BOOK THE EIGHTH. (continued 2)

Ch. XIV.—How the Swiss secured the French army in its retreat.—1495.

But to continue this discourse: Our rear was brought up by three hundred Swiss, with several field-pieces, and a strong body of hackbutters, who drove off the Estradiots, who were not numerous. However, the grand army which had fought us was pursuing with all possible diligence, but as they began their march a day after us, and were heavily armed, they could not get up to us; so that we lost not a man in our retreat, nor could they ever come within twenty miles of our rear. When they found they could not come up with us, (and perhaps they never desired it,) they turned off towards Novara, where, as we said before, the Duke of Milan and the Venetians had another army; but if they could have reached us, soon after we began our retreat, in all probability they had succeeded better than in the valley of Fornovo.

I have said in several places of these Memoirs, that I have seen, and by experience found, that God the Creator was our conductor in this expedition into Italy; yet it is convenient for me to repeat it again, for though from the time of the battle to our arrival at Nice, our quarters were taken up without proper order, yet we bore the hardships and inconveniences of the long march, without raising any mutiny or murmuring in the least. Our great want was of provisions, yet we were in some measure supplied by the country people, who might easily have poisoned us if they had pleased, not only in our victuals and wine, but in our water too, and our wells, which might have been dried up in a moment; for I do not remember I saw any but what were very small. If they had had a mind to have destroyed us by poison, it was in their power to have done it, and therefore we may reasonably believe our Saviour and Redeemer Jesus Christ prevented that desire in them. I have seen our men so thirsty, that our foot in great numbers have lain down, and drank out of the ditches round about the little villages through which we marched. Our marches were long, and our drink nothing but standing water that stank; and yet our men were so greedy, they plunged in it up to the waist to come at it; for we had multitudes that followed, the camp, and were not soldiers, but attended to our mules. The king always marched before day, but never took a guide with him, nor baited till noon, and then he dined; and those that attended him took what care they could of themselves. No man in the whole army, though of the best quality, was excused from looking to his own horse, but every one brought his own straw or hay in his arms. Twice I did it myself, and was two days without eating any thing but bread, and that none of the best; yet I suffered not so much hardship as others did. Our army was highly to be commended for one thing, and that is, that I never heard any of our soldiers complain; and yet it was the most painful and incommodious march I ever made, though I have been through several that were bad enough, with Charles Duke of Burgundy. We marched no faster than our artillery, and were often forced to halt, on purpose to mend the guns, which, because of the want of horses to draw them, incommoded us extremely; but whenever we were hard put to it, we were generously supplied by the officers of the army; so that we lost not one piece, nor one pound of powder in our retreat; and yet I am of opinion never any man saw guns of their size conveyed with such expedition through such impassable places. And if I have mentioned any thing of disorder or inconvenience in our quarters or elsewhere, it was not for want of good officers and men of experience in our army; but (as fortune would have it), they had no authority with the king, who was young and intractable, as I have said before; so that to conclude, our Saviour Jesus Christ did most manifestly reserve all the glory of that journey to himself.

The seventh day after the battle, we marched from Nice, and encamped all together in the field, not far from Alessandria. We doubled our guards that night, and kept very strict watch, and the next morning we marched to Asti, that is to say, the king and those that attended on him, but the army continued in the field. We found the town of Asti well furnished with provisions, which was a great refreshment to our wearied troops, who wanted them severely, having endured much hunger, thirst, labour, heat, and watching; and after all had no clothes to their backs, but what were ragged and worn out. As soon as the king was in Asti, about an hour before bedtime, I despatched a gentleman named Philip de la Couldre (who had formerly been in my service, but was then a servant to the Duke of Orleans), to Novara, where the duke was besieged, though not so closely but that people might get in and out; for their design was only to starve them. I sent him word by this gentleman, that our king had several treaties on foot with the Duke of Milan (one of which I managed by means of the Duke of Ferrara), for which reason I thought it convenient he should immediately come to the king, after he had assured his party in the town that he would return in a short time, or send them relief. They were no less than 7500 men in pay, and as fine a body of troops (for their number) both French and Swiss, as ever were seen in the field. After the king had been a day at Asti, he had intelligence from the Duke of Orleans and from others, that the enemies’ two armies were joined before Novara; and the duke pressed for supplies, for (by reason of their imprudence at first) their provisions now began to fail; but had they been so provident when they came into the town, as they ought to have been, they need not have been in distress; for there was plenty enough in the villages about it, especially of corn, which if they had brought in time into the town, and carefully laid up in their magazines, they would not have been forced to surrender: for had they held out but one month longer, they would have come off honourably themselves, and covered the enemy with shame and confusion.

Ch. XV.—How the King fitted out a Fleet with an intention to have relieved the Castles of Naples; and of the Miscarriage of that Design.—1495.

As soon as the king had refreshed himself for some few days at Asti, he marched to Turin⁠[432]; and at his departure from Asti he despatched Peron de Basche, the steward of his household, to equip a fleet at Nice with all speed for the relief of the castles of Naples, which held out for the king. Peron obeyed his majesty’s orders, prepared a fleet, and gave the command of it to the Lord d’Arban⁠[433], who sailed with it as far as Pruce⁠[434], within sight of the enemy; but the weather was bad, and would not suffer them to engage, so that the fleet did nothing; for the Lord d’Arban returned to Leghorn, where most part of his men got on shore, and ran away from their ships; and the enemy came with their fleet into the port of Bengon⁠[435], not far from Piombino, where they continued two months; so that our men were able to send some small supplies into Naples, by reason that the nature of the port of Bengon is such, that unless it be by one single wind ships can hardly get out, and that wind blows seldom in winter. The Lord d’Arban was valiant in person, but not a very skilful admiral.

During the king’s stay at Turin many proposals of treaties passed between the king and the Duke of Milan; and some were managed by the mediation of the Duchess of Savoy, who was the Marquis of Montferrat’s daughter, a widow, and mother to the young duke⁠[436] that was then living. Others were transacted by other people: I was also concerned therein: for the confederates (by whom I mean the commanders at that time before Novara), had a great desire to have me employed in the matter, and sent me a passport; but (as there are always emulations at court) the Cardinal would not suffer it, but prevailed that the overture proposed by the Duchess of Savoy might be preferred, which was managed by the Cardinal’s landlord, who was treasurer of Savoy, a wise man, and a good servant to his mistress: this treaty took up a long time, and for this cause the Bailiff of Dijon was sent ambassador into Switzerland, to raise five thousand of their men.

I have already mentioned the equipment of our fleet at Nice, and its setting sail for the relief of the castles of Naples, which it was unable to effect for the above-mentioned reasons; whereupon the Lord de Montpensier, and the rest of the officers that were in the castles aforesaid (perceiving their condition), resolved to march off by the help of the army, which had been left in divers places for the defence of that kingdom, and was then drawn as near the castle as possible; but they left a number to defend the castles proportionable to the quantity of provisions which remained; for they were insufficient to sustain them all. And having given the command of the garrison to the Lord Ognas and two other officers of conduct and experience, the Lord de Montpensier, the Prince of Salerno, the Seneschal of Beaucaire and others, marched off with two thousand five hundred men, for Salerno. King Ferrand pretended it was contrary to their treaty, and that the hostages which they had given him a few days before (which were the Lord d’Alegre, Monsieur de la Marche d’Ardain⁠[437], the Lord de la Chapelle d’Anjou, Monsieur Roquebertin, a Catalonian, and one Monsieur Genly⁠[438]), were at his mercy, and that he might lawfully put them to death. You must understand that some three months before, by intelligence with the enemy, and our bad order, King Ferrand had got into the town of Naples⁠[439], though our men had notice of all his designs. I would enlarge upon this, but I can say nothing of it except by hearsay (yet I had it from very good hands); however, it is not my method to insist upon any thing that I was not an eye-witness of myself. But while King Ferrand was in Naples, he received the news of our master’s being killed in the battle of Fornovo; and our men in the castle had the same news, from several letters and stories forged by the Duke of Milan, which they believed as readily as the Colonne, who revolted from us immediately, as desiring to be always on the strongest side, though (as I said before) they were under great obligations to the king. Upon these reports, but chiefly because our men were confined in great numbers in the castle (where provisions were scarce), and had lost all their horses and household stuff in the town, they came to a treaty, on the 19th of October 1495, after they had been besieged three months and fourteen days; and about three weeks after making the treaty, they marched away. They had promised, that if they were not relieved by a certain day, they would march off into Provence, and leave the castles without doing any farther act of hostility against that kingdom, either by sea or by land; for performance of which promise the said hostages were given. And King Ferrand alleged they had broken their promise by departing without leave; but our men affirmed the contrary; howbeit, the hostages were in no little danger, and not without cause. Whatever their articles were, I think our men did wisely to march away; but they had done better if they had delivered up the castles when they went, and taken their hostages along with them: for by reason of their want of provisions and their despair of relief, the remaining garrison was forced to surrender within twenty days after, and the loss of the castle of Naples was the loss of the whole kingdom.

