The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, CONTENTS — Read Online

The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong

Cecil Hague translation

THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG

A LECTURE

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1.Value of History and Philosophy for Jurisprudence; the new proposals for the reform of legal studies in Austria 1

2.Our theme; Relation to Ihering’s lecture before the Vienna Law Society2

3.Twofold meaning of the expression “natural right”2

4.Points of agreement with Ihering; rejection of the “jus naturae” and “jus gentium”; pre-ethical political statutes3

5.Opposition to Ihering; There exists a universally valid naturally recognizable moral law. Relative independence of the question4

6.The notion “natural sanction”4

7.Manifold misconception of the same by philosophers6

8.Habitually developed feeling of compulsion as such is no sanction6

9.Motives of hope and fear as such not yet sanction6

10.The thought of the arbitrary command of a higher power is not the natural sanction7

11.The ethical sanction is a command similar to the logical rule8

12.The aesthetic point of view; as little in ethics as in logic the right one9

13.Kant’s Categorical Imperative an impracticable fiction10

14.Necessity for preliminary psychological inquiries10

15.No willing without a final end10

16.The problem: which end is right? the chief problem of ethics11

17.The right end is the best among attainable ends; obscureness of this definition 11

18.Of the origin of the conception of the good; it has not its origin in the sphere of the so-called external impression12

19.The common characteristic of everything psychical12

20.The three fundamental classes of psychical phenomena; idea (Vorstellung), judgment, feeling (Gemütsbewegung)13

21.The contrasts, belief and denial, love and hate15

22.Of these opposed modes of relation one is always right, one wrong15

23.The conception of the good15

24.Distinction of the good in the narrow sense from what is good for the sake of some other good16

25.Love is not always a proof that an object is worthy to be loved16

26.“Blind” and “self-evident” judgment17

27.Analogous distinction in the sphere of pleasure and displeasure; criterion of the good18

28.Plurality of the good; problems associated therewith21

29.Whether by “the better” is to be understood that which deserves to be loved with more intensity21

30.Right determination of the conception22

31.When and how do we recognize that anything is in itself preferable? The case of the opposite, of absence, of the addition of like to like23

32.Cases where the problem is insoluble25

33.Whether the Hedonists in this respect would have the advantage26

34.Why these failures prove less disadvantageous than might be feared27

35.The sphere of the highest practical good28

36.The harmonious development28

37.The natural sanction respecting the limits of right29

38.The natural sanction for positive ethical laws29

39.The power of the natural sanction30

40.True and false relativity respecting ethical rules30

41.Derivation of well known special enactments32

42.Why other philosophers, by other ways, arrive at the same goal32

43.Whence arise the universally extended ethical truths? Unclearness concerning processes in one’s own consciousness33

44.Trace of the influence of the moments severally mentioned35

45.Lower currents exercising an influence37

46.Necessity of guarding against overlooking the distinction between ethical and pseudo-ethical development39

47.Value of such developments in the pre-ethical time; establishment of the social order; formation of dispositions; outlines of laws at the disposal of legislative ethical authority; security against doctrinaire tendencies39

48.Beneficent influences which still operate continually from this side41

49.A further word on the reform of politico-legal studies42

NOTES.

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13.In defence of my characterization of Herbart’s ethical criterion44

14.Of Kant’s Categorical Imperative44

16.The Nicomachean Ethics and Ihering’s “fundamental idea” in his work; Der Zweck im Recht46

17.Of the cases of smaller chances in the effort after higher ends46

18.Of the dependence of the conceptions upon concrete perceptions46

19.The term “intentional”47

21.The fundamental classification of mental states in Descartes47

22.Windelband’s error in respect of the fundamental classification of mental states; short defence of various attacks upon my Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint; Land, on a supposed improvement on formal logic; Steinthal’s criticism of my doctrine of judgment50

23.In criticism of Sigwart’s theories of the existential and negative judgments55

24.Descartes on the relation of “love” to “joy” and of “hate” to “sadness”69

25.Of the notions of truth and existence69

26.Of the unity of the notion of the good71

27.Of “evidence.” Descartes “Clara et distincta perceptio.” Sigwart’s doctrine of “evidence” and his “postulates”71

28.Of ethical subjectivism. Aristotle’s oversight in respect of the source of our knowledge of the good. Parallels between his error in respect of the feelings (Gemütsthätigkeit), and Descartes’ doctrine of the “Clara et distincta perceptio” as a pre-condition of the logically justified judgment; modern views which approach to this doctrine78

29.Of the expressions “gut gefallen” and “schlecht gefallen”84

31.Typical case of a constant geometrical relation of mental values85

32.Cases in which something at the same time both pleases and displeases85

33.Establishment of universal laws of valuation on the basis of a single experience86

34.Certain moments in the theory of ethical knowledge are of more importance for the theodicy than for ethics itself87

35.Explanation of the manner in which anything in certain cases is recognized as preferable87

36.The two cases, unique in their kind, in which preferability becomes clear for us from a certain character in the act of preference87

39.Gauss on the measurement of intensities89

40.Against exaggerated expectations from the so-called psycho-physical law89

40.Defence against the objection of a too great ethical rigour90

41.Love of neighbour in harmony with greater care of one’s own good91

43.Why the narrowness of human foresight should not do injury to moral courage92

44.In criticism of Ihering’s view of the notion of right and of his criticism of older views93

45.Of the provisional ethical sanction of objectionable laws96

60.Self-contradiction of Epicurus97

64-65.Proof for the law of addition of like to like; testimony for it in the teaching of the Stoa, of the theistic Hedonists, and in the demand for immortality; Helmholtz98

67.The great theologians are opponents of the arbitrary character of the divine law of morals99

68.John Stuart Mill on the doctrine of the distinction between “blind” and “self-evident judgments”99

(The numbers missing in the index contain only literary references.)

