Chapter III

Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation.

THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on which a divine revelation is founded, both as to its time, matter, and manner.

But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?”

If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine revelation, either as to its matter or manner, as imperfectly as he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for believing false revelations, as for idolatry; and as full of guilt for rejecting a true revelation, as for denying the only true God.

Secondly, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending the reasons, on which the particular matter or manner of any divine revelation is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons for receiving or not receiving a revelation as divine, as to make our conduct therein justly accountable to God.

For if God can shew a revelation to proceed from him, by the same undeniable evidence, as he shews the creation to be his work; if he can make himself as visible in a particular extraordinary manner, as he is by his general and ordinary providence; then, tho’ we are as unqualified to judge of the mysteries of a revelation, as we are to judge of the mysteries in creation and providence; yet we may be as fully obliged to receive a revelation, as to acknowledge the creation to be the work of God; and as highly criminal for disbelieving it, as for denying a general providence.

Adam, Noah, Abraham, and Moses, were very incompetent judges, of the reasons on which the particular revelations made to them were founded; but this did not hinder their sufficient assurance, that such revelations came from God, because they were proved to come from God in the same manner, as the creation is proved to be the work of God.

And as Adam and Noah must see every thing wonderful, mysterious, and above their comprehensions, in those new worlds into which they were introduced by God; so they could no more expect, that he should require nothing of them, but what they would enjoin themselves, than that their own frame, the nature of the creation, the providence of God, or the state of human life, should be exactly as they would have it.

And if their posterity will let no messages from heaven, no prophesies and miracles persuade them, that God can call them to any duties, but such as they must enjoin themselves; or to the belief of any doctrines, but such as their own minds can suggest; nor to any methods of changing their present state of weakness and disorder for a happy immortality, but such as suit their own taste, temper, and way of reasoning; it is because they are grown senseless of the mysteries of creation and providence with which they are surrounded, and forget the awful prerogative of infinite wisdom, over the weakest, lowest rank of intelligent beings.

* And as we can only know what is worthy of God in creation, by knowing what he has created; so we can no other way know what is worthy of God to be revealed, but by a revelation. And he that pretends independently of any relation, to shew how, and in what manner God ought to make a revelation worthy of himself, is as great a visionary, as he that should pretend independently of the creation, or without learning any thing from it, to shew how God ought to have proceeded in it, to make it worthy of himself. For as God alone, knows how to create worthy of himself, and nothing can possibly be proved to be worthy to be created by him, but because he has already created it; so God alone knows what is worthy of himself in a revelation, and nothing can possibly be proved worthy to be revealed by him, but because he has already revealed it.

Hence we may see how little this writer is governed by the reason and nature of things, who proceeds upon this as an undeniable principle, that we could not know a revelation to be divine, unless we knew, antecedently to revelation, what God could teach or require of us by it. Thus, says he, “Were we not capable by our own reason of knowing what the divine goodness could command, or forbid his creatures, antecedently to any external revelation, we could not distinguish the true instituted religion, from the many false ones.”¹

¹ Page 66.

Just as wild and visionary, as if it was said, Were we not capable by our reason of knowing what kind or orders of beings God ought to create independently of any thing we learn from the creation, we could never prove this or that creation to proceed from him. Did we not, antecedently to facts and experience, know by our own reason what ought to be the method and manner of divine providence, we could never prove that the providence which governs nations and persons is a divine providence.

Again, He proceeds to shew, that a revelation from God cannot contain any thing, but what human reason can prove from the nature of things; because if God could require any thing more of us, than what our own reason could thus prove, he must require without reason, and then there is an end of all religion.

Now this argument proceeds thus; If God does not act according to the measure of human reason, he cannot act according to reason itself. If he requires any more of us, than what we think the nature of things requires of us, then he cannot act according to the nature of things. If his wisdom is in any matters of revelation greater than ours; if it is not in every thing he reveals measurable by ours, it cannot be wisdom at all, much less can it be infinite wisdom.

That is, if he is more powerful than we are, he cannot be omnipotent; if he is more perfect than we are, he cannot be all perfection; if he acts upon greater, or higher, or more reasonable motives than we do, he cannot be a reasonable being.

