Volume 2 — FOOTNOTES :

FOOTNOTES TO VOLUME I

FOOTNOTES:

[1]

From a French work, "Moeurs et Coûtumes des Corses" (Paris, 1802), I take the following incident. A priest, charged with the duty of avenging a relative for some fourteen years, met his enemy at the gate of Ajaccio and forthwith shot him, under the eyes of an official—who did nothing. A relative of the murdered man, happening to be near, shot the priest. Both victims were quickly buried, the priest being interred under the altar of the church, "because of his sacred character." See too Miot de Melito, "Mémoires," vol. i., ch. xiii., as to the utter collapse of the jury system in 1800-1, because no Corsican would "deny his party or desert his blood."

[2]

As to the tenacity of Corsican devotion, I may cite a curious proof from the unpublished portion of the "Memoirs of Sir Hudson Lowe." He was colonel in command of the Royal Corsican Rangers, enrolled during the British occupation of Corsica, and gained the affections of his men during several years of fighting in Egypt and elsewhere. When stationed at Capri in 1808 he relied on his Corsican levies to defend that island against Murat's attacks; and he did not rely in vain. Though confronted by a French Corsican regiment, they remained true to their salt, even during a truce, when they could recognize their compatriots. The partisan instinct was proof against the promises of Murat's envoys and the shouts even of kith and kin.

[3]

The facts as to the family of Napoleon's mother are given in full detail by M. Masson in his "Napoléon Inconnu," ch. i. They correct the statement often made as to her "lowly," "peasant" origin. Masson also proves that the house at Ajaccio, which is shown as Napoleon's birthplace, is of later construction, though on the same site.

[4]

See Jacobi, "Hist. de la Corse," vol. ii., ch. viii. The whole story is told with prudent brevity by French historians, even by Masson and Chuquet. The few words in which Thiers dismisses this subject are altogether misleading.

[5]

Much has been written to prove that Napoleon was born in 1768, and was really the eldest surviving son. The reasons, stated briefly, are: (1) that the first baptismal name of Joseph Buonaparte was merely Nabulione (Italian for Napoleon), and that Joseph was a later addition to his name on the baptismal register of January 7th, 1768, at Corte; (2) certain statements that Joseph was born at Ajaccio; (3) Napoleon's own statement at his marriage that he was born in 1768. To this it maybe replied that: (a) other letters and statements, still more decisive, prove that Joseph was born at Corte in 1768 and Napoleon at Ajaccio in 1769; (b) Napoleon's entry in the marriage register was obviously designed to lessen the disparity of years of his bride, who, on her side, subtracted four years from her age. See Chuquet, "La Jeunesse de Napoléon," p. 65.

[6]

Nasica, "Mémoires," p. 192.

[7]

Both letters are accepted as authentic by Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. i., pp. 84, 92; but Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. i., p. 55, tracking them to their source, discredits them, as also from internal evidence.

[8]

Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 177.

[9]

Joseph Buonaparte, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 29. So too Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. x.

[10]

Chaptal, "Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 237. See too Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. i., p. 158, note.

[11]

In an after-dinner conversation on January 11th, 1803, with Roederer, Buonaparte exalted Voltaire at the expense of Rousseau in these significant words: "The more I read Voltaire, the more I like him: he is always reasonable, never a charlatan, never a fanatic: he is made for mature minds. Up to sixteen years of age I would have fought for Rousseau against all the friends of Voltaire. Now it is the contrary. I have been especially disgusted with Rousseau since I have seen the East. Savage man is a dog." ("Oeuvres de Roederer," vol. iii., p. 461.)

In 1804 he even denied his indebtedness to Rousseau. During a family discussion, wherein he also belittled Corsica, he called Rousseau "a babbler, or, if you prefer it, an eloquent enough idéalogue. I never liked him, nor indeed well understood him: truly I had not the courage to read him all, because I thought him for the most part tedious." (Lucien Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. xi.)

His later views on Rousseau are strikingly set forth by Stanislas Girardin, who, in his "Memoirs," relates that Buonaparte, on his visit to the tomb of Rousseau, said: "'It would have been better for the repose of France that this man had never been born.' 'Why, First Consul?' said I. 'He prepared the French Revolution.' 'I thought it was not for you to complain of the Revolution.' 'Well,' he replied, 'the future will show whether it would not have been better for the repose of the world that neither I nor Rousseau had existed.'" Méneval confirms this remarkable statement.

[12]

Masson, "Napoléon Inconnu," vol. ii., p. 53.

[13]

Joseph Buonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. i, p. 44.

[14]

M. Chuquet, in his work "La Jeunesse de Napoléon" (Paris, 1898), gives a different opinion: but I think this passage shows a veiled hostility to Paoli. Probably we may refer to this time an incident stated by Napoleon at St. Helena to Lady Malcolm ("Diary," p. 88), namely, that Paoli urged on him the acceptance of a commission in the British army: "But I preferred the French, because I spoke the language, was of their religion, understood and liked their manners, and I thought the Revolution a fine time for an enterprising young man. Paoli was angry—we did not speak afterwards." It is hard to reconcile all these statements.

Lucien Buonaparte states that his brother seriously thought for a time of taking a commission in the forces of the British East India Company; but I am assured by our officials that no record of any application now exists.

[15]

The whole essay is evidently influenced by the works of the democrat Raynal, to whom Buonaparte dedicated his "Lettres sur la Corse." To the "Discours de Lyons" he prefixed as motto the words "Morality will exist when governments are free," which he modelled on a similar phrase of Raynal. The following sentences are also noteworthy: "Notre organisation animale a des besoins indispensables: manger, dormir, engendrer. Une nourriture, une cabane, des vêtements, une femme, sont donc une stricte nécessité pour le bonheur. Notre organisation intellectuelle a des appétits non moins impérieux et dont la satisfaction est beaucoup plus précieuse. C'est dans leur entier développement que consiste vraiment le bonheur. Sentir et raisonner, voilà proprement le fait de l'homme."

[16]

Nasica; Chuquet, p. 248.

[17]

His recantation of Jacobinism was so complete that some persons have doubted whether he ever sincerely held it. The doubt argues a singular naïveté it is laid to rest by Buonaparte's own writings, by his eagerness to disown or destroy them, by the testimony of everyone who knew his early career, and by his own confession: "There have been good Jacobins. At one time every man of spirit was bound to be one. I was one myself." (Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le Consulat," p. 59.)

[18]

I use the term commissioner as equivalent to the French représentant en mission, whose powers were almost limitless.

[19]

See this curious document in Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii., p. 249. Masson ignores it, but admits that the Paolists and partisans of France were only seeking to dupe one another.

[20]

Buonaparte, when First Consul, was dunned for payment by the widow of the Avignon bookseller who published the "Souper de Beaucaire." He paid her well for having all the remaining copies destroyed. Yet Panckoucke in 1818 procured one copy, which preserved the memory of Buonaparte's early Jacobinism.

[21]

I have chiefly followed the careful account of the siege given by Cottin in his "Toulon et les Anglais en 1793" (Paris, 1898).

The following official figures show the weakness of the British army. In December, 1792, the parliamentary vote was for 17,344 men as "guards and garrisons," besides a few at Gibraltar and Sydney. In February, 1793, 9,945 additional men were voted and 100 "independent companies": Hanoverians were also embodied. In February, 1794, the number of British regulars was raised to 60,244. For the navy the figures were: December, 1792, 20,000 sailors and 5,000 marines; February, 1793, 20,000 additional seamen; for 1794, 73,000 seamen and 12,000 marines. ("Ann. Reg.")

[22]

Barras' "Mémoires" are not by any means wholly his. They are a compilation by Rousselin de Saint-Albin from the Barras papers.

[23]

Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii.

[24]

M.G. Duruy's elaborate plea (Barras, "Mems.," Introduction, pp. 69-79) rests on the supposition that his hero arrived at Toulon on September 7th. But M. Chuquet has shown ("Cosmopolis," January, 1897) that he arrived there not earlier than September 16th. So too Cottin, ch, xi.

[25]

As the burning of the French ships and stores has been said to be solely due to the English, we may note that, as early as October 3rd, the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Duc d'Alcuida, suggested it to our ambassador, Lord St. Helens: "If it becomes necessary to abandon the harbour, these vessels shall be sunk or set on fire in order that the enemy may not make use of them; for which purpose preparations shall be made beforehand."

[26]

Thiers, ch. xxx.; Cottin, "L'Angleterre et les Princes."

[27]

See Lord Grenville's despatch of August 9th, 1793, to Lord St. Helens ("F.O. Records, Spain," No. 28), printed by M. Cottin, p. 428. He does not print the more important despatch of October 22nd, where Grenville asserts that the admission of the French princes would tend to invalidate the constitution of 1791, for which the allies were working.

[28]

A letter of Lord Mulgrave to Mr. Trevor, at Turin ("F. O.Records, Sardinia," No. 13), states that he had the greatest difficulty in getting on with the French royalists: "You must not send us one émigré of any sort—they would be a nuisance: they are all so various and so violent, whether for despotism, constitution, or republic, that we should be distracted with their quarrels; and they are so assuming, forward, dictatorial, and full of complaints, that no business could go on with them. Lord Hood is averse to receiving any of them."

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—From the information which Mr. Spenser Wilkinson has recently supplied in his article in "The Owens College Hist. Essays" (1902), it would seem that Buonaparte's share in deciding the fate of Toulon was somewhat larger than has here been stated; for though the Commissioners saw the supreme need of attacking the fleet, they do not seem, as far as we know, to have perceived that the hill behind Fort L'Eguillette was the key of the position. Buonaparte's skill and tenacity certainly led to the capture of this height.

[29]

Jung, "Bonaparte et son Temps," vol. ii., p. 430.

[30]

"Mémorial," ch. ii., November, 1815. See also Thibaudeau, "Mémoires sur le Consulat," vol. i., p. 59.

[31]

Marmont (1774-1852) became sub-lieutenant in 1789, served with Buonaparte in Italy, Egypt, etc., received the title Duc de Ragusa in 1808, Marshal in 1809; was defeated by Wellington at Salamanca in 1812, deserted to the allies in 1814. Junot (1771-1813) entered the army in 1791; was famed as a cavalry general in the wars 1796-1807; conquered Portugal in 1808, and received the title Duc d'Abrantès; died mad.

[32]

M. Zivy, "Le treize Vendémiaire," pp.60-62, quotes the decree assigning the different commands. A MS. written by Buonaparte, now in the French War Office Archives, proves also that it was Barras who gave the order to fetch the cannon from the Sablons camp.

[33]

Buonaparte afterwards asserted that it was he who had given the order to fire, and certainly delay was all in favour of his opponents.

[34]

I caution readers against accepting the statement of Carlyle ("French Revolution," vol. iii. ad fin.) that "the thing we specifically call French Revolution is blown into space by the whiff of grapeshot." On the contrary, it was perpetuated, though in a more organic and more orderly governmental form.

[35]

Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs sur Napoléon," p. 198.

[Footntoe 36: Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. ii., p. 13, credits the French with only 37,775 men present with the colours, the Austrians with 32,000, and the Sardinians with 20,000. All these figures omit the troops in garrison or guarding communications.]

[37]

Napoleon's "Correspondence," March 28th, 1796.

[38]

See my articles on Colonel Graham's despatches from Italy in the "Eng. Hist. Review" of January and April, 1899.