Ch. XVI.—Of the great Famine and Misery to which the Duke of Orleans and his army were reduced at Novara: Of the Death of the Marchioness of Montferrat: Of the Death of the Duke of Vendôme; and the conclusion of a Peace for the preservation of the besieged after several negotiations.—1495.

The king, during his stay at Turin, or at Quiers⁠[440], (whither he went sometimes for his diversion) grew impatient for the Swiss whom he had sent the Bailiff of Dijon to raise in Switzerland; for he was extremely desirous, if possible, to restore the young Duke of Milan, and paid but little attention to the distress of his cousin the Duke of Orleans, who began to be straitened in provisions, and sent couriers to us every day to beg the king to relieve him. The enemy had advanced their approaches, and gotten nearer the town than ever: besides, they were reinforced with a thousand German horse, under the command of Monsieur Frederic Capelare, of the county of Ferrete, a brave soldier and an excellent officer, and trained in the wars of both Italy and France; they had a recruit likewise of eleven thousand Landsknechts, out of the territories of the King of the Romans, commanded by Monsieur George Dabecfin⁠[441], a native of Austria, a person of great valour, and the very same that took St. Omers for the King of the Romans.

The king, seeing the enemy’s army daily reinforced, and that no honourable terms were to be expected, was persuaded to retire to Vercelli⁠[442], and there to concert measures how to relieve the Duke of Orleans, who (as I have said before) had taken no care to erect any magazines for the subsistence of his army upon his first entrance into Novara; and certainly it had been much better for the duke to have followed the advice which I gave him upon the king’s return to Asti, to put all useless persons out of the town, and repair himself to the king: for his presence would have advanced his affairs, or at least the troops he had left behind would not have been reduced to such extremity of hunger, for he would have capitulated sooner, had he found there was no hope of relief. But the Archbishop of Rouen⁠[443], who was with him at the taking of Novara, and was then with the king, to solicit in his behalf, sent him word not to stir, and assured him of relief; grounding his confidence upon the promises of the Cardinal of St. Malo, who was all powerful with the king. The archbishop spoke as his affections prompted him; but I was assured of the contrary, for nobody had any inclination to return to the battle, unless the king went in person, and his Majesty had no inclination to do so, as the dispute was only about that town, which the Duke of Orleans desired to keep, and the Duke of Milan to recover; because as it is within ten leagues of Milan, he thought it necessary that they should be both under one jurisdiction, there being nine or ten great cities near one another, within a small compass, and all depending upon the said duchy. However, Ludovic Sforza offered fair terms, that if we would deliver up Novara, and not disturb him in Genoa, in other things he would serve the king to the utmost of his power.

Several great convoys of provision, both of corn and meal, were sent into Novara; but they always lost half by the way; and once a small force of sixty men-at-arms, under the command of Chastillon, a young gentleman belonging to the court, was quite routed; some were taken, some few entered, and others with great difficulty escaped; so that it is not possible to imagine the extremity the garrison was reduced to. Every day some were starved to death; two parts out of three were afflicted with distempers of which we had pitiful and continual accounts, both in cipher and otherwise, which came to us with very great difficulty. We constantly gave them fair promises, and as constantly deceived them; those who had the sole administration of affairs were very inclinable to fight, but they did not consider that nobody desired it beside themselves; for the great officers, as for instance the Prince of Orange (whom, upon his late arrival, the king often consulted in military affairs), and all the other officers of the army, desired things might be composed and adjusted by a peace, because winter was approaching, money wanting, the army but weak and sickly, and soldiers deserting daily, whilst others were dismissed by the king. Yet all the wise men in the camp were not able to persuade the Archbishop of Rouen from encouraging the Duke of Orleans not to leave Novara; by which advice they brought him into a great deal of danger; but this advice proceeded from an expectation of great recruits out of Switzerland, which the bailiff of Dijon had assured them he could raise. Some of our courtiers wrote to him to bring as many troops as he could assemble; thus our councils were divided, and every man wrote and said what he pleased.

Those who were averse to an accommodation, or to any meeting about it, pretended the enemy ought to make overtures first, and that it did not consist with the king’s honour to begin; and the enemy being equally haughty on their side, the poor garrison in Novara suffered incredibly, and their letters were full of nothing but relations of their miseries, assuring us, first, that they could not hold out above ten days, then eight, and at last three; but they exceeded the time which they had mentioned. To be brief, such necessities had not been known in our time, nor did ever men suffer so great a famine in a hundred years before.

During this posture of affairs the Marchioness of Montferrat died, and left her country involved in some troubles in respect of the competition for its government. The Marquis of Saluzzo pretended to it on one side, and the Lord Constantine, uncle to the Marchioness, claimed it on the other. He was a Greek as well as his niece, who was the King of Servia’s daughter; but both of them had been ruined by the Turks. This Lord Constantine had fortified the castle of Casale, where he kept in his hands the two sons (the eldest of whom was scarce nine years old) of the late marquis, and that beautiful and discreet lady his niece, who died in the twenty-ninth year of her age, and was a constant friend to the French. Other persons pretended likewise to the government, and there was great contest for it before the king by their respective agents. The king commanded me to proceed thither, with instructions to settle things for the advantage of the young children, and the general satisfaction of the people; fearing lest by these differences the Duke of Milan should be brought in, for the lord of that country was our very good ally.

I was extremely concerned at these orders, especially as I had to depart before I could set the treaty of peace on foot again; for I was sensible in what condition the town was. I saw winter approaching, and apprehended lest the prelates⁠[444] should bring the king to a new battle, in which (unless mightily supplied from Switzerland) he would be probably too weak, and if the supplies were as numerous as they were reported to be, it would not be safe for the king to venture himself in their hands; besides, the enemy were powerful, strongly encamped, and very well fortified. Upon these considerations, I presumed to tell the king that, in my judgment, he was about to put himself and his kingdom in very great hazard, upon a small and trifling occasion; that the danger which he escaped at the battle of Fornovo ought not to be forgotten, but that there he was under necessity, and here he was not. Wherefore I did humbly recommend him not to lose an honourable accommodation by stickling for the first overture; and if he pleased to authorise me, I questioned not but I could make a peace without the least dishonour to either side. He replied that he would have me speak to the Cardinal; and so I did, but he gave me strange unaccountable answers, expressing an inclination to fight, and making sure of the victory; and he told me the Duke of Orleans had promised, whenever he came to the duchy of Milan, to give him ten thousand ducats a year for one of his sons. The next morning I went to wait on the king, and take leave of his majesty, in order to begin my journey to Casale (which would take me about a day and a half). I there met the Lord de la Trimouille, and acquainted him with what had passed (he being related to the king⁠[445]), and desired his judgment whether I ought to mention the affair to him again; he told me to do so by all means, for everybody was very desirous of peace. The king was at that time in the garden; so I revived the discourse before the Cardinal, who told me that it was most proper for him, being an ecclesiastic, to begin it. I answered, if he did not, I would; for I perceived the king was inclinable enough, and so were all that were about him. After which I took my leave; and at my departure I told the Prince of Orange (who commanded the army in chief), that if I began anything in that business, my addresses should be to him; and so I went to Casale, where I was well received by all that family, and found them nearly all in favour of the Lord Constantine, as a fitter person for the guardianship of the children; for he was incapable of the succession, to which the Marquis of Saluzzo pretended a right. For several days together, I assembled both the nobility, clergy, and townsmen, and, at the request of most of them, I declared that it was my master’s pleasure that the Lord Constantine should be continued in the government; for, considering the king’s forces on that side of the mountains, and the affection that country had always retained to the court of France, I presumed they would not contradict the king’s desires.

I had scarce been three days at Casale before there arrived a gentleman from the Marquis of Mantua, captain-general of the Venetians, with compliments of condolence upon the death of the late Marchioness; for he was related to the family of Montferrat. This gentleman was steward of the marquis’s household, and he and I by degrees began to consult how we might prevent the battle that was likely to occur shortly; for all things tended to war, and the king was encamped not far from Vercelli; though, to speak the truth, he had only passed the river, and let his army encamp there, which was but ill-provided with tents and pavilions, for they had brought but few with them, and those few were lost; besides, the ground was moist,—for winter was coming on, and the country is but low.

