NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE. (continued 3)

Aug. 20/31 to Aug. 29/Sept. 9. (For this period the documents accessible to me give no information, but the Gabriel was doubtless pursuing her homeward way uneventfully along the coast of Kamchatka.)

Aug. 30/Sept. 10. A heavy storm arose with fog and the Gabriel finding herself dangerously close to the shore anchored near the land to ride it out. A note in Harris indicates that they may have been near Karaginski Island.

Aug. 31/Sept. 11. At one P.M. the storm had abated, but in weighing anchor the cable had been so chafed by the rocky bottom that it parted and they lost the anchor, and were obliged to put to sea without recovering it.

Sept. 1/12, 1728. At five o'clock in the afternoon they approached and at seven the next morning entered the mouth of the Kamchatka river, thus ending the voyage.

Note.—The Gabriel was secured in a slough of the river and the party went up the river to the fort of Lower Kamchatka where Bering passed the winter.

It is certain that the residents of Kamchatka and others more or less familiar with the reports of Cossack explorations in Chukchi-land were not altogether satisfied with the summary manner in which exploration had been given up by Bering, and his apparent assumption that there was no adjacent land to the eastward except small islands. More or less such discussion and criticism could hardly have failed to reach his ears, and his reflections may have led him to think that, after all, he had been too hasty. Trees not indigenous to Kamchatka had been seen floating near the shores, no heavy breakers ever proceeded from the eastward and it was even alleged that land or the loom of land might be seen to the east from the coast mountains in very clear weather. On account of these and other reasons¹⁴ which were urged by residents of the country, Bering determined to make a new trial. Instead of proceeding directly to Okhotsk across Kamchatka he fitted out the Gabriel for another voyage. Beside the fact that Luzhin, one of his cartographers, had explored the Kurile Islands lying next to Kamchatka, the vessel Fortuna during Bering's absence had doubled Cape Lopatka and was anchored in the Kamchatka River when Bering entered it on his return. It was therefore evident that the straits were navigable and the return voyage might be made that way. Spanberg was ordered to Bolsheretsk "on account of illness" (L.), and it is possible he took the Fortuna back there since she had already returned to Bolsheretsk when Bering reached that port, on his way to Okhotsk.

[¹⁴ The natives even claimed that a man had been stranded on the coast of Kamchatka in 1715, who stated that his own country lay to the eastward and contained forests with high trees and large rivers. (Lauridsen, op. cit. Am. ed. p. 51). Bering himself states that he made the search of 1729 at the instance of the Kamchatkan residents.]

Lauridsen has ascribed to Bering's own initiative the willingness to make another search for land as if these ideas were original with him. It is evident that this is unjustified and fanciful. Müller's account shows that the incitement to a second attempt proceeded from the residents of the country and that Bering complied with their suggestions; and Bering says so himself in his report.

On June¹⁵ 5/16, 1729, the Gabriel left the mouth of the Kamchatka River and stood to the eastward, directly off shore. She continued on this course about forty-eight hours, sailing a distance variously estimated at from ninety to one hundred and thirty miles. The weather was foggy, no land was seen, the wind shifted to dead ahead at east northeast, and on the third day Bering gave up the search and steered for the southern coast of Kamchatka, the extreme of which is marked by the point known as Narrow (Ooskoi) Cape, or more generally as Shovel (Lopatka) Cape, from its low square termination. He determined the latitude of this cape, and passing through the strait south of it reached Bolsheretsk on the west coast of the peninsula on the second of July. Most of this time was probably spent in tracing the form of the southern part of Kamchatka. Half way between the Kamchatka River and the coast the variation was observed to be one point easterly, and off Avatcha Bay three-quarters of a point easterly.

[¹⁵ Lauridsen says July, which is erroneous.]

In the American translation of Lauridsen it is said (p. 51) that Bering fixed the difference of latitude (for which one should read longitude) between Bolsheretsk and Lower Kamchatka Ostrog at 6° 29'. But on Bering's maps the difference is only 3° 50', while in his list of positions no longitude is assigned to Lower Kamchatka post. In Campbell's list it stands at 8° 39', which the correction of an evident error of 98° for 95° reduces to 5° 39'. The true difference of longitude according to the latest charts is about 5° 25'. Where Lauridsen got his figures he does not state. Campbell, in Harris, states that Bering was the first navigator to double Cape Lopatka, but the Fortuna had made this voyage in 1728, though her commander is not known.

