Volume 7 / Part 1 — PART I. REPORTS AND OPINIONS WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE. (continued 2)

IX.—Opinion respecting the expenses and salaries of foreign Ministers.

July 17, 1790.

The bill on the intercourse with foreign nations restrains the President from allowing to Ministers Plenipotentiary, or to Congress, more than $9,000, and $4,500 for their "personal services, and other expenses." This definition of the objects for which the allowance is provided appearing vague, the Secretary of State thought it his duty to confer with the gentlemen heretofore employed as ministers in Europe, to obtain from them, in aid of his own information, an enumeration of the expenses incident to these offices, and their opinion which of them would be included within the fixed salary, and which would be entitled to be charged separately. He, therefore, asked a conference with the Vice-President, who was acquainted with the residences of London and the Hague, and the Chief Justice, who was acquainted with that of Madrid, which took place yesterday.

The Vice-President, Chief Justice, and Secretary of State, concurred in the opinion that the salaries named by the act are much below those of the same grade at the courts of Europe, and less than the public good requires they should be. Consequently, that the expenses not included within the definition of the law, should be allowed as an additional charge.

1. Couriers, Gazettes, Translating necessary papers, Printing necessary papers, Aids to poor Americans.—All three agreed that these ought to be allowed as additional charges, not included within the meaning of the phrase, "his personal services, and other expenses."

2. Postage, Stationary, Court-fees.—One of the gentlemen being of opinion that the phrase "personal services, and other expenses," was meant to comprehend all the ordinary expenses of the office, considered this second class of expenses as ordinary, and therefore included in the fixed salary. The first class before mentioned, he had viewed as extraordinary. The other two gentlemen were of opinion this second class was also out of the definition, and might be allowed in addition to the salary. One of them, particularly, considered the phrase as meaning "personal services and personal expenses," that is, expenses for his personal accommodation, comforts, and maintenance. This second class of expenses is not within that description.

3. Ceremonies; such as diplomatic and public dinners, galas, and illuminations. One gentleman only was of opinion these might be allowed.

The expenses of the first class may probably amount to about fifty dollars a year. Those of the second, to about four or five hundred dollars. Those of the third are so different at different courts, and so indefinite in all of them, that no general estimate can be proposed.

The Secretary of State thought it his duty to lay this information before the President, supposing it might be satisfactory to himself, as well as to the diplomatic gentlemen, to leave nothing uncertain as to their allowances; and because, too, a previous determination is in some degree necessary to the forming an estimate which may not exceed the whole sum appropriated.

The Secretary of State has also consulted on the subject of the Morocco consulship, with Mr. Barclay, who furnished him with the note, of which a copy accompanies this. Considering all circumstances, Mr. Barclay is of opinion, we had better have only a consul there, and that he should be the one now residing at Morocco, because, as secretary to the Emperor, he sees him every day, and possesses his ear. He is of opinion six hundred dollars a year might suffice for him, and that it should be proposed to him not as a salary, but as a sum in gross intended to cover his expenses, and to save the trouble of keeping accounts. That this consul should be authorized to appoint agents in the seaports, who would be sufficiently paid by the consignments of vessels. He thinks the consul at Morocco would most conveniently receive his allowance through the channel of our Chargé at Madrid, on whom, also, this consulate had better be made dependent for instructions, information, and correspondence, because of the daily intercourse between Morocco and Cadiz.

The Secretary of State, on a view of Mr. Barclay's note, very much doubts the sufficiency of the sum of six hundred dollars; he supposes a little money there may save a great deal; but he is unable to propose any specific augmentation till a view of the whole diplomatic establishments and its expenses, may furnish better grounds for it.

[Appended to this note, were the following estimate of the expenses of foreign ministers, and of the probable calls on our foreign fund, from July 1, 1790, to July 1, 1791.—Ed.]

Estimate of the Expenses of a Minister Plenipotentiary.

July 19, 1790.

Minister Plenipotentiary, his salary $9,000

His outfit, suppose it to happen once in seven years, will average 1,285

His return at a quarter's salary will average 321

Extras, viz.: Gazettes, Translating, Printing, Aids to poor American sailors, Couriers, and Postage, about 350

His Secretary 1,350

$12,396

Estimate for a Chargé des Affaires.

Chargé des Affaires, his salary $4,500

His outfit, once in seven years, equal to an annual sum of 643

His return at a quarter's salary, do 161

Extras, as above 350

$5,654

The Agent at the Hague, his salary $1,300

Extras 100

$1,400

Estimate of the Annual Expenses of the Establishment proposed.

France, a Minister Plenipotentiary $12,306

London, do. do. 12,306

Madrid, a Chargé des Affaires 5,654

Lisbon, do. do. do. 5,654

Hague, an agent 1,400

Morocco, a consul 1,800

Presents to foreign ministers on taking leave, at $1,000 each, more or less, according to their favor and time. There will be five of them. If exchanged once in seven years, it will be annually 715

$39,835

Estimate of the probable calls on our foreign fund from July 1, 1790, when the act for foreign intercourse passed, to July 1, 1791.

France, a Minister Plenipotentiary, his outfit $9,000

His salary, suppose it to commence August 1st 8,250

Extras 320

Secretary 1,237.5 — $18,807.5

Chargé, suppose him to remain till November 1st. Salary 1,500

Extras 117

His return, a quarter's salary 1,125 — 2,742

Madrid, a Chargé, his salary 4,500

Extras 350 — 4,850

Lisbon, a Chargé, (or Resident,) his outfit 4,500

His salary, suppose it to commence January 1, 1791 2,250

Extras 175 — 6,925

London, an Agent, suppose to commence October 1st, at $1,350 salary 1,012.5

Extras, (at $100 a year) 75 — 1,087.5

Hague, an Agent 1,400

Morocco, Consul 1,800 — 3,200

Presents to foreign Ministers. The dye about 500

Two medals and chains 2,000 — 2,500

$40,112

X.—Opinion in regard to the continuance of the monopoly of the commerce of the Creek nation, enjoyed by Col. McGillivray:

July 29th, 1790.

Colonel McGillivray, with a company of British merchants, having hitherto enjoyed a monopoly of the commerce of the Creek nation, with a right of importing their goods duty free, and considering these privileges as the principal sources of his power over that nation, is unwilling to enter into treaty with us, unless they can be continued to him. And the question is how this may be done consistently with our laws, and so as to avoid just complaints from those of our citizens who would wish to participate of the trade?

Our citizens, at this time, are not permitted to trade in that nation. The nation has a right to give us their peace, and to withhold their commerce, to place it under whatever monopolies or regulations they please. If they insist that only Colonel McGillivray and his company shall be permitted to trade among them, we have no right to say the contrary. We shall even gain some advantage in substituting citizens of the United States instead of British subjects, as associates of Colonel McGillivray, and excluding both British and Spaniards from the country.

Suppose, then, it be expressly stipulated by treaty, that no person be permitted to trade in the Creek country, without a license from the President, that but a fixed number shall be permitted to trade there at all, and that the goods imported for and sent to the Creek nation, shall be duty free. It may further be either expressed that the person licensed shall be approved by the leader or leaders of the nation, or without this, it may be understood between the President and McGillivray that the stipulated number of licenses shall be sent to him blank, to fill up. A treaty made by the President, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, is a law of the land, and a law of superior order, because it not only repeals past laws, but cannot itself be repealed by future ones.[24] The treaty, then, will legally control the duty acts, and the acts for licensing traders, in this particular instance. When a citizen applies for a license, who is not of McGillivray's partnership, he will be told that but a given number could be licensed by the treaty, and that the number is full. It seems that in this way no law will be violated, and no just cause of complaint will be given; on the contrary, the treaty will have bettered our situation, though not in the full degree which might have been wished.

XI.—Opinion respecting our foreign debt.

August 26, 1790.

On consideration of the letter of our banker, of January 25th, 1790, the Secretary of the Treasury's answer to it, and the draught of powers and instructions to him, I am of opinion, as I always have been, that the purchase of our debt to France by private speculators, would have been an operation extremely injurious to our credit; and that the consequence foreseen by our banker, that the purchasers would have been obliged, in order to make good their payments, to deluge the markets of Amsterdam with American paper of all sorts, and to sell it at any price, was a probable one. And the more so, as we know that the particular individuals who were engaged in that speculation, possess no means of their own adequate to the payments they would have had to make. While we must not doubt that these motives, together with a proper regard for the credit of the United States, had real and full weight with our bankers, towards inducing them to counterwork these private speculations; yet, to ascribe their industry in this business wholly to these motives, might lead to a too great and dangerous confidence in them. It was obviously their interest to defeat all such speculations, because they tended to take out of their hands, or at least to divide with them, the profits of the great operation of transferring the French debt to Amsterdam, an object of first rate magnitude to them, and on the undivided enjoyments of which they might count, if private speculators could be baffled. It has been a contest of dexterity and cunning, in which our champions have obtained the victory. The manœuvre of opening a loan of three millions of florins, has, on the whole, been useful to the United States, and though unauthorized, I think should be confirmed. The measure proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury, of sending a superintendent of their future operations, will effectually prevent their doing the like again, and the funding laws leave no danger that such an expedient might at any future time be useful to us.