[39]

Thus Mr. Sargent ("Bonaparte's First Campaign") says that Bonaparte was expecting Beaulieu to move on Genoa, and saw herein a chance of crushing the Austrian centre. But Bonaparte, in his despatch of April 6th to the Directory, referring to the French advance towards Genoa, writes: "J'ai été très fâché et extrêmement mécontent de ce mouvement sur Gênes, d'autant plus déplacé qu'il a obligé cette république à prendre une attitude hostile, et a réveillé l'ennemi que j'aurais pris tranquille: ce sont des hommes de plus qu'il nous en coûtera." For the question how far Napoleon was indebted to Marshal Maillebois' campaign of 1745 for his general design, see the brochure of M. Pierron. His indebtedness has been proved by M. Bouvier ("Bonaparte en Italie," p. 197) and by Mr. Wilkinson ("Owens Coll. Hist. Essays").

[40]

Nelson was then endeavouring to cut off the vessels conveying stores from Toulon to the French forces. The following extracts from his despatches are noteworthy. January 6th, 1796: "If the French mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy. Holland and Flanders, with their own country, they have entirely stripped: Italy is the gold mine, and if once entered, is without the means of resistance." Then on April 28th, after Piedmont was overpowered by the French: "We English have to regret that we cannot always decide the fate of Empires on the Sea." Again, on May 16th: "I very much believe that England, who commenced the war with all Europe for her allies, will finish it by having nearly all Europe for her enemies."

[41]

The picturesque story of the commander (who was not Rampon, but Fornésy) summoning the defenders of the central redoubt to swear on their colours and on the cannon that they would defend it to the death has been endlessly repeated by historians. But the documents which furnish the only authentic details show that there was in the redoubt no cannon and no flag. Fornésy's words simply were: "C'est ici, mes amis, qu'il faut vaincre ou mourir"—surely much grander than the histrionic oath. (See "Mémoires de Masséna," Vol. ii.; "Pièces Just.," No. 3; also Bouvier, op. cit.)

[42]

Jomini, vol. viii., p. 340; "Pièces Justifs."

[43]

"Un Homme d'autrefois," par Costa de Beauregard.

[44]

These were General Beaulieu's words to Colonel Graham on May 22nd.

[45]

Periods of ten days, which, in the revolutionary calendar, superseded the week.

[46]

I have followed the accounts given by Jomini, vol. viii., pp. 120-130; that by Schels in the "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift" for 1825, vol. ii.; also Bouvier "Bonaparte en Italie," ch. xiii.; and J.G.'s "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." Most French accounts, being based on Napoleon's "Mémoires," vol. iii., p. 212 et seq., are a tissue of inaccuracies. Bonaparte affected to believe that at Lodi he defeated an army of sixteen thousand men. Thiers states that the French cavalry, after fording the river at Montanasso, influenced the result: but the official report of May 11th, 1796, expressly states that the French horse could not cross the river at that place till the fight was over. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch, vii.

[47]

Bouvier (p. 533) traces this story to Las Cases and discredits it.

[Footnote: 48 Directorial despatch of May 7th, 1796. The date rebuts the statement of M. Aulard, in M. Lavisse's recent volume, "La Révolution Française," p. 435, that Bonaparte suggested to the Directory the pillage of Lombardy.]

[49]

"Corresp.," June 6th, 1797.

[50]

"Corresp.," June 1st, 1796.

[51]

Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Républiques Italiennes," p. 22.

[52]

"Corresp.," May 17th, 1796.

[53]

Virgil, Aeneid, x. 200.

[54]

Colonel Graham's despatches.

[55]

"Corresp.," June 26th, 1796.

[56]

Despatch of Francis to Würmser, July 14th, 1796.

[57]

Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief of Würmser's staff, for the plan. Jomini gives the precise figures of the French on July 25th: Masséna had 15,000 men on the upper Adige; Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at Salo; Sérurier, 10,500 near Mantua; and with others at and near Peschiera the total fighting strength was 45,000. So "J.G.," p. 103.

[58]

See Thiébault's amusing account ("Memoirs," vol. i., ch. xvi.) of Bonaparte's contempt for any officer who could not give him definite information, and of the devices by which his orderlies played on this foible. See too Bourrienne for Bonaparte's dislike of new faces.

[59]

Marbot, "Mémoires," ch. xvi. J.G., in his recent work, "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97," p. 115, also defends Augereau.

[60]

Jomini, vol. viii., p. 321.

[61]

"English Hist. Review," January, 1899

[62]

Such is the judgment of Clausewitz ("Werke," vol. iv.), and it is partly endorsed by J.G. in his "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." St. Cyr, in his "Memoirs" on the Rhenish campaigns, also blames Bonaparte for not having earlier sent away his siege-train to a place of safety. Its loss made the resumed siege of Mantua little more than a blockade.

[63]

Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. i., p. 199.

[64]

"Corresp.," October 21st, 1796.

[65]

"Corresp.," October 24th, 1796. The same policy was employed towards Genoa. This republic was to be lulled into security until it could easily be overthrown or absorbed.

[66]

"Ordre du Jour," November 7th, 1796.

[67]

Marmont, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 237. I have followed Marmont's narrative, as that of the chief actor in this strange scene. It is less dramatic than the usual account, as found in Thiers, and therefore is more probable. The incident illustrates the folly of a commander doing the work of a sergeant. Marmont points out that the best tactics would have been to send one division to cross the Adige at Albaredo, and so take Arcola in the rear. Thiers' criticism, that this would have involved too great a diffusion of the French line, is refuted by the fact that on the third day a move on that side induced the Austrians to evacuate Arcola.

[68]

Koch, "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. i., p. 255, in his very complete account of the battle, gives the enemy's losses as upwards of 2,000 killed or wounded, and 4,000 prisoners with 11 cannon. Thiers gives 40,000 as Alvintzy's force before the battle—an impossible number. See ante.

[69]

The Austrian official figures for the loss in the three days at Arcola give 2,046 killed and wounded, 4,090 prisoners, and 11 cannon. Napoleon put it down as 13,000 in all! See Schels in "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift" for 1829.

[70]

A forecast of the plan realized in 1801-2, whereby Bonaparte gained Louisiana for a time.

[71]

Estimates of the Austrian force differ widely. Bonaparte guessed it at 45,000, which is accepted by Thiers; Alison says 40,000; Thiébault opines that it was 75,000; Marmont gives the total as 26,217. The Austrian official figures are 28,022 before the fighting north of Monte Baldo. See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Review" for April, 1899. I have largely followed the despatches of Colonel Graham, who was present at this battle. As "J.G." points out (op.cit. , p. 237), the French had 1,500 horse and some forty cannon, which gave them a great advantage over foes who could make no effective use of these arms.

[72]

This was doubtless facilitated by the death of the Czarina, Catherine II., in November, 1796. She had been on the point of entering the Coalition against France. The new Czar Paul was at that time for peace. The Austrian Minister Thugut, on hearing of her death, exclaimed, "This is the climax of our disasters."

[73]

Hüffer, "Oesterreich und Preussen," p. 263.

[74]

"Moniteur," 20 Floreal, Year V.; Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol. ii., ch. vii.

[75]

See Landrieux's letter on the subject in Koch's "Mémoires de Masséna," vol. ii.; "Pièces Justif.," ad fin.; and Bonaparte's "Corresp.," letter of March 24th, 1797. The evidence of this letter, as also of those of April 9th and 19th, is ignored by Thiers, whose account of Venetian affairs is misleading. It is clear that Bonaparte contemplated partition long before the revolt of Brescia.

[76]

Botta, "Storia d'Italia," vol. ii., chs. x., etc.; Daru, "Hist. de Venise," vol. v.; Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Républiques Italiennes," pp. 137-139; and Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol ii., chs. v. and vii.

[77]

Sorel, "Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797," p. 65.

[78]

Letter of April 30th, 1797.

[79]

Letter of May 13th, 1797.

[80]

It would even seem, from Bonaparte's letter of July 12th, 1797, that not till then did he deign to send on to Paris the terms of the treaty with Venice. He accompanied it with the cynical suggestion that they could do what they liked with the treaty, and even annul it!

[81]

The name Italian was rejected by Bonaparte as too aggressively nationalist; but the prefix Cis—applied to a State which stretched southward to the Rubicon—was a concession to Italian nationality. It implied that Florence or Rome was the natural capital of the new State.

[82]

See Arnault's "Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire" (vol. iii., p. 31) and Levy's "Napoléon intime," p. 131.

[83]

[100]

I am indebted for this fact to the Librarian of the Priory of the Knights of St. John, Clerkenwell.

[101]

See, for a curious instance, Chaptal, "Mes Souvenirs," p. 243.

[102]

The Arab accounts of these events, drawn up by Nakoula and Abdurrahman, are of much interest. They have been well used by M. Dufourcq, editor of Desvernois' "Memoirs," for many suggestive footnotes.

[103]

Desgenettes, "Histoire médicale de l'Armée d'Orient" (Paris, 1802); Belliard, "Mémoires," vol. i.

[104]

I have followed chiefly the account of Savary, Duc de Rovigo, "Mems.," ch. iv. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. iv.

[105]

See his orders published in the "Correspondance officielle et confid. de Nap. Bonaparte, Egypte," vol. i. (Paris, 1819, p. 270). They rebut Captain Mahan's statement ("Influence of Sea Power upon the Fr. Rev. and Emp.," vol. i., p. 263) as to Brueys' "delusion and lethargy" at Aboukir. On the contrary, though enfeebled by dysentery and worried by lack of provisions and the insubordination of his marines, he certainly did what he could under the circumstances. See his letters in the Appendix of Jurien de la Graviere, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. i.

[106]

Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. v.

[107]

Ib., ch. vi.

[108]

Order of July 27th, 1798.

[109]

Ducasse, "Les Rois, Frères de Napoléon," p. 8.

[110]

"Mémoires de Napoléon," vol. ii.; Bourrienne, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. xvii.

[111]

"Méms. de Berthier."

[112]

On November 4th, 1798, the French Government forwarded to Bonaparte, in triplicate copies, a despatch which, after setting forth the failure of their designs on Ireland, urged him either (1) to remain in Egypt, of which they evidently disapproved, or (2) to march towards India and co-operate with Tippoo Sahib, or (3) to advance on Constantinople in order that France might have a share in the partition of Turkey, which was then being discussed between the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna. No copy of this despatch seems to have reached Bonaparte before he set out for Syria (February 10th). This curious and perhaps guileful despatch is given in full by Boulay de la Meurthe, "Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Egypte," Appendix, No. 5.

On the whole, I am compelled to dissent from Captain Mahan ("Influence of Sea Power," vol. i., pp. 324-326), and to regard the larger schemes of Bonaparte in this Syrian enterprise as visionary.

[113]

Berthier, "Mémoires"; Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," also corrects Bourrienne. As to the dearth of food, denied by Lanfrey, see Captain Krettly, "Souvenirs historiques."

[114]

Emouf, "Le General Kléber," p. 201.

[115]

"Admiralty Records," Mediterranean, No. 19.

[116]

"Corresp.," No. 4124; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxi.

[117]

Sidney Smith's "Despatch to Nelson" of May 30th, 1799.

[118]

J. Miot's words are: "Mais s'il en faut croire cette voix publique, trop souvent organe de la vérite tardive, qu'en vain les grands espèrent enchaîner, c'est un fait trop avéré que quelques blessés du Mont Carmel et une grande partie des malades à l'hôpital de Jaffa ont péri par les médicaments qui leur ont été administrés." Can this be called evidence?

[119]

Larrey, "Relation historique"; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxi.

[120]

See Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs"; also a letter of d'Aure, formerly Intendant General of this army, to the "Journal des Débats" of April 16th, 1829, in reply to Bourrienne.

