Chapter II

Shewing from the relation between God and man, that human reason cannot be a competent judge of the fitness and reasonableness of God’s proceedings with mankind, either as to the time, or matter, or manner of an external revelation.

AS our author has laid it down for an undeniable rule of God’s actions, that he must, if he be a wise and good being, act according to the relation he stands in towards his creatures; I proceed upon this principle to prove the incapacity of human reason, to judge truly of God’s proceedings in regard to divine revelation.

For if the fitness of actions results from the nature and relations of beings, then the fitness of God’s actions, as he is an omniscient Creator and Governor, to whom every thing is eternally foreknown, over beings endued with our freedom of will, must be to us incomprehensible.

* We are not so much as capable of comprehending by our reason, the possibility of this relation, or how the fore-knowledge of God can consist with the free agency of creatures. We know that God fore-knows all things, with the same certainty as we know there is a God. And if self-consciousness is an infallible proof of our own existence, it proves with the same certainty the freedom of our will. And hence it is, that we have a full assurance of the consistency of God’s fore-knowledge with freedom of will.

* Now this incomprehensible relation between an eternally fore-knowing Creator and Governor, and his free creatures, is the relation from whence arises the fitness of God’s providence over us. But if the relation itself is incomprehensible, then those actions that have their fitness from it, must surely be incomprehensible. Nothing can be fit for God to do, either in creation or providence, but what has its fitness founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would follow, from every kind of creation, and every manner of providence: but if nothing can be fit, but because it is according to this fore-knowledge of every thing that would follow from every kind of creation, and every manner of providence; then we have the utmost certainty, that the fitness of God’s actions as a fore-knowing Creator, and Governor of free agents, must be founded upon reasons that we cannot possibly know any thing of.

* And a child that has but just learned to speak, is as well qualified to state the fitness of the laws of matter and motion by which the whole vegetable world is preserved, as the wisest of men is qualified to comprehend, or state the fitness of the methods, which a fore-knowing Providence observes over free agents. For every reason on which the fitness of such a providence is founded, is not only unknown to us, but by a necessity of nature impossible to be known by us.

For if the fitness of God’s acting in this, or that manner, is founded in his fore-knowledge of every thing that would happen, from every possible way of acting, then it is impossible for us to know the reasons, on which the fitness of his actions is founded, as it is impossible for us to be omniscient.

Who can tell what different kinds of rational creatures, distinguished by variety of natures, and faculties, it is fit and reasonable for God to create, because he eternally foresaw what would be the effect of such different creations? Who can explain the fitness of that vast variety there is amongst rational creatures of the same species, or shew that all their different faculties ought to be as they are? And yet the fitness of this providence has its certain reason in the divine fore-knowledge, and it could not be fit, but because of it.

Who can tell what degree of reason rational creatures ought to enjoy, or what degrees of new and revealed knowledge it is fit and reasonable for God to give, or not give them, because they seem, or seem not to themselves to want it, are disposed, or not disposed to receive it? For as mankind cannot tell why it was fit and reasonable for God to create them of such a kind, and degree, as they are of; so neither can they tell how God ought, or ought not to add to their natural knowledge, and make them as differently accountable for the use of revealed rules of life, as for the use of their natural faculties.

And as the reason why God created them of such a kind, and with such faculties, was because of his own fore-knowledge of the effects of such a creation; so if ever he does reveal to them any supernatural knowledge, both the doing it, the time, the matter, and manner of it, must have their fitness in his own eternal fore-knowledge of the effects of such a revelation.

The reasons therefore on which the fitness of this or that revelation depends, why or when, of what matter, in what manner, and to whom it is to be made, must, from the nature and reason of things, be as unsearchable by us, as the reasons of this or that creation of rational beings, at such a time, of such a kind, in such a manner, in such a state.

This may help us to an easy solution of the unreasonable questions, which this writer puts in this manner.

“If the design of God in communicating any thing of himself to men was their happiness, would not that design have obliged him, who at all times alike desires their happiness, to have at all times alike communicated it to them? If God always acts for the good of his creatures, what reason can be assigned, why he should not from the beginning have discovered such things as make for their good, but defer the doing it till the time of Tiberius; since the sooner this was done, the greater would his goodness appear?”¹

¹ Page 393.

And again “How is it consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, when all had equal need of it? Was it not as easy for him to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in one?”¹

¹ Page 196.

Now all this is fully answered, by our author’s own great and fundamental principle.

“For if the relations between things and persons, and the things resulting from thence, be the sole rule of God’s actions,”¹ as he expressly affirms; then the sole rule or reason of God’s revealing any thing to any men, at any time, must have its fitness resulting from the divine fore-knowledge of the effects of such a revelation, at such a time, and to such persons. If God does not act thus, he does not act according to the relation betwixt a fore-knowing Creator, and his free creatures. But if he does act according to a fitness resulting from this relation, and makes, or does not make revelations, according to his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times and persons for them; then to ask how a God, always equally good, can make a revelation at any time, and not make the same at all times, is as absurd as to ask, how a God, always equally good, can reveal that at one time, because it is a proper time for it, and not reveal it at every other time, tho’ improper for it.

¹ Page 28.

* God’s goodness, directed by his own fore-knowledge of the fitness of times, and of the state and actions of free agents, deferred a certain revelation to the time of Tiberius, because he fore-saw it would then be an act of the greatest goodness, and have its best effects upon the world: to ask therefore, what reason can be assigned, why so good a revelation was not sooner, or even from the beginning made to the world, is asking, why God should act, according to his own fore-knowledge of the state and actions of free agents, and order all things, according to a fitness resulting from such a fore-knowledge?