At Bolsheretsk Bering left a crew for the Fortuna which had returned thither; turned over some of his surplus stores to the local authorities and on the 14/25 July sailed from the Bolshoia River for Okhotsk. Here he arrived July 23/Aug. 3 and after some days spent in turning over government property to the local officials and procuring his horses and outfit, he left Okhotsk July 29/Aug. 9 on the overland journey to St. Petersburg. The second eclipse of the moon for the year occurred on this day, but during hours of daylight, and hence was invisible in this part of Asia.

After an uneventful but successful journey Bering arrived in St. Petersburg Mar. 1/12, 1730, bringing with him, according to Du Halde, the map and report he had prepared upon his explorations.

TABLE OF GEOGRAPHICAL POSITIONS DERIVED FROM BERING'S FIRST VOYAGE, REDUCED TO GREENWICH, E. LONGITUDE.

Meridian used in the original, Tobolsk. Tobolsk. Tobolsk. Ferro. Ferro. Greenwich.

Amount used for reduction, +67°. +67°. +67°. –18°. –18°.

Source of the data, Bering¹⁶ MS. Campbell.¹⁷ Du Halde. D'Anville. Müller. Modern charts.

Date, 1730? 1730? 1736. 1753. 1758. 1852-88.

° ' ° ' ° ' ° ' ° ' ° '

Okhotsk 58 54 141 30 59 13 143 07 58 54 141 20 — — — — 59 20 141 15 59 20¹⁸ 142 40

Bolsheretsk, Kamchatka 52 35 155 28 52 42 156 51 52 40 155 25 52 40 155 30 52 54¹⁹ 156 30²⁰ 52 51 156 50

Upper Kamchatka settlement 54 10 157 10 54 48 158 00 54 10 157 15 53 40 156 30 54 28 156 55 — — — —

Lower Kamchatka settlement 55 46 159 28 56 11 162 30²¹ 55 50 159 15 56 05 159 00 56 20 159 30 56 15 162 15

Cape, at Kamchatka river-mouth 55 52 162 05 56 03 163 10²² 55 40 162 10 56 00 159 20 56 10 160 20 56 00 163 05

Cape Thaddeus (Navarin) 61 50 176 05 62 20 178 32²³ 62 00 176 00 62 05 171 14 62 25 175 20 62 15 179 02

West point, entrance Holy Cross Bay 65 16 179 40 65 35 182 15²⁴ 65 15 180 00²⁵ 65 15 175 10 65 30 178 45 65 28 181 12

Mouth of river, Holy Cross Bay 66 00 179 40 — — — — 65 50 179 50 65 45 175 00 66 15 178 15 66 22 180 45

Transfiguration Bay (east entrance) 64 45 185 15 65 01 187 30 64 40 185 10 64 25 180 00 — — — — 64 45 185 15

Cape Chukotski, of Bering 63 55 186 55 64 25 189 55²⁶ 64 02 186 10 64 10 181 10 64 35 185 10 64 14 186 50

N. W. point St. Lawrence Id. 63 50 187 00 64 00 189 55 64 02 187 20 64 00 181 20 64 15 186 05 63 52²⁷ 188 27

St. Demetrius Id. (Big Diomede) 65 42 189 05²⁸ 66 00 192 42²⁹ — — — — 66 00 183 20²⁸ — — — —³⁰ 65 50 190 25

East Cape of Asia 66 40 189 40 67 18 193 07³¹ 66 45 189 45 66 30 184 00 66 45 187 25 66 05 190 30

Bering's farthest not indicated. 67 18 193 07³² — — — — — — — — 66 45³³ 187 25 — — — —

Petropavlovsk, Avacha Bay 53 10 160 02 53 12 159 50 53 15 157 00 52 50 158 55 52 55³⁴ 158 13 53 02 158 39³⁵

Cape Uskoi, or Lopatka³⁶ 50 50 155 05 51 10 156 51 51 10 155 10 51 20 156 00 51 20³⁷ 157 00 50 52 156 47

¹⁶ This column is taken directly from Baron Klinckofström's manuscript copy of Bering's chart.

