Volume 41 — Moro Pirates and their Raids in the Seventeenth Century

I

[In previous volumes have appeared various accounts of the piratical raids made, down to 1640, by the Mahometan Malays of Mindanao and other southern islands against the Spaniards and the native tribes whom they had subjected in the northern islands. A very brief outline of that information is here presented, with citations of volumes where it appears, as a preliminary to some further account which shall summarize this subject for the remainder of the seventeenth century.]

[When Legazpi first explored the Philippines, he sent some of his officers to open up trade with Mindanao, then reputed to be rich in gold and cinnamon (Vol. II, pp. 116–118, 147, 154, 209, 210). At the outset, much jealousy arose among the Spaniards against the Mahometan Malays (whom they called Moros) of that and other islands in the southern part of the Eastern archipelago, for two reasons—the Moros were “infidels,” and they far excelled the Spaniards as traders (Vol. II, pp. 156, 159, 186, 187; IV, pp. 66, 151, 174). Moreover, the natives were everywhere hostile to the Spaniards because the Portuguese representing themselves to be Castilians, had previously made cruel raids on some of those islands, notably Bohol (Vol. II, pp. 117, 184, 207, 208, 229; III, p. 46). In that first year, 1565, a Bornean vessel was captured by the Spaniards, after a desperate fight; but hostilities then went no further (Vol. II, pp. 116, 206). The Moros of the Rio Grande of Mindanao proffered (1574) their submission to the Spanish power, apparently being in some awe of it (Vol. III, p. 275). Governor Sande had expansive ideas of Spanish dominion, and in 1578–79 undertook an expedition for the subjugation of Borneo, Mindanao, and Joló; he obtained a temporary success, but the Moros again asserted their independence as soon as the Spaniards departed (Vol. IV, pp. 125, 130, 148–303; XV, pp. 54, 132). This expedition was partly caused by piratical raids made by the Borneans (Vol. IV, pp. 151, 153, 154, 159; VI, p. 183), and the Joloans (Vol. IV, pp. 176, 236) against the northern islands. Apparently this punishment intimidated the Moros for a time; the next important raid by them was in 1595 (Vol. IX, p. 196; XI, p. 266). In 1591 Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa had made a contract with Gomez P. Dasmariñas for the conquest of Mindanao (Vol. VIII, pp. 73–77). The island had then been partly explored and much of it assigned to Spaniards in repartimiento; some of these allotments are mentioned in Vol. VIII, pp. 127, 128, 132 (a list of those bestowed in 1571 is found in the Pastells edition of Colin’s Labor evangélica, i, p. 157, note 1). Instructions were given to Figueroa on November 13, 1595 (Vol. IX, pp. 181–188), and in the following spring he set out with an armed force; but hardly had he begun the campaign when he was slain by a Moro (Vol. IX, pp. 195, 196, 263–265, 276, 277; XV, pp. 89–93; XVI, pp. 270–272). Juan de Ronquillo succeeded him, and for the time “pacified” the hostile Moros (Vol. IX, pp. 281–298; X, pp. 41, 42, 49, 168, 169, 214, 215; XI, p. 236; XV, pp. 95–100; XVI, pp. 273, 274); see his own report of the campaign (Vol. X, pp. 53–74) and Tello’s (Vol. X, pp. 219–226; cf. Vol. XI, pp. 135–139). In 1599 the Spanish fort at La Caldera was dismantled (Vol. XI, pp. 138, 139, 237; XV, pp. 190, 191); this emboldened the Moros to renew their piracies, and from 1600 on they harassed the Visayan Islands and even Luzón—not only the Mindanaos but their allies the Ternatans, and the Joloans (Vol. XI, pp. 238, 239, 292–301, 303; XII, pp. 32, 39–41, 134–137; XIII, pp. 49, 146, 147; XV, pp. 192–196, 209, 265–267; XVIII, pp. 185–187, 331, 333; XIX, pp. 67, 68, 215–218, 223–225; XXII, pp. 89, 90, 203–206; XXIII, p. 259; XXIV, pp. 35–37, 102–104, 139, 142, 143, 329; XXV, pp. 86, 105, 152–154, 199; XXVI, p. 285; XXVII, pp. 215–226, 316). Similar raids were made by the Camucones, Moros from some small islands near Borneo (Vol. XVIII, p. 79; XXII, pp. 89, 132, 133, 202, 296–298, 303; XXIV, pp. 97, 138; XXV, pp. 154–156; XXVII, pp. 314–316; XXIX, pp. 31, 200). These attacks kept the peaceful natives in constant fear; their villages were burned and plundered, and their fields ravaged; and thousands were carried away to be sold as slaves, being thus dispersed among the Malay Islands. In 1621 Hernando de los Rios Coronel stated that ten thousand Christians were held captive in Mindanao (Vol. XIX, p. 264). At times the Spaniards sent armed fleets in pursuit of these pirates, but the latter would escape, on account of the superior lightness and swiftness of their vessels. Punitive expeditions were sent to their villages, some of which were futile, but others inflicted on them severe punishment—Jolo: 1602 (Vol. XV, pp. 240–243, 264, 265), 1626 (XXII, pp. 207–210), 1628 (XXII, pp. 293–295; XXIV, pp. 143–145), 1630 (XXIII, pp. 87, 88, 98; XXIV, pp. 163–165); and Mindanao: 1625 (XXII, pp. 116–119, 218, 224). It was proposed to enslave any Moro pirates who might be captured (Vol. XVII, pp. 187, 296, 331; XXIX, p. 269), and this was sometimes done (Vol. XXII, p. 134). Finally, Corcuera undertook to chastise them effectually; and in 1637 he led a large and well-equipped expedition to Mindanao, which captured Corralat’s stronghold and devastated nearly all the coast of that island, driving out Corralat as a fugitive and intimidating other chiefs who had intrigued with him against the Spaniards (Vol. XXVII, pp. 253–305, 319–325, 346–357; XXIX, pp. 28–30, 60, 86–101, 116–134). Corcuera followed up this success by another in Joló, in 1638 (Vol. XXVII, p. 325; XXVIII, pp. 41–63; XXIX, pp. 32, 36, 43, 44, 135, 136), and in the following year a Spanish expedition severely chastised the Moros around Lake Lanao, in Mindanao (XXIX, pp. 159, 161–163, 273–275); further military operations in Joló and Mindanao, on a smaller scale, occurred during 1638–39 (Vol. XXIX, pp. 141–166, 198–200). It may be noted, further, that the Jesuits established missions there at an early date, evangelists of that order going with Figueroa in 1596 (Vol. XII, pp. 313–321; XIII, pp. 47–49, 86–89; XXII, p. 117; XXVIII, pp. 94–99, 151, 171); and others were founded by Augustinian Recollects (XXI, pp. 196–247, 298–303; XXIV, p. 115; XXVIII, pp. 152, 175, 340–345).]

