Chapter VIII · (continued 3)

And further, the Apostle addeth, that now they should not only forgive and comfort him, ver. 7, but also confirm (κυρῶσαι) [pg 1-357] their love towards him, ver. 8. Now κύροω signifieth to confirm or ratify by authority; and so Chemnitius,1091 Bullinger,1092 and Cartwright,1093 expoundeth it in this place. It cometh from κῦρος, authority, whence cometh also κύριος, a lord, or one having authority. As, therefore, the presbytery, or company of pastors and elders, had, by their authority, established that he was to be excommunicate, and determined to proceed to the execution of extreme discipline against him, so now the Apostle would have them, by the same authority, to ratify and establish the remission of this punishment unto him, and to decree that the church should not deny her communion unto him. For this authority of binding and loosing, though it pertained to the whole church, in actu primo sive in esse, yet it pertained to the presbytery alone, in actu secundo sive in operara; and even as the act of speaking pertaineth to a man, as principium quod, but to the tongue alone, as principium quo; so albeit the power of the keys doth primarily and principally belong to the church, collectively taken, yet the actual execution of this power belongeth only to the presbytery which representeth the church, and unto which the church hath committed her authority to bind and loose. Wherefore, since the Apostle writeth to the whole church of Corinth to confirm, by their authority, their love to the penitent man; and since this authority, in the actual execution of it (which the Apostle craveth) did not agree to that whole church, collectively taken, we must needs understand his meaning to be, that their love towards that man, and their forgiving of him, should be ratified and confirmed by the authority of those church governors, qui ecclesiae nomen ad coetum repraesentant, totius nimirum presbyterii authoritate atque consensu.

Thus have we showed that the actual use of the keys, or the execution of the authority of binding and loosing, pertaineth to that ecclesiastical senate in every particular church, which the Apostle calleth a presbytery. For further illustration of the truth whereof, I add these four observations:—

1. We must distinguish1094 a twofold power [pg 1-358] of the keys: the one is executed in doctrine; the other in discipline: the one concionalis; the other judicialis. Touching the former, we grant it is proper for pastors alone, whose office and vocation it is, by the preaching and publishing of God's word, to shut the kingdom of heaven against impenitent and disobedient men, and to open it unto penitent sinners; to bind God's heavy wrath upon the former, and (by application of the promises of mercy) to loose the latter from the sentence and fear of condemnation. When we ascribe the power of binding and loosing to that whole consistory, wherein governing elders are joined together with pastors, we mean only of the keys of external discipline, which are used in ecclesiastical courts and judicatories.

2. When we teach that the pastor or pastors of every particular church and congregation, with the elders of the same, being met together, have power to bind and loose, we understand this only of such places wherein a competent number of understanding and qualified men may be had to make up an eldership; otherwise let there be one eldership made up of two or three of the next adjacent parishes, according as was ordained by the Church of Scotland, in the 7th chapter of the Second Book of Discipline. Sine totius &c.: “Without the consent of some whole church (saith Zanchius1095) no man ought to be excommunicate. Yea, I add, if it be a small church, and not consisting of many learned and skilful men, excommunication ought not to be done, except the neighbour churches be asked counsel of.” And, as touching the pastor's part, Calvin saith well, Nunquam, &c.:1096 “I never thought it expedient the liberty of excommunicating should be permitted to every pastor.” The fear of great inconveniences, which he thought likely to follow upon such a custom, if once it were permitted, makes him confess, in that epistle, that he durst not advise Liserus to excommunicate any man without taking counsel of other pastors. Now, I much marvel what butt Dr Forbesse1097 shot at when he entitleth one of his chapters De Potestate Excommunicandi, and then, in the body of the chapter, doth no more at all but only quote those two testimonies of Zanchius and Calvin; both of which do utterly condemn [pg 1-359] the usurpation of bishops who appropriate to themselves the power of excommunication, and ascribe this power to the consistory of pastors and elders in every particular church; and, in the forequoted places, do only (for preventing of abuses) set some bounds to the execution of their power; which bounds we also think good to be kept, viz., that if a church be so small that it hath not so many well-qualified men as may be sufficient to assist the pastor in the government thereof, then let one common eldership be made up out of it and some other neighbour churches: by which means it shall moreover come to pass (which is the other caution to be given), that not every pastor (no not with the elders of his congregation) shall be permitted to have full liberty of binding and loosing, but shall, in those matters, receive counsel and advice from other pastors. Howbeit, for this latter purpose, the church of Scotland hath profitably provided another remedy also, namely, that, in certain chief places, all the pastors in the adjacent bounds shall, at set and ordinary times, assemble themselves (which assemblies, in this nation, we call presbyteries), that so the churches may be governed communi presbyterorum consilio, as Jerome speaketh of the primitive times of the church.

