Volume 2 — FOOTNOTES : (continued 2)

[136]

"Lettres inédites de Talleyrand," p. 468; also Garden, vol. x., pp. 205-210; and "Ann. Reg." (1807), pp. 710-724, for the British replies to Austria.

[137]

Canning to Paget ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 324). So too Canning's despatch of July 21st to Gower (Russia, No. 69).

[138]

Stadion saw through it. See Beer, p. 243.

[139]

"Nap. Corresp.," No. 11918.

[140]

Ib., No. 12028. This very important letter seems to me to refute M. Vandal's theory ("Nap. et Alexandre," ch. i.), that Napoleon was throughout seeking for an alliance with Austria, or Prussia, or Russia.

[141]

Canning to Paget, May 16th, 1807 ("Paget Papers," vol. ii., p. 290).

[142]

Garden, vol. x., pp. 214-218; and Gower's despatch of June 17th. 1807 (Russia, No. 69).

[143]

All references to the story rest ultimately on Bignon, "Hist. de France" (vol. vi., p. 316), who gives no voucher for it. For the reasons given above I must regard the story as suspect. Among a witty, phrase-loving people like the French, a good mot is almost certain to gain credence and so pass into history.

[144]

Tatischeff, "Alexandre I et Napoléon" (pp. 144-148).

[145]

Reports of Savary and Lesseps, quoted by Vandal, op. cit., p. 61; "Corresp.," No. 12825.

[146]

Vandal, p. 73, says that the news reached Napoleon at a review when Alexander was by his side. If so, the occasion was carefully selected with a view to effect; for the news reached him on, or before, June 24th (see "Corresp.," No. 12819). Gower states that the news reached Tilsit as early as the 15th; and Hardenberg secretly proposed a policy of partition of Turkey on June 23rd ("Mems.," vol. iii., p. 463). Hardenberg resigned office on July 4th, as Napoleon refused to treat through him.

[147]

"Corresp.," No. 12862, letter of July 6th.

[148]

Tatischeff (pp. 146-148 and 163-168) proves from the Russian archives that these schemes were Alexander's, and were in the main opposed by Napoleon. This disproves Vandal's assertion (p. 101) that Napoleon pressed Alexander to take the Memel and Polish districts.

[149]

"Erinnerungen der Gräfin von Voss."

[150]

Probably this refers not to the restitution of Silesia, which he politely offered to her (though he had previously granted it on the Czar's request), but to Madgeburg and its environs west of the Elbe. On July 7th he said to Goltz, the Prussian negotiator, "I am sorry if the Queen took as positive assurances the phrases de politesse that one speaks to ladies" (Hardenberg's "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 512).

[151]

See the new facts published by Bailleu in the "Hohenzollern Jahrbuch" (1899). The "rose" story is not in any German source.

[152]

In his "Memoirs" (vol. i., pt. iii.) Talleyrand says that he repeated this story several times at the Tuileries, until Napoleon rebuked him for it.

[153]

Before Tilsit Prussia had 9,744,000 subjects; afterwards only 4,938,000. See her frontiers in map on p. 215.

[154]

The exact terms of the secret articles and of the secret treaty have only been known since 1890, when, owing to the labours of MM. Fournier, Tatischeff, and Vandal, they saw the light.

[155]

Gower's despatch of July 12th. "F.O.," Russia, No. 69.

[156]

De Clercq, "Traités," vol. ii., pp. 223-225; Garden, vol. x., p. 233 and 277-290. Our envoy, Jackson, reported from Memel on July 28th: "Nothing can exceed the insolence and extortions of the French. No sooner is one demand complied with than a fresh one is brought forward."

[157]

That he seriously thought in November, 1807, of leaving to Prussia less than half of her already cramped territories, is clear from his instructions to Caulaincourt, his ambassador to the Czar: "Is it not to Prussia's interest for her to place herself, at once, and with entire resignation, among the inferior Powers?" A new treaty was to be framed, under the guise of interpreting that of Tilsit, Russia keeping the Danubian Provinces, and Napoleon more than half of Prussia (Vandal, vol. i., p. 509).

[158]

Lucchesini to Gentz in October, 1806, in Gentz's "Ausgewählte Schriften," vol. v., p. 257.

[159]

See Canning's reply to Stahremberg's Note, on April 25th, 1807, in the "Ann. Reg.," p. 724.

[160]

For Mackenzie's report and other details gleaned from our archives, see my article "A British Agent at Tilsit," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of October, 1901.

[161]

James, "Naval History," vol. iv., p. 408.

[162]

"F.O.," Denmark, No. 53.

[163]

Garden, vol. x., p. 408.