¹⁷ Date of Campbell's Harris' Voy., 1748; date of table of positions, 1728; fide Campbell, 1021, col. 2.

¹⁸ The positions in this column are taken from the most recent charts of the U. S. Coast Survey and the U. S. and Russian Hydrographic bureaux.

¹⁹ Determined in 1741 by Krassilnikoff to be 52° 55' and 156° 24' E. Gr.

²⁰ From the chart; on p. 114 Müller has 156° 10'.

²¹ Campbell has 98° 30' E. of Tobolsk, an error(?), for 95° 30' (=162° 30' E. Gr.). Bering omits this position.

²² Campbell's confusion of two entries is here corrected from Bering's Report.

²³ Confused with preceding entry by Campbell.

²⁴ Campbell's confusion here corrected.

²⁵ Bering gives both east and west points of entrance in his table.

²⁶ The southern end of the cape is assumed to be meant.

²⁷ U. S. Coast Survey, 1880, Marcus Baker, observer; his position is reduced to the N. W. extreme of the island by adding 5' of latitude and deducting 30' 35" in longitude. See Bull. Phil. Soc. of Washington, iv, p. 133, 1882, and U. S. Coast Survey Report for 1880, App. No. 16.

²⁸ St. Diomide on the chart.

²⁹ The island is omitted by Du Halde and Müller, but appears on Campbell's version of Bering's chart.

³⁰ Name St. Deomed on chart, but no island represented.

³¹ Campbell, p. 1024; omitted by Bering from his report.

³² Campbell, p. 1022; also Bering's Report.

³³ From Jefferys' copy of the chart; on p. 47 of text N. Lat. 67° 18' appears but no longitude is given.

³⁴ From the chart; on p. 114 of text it is given as 53° 01' 45". Krassilnikoff (see note 19), made it N. Lat. 53° 01' and 158° 10' E. Lon. from Greenwich, from eclipses of Jupiter's satellites.

³⁵ Lieut. Onatsevich in Report Russ. Hydrographic office, 1878.

³⁶ Oskoi (error for Ooskoi), on most early charts; sometimes Osnoi (error for Uzhnoi=southern).

³⁷ From the chart; the text, p. 114, makes it 51° 03'.

RESUMÉ OF THE RESULTS.

Bering had brought a party, together with supplies and material, over the rough and difficult but long-traveled routes to Okhotsk. Wherever he went he found settlements and roads such as they were. He transported his material to Bolsheretsk and from there across the peninsula to Lower Kamchatka settlement. It would have been much easier and shorter to have doubled the peninsula and taken his stores by sea; one of his party had already explored the straits near Cape Lopatka, but there was the chance of disaster in this plan and, with his stores on terra firma, Bering cannot be blamed for taking the land route; especially as the difficulties would not inconvenience him personally. He succeeded in getting his stores and shipwrights to the place designated and there prepared himself for the voyage. In all this there was difficulty and trouble enough of a certain kind. That it all was surmounted with success is very creditable to Bering and his officers. But to call it exceptionally heroic or extraordinary, is to forget the hundreds of others who preceded Bering, without the strong arm of the government at their backs, who made the trails he followed, who founded the settlements at which he rested, who raised the dogs, the horses and the cattle which were used or consumed by his party.

Whatever praise we may feel due to Bering and his companions, and it is certainly no stinted allowance, the appreciation of their struggles cannot fail to include with justice, the still more remarkable and nearly forgotten pioneer labors of the undaunted Siberiaks, who paved the way, not only for Bering's weary journey, but for the slow yet never ceasing march of civilization.

