Volume 1 — SERMON IV. THE GENERAL ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY. John xiii. 19.

Now I tell you before it come, that when it is come to pass, ye may believe, that I am He.

It hath been concluded (not on the slight grounds of hypothesis, but on the express authority of scripture,) that prophecy was given to attest the mission of Jesus: to afford a reasonable evidence, that the scheme of redemption, of which he was the great instrument and minister, was, in truth, of divine appointment; and was carried on under the immediate cognizance and direction of the Supreme Being, whose prerogative it is to see through all time, and to call those things, which be not, as though they were39.

Our next inquiry will be, how the prophetic scriptures serve to that end, and what that evidence is (I mean, taking for granted, not the truth of the prophetic scheme itself, but the truth of the representation, given of it in scripture) which is thus administered to us by the light of prophecy.

I. The text refers to a particular prophecy of our Lord, concerning the treachery of Judas; of which, says he to his disciples, I now tell you before it come, that, when it is come to pass, ye may believe that I am He: that is, “I add this, to the other predictions concerning myself; that, when ye see it fulfilled, as it soon will be, ye may be the more convinced of my being the person, I assume to be, the Messias foretold.”

The information, here given, was perhaps intended by our Lord to serve a particular purpose, To prevent, we will say, the offence, which the disciples might have taken at the circumstance of his being betrayed by one of them, if they had not, previously, been admonished of it. But the reason of the thing shews, that the use, which the disciples are directed to make of this prophecy, was the general use of the prophecies concerning Jesus. The completion was to verify the prediction, in all cases; and to convince the world, That He was the Messiah, in whom such things should be seen to be accomplished, as had been expressly foretold40.

Indeed prophecies, unaccomplished, may have their use; that is, they may serve to raise a general expectation of a predicted event in the minds of those, who, for other reasons, regard the person predicting it, in the light of a true prophet. And such might be one, a subordinate, use of the prophecies concerning Jesus: but they could not be applied to the proof of his pretensions, till they were seen to be fulfilled. Nor can they be so applied even then, unless the things predicted be, confessedly, beyond the reach of human foresight.

Under these conditions, the argument is clear and easy, and will lie thus.—“A great variety of distant, or, at least, future events, inscrutable to human sagacity, and respecting one person (whom we will call, Messiah) have been by different men, and at different times, predicted. These events have accordingly come to pass, in the history and fortunes of one person; in such sort, that each is seen to be, in a proper sense, fulfilled in him, and all together in no other person whatsoever: Therefore the prediction of these events was divinely inspired: or (which comes to the same thing) therefore the person, claiming under these predictions to be the Messiah, or person foretold, hath his claims confirmed and justified by the highest authority, that of God himself.”

Such is the argument from prophecy41: and on this foundation, Jesus assumes to be the Messiah; and his religion, to be DIVINE.

II. Let us now see, what the amount of that evidence is, which results from this kind of proof.

Careless talkers may say, and sometimes think, “that prophecy is but an art of conjecturing shrewdly; that the sagacity of one man is seen to be vastly superior to that of another; that, in some men, the natural faculty may be so improved by experience, as to look like divination; and that no precise bounds can be set to its powers.” Light or sceptical minds may, I say, amuse themselves with such fancies: but serious men will readily acknowledge, That many future events, especially, if remote, or extraordinary42, or described with some degree of particularity, are not within the ability of the human mind to predict. And, to cut off all occasion of cavil, let it be owned, that the argument under consideration is, or ought to be, drawn from the completion of prophecies, so qualified.

To evade the force, which this argument apparently carries with it, it must then be said, That the completion of any particular prophecy, alleged, was fortuitous, or, what we call, a lucky hit.