The report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the draught of instructions, present this plan to view: First, to borrow on the best terms we can, not exceeding those limited by the law, such a sum as may answer all demands of principal or interest of the foreign debts, due, or to become due before the end of 1791. [This I think he supposes will be about three and a half millions of dollars.] Second, to consider two of the three millions of florins already borrowed by our bankers as, so far, an execution of this operation; consequently, that there will remain but about two and a half millions of dollars to be borrowed on the old terms. Third, to borrow no more as yet, towards completing the transfer of the French debt to Amsterdam, unless we can do it on more advantageous terms. Fourth, to consider the third millions of florins already borrowed by our bankers, as, so far, an execution of the powers given the President to borrow two millions of dollars, by the act of the 12th of August. The whole of this appears to me to be wise. If the third million be employed in buying up our foreign paper, on the exchange of Amsterdam, by creating a demand for that species of paper, it will excite a cupidity in the monied men to obtain more of it by new loans, and consequently enable us to borrow more and on lower terms. The saving of interest, too, on the sum so to be bought, may be applied in buying up more principal, and thereby keep this salutary operation going.

I would only take the liberty of suggesting the insertion of some such clause as the following, into the instructions: "The agents to be employed shall never open a loan for more than one million of dollars at a time, nor open a new loan till the preceding one has been filled, and expressly approved by the President of the United States." A new man, alighting on the exchange of Amsterdam, with powers to borrow twelve millions of dollars, will be immediately beset with bankers and brokers, who will pour into his ear, from the most unsuspected quarters, such informations and suspicions as may lead him exactly into their snares. So wonderfully dexterous are they in wrapping up and complicating their propositions, they will make it evident, even to a clear-headed man, (not in the habit of this business,) that two and two make five. The agent, therefore, should be guarded, even against himself, by putting it out of his power to extend the effect of any erroneous calculation beyond one million of dollars. Were he able, under a delusive calculation, to commit such a sum as twelve millions of dollars, what would be said of the government? Our bankers told me themselves that they would not choose, in the conduct of this great loan, to open for more than two or three millions of florins at a time, and certainly never for more than five. By contracting for only one million of dollars at a time, the agent will have frequent occasions of trying to better the terms. I dare say that this caution, though not expressed in the instructions, is intended by the Secretary of the Treasury to be carried into their execution. But, perhaps, it will be desirable for the President, that his sense of it also should be expressed in writing.

XII.—Opinion upon the question what the answer of the President should be in case Lord Dorchester should apply for permission to march troops through the territory of the United States, from Detroit to the Mississippi.

GEORGE WASHINGTON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

United States, August 27, 1790.

Provided the dispute between Great Britain and Spain should come to the decision of arms, from a variety of circumstances (individually unimportant and inconclusive, but very much the reverse when compared and combined,) there is no doubt in my mind, that New Orleans, and the Spanish posts above it on the Mississippi, will be among the first attempts of the former; and that the reduction of them will be undertaken by a combined operation from Detroit.

The consequences of having so formidable and enterprizing a people as the British on both our flanks and rear, with their navy in front, as they respect our western settlements which may be seduced thereby, as they regard the security of the Union and its commerce with the West Indies, are too obvious to need enumeration.

What then should be the answer of the Executive of the United States to Lord Dorchester, in case he should apply for permission to march troops through the territory of the said States from Detroit to the Mississippi?

What notice ought be taken of the measure, if it should be undertaken without leave, which is the most probable proceeding of the two?

The opinion of the Secretary of State is requested in writing upon the above statements.

Opinion on the questions stated in the President's note of August 27th, 1790.

August 28, 1790.

I am so deeply impressed with the magnitude of the dangers which will attend our government, if Louisiana and the Floridas be added to the British empire, that, in my opinion, we ought to make ourselves parties in the general war expected to take place, should this be the only means of preventing the calamity.

But I think we should defer this step as long as possible; because war is full of chances, which may relieve us from the necessity of interfering; and if necessary, still the later we interfere, the better we shall be prepared.

It is often indeed more easy to prevent the capture of a place, than to retake it. Should it be so in the case in question, the difference between the two operations of preventing and retaking, will not be so costly as two, three, or four years more of war.

So that I am for preserving neutrality as long, and entering into the war as late, as possible.

If this be the best course, it decides, in a good degree, what should be our conduct, if the British ask leave to march troops through our territory, or march them without leave.

It is well enough agreed, in the laws of nations, that for a neutral power to give or refuse permission to the troops of either belligerent party to pass through their territory, is no breach of neutrality, provided the same refusal or permission be extended to the other party.

If we give leave of passage then to the British troops, Spain will have no just cause of complaint against us, provided we extend the same leave to her when demanded.

If we refuse, (as indeed we have a right to do,) and the troops should pass notwithstanding, of which there can be little doubt, we shall stand committed. For either we must enter immediately into the war, or pocket an acknowledged insult in the face of the world; and one insult pocketed soon produces another.

There is indeed a middle course, which I should be inclined to prefer; that is, to avoid giving any answer. They will proceed notwithstanding, but to do this under our silence, will admit of palliation, and produce apologies, from military necessity; and will leave us free to pass it over without dishonor, or to make it a handle of quarrel hereafter, if we should have use for it as such. But, if we are obliged to give an answer, I think the occasion not such as should induce us to hazard that answer which might commit us to the war at so early a stage of it; and therefore that the passage should be permitted.

If they should pass without having asked leave, I should be for expressing our dissatisfaction to the British court, and keeping alive an altercation on the subject, till events should decide whether it is most expedient to accept their apologies, or profit of the aggression as a cause of war.

XIII.—Opinion on the question whether it will be expedient to notify to Lord Dorchester the real object of the expedition preparing by Governor St. Clair.

August 29, 1790.

On considering more fully the question whether it will be expedient to notify to Lord Dorchester the real object of the expedition preparing by Governor St. Clair, I still think it will not be expedient. For, if the notification be early, he will get the Indians out of the way, and defeat our object. If it be so late as not to leave him time to withdraw them before our stroke be struck, it will then be so late also as not to leave him time to withdraw any secret aids he may have sent them. And the notification will betray to him that he may go on without fear in his expedition against the Spaniards, and for which he may yet have sufficient time after our expedition is over. On the other hand, if he should suspect our preparations are to prevent his passing our territory, these suspicions may induce him to decline his expedition, as, even should he think he could either force or steal a passage, he would not divide his troops, leaving (as he would suppose) an enemy between them able to take those he should leave, and cut off the return of those he should carry. These suspicions, too, would mislead both him and the Indians, and so enable us to take the latter more completely by surprise, and prevent him from sending secret aid to those whom he would not suppose the objects of the enterprise; thus effecting a double purpose of preventing his enterprise, and securing our own. Might it not even be expedient, with a view to deter his enterprise, to instruct Governor St. Clair either to continue his pursuit of the Indians till the season be too far advanced for Lord Dorchester to move; or, on disbanding his militia, to give them general orders (which might reach the ears of Lord Dorchester) to be ready to assemble at a moment's warning, though no such assembly be really intended?

Always taking care neither to say nor do, against their passage, what might directly commit either our peace or honor.

XIV.—Opinion on proceedings to be had under the Residence act.

November 29, 1790.

A territory not exceeding ten miles square (or, I presume, one hundred square miles in any form) to be located by metes and bounds.

Three commissioners to be appointed. I suppose them not entitled to any salary.

[If they live near the place they may, in some instances, be influenced by self interest, and partialities; but they will push the work with zeal. If they are from a distance, and northwardly, they will be more impartial, but may affect delays.]

The commissioners to purchase or accept "such quantity of land on the east side of the river as the President shall deem proper for the United States," viz., for the federal Capitol, the offices, the President's house and gardens, the town house, market house, public walks and hospital. For the President's house, offices and gardens, I should think two squares should be consolidated. For the Capitol and offices, one square. For the market, one square. For the public walks, nine squares consolidated.

The expression "such quantity of land as the President shall deem proper for the United States," is vague. It may therefore be extended to the acceptance or purchase of land enough for the town; and I have no doubt it is the wish, and perhaps expectation. In that case, it will be to be laid out in lots and streets. I should propose these to be at right angles, as in Philadelphia, and that no street be narrower than one hundred feet, with foot ways of fifteen feet. Where a street is long and level, it might be one hundred and twenty feet wide. I should prefer squares of at least two hundred yards every way, which will be about eight acres each.

The commissioners should have some taste in architecture, because they may have to decide between different plans.

They will, however, be subject to the President's direction in every point.

When the President shall have made up his mind as to the spot for the town, would there be any impropriety in his saying to the neighboring land holders, "I will fix the town here if you will join and purchase and give the lands." They may well afford it by the increase of value it will give to their own circumjacent lands.

The lots to be sold out in breadths of fifty feet; their depths to extend to the diagonal of the square.

I doubt much whether the obligation to build the houses at a given distance from the street, contributes to its beauty. It produces a disgusting monotony; all persons make this complaint against Philadelphia. The contrary practice varies the appearance, and is much more convenient to the inhabitants.

In Paris it is forbidden to build a house beyond a given height; and it is admitted to be a good restriction. It keeps down the price of ground, keeps the houses low and convenient, and the streets light and airy. Fires are much more manageable where houses are low.