These questions suppose, that if God shewed his goodness to mankind by a revelation at such time, he must be wanting in goodness before that time, because he did not make it sooner; whereas if his deferring it till such a time, was owing to his fore-knowledge of the actions and state of free agents, and because it would then have its best effects, then God is proved to be equally good before he made it, for this very reason, because he did not make it before its proper time: and he had been wanting in goodness, if he had not deferred it till that time.

Now this appealing to God’s fore-knowledge of the state and actions of free agents, as the cause of all that is particular in the time and manner of any revelation, and deducing its fitness from thence, cannot be said to be begging the question, but is resolving it directly according to the rule, which this writer lays down for God to act by: that “the relations between things and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, must be the sole rule of God’s actions.”

But if this is the sole rule, then God in giving any revelation, must act as the relation betwixt a fore-knowing Creator and his free creatures requires; and his actions must have their fitness resulting from his fore-knowledge of the state and actions of free agents. And if this is God’s sole rule, then to ask why this or that revelation only at such a time, is to ask why God only does that which is fit for him to do? And to ask, why not the same revelation at any other time, is asking why God does not do that, which it is not fit for him to do?

This writer asks, “How it is consistent with the notion of God’s being universally benevolent, not to have revealed it to all his children, who had equal need of it?” But if they had equal need of it, yet if they were not equally fit for it, but prepared only to have their guilt increased by it, and so be exposed to a greater damnation; then God’s goodness to them is manifest, by withholding such information from them, and reserving it for those that would be made happier by it.

Judas, Pontius Pilate, and the Jews that called for our Saviour’s crucifixion, had equal need of a Saviour with those that believed in him. Chorazin and Bethsaida wanted the light of the gospel as much as those that received it. And if the rest of the world had been, at that time, as much indisposed for the light of the gospel, as they were, God’s goodness had been, greater to that age, if he had reserved the light of the gospel till a better age had succeeded.

So that this argument, founded on the equal need of all, or former ages, has no force, unless it could be shewn, that the same revelation made to any of these former ages, would have produced all those good effects, which God foresaw would follow, from its being reserved for such a particular time and state of things and persons.

He asks again, “Was it not as easy for God to have communicated it to all nations, as to any one nation or person? Or in all languages, as in any one?” This argument is built upon this supposition, that God does things because they are easy, or forbears things because they are difficult to be performed. For it can be no argument, that God ought to have revealed such things to all nations or persons, because it was as easy to him, as to do it to any one nation or person; unless it be supposed, that the easiness of a thing is a reason why God does it, and the difficulty of a thing a reason why he does not do it. But if this supposition be very absurd, then the argument founded upon it must be liable to the same charge.

But if God does things, not because they are easy, but because they are infinitely good and fit to be done, then the reason why God has afforded different revelations, to different ages and persons, is this, that his manner of revealing every thing, might be worthy of his own fore-knowledge of the effects of it, and that every thing that is particular in the time or manner of any revelation, might have its fitness resulting from the relation betwixt a good God and his creatures, whose changing state, different conduct, tempers and actions, are all eternally fore-known by him.

Again, it is objected, that a divine revelation must either be the effect of justice, or else of mercy and free goodness; but in either of these cases it ought to be universal; for justice must be done to all. But if it is the effect of mercy and free goodness, this writer asks, “How a being can be denominated merciful and good, who is so only to a few, but cruel and unmerciful to the rest?”¹

¹ Page 401.

It is answered, That there is neither justice in God without mercy, nor mercy without justice; and to ascribe a revelation to either of them separately, in contradistinction to the other, has no more reason in it, than to ascribe the creation separately either to the wisdom or power of God, in contradistinction to the other.

Secondly, A divine revelation is not owing barely to the justice or free goodness of God, but to the goodness, mercy, and justice of God, governed and directed by his eternal fore-knowledge of all the effects of every revelation, at any, or all times.

* God ordains a revelation in this, or that manner, time, and place; not because it is a justice that he cannot refuse, not because it is a matter of favour or free goodness, and therefore may be given in any manner at pleasure; but because he has the whole duration of human things, the whole race of mankind, the whole order of human changes and events, the whole combination of all causes and effects of human tempers, all the actions of free agents, and all the consequences of every revelation, plainly in his sight; and according to this eternal fore-knowledge, every revelation receives every thing that is particular in it, either as to time, matter, manner, or place.

* All complaints therefore about that which is particular, or seemingly partial in the time and manner of any revelation, are very unjustifiable; and shew, that we are discontent at God’s proceedings, because he acts like himself, does what is best and fittest to be done, and governs the world, not according to our weak imaginations, but according to his own infinite perfections.

* We will not allow a providence to be right, unless we can comprehend the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as much above our comprehension, as our wisdom is below that which is infinite.

For if the relations of things, and persons, and the fitness resulting from thence, be the rule of God’s actions; then all the revelations that come from God, must have their fitness resulting from the relation his fore-knowledge bears to the various states, conditions, tempers, and actions of free agents, and the various effects of every manner of revelation.

But if God cannot act worthy of himself in any revelation, unless he acts according to a fitness resulting from this relation; then he must act by a rule that lies out of our sight, and his providence in this particular must be incomprehensible to us; for this very reason, because it has that very fitness, wisdom and goodness in it, that it ought to have.