The king lay but one night in the camp, and returned next morning to the town; but the Prince of Orange remained with the army, and with him the Counts of Foix and Vendôme⁠[446], the latter of whom fell into a dysentery and died, to the unspeakable sorrow of the whole army, for he was a young gentleman of great valour and conduct, and came thither post upon the report of a coming battle; but he was not with the king in his expedition into Italy. There were likewise the Marshal de Gié, and several other commanders, but their principal force was the Swiss, who had been in Italy with the king; for the French, being so near home, were very unwilling to stay any longer in the camp, and several had already left it, some with leave and others without it. From Vercelli to Novara was ten good Italian miles, that is six French leagues; the country was flat and dirty, with ditches on both sides the road, much deeper than those in Flanders: in winter the roads are full of mud, and in summer of dust. Between our army and Novara there was a little town called Borgo, which we had taken possession of; and the enemy had another about the same distance from their camp, called Cameri: but the waters being up, the passage was very difficult from one army to the other.

But as I was saying, the steward of the Marquis of Mantua’s household and I continued our conferences. I gave him several reasons why his master ought to be cautious of coming to a battle. I put him in mind of the danger he had lately escaped, and that he would expose himself for a people who had never rewarded him for services he had done; and that, therefore, his wisest method would be to endeavour an accommodation, and I promised to do all that lay in my power to promote it. He replied that his master was well enough inclined, but that it would be necessary (as I had received intimation before) that we should make the first overture, because they looked upon their alliance, which consisted of the Pope, the King of the Romans, the King of Spain, and the Duke of Milan, to be of greater dignity than a single monarch. I answered that this punctilio was idle and trifling, and that in justice our king was to be preferred, because he was there in person, and the confederates were represented only by their lieutenants. But I offered, if he pleased, that he and I as mediators would set the treaty on foot, provided I could be assured his master would continue it, and observe it; and finally it was concluded that I should send a trumpeter to their army the next morning, and that I should write to Signor Luca Pisani and Signor Melchior Trevisano, the two Venetian proveditors, or commissioners appointed to advise their generals and superintend the affairs of the army.

In pursuance of what we concluded, I wrote to the proveditors the substance of what I had mentioned before to the Marquis of Mantua’s steward; and I had a fair opportunity to offer my mediation, upon account of the agreement made between us at my departure from Venice. Besides, I knew the king was desirous of peace, and I thought it necessary,—for there are always enough persons to perplex and exasperate an affair, but few that combine the good fortune and courage necessary to compose so great a difference, or to endure so many hard words as are said by the plenipotentiaries in such negotiations; for in great armies there is sure to be a variety of opinions. The proveditors were glad of the news, and sent me word I should have an answer very suddenly, for they sent post to Venice for instructions; and having a speedy answer from the Signory, a count belonging to the Duke of Ferrara was sent to our camp. The Duke of Ferrara had one son in the Duke of Milan’s service, and another in the king’s. The count also was in the Duke of Milan’s service, his name was Albertini⁠[447]; but his pretence of coming into our army was to visit Signor John James di Trivulce, and to inquire after one of his sons who was then in that captain’s service. He made application to the Prince of Orange, according to the agreement between the steward and myself, and told him he had a commission from the Marquis of Mantua, and the proveditors and other captains, to desire a passport for the marquis and fifty horse, to meet and confer with such persons as the king should depute; and he acknowledged that in reason they ought to make the first overture to the king, or such as he should appoint, and that they would pay him that honour; and then he desired he might have a private conference with his majesty, which was granted him, and in which he advised him not to set any treaty on foot, assuring him that their army was in great consternation, and would break up in a very short time. By these words he seemed desirous to obstruct that peace which he was sent to promote, though his public commission was as you have heard. Signor John James di Trivulce was present when he gave the king this advice, and being a great enemy to the Duke of Milan, he had no mind to the peace; but, above all, no man was so averse to it as Count Albertini’s master, the Duke of Ferrara, who desired the continuation of the war upon account of an old pique against the Venetians, who had taken from him several territories, as the Polesan and others; and this duke was therefore come himself into the army of the Duke of Milan, who had married his daughter.

As soon as the king had heard what the count had to offer, his majesty sent for me, and it was warmly debated whether a passport should be granted or not. Those who were against the peace (as Signor John James di Trivulce and others, who thought themselves great favourers of the interest of the Duke of Orleans,) were for fighting by all means; but they were, most of them, churchmen, and not like to be in the battle, and they pretended to have certain intelligence that the enemy must suddenly raise the siege, or be starved to death. Others objected (and I was of that number) that we should be starved first; that the enemy were in their own country, and their power too great to be so easily destroyed; and that such counsel proceeded from persons who had a mind to engage us in their quarrels, and set us fighting purely to gratify their own revenge and ambition. Yet, for all this, the passport was granted and sent, signifying, that the next day at two o’clock in the afternoon, the Prince of Orange, the Marshal de Gié, the Lord de Piennes, and myself, with our retinue, should be between Borgo and Cameri, near a certain tower, in which they had a guard, and that there we should be ready to enter into a conference. At the appointed hour, we went to the place under a strong guard. The Marquis of Mantua and a Venetian who had the command of their Estradiots⁠[448], came to us, and in very civil language told us, that for their part they were desirous of peace. For better convenience of treating, it was agreed, that the next day some of their deputies should come into our camp, and that the day after some of ours should go into theirs, which was done. The next morning there came to us Signor Francisco Bernardino Visconti on behalf of the Duke of Milan, and a secretary from the Marquis of Mantua. On our side, besides the persons above mentioned, we had added to us the Cardinal of St. Malo, and we began to treat. They demanded Novara, in which the Duke of Orleans was besieged; and we insisted upon having Genoa, saying, it was feudatory to the king, and that the Duke of Milan had confiscated it. They excused themselves as to that, assuring us that their master had done nothing against the king except in his own defence; that the Duke of Orleans had taken Novara from them by force, and begun the war with our king’s forces; and that therefore they thought their masters would be hardly persuaded to agree to these demands, but in any thing else would be ready to comply. Our conferences lasted two days, after which they returned to their camp, whither the Marshal de Gié, the Lord de Piennes, and myself, were sent after them to press for the restitution of Genoa. We would have been content that Novara should have been surrendered to the forces of the King of the Romans, which were commanded by Signor George di Pietraplanta⁠[449], the Lord Frederic Capellare, and another called Monsieur Hans; for we found it could not be relieved without a battle, which we had no great inclination to venture; and by this means (as we pretended) we proposed to acquit ourselves very honourably to the emperor, of whom the whole duchy of Milan is held as a fief. Several goings and comings there were between our camp and theirs, but we came to no manner of conclusion. I continued constantly with them by the king’s direction (who was unwilling the treaty should be broken off); and, at last, our deputies came to them again, and with us we had the President de Gannay, and one Monsieur de Morvilliers, Bailiff of Amiens, to speak with them in Latin, (for till then I had conducted the conferences in bad Italian,) and to draw up the articles. Our manner of treating was to go to the duke’s quarters, and he, in complaisance, used to meet us with his duchess at the end of a gallery, and then sent us all before him into his chamber, where there were two great rows of chairs ready set, as close as was convenient, and opposite to each other. They placed themselves on one side, and we sate on the other. The first on their side was the commissioner for the King of the Romans, then the Spanish ambassador, then the Marquis of Mantua, after him the two proveditors, then the Venetian ambassador, then the Duke and Duchess of Milan, and last of all the ambassador of Ferrara. On their side none spoke but the Duke of Milan, and on our side nobody but one. It is not our method to discourse with that sedateness of temper which they do, for sometimes two or three of us were speaking at a time; but the duke always interrupted us with, “Hold, gentlemen, one to one.” As we were obliged to digest all into articles, whatever was agreed upon was immediately put into writing by one of our secretaries for us, and by another of theirs for them; and this was read aloud by the secretaries, one in Italian, and the other in French; and this was done again at our next meeting, that we might see whether any thing had been changed; and it is a good way to dispatch any affair of importance. This treaty was in progress about a fortnight or longer; but the first day of our conference it was concluded that the Duke of Orleans might have liberty to come out of Novara, to which end a cessation of arms was agreed upon for that day, and continued from day to day till the conclusion of the peace; and for surety for the passage of the Duke of Orleans, the Marquis of Mantua delivered himself as a hostage into the hands of the Count de Foix; and he did it voluntarily, and more to give us pleasure than from any fear; yet first they made us swear that we were proceeding with sincerity and bona fides in the treaty of peace, and that we did not do it merely to deliver the duke out of danger.

Ch. XVII.—How the Duke of Orleans and his Army were delivered upon Terms of Accommodation from the dire Misery they suffered during their being besieged in Novara; and of the Arrival of the Swiss that came to the Relief of the King and the said Duke of Orleans.—1495.