XV.—Report by the Secretary of State to the President of the United States on the Report of the Secretary of the Government north-west of the Ohio.

December 14, 1790.

The Secretary of State having had under his consideration the report made by the Secretary of the Government north-west of the Ohio, of his proceedings for carrying into effect the resolution of Congress of August 29th, 1788, respecting the lands of the inhabitants of Port Vincennes, makes the following report thereon to the President of the United States:

The resolution of Congress of August 29th, 1788, had confirmed in their possessions and titles the French and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers at that post, who, in or before the year 1783, had settled there, and had professed themselves citizens of the United States or any of them, and had made a donation to every head of a family, of the same description of four hundred acres of land, part of a square to be laid off adjoining the improvements at the post.

The Secretary of the north-western government, in the absence of the Governor, has carried this resolution into effect, as to all the claims to which he thought it could be clearly applied: there remain, however, the following description of cases, on which he asks further instructions:

1. Certain cases within the letter of the resolution, but rendered doubtful by the condition annexed, to the grants of lands in the Illinois country. The cases of these claimants, fifteen in number, are specially stated in the papers hereto annexed, number 2, and the lands are laid off for them but remain ungranted till further orders.

2. Certain persons who, by removals from one part of the territory to another, are not of the letter of the resolutions, but within its equity, as they conceive.

3. Certain heads of families, who became such soon after the year 1783, who petition for a participation of the donation, and urge extraordinary militia service to which they are exposed.

4. One hundred and fifty acres of land within the village granted under the former government of that country, to the Piankeshaw Indians, and on their removal sold by them in parcels to individual inhabitants, who in some instances have highly improved them both before and since the year 1783.

5. Lands granted both before and after 1783, by authority from the commandant of the post, who, according to the usage under the French and British governments, thinking himself authorized to grant lands, delegated that authority to a court of civil and criminal jurisdiction, whose grants before 1783, amount to twenty-six thousand acres, and between that and 1787, (when the practice was stopped,) to twenty-two thousand acres. They are generally in parcels from four hundred acres down to the size of house lots; and some of them under considerable improvement. Some of the tenants urge that they were induced by the court itself to come and settle these lands under assurance of their authority to grant them, and that a loss of the lands and improvements will involve them in ruin. Besides these small grants, there are some much larger, sometimes of many leagues square, which a sense of their impropriety has prevented the grantees from bringing forward. Many pretended grants, too, of this class are believed to be forgeries, and are, therefore, to be guarded against.

6. Two thousand four hundred acres of good land, and three thousand acres of sunken land, held under the French, British, and American governments, as commons for the use of the inhabitants of the village generally, and for thirty years past kept under inclosure for these purposes.

The legislature alone being competent to authorize the grant of lands in cases as yet unprovided for by the laws. The Secretary of State is of opinion that the report of the Secretary of the north-western government, with the papers therein referred to, should be laid before Congress for their determination. Authentic copies of them are herewith enclosed to the President of the United States.

XVI.—Opinion on certain proceedings of the Executive in the North-western Territory.

December 14, 1790.

The Secretary of State having had under his consideration, the journal of the proceedings of the Executive in the North-western Territory, thinks it his duty to extract therefrom, for the notice of the President of the United States, the articles of April 25th, June 6th, 28th, and 29th. Some of which are hereto annexed.

Conceiving that the regulations, purported in these articles, are beyond the competence of the executive of the said government, that they amount, in fact, to laws, and as such, could only flow from its regular legislature. That it is the duty of the general government to guard its subordinate members from the encroachments of each other, even when they are made through error or inadvertence, and to cover its citizens from the exercise of powers not authorized by the law. The Secretary of State is of opinion that the said articles be laid before the Attorney General for consideration, and if he finds them to be against law, that his opinion be communicated to the Governor of the North-western Territory, for his future conduct.

[The following are the extracts alluded to above.]

Extracts from the Journal of the Proceedings in the Executive Department of government in the Territory of the United States, north-west of the Ohio, reported to the President of the United States, by Winthrop Sargent, Secretary.

April 25, 1790.—The governor was pleased to issue the following order, viz.: All the inhabitants are forbidden to entertain any strangers, white, Indian, or negro, let them come from whatsoever place, without acquainting the officer commanding the troops, of the names of such strangers, and the place from whence they came. And every stranger arriving at Cahokia, is ordered to present himself to said officer within two hours after his arrival, on pain of imprisonment.

June 6, 1790.—The Governor at Kaskaskias, was pleased to make the following proclamation:

The practice of selling spirituous liquors to the Indians in the villages being attended with very ill consequences, it is expressly prohibited; and all and every person transgressing this order, will be liable to be tried and fined at the pleasure of the court of quarter sessions of the peace. And as it may be necessary that spirituous liquors should be vended in small quantities to white travellers and others; to prevent all danger of imposition and extortion, no person whosoever shall sell in any of the villages or their environs, spirituous liquors to any white person, traveller, or inhabitant, in any quantity less than one quart at one time, without obtaining a license from the governor, which license shall not be granted but upon the recommendation of the Justices of the Peace in their court of quarter sessions, and on his or their giving security in the sum of two hundred dollars, to abide by all the regulations made by law respecting retailers of spirituous liquors, and the orders of the said court of quarter sessions in the premises in the meantime. And for every offence, he or they shall be liable to prosecution by indictment and fine at the pleasure of the court, and to the forfeiture of their bonds.

Nor shall any person undertake or exercise the calling or occupation of an Inn-holder or Tavern-keeper, without obtaining in the same manner, and under the same restrictions and penalties, a license for so doing.

Proclamation.—Whereas, his Excellency, Arthur St. Clair, Esq., governor and commander-in-chief of this Territory, did by proclamation given at the Kaskaskias the 10th instant, strictly prohibit all persons, not citizens of the United States or the Territory, from hunting or killing any kind of game within the same, either for the flesh or skins, upon penalty not only of forfeiting the flesh and skins which they might acquire, but also prosecution and punishment as trespassers.

And it appearing to me to be particularly essential to the interests of this country, that an observance of the order and prohibition should be obtained, I do hereby call upon all civil and military officers, who now are, or hereafter may be appointed, to use their best endeavors for detecting and bringing to justice every person who shall violate the same. And, whereas, it appears to me to be expedient that government should receive information of all characters, foreigners and others, coming into the Territory, I do hereby order and direct that any person arriving at this, or any of the military posts of the United States within the same, should present himself to the commanding officer of the troops in two hours next after his arrival; and the inhabitants are hereby forbidden to entertain such characters, whether whites, Indians, or negroes, without immediate information thereof to the said commanding officers.

Given under my hand and seal at the town of Post Vincennes, and county of Knox, this 28th day of June, A. D. 1790, and of the Independence of the United States, the fourteenth.

(Signed,) Winthrop Sargent.

June 29, 1790.—It is to be considered as a standing order hereafter, that no person enrolled in the militia shall leave the village or stations, for a longer absence than twenty-four hours, without informing him (Mayor Hamtramck) or the commanding officer for the time being, of their intention. And all intelligence or discoveries of Indians, to be immediately reported.

(Signed,) Winthrop Sargent.

XVII.—Report on certain letters from the President to Mr. Gouverneur Morris, and from Mr. Morris to the President, relative to our difficulties with England—1790.

December 15, 1790.

The Secretary of State having had under consideration the two letters of October 13th, 1789, from the President of the United States, to Mr. Gouverneur Morris; and those of Mr. Morris to the President, of January 22d, April 7th, 13th, May 1st, 29th, July 3d, August 16th, and September 18th, referred to him by the President, makes the following report thereon:

The President's letter of January 22d, authorized Mr. Morris to enter into conference with the British ministers in order to discover their sentiments on the following subjects:

1. Their retention of the western posts contrary to the treaty of peace.

2. Indemnification for the negroes carried off against the stipulations of the same treaty.

3. A treaty for the regulation of the commerce between the two countries.

4. The exchange of a minister.

The letters of Mr. Morris before mentioned, state the communications, oral and written, which have passed between him and the ministers; and from these the Secretary of State draws the following inferences:

1. That the British court is decided not to surrender the posts in any event; and that they will urge as a pretext that though our courts of justice are now open to British subjects, they were so long shut after the peace as to have defeated irremedially the recovery of debts in many cases. They suggest, indeed, the idea of an indemnification on our part. But probably were we disposed to admit their right to indemnification, they would take care to set it so high as to insure a disagreement.

2. That as to indemnification for the negroes, their measures for concealing them were in the first instance so efficacious, as to reduce our demand for them, so far as we can support it by direct proof, to be very small indeed. Its smallness seems to have kept it out of discussion. Were other difficulties removed, they would probably make none of this article.

3. That they equivocate on every proposal of a treaty of commerce, and authorize in their communications with Mr. Morris the same conclusions which have been drawn from those they had had from time to time with Mr. Adams, and those through Mayor Beckwith; to wit, that they do not mean to submit their present advantages in commerce to the risk which might attend a discussion of them, whereon some reciprocity could not fail to be demanded. Unless, indeed, we would agree to make it a treaty of alliance as well as commerce, so as to undermine our obligations with France. This method of stripping that rival nation of its alliances, they tried successfully with Holland, endeavored at it with Spain, and have plainly and repeatedly suggested to us. For this they would probably relax some of the rigors they exercise against our commerce.