[121]

"On disait tout haut qu'il se sauvait lâchement," Merme in Guitry's "L'Armée en Egypte." But Bonaparte had prepared for this discouragement and worse eventualities by warning Kléber in the letter of August 22nd, 1799, that if he lost 1,500 men by the plague he was free to treat for the evacuation of Egypt.

[122]

Lucien Bonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. xiv.

[123]

In our "Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 21) are documents which prove the reality of Russian designs on Corsica.

[124]

"Consid. sur la Rév. Française," bk. iii., ch. xiii. See too Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol. iv., chs. xiii.-xiv.

[125]

La Réveillière-Lépeaux, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xliv.; Hyde de Neuville, vol. i., chs. vi.-vii.; Lavisse, "Rév. Française," p. 394.

[126]

Barras, "Mems.," vol. iv., ch. ii.

[127]

"Hist. of the United States" (1801-1813), by H. Adams, vol. i., ch. xiv., and Ste. Beuve's "Talleyrand."

[128]

Gohier, "Mems.," vol. i.; Lavalette's "Mems.," ch. xxii.; Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 301; Madelin's "Fouché," p. 267.

[129]

For the story about Aréna's dagger, raised against Bonaparte see Sciout, vol. iv., p. 652. It seems due to Lucien Bonaparte. I take the curious details about Bonaparte's sudden pallor from Roederer ("Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 302), who heard it from Montrond, Talleyrand's secretary. So Aulard, "Hist, de la Rév. Fr.," p. 699.

[130]

Napoleon explained to Metternich in 1812 why he wished to silence the Corps Législatif; "In France everyone runs after applause: they want to be noticed and applauded.... Silence an Assembly, which, if it is anything, must be deliberative, and you discredit it."—Metternich's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 151.

[131]

This was still further assured by the first elections under the new system being postponed till 1801; the functionaries chosen by the Consuls were then placed on the lists of notabilities of the nation without vote. The constitution was put in force Dec. 25th, 1799.

[132]

Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 303. He was the go-between for Bonaparte and Sieyès.

[133]

See the "Souvenirs" of Mathieu Dumas for the skilful manner in which Bonaparte gained over the services of this constitutional royalist and employed him to raise a body of volunteer horse.

[134]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," February 21st, 1800; "Mémoires du Général d'Andigné," ch. xv.; Madelin's "Fouché," p. 306.

[135]

"Georges Cadoudal," par son neveu, G. de Cadoudal; Hyde de Neuville, vol. i., p. 305.

[136]

Talleyrand, "Mems.," vol. i., part ii.; Marmont, bk. v.

[137]

"F.O.," Austria, No. 58; "Castlereagh's Despatches," v. ad init. Bowman, in his excellent monograph, "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens" (Toronto, 1899), has not noted this.

[138]

"Nap. Correspond.," February 27th 1800; Thugut, "Briefe" vol. ii., pp. 444-446; Oncken, "Zeitalter," vol. ii. p. 45.

[139]

A Foreign Office despatch, dated Downing Street, February 8th, 1800, to Vienna, promised a loan and that 15,000 or 20,000 British troops should be employed in the Mediterranean to act in concert with the Austrians there, and to give "support to the royalist insurrections in the southern provinces of France." No differences of opinion respecting Piedmont can be held a sufficient excuse for the failure of the British Government to fulfil this promise—a failure which contributed to the disaster at Marengo.

[140]

Thiers attributes this device to Bonaparte; but the First Consul's bulletin of May 24th ascribes it to Marmont and Gassendi.

[141]

Marbot, "Mems.," ch. ix.; Allardyce, "Memoir of Lord Keith," ch. xiii.; Thiébault's "Journal of the Blockade of Genoa."

[142]

That Melas expected such a march is clear from a letter of his of May 23rd, dated from Savillan, to Lord Keith, which I have found in the "Brit. Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 22), where he says: "L'ennemi a cerné le fort de Bard et s'est avancé jusque sous le château d'Ivrée. Il est clair que son but est de délivrer Masséna."

[143]

Bonaparte did not leave Milan till June 9th: see "Correspondance" and the bulletin of June 10th. Jomini places his departure for the 7th, and thereby confuses his description for these two days. Thiers dates it on June 8th.

[144]

Lord W. Bentinck reported to the Brit. Admiralty ("Records," Meditn., No. 22), from Alessandria, on June 15th: "I am sorry to say that General Elsnitz's corps, which was composed of the grenadiers of the finest regiments in the (Austrian) army, arrived here in the most deplorable condition. His men had already suffered much from want of provisions and other hardships. He was pursued in his retreat by Genl. Suchet, who had with him about 7,000 men. There was an action at Ponte di Nava, in which the French failed; and it will appear scarcely credible, when I tell your Lordship, that the Austrians lost in this retreat, from fatigue only, near 5,000 men; and I have no doubt that Genl. Suchet will notify this to the world as a great victory."

[145]

The inaccuracy of Marbot's "Mémoires" is nowhere more glaring than in his statement that Marengo must have gone against the French if Ott's 25,000 Austrians from Genoa had joined their comrades. As a matter of fact, Ott, with 16,000 men, had already fought with Lannes at Montebello; and played a great part in the battle of Marengo.

[146]

"Corresp.," vol. vi., p. 365. Fournier, "Hist. Studien und Skizzen," p. 189, argues that the letter was written from Milan, and dated from Marengo for effect.

[147]

See Czartoryski's "Memoirs," ch. xi., and Driault's "La Question d'Orient," ch. iii. The British Foreign Office was informed of the plan. In its records (No. 614) is a memoir (pencilled on the back January 31st, 1801) from a M. Leclerc to Mr. Flint, referring the present proposal back to that offered by M. de St. Génie to Catherine II., and proposing that the first French step should be the seizure of Socotra and Perim.

[148]

Garden, "Traités," vol. vi., ch. xxx.; Captain Mahan's "Life of Nelson," vol. ii., ch. xvi.; Thiers, "Consulate," bk. ix. For the assassination of the Czar Paul see "Kaiser Paul's Ende," von R.R. (Stuttgart, 1897); also Czartoryski's "Memoirs," chs. xiii.-xiv. For Bonaparte's offer of a naval truce to us and his overture of December, 1800, see Bowman, op. cit.

[149]

Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. ii., p. 299. So too Mollien, "Mems.": "With an insatiable activity in details, a restlessness of mind always eager for new cares, he not only reigned and governed, he continued to administer not only as Prime Minister, but more minutely than each Minister."

[150]

Lack of space prevents any account of French finances and the establishment of the Bank of France. But we may note here that the collection of the national taxes was now carried out by a State-appointed director and his subordinates in every Department—a plan which yielded better results than former slipshod methods. The conseil général of the Department assessed the direct taxes among the smaller areas. "Méms." de Gaudin, Duc de Gaëte.

[151]

Edmond Blanc, "Napoléon I; ses Institutions," p. 27.

[152]

Theiner, "Hist. des deux Concordats," vol. i., p. 21.

[153]

Thibaudeau estimated that of the population of 35,000,000 the following assortment might be made: Protestants, Jews, and Theophilanthropists, 3,000,000; Catholics, 15,000,000, equally divided between orthodox and constitutionals; and as many as 17,000,000 professing no belief whatever.

[154]

See Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 475. On the discontent of the officers, see Pasquier's "Mems.," vol. i., ch. vii.; also Marmont's "Mems.," bk. vi.

[155]

See the drafts in Count Boulay de la Meurthe's "Négociation du Concordat," vol. ii., pp. 58 and 268.

[156]

Theiner, vol. i., pp. 193 and 196.

[157]

Méneval, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 81.

[158]

Thiers omits any notice of this strange transaction. Lanfrey describes it, but unfortunately relies on the melodramatic version given in Consalvi's "Memoirs," which were written many years later and are far less trustworthy than the Cardinal's letters written at the time. In his careful review of all the documentary evidence, Count Boulay de la Meurthe (vol. iii., p. 201, note) concludes that the new project of the Concordat (No. VIII.) was drawn up by Hauterive, was "submitted immediately to the approbation of the First Consul," and thereupon formed the basis of the long and heated discussion of July 14th between the Papal and French plenipotentiaries. A facsimile of this interesting document, with all the erasures, is appended at the end of his volume.

[159]

Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. vii. Two of the organic articles portended the abolition of the revolutionary calendar. The first restored the old names of the days of the week; the second ordered that Sunday should be the day of rest for all public functionaries. The observance of décadis thenceforth ceased; but the months of the revolutionary calendar were observed until the close of the year 1805. Theophilanthropy was similarly treated: when its votaries applied for a building, their request was refused on the ground that their cult came within the domain of philosophy, not of any actual religion! A small number of priests and of their parishioners refused to recognize the Concordat; and even to-day there are a few of these anti-concordataires.

[160]

Chaptal, "Souvenirs," pp. 237-239. Lucien Bonaparte, "Mems.," vol. ii., p. 201, quotes his brother Joseph's opinion of the Concordat: "Un pas rétrograde et irréfléchi de la nation qui s'y soumettait."]

[161]

Thibaudeau, "Consulat," ch. xxvi.

[162]

"Code Napoléon," art. 148.

[163]

In other respects also Bonaparte's influence was used to depress the legal status of woman, which the men of 1789 had done so much to raise. In his curious letter of May 15th, 1807, on the Institution at Ecouen, we have his ideas on a sound, useful education for girls: "... We must begin with religion in all its severity. Do not admit any modification of this. Religion is very important in a girls' public school: it is the surest guarantee for mothers and husbands. We must train up believers, not reasoners. The weakness of women's brains, the unsteadiness of their ideas, their function in the social order, their need of constant resignation and of a kind of indulgent and easy charity—all can only be attained by religion." They were to learn a little geography and history, but no foreign language; above all, to do plenty of needlework.

[164]

Sagnac, "Législation civile de la Rév. Fr.," p. 293.

[165]

Divorce was suppressed in 1816, but was re-established in 1884.

[166]

Sagnac, op. cit., p. 352.

[167]

"The Life of Sir S. Romilly," vol. i., p. 408.

[168]

Madelin in his "Fouché," ch. xi., shows how Bonaparte's private police managed the affair. Harel was afterwards promoted to the governorship of the Castle of Vincennes: the four talkers, whom he and the police had lured on, were executed after the affair of Nivôse. That dextrous literary flatterer, the poet Fontanes, celebrated the "discovery" of the Aréna plot by publishing anonymously a pamphlet ("A Parallel between Caesar, Cromwell, Monk, and Bonaparte") in which he decided that no one but Caesar deserved the honour of a comparison with Bonaparte, and that certain destinies were summoning him to a yet higher title. The pamphlet appeared under the patronage of Lucien Bonaparte, and so annoyed his brother that he soon despatched him on a diplomatic mission to Madrid as a punishment for his ill-timed suggestions.

[169]

Thibaudeau, op. cit., vol. ii., p. 55. Miot de Melito, ch. xii.

[170]

It seems clear, from the evidence so frankly given by Cadoudal in his trial in 1804, as well as from his expressions when he heard of the affair of Nivôse, that the hero of the Chouans had no part in the bomb affair. He had returned to France, had empowered St. Réjant to buy arms and horses, "dont je me servirai plus tard"; and it seems certain that he intended to form a band of desperate men who were to waylay, kidnap, or kill the First Consul in open fight. This plan was deferred by the bomb explosion for three years. As soon as he heard of this event, he exclaimed: "I'll bet that it was that—— St. Réjant. He has upset all my plans." (See "Georges Cadoudal," par G. de Cadoudal.)

[171]

Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 352. For these negotiations see Bowman's "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens" (Toronto, 1899).