“Coincidencies of this sort, we may be told, are very frequent. In the ceaseless revolution of human affairs, some event or other will be turning up, which may give a countenance to the wildest and most hazardous conjecture. Hence it is, that every groundless fear, every dream, almost, has the appearance of being realized by some corresponding accident; which will not be long in occurring to those, who are upon the watch to make such discoveries. Upon these grounds, the superstition of omens hath, at all times, been able to sustain itself; and to acquire a degree of credit, even with wise men. We see, then, that chance, in a good degree, supplies the place of inspiration: and that He, who sets up for a Prophet, is likely to drive a safe, as well as gainful trade; especially, if he have but the discretion not to deal too freely in precise descriptions of times, and persons43: a consideration, of great moment to the men of this craft44; and which hath not been overlooked by those, whom we account true prophets.”

Such libertine reflections, as these, thrown out with an air of negligent ridicule, have too often the effect intended by them. At the same time, they disgust sober men, and are thought too light and trivial to deserve a confutation. But, because I take these suggestions, with whatever levity, or disingenuity, they may be made, to contain the whole, or at least, the chief strength of the infidel cause, on this subject, I shall not decline to give them a very serious answer.

It is true, no doubt, what is here alledged, That the conjectures of fanciful or designing men, whether grounded on casual signs, or delivered in the direct way of prophecy, have been frequently verified in the events: that is, such events have actually come to pass, in the sense put upon the sign, when it was observed, and in the literal sense of the prophecy, as delivered. History and common life, it is agreed, abound in such instances45: and I shall even make no scruple to produce one of each sort; as much, at least, to the purpose of these objectors, as any of those, which they have produced for themselves.

Nothing is more famous in the annals of ancient Rome, than the story of Romulus, and his TWELVE VULTURES; an omen this, on which the auspicious name of the rising city, and the fortune of its founder, were, at once, established46. What further construction was then put on this prodigy, doth not appear: but, as the science of augury advanced in succeeding times, a very momentous and striking prophecy was grounded upon it. For we have it affirmed47, on the high authority of M. T. Varro, that Vettius Valens, an augur of distinguished name in those days, took occasion from this circumstance (and in the hearing of Varro himself) to fix the duration of the Roman empire. The TWELVE VULTURES, he said, which appeared to Romulus, portended, that the sovereignty of that state and city, whose foundations he was then laying, should continue for the space of TWELVE HUNDRED YEARS. It is of no moment to inquire, on what principles of his art the learned augur proceeded, in this calculation. The TRUTH is, that the event corresponded, in a surprising manner, to the conjecture; and that the majesty of the Western empire (of which Rome was the capital) did, indeed, expire under the merciless hands of the Goths, about the time limited by this augural prophet.

It should further, be observed that this prediction was of such credit and notoriety, as to take the attention of the later Romans themselves48, who looked with anxiety for the accomplishment of it: and that it was delivered by Valens, at least five hundred years before the event; when there was not the least appearance, that this catastrophe would befall, what was called, the ETERNAL CITY, within that period.

This is an instance of divination from augury. The OTHER, I am about to give, is a prophecy, in full form; respecting a still more important subject, and equally accomplished in the event. A poet, in the ideas of paganism, was a prophet, too. And Seneca49 hath left us, in proof of the inspiration to which, in his double capacity, he might pretend, the following oracle:

This prediction was made in the reign of Nero; and, for more than fourteen hundred years, might only pass for one of those sallies of imagination, in which poetry so much delights. But, when, at length, in the close of the fifteenth century, the discoveries of Columbus had realized this vision: when that enterprizing navigator had forced the barriers of the vast Atlantic ocean; had loosened, what the poet calls, the chain of things; and in these later ages50, as was expressly signified, had set at liberty an immense continent, shut up before in surrounding seas from the commerce and acquaintance of our world; when this event, I say, so important and so unexpected, came to pass, it might almost surprize one into the belief, that the prediction was something more than a poetical fancy; and that Heaven had, indeed, revealed to one favoured Spaniard, what it had decreed, in due time, to accomplish under the auspices of another51.