After leaving port Bering traced the shores of Kamchatka and eastern Siberia as far as East Cape. Thence he sailed in a northeasterly direction. At 3 P.M., Aug. 14th, land was seen astern; the vessel continued in the same direction until 3 P.M. the next afternoon, having, at most, sailed about twenty-four hours out of sight of land but in shallow water. Bering then concluded he had gone far enough to show the separation of Asia from America, or any land to the eastward. No doubt he was influenced by the testimony of the residents of Kamchatka who knew the work which had been performed in this region by Deshneff and others, and also by the fact that the native testimony all pointed the same way. If he was convinced of the truth of this testimony he would have been disposed to accept as conclusive evidence which would not be so regarded by critics. All the evidence shows Bering as faithful to the letter of his orders, honest, patient with the ill-doing or insubordination of others, but perfectly satisfied with the accomplishment of what he had been specifically directed to perform, and with a tendency to limit the specifications to the narrowest construction they would bear. He adventured nothing beyond. In the arbitrary government under which he served, with the violent competition between foreign officers in the Russian service for promotion in rank and pay, who can criticise him for the prudence and caution which kept him well within his instructions? I certainly do not. But to say that he was a cautious, prudent and sagacious officer, is a different thing from asserting he was a daring, adventurous and heroic explorer. I have not been able to discover anything in his career justifying the latter estimate of his character.

At all events in the present case it must in time have occurred to him, or have been suggested by his officers or by the Kamchatkans after his return that the mere sailing off shore in admittedly shallow water for twenty-four hours, was not an absolutely conclusive proof that the continents were separated. Here was a man with a new vessel, a full crew, a year's provisions for all hands, who has come half around the globe, taking three and a half years to do it, building ships and at no end of labor of one sort and another; all this to get into the region where there is a question to be answered; and when he gets there he barely gives twenty-four hours to searching for that answer with a month of the season still available for work; and then starts for home without settling the question; with a right conclusion, it is true, but not of his own discovery, and without securing definite proof to defy critics.

Leaving out of account the continent within half a day's sail which he fairly ran away from, ignorantly, where is there anything adventurous, daring or heroic in such conduct?

It is evident that if Bering had sailed along the coast which the Chukchis said extended to the westward, instead of going off shore, away from it, he would have confirmed that part of their testimony, and given high probability to the assumption of their correctness in the rest.

As it was, he left the question in a state so unsettled as to be a subject of debate for nearly half a century; even authorities so friendly as Dr. Campbell assuming with great confidence that Bering's conclusions as to the separation of the two continents were erroneous. It was not until the voyages of Captain Cook and his associates were given to the world in 1784 that the matter was settled beyond controversy.

Even in regard to the details of his voyage it was only through Bergh's publication of Chaplin's logbook of the voyage in 1823, that the public were informed as to what Bering did, and it was only in 1847 that the unmutilated, but still ambiguous Report of 1730 was accessible even in Russian typography.

We find that all the authorities who published in the last century copies of Bering's map and accounts of his expedition arrived at what Lauridsen calls an "interesting misunderstanding."

This misunderstanding was that he had sailed along the Chukchi coast, as above suggested, and that his farthest point was in latitude 67° 18' on the coast of northeastern Siberia.

How was it possible that men of such exceptional intelligence as Du Halde and D'Anville and Müller, and Hazius, and Euler and Campbell were all so deceived?

The facts are as follows:

(1) The verbatim Report of the voyage, the logbook of the expedition, Bering's chart in its entirety, were inaccessible to the public for many years; the chart has never been fully engraved for publication.

(2) The fragments of the Report which were circulated in print were ambiguous in their language or erroneously modified; while the published reductions of the chart which got into print were misleading, or even erroneous.

(3) Two conflicting versions of the manuscript chart were circulated and appear to have been officially sent out. That which appears to be the later of the two is in some details quite erroneous and at variance with Bering's report as printed and with the facts derived from Chaplin's logbook, these two constituting the only authentic original information which has yet reached the public in printed form. But these two sources of correct data about the expedition were not printed until long after the charts had been widely circulated, while the extracts from the Report which appeared in print, even under so friendly an editor as Dr. Campbell were so modified as to support rather than expose the original error. How this arose there may be something in the Russian archives to explain, or, if not, the case seems insoluble. Whatever conclusion one arrives at, it is difficult to acquit Bering of all responsibility for the misconception, if, as Lauridsen claims, he was responsible for the chart of Du Halde in the form it was engraved.