[172]

Porter, "Progress of the Nation," ch. xiv.

[173]

"New Letters of Napoleon I." See too his letter of June 17th.

[174]

"Cornwallis Correspondence," vol. iii., pp. 380-382. Few records exist of the negotiations between Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto at London. I have found none in the Foreign Office archives. The general facts are given by Garden, "Traités," vol. vii., ch. xxxi.; only a few of the discussions were reduced to writing. This seriously prejudiced our interests at Amiens.

[175]

Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ch. iv

[176]

Chaptal. "Mes Souvenirs," pp. 287, 291, and 359.

[177]

See Chapter XIV. of this work.

[178]

Thibaudeau, op. cit., ch. xxvi.; Lavisse, "Napoléon," ch. i.

[179]

"A Diary of St. Helena," by Lady Malcolm, p. 97.

[180]

"The Two Duchesses," edited by Vere Foster, p. 172. Lord Malmesbury ("Diaries," vol. iv., p. 257) is less favourable: "When B. is out of his ceremonious habits, his language is often coarse and vulgar."

[181]

Jurien de la Graviere, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. ii., chap. vii.

[182]

These facts were fully acknowledged later by Otto: see his despatch of January 6th, 1802, to Talleyrand, published by Du Casse in his "Négociations relatives au Traité d'Amiens," vol. iii.

[183]

"F.O.," France, No. 59. The memoir is dated October 19th, 1801.

[184]

"F.O.," France, No. 59.

[185]

Castlereagh, "Letters and Despatches," Second Series, vol. i., p. 62, and the speeches of Ministers on November 3rd, 1801.

[186]

Cornwallis, "Correspondence," vol. iii., despatch of December 3rd, 1801. The feelings of the native Maltese were strongly for annexation to Britain, and against the return of the Order at all. They sent a deputation to London (February, 1802), which was shabbily treated by our Government so as to avoid offending Bonaparte. (See "Correspondence of W.A. Miles," vol. ii., pp. 323-329, who drew up their memorial.)

[187]

Cornwallis's despatches of January 10th and 23rd, 1802.

[188]

Project of a treaty forwarded by Cornwallis to London on December 27th, 1801, in the Public Record Office, No. 615.

[189]

See the "Paget Papers," vol. ii. France gained the right of admission to the Black Sea: the despatches of Mr. Merry from Paris in May, 1802, show that France and Russia were planning schemes of partition of Turkey. ("F.O.," France, No. 62.)

[190]

The despatches of March 14th and 22nd, 1802, show how strong was the repugnance of our Government to this shabby treatment of the Prince of Orange; and it is clear that Cornwallis exceeded his instructions in signing peace on those terms. (See Garden, vol. vii., p. 142.) By a secret treaty with Prussia (May, 1802), France procured Fulda for the House of Orange.

[191]

Pasolini, "Memorie," ad init.

[192]

"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon" (Paris, 1889).

[193]

Mr. Jackson's despatch of February 17th, 1802, from Paris. According to Miot de Melito ("Mems.," ch. xiv.), Bonaparte had offered the post of President to his brother Joseph, but fettered it by so many restrictions that Joseph declined the honour.

[194]

Roederer tells us ("OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 428) that he had drawn up two plans of a constitution for the Cisalpine; the one very short and leaving much to the President, the other precise and detailed. He told Talleyrand to advise Bonaparte to adopt the former as it was "short and"—he was about to add "clear" when the diplomatist cut him short with the words, "Yes: short and obscure!"

[195]

Napoleon's letter of February 2nd, 1802, to Joseph Bonaparte; see too Cornwallis's memorandum of February 18th.

[196]

It is only fair to Cornwallis to quote the letter, marked "Private," which he received from Hawkesbury at the same time that he was bidden to stand firm:

"DOWNING STREET, March 22nd, 1802.

"I think it right to inform you that I have had a confidential communication with Otto, who will use his utmost endeavours to induce his Government to agree to the articles respecting the Prince of Orange and the prisoners in the shape in which they are now proposed. I have very little doubt of his success, and I should hope therefore that you will soon be released. I need not remind you of the importance of sending your most expeditious messenger the moment our fate is determined. The Treasury is almost exhausted, and Mr. Addington cannot well make his loan in the present state of uncertainty."

[197]

See the British notes of November 6th-16th, 1801, in the "Cornwallis Correspondence," vol. iii. In his speech in the House of Lords, May 13th, 1802, Lord Grenville complained that we had had to send to the West Indies in time of peace a fleet double as large as that kept there during the late war.

[198]

For these and the following negotiations see Lucien Bonaparte's "Mémoires," vol. ii., and Garden's "Traités de Paix," vol. iii., ch. xxxiv. The Hon. H. Taylor, in "The North American Review" of November, 1898, has computed that the New World was thus divided in 1801:

[199]

"History of the United States, 1801-1813," by H. Adams, vol. i, p. 409.

[200]

Napoleon's letter of November 2nd, 1802.

[201]

Merry's despatch of October 21st, 1802.

[202]

The instructions which he sent to Victor supply an interesting commentary on French colonial policy: "The system of this, as of all our other colonies, should be to concentrate its commerce in the national commerce: it should especially aim at establishing its relations with our Antilles, so as to take the place in those colonies of the American commerce.... The captain-general should abstain from every innovation favourable to strangers, who should be restricted to such communications as are absolutely indispensable to the prosperity of Louisiana."

[203]

Lucien Bonaparte, "Mémoires," vol. ii., ch. ix. He describes Josephine's alarm at this ill omen at a time when rumours of a divorce were rife.

[204]

Harbé-Marbois, "Hist. de Louisiana," quoted by H. Adams, op. cit., vol. ii., p. 27; Roloff, "Napoleon's Colonial Politik."

[205]

Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., ch. xxxiv. See too Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 461, for Napoleon's expressions after dinner on January 11th, 1803: "Maudit sucre, maudit café, maudites colonies."

[206]

Cornwallis, "Correspondence," vol. iii., despatch of December 3rd, 1801.

[207]

See the valuable articles on General Decaen's papers in the "Revue historique" of 1879 and of 1881.

[208]

Dumas' "Précis des Événements Militaires," vol. xi., p. 189. The version of these instructions presented by Thiers, book xvi., is utterly misleading.

[209]

Lord Whitworth, our ambassador in Paris, stated (despatch of March 24th, 1803) that Decaen was to be quietly reinforced by troops in French pay sent out by every French, Spanish, or Dutch ship going to India, so as to avoid attracting notice. ("England and Napoleon," edited by Oscar Browning, p. 137.)

[210]

See my article, "The French East India Expedition at the Cape," and unpublished documents in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of January, 1900. French designs on the Cape strengthened our resolve to acquire it, as we prepared to do in the summer of 1805.

[211]

Wellesley, "Despatches," vol. iii., Appendix, despatch of August 1st, 1803. See too Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second Series, vol. i., pp. 166-176, for Lord Elgin's papers and others, all of 1802, describing the utter weakness of Turkey, the probability of Egypt falling to any invader, of Caucasia and Persia being menaced by Russia, and the need of occupying Aden as a check to any French designs on India from Suez.

[212]

Wellesley's despatch of July 13th, 1804: with it he inclosed an intercepted despatch, dated Pondicherry, August 6th, 1803, a "Mémoire sur l'Importance actuelle de l'Inde et les moyens les plus efficaces d'y rétablir la Nation Française dans son ancienne splendeur." The writer, Lieutenant Lefebvre, set forth the unpopularity of the British in India and the immense wealth which France could gain from its conquest.

[213]

The report of the Imaum is given in Castlereagh's "Letters," Second Series, vol. i., p. 203.

[214]

"Voyage de Découverte aux Terres Australes sur les Corvettes, le Géographe et le Naturaliste," rédigé par M.F. Péron (Paris, 1807-15). From the Atlas the accompanying map has been copied.

[215]

His later mishaps may here be briefly recounted. Being compelled to touch at the Ile de France for repairs to his ship, he was there seized and detained as a spy by General Decaen, until the chivalrous intercession of the French explorer, Bougainville, finally availed to procure his release in the year 1810. The conduct of Decaen was the more odious, as the French crews during their stay at Sydney in the autumn of 1802, when the news of the Peace of Amiens was as yet unknown, had received not only much help in the repair of their ships, but most generous personal attentions, officials and private persons at Sydney agreeing to put themselves on short rations in that season of dearth in order that the explorers might have food. Though this fact was brought to Decaen's knowledge by the brother of Commodore Baudin, he none the less refused to acknowledge the validity of the passport which Flinders, as a geographical explorer, had received from the French authorities, but detained him in captivity for seven years. For the details see "A Voyage of Discovery to the Australian Isles," by Captain Flinders (London, 1814), vol. ii., chs. vii.-ix. The names given by Flinders on the coasts of Western and South Australia have been retained owing to the priority of his investigation: but the French names have been kept on the coast between the mouth of the Murray and Bass Strait for the same reason.

[216]

See Baudin's letter to King of December 23rd, 1803, in vol. v. (Appendix) of "Historical Records of New South Wales," and the other important letters and despatches contained there, as also ibid., pp. 133 and 376.

[217]

Mr. Merry's ciphered despatch from Paris, May 7th, 1802.

[218]

It is impossible to enter into the complicated question of the reconstruction of Germany effected in 1802-3. A general agreement had been made at Rastadt that, as an indemnity for the losses of German States in the conquest of the Rhineland by France, they should receive the ecclesiastical lands of the old Empire. The Imperial Diet appointed a delegation to consider the whole question; but before this body assembled (on August 24th, 1802), a number of treaties had been secretly made at Paris, with the approval of Russia, which favoured Prussia and depressed Austria. Austria received the archbishoprics of Trent and Brixen: while her Archdukes (formerly of Tuscany and Modena) were installed in Salzburg and Breisgau. Prussia, as the protégé of France, gained Hildesheim, Paderborn, Erfurt, the city of Münster, etc. Bavaria received Würzburg, Bamberg, Augsburg, Passau, etc. See Garden, "Traités," vol. vii., ch. xxxii.; "Annual Register" of 1802, pp. 648-665; Oncken, "Consulat und Kaiserthum," vol. ii.; and Beer's "Zehn Jahre Oesterreichischer Politik."

[219]

The British notes of April 28th and May 8th, 1803, again demanded a suitable indemnity for the King of Sardinia.

[220]

See his letters of January 28th, 1801, February 27th, March 10th, March 25th, April 10th, and May 16th, published in a work, "Bonaparte, Talleyrand et Stapfer" (Zürich, 1869).

[221]

Daendliker, "Geschichte der Schweiz," vol. iii., p. 418; Muralt's "Reinhard," p. 55; and Stapfer's letter of April 28th: "Malgré cette apparente neutralité que le gouvernement français déclare vouloir observer pour le moment, différentes circonstances me persuadent qu'il a vu avec plaisir passer la direction des affaires des mains de la majorité du Sénat [helvétique] dans celles de la minorité du Petit Conseil."

[222]

Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., p. 10. Mr. Merry, our chargé d'affaires at Paris, reported July 21st; "M. Stapfer makes a boast of having obtained the First Consul's consent to withdraw the French troops entirely from Switzerland. I learn from some well-disposed Swiss who are here that such a consent has been given; but they consider it only as a measure calculated to increase the disturbances in their country and to furnish a pretext for the French to enter it again."

[223]

Reding, in a pamphlet published shortly after this time, gave full particulars of his interviews with Bonaparte at Paris, and stated that he had fully approved of his (Reding's) federal plans. Neither Bonaparte nor Talleyrand ever denied this.