[164]

"Corresp.," No. 12962; see too No. 12936, ordering the 15,000 Spanish troops now serving him near Hamburg to form the nucleus of Bernadotte's army of observation, which, "in case of events," was to be strengthened by as many Dutch.

[165]

"F.O.," Denmark, No. 53. I published this Memorandum of Canning and other unpublished papers in an article, "Canning and Denmark," in the "Eng. Hist. Rev." of January, 1896. The terms of the capitulation were, it seems, mainly decided on by Sir Arthur Wellesley, who wrote to Canning (September 8th): "I might have carried our terms higher ... had not our troops been needed at home" ("Well. Despatches," vol. iii., p. 7).

[166]

Castlereagh's "Corresp.," vol. vi. So too Gower reported from St. Petersburg on October 1st that public opinion was "decidedly averse to war with England, ... and it appears to me that the English name was scarcely ever more popular in Russia than at the present time."

[167]

Letters of July 19th and 29th.

[168]

The phrase is that of Viscount Strangford, our ambassador at Lisbon ("F.O.," Portugal, No. 55). So Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 136.

[169]

Report of the Portuguese ambassador, Lourenço de Lima, dated August 7th, 1807, inclosed by Viscount Strangford ("F.O.," Portugal, No. 55).

[170]

This statement as to the date of the summons to Portugal is false: it was July 19th when he ordered it to be sent, that is, long before the Copenhagen news reached him.

[171]

"Corresp.," No. 12839.

[172]

See Lady Blennerhasset's "Talleyrand," vol. ii., ch. xvi., for a discussion of Talleyrand's share in the new policy. This question, together with many others, cannot be solved, owing to Talleyrand's destruction of most of his papers. In June, 1806, he advised a partition of Portugal; and in the autumn he is said to have favoured the overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons. But there must surely be some connection between Napoleon's letter to him of July 19th, 1807, on Portuguese affairs and the resignation which he persistently offered on their return to Paris. On August 10th he wrote to the Emperor that that letter would be the last act of his Ministry ("Lettres inédites de Tall.," p. 476). He was succeeded by Champagny.

[173]

"Corresp.," Nos. 13235, 37, 43.

[174]

"Corresp.," Nos. 13314 and 13327. So too, to General Clarke, his new Minister of War, he wrote: "Junot may say anything he pleases, so long as he gets hold of the fleet" ("New Letters of Nap.," October 28th, 1807).

[175]

Strangford's despatches quite refute Thiers' confident statement that the Portuguese answers to Napoleon were planned in concert with us. I cannot find in our archives a copy of the Anglo-Portuguese Convention signed by Canning on October 22nd, 1807; but there are many references to it in his despatches. It empowered us to occupy Madeira; and our fleet did so at the close of the year. In April next we exchanged it for the Azores and Goa.

[176]

"Corresp.," July 22nd, 1807.

[177]

Between September 1st, 1807, and November 23rd, 1807, he wrote eighteen letters on the subject of Corfu, which he designed to be his base of operations as soon as the Eastern Question could be advantageously reopened. On February 8th, 1808, he wrote to Joseph that Corfu was more important than Sicily, and that "in the present state of Europe, the loss of Corfu would be the greatest of disasters." This points to his proposed partition of Turkey.

[178]

Letter of October 13th, 1807.

[179]

"Ann. Register" for 1807, pp. 227, 747.

[180]

Ibid., pp. 749-750. Another Order in Council (November 25th) allowed neutral ships a few more facilities for colonial trade, and Prussian merchantmen were set free (ibid., pp. 755-759). In April, 1809, we further favoured the carrying of British goods on neutral ships, especially to or from the United States.

[181]

Bourrienne, "Memoirs." The case against the Orders in Council is fairly stated by Lumbroso, and by Alison, ch. 50.

[182]

Gower reported (on September 22nd) that the Spanish ambassador at St. Petersburg had been pleading for help there, so as to avenge this insult.

[183]

Baumgarten, "Geschichte Spaniens," vol. i., p. 138.

[184]

"Nap. Corresp." of October 17th and 31st, November 13th, December 23rd, 1807, and February 20th, 1808; also Napier, "Peninsular War," bk. i., ch. ii.

[185]

Letter of January 10th, 1808.

[186]

Letter of Charles IV. to Napoleon of October 29th, 1807, published in "Murat, Lieutenant de l'Empereur en Espagne," Appendix viii.

[187]

"New Letters of Napoleon."

[188]

"Corresp.," letter of February 25th.

[189]

Murat in 1814 told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 131) he had had no instructions from Napoleon.

[190]

Thiers, notes to bk. xxix.

