Note 41 — SERMON IV. THE GENERAL ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY. John xiii. 19.

Yet hear in how decisive a tone a certain writer, of no small account with the infidel party, reprobates this argument:—“Je dis de plus, qu’aucune prophétie ne sauroit faire autorité pour moi.” [Rousseau, Œuvres, T. III. p. 156. La Haye, 1762.] “I say,” says Mr. Rousseau, “that the argument from prophecy can have no weight with me.” If you ask his reason, it follows. “Because, to give it any authority, three conditions are required, the concurrence of which is impossible. First, I must have been, myself, a witness of the prophecy, when delivered. Secondly, I must have been, myself; a witness of the event: And lastly, I must have it demonstrated to me that the agreement between the prophecy and the event could not have been fortuitous. For though the prophecy were clearer, and more precise, than a geometrical axiom, yet as the clearness of a prediction, made at hazard, does not render the accomplishment of it impossible, this accomplishment, allowing it to take place, proves nothing, strictly speaking, in favour of the person who foretold it.”

First, he says, He must himself have been a witness of the prophecy. But why so? Is there no way of being reasonably assured that a prophecy has been delivered, unless one has been actually present at the delivery of it? Does any one doubt, whether Socrates told his friend that he should die within three days’ time, because he did not hear these words from the mouth of the philosopher? But, there is less reason still to doubt whether Jesus uttered the prophecies, ascribed to him in the Gospel.

Next, He must have been, himself, a witness of the event. With just as good reason, as of the prophecy. However, it so happens that we are, or may be, if we please, witnesses of the events, foretold in many prophecies. What does he think of the dispersion of the Jews, for instance? Is he not a witness of this event?

But lastly, He must have it demonstrated to him that the agreement between the prophecy and the event could not have been fortuitous. What, will nothing less than demonstration satisfy him? Will not a high degree of probability serve him to form a conclusion upon, nay, and to regulate his conduct? And will he stand out against the strongest degree of evidence, short of mathematical, or a proof à la rigueur, as he terms it, in a subject, where, from the nature of it, mathematical certainty is not to be had?

Surely one needs be no great philosopher to see that all which is wanting to give authority to the argument from prophecy, is, That we have reason to admit the delivery of a prediction—that we have reason to admit the completion of it—and that we have reason to think the agreement between the prediction and the event not fortuitous. And where is the impossibility that these three reasons should concur?—It is plain that the only one of these three reasons that appears in any degree problematical is the last concerning the completion of a prophecy in its event, whether it be fortuitous or not. Have I not reason then to say, as I do below p. 81, 82, that the strength of the infidel cause lies in this last consideration?—But what that strength is, we shall see as we go along.