4. That as to a minister, their Secretary for foreign affairs is disposed to exchange one, but meets with opposition in his cabinet, so as to render the issue uncertain.

From the whole of which, the Secretary of State is of opinion that Mr. Morris' letters remove any doubts which might have been entertained as to the intentions and dispositions of the British cabinet.

That it would be dishonorable to the United States, useless and even injurious, to renew the propositions for a treaty of commerce, or for the exchange of a minister; and that these subjects should now remain dormant, till they shall be brought forward earnestly by them.

That the demands of the posts, and of indemnification for the negroes, should not be again made till we are in readiness to do ourselves the justice which may be refused.

That Mr. Morris should be informed that he has fulfilled the object of his agency to the satisfaction of the President, inasmuch as he has enabled him to judge of the real views of the British cabinet, and that it is his pleasure that the matters committed to him be left in the situation in which the letter shall find them.

That a proper compensation be given to Mr. Morris for his services herein, which having been begun on the 22d of January, and ended the 18th of September, comprehend a space of near eight months; that the allowance to an agent may be properly fixed anywhere between the half and the whole of what is allowed to a Chargé d'affaires; which, according to the establishment of the United States at the time of this appointment, was at the rate of $3,000 a year; consequently, that such a sum of between one and two thousand dollars be allowed him as the President shall deem proper, on a view of the interference which this agency may have had with Mr. Morris' private pursuits in Europe.

XVIII.—Report relative to the Mediterranean trade.

December 28, 1790.

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of Representatives so much of the speech of the President of the United States to both Houses of Congress, as relates to the trade of the United States in the Mediterranean, with instructions to report thereupon to the House, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following report:

The loss of the records of the custom houses in several of the States, which took place about the commencement and during the course of the late war, has deprived us of official information, as to the extent of our commerce and navigation in the Mediterranean sea. According to the best which may be obtained from other sources meriting respect, it may be concluded that about one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported from the United States, and about one-fourth in value of their dried and pickled fish, and some rice, found their best markets in the Mediterranean ports; that these articles constituted the principal part of what we sent into that sea; that that commerce loaded outwards from eighty to one hundred ships, annually, of twenty thousand tons, navigated by about twelve hundred seamen. It was abandoned early in the war. And after the peace which ensued, it was obvious to our merchants, that their adventures into that sea would be exposed to the depredations of the piratical States on the coast of Barbary. Congress, too, was very early attentive to this danger, and by a commission of the 12th of May, 1784, authorized certain persons, named ministers plenipotentiary for that purpose, to conclude treaties of peace and amity with the Barbary powers. And it being afterwards found more expedient that the negotiations should be carried on at the residences of those powers. Congress, by a farther commission, bearing date the 11th of March, 1785, empowered the same ministers plenipotentiary to appoint agents to repair to the said powers at their proper residences, and there to negotiate such treaties. The whole expenses were limited to eighty thousand dollars. Agents were accordingly sent to Morocco and Algiers.

Before the appointment of the one to Morocco, it was known that a cruiser of that State had taken a vessel of the United States; and that the emperor, on the friendly interposition of the court of Madrid had liberated the crew, and made restitution of the vessel and cargo, as far as their condition admitted. This was a happy presage of the liberal treaty he afterwards concluded with our agent, still under the friendly mediation of Spain, and at an expense of between nine and ten thousand dollars only. On his death, which has taken place not long since, it becomes necessary, according to their usage, to obtain immediately a recognition of the treaty by his successor, and consequently, to make provision for the expenses which may attend it. The amount of the former furnishes one ground of estimate; but the character and dispositions of the successor, which are unknown here, may influence it materially. The friendship of this power is important, because our Atlantic as well as Mediterranean trade is open to his annoyance, and because we carry on a useful commerce with his nation.

The Algerines had also taken two vessels of the United States, with twenty-one persons on board, whom they retained as slaves. On the arrival of the agent sent to that regency, the dey refused utterly to treat of peace on any terms, and demanded 59,496 dollars for the ransom of our captives. This mission therefore proved ineffectual.

While these negotiations were on foot at Morocco and Algiers, an ambassador from Tripoli arrived in London. The ministers plenipotentiary of the United States met him in person. He demanded for the peace of that State, thirty thousand guineas; and undertook to engage that of Tunis for a like sum. These demands were beyond the limits of Congress, and of reason, and nothing was done. Nor was it of importance, as, Algiers remaining hostile, the peace of Tunis and Tripoli was of no value, and when that of the former should be obtained, theirs would soon follow.

Our navigation, then, into the Mediterranean, has not been resumed at all since the peace. The sole obstacle has been the unprovoked war of Algiers; and the sole remedy must be to bring that war to an end, or to palliate its effects. Its effects may, perhaps, be palliated by insuring our ships and cargoes destined for that sea, and by forming a convention with the regency, for the ransom of our seamen, according to a fixed tariff. That tariff will, probably, be high, and the rate of insurance so settled, in the long run, as to pay for the vessels and cargoes captured, and something more. What proportion will be captured nothing but experience can determine. Our commerce differs from that of most of the nations with whom the predatory States are in habits of war. Theirs is spread all over the face of the Mediterranean, and therefore must be sought for all over its face. Ours must all enter at a strait only five leagues wide; so that their cruisers, taking a safe and commanding position near the strait's mouth, may very effectually inspect whatever enters it. So safe a station, with a certainty of receiving for their prisoners a good and stated price, may tempt their cupidity to seek our vessels particularly. Nor is it certain that our seamen could be induced to engage in that navigation, though with the security of Algerine faith that they would be liberated on the payment of a fixed sum. The temporary deprivation of liberty, perhaps chains, the danger of the pest, the perils of the engagement preceding their surrender, and possible delays of the ransom, might turn elsewhere the choice of men, to whom all the rest of the world is open. In every case, these would be embarrassments which would enter into the merchants' estimate, and endanger the preference of foreign bottoms not exposed to them. And upon the whole, this expedient does not fulfil our wish of a complete re-establishment of our commerce in that sea.

A second plan might be to obtain peace by purchasing it. For this we have the example of rich and powerful nations, in this instance counting their interest more than their honor. If, conforming to their example, we determine to purchase a peace, it is proper to inquire what a peace may cost. This being merely a matter of conjecture, we can only compare together such opinions as have been obtained, and from them form one for ourselves.

Mr. Wolf, a respectable Irishman, who had resided very long at Algiers, thought a peace might be obtained from that regency, and the redemption of our captives included, for sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling.[25] His character and opinion both merited respect. Yet his estimate being the lowest of all who have hazarded an opinion on this subject, one is apt to fear his judgment might have been biassed by the hope he entertained that the United States would charge him with this negotiation.

Captain O'Brien, one of our captives, who had been in Algiers four years and a half at the date of his last letter, a very sensible man, and to whom we are indebted for very minute information, supposes that peace alone, might be bought for that sum, that is to say, for three hundred and twenty-two thousand dollars.

The Tripoline ambassador, before mentioned, thought that peace could be made with the three smaller powers for ninety thousand pounds sterling, to which were to be added the expenses of the mission and other incidental expenses. But he could not answer for Algiers; they would demand more. The ministers plenipotentiary, who conferred with him, had judged that as much must be paid to Algiers as to the other three powers together; and consequently, that according to this measure, the peace of Algiers would cost from an hundred to an hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds sterling; or from four hundred and sixty to five hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars.

The latter sum seemed to meet the ideas of the Count de Vergennes, who, from a very long residence at Constantinople, was a good judge of what related to the porte, or its dependencies.

A person whose name is not free to be mentioned here, a native of the continent of Europe, who had long lived, and still lives at Algiers, with whom the minister plenipotentiary of the United States, at Paris, had many and long conversations, and found his information full, clear, and consistent, was of opinion the peace of Algiers could not be bought by the United States for less than one million of dollars. And when that is paid, all is not done. On the death of a dey, (and the present one is between seventy and eighty years of age,) respectable presents must be made to the successor, that he may recognize the treaty and very often he takes the liberty of altering it. When a consul is sent or changed, new presents must be made. If these events leave a considerable interval, occasion must be made of renewing presents. And with all this they must see that we are in condition to chastise an infraction of the treaty; consequently some marine force must be exhibited in their harbor from time to time.

The late peace of Spain with Algiers is said to have cost from three to five millions of dollars. Having received the money, they take the vessels of that nation on the most groundless pretexts; counting, that the same force which bound Spain to so hard a treaty, may break it with impunity.

Their treaty with France, which had expired, was about two years ago renewed for fifty years. The sum given at the time of renewal is not known. But presents are to be repeated every ten years, and a tribute of one hundred thousand dollars to be annually paid. Yet perceiving that France, embarrassed at home with her domestic affairs, was less capable of acting abroad, they took six vessels of that nation in the course of the last year, and retain the captives, forty-four in number, in slavery.