In his report he states that their northernmost latitude was 67° 18', that "all along the seacoast to this place wind elevated mountains." On turning to the Du Halde chart we find the range of mountains continued along the Chukchi coast until it reaches the latitude of 67° 18' where it stops. If Bering drew the chart so, it would have been deception, but it is quite as probable that the editor modified the chart in engraving it, to correspond to his understanding of Bering's ambiguity. As this would present nothing questionable to the reader, in the absence of the details omitted by Bering, it would have been nothing surprising if Campbell's interpolation of a false longitude for Lower Kamchatka, in his list of positions, might have been, not a typographical error, but an attempt to make the position agree with this erroneous assumption. If it was a pure accident, the coincidence is extraordinary. Of course Bering never was on this coast but Du Halde's map is so engraved as to lead directly to the false inference that he had been.

Again Bering says in his Report that at his turning point the land no longer extended to the north and that no projecting points could be observed in any direction. Since he had deliberately sailed away from the shores without attempting to follow their trend this observation would be absurd unless we suppose it addressed to a reader who took it for granted that the vessel was still skirting the coast. There is no mention in his Report of the fact that he had sailed away from the coast, nor of the still more important fact that the soundings showed that the water was comparatively shallow and discolored. Of course in the absence of direct proof of the separation of Asia and America this last evidence would tend to indicate that Bering was only in a bay or shallow arm of the sea and that he suppressed it shows, if not a want of candor, at least an injudicious reticence.

The map for the day when it was made (in the earlier version) was a good one, and is appropriately praised by Cook, who had a copy of Campbell's Harris on his vessel when exploring in the same region fifty years later.

In his report of the trip eastward from Kamchatka in 1729, Bering says nothing about the weather being foggy or stormy, but merely asserts that he sailed nearly 200 versts and saw no trace of land. He leaves it to be inferred that he could have seen land if it had been there to see, which if the weather was foggy was not true.

The impression which these facts leave upon the mind is that Bering did certainly frame his language so as to convey the idea that his evidence of the separation of the two continents and of the absence of land eastward from Kamchatka was more conclusive than it was in reality.

That this was done to avoid criticism seems a natural inference. That an examination of his list of positions would have shown the location of the point whence he turned back to be to the eastward of the easternmost of his reported land is true, but his list of positions was not published with his report, does not agree with his maps, and when published by Campbell was garbled, as I have shown.

That the truth, however, did get out and that criticism was not successfully avoided, is a matter of history. There can be little doubt that Bering's anxiety to undertake the second expedition, which followed, was stimulated by a desire to set these criticisms (which would naturally be magnified by his enemies) finally at rest.

It may be suggested that Bering's report was modified by the authorities, though why they should make these particular modifications is not very evident. Bering was the only person who could profit by them and the natural conclusion is that he should be held responsible.

In pointing out that some of Bering's acts are vulnerable to criticism I am far from desiring to sully his memory or give the idea that he was not entitled to great praise for what he accomplished, much of which was admirably done.

I wish merely to apply a gentle corrective to the exaggerated and injurious flattery and undiscriminating praise which has been injudiciously indulged in by his latest biographer.

If the interest in the subject be stimulated by discussion from these opposing points of view, so as to result in the publication of some of the material still hidden in the Russian archives I shall be more than repaid for the time I have devoted to the question, even if the publication of the original data should show some of my conclusions to be ill founded or erroneous.

Note—The reception of the original work of Bergh while reading the proofs of these pages has enabled me to correct several errors of previous writers, but it was too late to incorporate here the additional material which Bergh's work affords. This will enable me to add, in a future publication, some historical data which have never appeared in English and which are necessary to complete the record. I desire in this place to express my gratitude for and appreciation of the liberality of the authorities of that ancient seat of learning, the University of Upsala, as exhibited in their willingness to send such a valuable document to a foreign student half around the world for purposes of historical research.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE BY MARCUS BAKER.

ON THE ALLEGED OBSERVATION OF A LUNAR ECLIPSE BY BERING IN 1728-9.

Bering was in Eastern Siberia, Kamchatka and the adjacent waters in 1728 and 1729. Could he have observed a lunar eclipse there at that time?

According to the ephemeris of Manfred¹ published at Bonn in 1725 there were two partial eclipses of the moon visible in Europe in 1728, and two total eclipses of the moon in 1729.