[224]

See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., despatches of October 29th, 1802, and January 28th, 1803.

[225]

Napoleon avowed this in his speech to the Swiss deputies at St. Cloud, December 12th, 1802.

[226]

Lord Hawkesbury's note of October 10th, 1802, the appeal of the Swiss, and the reply of Mr. Moore from Constance, are printed in full in the papers presented to Parliament, May 18th, 1803.

The Duke of Orleans wrote from Twickenham a remarkable letter to Pitt, dated October 18th, 1802, offering to go as leader to the Swiss in the cause of Swiss and of European independence: "I am a natural enemy to Bonaparte and to all similar Governments....England and Austria can find in me all the advantages of my being a French prince. Dispose of me, Sir, and show me the way. I will follow it." See Stanhope's "Life of Pitt," vol. iii., ch. xxxiii.

[227]

See Roederer, "Œuvres," vol. iii., p. 454, for the curious changes which Napoleon prescribed in the published reports of these speeches; also Stapfer's despatch of February 3rd, 1803, which is more trustworthy than the official version in Napoleon's "Correspondance." This, however, contains the menacing sentence: "It is recognized by Europe that Italy and Holland, as well as Switzerland, are at the disposition of France."

[228]

It is only fair to say that they had recognized their mistake and had recently promised equality of rights to the formerly subject districts and to all classes. See Muralt's "Reinhard," p. 113.

[229]

See, inter alia, the "Moniteur" of August 8th, October 9th, November 6th, 1802; of January 1st and 9th, February 19th, 1803.

[230]

Lord Whitworth's despatches of February 28th and March 3rd, 1803, in Browning's "England and Napoleon."

[231]

Secret instructions to Lord Whitworth, November 14th, 1802.

[232]

"Foreign Office Records," Russia, No. 50.

[233]

In his usually accurate "Manuel historique de Politique Etrangère" (vol. ii., p. 238), M. Bourgeois states that in May, 1802, Lord St. Helens succeeded in persuading the Czar not to give his guarantee to the clause respecting Malta. Every despatch that I have read runs exactly counter to this statement: the fact is that the Czar took umbrage at the treaty and refused to listen to our repeated requests for his guarantee. Thiers rightly states that the British Ministry pressed the Czar to give his guarantee, but that France long neglected to send her application. Why this neglect if she wished to settle matters?

[234]

Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second Series, vol. i., pp. 56 and 69; Dumas' "Evénements," ix. 91.

[235]

Mémoire of Francis II. to Cobenzl (March 31st, 1801), in Beer, "Die Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs," Appendix.

[236]

"Memoirs," vol. i., ch. xiii.

[237]

Ulmann's "Russisch-Preussische Politik, 1801-1806," pp. 10-12.

[238]

Warren reported (December 10th, 1802) that Vorontzoff warned him to be very careful as to the giving up of Malta; and, on January 19th, Czartoryski told him that "the Emperor wished the English to keep Malta." Bonaparte had put in a claim for the Morea to indemnify the Bourbons and the House of Savoy. ("F.O.," Russia, No. 51.)

[239]

Browning's "England and Napoleon," pp. 88-91.

[240]

"F.O.," France, No. 72.

[241]

We were undertaking that mediation. Lord Elgin's despatch from Constantinople, January 15th, 1803, states that he had induced the Porte to allow the Mamelukes to hold the province of Assouan. (Turkey, No. 38.)

[242]

Papers presented to Parliament on May 18th, 1803. I pass over the insults to General Stuart, as Sebastiani on February 2nd recanted to Lord Whitworth everything he had said, or had been made to say, on that topic, and mentioned Stuart "in terms of great esteem." According to Méneval ("Mems.," vol i., ch. iii.), Jaubert, who had been with Sebastiani, saw a proof of the report, as printed for the "Moniteur," and advised the omission of the most irritating passages; but Maret dared not take the responsibility for making such omissions. Lucien Bonaparte ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. ix.) has another version—less credible, I think—that Napoleon himself dictated the final draft of the report to Sebastiani; and when the latter showed some hesitation, the First Consul muttered, as the most irritating passages were read out: "Parbleu, nous verrons si ceci—si cela—ne décidera pas John Bull à guerroyer." Joseph was much distressed about it, and exclaimed: "Ah, mon pauvre traité d'Amiens! Il ne tient plus qu'à un fil."

[243]

So Adams's "Hist, of the U.S.," vol. ii., pp. 12-21.

[244]

Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i, ch. xv., quotes the words of Joseph Bonaparte to him: "Let him [Napoleon] once more drench Europe with blood in a war that he could have avoided, and which, but for the outrageous mission on which he sent his Sebastiani, would never have occurred."

Talleyrand laboured hard to persuade Lord Whitworth that Sebastiani's mission was "solely commercial": Napoleon, in his long conversation with our ambassador, "did not affect to attribute it to commercial motives only," but represented it as necessitated by our infraction of the Treaty of Amiens. This excuse is as insincere as the former. The instructions to Sebastiani were drawn up on September 5th, 1802, when the British Ministry was about to fulfil the terms of the treaty relative to Malta and was vainly pressing Russia and Prussia for the guarantee of its independence

[245]

Despatch of February 21st.

[246]

"View of the State of the Republic," read to the Corps Législatif on February 21st, 1803.

[247]

Papers presented to Parliament May 18th, 1803. See too Pitt's speech, May 23rd, 1803.

[248]

See Russell's proclamation of July 22nd to the men of Antrim that "he doubted not but the French were then fighting in Scotland." ("Ann. Reg.," 1803, p. 246.) This document is ignored by Plowden ("Hist. of Ireland, 1801-1810").

[49:]

Despatch of March 14th, 1803. Compare it with the very mild version in Napoleon's "Corresp.," No. 6636.

[250]

Lord Hawkesbury to General Andreossy, March 10th.

[251]

Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, April 4th, 1803.

[252]

Despatches of April 11th and 18th, 1803.

[253]

Whitworth to Hawkesbury, April 23rd.

[254]

Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. i., ch. xiii.) calls him "an excellent admiral but an indifferent diplomatist—a perfect representative of the nullity and incapacity of the Addington Ministry which had appointed him. The English Government was seldom happy in its ambassadors." So Earl Minto's "Letters," vol. iii., p. 279.

[255]

See Lord Malmesbury's "Diaries" (vol. iv., p. 253) as to the bad results of Whitworth's delay.

[256]

Note of May 12th, 1803: see "England and Napoleon," p. 249.

[257]

"Corresp.," vol. viii., No. 6743.

[258]

See Romilly's letter to Dumont, May 31st, 1803 ("Memoirs," vol. i.).

[259]

"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," November 3rd, 1802. In his letter of May 3rd, 1803, to Lord Whitworth, M. Huber reports Fouché's outspoken warning in the Senate to Bonaparte: "Vous êtes vous-même, ainsi que nous, un résultat de la révolution, et la guerre remet tout en problême. On vous flatte en vous faisant compter sur les principes révolutionnaires des autres nations: le résultat de notre révolution les a anéantis partout."

[260]

A copy of this letter, with the detailed proposals, is in our Foreign Office archives (Russia, No. 52).

[261]

Bourgeois, "Manuel de Politique Etrangère," vol. ii., p. 243.

[262]

See Castlereagh's "Letters and Despatches," Second Series, vol. i., pp. 75-82, as to the need of conciliating public opinion, even by accepting Corfu as a set-off for Malta, provided a durable peace could thus be secured.

[263]

"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," August 21st, 1803.

[264]

Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., p. 191.

[265]

Holland was required to furnish 16,000 troops and maintain 18,000 French, to provide 10 ships of war and 350 gunboats.

[266]

"Corresp.," May 23rd, 1803.

[267]

Nelson's letters of July 2nd. See too Mahan's "Life of Nelson," vol. ii., pp. 180-188, and Napoleon's letters of November 24th, 1803, encouraging the Mamelukes to look to France.

[268]

"Foreign Office Records," Sicily and Naples, No. 55, July 25th.

[269]

Letter of July 28th, 1803.

[270]

"Nap. Corresp.," August 23rd, 1803, and Oncken, ch. v.

[271]

"Corresp.," vol. viii., No. 6627.

[272]

Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," ch. viii.; "Nap. Corresp.," vol. viii., Nos. 6979, 6985, 7007, 7098, 7113.

[273]

The French and Dutch ships in commission were: ships of the line, 48; frigates, 37; corvettes, 22; gun-brigs, etc., 124; flotilla, 2,115. (See "Mems. of the Earl of St. Vincent," vol. ii., p. 218.)

[274]

Pellew's "Life of Lord Sidmouth," vol. ii., p. 239.

[275]

Stanhope's "Life of Pitt," vol. iv., p. 213.

[276]

Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 348; Méneval, vol. i., ch. iv.

[277]

Lucien ("Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 315-320) says at Malmaison; but Napoleon's "Correspondance" shows that it was at St. Cloud. Masson (" Nap. et sa Famille," ch. xii.) throws doubt on the story.

[278]

Ibid., p. 318. The scene was described by Murat: the real phrase was coquine, but it was softened down by Murat to maîtresse.

[279]

Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. 1., ch. xv. Lucien settled in the Papal States, where he, the quondam Jacobin and proven libertine, later on received from the Pope the title of Prince de Canino.

[280]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," April 22nd, 1805.

[281]

Pasquier, "Mems.," vol. i., p. 167, and Boulay de la Meurthe, "Les dernières Années du duc d'Enghien," p. 299. An intriguing royalist of Neufchâtel, Fauche-Borel, had been to England in 1802 to get the help of the Addington Ministry, but failed. See Caudrillier's articles in the "Revue Historique," Nov., 1900—March, 1901.

[282]

Madelin's "Fouché," vol. i., p. 368, minimizes Fouché's rôle here.

[283]

Desmarest, "Témoignages historiques," pp. 78-82.

[284]

"Alliance des Jacobins de France avec le Ministère Anglais."

[285]

Brit. Mus., "Add. MSS.," Nos. 7976 et seq.

[286]

In our Records (France, No. 71) is a letter of Count Descars, dated London, March 25th, 1805, to Lord Mulgrave, Minister for War, rendering an account for various sums advanced by our Government for the royalist "army."

[287]

"Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 96.

[288]

"Parl. Debates," April, 1804 (esp. April 16th). The official denial is, of course, accepted by Alison, ch. xxxviii.

[289]

The expression is that of George III., who further remarked that all the ambassadors despised Hawkesbury. (Rose, "Diaries," vol. ii., p. 157.) Windham's letter, dated Beaconsfield, August 16th, 1803, in the Puisaye Papers, warned the French émigrés that they must not count on any aid from Ministers, who had "at all times shown such feebleness of spirit, that they can scarcely dare to lift their eyes to such aims as you indicate. ("Add. MSS.," No. 7976.)

[290]

See in chapter xxi., p. 488. Our envoy, Spencer Smith, at Stuttgart, was also taken in by a French spy, Captain Rosey, whose actions were directed by Napoleon. See his letter (No. 7669).

[291]

"F.O.," Austria, No. 68 (October 31st, 1803).

[292]

Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxiii.; "Georges Cadoudal," by Georges de Cadoudal (Paris, 1887).

[293]

See his letter of January 24th, 1804, to Réal, instructing him to tell Méhée what falsehoods are to find a place in Méhée's next bulletin to Drake! "Keep on continually with the affair of my portfolio."

[294]

Miot de Melito, vol. i., ch. xvi.; Pasquier, vol. i., ch. vii. See also Desmarest, "Quinze ans de la haute police": his claim that the police previously knew nothing of the plot is refuted by Napoleon's letters (e.g., that of November 1st, 1803); as also by Guilhermy, "Papiers d'un Emigré," p. 122.