MIKLOSICH ON SUBJECTLESS PROPOSITIONS (Appendix to pages 14 and 55).

I. Short sketch of the essential features treated in Miklosich’s article105

II. Critical remarks110

Biographical Note119

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · (p. 9). This comparison with logic should be my best defence against the charge of placing Herbart’s doctrine in a false light. Were the log Note 2 · (p. 10). In his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant enunciates his Categorical Imperative in the following forms: “Act only in accor Note 3 · (p. 11). Cf. with what has been said in the lecture the first chapter of the Nicomachian Ethics, and it will be seen that Ihering’s “fundame Note 4 · (p. 12). Cases may arise where the consequence of certain efforts remains in doubt, and two courses are open: one presenting the prospect of Note 5 · (p. 12). This truth was familiar to Aristotle (cf. e.g. De Anima, iii. 8). The Middle Ages maintained it, but expressed it unfortunately in Note 6 · (p. 12). This doctrine in germ is also found in Aristotle; cf. espec. Metaph.: Δ 15, p. 1021 a. 29. This term “intentional,” like many other Note 7 · (p. 13). Meditat. iii. “Nunc autem ordo videtur exigere, ut prius omnes meas cogitationes (all psychical acts) in certa genera distribuam...Note 8 · (p. 13). I do not mean to say that the classification is, universally recognized to-day. It would not even be possible to regard as certain Note 9 · (p. 14). Miklosich, Subjectlose Sätze, second edition, Vienna, 1883. In order to make the reader familiar with the contents of this valuable Note 10 · (p. 15). The discovery that every act of love is a “pleasing,” every act of hate a “displeasing,” was very near to Descartes when he wrote h Note 11 · (p. 16). The expressions “true” and “false” are employed in a manifold sense; in one sense we employ them in speaking of true and false judg Note 12 · (p. 16). The notion of the good, in and for itself, is accordingly a unity in the strict sense, and not, as Aristotle teaches (in consequenc Note 13 · (p. 18). The distinction between “self-evident” and “blind” judgments is something too striking to have altogether escaped notice. Even the Note 14 · (p. 19). Cf. Hume’s Essay, already cited: An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Other philosophers, who have placed the foundation Note 15 · (p. 19). When I affirmed that the language of common life offers no suitable terms for activities of feeling qualified as right, I did not m Note 16 · (p. 20) i.e., “Als richtig characterisiert.” This phrase, which occurs frequently, I have translated sometimes as above, sometimes by “quali Note 17 · (p. 20). In order to exclude a misunderstanding and the doubts necessarily connected therewith, I add the following remark to what has been Note 18 · (p. 20). It may happen that, at the same time, one and the same thing is both pleasing and displeasing. First, something in itself displeasi Note 19 · (p. 21). Just as love and hate may be directed towards single individuals, so also they may be directed to whole classes. This Aristotle has Note 20 · (p. 21). It is easy to see how important this proposition may become for a theodicy. As regards ethics it might be feared that its security Note 21 · (p. 22). It seems to me evident even from analysis of the notion of choice (1) that everything which is good is to be preferred, i.e. that i Note 22 · (p. 26). E. Dumont. Traités de législation civile et pénale, extraits des manuscrits de J. Bentham; espec. in the section bearing the title:Note 23 · (p. 27). S. Rudolph Wagner. Der Kampf um die Seele, vom Standpunkt der Wissenschaft. (Sendschreiben an Herrn Leibarzt Dr. Beneke in Oldenbur Note 24 · (p. 27). Fechner’s psycho-physical law, even were it assured, whereas it awakens continually increasing doubt and opposition, could only be Note 25 · (p. 28). It is necessary to be on one’s guard against drawing from the principle of love of our neighbour the conclusion that each has to ca Note 26 · (p. 29). The fact that we are often unable to measure the more remote results of our actions offers a more serious difficulty. But even this Note 27 · (p. 29). That in the case of the limits of right (Rechtsgrenzen) we have essentially to do with spheres which lie at the disposal of the ind Note 28 · (p. 35). The Stoics, and in the Middle Ages, the followers of Scotus.Note 29 · [64] (p. 36). Metaph. Δ 10.Note 30 · (p. 34). Metaph. Δ 10.Note 31 · (p. 37). This is the standing doctrine of the great theologians, as e.g. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica. Only certain nominalists, l