II

[The second reduction of Joló—by Almonte, in 1639 (Vol. XXIX, p. 143)—subdued all of that archipelago, save the Guimbanos, a fierce Moro people inhabiting the mountains of Sulu (Joló) Island, who were hostile to the Joloans of the coast. When Almonte ordered them to cease disturbing the pacified Joloans, the Guimbanos made an insolent reply, telling the Spaniards to come to their country and learn the difference between them and the Joloans. Almonte therefore sent (July, 1639) troops, under Luis de Guzman and Agustin de Cepeda, to subdue these proud mountaineers; and after a fierce battle the Guimbanos retreated, leaving four hundred dead on the field, and three hundred captives in the hands of the Spaniards—of whom eight died, including Guzman, besides twenty Indian auxiliaries. (Murillo Velarde, Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 96 b, 97.) After the departure of Almonte from Joló, affairs went ill, Morales being unfit for his post as governor of those islands, although he was valiant in battle. Having abducted a beautiful girl, daughter of a chief named Salibanza, a conspiracy against him was formed by the enraged father; this was discovered, and the leaders seized. This, with several arbitrary and hostile measures of Morales, stirred up the Joloans to revolt, and an affray occurred between them and the Spaniards, in which Morales was wounded. Juan Ruiz Maroto was sent to relieve him from office, and tried to pacify the natives, but in vain; he then sent Pedro de la Mata Vergara to harry all the coast of Joló, who burned many villages and carried away three thousand captives. Mata, being obliged to return to Mindanao, was succeeded by Morales, who rashly attacked (near Párang, Sulu Island) a force of Moros with troops exhausted by forced marches; the Spaniards, although in numbers far superior to the Moros, were ignominiously put to flight, thirty-nine of their number being slain, including Morales and another officer. At this time Cepeda was governor of Joló, and he soon found it necessary to chastise the natives, who were encouraged to rebellion by their recent victory. (Combés, Hist. de Mindanao, col. 402–412; Murillo Velarde, Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 121–122; Montero y Vidal, Hist. piratería, i, pp. 175–181, 199–211.) An account of his exploits in this direction is furnished by letters of the Jesuit Miguel Paterio to Father Juan Lopez, regarding the expeditions of Cepeda (to whom Combés dedicated his book), written in 1643–44 (ut supra, col. cix–cxv); we present them here as a specimen of the proceedings in these punitive expeditions.]