These two instances of casual conjecture, converted by time and accident into prophecies, I shall take for granted, are as remarkable, as any other that can be alledged. Cicero, in his first book of Divination, where he laboured to assert the reality of such a power in the pagan world, was able to produce nothing equal, or comparable to them. We have the fullest evidence, that these two predictions were delivered by the persons, to whom they are ascribed; and in the time, in which they are said to have been delivered, that is, many hundred years before the event. They, both of them, respect events of the greatest dignity and importance: one of them, the downfal of the mightiest empire, that hath hitherto subsisted on the face of the earth; and the other, the discovery of a new world. Both, express the time, when these extraordinary events were to happen: the latter, by a general description, indeed, yet not more general, than is frequent in the scriptural prophets; but the former, in the most precise and limited terms. In a word, both these predictions are authentic, important, circumstantial: they foretell events, which no human sagacity could have foreseen; and they have been strictly and properly fulfilled.

Now, if such coincidencies, as these, do not infer divine inspiration; if, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, it must still be allowed (as it will, on all sides) that they were simply fortuitous, or what we call the effects of hazard and pure chance, by what characters shall we distinguish genuine, from pretended, prophecies; or in what way shall it be discovered, that the scriptural prophets spake by the spirit of God, when these pagan diviners could thus prophecy, by their own spirit?

To this objection, put with all the force which I am able to give to it, I reply directly, That the distinction, so importunately demanded, may very easily and clearly be assigned.

If one or two such prophecies, only, had occurred in our scriptures; if even several such had occurred in the whole extent of those writings, and in the large compass of time they take up, without descending to a greater detail than is expressed in these pagan oracles; nay, if a greater number still of supposed predictions, thus generally delivered in the sacred writings, had been applicable only to single independent events, dispersed indifferently through the several ages of the world: In all these cases, I should freely admit, that the argument from prophecy was very precarious and unsatisfactory: I could even suppose, with the deriders of this argument, that so many, and such prophecies, so directed, might not improbably be accounted for, from some odd conjuncture of circumstances; and that the accomplishment of them did by no means infer a certainty of inspiration.

But, if now, on the other hand, it be indisputable, That a vast variety of predictions are to be found in the scriptures of the Old and New Testament; That a great part of these predictions are delivered with the utmost degree of minuteness and particularity; and, lastly, That all of them, whether general or particular, respect one common subject, and profess to have, or to expect, their completion in one connected scheme of things, and, upon the matter, in one single person: On this latter supposition, I must still think, that there is great reason to admit the divine inspiration of such prophecies, when seen to be fulfilled.

To convert this supposition into a proof, is not within the scope and purpose of this Lecture. The work hath been undertaken and discharged by many others: or, it may be sufficient, in so clear a point, to refer you directly to the Scriptures themselves; which no man can read without seeing, that the prophecies, contained in them, are extremely numerous—that many of these prophecies are minutely circumstantial—and that one person, whoever he be, is the principal object of them all. My concern, at present, is only to shew, that, if the supposition itself be well founded, the inference, just now mentioned, is rightly made.

1. First, then, if the prophecies in the Old and New Testament be very numerous, and if those prophecies, so many of them, I mean, as are alledged in this controversy with unbelievers, have had a reasonable completion (and I have a right to make this last supposition, when the question is concerning the account to be given of such a fact): If, I say, we argue from these two assumptions, it must appear highly credible and probable, that so numerous prophecies, so fulfilled, had not their origin from human conjecture, nor their accomplishment from what we call, Chance. For mere conjecture is not usually so happy; nor chance, so constant52. Further still; if the scriptural prophecies have been completed in numerous instances, and if in no instance whatsoever can it be clearly shewn that they have failed in the event, the presumption is still stronger, that such coincidence could not be fortuitous; and a material difference between scriptural prophecy, and pagan divination is, at the same time, pointed out. For, that, in the multitude of pretended oracles in the days of paganism, some few only should come to pass, while the generality of them fell to the ground, may well be the sport of fortune53. But, that very many prophecies, recorded in our scriptures, have had an evident completion, when not one of all those, there recorded, can be convicted of imposture, must surely be the work of design.