The Marshal de Gié went into the town of Novara, with other commissioners deputed by the Duke of Milan, and dismissed the Duke of Orleans, and some few of his attendants, to their very great satisfaction. Those who were in the place were so pressed with hunger and sickness, that the marshal was forced to leave his nephew Monsieur de Romefort⁠[450] as an hostage, promising they should all be at liberty to depart within three days. You have heard how the Bailiff of Dijon had been sent into Switzerland to raise five thousand men in all the cantons; but when the Duke of Orleans marched out of Novara they were not arrived; and it was well they were not, for had they joined our army, certainly (at least in my judgment) we should have fought a battle; but if we had been sure that their number would be far greater than we expected, we could not have stayed till their arrival, by reason of the extreme famine in the town, where two thousand people were already dead, some with hunger, some with disease, and the rest were so lean and meagre they looked more like dead than living people; and, truly, I believe never men endured more misery (unless, perhaps, at the siege of Jerusalem). All which had been prevented, if they had been so prudent as to have brought in all the corn and provisions about the town upon their first coming into it: had they acted so wisely they had never plunged themselves into those exigencies, for the enemy would have been obliged to have abandoned the siege, and to have marched shamefully off.

Some three or four days after the Duke of Orleans had left the town, it was agreed on both sides that the whole garrison should march out; and the Marquis of Mantua, and the Lord Galeas di San Severino, (who commanded both the Venetians and the Duke of Milan’s army,) had orders to see them safely conducted away; which was performed, and the town left in the hands of the inhabitants, under an oath not to deliver it either to the French or the Italians till the conclusion of a general peace. Only thirty men were put into the castle, who were supplied with provisions by the Duke of Milan, for money, and they were never to have more provision at a time than was sufficient for one single day. No man that did not see it, can conceive the poverty of the garrison that marched out. They had few or no horses left, for most of them were eaten; and of the five thousand men that marched out, scarcely six hundred were able to defend themselves; they fell down frequently in the road as they marched along, and the enemy were forced to help them up again. I know I saved fifty of them, at the cost of a crown, not far from the little castle called Cameri, which was in the enemy’s possession, by lodging them in a garden, and giving them warm broth, so that but one of them died. Upon the way (it being ten miles between Novara and Vercelli) four more of them died. The king (as a token of his compassion) caused eight hundred francs to be distributed amongst those who came to Vercelli, as a benevolence in addition to their pay, which was paid to a farthing, both to the living and the dead, and particularly to the Swiss, of whom there were near four hundred dead; yet, notwithstanding all the care that could be taken of them, about thirty of them died in Vercelli, some with eating too much, others by diseases, and some on the dunghills of the town.

About the time that all of them had evacuated the town, except the thirty left in the castle (and of these one or other came away every day), the Swiss arrived, to the number of eight or ten thousand, in our camp, in which we had already about two thousand who had served in our expedition to Naples. There were also ten thousand more, but they were quartered at some distance from Vercelli; for the king was advised not to suffer the conjunction of two such great bodies, which would have amounted together to twenty-two thousand men, the greatest number (I think) that ever came out of their country at one time; and I have been informed by those that were well acquainted with the affairs of Switzerland, that they scarce left any fighting men behind them; and those who did come, came for the most part, in spite of our teeth, and their wives and children would also have come along with them, had we not set guards upon the passes in Piedmont on purpose to stop them. It may be demanded whether this extraordinary alacrity proceeded from any extraordinary affection; for King Louis XI. had done them many good offices, and contributed much to make them a reputation in the world. Indeed there were some old soldiers who had a respect for the memory of King Louis; and some of their officers were above seventy-two years old, and had been captains in the wars against Charles Duke of Burgundy; but the chief motives that induced them to leave their own country were avarice and poverty. To speak truth, all their best men came to us; and such a number of brave fellows I had never seen before together in my life; and to me it seemed impossible to conquer them, unless by cold, famine, or some other distress.

But to return to the principal point of our treaty. The Duke of Orleans having lived eight or ten days at his ease and pleasure, and being attended by all sorts of people, was told that it had been stated, as some diminution to his honour, that such a numerous garrison as he had in Novara should have been reduced to such necessities; upon which he began to talk of fighting again, and one or two that were about him encouraged him to it. Monsieur de Ligny and the Archbishop of Rouen were highly for his interest; and some mean persons bribed thirty of the Swiss to come of themselves and offer the enemy battle; but without any reason, for the Duke of Orleans had only thirty men left in the castle, and there was no further occasion to fight, for the king pretended no quarrel of his own, but had come thither only to rescue the duke and his friends; besides the enemy were very powerful, and it was impossible to attack them in their camp; for besides the natural strength of the place, they were strongly entrenched, all the ditches were full of water, and there were no forces but ours to give them any disturbance, as no sallies could be expected out of the town. Their army consisted of two thousand eight hundred men-at-arms barbed, five thousand light horse, and eleven thousand five hundred Germans commanded by good officers (as Signor George di Pietraplanta, Count Frederic Capellare, and Monsieur Hans), besides a great number of foot; so that to talk of attacking them in their entrenchments, or beating them so easily, was but a rhodomontade, and spoken in flattery. Another great dread we had, and that was, lest the Swiss should join in one body, and seize upon the king and all the chief officers of his army (who were not able to resist their power), and carry them into their own country; and of this there was some appearance, as you will see by the conclusion of the peace.

Ch. XVIII.—How Peace was concluded between the King and the Duke of Orleans on the one Part, and the League on the other; and of the Conditions and Articles contained in that Treaty of Peace.—1495.

The debate about this affair grew at last so fierce amongst us, that, in the heat of argument, the Duke of Orleans gave the Prince of Orange the lie; but at last, the Marshal de Gié, the Lord de Piennes, the President Gannay, the Lord de Morvilliers, the Vidame of Chartres⁠[451], and I, returned to the enemy’s camp, and concluded a peace⁠[452], though by several indications we judged it unlikely to continue long; but we were under a necessity of doing it, both in respect of the season of the year, our want of money, and that we might come off honourably in the business; to which end the peace was concluded and engrossed, so that it might be published throughout the world, which was done afterwards by the king’s express order in council, and in the presence of the Duke of Orleans. The substance of it was, that the Duke of Milan should serve the king against all opposers; that, at his own proper charge, the Duke of Milan should fit out two ships for the relief of the castles of Naples, which still held out for the king; that the next year (in case the king made a new invasion upon that kingdom), he should furnish him with three ships, and assist him in person, and give free passage to his troops; that in case the Venetians did not accept the said peace within two months’ time, but continued to assist the House of Aragon, the duke should then take part with the King of France against them, and employ his person and interest in his service, upon condition that whatever was taken from the enemy should be delivered to the duke, for which terms he was to remit to the king eighty thousand of the hundred and twenty-four thousand ducats which he had lent him in his voyage to Naples; that with regard to Genoa, he should put two hostages into the king’s hands; that Castelleto should be committed to the Duke of Ferrara, as a neutral, for two years; that the Duke of Milan should pay one-half of the garrison of Castelleto, and the king the other; and that if it should happen that the duke should at any time attempt to do any thing against the king at Genoa, then the Duke of Ferrara was to deliver Castelleto to the king. He was likewise to give two hostages for Milan, which was performed; and he would have done as much for Genoa, had not the king been in such haste to be gone; but as soon as he went away, the duke made use of shifts and evasions to excuse himself from doing it.

Immediately upon our return from swearing the Duke of Milan to observe this peace, and bringing word that the Venetians had taken two months to accept or refuse (for to other terms we could not persuade them), the king swore likewise to observe the peace; and the next day he resolved to begin his march, as both he and his whole army had a great desire to return into France; but that very night the Swiss who were in our camp began to cabal, and hold private consultations among the men of their several cantons, beating their drums and standing to their arms (as their manner is when they call any councils); and this I was informed of by Monsieur de Lornay, who was then (and had been long before) one of their chief officers, and was well acquainted with their language, and he gave the king intelligence of it.

Some proposed to seize upon the king, and all the chief (that is to say, the rich) officers of the army; others went not so far, but moved that they should demand three months’ pay, on the score of an old promise made them by the late king⁠[453], that such a sum should be paid them whenever they came out of their own country into his service with their colours displayed. Others were for securing the chief ministers about the king, without meddling with his person; and this they designed to put in execution, having already got a great number of their own troops into the town; but before they could come to an agreement among themselves, the king had left for Trino⁠[454] (which is a town belonging to the Marquis of Montferrat). In this they were much in the wrong, for there was never but one month’s pay promised them, and they had done nothing for that. At length, this troublesome affair was adjusted; but first, those Swiss who were with us in the expedition to Naples, had seized upon the Bailiff of Dijon and Monsieur de Lornay (who commanded them all along), and pressed hard for a fortnight’s pay before they marched; but the rest insisted upon pay for three months, which in all amounted to five hundred thousand francs, for the raising of which they took hostages; and to this they were animated by the French themselves, who were averse to the peace; and of this the Prince of Orange was informed by one of their captains, and he immediately informed the king of it.