¹ Manfredius (Eustachius). Novissimae ephemerides motuum coelestium e Cassinianis tabulis ad meridianum Bononiae supputatae auctoribus Eustachio Manfredio (etc.) Tomus 1. ex anno 1726 in annum 1737 (etc.) 4° Bononiae, MDCCXXV.

In regard to these four eclipses the ephemeris furnishes the following data:

1728, Feb. 24. 1728, Aug. 19. 1729, Feb. 13. 1729, Aug. 8.

Eclipse begins 18^h 32^m 4^h 07^m 7^h 45^m 12^h 02^m

Total immersion — — — — 8 46 13 02

Middle of eclipse 20 0 5 35 9 35 13 52

Emersion begins — — — — 10 24 14 42

Eclipse ends 21 29 7 03 11 25 15 42

Digits eclipsed 9 51 S. 7 45 N. 19 46 19 44 S.

Sun rises 18 36 — — — — — —

Sun sets — — 6 49 — — — —

Eclipse Partial Partial Total Total.

Sun's declination –9° 38' +12° 42' –13° 16' +16° 09'

" hourly motion + 0.9 – 0.8 + 0.8 – 0.7

In this table the calendar is Gregorian, the time is apparent or true sun time, the day is reckoned from noon and the hours are counted continuously through the entire 24.

The present observatory in Bonn is in

Latitude 50° 43' 45" N.

Longitude 0^h 28^m 23^s E. from Greenwich.

At the date of the first eclipse Bering was on his way across the southern end of Kamchatka from Bolsheretsk to Lower Kamchatka. This would make his position somewhere near latitude 55° N. and longitude 160° or 10^h 40^m E. from Greenwich.

He was therefore 10^h 12^m east of Bonn for which we have the elements of this eclipse as computed by Manfred. With this data together with the latitude and sun's declination we have the following data for the eclipse in the region where Bering was.

Beginning of eclipse 4^h 44^m

Middle of eclipse 6 12

End of eclipse 7 41

Sun sets 5 07

This means that the sun set, bearing about W. by S. ½ S., and the moon rose in partial eclipse, bearing about E. by N. ½ N., at 5^h 07^m after apparent noon or 23 minutes after the eclipse had begun. The eclipse lasted for 2^h 34^m after sunset, or until 7^h 41^m in the evening, thus rendering observation of the last contact plainly visible.

At the date of the second eclipse of 1728, August 19, Bering was at sea somewhere in the vicinity of the strait which bears his name. Assuming his position to have been latitude 65° N. and longitude 188° or 12^h 32^m E. from Greenwich, equal to 12^h 04^m E. from Bonn, and as before taking the data from Manfred's ephemeris we have as follows:

Beginning of eclipse 16^h 11^m

Middle of eclipse 17 39

End of eclipse 19 07

Sun rises 16 04

It thus appears that the first contact of this partial eclipse of the northern limb of the moon may have been just barely visible to Bering. The moon bearing about SW. by W. was entering the earth's shadow about five minutes before the sun's rising and its own setting. If much importance attaches to determining the possibility to Bering of observing this eclipse then a more precise calculation is needful.

At the date of the first lunar eclipse of 1729, February 13, Bering was at Lower Kamchatka, in latitude 56° 03' N. and longitude 162° 15' or 10^h 49^m E. from Greenwich equal to 10^h 21^m E. from Bonn. For this place we have from Manfred:

Eclipse begins 18^h 06^m

Total immersion 19 07

Middle of eclipse 19 56

Emersion begins 20 45

Eclipse ends 21 46

Sun rises 19^h 21^m

Thus it appears that this total and almost central eclipse of the moon lasting 3^h 40^m began at Bering's station 1^h and 15^m before sunrise of February 14, the total immersion occurring 14 minutes before sunrise. It is manifest, therefore, that Bering might have observed this eclipse.

The second lunar eclipse of 1729 occurred August 8, when Bering was in or near Okhotsk and about returning to Europe. We may assume his position to have been latitude 59° 20' N. and longitude 142° 40' or 9^h 31^m E. from Greenwich, equal to 9^h 03^m E. from Bonn. This eclipse was also total and almost central, but at Bering's station was wholly invisible, beginning at 9^h 05^m A.M. and ending at 12^h 45^m P.M.