[295]

Ségur, "Mems.," ch. x. Bonaparte to Murat and Harel, March 20th.

[296]

Letter to Réal, "Corresp.," No. 7639.

[297]

The original is in "F.O." (Austria, No. 68).

[298]

Pasquier, "Mémoires," vol. i., p. 187.

[299]

The Comte de Mosbourg's notes in Count Murat's "Murat" (Paris, 1897), pp. 437-445, prove that Savary did not draw his instructions for the execution of the duke merely from Murat, but from Bonaparte himself, who must therefore be held solely responsible for the composition and conduct of that court. Masson's attempt ("Nap. et sa Famille," ch. xiv.) to inculpate Murat is very weak.

[300]

Hulin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," p. 118.

[301]

Dupin in "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien," pp. 101, 123.

[302]

The only excuse which calls for notice here is that Napoleon at the last moment, when urged by Joseph to be merciful, gave way, and despatched orders late at night to Réal to repair to Vincennes. Réal received some order, the exact purport of which is unknown: it was late at night and he postponed going till the morrow. On his way he met Savary, who came towards Paris bringing the news of the duke's execution. Réal's first words, on hearing this unexpected news, were: "How is that possible? I had so many questions to put to the duke: his examination might disclose so much. Another thing gone wrong; the First Consul will be furious." These words were afterwards repeated to Pasquier both by Savary and by Real: and, unless Pasquier lied, the belated order sent to Réal was not a pardon (and Napoleon on his last voyage said to Cockburn it was not), but merely an order to extract such information from the duke as would compromise other Frenchmen. Besides, if Napoleon had despatched an order for the duke's pardon, why was not that order produced as a sign of his innocence and Réal's blundering? Why did he shut himself up in his private room on March 20th, so that even Josephine had difficulty in gaining entrance? And if he really desired to pardon the duke, how came it that when, at noon of March 21st, Réal explained that he arrived at Vincennes too late, the only words that escaped Napoleon's lips were "C'est bien"? (See Méneval, vol. i, p. 296.) Why also was his countenance the only one that afterwards showed no remorse or grief? Caulaincourt, when he heard the results of his raid into Baden, fainted with horror, and when brought to by Bonaparte, overwhelmed him with reproaches. Why also had the grave been dug beforehand? Why, finally, were Savary and Réal not disgraced? No satisfactory answer to these questions has ever been given. The "Catastrophe du duc d'Enghien" and Count Boulay de la Meurthe's "Les dernières Années du duc d'Enghien" and Napoleon's "Correspondance" give all the documents needed for forming a judgment on this case. The evidence is examined by Mr. Fay in "The American Hist. Rev.," July and Oct., 1898. For the rewards to the murderers see Masson, "Nap. et sa Famille," chap. xiii.

[303]

Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Nap.," p. 9.

[304]

Miot de Melito; vol. ii., ch. i.; Pasquier, vol. i., ch. ix.

[305]

I cannot agree with M. Lanfrey, vol. ii., ch. xi., that the Empire was not desired by the nation. It seems to me that this writer here attributes to the apathetic masses his own unrivalled acuteness of vision and enthusiasm for democracy. Lafayette well sums up the situation in the remark that he was more shocked at the submission of all than at the usurpation of one man ("Mems.," vol. v., p. 239).

[306]

See Aulard, "Rév. Française," p. 772, for the opposition.

[307]

Roederer, "Œuvres," vol. iii., p. 513.

[308]

Macdonald, "Souvenirs," ch. xii.; Ségur, "Mems.," ch. vii. When Thiébault congratulated Masséna on his new title, the veteran scoffingly replied: "Oh, there are fourteen of us." (Thiébault, "Mems.," ch. vii., Eng. edit.) See too Marmont ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 227) on his own exclusion and the inclusion of Bessières.

[309]

Chaptal, "Souvenirs," p. 262. For Moreau's popularity see Madelin's "Fouché," vol. i., p. 422.

[310]

At the next public audience Napoleon upbraided one of the judges, Lecourbe, who had maintained that Moreau was innocent, and thereafter deprived him of his judgeship. He also disgraced his brother, General Lecourbe, and forbade his coming within forty leagues of Paris. ("Lettres inédites de Napoléon," August 22nd and 29th, 1805.)

[311]

Miot de Melito, vol ii., ch. i.

[312]

Napoleon to Roederer, "Œuvres," vol. iii., p. 514.

[313]

Lafayette, "Mems.," vol. v., p. 182.

[314]

"Mémoires de Savary, Duc de Rovigo." So Bourrienne, who was informed by Rapp, who was present (vol. ii., ch. xxxiii.). The "Moniteur" (4th Frimaire, Year XIII.) asserted that the Pope took the right-hand seat; but I distrust its version.

[315]

Mme. de Rémusat, vol. i., ch. x. As the curé of the parish was not present, even as witness, this new contract was held by the Bonapartes to lack full validity. It is certain, however, that Fesch always maintained that the marriage could only be annulled by an act of arbitrary authority. For Napoleon's refusal to receive the communion on the morning of the coronation, lest he, being what he was, should be guilty of sacrilege and hypocrisy, see Ségur.

[316]

Ségur, ch. xi.

[317]

F. Masson's "Joséphine, Impératrice et Reine," p. 229. For the Pitt diamond, see Yule's pamphlet and Sir M. Grant Duff's "Diary," June 30, 1888.

[318]

De Bausset, "Court de Napoléon," ch. ii.

[319]

"Foreign Office Records," Intelligences, No. 426.

[320]

"Life of Fulton," by Colden(1817); also one by Reigart (1856).

[321]

Jurien de la Gravière, "Guerres Maritimes," vol. ii., p. 75; Chevalier, "Hist. de la Marine Française," p. 105; Capt. Desbrière's "Projets de Débarquement aux Iles Britanniques," vol. i. The accompanying engraving shows how fantastic were some of the earlier French schemes of invasion.

[322]

"Mémoires du Maréchal Ney," bk. vii., ch. i.; so too Marmont, vol. ii., p. 213; Mahan, "Sea Power," ch. xv.

[323]

Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 494.

[324]

Colonel Campbell, our Commissioner at Elba, noted in his diary (December 5th, 1814): "As I have perceived in many conversations, Napoleon has no idea of the difficulties occasioned by winds and tides, but judges of changes of position in the case of ships as he would with regard to troops on land."

[325]

Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 88, who says: "His mild and melancholy disposition, his sad and modest behaviour, ill suited the Emperor's ambitious plans."

[326]

"Corresp.," No. 8063. See too No. 7996 for Napoleon's plan of carrying a howitzer in the bows of his gun vessels so that his projectiles might burst in the wood. Already at Boulogne he had uttered the prophetic words: "We must have shells that will shiver the wooden sides of ships."

[327]

James, "Naval History," vol. iii., p. 213, and Chevalier, p. 115, imply that Villeneuve's fleet from Toulon, after scouring the West Indies, was to rally the Rochefort force and cover the Boulogne flotilla: but this finds no place in Napoleon's September plan, which required Gantheaume first to land troops in Ireland and then convoy the flotilla across if the weather were favourable, or if it were stormy to beat down the Channel with the troops from Holland. See O'Connor Morris, "Campaigns of Nelson," p. 121.

[328]

Colomb, "Naval Warfare," p. 18.

[329]

Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 100. Nelson was aware of the fallacies that crowded Napoleon's brain: "Bonaparte has often made his boast that our fleet would be worn out by keeping the sea, and that his was kept in order and increasing by staying in port; but he now finds, I fancy, if emperors hear truth, that his fleet suffers more in a night than ours in one year."—Nelson to Collingwood, March 13th, 1805.

[330]

Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 276-290; also Capt. Mahan, "Influence of Sea Power, etc.," vol. ii., ch. xv. ad fin. He quotes the opinion of a Spanish historian, Don José de Couto: "If all the circumstances are properly weighed ... we shall see that all the charges made against England for the seizure of the frigates may be reduced to want of proper foresight in the strength of the force detailed to effect it."—In the Admiralty secret letters (1804-16) I have found the instructions to Sir J. Orde, with the Swiftsure, Polyphemus, Agamemnon, Ruby, Defence, Lively, and two sloops, to seize the treasure-ships. No fight seems to have been expected.

[331]

"Corresp.," No. 8379; Mahan, ibid., vol. ii., p. 149.

[332]

Letter of April 29th, 1805. I cannot agree with Mahan (p. 155) that this was intended only to distract us.

[333]

"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 121.

[334]

Jurien de la Gravière, vol. ii., p. 367.

[335]

Thiers writes, most disingenuously, as though Napoleon's letters of August 13th and 22nd could have influenced Villeneuve.

[336]

Dupin, "Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne" (tome i., p. 244), who had the facts from Daru. But, as Méneval sensibly says ("Mems.," vol. i., ch. v.), it was not Napoleon's habit dramatically to dictate his plans so far in advance. Certainly, in military matters, he always kept his imagination subservient to facts. Not until September 22nd, did he make any written official notes on the final moves of his chief corps; besides, the Austrians did not cross the Inn till September 8th.

[337]

Diary of General Bingham, in "Blackwood's Magazine," October, 1896. The accompanying medal, on the reverse of which are the words "frappée à Londres, en 1804," affords another proof of his intentions.

[338]

Marbot, "Mems.," ch. xix; Fouché, "Mems.," part 1; Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. i.

[339]

See Nelson's letters of August 25th, 1803, and May 1st, 1804; also Collingwood's of July 21st, 1805.

[340]

In "F.O.," France, No. 71, is a report of a spy on the interview of Napoleon with O'Connor, whom he made General of Division. See Appendix, p. 510.

FOOTNOTES TO VOLUME II

[1]

Armfeldt to Drake, December 24th, 1803 ("F.O.," Bavaria, No. 27).

[2]

Drake's despatch of December 15th, 1803, ib.

[3]

Czartoryski, "Memoirs," vol. ii., ch. ii.

[4]

The Czar's complaints were: the exile of the King of Sardinia, the re-occupation of S. Italy by the French, the changes in Italy, the violation of the neutrality of Baden, the occupation of Cuxhaven by the French, and the levying of ransom from the Hanse Towns to escape the same fate ("F.O.," Russia, No. 56).

[5]

Lord Harrowby to Admiral Warren ("F.O.," Russia, No. 56).

[6]

Garden, "Traités" vol. viii., p. 302; Ulmann, "Russisch-Preussische Politik," p. 117

[7]

See the letter in the "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 170.

[8]

"F.O.," Russia, No. 55. See note on p. 28.

[9]

Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., chs. ii.-iv.

[10]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon" (May 30th, 1805).

[11]

See Novossiltzoff's Report in Czartoryski's "Memoirs," vol. ii., ch. iv., and Pitt's note developing the Russian proposals in Garden's "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 317-323, or Alison, App. to ch. xxxix. A comparison of these two memoranda will show that on Continental questions there was no difference such as Thiers affected to see between the generous policy of Russia and the "cold egotism" of Pitt. As Czartoryski has proved in his "Memoirs" (vol. ii., ch. x.) Thiers has erred in assigning importance to a mere first draft of a conversation which Czartoryski had with that ingenious schemer, the Abbé Piatoli. The official proposals sent from St. Petersburg to London were very different; e.g., the proposal of Alexander with regard to the French frontiers was this: "The first object is to bring back France into its ancient limits or such other ones as might appear most suitable to the general tranquillity of Europe." It is, therefore, futile to state that this was solely the policy of Pitt after he had "remodelled" the Russian proposals.