Relation of the exploit which was accomplished in the villages of Paran by Captain and Sargento-mayor Don Agustin de Zepeda, warden of the forts in Jolo.

From this expedition and victory I have learned some things about Guimba which are worth mentioning here. The first is, that two days afterward the people of Paran made war on the chiefs Ulis and Sambali whom we mentioned above, complaining that these chiefs had not warned them that the Spanish troops had passed close to their villages, and even because they had allowed the Spaniards to pass them. May God establish them in peace, and grant them light and a knowledge of the truth. And after this expedition, as I have said, one of the chiefs in the villages to the east named Suil, complained that the sargento-mayor had not informed him of it, so that Suil with all his men might have accompanied the Spaniards. Although he may not be sincere, thanks are returned to him, and probably his offer was prompted by the admiration and high opinion that he entertains for our men since this exploit; or because he feared lest the like fate might befall him. He and other chiefs beyond Guimba to the east have sent to tell me that, although those who killed the sargento-mayor are their brothers, they will not for that reason fail to be the friends of the Spaniards; and that they will come to the village of the Lutaos who are in this fort [i.e., at Joló] to talk with the father and treat of peace. And it cannot be denied that there has been a great disturbance among them since this expedition, and it has caused among them all not only fear, but astonishment also, to see that so few Spaniards could dare to traverse almost all of Guimba, marching almost all the way among the settlements, without being seen. In this affair not only the caution of the Spaniards, but their courage in penetrating among so many barbarians, the most valiant in all these islands, is causing great admiration—which is increased at seeing how so few Spaniards made so great a number of enemies take to flight; for in all the villages there are nearly a thousand barbarians who carry arms. It is certain that, considering the circumstances of this exploit, it adds prestige to several others that have been performed; and I even venture to say that it is astonishing, if we consider what occurred in one night, the perils that they went through, the daring of so few soldiers among so many enemies, and, finally, their accomplishing what they did in destroying and burning the villages and their people, without injury to any one of our men. All this causes the Moros who see these occurrences close to them to wonder and fear, and apparently they are talking in earnest of becoming friends and vassals of his Majesty. [Marginal note: “For Father Juan Lopez, rector of Cavite.”]

[Another letter by Father Paterio, written from Jolo, February 28, 1644, relates the particulars of another expedition by Zepeda into Guimba, six days previous to that date. The native chiefs on the east side of the island are intimidated by the punishment inflicted on Paran, and are inclined to submit to the victorious Spanish arms; but those on the west desire to take revenge for the massacre of their tribesmen. A conference of the latter chiefs is accordingly held at the village of Ulis, where they talk of making an attack on the Spanish forts at Jolo. They invite Suil, one of the friendly chiefs, to join them; but he sends word to the Spaniards (February 9) of the plot against them. Zepeda is then absent in Zamboanga, but returns soon afterward; and another warning from Suil being received ten days later, Zepeda decides to inflict summary punishment on the plotters. He therefore leads an expedition against the village of Ulis, on February 21, and, as before, attacks the village at daylight. This time, the natives have had warning of the intended assault, and attempt resistance; but they are defeated with considerable loss—among the slain being Ulis, “who was the idol of that island, and whom all obeyed,” and three other chiefs. In this fight the Spaniards lose but four lives—a soldier, an officer, and two servants. This causes even more fear and awe than even the former expedition, and brings the recalcitrants quickly to terms—Suil and other chiefs proposing to leave their homes and go to dwell near the Spanish forts. Later, the Spaniards complete this castigation by ravaging the country, burning and destroying all before them, “by which the Spanish arms have acquired greater reputation and glory than that which they had lost on former adverse occasions.” Then other islands adjacent to Jolo are intimidated, and two battles are fought with their natives, who lose many men therein. As a reward for his services, Zepeda is honored by Corcuera with the governorship of Zamboanga.]