[191]

"Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la Révolution d'Espagne, par Nellerto"; also "The Journey of Ferdinand VII. to Bayonne," by Escoiquiz.

[192]

"Corresp.," No. 13696. A careful comparison of this laboured, halting effusion, with the curt military style of the genuine letters—and especially with Nos. 93, 94, and 100 of the "New Letters"—must demonstrate its non-authenticity. Thiers' argument to the contrary effect is rambling and weak. Count Murat in his recent monograph on his father pronounces the letter a fabrication of St. Helena or later. It was first published in the "Mémorial de St. Hélène," an untrustworthy compilation made by Las Cases after Napoleon's death from notes taken at St. Helena.

[193]

Napoleon had at first intended the Spanish crown for Louis, to whom he wrote on March 27th: "The climate of Holland does not suit you. Besides, Holland can never rise from her ruins." Louis declined, on the ground that his call to Holland had been from heaven, and not from Napoleon!

[194]

Memoirs of Thiébault and De Broglie; so, too, De Rocca, "La Guerre en Espagne."

[195]

See the letter of an Englishman from Buenos Ayres of September 27th, 1809, in "Cobbett's Register" for 1810 (p. 256), stating that the new popular Government there was driven by want of funds, "not from their good wishes to England," to open their ports to all foreign commerce on moderate duties.

[196]

Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," ch. vii. It is not published in the "Correspondence" or in the "New Letters."

[197]

Vandal, "Napoléon et Alexandre," vol. i., ch. iv., and App. II.

[198]

In the conversations which Metternich had with Napoleon and Talleyrand on and after January 22nd, 1808, he was convinced that the French Emperor intended to partition Turkey as soon as it suited him to do so, which would be after he had subjected Spain. Napoleon said to him: "When the Russians are at Constantinople you will need France to help you against them."—"Metternich Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 188.

[199]

So Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 171).

[200]

Vandal, vol. i., p. 384.

[201]

Metternich, "Mems.," vol. ii. p. 298 (Eng. edit.).

[202]

I think that Beer (pp. 330-340) errs somewhat in ranking Talleyrand's work at Erfurt at that statesman's own very high valuation, which he enhanced in later years: see Greville's "Mems.," Second Part, vol. ii., p. 193.

[203]

Vandal, vol. i., p. 307.

[204]

Sklower, "L'Entrevue de Napoléon avec Goethe"; Mrs. Austin's "Germany from 1760 to 1814"; Oncken, bk. vii., ch. i. For Napoleon's dispute with Wieland about Tacitus see Talleyrand, "Mems.," vol. i., pt. 5. When the Emperors' carriages were ready for departure, Talleyrand whispered to Alexander: "Ah! si Votre Majesté pouvait se tromper de voiture."

[205]

"F.O.," Russia, No. 74, despatch of December 9th, 1808. On January 14th, 1809, Canning signed a treaty of alliance with the Spanish people, both sides agreeing never to make peace with Napoleon except by common consent. It was signed when the Spanish cause seemed desperate; but it was religiously observed.

[206]

Madelin's "Fouché," vol. ii., p. 80; Pasquier, vol. i., pp. 353-360.

[207]

Seeley, "Life and Times of Stein," vol. ii., p. 316; Hausser, vol. iii., p. 219 (4th edition).

[208]

Our F.O. Records show that we wanted to help Austria; but a long delay was caused by George III.'s insisting that she should make peace with us first. Canning meanwhile sent £250,000 in silver bars to Trieste. But in his note of April 20th he assured the Court of Vienna that our treasury had been "nearly exhausted" by the drain of the Peninsular War. (Austria, No. 90.)

[209]

For the campaign see the memoirs of Macdonald, Marbot, Lejeune, Pelet and Marmont. The last (vol. iii., p. 216) says that, had the Austrians pressed home their final attacks at Aspern, a disaster was inevitable; or had Charles later on cut the French communications near Vienna, the same result must have followed. But the investigations of military historians leave no doubt that the Austrian troops were too exhausted by their heroic exertions, and their supplies of ammunition too much depleted, to warrant any risky moves for several days; and by that time reinforcements had reached Napoleon. See too Angelis' "Der Erz-Herzog Karl."

[210]

Thoumas, "Le Maréchal Lannes," pp. 205, 323 et seq. Desvernois ("Mems.," ch. xii.) notes that after Austerlitz none of Napoleon's wars had the approval of France.

[211]

For the Walcheren expedition see Alison, vol. viii.; James, vol. iv.; as also for Gambier's failure at Rochefort. The letters of Sir Byam Martin, then cruising off Danzig, show how our officers wished to give timely aid to Schill ("Navy Records," vol. xii.).