The king, upon his arrival at Trino, sent the Marshal de Gié, the President Gannay, and myself, to the Duke of Milan, to desire that he would come to him thither. We used several arguments to persuade him, and told him it would be a great confirmation of the peace; but he gave as many to the contrary, and excused himself upon a proposition which Monsieur de Ligny had formerly made to have him seized upon, when he was with the king at Pavia, and upon certain expressions which the Cardinal of St. Malo had used, who, at that time, was the only minister who had influence with the king. It is certain that several idle words had been spoken by some about the court, but yet the king had a great desire to cultivate a friendship with him. The Duke of Milan was at a place called Bolia⁠[455], and consented to a conference, provided it might be upon some river, with a barrier between them.⁠[456] As soon as the king had received his answer, he removed to Quiers⁠[457] where he staid but a night or two, and then marched away to cross the mountains, having despatched me to Venice, and others to Genoa, to see the ships equipped which the Duke of Milan was to lend him; but the duke put the king to great expense in preparations, and at last would not let them go; but instead of keeping his promise, he sent two ships to the enemy.

Ch. XIX.—How the King sent the Lord of Argenton to Venice again, to invite the Venetians to accept the Terms of Peace that were offered, which the Venetians refused; and of the Tricks and Jugglings of the Duke of Milan.—1495.

The business of my embassy to Venice at this time was to know whether they would accept the peace, and subscribe to three articles. The first was to restore Monopoli, which they had lately taken from us; the second was to withdraw the Marquis of Mantua and his forces out of the kingdom of Naples, and from the service of King Ferrand; and the third was to declare that King Ferrand was not comprehended in their recent league, in which mention was made only of the Pope, the King of the Romans, the King of Spain, and the Duke of Milan. Upon my arrival at Venice they received me very honourably, but not quite in the same manner as when I was there first,—for then we were at peace, but now at war with each other. I delivered my message to the Doge of Venice, who complimented me highly, and told me I was very welcome; and that he would consult with the Senate, and in a short time return me an answer.

For three days together they appointed solemn processions to be made, public alms to be given, and sermons to be preached all over the city, beseeching God of His grace to direct them in their consultations, which, as I was informed, was no more than what they frequently do upon extraordinary occasions. And truly, in religious affairs, and in the beautifying and adorning their churches, it is a city of the greatest reverence and decency that ever I saw; and in these things I esteem them equal to the Romans, and I question not but that their Signory derives much of its grandeur from this fact, and it is worthy rather to be augmented than lessened. But to the business of my embassy. I waited a fortnight before I had an answer, and then it was a refusal of all I had demanded. They told me they had no war with the king, and that what they had done was only to assist and support the Duke of Milan, who was their ally, and whom the king had a desire to destroy; yet they permitted their Doge to talk with me alone, and he offered very advantageous terms, which were, that King Ferrand should do homage to our king for the kingdom of Naples, by the Pope’s consent; that King Ferrand should pay our king a yearly tribute of fifty thousand ducats, besides a sum of money down, which they would lend (intending to have the towns of Brindisi, Otranto, Trani, and others in Apulia, put into their hands for security for the said loan); and that King Ferrand should deliver up or leave the king in possession of some towns or places in Apulia for his security (and they meant Tarento, which our king has still in his hands⁠[458]), and (if he pleased) two or three more, which they offered should be on that side, because it was farthest from them, though they pretended it was for the convenience of his designs against the Turk, of which our king had talked much at his first entrance into Italy, declaring he undertook that enterprise for no other end but to be nearer and more ready to invade him; but it was an evil invention, a mere fraud, and we cannot conceal our thoughts from God. The Doge of Venice offered besides, that if our king would attempt any thing against the Turk, he should have free passage for his troops, through all those places; and all Italy should contribute: the King of the Romans would make a diversion on his side; and the king, in conjunction with them, would be able to govern all Italy, in such a manner as to compel any of the princes as should refuse, to comply with their orders; and that for their part they would assist his majesty, at their own charge, with a hundred galleys at sea, and five thousand horse on land.

When I had my audience of leave, I told the Doge and Signory I would report all faithfully to the king. I returned by Milan, and found the Duke of Milan at Vigevano, and the king’s ambassador with him, who was one Rigault d’Oreilles⁠[459], steward to his household. The duke pretended to go a hunting, and came out to meet me (for they are very civil to ambassadors) and ordered me a very noble apartment in his castle. I begged that I might have the honour of a private conference with him, which at last he promised me, but with some signs of reluctancy. As the castle of Naples still held out for us, I was resolved to press for the ships with which he was bound to furnish us by the treaty at Vercelli. The ships were ready, and he was willing in appearance to send them out, but Peron de Basche and Stephen de Neves being at that time at Genoa on behalf of our king, and understanding I was at Vigevano, wrote to me immediately, complaining of the Duke of Milan’s treacherous way of dealing, who pretended to furnish us with ships and had sent two against us; that the governor of Genoa had told them one day that he could not suffer the ships to be manned with French sailors, and another, that there could not be above five and twenty of them permitted to be in any one vessel, with many such trifling excuses to protract and gain time, till they had heard the news of the capture of the castle of Naples, in which the Duke of Milan knew there was not provision enough for above a month, and that the king’s forces in Provence would be unable to raise the siege without the assistance of those two ships, for the enemy had blocked up the castle by sea with a great fleet furnished by the Venetians and the King of Spain as well as by themselves.

I was three days with the duke; the first he spent most in conference with me, and seemed to be angry that I was not satisfied with his answer about the ships, to which he added that though at the treaty of Vercelli he had promised to serve the king with two ships, yet he had never promised that they should be manned with French. I replied, that in my judgment that excuse was but weak and trifling, for if he should lend me a good mule with which to pass the mountains, what favour would it be if he should oblige me to lead her by the hand? I should only have liberty to see her, but no advantage unless I had leave to mount her. After a long conference he conducted me into a gallery apart, where I took occasion to remonstrate the great pains which other’s and myself had taken about the treaty of Vercelli; and the danger he would bring upon us by acting so contrary, and causing the king to lose his castles in Naples, which would be the total loss of the kingdom, and an occasion of perpetual animosity between my master and him, and I offered him the principality of Tarento, and the duchy of Bari, which duchy was already his own. I represented to him the danger he brought upon himself and all Italy by consenting that the Venetians should hold those places in Apulia; and he confessed that what I had urged was true, especially in relation to the Venetians, but told me plainly at last he could repose no confidence in our king.

After this discourse I took my leave of the Duke of Milan, who conducted me a league on my way home, and even at my departure he invented a more cunning lie (if it be decent to use such an expression towards a prince) than any of his former falsehoods. Perceiving I was melancholy, he told me on a sudden (as a man who had quite changed his resolutions) that he would show himself my friend at the last, and do that which should make me acceptable to my master; and he promised me that the next day he would send the Lord Galeas (who was the fittest man for that purpose) to see his ships at Genoa equipped and sent away to join our fleet; that he would do the king that service so as to save his castle, and by consequence the whole kingdom of Naples (and if he had performed his promise, this would have been the result); and that when the ships had sailed he would give me an account of it by a letter under his own hand, that the king might have the first news of it from myself, and be sensible of the service which I had done him, adding also that his letters should overtake me before I got to Lyons. Big with these hopes I departed, and continued my journey over the mountains. I knew the man, and durst not be too confident; yet I never heard any courier behind me, but I fancied he was bringing me those letters. I passed on till I came to Chambery, where I found the Duke of Savoy, who received me very graciously, and obliged me to stay a whole day with him. From thence I proceeded to Lyons (but no letters overtook me) to give the king an account of my transactions; for he was there at that time, giving himself up wholly to feastings, jousts, and other gay entertainments, without the least regard to anything else.

Those who had been enemies to the peace of Vercelli were extremely pleased with the Duke of Milan’s prevarication; and indeed they had reason, for their authority was increased by it, and I was traduced, which in the like cases is an ordinary thing in the courts of princes.