While Balatamay was raiding the above-mentioned islands, a splendid squadron sailed from Cavite by order of the governor-general, in command of an officer whose name is not told in the histories, from whom brilliant conduct was expected, to judge from the valor of which he boasted in drawing-rooms; but, far from fulfilling his duty, he lingered in Balayan under pretext of securing supplies of rice, and then in Mindoro, carrying out his cowardly purpose of not encountering the Moros, notwithstanding that the forces under his command were more than sufficient to destroy the pirates. To the end that he might operate in conjunction with the said squadron, Esteybar ordered Alférez Luis de Vargas to scour the coasts of Mindanao; but as the commander of the squadron failed to carry out the instructions that he had received, Vargas, as he could not find him, confined his efforts to burning a village on the bay of Simuay, where he seized several captives. Bobadilla reduced to ashes the old capital of Corralat, Lamitan, its inhabitants having fled to the woods. Also in the said year of 1657 the dato Salicala of Mindanao scoured the seas with his squadron; the natives in consternation abandoned their villages without daring to resist him, and he carried away as captives more than a thousand Indians—his audacity going so far that he sailed into the bay of Manila.

Esteybar then equipped a small squadron of caracoas and vintas, which departed from Zamboanga on January 1, 1658, resolved to chastise the pirate severely. He spread the report that they were going to Sibuguey. He reached that river in seven days and, placing part of his forces in charge of Sargento-mayor Itamarren, he destroyed the village of Namucan, and at Luraya burned many boats. Four pilans captured the joanga which had carried Father López to Simuay, manned by Moros from Mintun. Suddenly changing his course, he took the route to Punta de Flechas, in order to go to the capital of Corralat, but sent beforehand thirty Spaniards, with Captain Don Pedro de Viruega, to the district of Butig. Its chief Matundin, at the head of five hundred men, was defeated, the grain-fields ravaged, and the village reduced to ashes. The tilled land of this district was exceedingly rich, since it is the principal source of supply for rice in Mindanao. Great damage was also done in La Sabanilla by Captain Don Juan González Carlete. On the nineteenth of January the squadron encountered a large Dutch ship surrounded by some pirate vessels. Esteybar attempted to secure a free passage without bringing on a contest, to which end he hoisted a white flag; but the commander of the Dutch ship displayed a red flag, firing all his cannon against the Spanish vessels. Then, without heeding the superiority of the enemy, Bobadilla came against the ship, all his men rowing as hard as they could; and Esteybar attacked it at the stern. The Spaniards then were going to board the ship with a rush, when a ball fired from the vessel of Esteybar set on fire the Santa Barbara [i.e., powder-magazine] of the Dutch ship, thus blowing it into pieces. Only twenty-four of its crew survived, and these were drawn out of the sea and made prisoners. Esteybar continued his voyage to Simuay, the bar of which was fortified with heavy stockades; moreover, at its ends were two forts, garrisoned by Malays, Macassars, and Dutchmen. This did not frighten Esteybar, and he made preparations to capture the posts of the enemy, in spite of advice to the contrary from his captains. While he was deciding the best method of accomplishing this, he passed with his squadron to the river of Buhayen, sending in by one of its entrances the valiant Bobadilla with some vessels, and by the other Sargento-mayor Itamarren. The former sacked the villages and ravaged the grain-fields of Tannil and Tabiran, the latter those of Lumapuc and Buhayen; they destroyed a powerful armada which had been prepared for raiding the islands, and carried away as spoil many versos, muskets, campilans, crises, and all kinds of weapons.