3. Though the execution of the discipline of excommunication and absolution pertain to the consistory of the pastor and elders in every church, yet this discipline is to be by them executed in name of the whole church.1098 Saravia is bold to affirm,1099 that he who receiveth a sinner, or casteth him out of the church, doeth this in the name and authority of God alone. We have proven, by strong arguments, that the authority of excommunication pertaineth to the whole church; which, though he contradicteth, yet, in one place,1100 forgetting himself, he acknowledges that the authority of the church of Corinth was to intervene in the excommunication of the incestuous man. Wherefore, as in the name of God, so in the name and authority of the whole church, must one be cast out or received.

4. To the right execution of this discipline the manifest consent of the whole [pg 1-360] church is also necessary:1101 the truth whereof, beside that it appeareth from that which hath been said concerning the church's authority, it is further confirmed, if we consider either the importance of the thing, or the good of the person. Touching the importance of the thing, Gravissima, &c.: “Most weighty matters in the church,” saith Gerhard,1102 and the same saith Zanchius also,1103 “ought not to be undertaken without the consent of the whole ecclesiastical body;” and, as Pope Leo writeth, “Such things as pertain unto all ought to be done with the consent of all. But what can be more weighty, and what doth more pertain to the body of the church, than to cut off some member from the body?” And, touching the good of the person, Augustine showeth1104 that then only a sinner is both stricken with fear and healed with shame, when, seeing himself anathematised by the whole church, he cannot find a fellow multitude together wherewith he may rejoice in his sin and insult upon good men. And that otherwise, if the tares grow so rank that they cannot be pulled up, and if the same evil disease take hold of so very many that the consent of the church cannot be had to the excommunication of a wicked person, then good men must grieve and groan, and endure what they cannot help. Therefore that excommunication may fruitfully succeed, the consent of the people is necessary: Frustra enim ejicitur ex ecclesia, et consortio fidelium privatur, quem populus, abigere, et a quo abstinere recuset.1105 Howbeit, even in such cases, when the consent of the church cannot be had to the execution of this discipline, faithful pastors and professors must, every one for his own part, take heed that he have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but even reprove them; yea, they ought, in. sensu negativo, excommunicate those who should be (but are not) excommunicate positively, which negative excommunication is not an ecclesiastical censure, but either a bare punishment, or a cautel and animadversion; and so saith the Archbishop of Spalato,1106 not only one brother may refuse [pg 1-361] to communicate with another, but a people, also, may refuse to communicate with their pastor, which he confirmeth by certain examples. But the public censure of positive excommunication should not be inflicted without the church's consent, for the reasons foresaid. Cyprian writeth to Cornelius, bishop of Rome, that he had much laboured with the people that peace might be given to them who had fallen; that is, that they might be again received into the communion of the church; which, if he might have done by himself, why did he labour and deal so much with the people in that business? And as they were not received into the church's communion without the people's consent, so neither were they without their consent excommunicate. Chrysostom showeth,1107 concerning his time, that when one was to be excommunicate, the whole church was humbled in prayer to God for him; and, when he was again released, they did all kindly salute him, and wish him peace. Tertullian also writeth,1108 that he who was to be excommunicate in the public assembly of the church, was, by the common consent of all, stricken with judgment, and that all the approven and well-liked elders had the precedence or direction of the rest of the church in these matters.