[212]

Captain Boothby's "A Prisoner of France," ch. iii.

[213]

For Charles's desire to sue for peace after the first battles on the Upper Danube, see Häusser, vol. iii., p. 341; also, after Wagram, ib., pp. 412-413.

[214]

Napier, bk. viii., chs. ii. and iii. In the App. of vol. iii. of "Wellington's Despatches" is Napoleon's criticism on the movements of Joseph and the French marshals. He blames them for their want of ensemble, and for the precipitate attack which Victor advised at Talavera. He concluded: "As long as you attack good troops like the English in good positions, without reconnoitring them, you will lead men to death en pure perte."

[215]

An Austrian envoy had been urging promptitude at Downing Street. On June 1st he wrote to Canning: "The promptitude of the enemy has always been the key to his success. A long experience has proved this to the world, which seems hitherto not to have profited by this knowledge." On July 29th Canning acknowledged the receipt of the Austrian ratification of peace with us, "accompanied by the afflicting intelligence of the armistice concluded on the 12th instant between the Austrian and French armies."

Napoleon at St. Helena said to Montholon that, had 6,000 British troops pushed rapidly up the banks of the Scheldt on the day that the expedition reached Flushing, they could easily have taken Antwerp, which was then very weakly held. See, too, other opinions quoted by Alison, ch. lx.

[216]

Beer, p. 441.

[217]

Vandal, vol. ii., p. 161; Metternich, vol. i., p. 114.

[218]

Letter of February 10th, 1810, quoted by Lanfrey. See, too, the "Mems." of Prince Eugène, vol. vi., p. 277.

[219]

"Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 365 (Eng. ed.).

[220]

Bausset, "Mems.," ch. xix.

[221]

Mme. de Rémusat, "Mems.," ch. xxvii.

[222]

Tatischeff, "Alexandre et Napoléon," p. 519. Welschinger, "Le Divorce de Napoléon," ch. ii.; he also examines the alleged irregularities of the religious marriage with Josephine; Fesch and most impartial authorities brushed them aside as a flimsy excuse.

[223]

Metternich's despatch of December 25th, 1809, in his "Mems.," vol. ii., § 150. The first hints were dropped by him to Laborde on November 29th (Vandal, vol. ii., pp. 204, 543): they reached Napoleon's ears about December 15th. For the influence of these marriage negotiations in preparing for Napoleon's rupture with the Czar, see chap, xxxii. of this work.

[224]

"Conversations with the Duke of Wellington," p. 9. The disobedience of Ney and Soult did much to ruin Masséna's campaign, and he lost the battle of Fuentès d'Onoro mainly through that of Bessières. Still, as he failed to satisfy Napoleon's maxim, "Succeed: I judge men only by results," he was disgraced.

[225]

Decree of February 5th, 1810. See Welschinger, "La Censure sous le premier Empire," p. 31. For the seizure of Madame de Staël's "Allemagne" and her exile, see her preface to "Dix Années d'Exil."

[226]

Mollien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 183.

[227]

Fouché retired to Italy, and finally settled at Aix. His place at the Ministry of Police was taken by Savary, Duc de Rovigo. See Madelin's "Fouché," chap. xx.

[228]

Porter, "Progress of the Nation," p. 388.

[229]

Letters of August 6th, 7th, 29th. The United States had just repealed their Non-Intercourse Act of 1807. For their relations with Napoleon and England, see Channing's "The United States of America," chs. vi. and vii.; also the Anglo-American correspondence in Cobbett's "Register for 1809 and 1810."

[230]

Mollien, "Mems." vol. i., p. 316.

[231]

Tooke, "Hist. of Prices," vol. i., p. 311; Mollien, vol. iii., pp. 135, 289; Pasquier, vol. i., p. 295; Chaptal, p. 275.

[232]

Letter of August 6th, 1810, to Eugène.

[233]

"Progress of the Nation," p. 148.

[234]

So Mollien, vol. iii., p. 135: "One knows that his powerful imagination was fertile in illusions: as soon as they had seduced him, he sought with a kind of good faith to enhance their prestige, and he succeeded easily in persuading many others of what he had convinced himself. He braved business difficulties as he braved dangers in war."

[235]

Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. xv. For some favourable symptoms in French industry, see Lumbroso, pp. 165-226, and Chaptal, p. 287. They have been credited to the Continental System; but surely they resulted from the internal free trade and intelligent administration which France had enjoyed since the Revolution.

[236]

"Nap. Corresp.," May 8th, 1811.

[237]

Goethe published the first part of "Faust," in full, early in 1808.

[238]

Baur, "Stein und Perthes," p. 85.