Now if these absurdities are not plain and manifest to every common understanding, it is in vain to dispute about any thing; but if they are, then it is as plain, this writer’s great argument against Christianity, and first principle of his rational religion, is in the same state of undeniable absurdity.

Thus says he, “Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow from the reason and the nature of things.”¹ That is, natural religion takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says he, “Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure, otherwise it would be the same with natural religion.”²

¹ Page 114.

² Page 16.

Here you see all the absurdities just mentioned, are ♦expressly contained in this argument, God is all humour and caprice, if his revelation is not strictly, in every respect, the same with human reason. That is, he is without wisdom, without reason, if his wisdom and reason exceed ours. He has no reason, nor wisdom, if his reason and wisdom are infinite.

Secondly, This argument, if it were allowed, leads directly to atheism. For if a revelation cannot be divine, if it contains any thing mysterious, whose fitness and necessity cannot be explained by human reason, then neither creation nor providence can be proved to be divine, for they are both of them more mysterious than the Christian revelation.

And if every thing is arbitrary, whose fitness and experience human reason cannot prove and explain, then surely an invisible over-ruling providence that orders all things in a manner, and for reasons, known only to itself; that subjects human life, and human affairs, to what changes it pleases; that confounds the best-laid designs, and makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence; that gives not the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous; surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.

And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly to atheism, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in a secret and invisible manner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.

* There is nothing therefore half so mysterious in the Christian revelation, as there is in that invisible providence, which all must hold that believe a God. And tho’ there is enough plain in providence, to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often been a rock of atheism to those, who make their own reason the measure of wisdom.

Again, Tho’ the creation plainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and goodness of God; yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose fitness, expedience, and reasonableness, human reason cannot comprehend, than are to be found in scripture.

If therefore he reasons right, who says, “If there may be some things in a true religion, whose fitness and expedience we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s laws all of a piece? And if the having of these things is no proof of its falshood, how can any things fit and expedient (which no religion is without) be a proof of the truth of any one religion?”¹ If, I say, this is the right reasoning, then it may be said, “If there are things in the creation whose fitness we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s works of a piece? And if the being of such things as these in the creation, is not a proof of its not being divine, how can the fitness and expedience of any creation prove that it is the work of God?”

¹ First address to the inhabitants of London, Page 57.

Thus does this argument tend wholly to atheism, and concludes with the same force against creation and providence, as it does against revelation.

Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation, whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God’s providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.

The credibility of an external divine revelation with regard to human reason, rests wholly upon such external evidence, as is a sufficient proof of the divine interposition. If there be no such external evidence possible; if God has no ways of acting so peculiar to himself, as to be a sufficient proof to human reason of his action; then no revelation can be sufficiently proved to be a divine, external revelation from God.

I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this kind of proof.

1. It is objected, That miracles cannot prove a false, or bad doctrine, to be true and good; therefore miracles, as such, cannot prove the truth of any revelation.

But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good; yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things revealed, but because they are God’s testimony to the truth of that which he reveals.

But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.

“If, says he, evil beings can impress notions in mens minds as strongly as good beings, and cause miracles to be done in confirmation of them; is there any way to know to which of the two, notions thus impressed are owing, but from their internal marks of wisdom and goodness?”

This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that power which evil spirits may have; yet if we know enough of it to affirm, that the creation is not the work of evil spirits; if we can securely appeal to the creation, as a sufficient proof of God’s action and ♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as a sufficient proof of a divine revelation.

For, if the creation must be allowed to be the work of God, notwithstanding any unknown degree of power in evil spirits; if we can as certainly ascribe it to God, as if there were no such spirits; then miracles may be as full a proof of the interposition of God, as if there were no such spirits in being.

I do not ask, Whether the same divine perfection is necessary to foretel such things as are foretold in scripture, and work such miracles as are there related, as is necessary to create? I do not ask, Whether any power less than divine can do such things? I only ask, Whether there is any certainty, that the creation is the work of God? Whether we can be sure of the divine operation, from the existence of that creation? Or, Whether we are in doubt or uncertainty about it, because we do not know the degree of power, that may belong to evil spirits.