In the village of Buhayen resided Prince Hamo, son of Moncay, from whom the kingdom had been usurped; he mounted a white flag and a cross above his house, being desirous of forming an alliance with the Spaniards, but they, being warned by experience with the treasons of the Moros, continued the hostilities, without attaching any importance to that signal. While they constructed rafts with which to attack the fortress of Corralat, Captain Antonio de Palacios went to destroy the village of Tampacan and its environs; and Adjutant Antonio Vázquez disembarked with orders to cut off the retreat of the enemy’s spies. These were twenty in number, thoroughly armed; Vázquez rushed upon them, and at the first encounter killed five and wounded six of them, and the rest were shot to death in the woods. Esteybar returned to the bar of Buhayen; he knew that at a day’s journey from there was a village of Lutaos, called Maolo, and, desirous to chastise that settlement and obtain information about that coast, he sent Sargento-mayor Itamarren—who, finding it deserted, set fire to the village, killed four Moros, and captured two others, the only ones who waited for the attack.

Notwithstanding these provocations, and others that were directly offered to Corralat in the environs of his fortifications, it was impossible to draw him out into the open country. Having constructed a number of rafts, on which were placed pieces of artillery, the governor went aboard the largest of them, and with the aid of the vessels cannonaded the fort of Corralat for the space of four hours, but he defended it well. It was evident that the difficulties of assaulting it were insuperable, and that the artillery was operating with but little result, on account of the condition of the sea; accordingly it was decided to retire to the bar of Buhayen. The squadron went to La Sabanilla on the seventeenth of February; here Esteybar received orders to return to Molucas, and he proceeded to Zamboanga. Notwithstanding the well-known valor of this chief, and the injuries inflicted on the Moros during the two months of the campaign, this retreat gave much satisfaction to Corralat, since it freed him from [the danger of] going as a wanderer through the hills, as on previous occasions.

The valiant Esteybar had been replaced as governor of the military post of Zamboanga by Don Fernando de Bobadilla—a chief no less courageous and resolute—with the same titles and preeminences as the former. Corralat, in order better to secure his dominions against the aggressions of the Spaniards, made Namu, king of Buhayen, establish a fort at the mouth of the river, the opposite shore of which was likewise fortified by Corralat; he entrusted to Marundin the defense of the bar of Simuay, and to the Basilan chiefs Ondol and Boto the construction of a fortification at the entrance of the estuary of Zamboanga. Don Diego Zarria Lazcano took the place of Bobadilla, the former remaining at the head of the armada.

The datos Linao and Libot of Joló, and Sacahati of Tawi-Tawi, with thirteen vessels, scoured the coasts of Bohol, Leyte, and Masbate. Near Luban they put to death father Fray Antonio de San Agustin, who on account of his ailments could not retreat to the interior of that island as did the rest who were going with him in their vessel. A squadron sailed from Manila in command of Don Pedro Duran de Monforte; they went to Luban, Mindoro, Panay, and Gigantes without discovering the pirates, and returned to the capital. The Moros were able to return to Joló with many spoils and eighty captives; but the sultan of that island sent back the said captives, in order to prove that he desired peace with the Spaniards. (Montero y Vidal. Hist. piratería, i, pp. 236–244. Cf. Combés, Hist. Mindanao, col. 533–549, 570–587.)

Great were the calamities suffered by the Filipinas Islands in these years of 1657 and 58, which might have occasioned their entire ruin, if divine Providence had not manifestly preserved them, at the expense of miracles and prodigies. Even the arrogance of the Dutch recognized this, when they saw their proud forces humiliated by the unequal strength of ours; and it was acknowledged by the inhabitants of these islands, recognizing the divine clemency. In the former of those years the scourge of divine justice was the great armada of Mindanao corsairs, which, commanded by Salicala, a Moro of much valor, infested the Pintados Islands; and their insolence went so far that they came in sight of the great bay of Manila. The poor natives who groaned under the yoke of captivity to these pirates amounted to more than a thousand; and as it was impossible for most of them to furnish ransom for their persons, they usually died as slaves of the Moros. I have not been able to learn the reason why no assistance was given to deliver them by going out to find those pirates—although I do not believe that it was the absence of compassion in Governor Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, but rather his lack of means, and his being engrossed with more pressing affairs. This was followed by the plagues of innumerable locusts, which, laying waste the fields, made general havoc, occasioning the famine which was the worst enemy of the poor; this was followed by its inseparable companion, pestilence, which made great ravages with a general epidemic of smallpox. (Diaz, Conquistas, p. 556.)