It is the opinion of Captain O'Brien, that those nations are best treated who pay a smaller sum in the beginning, and an annual tribute afterwards. In this way he informs us that the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and Venetians pay to Algiers, from twenty-four to thirty thousand dollars a year, each; the two first in naval stores, the two last chiefly in money. It is supposed, that the peace of the Barbary States costs Great Britain about sixty thousand guineas, or two hundred and eighty thousand dollars a year. But it must be noted that these facts cannot be authentically advanced; as from a principle of self-condemnation, the governments keep them from the public eye as much as possible.

Nor must we omit finally to recollect, that the Algerines, attentive to reserve always a sufficient aliment for their piracies, will never extend their peace beyond certain limits, and consequently, that we may find ourselves in the case of those nations to whom they refuse peace at any price.

The third expedient is to repel force by force. Several statements are hereto annexed of the naval force of Algiers, taken in 1785, 1786, 1787, 1788, and 1789, differing in small degrees, but concurring in the main. From these it results that they have usually had about nine chebecs, from ten to thirty-six guns, and four galleys, which have been reduced by losses to six chebecs and four galleys. They have a forty-gun frigate on the stocks, and expect two cruisers from the grand seignior. The character of their vessels is, that they are sharp built and swift, but so light as not to stand the broadside of a good frigate. Their guns are of different calibres, unskilfully pointed and worked. The vessels illy manœuvred, but crowded with men, one third Turks, the rest Moors, of determined bravery, and resting their sole hopes on boarding. But two of these vessels belong to the government, the rest being private property. If they come out of the harbor together, they separate immediately in quest of prey; and it is said they were never known to act together in any instance. Nor do they come out at all, when they know there are vessels cruising for them. They perform three cruises a year, between the middle of April and November, when they unrig and lay up for the winter. When not confined within the straits, they rove northwardly to the channel, and westwardly to the westward islands.

They are at peace at present, with France, Spain, England, Venice, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark; and at war with Russia, Austria, Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, Genoa, and Malta.

Should the United States propose to vindicate their commerce by arms, they would, perhaps, think it prudent to possess a force equal to the whole of that which may be opposed to them. What that equal force would be, will belong to another department to say.

At the same time it might never be necessary to draw out the whole at once, nor perhaps any proportion of it, but for a small part of the year; as it is reasonable to presume that a concert of operation might be arranged among the powers at war with the Barbary States, so as that, each performing a tour of given duration, and in given order, a constant cruise during the eight temperate months of every year, may be kept up before the harbor of Algiers, till the object of such operations be completely obtained. Portugal has singly, for several years past, kept up such a cruise before the straits of Gibraltar, and by that means has confined the Algerines closely within. But two of their vessels have been out of the straits in the last five years. Should Portugal effect a peace with them, as has been apprehended for some time, the Atlantic will immediately become the principal scene of their piracies; their peace with Spain having reduced the profits of their Mediterranean cruises below the expenses of equipment.

Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce. If war, they will consider how far our own resources shall be called forth, and how far they will enable the Executive to engage, in the forms of the constitution, the co-operation of other powers. If tribute or ransom, it will rest with them to limit and provide the amount; and with the Executive, observing the same constitutional forms, to take arrangements for employing it to the best advantage.

No. 1.—Extract of a letter from Richard O'Brien, one of the American captives at Algiers, to Congress. Algiers, December 26, 1789.

"It was the opinion of Mr. John Wolf, who resided many years in this city, that the United States of America may obtain a peace for one hundred years with this regency, for the sum of sixty or seventy thousand pounds sterling, and the redemption of fifteen Americans included. Mr. Wolf was the British chargé des affaires in Algiers, and was much the friend of America, but he is no more.

"I have now been four years and a half in captivity, and I have much reason to think, that America may obtain a peace with Algiers for the sum of sixty-five or seventy thousand pounds, considering the present state of Algiers. That this regency would find it their interest to take two or three American cruisers in part payment for making a peace; and also would take masts, yards, plank, scantling, tar, pitch, and turpentine, and Philadelphia iron, as a part payment; all to be regulated at a certain fixed price by treaty."

No. 2.—Extract of a letter from the Honorable John Adams, Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States at London, to the Honorable John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. London, February 22, 1786

"On Monday evening another conference was held with the Tripolitan ambassador. When he began to explain himself concerning his demands, he said they would be different according to the duration of the treaty. If that were perpetual, they would be greater; if for a term of years, less; his advice was that it should be perpetual. Once signed by the bashaw, dey, and other officers, it would be indissoluble and binding forever upon all their successors. But if a temporary treaty were made, it might be difficult and expensive to revive it. For a perpetual treaty, such as they now had with Spain, a sum of thirty thousand guineas must be paid upon the delivery of the articles signed by the dey and other officers. If it were agreed to, he would send his secretary by land to Marseilles, and from thence, by water, to Tripoli, who should bring it back by the same route, signed by the dey, &c. He had proposed so small a sum in consideration of the circumstances, but declared it was not half of what had been lately paid them by Spain. If we chose to treat upon a different plan, he would make a treaty perpetual upon the payment of twelve thousand five hundred guineas for the first year, and three thousand guineas annually, until the thirty thousand guineas were paid. It was observed that these were large sums, and vastly beyond expectation; but his excellency answered, that they never made a treaty for less. Upon the arrival of a prize, the dey and other officers are entitled, by their laws, to large shares, by which they might make greater profits than those sums amounted to, and they never would give up this advantage for less.

"He was told, that although there was full power to treat, the American ministers were limited to a much smaller sum; so that it would be impossible to do anything until we wrote to Congress and know their pleasure. Colonel Smith was present at this, as he had been at the last conference, and agreed to go to Paris, to communicate all to Mr. Jefferson, and persuade him to come here, that we may join in farther conferences, and transmit the result to Congress.

"The ambassador believed that Tunis and Morocco would treat upon the same terms, but could not answer for Algiers. They would demand more. When Mr. Jefferson arrives, we shall insist upon knowing the ultimatum, and transmit it to Congress.

"Congress will perceive that one hundred and twenty thousand guineas will be indispensable to conclude with the four powers at this rate, besides a present to the ambassadors, and their incidental charges. Besides this, a present of five hundred guineas is made, upon the arrival of a consul in each State. No man wishes more fervently that the expense could be less, but the fact cannot be altered, and the truth ought not to be concealed.

"It may be reasonably concluded that this great affair cannot be finished for much less than two hundred thousand pounds sterling."

No. 3.—Extract of a Letter from the Honorable Thomas Jefferson, Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States at Paris, to the Honorable John Jay, Secretary for foreign Affairs. Paris, May 23, 1786.

"Letters received both from Madrid and Algiers, while I was in London, having suggested that treaties with the States of Barbary would be much facilitated by a previous one with the Ottoman Porte, it was agreed between Mr. Adams and myself, that on my return I should consult, on this subject, the Count De Vergennes, whose long residence at Constantinople rendered him the best judge of its expediency. Various circumstances have put it out of my power to consult him till to-day. I stated to him the difficulties we were likely to meet with at Algiers, and asked his opinion, what would be the probable expense of a diplomatic mission to Constantinople, and what its effects at Algiers. He said that the expense would be very great; for that presents must be made at that court, and every one would be gaping after them; and that it would not procure us a peace at Algiers one penny the cheaper. He observed that the Barbary States acknowledged a sort of vassalage to the Porte, and availed themselves of that relation when anything was to be gained by it; but that whenever it subjected them to the demand from the Porte, they totally disregarded it; that money was the sole agent. He cited the present example of Spain, which, though having a treaty with the Porte, would probably be obliged to buy a peace at Algiers, at the expense of upwards of six millions of livres. I told him we had calculated, from the demands and information of the Tripoline ambassador at London, that to make peace with the four Barbary States would cost us between two and three hundred thousand guineas, if bought with money.

"The sum did not seem to exceed his expectations. I mentioned to him, that considering the uncertainty of a peace, when bought, perhaps Congress might think it more eligible to establish a cruise of frigates in the Mediterranean, and even blockade Algiers. He supposed it would require ten vessels, great and small. I observed to him that M. De Massiac had formerly done it with five; he said it was true, but that vessels of relief would be necessary. I hinted to him that I thought the English capable of administering aid to the Algerines. He seemed to think it impossible, on account of the scandal it would bring on them. I asked him what had occasioned the blockade by M. De Massiac, he said an infraction of their treaty by the Algerines."

No. 4.—Extract of a Letter from Richard O'Brien to the Hon. Thomas Jefferson. Algiers, April 28, 1787.

"It seems the Neapolitan ambassador had obtained a truce with this regency for three months; and the ambassador wrote his court of his success; but about the 1st of April, when the cruisers were fitting out, the ambassador went to the dey, and hoped the dey would give the necessary orders to the captains of his cruisers not to take the Neapolitan vessels. The dey said the meaning of the truce was not to take the Neapolitan cruisers, but if his chebecks should meet the Neapolitan merchantmen to take them and send them for Algiers. The ambassador said, the Neapolitan cruisers would not want a pass on those terms. The dey said, if his chebecks should meet either men of war or merchant vessels, to take them; so gave orders accordingly. The Algerines sailed the 9th instant, and are gone, I believe, off the coast of Italy. This shows there is very little confidence to be put in the royal word. No principle of national honor will bind those people; and I believe not much confidence to be put in them in treaties. The Algerines are not inclinable to a peace with the Neapolitans. I hear of no negotiation. When the two frigates arrive with the money for the ransom of the slaves, I believe they are done with the Neapolitans."