[12]

"Corresp.," No. 8231. See too Bourrienne, Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. iv., and Thiers, bk. xxi.

[13]

This refusal has been severely criticised. But the knowledge of the British Government that Napoleon was still persevering with his schemes against Turkey, and that the Russians themselves, from their station at Corfu, were working to gain a foothold on the Albanian coast, surely prescribed caution ("F.O.," Russia, Nos. 55 and 56, despatches of June 26th and October 10th, 1804). It was further known that the Austrian Government had proposed to the Czar plans that were hostile to Turkey, and were not decisively rejected at St. Petersburg; and it is clear from the notes left by Czartoryski that the prospect of gaining Corfu, Moldavia, parts of Albania, and the precious prize of Constantinople was kept in view. Pitt agreed to restore the conquests made from France (Despatch of April 22nd).

[14]

Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 328-333. It is clear that Gustavus IV. was the ruler who insisted on making the restoration of the Bourbons the chief aim of the Third Coalition. In our "F.O. Records" (Sweden, No. 177) is an account (August 20th, 1804) of a conversation of Lord Harrowby with the Swedish ambassador, who stated that such a declaration would "palsy the arms of France." Our Foreign Minister replied that it would "much more certainly palsy the arms of England: that we made war because France was become too powerful for the peace of Europe."

[15]

"Corresp.," No. 8329.

[16]

Bailleu, "Preussen und Frankreich," vol. ii., p. 354.

[17]

Thiers (bk. xxi.) gives the whole text.

[18]

The annexation of the Ligurian or Genoese Republic took place on June 4th, the way having been prepared there by Napoleon's former patron, Salicetti, who liberally dispensed bribes. A little later the Republic of Lucca was bestowed on Elisa Bonaparte and her spouse, now named Prince Bacciochi. Parma, hitherto administered by a French governor, was incorporated in the French Empire about the same time.

[19]

Paget to Lord Mulgrave (March 19th, 1805).

[20]

Beer, "Zehn Jahre oesterreich. Politik (1801-1810)." The notes of Novossiltzoff and Hardenberg are printed in Sir G. Jackson's "Diaries," vol i., App.

[21]

See Bignon, vol. iv., pp. 271 and 334. Probably Napoleon knew through Laforest and Talleyrand that Russia had recently urged that George III. should offer Hanover to Prussia. Pitt rejected the proposal. Prussia paid more heed to the offer of Hanover from Napoleon than to the suggestions of Czartoryski that she might receive it from its rightful owner, George III. Yet Duroc did not succeed in gaining more from Frederick William than the promise of his neutrality (see Garden, "Traités," vol. viii., pp. 339-346). Sweden was not a member of the Coalition, but made treaties with Russia and England.

The high hopes nursed by the Pitt Ministry are seen in the following estimate of the forces that would be launched against France: Austria, 250,000; Russia, 180,000; Prussia, 100,000 (Pitt then refused to subsidize more than 100,000); Sweden, 16,000; Saxony, 16,000; Hesse and Brunswick, 16,000; Mecklenburg, 3,000; King of Sardinia, 25,000; Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, 25,000; Naples, 20,000. In a P.S. he adds that the support of the King of Sardinia would not be needed, and that England had private arrangements with Naples as to subsidies. This Memoir is not dated, but it must belong to the beginning of September, before the defection of Bavaria was known ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).

[22]

"F.O.," Russia, No. 57; Gower's note of July 22nd, 1805.

[23]

Colonel Graham's despatches, which undoubtedly influenced the Pitt Ministry in favouring the appointment of Mack to the present command. Paget ("Papers," vol. ii., p. 238) states that the Iller position was decided on by Francis. The best analysis of Mack's character is in Bernhardi's "Memoirs of Count Toll" (vol. i., p. 121). The State Papers are in Burke's "Campaign of 1805," App.

[24]

Marmont, "Mems.," vol. ii., p. 310.

[25]

See "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 224; also Schönhals "Der Krieg 1805 in Deutschland," p. 67.

[26]

"Corresp.," No. 9249. See too No. 9254 for the details of the enveloping moves which Napoleon then (September 22nd) accurately planned twenty-five days before the final blows were dealt: yet No. 9299 shows that, even on September 30th, he believed Mack would hurry back to the Inn. Beer, p. 145.

[27]

Rüstow, "Der Krieg 1805." Hormayr, "Geschichte Hofers" (vol. i., p. 96), states that, in framing with Russia the plan of campaign, the Austrians forgot to allow for the difference (twelve days) between the Russian and Gregorian calendars. The Russians certainly were eleven days late.

[28]

"Corresp.," No 9319; Sir G. Jackson's "Diaries," vol. i., p. 334.

[29]

Ibid.; also Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii. For Prussia's protest to Napoleon, which pulverized the French excuses, see Garden, vol. ix., p. 69.

[30]

Schönhals; Ségur, ch. xvi., exculpates Murat and Ney.

[31]

Schönhals, p. 73. Thiers states that Dupont's 6,000 gained a victory over 25,000 Austrians detached from the 60,000 who occupied Ulm!

[32]

Marmont, vol. ii., p. 320; Lejeune, "Memoirs," vol. i., ch. iii.

[33]

Thiers, bk. xxii. During Mack's interview with Napoleon (see "Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 235), when the Emperor asked him why he did not cut his way through to Ansbach, he replied, "Prussia would have declared against us." To which the Emperor retorted: "Ah! the Prussians do not declare so quickly."

[34]

"Alexandre I et Czartoryski," pp. 32-34.

[35]

See these terms compared with the Anglo-Russian treaty of April 11th, 1805, in the Appendix of Dr. Hansing's "Hardenberg und die dritte Coalition" (Berlin, 1899).

[36]

Häusser, vol. ii., p. 617 (4th. edit.); Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806-1807," vol. i., ad init.

[37]

For the much more venial stratagem which Kutusoff played on Murat at Hollabrunn, see Thiers, bk. xxiii.

[38]

Lord Harrowby, then on a special mission to Berlin, reports (November 24th) that this appeal of the Czar had been "coolly received," and no Prussian troops would enter Bohemia until it was known how Prussia's envoy to Napoleon, Count Haugwitz, had been received.

[39]

Thiers says December 1st, which is corrected by Napoleon's letter of November 30th to Talleyrand.

[40]

Thiébault, vol. ii., ch. viii.; Ségur, ch. xviii.; York von Wartenburg, "Nap. als Feldherr," vol. i., p. 230.

[41]

Davoust's reports of December 2nd and 5th in his "Corresp."

[42]

Ségur, Thiébault, and Lejeune all state that Napoleon in the previous advance northwards had foretold that a great battle would soon be fought opposite Austerlitz, and explained how he would fight it.

[43]

Thiébault wrongly attributes this succour to Lannes: for that Marshal, who had just insulted and challenged Soult, Thiébault had a manifest partiality. Savary, though hostile to Bernadotte, gives him bare justice on this move.

[44]

Harrowby evidently thought that Prussia's conduct would depend on events. Just before the news of Austerlitz arrived, he wrote to Downing Street: "The eyes of this Government are turned almost exclusively on Moravia. It is there the fate of this negotiation must be decided." Yet he reports that 192,000 Prussians are under arms ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).

[45]

Jackson, "Diaries," vol. i., p. 137.

[46]

"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," pp. 205-208.

[47]

Metternich, "Mems.," vol. i., ch. iii.

[48]

Hanover, along with a few districts of Bavarian Franconia, would bring to Prussia a gain of 989,000 inhabitants, while she would lose only 375,000. Neufchâtel had offered itself to Frederick I. of Prussia in 1688, and its proposed barter to France troubled Hardenberg ("Mems.," vol. ii., p. 421).

[49]

Gower to Lord Harrowby from Olmütz, November 25th, in "F.O. Records," Russia, No. 59.

[50]

"Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 216.

[51]

Printed for the first time in full in "Lettres inédites de Tall.," pp. 156-174. On December 5th Talleyrand again begged Napoleon to strengthen Austria as "a needful bulwark against the barbarians, the Russians."

[52]

I dissent, though with much diffidence, from M. Vandal ("Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., p. 9) in regard to Talleyrand's proposal.

[53]

Napoleon to Talleyrand (December 14th, 1805): "Sûr de la Prusse, l'Autriche en passera par où je voudrai. Je ferai également prononcer la Prusse contre l'Angleterre."

[54]

Report of M. Otto, August, 1799.

[55]

Czartoryski ("Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xii.) states that England offered Holland to Prussia. I find no proof of this in our Records. The districts between Antwerp and Cleves are Belgian, not Dutch; and we never wavered in our support of the House of Orange.

[56]

These proposals, dated October 27th, 1805, were modified somewhat on the news of Mack's disaster and the Treaty of Potsdam. Hardenberg assured Harrowby (November 24th) that, despite England's liberal pecuniary help, Frederick William felt great difficulty in assenting to the proposed territorial arrangements ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 70).

[57]

Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., pp. 377, 382.

[58]

Ompteda, p. 188. The army returned in February, 1806.

[59]

"F.O.," Prussia, No. 70 (November 23rd).

[60]

"Diaries of Right Hon. G. Rose," vol. ii., pp. 223-224.

[61]

Ib., pp. 233-283; Rosebery, "Life of Pitt," p. 258.

[62]

Lord Malmesbury's "Diary," vol. iv., p. 114.

[63]

Letter of December 27th, 1805; Jackson, "Diaries," vol. ii., p. 387.

[64]

Mollien, "Mems.," vol. i. ad fin., and vol. ii., p. 80, for the budget of 1806; also, Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec Bonaparte," vol. ii., pp. 180-203.

[65]

The Court of Naples asserted that in the Convention with France its ambassador, the Comte de Gallo, exceeded his powers in promising neutrality. See Lucchesini's conversation with Gentz, quoted by Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 129.

[66]

See my article in the "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1900.

[67]

Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," p. 11.

[68]

Letter of February 7th, 1806. On the same day he blames Junot, then commander of Parma, for too great lenience to some rebels near that city. The Italians were a false people, who only respected a strong Government. Let him, then, burn two large villages so that no trace remained, shoot the priest of one village, and send three or four hundred of the guilty to the galleys. "Trust my old experience of the Italians."

[69]

For a list of the chief Napoleonic titles, see Appendix, ad fin.

[70]

January 2nd, 1802; so too Fiévée, "Mes Relations avec Bonaparte," vol. ii., p. 210, who notes that, by founding an order of nobility, Napoleon ended his own isolation and attached to his interests a powerful landed caste.

[71]

Hardenberg's "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 390-394.

[72]

Hardenberg to Harrowby on January 7th, "Prussia," No. 70.

[73]

I have not found a copy of this project; but in "Prussia," No. 70 (forwarded by Jackson on January 27th, 1806), there is a detailed "Mémoire explicatif," whence I extract these details, as yet unpublished, I believe. Neither Hardenberg, Garden, Jackson, nor Paget mentions them.

[74]

Records, "Prussia," No. 70, dated February 21st.

[75]

Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. ii., pp. 463-469; "Nap. Corresp.," No. 9742, for Napoleon's thoughts as to peace, when he heard of Fox being our Foreign Minister.

[76]

See "Nap. Corresp.," Nos. 9742, 9773, 9777, for his views as to the weakness of England and Prussia. This treaty of February 15th, 1806, confirmed the cession of Neufchâtel and Cleves to France, and of Ansbach to Bavaria; but did not cede any Franconian districts to Prussia's Baireuth lands. See Hardenberg, "Mémoires," vol. ii., p. 483, for the text of the treaty.