The authorities and citizens of Manila were the victims in May, 1662, of a fearful panic, on account of the claim by the powerful Chinese pirate Kue-Sing that the little realm of Filipinas should render him homage and be declared his tributary, under penalty of his going with his squadrons to destroy the Spaniards—as he had done with the Dutch, expelling them from Formosa. This embassy, which was brought to Manila by the Dominican father Fray Victorio Ricci, and the consequent indignation against the Chinese, were the origin of an insurrection by those who resided in Manila, which was subdued; and the conference of authorities resolved to expel them from the country and repel by force of arms the aggression of Kue-Sing—the governor-general making ready great armaments, and whatever preparations for defense seemed to him necessary that he might come out victorious from the tremendous danger that threatened the island.

The governor-general of the islands sent a squadron to pursue the pirates, but they accomplished nothing. From Zamboanga Adjutant Francisco Alvarez went out alone to encounter them; he captured the caracoa of the pirate Gani, a relative of Salé, and of thirty captives whom the latter was carrying away. Alvarez freed twenty-two—afterward going to an island of Joló, where he captured twelve Moros. Bobadilla, in answer to his message, on November 8 received pressing orders to return to Manila without loss of time, the governor yielding so far as to allow that he might leave in the fortress of Zamboanga at most fifty Spaniards. This was equivalent to condemning those unfortunates to a sure death, and the Jesuit fathers protested against it, saying that necessarily they would incur the same fate; but finally the supreme authority of the islands decided upon the total abandonment of the posts above mentioned. Nevertheless Bobadilla, with the object of encouraging the Lutaos and leading the Moros to believe that he was not abandoning the post, sent in pursuit of them Don Juan de Morales Valenzuela, with two caracoas, to the islands called “Orejas de Liebre,” on January 2, 1663; but on the fourth of the same month he received a new and more positive order from the captain-general, dated October 11, that without delay or any excuse he must abandon Zamboanga. At sight of this, Bobadilla warned Morales that the withdrawal must be made, as was done on the seventh—as promptly as possible fulfilling the said imperious mandate, convinced that it was now altogether impossible to oppose so plain a decision.

The governor of Zamboanga made a solemn surrender of the fort to the master-of-camp of the Lutao natives, Don Alonso Macombon, receiving from him an oath of fidelity to hold it for the king of España and defend it from his enemies; but Don Alonso refused to include among these the sultan of Mindanao, on the pretext that he had not sufficient strength to oppose the dreaded Corralat. The governor, fearing his defection, did not leave him any artillery. The Jesuits also surrendered to Macombon their houses and churches, carrying away the images, ornaments, chalices, and books; and six thousand Christians remained in Zamboanga exposed to the rage of the Mahometans. Some Lutaos, although not many, decided to go to the province of Cebú, or to that of Dapitan; others scattered through Joló or Mindanao in search of safety, returning to their former religion.

The abandonment of our military posts in Mindanao was, although it is excused by the embarrassed condition of the capital of the islands, an exceedingly imprudent measure, since, in order to provide for an uncertain danger, the Visayan Islands were left exposed to another which was more immediate and real—to say nothing of the retrogression that must necessarily result to our domination among the natives of Mindanao, where at that time over seventy thousand Christians lived. The pirate who could cause such a panic in the authorities of Manila, and occasioned so great losses to the undertaking of subduing the Mahometan Malay pirates, died without carrying out his threats.

Great was the injury which these pirates inflicted on the islands, and although the alcalde-mayor of Balayan went out against them with some armed vessels they could not be found, either by him or by some other vessels which went from Manila for this purpose with a considerable force of men, on account of the adroitness with which the Moros concealed themselves, avoiding an encounter—to such an extent that the belief was current in Manila that these were not outside enemies, but insurgent Indians of the country, until a Spaniard who had been seized by the enemy at the shoals of Mindoro made his escape from them, and his account undeceived the people of Manila. The governor despatched an armed fleet in command of Admiral Pedro Durán de Monforte, a soldier of long experience, but this remedy came too late; for the pirates, satiated with burning villages, plundering, and taking captives, had returned to their own country. Accordingly the armada, having vainly scouted along Lubán, Mindoro, and Panay, returned to Manila, having accomplished nothing save the expenses which were caused for the royal exchequer, which is the paymaster for these and other cases of negligence.

