ORDER.

Because polemic and eristic discourses must follow the adversaries at the heels whithersoever they go, finding them out in all the lurking-places of their elaborate subterfuges, and conflicting with them wheresoever they pitch, until not only all their blows be awarded, but themselves also all derouted, therefore, perceiving the informality of the Formalists to be such that sometimes they plead for the controverted ceremonies as necessary, sometimes as expedient, sometimes as lawful, and sometimes as indifferent, I resolve to follow the trace, and to evince, by force of reason, that there is none of all those respects to justify either the urging or the using of them. And albeit the Archbishop of Spalato (Pref. Libror. de Rep. Eccl.) cometh forth like an Olympic champion, stoutly brandishing and bravading, and making his account that no antagonist can match him except a prelate, albeit likewise the Bishop of Edinburgh (Proc. in Perth, Assembly, part iii. p. 55) would have us to think that we are not well advised to enter into combat with such Achillean strength as they have on their side, yet must our opposites know, that we have more daring minds than to be dashed with the vain flourish of their great words. Wherefore, in all these four ways wherein I am to draw the line of my dispute, I will not shun to encounter and handle strokes with the most valiant champions of that faction, knowing that—Trophoeum ferre me à forti viro, pulchrum est: sin autem et vincar, vinci à tali nullum est probrum—But what? Shall I speak doubtfully of the victory, or fear the foil? Nay, I consider that there is none of them so strong as he was who said, “We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth,” 2 Cor. xxiii. 8. I will therefore boldly adventure to combat with them even where they seem to be strongest, and to discuss their best arguments, allegations, answers, assertions, and distinctions. And my dispute shall consist of four parts, according to those four pretences which are given out for the ceremonies, which, being so different one from another, must be severally examined. The lawfulness of a thing is in that it may be done; the indifferency of it in that it may either be done or left undone, the expediency of it in that it is done profitably; and the necessity of it in that it may not be left undone. I will begin with the last respect first, as that which is the weightiest.

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