For if it can be affirmed, that the creation is the work of God, notwithstanding our uncertainty about the degree of power that may belong to evil spirits; then we have the same certainty, that the prophecies and miracles recorded in scripture, are to be ascribed to God, notwithstanding our uncertainty of the power of evil spirits.

For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God, is the same argument against the certainty of the creation’s being the work of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case than in the other.

For, if evil spirits have so the creation in their hands, that by reason of their power over it, no miracles can prove the operation of God, then the operation of God cannot be proved from the creation itself.

For the creation cannot be proved to be the operation of God, unless it can be proved that God still presides over it.

And if all that which is extraordinary and miraculous may be accounted for, without the interposition of God; then nothing that is ordinary and common according to the course of nature, can be a proof of the action of God. For there can be no reason assigned, why that which is ordinary shall be ascribed to God, if all that is, or has been, or can be miraculous, may be ascribed to evil spirits.

Either therefore it must be said, that there are, or may be miracles, which cannot be the effects of evil spirits; or else nothing that is ordinary and common can be a proof of the operation of God. For if nothing miraculous can be an undeniable proof of God’s action, nothing created can be a proof of it.

The matter therefore stands thus: There are, and may be miracles, that cannot be ascribed to evil spirits, without ascribing the creation to them; and which can no more be doubted to come from God, than we can doubt of his being the Creator of the world. There may be miracles therefore, which, are as full a proof of the truth of that which they attest, as the creation is of the fitness of that which is created.

And though the matter of a revelation is to be attended to, that we may fully understand it, and be rightly affected with it; yet the reason of our receiving it, must rest upon that external authority, which shews it to be of God.

And the authority of miracles, sufficiently plain and apparent, are of themselves a full reason for receiving a revelation, which both as to its matter and manner, would not be approved by us without them.

The history of magical wonders, and extraordinary things done by evil spirits, is no objection against the sufficiency of that proof, that arises from miracles. For the question is not, whether nothing that is extraordinary can be done by evil spirits, but whether nothing that is miraculous can, be a proof of its being done by God. For these two cases are very consistent. It may be very possible for evil spirits, to do things extraordinary in some circumstances, as ♦where people enter into contracts with them, and resign themselves up to their power, and yet that miracle may in other circumstances, be a sufficient proof of their being done by God.

And as miracles are the highest and most undeniable evidence of the truth and divinity of any external revelation; so Christianity stands fully distinguished from all other religions, by the highest and most undeniable evidences; since it has all the proof that the highest state of miracles can give, and every other religion is without any support from them.

And though this writer, with a boldness worthy of himself, often puts all traditional religion upon a level; yet he might have shewn himself as much a friend to truth as sobriety, by asserting, that all arguments are equally conclusive, all tempers equally virtuous, all designs equally honest, and all histories and fables equally supported by evidences of fact.

To give you one instance more of this writer’s extravagant and inconsistent notions.

He makes reason, or natural religion, to be God’s internal revelation, differing only from external revelation in the manner of its being communicated. He rejects external revelation as unworthy of God, because it has not been sufficiently made known at all times, and in all places; yet he sets up an internal revelation, as worthy of God, which has never been made known to any one man of any time or place in the world. For what one man ever knew that reason was God’s internal revelation, to which nothing could be added by any external revelation?

It is a mighty complaint with our author against Christianity, that so much happiness should be deferred till the time of Tiberius, and that it should be communicated to no greater a part of the world, than Christianity hath been. But is not this a judicious complaint in the mouth of a person, that is setting up a religion, that has been communicated to no body but himself.

I know nothing that can be said for our author, in excuse of so much confusion and self-contradiction, unless it be the particular hardships of his sect. The free-thinking few, he says, are forced into an outward compliance; and that which forces a man into a state of hypocrisy, may force him into a great deal of confusion and self-contradiction.

To return: I have from a consideration of the state of man, and the several relations which God stands in towards his creatures, shewn that it is utterly impossible for human reason to be a competent judge of the fitness, or unfitness, of all that God may, or may not require of us. The two following chapters shall state the nature and perfection of reason, as it is a faculty, or principle of action in human nature.