Extract of a Letter from Richard O'Brien to the Hon. Thomas Jefferson. Algiers, June 13, 1789.

"The cruisers had orders to take the Danes; but I believe Denmark, suspecting that on account of their alliance with Russia, that the grand seignior would order the regency of Algiers to make war against the Danes; accordingly, the Danes have evacuated the Mediterranean seas, until the affairs of Europe are more settled. The Danish ship with the tribute is shortly expected. She is worth fifty thousand dollars; so that the Algerines will not make known publicly their intention of breaking with Denmark, until this ship arrives with the tribute. I am very sure that Mr. Robindar is very sensible of the intention of those sea-robbers, the terror and scourge of the Christians. The reason the Algerines have not committed any depredations on the English, is, that the cruisers have not met with any of them richly loaded; for if they had met a rich ship from London for Livorna, they would certainly have brought her into port, and said that such ship was loaded for the enemy of Algiers at Livorna; but if that was not a sufficient excuse, hove overboard or clipt the pass.

"Consul Logie has been treated with much contempt by the Algerine ministry; and you may depend, that when the dey goes to his long home, that his successor will not renew the peace with Great Britain, without a large sum of money is paid, and very valuable presents. This I well know; the whole ministry says, that the peace with the English is very old, and that the English must conform to the custom of other nations, in giving the government here money and presents. In fact, the Algerines are trying their endeavors to find some nation to break the peace with them. I think, if they had treated the English in such a manner as they have the French, that the English would resent it."

Extract of a Letter from Richard O'Brien to the Hon. Thomas Jefferson. Algiers, June 13, 1789.

"What dependence or faith could be given to a peace with the Algerines, considering their present haughtiness, and with what contempt and derision do they treat all nations; so that, in my opinion, until the Algerines more strictly adhere to the treaties they have already made, it would be impolitic in any nation to try to make a peace here; for I see they take more from the nations they are at peace with, than from those they are at declared war with. The Portuguese, I hope, will keep the Algerines inside the straits; for only consider the bad consequence of the Algerines going into the mar Grandi. Should the Portuguese make a sudden peace with this regency, the Algerines would immediately go out of the straits, and of course, take many an American."

No. 5.—Extract of a Letter from the Hon. John Adams, Esq., Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of Great Britain, to the Hon. John Jay, Esq., Secretary for Foreign Affairs. February 16, 1786.

"The American commerce can be protected from these Africans only by negotiation, or by war. If presents should be exacted from us, as ample as those which are given by England, the expense may amount to sixty thousand pounds sterling a year, an enormous sum to be sure; but infinitely less than the expense of fighting. Two frigates of 30 guns each would cost as much to fit them for the sea, besides the accumulating charges of stores, provisions, pay, and clothing. The powers of Europe generally send a squadron of men of war with their ministers, and offer battle at the same time that they propose treaties and promise presents."

No. 6.—Several statements of the Marine force of Algiers.—Public and private

May 20, 1786.—Mr. Lamb says it consists of

9 Chebecs from 36 to 8 guns; manned, the largest with 400 men, and so in proportion.

10 Row Galleys

May 27, 1787.—Mr. Randall furnishes two statements, viz.:

A more general one— 1 Setye of 34 guns.

2 Setye of 32 guns.

1 Setye of 26 guns.

1 Setye of 24 guns.

1 Chebec of 20 guns

1 Chebec of 18 guns.

1 Chebec of 10 guns.

8

4 half-galleys, carrying from 120 to 130 Moors.

3 galliots of 70, 60, and 50 Moors.

A more particular one as follows:

1 of 32 guns, viz. 2 eighteens, 24 nines, 6 fours, and 450 men.

1 of 28 guns, viz. 2 twelves, 24 nines, 2 sixes, and 400 men.

1 of 24 guns, viz. 20 fours, and 350 men.

1 of 20 guns, viz. 20 sixes, and 300 men.

2 of 18 guns, viz. 18 sixes, and 260 men.

1 of 16 guns, viz. 16 sixes, and 250 men.

2 small craft.

9

55 gun-boats, carrying 1 twelve pounder each, for defence of the harbor.

June 8, 1786.—A letter from the three American captains, O'Brien, Coffin, and Stephens, state them

as 1 of 32

1 of 30

3 of 24

3 of 18

1 of 12

9 and 55 gun-boats.

September 25, 1787.—Captain O'Brien furnishes the following statement

1 of 30 guns, 400 men, 106 feet length, straight keel.

1 of 26 guns, 320 men, 96 feet length, straight keel.

2 of 22 guns, 240 men, 80 feet length, straight keel.

1 of 22 guns, 240 men, 75 feet length, straight keel.

1 of 22 guns, 240 men, 70 feet length, straight keel.

1 of 18 guns, 200 men, 70 feet length, straight keel.

1 of 16 guns, 180 men, 64 feet length, straight keel.

1 of 12 guns, 150 men, 50 feet length, straight keel.

9

Galleys 1 of 4 guns, 70 men, 40 feet length, straight keel.

2 of 2 guns, 46 men, 32 feet length, straight keel.

1 of 2 guns, 40 men, 32 feet length, straight keel.

February 5, 1788.—Statement by the inhabitants of Algiers, spoken of in the report.

9 vessels from 36 down to 20 guns.

4 or 5 smaller.

About this date the Algerines lost two or three vessels, stranded or taken.

December, 1789.—Captain O'Brien furnishes the latest statement.

1 ship of 24 guns, received lately from France.

5 large cruisers.

6 3 galleys, and 60 gun-boats.

In the fall of 1789, they laid the keel of a 40 gun frigate, and they expect two cruisers from the grand seignior.

No. 7.—Translation of a Letter from Count D'Estaing to the Hon. Thomas Jefferson, Esq. Paris, May 17, 1784.

Sir,—In giving you an account of an opinion of Mr. Massiac, and which absolutely corresponds with my own, I cannot too much observe how great a difference may take place in the course of forty years between the means which he required and those which political circumstances, that I cannot ascertain, may exact.

This Secretary of State, afterwards vice-Admiral, had the modesty, when a captain, to propose a means for the reduction of Algiers, less brilliant to himself, but more sure and economical than the one government was about to adopt. They wanted him to undertake a bombardment; he proposed a simple blockade. All the force he requested was a single man-of-war, two strong frigates, and two sloops-of-war.

I am convinced, that by blocking up Algiers by cross-anchoring, and with a long tow, that is to say, with several cables spliced to each other, and with iron chains, one might, if necessary, always remain there, and there is no Barbarian power thus confined, which would not sue for peace.

During the war before last the English remained, even in winter, at anchor before Morbian, on the coast of Brittany, which is a much more dangerous coast. Expeditious preparation for sailing of the vessels which form the blockade, which should be of a sufficient number to prevent anything from entering or going out, while the rest remain at their stations, the choice of these stations, skilful manœuvres, strict watch during the night, every precaution against the element which every seaman ought to be acquainted with; also, against the enemy to prevent the sudden attack of boats, and to repel them in case they should make an attack by boats prepared for the purpose, frequent refreshments for the crews, relieving the men, an unshaken constancy and exactness in service, are the means, which in my opinion, would render the event indubitable. Bombardments are but transitory. It is, if I may so express myself, like breaking glass windows with guineas. None have produced effect against the barbarians. Even an imperfect blockade, were one to have the patience and courage to persist therein, would occasion a perpetual evil, it would be insupportable in the long run. To obtain the end proposed no advantage ought to be lost. If several powers would come to a good understanding, and pursue a plan formed on the principles of humanity; if they were not counteracted by others, it would require but a few years to compel the barbarians to cease being pirates; they would become merchants in spite of themselves. It is needless to observe, that the unsuccessful attempts of Spain, and those under which the republic of Venice, perhaps, hides other views, have increased the strength as well as the self-love of all the barbarians. We are assured that the Algerines have fitted out merchantmen with heavy cannon. This would render it necessary to block the place with two ships, so that one of the two might remain moored near the bar, while the other might prepare to support such of the frigates as should give chase. But their chebecs, even their frigates, and all their vessels, although overcharged with men, are moreover so badly armed and manœuvred that assistance from without would be most to be feared.

Your excellency has told me the only true means of bringing to terms the only people who can take a pleasure in disturbing our commerce. You see, I speak as an American citizen; this title, dear to my heart, the value of which I justly prize, affords me the happy opportunity of offering, still more particularly, the homage, the sincere attachment, and the respect with which I have the honor to be, &c.

Estaing.

XIX.—Report on the Algerine Prisoners.

December 28, 1790.

The Secretary of State, having had under consideration the situation of the citizens of the United States in captivity at Algiers, makes the following report thereupon to the President of the United States:

When the House of Representatives, at their late session, were pleased to refer to the Secretary of State, the petition of our citizens in captivity at Algiers, there still existed some expectation that certain measures, which had been employed to effect their redemption, the success of which depended on their secrecy, might prove effectual. Information received during the recess of Congress has so far weakened those expectations, as to make it now a duty to lay before the President of the United States, a full statement of what has been attempted for the relief of these our suffering citizens, as well before, as since he came into office, that he may be enabled to decide what further is to be done.