The argument cannot be denied to have real weight, though the expression of all the prophecies were allowed to be general. But this is, by no means, the case. It is further assumed, and is evident to all that have read the Scriptures, that a great number of them are delivered with the utmost degree of minuteness and particularity. And, from this assumption, I infer,

2. Secondly, that the accomplishment of prophecies, so circumstantially defined, can still less be imputed to mere chance.

Without doubt, if all the prophecies concerning the Messiah had been penned in the style of the first—that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent’s head—though even then there might be reason for applying them, exclusively, to the person of Christ, yet, the evidence, that they were intended to be so applied, would have been much obscured by the mode of expression; the wide cover of which might seem to afford room for other applications. But when, to this general prophecy, the theme of all succeeding ones, it is further added, That this seed of the woman, should be the seed of Abraham; of the tribe of Juda; of the family of David; that he should be born at Bethlehem; that he should appear in the world at a time, limited by certain events, and even precisely determined to a certain period:—when, after a particular description of his life and office, it is said of him, that he should be betrayed by an intimate friend; and sold for a price, exactly specified; that he should suffer a particular kind of death; should have his hands and feet pierced; should have vinegar given him to drink; and should be buried in the sepulchre of a rich man—with innumerable other particularities of the like nature54—When all this, I say, is considered; the improbability, that these specific characters should meet in the same person by chance, is so great, that a reasonable man will scarce venture on so hazardous a position.

3. Still this is not all. Were we at liberty to apply even numerous, and circumstantial prophecies, to any person, indifferently, whom they might suit, and to any events indiscriminately, to which they might correspond, sought out at large in the history of mankind, the force of the argument for design in such prophecies, might in good measure be eluded. But, when we reflect on what, in part, hath appeared under the last article, that all the scriptural predictions profess to respect one certain scheme of things; run in the line of one people; and point ultimately at one person, whose country, and family, and age, and birth-place are exactly defined; the application of them is so limited and restrained, that, if they suit at all, there is scarce a possibility of excluding actual foresight, and intention.

Let me, further, observe, that, as, upon this idea of a confined, connected, and dependent scheme, in the prophecies, the detection of imposture, if there be any, is much facilitated; so, on the other hand, if the prophecies can be fairly applied in this way, not only the presumption, that they were given to be so applied, is much increased, but a clearer insight into the scope and meaning of them, is obtained. For, in a system of prophecy, directed to one and the same general end, preceding prophecies prepare the way for interpreting those that follow, and every succeeding prophecy reflects some light on those that went before. Thus, the general evidence, arising from this species of argument, is, in all ways, augmented; while we see, that less room is left to chance in verifying the more clear and direct prophecies, and that fresh light is let in upon such as are more ambiguous or obscure.

It is said, that many passages in the prophets are applied to Jesus, on very slight grounds. This would be true, if the prophetic scriptures, like the pagan oracles, had no determinate scheme in view, and had, for their object, only detached and unconnected events. But, on this scriptural principle, that one common purpose is in the contemplation of that divine spirit, which dictated all those writings, That is expressed, which is barely intimated; and every applicable prophecy is rightly applied: whence it is, that even secondary prophecies have, in the system of revelation, all the light and force of the primary; as, in a former discourse, hath been observed.

This assertion, I know, may startle such persons, as have not attended to the genius of the prophetic writings, or to that general harmony of design and destination, which makes their distinctive character: but it may be rendered familiar to us by reflecting on the manner, in which we interpret other writings, somewhat similar to these.

It is generally supposed, and on good grounds, that Virgil wrote his Æneid with the view of doing honour to the person and government of Augustus. But, the subject of his work being taken from a former age, this was either to be done, by introducing his encomiums under the form of prophecies, or by conveying them indirectly in allusive descriptions and, what we call, secondary applications. The poet hath employed both these methods, with success. The purpose of his predictions is clear; for in them the emperor is expressly named: and the ablest critics make no scruple of applying to Augustus all those passages in this poem, which, however they may respect, immediately, other persons, are yet clearly seen to be applicable to Him.