I was very melancholy and angry: I informed the king of all I had done, and showed him in writing the offers which the Venetians had made him; but he seemed not to value them much, and the Cardinal of St. Malo, who at that time had the sole administration of affairs, valued them still less. However, I pressed the king again, believing it better to accept that offer than lose all; for I saw nobody about him fit to manage such an important affair, and those who were most able were never consulted, or at least as seldom as possible. The king himself was inclinable enough to do it, but loth to displease those to whom he had committed his affairs, especially those who managed his treasury, namely, the Cardinal, his brothers and relations. This is a fine example for princes. It is necessary that they should take upon themselves the conduct of their own affairs, and not only call others to council upon occasion, but give them equal authority and countenance in certain matters; for if any minister of state be grown so great as to became terrible to the rest, and to manage the whole affairs of a kingdom according to his own will and pleasure (of which sort King Charles VIII. was never without one) that minister is king in reality, and his master is ill served, as King Charles was always by his ministers, who did their own business well enough, but neglected his, to his great prejudice and dishonour.

Ch. XX.—How the King forgot those that were left behind at Naples, upon his Return into France; and of the Dauphin’s Death, which was a great Affliction to the King and Queen.—1495.

I arrived at Lyons on the 12th of December, in the year 1495: and there I found the king and his whole army. The king had been absent on his expedition about a year and two months.⁠[460] The castles of Naples still held out for him, as you have heard. The Lord de Montpensier, his lieutenant in that kingdom, was at Salerno with the prince of that place; the Lord d’Aubigny was in Calabria, where he had done signal service, though under a long fit of sickness; the Lord Gracian des Guerres was in Abruzzo, Don Julian at Mount St. Angelo, and George de Suilly at Tarento; but all of them most miserably poor, and so far abandoned by our court that they could seldom or never receive letters or news out of France, and when they did, it was nothing but shams and promises without effect; for (as I said before) the king did nothing of himself. If they had been supplied with money in time, even a sixth part of what was spent afterwards to no purpose would have saved that kingdom from being lost; for at length when all was lost, they sent them forty thousand crowns as part of a year’s pay, and yet if that had arrived but a month sooner, the calamities and disgraces which they endured had never befallen them, and their divisions had been prevented; all which was occasioned through the negligence of the king, who managed nothing himself, and would not so much as hear anybody that came from them, and those whom he employed were careless and inexperienced, and I think some of them held a correspondence with the Pope; so that in appearance God had forsaken our king, and taken away that grace with which He had hitherto conducted him.

The king had not been at Lyons above two months, or thereabouts, when he received news that his only son, the dauphin, lay dangerously ill; and three days after, letters came that gave an account of his death.⁠[461] The king was extremely concerned at first, as he ought to have been out of paternal affection; yet his sorrow soon wore off. But the queen (who was Anne, Duchess of Bretagne) took it more to heart than perhaps any other woman would have done, and her sorrow remained longer upon her; and I am afraid, that besides the natural affliction of mothers upon the loss of their children, her mind misgave her, and she was apprehensive that some greater misfortune would soon happen to her. The king (as I said before) having got over his own grief, had a great desire to give the queen some diversion at a ball of young gentlemen, which the king had appointed; among the rest of the dancers, the Duke of Orleans was one, who was at that time about thirty-four years old⁠[462]; but he behaved himself so, that it was visible to all the court he rejoiced at the dauphin’s death, for he was (after him) next heir to the crown. Wherefore the king and he never spoke to one another for a long time after. The dauphin was about three years old when he died, yet a very handsome and precocious child, and not alarmed at those things wherewith children are usually frighted; for which reason his father was the sooner recovered from his sorrow, as being fearful already lest he should have grown too fast, and lest, if his courage increased with his years, he would have entrenched upon his father’s power and authority; for the king was not commanding either in person or understanding, but of the mildest and best disposition in the world. By this example we may see to what miseries great kings and princes, who grow jealous of their own children, are subject. His father, Louis XI., though so wise and virtuous a prince, was yet fearful of Charles VIII., but he provided prudently against the worst, and left him the crown when he was but fourteen years old. Louis XI. had been no less terrible to his father Charles VII., for at the age of thirteen years he was in arms, and confederated against him with certain of the nobility, upon some court-quarrels⁠[463] and complaints against the government, (and this King Louis has often told me himself,) yet these troubles lasted not long. But when he came to man’s estate, he had great controversy with his father Charles VII., retired into Dauphiny, and from thence into Flanders, leaving Dauphiny to his father, as has been observed at the beginning of these Memoirs⁠[464], in relating the reign of Louis XI.

No creature is exempt from adversity; every man eats his bread in pain and sorrow: God Almighty promised it to our first parents, and he has performed it very faithfully ever since to all people. Yet there are degrees and distinctions of sorrow, and the troubles and vexations of the mind are greater than those of the body; the anxiety of the wise is of one sort, and that of the fool of another, but that of the fool is the greater of the two (though some are of a contrary opinion) because he is less capable of comfort.

The poor people, who labour, drudge and toil to maintain themselves and their children, and pay their taxes and subsidies to their princes, would have but little comfort in this world if princes and great lords were sensible of nothing but pleasure, and they of nothing but sorrow and misery. But the thing is quite otherwise; for, should I endeavour to give an account of the sufferings and disorders which (for these thirty years) I have seen endured by persons of quality of both sexes, it would swell to a large volume. I do not mean such persons as Boccace mentions in his book⁠[465], but such as raise the envy of all people, by their riches, health, and prosperity. Those who have not conversed with them so much as I have done, believe the condition of great persons to be the happiest in the world; but I have seen their troubles and disquiets, aroused upon such trifling occasions, as persons at a distance could hardly believe; an idle apprehension or an extravagant report disturbs them extremely; and this is the secret distemper that reigns in the courts of great princes, from whence many mischiefs arise to the sovereign, his ministers and subjects; and it is so great a shortener of life, that there is scarce a king of France (since the time of Charlemagne) who lived to be sixty years old.

Upon this bare suspicion, when Louis XI. came to be about that age, being sick of that disease, he concluded himself already dead. His father Charles VII., who had done so many memorable things in France, took a fancy that his courtiers had a design to poison him, and upon that account he ate nothing. Charles VI. had his jealousies too, and became crazed in his understanding upon a mere report. Certainly, princes are guilty of great error in not examining, or causing other people to examine, such tales as concern them, though, perhaps, they may be of themselves of no great importance; but this would keep them from being so frequently current, especially if they confronted the accused with the informer; by that means nothing would be reported but what was true. But there are some princes so stupid as to promise and swear to the accusers they will never discover them; and these are they who are subject to those anguishes and torments of mind of which I speak and who many times hate and injure the best ministers they have, upon the bare reports and calumnies of evil-minded and designing people, by which means they occasion great mischiefs and sorrows to their subjects.

Ch. XXI.—How the King received News of the Loss of the Castle of Naples; of the selling of the Towns belonging to the Florentines to several Persons; of the Treaty of Atella in Apulia, much to the Prejudice of the French; and of the Death of Ferrand, King of Naples.—1496.

The death of the Dauphin (only son to Charles VIII.), occurred about the beginning of the year 1496, and was the greatest loss that happened or could possibly happen to the king, for he had never any child afterwards that lived. But this misfortune came not alone; for at the same time he received advice that the castle of Naples had been surrendered by those whom the Lord de Montpensier had left in it, under pressure of famine, and for the safety of the hostages, who had been delivered into the enemy’s hands by the Lord de Montpensier. The names of the hostages were Monsieur d’Alegre, one of the sons of the Lord de la Marche d’Ardaine, one called the Lord de la Chapelle de Loudonnois, and John Roquebertin, a Catalonian.⁠[466] Those who had been in the castle were sent back again by sea. After this, another disgraceful accident befel him, and that was, that one Entragues, who was governor of the citadel of Pisa (which was strong, and commanded the whole town), delivered it up to the Pisans; which was contrary to the king’s oath, for he had sworn twice to the Florentines to deliver the said citadel to them, and other places, as Sarzana, Sarzanello, Pietrasanta, Librefatta, and Mortron, which the Florentines had lent the king in his necessities, at his first coming into Italy, and had given him six score thousand ducats, of which there were not above thirty thousand in arrear when he returned into France, as has been mentioned in another place.⁠[467] In short, all these places were sold; the Genoese bought Sarzana and Sarzanello, and they were sold by the Bastard of St. Paul.⁠[468] Monsieur Entragues sold Pietrasanta to the citizens of Lucca⁠[469], and Librefatta to the Venetians, to the great dishonour of the king and his subjects, and to the detriment and I may say destruction of the kingdom of Naples. The first oath King Charles VIII. took for the restitution of those places was at Florence, upon the high altar in the great church of St. John; the second was at Asti, on his return, where the Florentines furnished him in his extremity with thirty thousand ducats, upon condition that if Pisa were surrendered to them, the king should be discharged of the said sum, and all his jewels and pawns should be restored; and they were to lend him threescore thousand more, to be paid down in the kingdom of Naples, to those whom his majesty had appointed to manage his affairs there, and to maintain at their charge three hundred horse for the service of our king in the kingdom of Naples, which were to continue there during the whole expedition; but upon the selling of Pisa and the rest of the towns all was at an end, and the king was obliged to repay the thirty thousand ducats which the Florentines had lent him, and all this by the disobedience and whisperings of some persons about the king, who had given private encouragement to Entragues to act thus in the business.