On the 25th of July, 1785, the schooner Maria, Captain Stevens, belonging to a Mr. Foster, of Boston, was taken off Cape St. Vincents, by an Algerine corsair; and, five days afterwards, the ship Dauphin, Captain O'Brien, belonging to Messieurs Irvins of Philadelphia, was taken by another Algerine, about fifty leagues westward of Lisbon. These vessels, with their cargoes and crews, twenty-one persons in number, were carried into Algiers.

Congress had some time before commissioned ministers plenipotentiary for entering into treaties of amity and commerce with the Barbary Powers, and to send to them proper agents for preparing such treaties. An agent was accordingly appointed for Algiers, and his instructions prepared, when the Ministers Plenipotentiary received information of these captures. Though the ransom of captives was not among the objects expressed in their commissions, because at their dates the case did not exist, yet they thought it their duty to undertake that ransom, fearing that the captives might be sold and dispersed through the interior and distant countries of Africa, if the previous orders of Congress should be waited for. They therefore added a supplementary instruction to the agent to negotiate their ransom. But, while acting thus without authority, they thought themselves bound to offer a price so moderate as not to be disapproved. They therefore restrained him to two hundred dollars a man; which was something less than had been just before paid for about three hundred French captives, by the Mathurins, a religious order of France, instituted in ancient times for the redemption of Christian captives from the infidel Powers. On the arrival of the agent at Algiers, the dey demanded fifty-nine thousand four hundred and ninety-six dollars for the twenty-one captives, and could be brought to abate but little from that demand. The agent, therefore, returned in 1786, without having effected either peace or ransom.

In the beginning of the next year, 1787, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris procured an interview with the general of the religious order of Mathurins, before mentioned, to engage him to lend his agency, at the expense of the United States, for the redemption of their captive citizens. He proffered at once all the services he could render, with the liberality and the zeal which distinguish his character. He observed, that he had agents on the spot, constantly employed in seeking out and redeeming the captives of their own country; that these should act for us, as for themselves; that nothing could be accepted for their agency; and that he would only expect that the price of redemption should be ready on our part, so as to cover the engagement into which he should enter. He added, that, by the time all expenses were paid, their last redemption had amounted to near two thousand five hundred livres a man, and that he could by no means flatter us that they could redeem our captives as cheap as their own. The pirates would take advantage of its being out of their ordinary line. Still he was in hopes they would not be much higher.

The proposition was then submitted to Congress, that is to say, in February, 1787, and on the 19th of September, in the same year, their Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris received their orders to embrace the offers of the Mathurins. This he immediately notified to the general, observing, however, that he did not desire him to enter into any engagements till a sufficient sum to cover them should be actually deposited in Paris. The general wished that the whole might be kept rigorously secret, as, should the barbarians suspect him to be acting for the United States, they would demand such sums as he could never agree to give, even with our consent, because it would injure his future purchases from them. He said he had information from his agent at Algiers, that our captives received so liberal a daily allowance as to evince that it came from a public source. He recommended that this should be discontinued; engaging that he would have an allowance administered to them, much short indeed of what they had hitherto received, but such as was given to his own countrymen, quite sufficient for physical necessities, and more likely to prepare the opinion, that as they were subsisted by his charity, they were to be redeemed by it also. These ideas, suggested to him by the danger of raising his market, were approved by the Minister Plenipotentiary; because, this being the first instance of a redemption by the United States, it would form a precedent, because a high price given by us might induce these pirates to abandon all other nations in pursuit of Americans; whereas, the contrary would take place, could our price of redemption be fixed at the lowest point.

To destroy, therefore, every expectation of a redemption by the United States, the bills of the Spanish consul at Algiers, who had made the kind advances before spoken of for the sustenance of our captives, were not answered. On the contrary, a hint was given that these advances had better be discontinued, as it was not known that they would be reimbursed. It was necessary even to go further, and to suffer the captives themselves and their friends to believe for awhile, that no attention was paid to them, no notice taken of their letters. They are still under this impression. It would have been unsafe to trust them with a secret, the disclosure of which might forever prevent their redemption, by raising the demands of the captors to sums which a due regard for our seamen, still in freedom, would forbid us to give. This was the most trying of all circumstances, and drew from them the most afflicting reproaches.

It was a twelvemonth afterwards before the money could be deposited in Paris, and the negotiation be actually put into train. In the meantime the general had received information from Algiers of a very considerable change of prices there. Within the last two or three years the Spaniards, the Neapolitans, and the Russians, had redeemed at exorbitant sums. Slaves were become scarce, and would hardly be sold at any price. Still he entered on the business with an assurance of doing the best in his power; and he was authorized to offer as far as three thousand livres, or five hundred and fifty-five dollars a man. He wrote immediately to consult a confidential agent at Marseilles, on the best mode of carrying this business into effect; from whom he received the answer No. 2, hereto annexed.

Nothing further was known of his progress or prospects, when the House of Representatives were pleased, at their last session, to refer the petition of our captives at Algiers to the Secretary of State. The preceding narrative shows that no report could have then been made without risking the object, of which some hopes were still entertained. Later advices, however, from the chargé des affaires of the United States, at Paris, informs us, that these measures, though not yet desperate, are not to be counted on. Besides the exorbitance of price, before feared, the late transfer of the lands and revenues of the clergy in France to the public, by withdrawing the means, seems to have suspended the proceedings of the Mathurins in the purposes of their institution.

It is time, therefore, to look about for something more promising, without relinquishing, in the meanwhile, the chance of success through them. Endeavors to collect information, which have been continued a considerable time, as to the ransoms which would probably be demanded from us, and those actually paid by other nations, enable the Secretary of State to lay before the President the following short view, collected from original papers now in his possession, or from information delivered to him personally. Passing over the ransoms of the Mathurins, which are kept far below the common level by special circumstances:

In 1786, the dey of Algiers demanded from our agent $59,496 for twenty-one captives, which was $2,833 a man. The agent flattered himself they could be ransomed for $1,200 apiece. His secretary informed us, at the same time, that Spain had paid $1,600.

In 1787, the Russians redeemed at $1,546 a man.

In 1788, a well-informed inhabitant of Algiers assured the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, that no nation had redeemed, since the Spanish treaty, at less than from £250 to £300 sterling, the medium of which is $1,237. Captain O'Brien, at the same date, thinks we must pay $1,800, and mentions a Savoy captain, just redeemed at $4,074.

In 1789, Mr. Logie, the English consul at Algiers, informed a person who wished to ransom one of our common sailors, that he would cost from £450 to £500 sterling, the mean of which is $2,137. In December of the same year, Captain O'Brien thinks our men will now cost $2,290 each, though a Jew merchant believes he could get them for $2,264.

In 1790, July 9th, a Mr. Simpson, of Gibraltar, who, at some particular request, had taken pains to find for what sum our captives could be redeemed, finds that the fourteen will cost $34,79,228, which is $2,485 a man. At the same date, one of them, a Scotch boy, a common mariner, was actually redeemed at 8,000 livres, equal to $1,481, which is within nineteen dollars of the price Simpson states for common men; and the chargé des affaires of the United States at Paris is informed that the whole may be redeemed at that rate, adding fifty per cent. on the captains, which would bring it to $1,571 a man.

It is found then that the prices are 1,200, 1,237, 1,481, 1,546, 1,571, 1,600, 1,800, 2,137, 2,264, 2,485, 2,833, and 2,920 dollars a man, not noticing that of $4,074, because it was for a captain.

In 1786, there were 2,200 captives in Algiers, which, in 1789, had been reduced by death or ransom to 655. Of ours six have died, and one has been ransomed by his friends.

From these facts and opinions, some conjecture may be formed of the terms on which the liberty of our citizens may be obtained.

But should it be thought better to repress force by force, another expedient for their liberation may perhaps offer. Captures made on the enemy may perhaps put us into possession of some of their mariners, and exchange be substituted for ransom. It is not indeed a fixed usage with them to exchange prisoners. It is rather their custom to refuse it. However, such exchanges are sometimes effected, by allowing them more or less of advantage. They have sometimes accepted of two Moors for a Christian, at others they have refused five or six for one. Perhaps Turkish captives may be objects of greater partiality with them, as their government is entirely in the hands of Turks, who are treated in every instance as a superior order of beings. Exchange, too, will be more practicable in our case, as our captives have not been sold to private individuals, but are retained in the hands of the Government.

The liberation of our citizens has an intimate connection with the liberation of our commerce in the Mediterranean, now under the consideration of Congress. The distresses of both proceed from the same cause, and the measures which shall be adopted for the relief of the one, may, very probably, involve the relief of the other.

XX.—The Secretary of State, to whom was referred by the House of Representatives, the representation from the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the subjects of the cod and whale fisheries, together with the several papers accompanying it, has had the same under consideration, and thereupon makes the following report:

February 1, 1791.

The representation sets forth that, before the late war, about four thousand seamen, and about twenty-four thousand tons of shipping, were annually employed from that State, in the whale fishery, the produce whereof was about three hundred and fifty thousand pounds lawful money a year.

That, previous to the same period, the cod fishery of that State employed four thousand men, and twenty-eight thousand tons of shipping, and produced about two hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year.