We have another instance of the same sort, at home. Our Spenser wrote his famous poem, to illustrate the virtues and reign of Queen Elizabeth. This we know from himself. Though his scene, therefore, be laid in Faery Land, yet, whenever we find his fictions agreeing to the history of that princess, or the characters of his knights expressive of those virtues, which distinguished the great persons of her court, we make no doubt of applying them in that way, or of the poet’s intending that they should be so applied. These applications would not be equally justifiable in other works of fancy, written in that time; but the knowledge, we have of the author’s general purpose in writing, makes them reasonable in this.

It may appear from these examples55, that, whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, whose real or assumed character gives him a right to deal in secondary senses and prophetic anticipations, that scheme becomes the true key, in the hands of his reader, for unlocking the meaning of particular parts; of many parts, which would otherwise not be seen clearly and distinctly to refer to such scheme. The observation applies to the inspired writers, in all its force. We understand, that they had one common and predominant scheme in view, which was to bear testimony to Jesus. Their writings are, then, to be interpreted in conformity to that scheme. Not only the more direct prophecies require this interpretation; but, if we will judge in this, as we do in other similar instances, whatever passages occur in those writings, which bear an apt and easy resemblance to the history of Jesus, may, or rather must, in all reasonable construction, be applied to him.

Whence we see (to mention it by the way) that, if no prophecy in the Old Testament had applied to Christ directly in its primary sense, Christianity might, yet, support itself on the evidence of prophecy. For the evidence, arising from a secondary sense of prophecies, is real evidence; and was certainly admitted, as such, by that great man56, whose mistakes on this subject have afforded the occasion of so much vain triumph to infidelity.

Fancy, no doubt, may grow wanton in this sort of applications. It may find, in the prophet or poet, what was never designed by either: but, in the circumstances supposed, the severest reader will not deny, that much was probably designed by both. It is impossible to lay down general rules, that shall prevent all abuse in the interpretation of such writings. But good sense will easily see, in particular cases, where this liberty of interpreting is, in fact, abused.

It is obvious to remark, that this use of prophecy doth not commence, till the corresponding facts can be produced; that is, till the prophecies are seen to be fulfilled. But this circumstance is no discredit to the prophetic system; which pretends not to give immediate conviction, but to lay in, beforehand, the means of conviction to such as shall be in a condition to compare, in due time, the prediction with the event. Till then, prophecy serves only to raise a general expectation of the event predicted; that is, it serves to make men attentive and inquisitive, and to prepare them for that full conviction, which it finally hath in view. And this service, the prophecies of the Old Testament actually did the Jews, who were led by them to expect the Messiah, when he, in fact, appeared among them. And, had they pursued this reasonable method of interpreting the prophecies, not by their prejudices, but by corresponding events, they must have been further led to acknowledge his mission, as being evidently attested by predictions, so fulfilled. But their capital mistake lay in supposing, that their prophecies were sufficiently clear, without the help of any comment from succeeding events; and thus, what they could not see beforehand, they would not acknowledge, when these events came to pass.

It follows from what hath been said, that the obscurity of the Jewish prophecies concludes nothing against the use of those writings, or against the application of them, which Christians now make. Their declared use is posterior to the facts they adumbrate; whence the intervening obscurity of those writings is no just ground of complaint: and the application of them to Jesus, now that history hath taught us to understand them better, is made on principles to which no sober man can object.

On the whole, the general evidence for the truth of Christianity, as resulting from the scriptural prophecies, though possibly not that which some may wish or expect, is yet apparently very considerable. Some coincidencies might fall out, by accident; and more, might be imagined. But when so many, and such prophecies are brought together, and compared with their corresponding events, it becomes ridiculous (because the effect is, in no degree, proportioned to the cause) to say of such coincidencies, that they are the creatures of fancy or could have been the work of chance.

The text supplies the only just account of such a phænomenon: and the spirit of God, methinks, calls aloud to us, in the language of his Son—These things have I told you before they come, that when they come to pass, ye may believe, that I am He.