Now, from all this which hath been said of the power and authority to excommunicate and absolve, it is manifest how unjustly usurping prelates do arrogate and appropriate to themselves this power, which Christ hath committed to every particular church or congregation, and ordained to be execute by the ecclesiastical consistory within the same. Which episcopal usurpation, as it hath been showed to be most contrary to divine institution, so doth it also depart from the manner of the ancient church: for it may be seen, in Cyprian,1109 that the authority of reconciling and receiving into the church such as had fallen, was not proper to the bishop, but, with him, common to his clergy and presbytery, and that jus communicationis was given them by the clergy as well as by the bishop. We have heard, out of Jerome,1110 that a bishop did nothing which a presbyter did not also, except [pg 1-362] only that he gave rite or sign of ordination, that is, imposition of hands. Whereby we understand that as all other things, beside ordination, so the power of excommunication, among the rest, was alike common to bishops and presbyters. Whence it is, that the same Jerome, writing to Demetriades, calleth excommunication Episcoporum et Presbyterorum censura. And elsewhere, Alligat vel solvit Episcopus et Presbyter.1111 Justinian (Novel. 123, cap. 11) saith, Omnibus autem Episcopis et Presbyteris interdicimus segregare aliquem a sacra communione, antequam causa monstretur, &c., certifying them, if they do otherwise, that he whom they excommunicate should be loosed from excommunication a majore sacerdota. Whence we see, that presbyters also were wont to excommunicate, and that this power was common to them with the bishops. The First Council of Carthage, can. 23, decreeth that a bishop hear no man's cause without the presence of his clergy; and that otherwise his sentence shall be void, except it be confirmed by the presence of his clergy. The canon law itself hath some vestiges of the ancient order: it ordaineth,1112 that when a bishop either excommunicateth or absolveth any man, twelve of the clergy be present, and concur with him. Dr Forbesse now also acknowledgeth,1113 that it is not lawful for a bishop to exercise the power of public jurisdiction by himself, and without the presbytery; and, under this power of jurisdiction, whereof he speaketh,1114 he comprehendeth the visitation of churches, ordination, suspension, and deposition of ministers, the excommunicating of contumacious persons, and the reconciling of them when they become penitent, the calling of the fellow-presbyters to a synod, the making of ecclesiastical canons, &c.; which power of jurisdiction, saith he,1115 remaineth one and the same, whole and entire, both in the bishop, and in the presbytery: in him personally; in it collegially. His confession of the presbytery's power and authority, we catch and lay hold on; but whereas he would have this power any way proper and personal to bishops, he is confuted by our former arguments.

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And thus far have we demonstrated to princes, who be they to whom Christ hath committed the power of excommunication, that with them they may cause it to remain, and correct the usurpation of prelates, who bereave them of it. Let us next consider what princes may, or should do, after that the sentence of any man's excommunication or reconciliation is given forth by them to whom the power of this discipline pertaineth. The Archbishop of Spalato is of opinion,1116 that not only it is free to princes to communicate with excommunicate persons, but also, that if they shall happen to communicate with them, the church (for the reverence she oweth to princes) should straight absolve them, and that her sentence of excommunication should no longer have any strength. What! Shall the church draw and put up again the spiritual sword at the pleasure of princes? Or because princes will perhaps cast holy things to dogs, must others do so likewise? O prodigious licentiousness, and hellish misorder, worthy to be drowned in the lake of Lethe! But what, then, is the part of the prince, after that the church hath given judgment? Surely, whensoever need is, he ought, by the private judgment of Christian discretion, to try and examine whether this discipline be rightly executed or not. If he find the execution thereof to be unreprovable, and that yet the sinner goeth on in his contumacy, then, by his civil power,1117 he ought further to punish him in his person or worldly estate, that he may either reform or repress such an one as hath not been terrified by the church's censures. But if, after trial, he understand that the sentence given forth is unjust and erroneous, either through the ignorance or the malice of the ecclesiastical and regular judges, then he ought to interpone his authority, and cause a due proceeding; for, in such extraordinary cases of the failing of ecclesiastical persons, princes may do much in things spiritual, which, ordinarily, they cannot.