About the same time, in the beginning of the year 1496, the Lord de Montpensier, the Lord Virgil Ursini, Signor Camillo Vitelli, and the rest of the French officers, seeing that all was lost, took the field, and made themselves masters of several small towns; upon which King Ferrand, the son of Alphonso (who was turned monk, as you have heard before), with the Marquis of Mantua, brother to the Lord Montpensier’s wife⁠[470], and captain-general of the Venetians, drew out against them, and found the Lord de Montpensier in a town called Atella, situated very disadvantageously for the supply of provisions. The enemy immediately encamped on a hill, and fortified themselves as strongly as they could, not daring to venture a battle, for King Ferrand and the Marquis of Mantua had been beaten by us in every engagement they had fought. The Venetians had in pledge six towns in Apulia, of very great importance, namely, Brindisi, Trani, Gallipoli, Crana, Otranto, Monopoli, and Tarento, which last they had taken from us. And they lent some money to King Ferrand, but they valued the service of their forces in that kingdom so high, that it was computed and charged upon the said towns at two hundred and fifty thousand ducats, besides what they demanded for the fortifications and other expenses in keeping them; so that I am persuaded they have no intention to restore them⁠[471]; for it is not their custom to part with anything that is for their convenience, as those towns are, lying all upon the Gulf of Venice, and making them absolute lords of it, from Venice to Otranto, which is nine hundred miles complete. The Pope, indeed, has Ancona and some few other towns between them; but all must pay duties to the Venetians, or there is no passing through the Gulf; so that it was a great advantage to them to have those towns in their hands, and perhaps more than many people imagine, for they receive from them great quantities of corn and oil, which are two commodities very beneficial and necessary for them.

At the town of Atella⁠[472] above-mentioned, our troops began to mutiny, not only for provisions (which were beginning to fail), but for their pay, for there was already an arrear due to them for above eighteen months, and they had suffered very great hardships. The Swiss, too, were largely in arrear, but not altogether so much, for all the money the Lord de Montpensier could raise in that kingdom went to the payment of them, and yet they had above a year due to them. They had, however, plundered several little villages, and got a considerable booty. If the forty thousand ducats which had been so often promised had been sent in time, or had they known they would receive them at Florence, this mutiny had never happened; but now all that was done proceeded merely from despair. Several of the commanders have told me since, that if our men would have agreed to have ventured a battle, in all likelihood the victory would been theirs, or if they had lost it, it could not have been with the destruction of half so many as they lost by their base and dishonourable surrender. The Lords de Montpensier and Virgil Ursini would willingly have fought, and they died in prison, and not one of the articles of their treaty was observed to them. These two gentlemen accused the Lord de Percy (a young gentleman of Auvergne), of having been the occasion of their not fighting; and the truth is, the Lord de Percy was an ill-conditioned and mutinous knight.

There were two sorts of Germans in that army⁠[473]; one was the Swiss, of whom we had about one thousand five hundred, who had been with us from the beginning of our expedition, and they served us faithfully and as well as men could do to the very last. There was another commonly called Lansquenets, which is as much as to say, Companions of the Country, and these have a natural antipathy to the Swiss; they are a collection from all the countries upon the Rhine, Swabia, the Pays de Vaux in Sequania, and Guelderland; and they consisted of about seven or eight hundred men lately sent thither, with two months’ pay in advance, which was spent by them before they arrived. Seeing themselves in such danger and distress, they retained not that affection to us which the Swiss did, but began to hold parleys, and by degrees revolted to the enemy; upon which and the division among our commanders, the soldiers made a villanous and infamous agreement, which King Ferrand swore to observe; for the Marquis of Mantua took great care to secure the person of the Lord de Montpensier, his brother-in-law.

By the said agreement they delivered themselves into the hands of their enemies, gave them all the artillery which belonged to our king, and promised to restore all the places which our king possessed in that kingdom, as well in Calabria, where the Lord d’Aubigny commanded, as in Abruzzo, where the Lord Gracian des Guerres was chief; besides Gaeta and Tarento. Upon which terms King Ferrand undertook to send them into Provence by sea, and their baggage with them, which was worth little or nothing.⁠[474] They were about five or six thousand men, and King Ferrand caused them to be conducted to Naples. So ignominious an agreement had not been made before in our times, nor did I ever read of any like it, unless it was that which (as Titus Livius reports⁠[475]) was made by the two Roman consuls with the Samnites (who are now supposed to be the inhabitants of Beneventum) at a certain place upon the mountains, which was then called the Caudine Forks; but the Romans refused to ratify and confirm it, and sent the two consuls back prisoners to the enemy.

If our army had fought and been defeated, we had not lost so great a number of men as we did, for two-thirds of them died of famine and plague on ship-board, and in the Isle of Procida, whither they were sent afterwards by King Ferrand; among the rest, the Lord de Montpensier died there, some say of poison, others of a fever, (which I rather believe). And I think of their whole number there came not above one thousand five hundred back; for of the Swiss, who were one thousand three hundred, there returned not above three hundred and fifty, and those in a weak and miserable condition. These Swiss were highly to be commended for their loyalty; for they would never bear arms under King Ferrand, but chose rather to die, as many of them did in the island of Procida, some of a calenture, some of other diseases, and some of very hunger; for it is not to be imagined in what want of food they were kept on ship-board, and how long. I saw some of those who returned, and particularly the Swiss, who brought back all their colours; but by their looks one might see what they had suffered; for all of them were so very sick, that when they came ashore to take a little air, they could not walk without being supported. The Lord Virgil Ursini by his articles was to have had liberty to return into his own country with his son⁠[476], and his whole regiment; but they detained him, and his lawful son with him (of which sort he had but one); yet he had a bastard who was a brave man, called Signor Carlo⁠[477]; but he was killed by certain Italians who were in his company upon the road. Had this misfortune fallen upon any but those who had a hand in the treaty, it had been a very deplorable accident.⁠[478]

Not long after King Ferrand had gained this honour, and newly married the daughter of his grandfather King Ferrand, whom he had by the present King of Castile’s sister (so that his queen was sister to his own father King Alphonso), and who was a young lady not above thirteen or fourteen years old, he fell into a hectic fever, and died in a few days.⁠[479] He left the possession of his kingdom to King Frederic (now reigning) who was his uncle. I cannot think of this marriage without horror, though there were several of the same nature in that family within the memory of man, and that within the space of thirty years. He died not long after that infamous treaty of Atella in the year 1496. King Ferrand, when he was living, and Frederic since his accession to the throne, excused themselves, because the Lord de Montpensier had not surrendered the towns that were mentioned in the articles of agreement; but it was not in his power, for Gaeta and other places were not in his hands; and indeed though he was our king’s lieutenant in that kingdom, yet the governors of the respective towns were not bound to surrender them at his command, though if they had, our king had been no great loser by the bargain; for they afterwards cost a great deal to repair and victual: and so they were lost at last. I was present myself when provisions were sent, once to the castles of Naples, and thrice to Gaeta; and I think I should not mistake if I said those four supplies cost the king above three hundred thousand francs; and yet all came to nothing.

Ch. XXII.—How several Plots were formed (in favour of our King) by some of the Italian Princes, not only for the Recovery of Naples, but for the Destruction of the Duke of Milan; how they miscarried for want of Supplies; and how another Design against Genoa came to the same ill End.—1496.

The king, after his return from his expedition to Naples, as we have already mentioned, continued a long time at Lyons, entertaining himself with jousts and tournaments; and though still desirous to regain the places he had lost in the kingdom of Naples, whatever it cost him, he would take no pains to manage his own affairs. He had very good intelligence in Italy, and great designs were set on foot in his favour; which could easily have been managed by the kingdom of France, which is very populous, and plentiful in corn, especially in Languedoc and Provence, and other countries, out of which it is no difficult task to raise money. But if any other prince besides the King of France should embrace the cause of the Italians, and undertake their assistance, it would impoverish and exhaust him to no purpose; for they will do nothing without money; nor, indeed, are they able to do anything, unless it be the Duke of Milan, or some of the great States. But a private governor or general, how well affected soever he may be to the House of France, and its pretensions to the kingdom of Naples, or the duchy of Milan, let him be as devoted as he will to its interest (and from Italians you must expect nothing more than partisanship), yet he cannot serve that house long after the pay begins to fail; for the poor general would be deserted by his own soldiers, and would himself be utterly undone; because for the most part they have nothing wherewith to raise men, but their reputation and credit; and the soldiers are paid by the general, and the general by him who employs him in his service.