That these branches of business, annihilated during the war, have been, in some degree, recovered since; but that they labor under many and heavy embarrassments, which, if not removed, or lessened, will render the fisheries every year less extensive and important.

That these embarrassments are, heavy duties on their produce abroad, and bounties on that of their competitors; and duties at home on several articles, particularly used in the fisheries.

And it asks that the duties be taken off; that bounties be given to the fishermen; and the national influence be used abroad, for obtaining better markets for their produce.

The cod and whale fisheries, carried on by different persons, from different ports, in different vessels, in different seas, and seeking different markets, agree in one circumstance, in being as unprofitable to the adventurer, as important to the public. A succinct view of their rise, progress, and present state, with different nations, may enable us to note the circumstances which have attended their prosperity, and their decline; to judge of the embarrassments which are said to oppress ours; to see whether they depend on our own will, and may, therefore, be remedied immediately by ourselves, or, whether depending on the will of others, they are without the reach of remedy from us, either directly or indirectly.

Their history being as unconnected as their practice, they shall be separately considered.

Within twenty years after the supposed discovery of Newfoundland, by the Cabots, we find that the abundance of fish on its banks, had already drawn the attention of the people of Europe. For, as early as 1517, or 1519, we are told of fifty ships being seen there at one time. The first adventurers in that fishery were the Biscayans, of Spain, the Basques and Bas-Bretons, of France, all united anciently in language, and still in habits, and in extreme poverty. The last circumstance enabled them long to retain a considerable share of the fishery. In 1577, the French had one hundred and fifty vessels there; the Spaniards had still one hundred, and the Portuguese fifty, when the English had only fifteen. The Spaniards and Portuguese seem at length to have retired silently, the French and English claiming the fishery exclusively, as an appurtenance to their adjacent colonies, and the profits being too small for nations surcharged with the precious metals proceeding from their mines.

Without materials to trace the intermediate progress, we only know that, so late as 1744, the French employed there five hundred and sixty-four ships, and twenty-seven thousand five hundred seamen, and took one million two hundred and forty-six thousand quintals of fish, which was three times the extent to which England and her colonies together, carried this fishery at that time.

The English, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, had employed, generally, about one hundred and fifty vessels in the Newfoundland fishery. About 1670 we find them reduced to eighty, and one hundred, the inhabitants of New England beginning now to supplant them. A little before this, the British Parliament perceiving that their citizens were unable to subsist on the scanty profits which sufficed for their poorer competitors, endeavored to give them some advantage by prohibiting the importation of foreign fish; and, at the close of the century, they formed some regulations for their government and protection, and remitted to them some duties. A successful war enabled them, in 1713, to force from the French a cession of the Island of Newfoundland; under these encouragements, the English and American fisheries began to thrive. In 1731 we find the English take two hundred thousand quintals of fish, and the Americans two hundred and thirty thousand, besides the refuse fish, not fit for European markets. They continue to gain ground, and the French to lose it, insomuch that, about 1755, they are said to have been on a par; and, in 1768, the French have only two hundred and fifty-nine vessels, of twenty-four thousand four hundred and twenty tons, nine thousand seven hundred and twenty-two seamen, taking two hundred thousand quintals, while America alone, for some three or four years before that, and so on, to the commencement of the late war, employed six hundred and sixty-five vessels, of twenty-five thousand six hundred and fifty tons, and four thousand four hundred and five seamen, and took from three hundred and fifty thousand to upwards of four hundred thousand quintals of fish, and England a still greater quantity, five hundred and twenty-six thousand quintals, as is said.

Spain had formally relinquished her pretensions to a participation in these fisheries, at the close of the preceding war; and, at the end of this, the adjacent continent and islands being divided between the United States, the English and French, (for the last retained two small islands merely for this object,) the right of fishing was appropriated to them also.

France, sensible of the necessity of balancing the power of England on the water, and, therefore, of improving every resource for raising seamen, and seeing that her fishermen could not maintain their competition without some public patronage, adopted the experiment of bounties on her own fish, and duties on that of foreign nations brought into her markets. But, notwithstanding this, her fisheries dwindle, from a change taken place, insensibly, in the character of her navigation, which, from being the most economical, is now become the most expensive. In 1786, she is said to have employed but seven thousand men in this fishery, and to have taken four hundred and twenty-six thousand quintals; and, in 1787, but six thousand men, and one hundred and twenty-eight thousand quintals. She seems not yet sensible that the unthriftiness of her fisheries proceeds from the want of economy, and not the want of markets; and that the encouragement of our fishery abridges that of a rival nation, whose power on the ocean has long threatened the loss of all balance on that element.

The plan of the English Government, since the peace, has been to prohibit all foreign fish in their markets, and they have given from eighteen to fifty thousand pounds sterling on every fishing vessel complying with certain conditions. This policy is said to have been so far successful, as to have raised the number of seamen employed in that business, in 1786, to fourteen thousand, and the quantity of fish taken, to 732,000 quintals.

* * * * * * * *

The fisheries of the United States, annihilated during the war; their vessels, utensils, and fishermen destroyed; their markets in the Mediterranean and British America lost, and their produce dutied in those of France; their competitors enabled by bounties to meet and undersell them at the few markets remaining open, without any public aid, and, indeed, paying aids to the public;—such were the hopeless auspices under which this important business was to be resumed. Yet it was resumed, and, aided by the mere force of natural advantages, they employed, during the years 1786, 1787, 1788, and 1789, on an average, five hundred and thirty-nine vessels, of nineteen thousand one hundred and eighty-five tons, three thousand two hundred and eighty-seven seamen, and took two hundred and fifty thousand six hundred and fifty quintals of fish. * * * And an official paper * * shows that, in the last of those years, our exportation amounted to three hundred and seventy-five thousand and twenty quintals, and thirty thousand four hundred and sixty-one barrels; deduction made of three thousand seven hundred and one quintals, and six thousand three hundred and forty-three barrels of foreign fish, received and re-exported. * * Still, however, the calculations * * which accompany the representation, show that the profits of the sales in the years 1787 and 1788, were too small to afford a living to the fishermen, and on those of 1789, there was such a loss as to withdraw thirty-three vessels, of the town of Marblehead alone, from the further pursuit of this business; and the apprehension is, that, without some public aid, those still remaining will continue to withdraw, and this whole commerce be engrossed by a single nation.

This rapid view of the cod fishery enables us to discern under what policy it has nourished or declined in the hands of other nations, and to mark the fact, that it is too poor a business to be left to itself, even with the nation most advantageously situated.

It will now be proper to count the advantages which aid, and the disadvantages which oppose us, in this conflict.

Our advantages are—

1. The neighborhood of the great fisheries, which permits our fishermen to bring home their fish to be salted by their wives and children.

2. The shore fisheries, so near at hand, as to enable the vessels to run into port in a storm, and so lessen the risk, for which distant nations must pay insurance.

3. The winter fisheries, which, like household manufactures employ portions of time, which would otherwise be useless.

4. The smallness of the vessels, which the shortness of the voyage enables us to employ, and which, consequently, require but a small capital.

5. The cheapness of our vessels, which do not cost above the half of the Baltic fir vessels, computing price and duration.

6. Their excellence as sea boats, which decreases the risk and quickens the return.

7. The superiority of our mariners in skill, activity, enterprise, sobriety, and order.

8. The cheapness of provisions.

9. The cheapness of casks, which, of itself, is said to be equal to an extra profit of fifteen per cent.

These advantages are of such force, that, while experience has proved that no other nation can make a mercantile profit on the Newfoundland fishery, nor can support it without national aid, we can make a living profit, if vent for our fish can be procured.

Of the disadvantages opposed to us, those which depend on ourselves, are—

Tonnage and naval duties on the vessels employed in the fishery.

Impost duties on salt.

On tea, rum, sugar, molasses, hooks, lines, and leads, duck, cordage, and cables, iron, hemp, and twine, used in the fishery; coarse woollens, worn by the fishermen, and the poll tax levied by the State on their persons. The statement No. 6, shows the amount of these, exclusive of the State tax and drawback on the fish exported, to be $5 25 per man, or $57 75 per vessel of sixty-five tons. When a business is so nearly in equilibrio that one can hardly discern whether the profit be sufficient to continue it or not, smaller sums than these suffice to turn the scale against it. To these disadvantages, add ineffectual duties on the importation of foreign fish. In justification of these last, it is urged that the foreign fish received, is in exchange for the produce of agriculture. To which it may be answered, that the thing given, is more merchantable than that received in exchange, and agriculture has too many markets to be allowed to take away those of the fisheries. It will rest, therefore, with the wisdom of the Legislature to decide, whether prohibition should not be opposed to prohibition, and high duty to high duty, on the fish of other nations; whether any, and which, of the naval and other duties may be remitted, or an equivalent given to the fisherman, in the form of a drawback, or bounty; and whether the loss of markets abroad, may not, in some degree, be compensated, by creating markets at home; to which might contribute the constituting fish a part of the military ration, in stations not too distant from navigation, a part of the necessary sea stores of vessels, and the encouraging private individuals to let the fishermen share with the cultivator, in furnishing the supplies of the table. A habit introduced from motives of patriotism, would soon be followed from motives of taste; and who will undertake to fix the limits to this demand, if it can be once excited, with a nation which doubles, and will continue to double, at very short periods?