[77]

The strange perversity of Haugwitz is nowhere more shown than in his self-congratulation at the omission of the adjectives offensive et défensive from the new treaty of alliance between France and Prussia (Hardenberg, vol. ii., p. 481). Napoleon was now not pledged to help Prussia in the war which George III. declared against her on April 20th.

[78]

It is noteworthy that in all the negotiations that followed, Napoleon never raised any question about our exacting maritime code, which proves how hollow were his diatribes against the tyrant of the seas at other times.

[79]

Despatch of April 20th, 1806, in Papers presented to Parliament on December 22nd, 1806.

[80]

Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiii.

[81]

"I do not intend the Court of Rome to mix any more in politics" (Nap. to the Pope, February 13th, 1806).

[82]

I translate literally these N.B.'s as pasted in at the end of Yarmouth's Memoir of July 8th ("France," No. 73). As Oubril's instructions have never, I believe, been published, the passage given above is somewhat important as proving how completely he exceeded his powers in bartering away Sicily. The text of the Oubril Treaty is given by De Clercq, vol. ii., p. 180. The secret articles required Russia to help France in inducing the Court of Madrid to cede the Balearic Isles to the Prince Royal of Naples; the dethroned King and Queen were not to reside there, and Russia was to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as King of the Two Sicilies.

[83]

In conversing with our ambassador, Mr. Stuart, Baron Budberg excused Oubril's conduct on the ground of his nervousness under the threats of the French plenipotentiary, General Clarke, who scarcely let him speak, and darkly hinted at many other changes that must ensue if Russia did not make peace; Switzerland was to be annexed, Germany overrun, and Turkey partitioned. That Clarke was a master in diplomatic hectoring is well known; but, from private inquiries, Stuart discovered that the Czar, in his private conference with Oubril, seemed more inclined towards peace than Czartoryski: when therefore the latter resigned, Oubril might well give way before Clarke's bluster. (Stuart's Despatch of August 9th, 1806, F.O., Russia, No. 63; also see Czartoryski's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xiv.; and Martens, "Traités," Suppl. vol. iv.)

[84]

"Memoirs of Karl Heinrich, Knight of Lang."

[85]

Garden, vol. ix., pp. 157, 189, 255.

[86]

"Corresp.," Nos. 10522 and 10544. For a French account see the "Mems." of Baron Desvernois, p. 288.

[87]

"F.O. Records," Naples, No. 73.

[88]

This was on Napoleon's advice. He wrote to Talleyrand from Rambouillet on August 18th, to give as an excuse for the delay, "The Emperor is hunting and will not be back before the end of the week."

[89]

So too Napoleon said at St. Helena to Las Cases: "Fox's death was one of the fatalities of my career."

[90]

Despatches of September 26th and October 6th.

[91]

Bailleu, "Frankreich und Preussen," Introd.

[92]

Decree of July 26th.

[93]

See "Corresp." No. 10604, note; also Talleyrand's letter of August 4th ("Lettres inédites," p. 245), showing the indemnities that might be offered to Prussia after the loss of Hanover: they included, of course, little States, Anhalt, Lippe, Waldeck, etc.

[94]

Gentz, "Ausgew. Schriften," vol. v., p. 252. Conversation with Lucchesini.

[95]

"Corresp.," Nos. 10575, 10587, 10633.

[96]

"Mems.," vol. iii., pp. 115, et seq. The Prusso-Russian convention of July, by which these Powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their States, was mainly the work of Hardenberg.

[97]

Bailleu, pp. 540-552. See too Fournier's "Napoleon," vol. ii., p. 106.

[98]

Bailleu, pp. 556-557. So too Napoleon's letter of September 5th to Berthier is the first hint of his thought of a Continental war.

[99]

Queen Louisa said to Gentz (October 9th) that war had been decided on, not owing to selfish calculations, but the sentiment of honour (Garden, "Traités," vol. x., p. 133).

[100]

A memorial was handed in to him on September 2nd. It was signed by the King's brothers, Henry and William, also by the leader of the warlike party, Prince Louis Ferdinand, by Generals Rüchel and Phull, and by the future dictator, Stein. The King rebuked all of them. See Pertz, "Stein," vol. i., p. 347.

[101]

"F.O.," Russia, No. 64. Stuart's despatches of September 30th and October 21st.

[102]

Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."

[103]

Lettow-Vorbeck, "Der Krieg von 1806-7," p. 163.

[104]

See Prince Hohenlohe's "Letters on Strategy" (p. 62, Eng. ed.) for the effect of this rapid marching; Foucart's "Campagne de Prusse," vol. i., pp. 323-343; also Lord Fitzmaurice's "Duke of Brunswick."

[105]

Höpfner, vol. i.p. 383; and Lettow-Vorbeck, vol. i., p. 345.

[106]

Foucart, op. cit., pp. 606-623.

[107]

Marbot says Rüchel was killed: but he recovered from his wound, and did good service the next spring.

Vernet's picture of Napoleon inspecting his Guards at Jena before their charge seems to represent the well-known incident of a soldier calling out "en avant"; whereupon Napoleon sharply turned and bade the man wait till he had commanded in twenty battles before he gave him advice.

[108]

Foucart, p. 671.

[109]

Lang thus describes four French Marshals whom he saw at Ansbach: "Bernadotte, a very tall dark man, with fiery eyes under thick brows; Mortier, still taller, with a stupid sentinel look; Lefebvre, an old Alsatian camp-boy, with his wife, former washerwoman to the regiment; and Davoust, a little smooth-pated, unpretending man, who was never tired of waltzing."

[110]

Davoust, "Opérations du 3'me Corps," pp. 31-32. French writers reduce their force to 24,000, and raise Brunswick's total to 60,000. Lehmann's "Scharnhorst," vol. i., p. 433, gives the details.

[111]

Foucart, pp. 604-606, 670, and 694-697, who only blames him for slowness. But he set out from Naumburg before dawn, and, though delayed by difficult tracks, was near Apolda at 4 p.m., and took 1,000 prisoners.

[112]

For this service, as for his exploits at Austerlitz, Napoleon gave few words of praise. Lannes' remonstrance is printed by General Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," p. 169. The Emperor secretly disliked Lannes for his very independent bearing.

[113]

"Nap. Corresp.," November 21st, 1807; Baron Lumbroso's "Napoleone I e l'Inghilterra," p. 103; Garden, vol. x., p. 307.

[114]

This decree, of 10 Brumaire, an V, is printed in full, and commented on by Lumbroso, op. cit., p. 49. See too Sorel, "L'Europe et la Rév. Fr.," vol. iii., p. 389; and my article, "Napoleon and English Commerce," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of October, 1893.

[115]

This phrase occurs, I believe, first in the conversation of Napoleon on May 1st, 1803: "We will form a more complete coast-system, and England shall end by shedding tears of blood" (Miot de Melito, "Mems.," vol. i., chap. xiv.).

[116]

E.g., Fauchille, "Du Blocus maritime," pp. 93 et seq.

[117]

See especially the pamphlet "War in Disguise, or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags" (1805), by J. Stephen. It has been said that this pamphlet was a cause of the Orders in Council. The whole question is discussed by Manning, "Commentaries on the Law of Nations" (1875); Lawrence, "International Law"; Mahan, "Infl. of Sea Power," vol. ii., pp. 274-277; Mollien, vol. iii., p. 289 (first edit.); and Chaptal, p. 275.

[118]

Hausser, vol. iii., p. 61 (4th edit.). The Saxon federal contingent was fixed at 20,000 men.

[119]

Papers presented to Parliament, December 22nd, 1806.

[120]

After the interview of November 28th, 1801, Cornwallis reports that Napoleon "expressed a wish that we could agree to remove disaffected persons from either country ... and declared his willingness to send away United Irishmen" ("F.O. Records," No. 615).

[121]

Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xv.

[122]

In our "F.O. Records," Prussia, No. 74, is a report of Napoleon's reply to a deputation at Warsaw (January, 1807): "I warn you that neither I nor any French prince cares for your Polish throne: I have crowns to give and don't know what to do with them. You must first of all think of giving bread to my soldiers—'Bread, bread, bread.' ... I cannot support my troops in this country, where there is no one besides nobles and miserable peasants. Where are your great families? They are all sold to Russia. It is Czartoryski who wrote to Kosciusko not to come back to Poland." And when a Galician deputy asked him of the fate of his province, he turned on him: "Do you think that I will draw on myself new foes for one province." Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the Poles was not wholly chilled. Their contingents did good service for him. Somewhat later, female devotion brought a beautiful young Polish lady to act as his mistress, primarily with the hope of helping on the liberation of her land, and then as a willing captive to the charm which he exerted on all who approached him. Their son was Count Walewska.

[123]

Marbot, ch. xxviii.

[124]

Lettow-Vorbeck estimates the French loss at more than 24,000; that of the Russians as still heavier, but largely owing to the bad commissariat and wholesale straggling. On this see Sir R. Wilson's "Campaign in Poland," ch. i.

[125]

Napoleon on February 13th charged Bertrand to offer verbally, but not in writing, to the King of Prussia a separate peace, without respect to the Czar. Frederick William was to be restored to his States east of the Elbe. He rejected the offer, which would have broken his engagements to the Czar. Napoleon repeated the offer on February 20th, which shows that, at this crisis, he did wish for peace with Prussia. See "Nap. Corresp.," No. 11810; and Hausser, vol. iii., p. 74.

[126]

"I have been repeatedly pressed by the Prussian and Russian Governments," wrote Lord Hutchinson, our envoy at Memel, March 9th, 1807, "on the subject of a diversion to be made by British troops against Mortier.... Stettin is a large place with a small garrison and in a bad state of defence" ("F.O.," Prussia, No. 74). in 1805 Pitt promised to send a British force to Stralsund (see p. 17).

[127]

Lord Cathcart's secret report to the War Office, dated April 22nd, 1807, dealt with the appeal made by Lord Hutchinson, and with a Projet of Dumouriez, both of whom strongly urged the expedition to Stralsund. On May 30th Castlereagh received a report from a Hanoverian officer, Kuckuck, stating that Hanover and Hesse were ripe for revolt, and that Hameln might easily be seized if the North Germans were encouraged by an English force ("Castlereagh Letters," vol. vi., pp. 169 and 211).

[128]

"F.O.," Russia, No. 69.

[129]

"Correspond.," No. 12563; also "La Mission du Gen. Gardane en Perse," par le comte de Gardane. Napoleon in his proclamation of December 2nd, 1806, told the troops that their victories had won for France her Indian possessions and the Cape of Good Hope.

[130]

Wilson, "Campaign in Poland"; "Opérations du 3'me Corps [Davoust's], 1806-1807," p. 199.

[131]

"Corresp.," Nos. 12749 and 12751. Lejeune, in his "Memoirs," also shows that Napoleon's chief aim was to seize Königsberg.

[132]

"Memoirs of Oudinot," ch. i

[133]

The report is dated Memel, June 21st, 1807, in "F.O.," Prussia, No. 74. Hutchinson thinks the Russians had not more than 45,000 men engaged at Friedland, and that their losses did not exceed 15,000: but there were "multitudes of stragglers." Lettow-Vorbeck gives about the same estimates. Those given in the French bulletin are grossly exaggerated.

[134]

On June 17th, 1807, Queen Louisa wrote to her father: " ... we fall with honour. The King has proved that he prefers honour to shameful submission." On June 23rd Bennigsen professed a wish to fight, while secretly advising surrender (Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 469).

[135]

"F.O.," Russia, No. 69. Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 185) that Bennigsen was plotting to murder the Czar, and he (S.) warned him of it.