The distrust which was felt regarding the maintenance of the peace by the king of Joló perhaps occasioned anger that he had not prevented these injuries; but he, knowing that if he did not make amends it would be a cause for justifiable hostilities, sent an embassy to the governor (who was Don Diego Sarria Lazcano), exonerating himself and promising to chastise Linao, Libot, and Sacahati; this he did, and many captives were restored, which was no slight [amends]. King Corralat raised his false alarms, as he was wont to do when that suited him, and also made some trifling raids through the agency of the people of Sibuguey, and threatened the Zebuans at Dapitán. But all became quiet when the office of governor of those coasts was assumed (June 16, 1659) by Don Agustín de Cepeda, a great soldier—who died in decrepit old age as master-of-camp of these Filipinas. Corralat knew, much to his sorrow, the valor of this able officer, and therefore did not dare to anger him, content that the Spaniards should leave him in peace. Don Agustín, as a prudent man, determined to try measures to secure peace; and, conferences having been held, those measures were carried out, with very advantageous arrangements for our forces.

The frequent raids of these Moro pirates, both Mindanaos and Joloans, were one of the greatest hardships which these Filipinas Islands suffered through many continuous years; they were the scourge of the natives of the islands of Pintados and Camarines, Tayabas, and Mindoro, as being nearest to the danger and most weak for defense. These people paid with their beloved liberty for our neglect to defend them—not always deserving of blame, on account of the mutations of the times. Few Spaniards have been the prey of these vile thieves, except some who were very incautious; but amends have been made for these by many religious and some secular priests, ministers in the Indian villages, who have suffered rigorous captivities and cruel deaths. No small amount of expenditure has fallen on the royal exchequer; for those pirates have caused innumerable expenses in armed fleets, most of them useless because the news of the loss did not reach us until the pirates were returning unhurt to their own lands. At times it has given even the governors and captains-general of these islands plenty to do in defending them from these pilfering thieves, as we saw in the first part of this history, in the case of Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera and others. All the life of Cachil Corralat—which was a very long one, for it exceeded ninety years—and that of his father Bahisan kept our vigilance continually on the alert, and caused us to found and maintain the fortified posts of Zamboanga, Sabanilla, Malanao, and others—which caused so much expense and no profits; for the forts defend only a small space, and the sea has many roads, and thus they did not hinder the Moro fleets from sallying forth whenever they chose. Moreover, Corralat had all the Lutaos for spies, on account of their great reverence for him, and because they were in secret as much Mahometans as himself; for never is a Lutao found who has not been circumcised, or one who eats pork—and it is this which constitutes their Mahometanism, as also having many wives and being enemies of Christians; for in other respects they are atheists, and do not know what the Koran is or what it contains. And, as I have heard from military men who have experience in these wars, the only restraint upon these Joloan and Mindanao enemies is in armed fleets, which go to search for them in their homes and inflict on them all the damage they can, without going inland; for the Spaniards will not find any one there on whom to avenge themselves, since the inhabitants are safe in their thick forests and on impregnable heights.

After so many years of misfortunes the divine mercy took pity on these poor natives, on whom the cruelty and greed of the Moros had so long fattened, selecting as an agent the very Corralat who had been the cause of the past havoc. With old age and experience he came to see the injury which was resulting to his people (and most of all to the kings of Mindanao) from having enemies so valiant as the Spaniards had proved to be; and therefore while he lived he maintained peace with Manila, with friendly relations and the benefit of commerce on both sides. And when his death arrived, which was at the end of the year 1671, he left his nephew and heir, Balatamay, strictly charged to keep the peace, with heavy curses and imprecations, according to their custom; and his people obeyed him so well that for a long time no raid was heard of; nor was there any by the Camucones, who are subject to Borney. The king of Joló, Paguián, has preserved the same peace and friendship; for all the Moro tribes of these regions reverenced Corralat as if he were Mahoma himself. For he was a Moro of great courage, intelligence, and sagacity, besides being exceedingly zealous for his accursed sect, and a great sorcerer—for all of which he probably has met condign punishment. (Diaz, Conquistas, pp. 564–567.)