It remaineth to show who have the power of those censures and punishments which are proper to ecclesiastical persons. Where, first, we are to consider, that there are two sorts of faults which make ecclesiastical men worthy to be punished, viz., either such as [pg 1-364] violate sacred, or such as violate civil and human duties: the one is to be judged by ecclesiastical judges alone, and that according to the laws of God and the church; the other by civil judges alone, and that according to the civil and municipal laws of the commonwealth. This latter form, again, is twofold; for either the fault is such, that, though a man be condignly punished for it by the civil magistrate, yet he doth not, therefore, fall from his ecclesiastical office or dignity; of which sort experience showeth many; or else such as being punished according to their quality and demerit, a man, by necessary consequence, falleth from the ecclesiastical function and dignity which before he had: this was Abiathar's case, and the case of so many as, being justly punished by proscription, incarceration, or banishment, are secundario et ex consequenti shut from their bearing office in the church. “If Abiathar had sinned in a sacred matter, the cognition thereof (saith Junius1118) had pertained to the priests; but because he sinned against the commonwealth and the king's majesty, it was necessary to deal with him civilly, and not ecclesiastically. What! Are no ecclesiastical men in this time also thought to be lawfully judged by the civil magistrate, if, at any time, they be found guilty of appaired majesty?” As for the other sorts of faults, whereby (as we have said) sacred and ecclesiastical duties are violate, such as the teaching of false and heretical doctrine, neglecting of discipline, unbeseeming and scandalous conversation, &c. which things (if they be not mended) they who have the execution of ecclesiastical jurisdiction committed to them ought to punish by suspension, deposition, &c. Now, as when one is called to the work of the ministry, his fitness and qualification for that work should be tried and judged by the clergy of the adjacent bounds assembled in their classical presbytery, to whom it also appertaineth (after that he is by them tried and approved, and after that he is elected by the church where he is to serve) to send him out from them with power to exercise the office of a pastor; so when there is just cause of suspending and depriving him, it belongeth to the same presbytery to consider and judge hereof; and, according to his offence, to give judgment against him. For who should recal [pg 1-365] him but they that sent him? Or who should discharge him his ministerial function, except they who ordained him to exercise the same? And who may take the power from him but they who gave the power unto him? That ordination pertaineth to the whole presbytery, and not to the bishop alone, we have showed before, and now, by the same reason, we say suspension and deposition pertaineth to the presbytery also, and are not in the power of the bishop. And that, in the ancient church, as bishops gave not ordination, so neither did they suspend nor depose any man without the common counsel, advice, and concurrence of the presbytery, yea, and sometimes of a synod, it is clear from Cypr. (lib. 1, epist. 9; lib. 3, epist. 2, 10), Council Carthag. 3 (can. 8), Council Carthag. 4 (can. 22, 23), Council African. (can. 20), Council Hispan. 2 (can. 6), Justin. (Novel. 42, cap. 1), Jerome (Comment. ad Isa 3), Siricius (Epist ad Ambros. inter Ambr. Epist.) So, touching the suspension and deposition of ministers, the Assembly at Glasgow, anno 1610, ordained that the bishop should associate to himself the ministry of those bounds where the delinquent served, that is, the presbytery whereof he hath been a member, and, together with them, there take trial of the fact, and, upon just cause found, to deprive or suspend: which Act was ratified in the 12th parliament of king James, anno 1612. Nevertheless, if any man think the sentence of the bishop and the presbytery, given forth against him, to be unjust, he ought to have liberty of recourse to the synod, and there to be heard, according as it was decreed by the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 66. But oftimes the matter is of such difficulty or importance that the bishop and the presbytery may not give out any peremptory sentence of suspension or deprivation till the matter be brought to the synod of the province,1119 where, according to the ancient order, the matter is to be handled,1120 not “by the censure of one bishop, but by the judgment of the whole clergy gathered together.”

Princes, therefore, may not suffer bishops to usurp the power of suspending and depriving at their pleasure, and whensoever they commit any such tyranny in smiting of [pg 1-366] their fellow-servants, it is the part of princes to cause these things to be redressed, and for this end graciously to receive the grievances of oppressed ministers. The Arians of old, being assembled in a council at Antioch, decreed, that if any ecclesiastical person should, without the advice and the letters of the bishops1121 of the province, and chiefly of the metropolitan, go to the emperor to put up any grievance unto him, he should be cast out, not only from the holy communion, but from his proper dignity which he had in the church. Whereupon Osiander hath this observation:1122 “This canon also was composed against holy Athanasius; for Athanasius being expelled by the Arians, had fled to the emperor Constantine the younger, and had from him obtained a return to his own church. Now this canon is very unjust, which forbids that a bishop, or any other minister of the church, being unjustly oppressed, flee to his godly civil magistrate; since it was lawful to the apostle Paul to appeal to the Roman emperor wicked Nero, as the Acts of the Apostles witness. But it may be seen in this place, that bishops were very soon seeking dominion, yea, tyranny over the church, and over their colleges.” Besides all this, there is yet another thing which ought to have a very principal consideration in the deposition of a minister, and that is, the consent of the church and congregation where he hath served. Let the magistrate know, saith Gerhard,1123 “that as the vocation of ministers pertaineth to the whole church, so to the same also pertaineth the removing of ministers; therefore, as a minister ought not to be obtruded upon an unwilling church, so the hearers, being unwilling and striving against it, a fit minister ought not to be plucked away from them.” The deposing of a minister, whom the church loves and willingly hears, Balduine accounteth to be high sacrilege,1124 and holdeth that, as the calling, so the dismissing of ministers pertaineth to the whole church; and so teacheth Junius.1125 Shortly, as a man is rightly called to the ministerial office and dignity when he is elected by the church and ordained by the presbytery, so is he rightly deposed and put from the same [pg 1-367] when he is rejected by the church and discharged by the presbytery.