But as to the designs which I have mentioned as being so considerable, they began before the surrender of Gaeta, upon the Duke of Milan’s not keeping his promise, and continued for two years after our king’s return. As for the Duke of Milan, he did not break his promise so much out of malice and deceit, as through fear; for he was fearful that the king could not have so great an addition to his power, without some diminution of his own; besides, he did not think our king a prince of any firmness or resolution. At length it was concluded that the Duke of Orleans should march to Asti with a considerable body of forces; and I saw him and his troops ready to set out. We were secure of the Duke of Ferrara with five hundred men-at-arms and two thousand foot (though he was the Duke of Milan’s father-in-law); for he joined with us to preserve himself against the danger he was in between the Duke and the Venetians, who not long previously (as I have said before⁠[480]) had taken from him the Polesan, and endeavoured all they could to ruin him: upon which account he preferred his own and his children’s safety before the friendship of his son-in-law; and perhaps he was of opinion that his son-in-law would, by his mediation, come to some agreement with the king, when he found himself in danger. We had also engaged the Marquis of Mantua on our side, who had been, and was at that time general for the Venetians; but they were so jealous of him, and he so dissatisfied with them, that he remained with three hundred men-at-arms with his father-in-law the Duke of Ferrara, for his wife was sister to the Duchess of Milan, and the Duke of Ferrara’s daughter. Signor John Bentivoglio (who was governor, and as it were Prince of Bologna,) was to have provided a hundred and fifty men-at-arms, besides the horse and foot which his two sons were to have brought with them, and his country was well situated for an attack on the Duke of Milan. The Florentines, who saw they were utterly undone, and were afraid they should be dispossessed of Pisa and the rest of their towns, unless they exerted themselves, and did something extraordinary in this critical juncture of affairs, agreed to assist us with eight hundred men-at-arms, and five thousand foot, and to maintain them at their own expense; and they had six months’ pay ready in bank. The Ursini and the Prefect of Rome⁠[481] (who was brother to the Cardinal of St. Peter ad Vincula, so often mentioned before), who were in the king’s pay, would have brought a thousand men-at-arms, but you must know the retinue and equipage of their men-at-arms is not so great as ours; for they have no archers, but their pay is alike; for the pay of a man-at-arms (if he is well paid) is one hundred ducats a year, but if he be attended by archers it is double. These soldiers the king would have paid, but the Florentines were to have paid their own forces. The Duke of Ferrara, the Marquis of Mantua, and Signor Bentivoglio desired only their expenses; for they expected their reward out of the towns which they should take from the Duke of Milan, had he been suddenly invaded by the Duke of Orleans’ forces. And of those who were his confederates, none would have been able to avoid siding with the king against the Venetians; and for less than eighty thousand crowns the king could have kept all these Italians together a long time; and if the Duke of Milan had been conquered, the kingdom of Naples would have fallen of course.

The miscarriage of this important design proceeded merely from the Duke of Orleans’ inconstancy. He intended over-night to set out in the morning; he had sent all his equipage, baggage, and whatever else belonged to his person, before him; so that there was nothing to follow but himself. His army, consisting of eight hundred French men-at-arms and six thousand foot (among whom were four hundred Swiss), lay ready at Asti, and their pay in advance in their pockets; yet on a sudden he changed his mind, and made two several requests to the king, that the expedition might be once more debated before the council; and it was done twice. I was present on both occasions: the result was, nemine contradicente (though there were always ten or twelve in council), that he should proceed on the expedition; because they had given their above-mentioned friends in Italy repeated assurances of his coming; and they had raised men, and been at great expense in expectation of him. But the Duke of Orleans (either by the advice of some other person, or through his own unwillingness to go, on account of the king’s illness, and his being the next heir to the crown,) plainly declared he would not undertake that enterprise upon any quarrel of his own; but as he was the king’s lieutenant, if his majesty pleased to command it, he would go with all his heart; and so the council broke up. The next day, and several days after, the Florentine envoys, and the rest of the ambassadors, pressed the king, that he would command the duke to go; but the king’s answer was, that he would never send him to make war against his inclinations. And thus was that enterprise quashed in a moment, to the king’s great displeasure, who had been at vast charges, and had great hopes of revenging himself on the Duke of Milan, considering his own alliances at that time, and what he might have had by Signor John James de Trivulce, who was lieutenant-general for the king; and that the Duke of Orleans was born, and had great interest and alliance in the duchy of Milan, where many persons would have supported him.

But though this design miscarried, another revived, nay two or three at a time, in Genoa, which is a place ever prone to revolutions. One was contrived by Signor Baptista di Campoforgoso⁠[482], a great leader of faction in Genoa; but he was banished, and his party could do nothing; nor could the family of Doria, who were gentlemen, but the Campoforgosi were not. The Dorias are of the same party with the Campoforgosi, but cannot be Doges themselves, because they are gentlemen; for no gentleman is capable of being Doge by their laws. But this Baptista had been Doge not long before, but was supplanted by his uncle the Cardinal of Genoa, who put the government into the hands of the Duke of Milan, under whom the city was governed by the Adorni, who also are not gentlemen; yet they have been often Doges, and are supported by the house of the Spinoli, who are gentlemen. The nobility in Genoa make Doges, but cannot be made so themselves. This Signor Baptista expected his whole party (both in the city and country) would take arms in his favour, and that the king would obtain the sovereignty, but the government would fall into the hands of himself and his party; and they did not question but to drive out the rest.

The other design was set on foot by several persons in Savona, who addressed themselves to the Cardinal of St. Peter ad Vincula, assuring him they would deliver up the town, provided their liberties and privileges might be secured to them; for they were then under the jurisdiction of Genoa, and paid heavy duties. If he could have made himself master of this town, he would have reduced Genoa to great straits, considering Provence was our king’s own country, and Savoy at his command. Upon this news, the king sent to Signor John James di Trivulce to assist the said Baptista di Campoforgoso with such supplies as might carry him to the very walls of Genoa, to see whether his party would rise. On the other side he was pressed hard by the Cardinal of St. Peter ad Vincula, who also obtained a letter to Trivulce from the king, commanding him to furnish the Cardinal with men enough to conduct him to Savona; and he received the same message by word of mouth from the Lord of Sernon in Provence, who was the Cardinal’s friend, and a bold talker. The king also sent orders to Signor James di Trivulce to contrive matters so as to support both parties, and yet do nothing against the Duke of Milan, or contrary to the peace that had been made with him the year before; but these orders were downright contradictions.

And after this manner the affairs of great princes are managed, when they are not present themselves, or are too hasty in commanding letters and messengers to be despatched, without mature and requisite deliberation. In this case, if one considers what was required by Signor Baptista di Campoforgoso and the Cardinal, we shall find that it was impossible to supply them both at a time. For to approach the walls of Genoa without a considerable body of forces, was ridiculous and impracticable, by reason of the numbers and courage of the inhabitants; and to have supplied the Cardinal had been to have divided his own army into three bodies, for part must of necessity have remained with Signor John James; and, besides, the alarm was taken, and the Duke of Milan, the Venetians, Don Frederic, and the Pope, had all of them sent forces to Genoa and Savona, suspecting their intended revolt.

Besides these two, Signor John James Trivulce had a third design of his own, and that was, to march directly with all his forces against the Duke of Milan, and lay those other enterprises aside; and certainly if he had been permitted to pursue his own scheme, he would have performed some great action; for, under pretence that he could not otherwise protect such as were engaged in the designs upon Genoa and Savona, he posted himself upon the high road from Alessandria to Genoa (and indeed the Duke of Milan could send forces no other way to molest us), and possessed himself of two or three small towns, without any resistance, pretending that this was no violation of the peace with the duke, for he was forced to it of necessity; and that the king could not be said to have made war upon the duke by endeavouring to recover Genoa and Savona, because they held of the king, and had forfeited their allegiance. However, to satisfy the Cardinal, Signor John James di Trivulce sent part of his army to Savona; but he found the garrison reinforced and his designs defeated, and so he marched back. He sent other troops to Signor Baptista, to attempt something upon Genoa, and great matters were expected from thence; but before they had marched four leagues, both the French and Swiss who were in his company grew suspicious of him (though I think it was wrongfully), and it was well things happened so; for their number being very inconsiderable, they would have exposed themselves to great danger if their party in the town had not risen. Thus all these enterprises and designs miscarried, and the Duke of Milan became strong; but he had run great danger if Signor John James had not been countermanded. Our army marched back, our foot were disbanded, the small towns restored, and the war was concluded, but with little advantage to the king, considering what expense he had been at in military preparations.