowledge (scientia) nor a judgment (judicium), but a suspensio judicii; hence no one can have a conscientia peccati who has no proof that he has incurred sin. This is the answer to the arguments of the first opinion. Weight is added to this answer by the very words of the same Council: “It is well known that in the Church of God nothing more is demanded of the penitents but that each one after diligent examination ... confess those sins by which he is conscious to himself of having grievously offended his Lord and God; the remaining sins, however, which do not occur to him after diligent examination are considered as included generally in the same confession.” Since, therefore, concludes the holy Doctor, the penitent is not bound to confess his venial sins, he is not bound to confess the doubtful ones, for the Council says he is not obliged to confess any but the mortal sins of which he has knowledge; but to doubt is not “to have knowledge,” it is rather “to be wanting in knowledge.” Moreover, an onus certum ought not to be inflicted for a delictum dubium, and in the doubt whether the law exists there is no obligation to observe the law. Finally, he who doubts without good foundation should not heed the doubt. The faithful, it is true, do confess these doubtful sins in order to gain peace and ease of conscience, but not because they are bound to do so; it is also customary and general for them to confess those which are positively dubious, and no one holds that this is of obligation, not even our opponents.

The grounds for this opinion, and the objections to the opposite view, are so convincing that it may be regarded as the more probable and be followed tuta conscientia.⁠[281] The following objection has no weight. Since confession is a necessary means for salvation, and since in such a case a man must take the safer means rather than trust to a probable opinion, he is thus obliged to confess peccata dubia. A distinction must be made. The Sacrament of Penance, and particularly the absolution in which its efficacy for the most part consists, may certainly be called a necessary means for salvation in re vel in voto with regard to those who have committed mortal sin after Baptism; besides, if a man doubt whether he has sinned grievously, either perfect contrition or absolution are necessary, and for that reason confession also in so far as this is required to obtain valid absolution or sanctifying grace through the absolution; but the integrity of confession can be regarded as necessary only in so far as it is proved to be the prescribed means of obtaining absolution licite et valide. The proof, however, for the necessity of confessing doubtful sins is so little substantiated that, as we have shown, the very opposite is proved from the words of the Council and the explanation of St. Alphonsus.⁠[282]

When one considers the teaching of those older theologians who maintained the necessity of confessing mortalia negative dubia, it is not difficult to see that, while their mode of expression comprises more, yet, they really meant to say that a penitent is not to consider himself free from all obligation of confessing his sin for some paltry reason which is in his favor, though knowing at the same time that there are weighty reasons to be urged against him and his freedom from mortal sin.⁠[283]

From this teaching it follows that he who has a negative doubt as to whether he sinned is not stricte loquendo obliged to confess before communicating; but in order to make sure of the required dispositions he ought either to make an act of perfect contrition or receive sacramental absolution after confessing something which is included under materia certa.⁠[284]

For the rest it is in practice generally recommended to the faithful, in order to secure peace of soul, to mention even their doubtful mortal sins, though there is no obligation to do so, and the confession without the accusation of these sins is complete; they must, however, be instructed to confess these sins as doubtful and not as certain. If a penitent have only sins of this sort to accuse himself of, he has a right to conditional absolution on the first accusation of them. It is better, however, to add other certain matter as the sins of one’s past life; this is required if the absolution is to be unconditional.

In practice the following rules might be profitably observed:—

1. If there be a doubt as to whether the matter of a sin be grave, ill-instructed penitents (pœnitentes rudes) should confess their doubts because (a) they cannot guide their own consciences, or they do so with great difficulty, and because (b) for the most part they do not know how to distinguish between mortal and venial sin. Exception, of course, is made for the scrupulous who are not in the habit of frequently committing mortal sin. Well-instructed penitents are certainly not obliged to confess doubtful mortal sins, since they are in a position to guide their own consciences; yet they are advised to do so, for then their confessor is informed of the dangers to which his penitent is exposed and can warn, instruct, and free him from them.

2. If the doubt turns on the free consent of the will or full advertence, (a) penitents of timorous consciences, who do not ordinarily sin mortally, are in no way obliged to confess doubtful sins, for the presumption is in their favor: ex communiter contingentibus fit prudens præsumptio. Since they are not in the habit of sinning mortally, it is fair to presume that their doubtful sins are not mortal; indeed they ought not infrequently to be deterred from confessing them if they are inclined to scrupulosity. “A man of approved virtue who is worried as to whether he has consented to an impure temptation may be morally certain that he has not consented; for it is morally impossible that a will so constant in good resolutions should change without giving unmistakable signs.”⁠[285] (b) Penitents who, though not timorous, are not lax are certainly not obliged to confess a doubtful consent, though they may be advised to do so to secure peace of conscience and the other benefits which follow from the practice. (c) If, however, the penitent has a lax conscience, he is obliged to confess his doubtful sins, for the presumption is against him.⁠[286]

If, then, a pious person who often renews his resolution never to sin mortally is not certain that he has ever revoked that resolution; if he is startled when he perceives the evil and promptly repels the temptation, and doubts whether he has given way; if he remembers that he was in an excited state of mind; if he cannot tell whether the thought or action took place in sleep or in waking moments, the presumption is that there was no full consent.

The presumption, however, is against those who are accustomed to fall easily into grave sin; had they withstood the temptation they would remember what effort they made to overcome it. Hence Lacroix⁠[287] very justly concludes that such people never have a real negative doubt, since the presumption determines the probability of consent or resistance to the temptation.