Note 23 — CONTENTS

(p. 14). Miklosich, Subjectlose Sätze, second edition, Vienna, 1883.

In order to make the reader familiar with the contents of this valuable little book a notice written at the time for the Vienna Evening Post may prove useful. Through an oversight it was printed as a feuilleton in the Vienna newspaper. As no one certainly would look for it there, I will include it here by way of an appendix. Meantime, Sigwart’s monograph, The Impersonalia has appeared, in which he opposes Miklosich. Marty has submitted this, as well as (shortly before) the corresponding section in Sigwart’s Logic to a telling criticism in the Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosopie, with regard to which criticism Sigwart, though without any reasonable ground, has shown himself highly indignant. “Il se fache,” the French say, “donc il a tort.” That Sigwart’s theory in its essential points has not succeeded, even Steinthal really allows, though in his Zeitschrift (chap. xviii. p. 172 seq.) he burns thick clouds of incense to the writer of the monograph, and even in his preface to the fourth edition of his Origin of Language applauds a form of conduct which every true friend of that deserving man (Sigwart) must regret. After the high praise awarded to him at the outset, one feels somewhat disappointed finally by the criticism. Steinthal rejects (pp. 177-180) Sigwart’s theory on its grammatical side. There would only remain therefore as really successful Sigwart’s psychological theory. But the psychological portion is not that concerning which Steinthal’s estimate is authoritative; for in that case, one would be bound to take seriously the following remark: “In the proposition: “Da bückt sich’s hinunter mit liebendem Blick” (a line from Schiller’s Diver), it is obvious that everybody must think of the king’s daughter, but it is not she which stands before me but a subjectless “sich hinunter-bücken,” and now I have all the more fellow-feeling for her. According to my (Steinthal’s) psychology, I should say the idea of the king’s daughter “fluctuates” (schwingt) but does not enter into consciousness.” This calls for something more than the old saying: Sapienti sat.

I

The psychological theory of Sigwart shows itself in all its weakness when he seeks to give an account of the notion of “existence.” It has been already recognized by Aristotle, that this notion is gained by reflection upon the affirmative judgment. But Sigwart, like most modern logicians, neglects to make use of this hint. Instead of saying that to the existent belongs everything of which the affirmative judgment is true, he becomes repeatedly, and once more in the second edition of his logic (pp. 88-95) involved in diffuse discussions upon the notion of being and upon existential propositions, which cannot in any way conduce to clearness, seeing that they move in false directions.

“To be,” according to Sigwart, expresses a relation (pp. 88, 95); if it be asked: What kind of a relation? the answer would, at first sight (92), appear to be, a relation to me as thinking. But no; the existential proposition asserts just this: “that the existing also exists, apart from its relation to me and to another thinking being.” It cannot, therefore, be “a relation to me as thinking.” But what other relation can be meant? Not until p. 94 is this brought out more clearly. The relation ought to mean (of course he adds “zunächst”, provisionally) the agreement (“identity” ib.) of the thing represented with a possible impression (“einem Wahrnehmbaren” ib. “something which may be perceived by me,” ib. p. 90).

Now it will be immediately recognized that this notion of existence is too narrow; for it might very well be asserted that much exists which it is not possible to perceive, e.g. a past and a future, an empty space, and any sort of deficiency, a possibility or impossibility, etc., etc. It is therefore not surprising that Sigwart himself seeks to widen the notion. But he does this in a manner which I find it difficult to understand. At first sight he appears to say in order that something may exist it is not necessary that it can be perceived by me; it is enough if it can be perceived by anybody. Or what else can be meant when Sigwart, after what has just been said, that existence was the agreement of the thing represented with a possible impression, thus continues: “That which exists stands not merely in this relation to me but to all other existing beings?” It cannot surely mean that Sigwart is inclined to ascribe to every existing being the capacity to receive every impression. It may be he only wishes to say that everything which exists stands to every other existing being in the relation of existence, and then it might be concluded from what immediately follows that this rather meaningless definition is intended to express that existence is the capacity to act or to be acted upon. (“What exists ... stands in causal relations to the rest of the world”; similar also is p. 91, note: the existent is something which “can exercise effects upon me and others.”) Finally, however, there is some ground for thinking Sigwart would say: what exists is that which can be perceived or can be inferred as perceivable, for he adds: “hence (on account of this causal relation) from what is perceivable also an existence which is merely inferred may be asserted.”

That all this is equally to be rejected it is not difficult to recognize.

For (1) To “infer” the existence of something does not mean so much as “to infer that it is capable of being perceived.” If, for example, the existence of atoms and of empty spaces could be assured by inference, we should still be very far from proving their perceptibility either to ourselves or to some other being. If any one were to conclude the existence of God while giving up the attempt “to give vividness” to the thought by anthropomorphic means, he would not on this account believe that God must be perceptible to one of his creatures or even that he is the object of his own perception.

2. From this point of view it would be absurd for any one to say: “I am convinced that there is much the existence of which can neither be perceived at any time or even inferred by anybody.” For that would mean: “I am convinced that much can be perceived or can be inferred to be capable of perception which yet can never be perceived or inferred.” Who does not recognize here how far Sigwart has strayed from the true notion of existence!

3. Should Sigwart wish in this passage to widen the notion of existence to such a degree as to think that existence is that which can either be perceived or inferred from some perceivable object, or again, stands in some sort of causal relation to what is perceivable, it might be replied—if indeed such a monstrous notion of existence still require refutation—that even this notion is still too narrow. If, for example, I say: It may be that an empty space exists but this can never with certainty be known by any one, I thereby confess that existence may perhaps belong to empty space; but I deny most definitely that it is perceptible, or that it is to be inferred from that which is perceptible. In regard to relations of cause and effect on the other hand, it is of course impossible that empty space (which is certainly no thing) can stand in such a relation to anything perceivable. We should thus once again arrive at an absurd meaning in interpretation of an assertion in no way absurd.

How wrongly Sigwart has analysed the notion of existence is also proved very simply by means of the following proposition: A real centaur does not exist; a centaur in idea, however, certainly exists, and that as often as I imagine it. Whoever does not clearly recognize here the distinction of the “ὂν ὡς ἀληθές i.e. in the sense of existing, from ὂν in the sense of real (wesenhaft) will I fear hardly be brought to recognize it by the fullest illustrations which might be furnished by further examples. We may, however, also consider briefly the following point: According to Sigwart, the knowledge of the existence of anything consists in the knowledge of the agreement of something represented in idea with, let us say, χ, since I do not clearly understand with what. What now is necessary in order to recognize the agreement of something with something else? Manifestly, the knowledge of everything which is required in order that this agreement should really exist. But this requires (1) that the one element exist, (2) that the other element exist, and (3) that between them there exist the relation of identity since what does not exist can be neither like something nor different from it. But the knowledge of the first element constitutes already in itself a knowledge of existence. Hence the knowledge of the two remaining elements is no longer necessary to the recognition of any existence, and Sigwart’s theory leads to a contradiction. (Cf. with what has been said here, Sigwart’s polemic against my Psychology, book ii. chap. vii. in his work; The Impersonalia, p. 50 seq., and Logic, vol. i. second edition, p. 89 seq. note, as well as Marty’s polemic against Sigwart in the articles: “Über Subjectlose Sätze” in the Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, viii. i. seq.)[A]