How there was brought forth in Scotland, anno 1610, a certain amphibian brood, sprung out of the stem of Neronian tyranny, and in manners like to his nearest kinsman, the Spanish Inquisition. It is armed with a transcendant power, and called by the dreadful name of the High Commission. Among other things, it arrogateth to itself the power of deposing ministers; but how unjustly, thus it appeareth:

1. If those commissioners have any power at all to depose ministers, they have it from the king, whose commissioners they are: but from him they have it not; therefore they have none at all. The proposition is most certain; for they sit not in that commission to judge in their own name, nor by their own authority, (quum nihil exerceat delegatus nomine proprio, as Panormitan saith,1126) but by virtue only of the commission and delegation which they have of the king. Yea, bishops themselves exercise not any jurisdiction in the High Commission as bishops, but only as the king's commissioners, as Dr Downame acknowledgeth.1127 The assumption is grounded upon this reason: The king hath not power to depose ministers; therefore he cannot give this power to others. For nemo potest plus juris transferre in alium quam sibi competere dignoscatur,1128 the king may sometimes inflict such a civil punishment upon ministers, whereupon, secondarily and accidentally, will follow their falling away from their ecclesiastical office and function (in which sense it is said that Solomon deposed Abiathar, as we heard before), but to depose them directly and formally (which the High Commission usurped to do) he hath no power, and that because this deposition is an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; whereas the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction doth no more agree to the king than the power of ecclesiastical order: his power is civil and temporal, not spiritual and ecclesiastical. Dr Field also confesseth,1129 that none may judicially degrade, or put any one, lawfully admitted, from his degree and order, but the spiritual guides of the church alone.

2. The deposing of ministers pertaineth [pg 1-368] to classical presbyteries, or (if the matter be doubtful and difficult) to synods, as hath been showed. And who, then, can give the High Commission such authority as to take this power from them and assume it unto itself. These commissioners profess that they have authority to discharge other ecclesiastical judicatories within the kingdom from meddling with the judging of anything which they shall think impertinent for them, and which they shall think good to judge and decide by themselves in their commission: which, if it be so, then, when it pleaseth them, they may make other ecclesiastical judicatories to be altogether useless and of no effect in the church.

3. In this commission ecclesiastical and temporal men are joined together, and both armed with the same power; therefore it is not right nor regular, nor in any ways allowable. For even, as when a minister hath offended in a civil matter, his fault is to be judged by civil judges according to the civil laws, and by no other; so, when he offendeth in an ecclesiastical matter, his fault is to be judged only by ecclesiastical persons according to ecclesiastical laws; and, in such case, Justinian forbiddeth1130 civil men to be joined with ecclesiastical men in judgment. They are ecclesiastical things or causes which are handled and examined by the High Commission in the process of deposing ministers; and a shame it is to ecclesiastical men, if they cannot, without the help and joining of temporal men, judge and decide things of this quality.

4. As in the matters to be judged, so in the censures and punishments to be inflicted, ecclesiastical and civil men have, in this commission, alike power and authority; for ecclesiastical men therein have power of fining, confining, warding, &c., common to them with the temporal men; and, again, the temporal men have power of excommunication, suspension, deprivation, &c., common to them with the ecclesiastical men. For they all sit there as the king's commissioners, and eo nomine, they exercise this jurisdiction; which commission being alike discharged by them all, it is manifest that both temporal men take hold of the keys and ecclesiastical men take hold of the civil sword. And this monstrous confusion and mixture giveth sufficient demonstration that [pg 1-369] such a form of judgment is not from the God of order.

Of the abuses and irregularities of the High Commission we may not now speak at greater length, but are hasted to make forward.