[239]

Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxv.

[240]

Letters of October 10th and 13th, 1810, and January 1st, 1811.

[241]

Letter of September 17th, 1810.

[242]

Letter of March 8th, 1811. For a fuller treatment of the commercial struggle between Great Britain and Napoleon see my articles, "Napoleon and British Commerce" and "Britain's Food Supply during the French War," in a volume entitled "Napoleonic Studies" (George Bell and Sons, 1904).

[243]

Czartoryski, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xvii. At this time he was taken back to the Czar's favour, and was bidden to hope for the re-establishment of Poland by the Czar as soon as Napoleon made a blunder.

[244]

Tatischeff, p. 526; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii.

[245]

"Corresp.," No. 16178; Vandal, vol. ii., ch. vii. The exposé of December 1st, 1809, had affirmed that Napoleon did not intend to re-establish Poland. But this did not satisfy Alexander.

[246]

Letters of October 23rd and December 2nd, 1810.

[247]

Vandal, vol. ii., p. 529.

[248]

Tatischeff, p. 555.

[249]

Vandal, vol. ii., p. 535, admits that we had no hand in it. But the Czar naturally became more favourable to us, and at the close of 1811 secretly gave entry to our goods.

[250]

Quoted by Garden, vol. xiii., p. 171.

[251]

Bernhardi's "Denkwürdigkeiten des Grafen von Toll," vol. i. p. 223.

[252]

Czartoryski, vol. ii., ch. xvii. At Dresden, in May, 1812, Napoleon admitted to De Pradt, his envoy at Warsaw that Russia's lapse from the Continental System was the chief cause of war; "Without Russia, the Continental System is absurdity."

[253]

For the overtures of Russia and Sweden to us and their exorbitant requests for loans, see Mr. Hereford George's account in his careful and systematic study, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia," ch. iv. It was not till July, 1812, that we formally made peace with Russia and Sweden, and sent them pecuniary aid. We may note here that Napoleon, in April, 1812, sent us overtures for peace, if we would acknowledge Joseph as King of Spain and Murat as King of Naples, and withdraw our troops from the Peninsula and Sicily: Napoleon would then evacuate Spain. Castlereagh at once refused an offer which would have left Napoleon free to throw his whole strength against Russia (Garden, vol. xiii., pp. 215, 254).

[254]

Garden, vol. xiii., p. 329.

[255]

Hereford George, op. cit., pp. 34-37. Metternich ("Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 517, Eng. ed.) shows that Napoleon had also been holding out to Austria the hope of gaining Servia, Wallachia and Moldavia (the latter of which were then overrun by Russian troops), if she would furnish 60,000 troops: but Metternich resisted successfully.

[256]

See his words to Metternich at Dresden, Metternich's "Mems.," vol. i., p. 152; as also that he would not advance beyond Smolensk in 1812.

[257]

Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. i., p. 226; Stern, "Abhandlungen," pp. 350-366; Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben"; L'Abbé de Pradt, "L'histoire de l'Ambassade de Varsovie."

[258]

"Erinnerungen des Gen. von Boyen," vol. ii., p. 254. This, and other facts that will later be set forth, explode the story foisted by the Prussian General von dem Knesebeck in his old age on Müffling. Knesebeck declared that his mission early in 1812 to the Czar, which was to persuade him to a peaceful compromise with Napoleon, was directly controverted by the secret instructions which he bore from Frederick William to Alexander. He described several midnight interviews with the Czar at the Winter Palace, in which he convinced him that by war with Napoleon, and by enticing him into the heart of Russia, Europe would be saved. Lehmann has shown ("Knesebeck und Schön") that this story is contradicted by all the documentary evidence. It may be dismissed as the offspring of senile vanity.

[259]

"Toll," vol. i., pp. 256 et seq. Müffling was assured by Phull in 1819 that the Drissa plan was only part of a grander design which had never had a fair chance!

[260]

Bernhardi's "Toll" (vol. i., p. 231) gives Barclay's chief "army of the west" as really mustering only 127,000 strong, along with 9,000 Cossacks; Bagration, with the second "army of the west," numbered at first only 35,000, with 4,000 Cossacks; while Tormasov's corps observing Galicia was about as strong. Clausewitz gives rather higher estimates.

[261]

Labaume, "Narrative of 1812," and Ségur.

[262]

See the long letter of May 28th, 1812, to De Pradt; also the Duc de Broglie's "Memoirs" (vol. i., ch. iv.) for the hollowness of Napoleon's Polish policy. Bignon, "Souvenirs d'un Diplomate" (ch. xx.), errs in saying that Napoleon charged De Pradt—"Tout agiter, tout enflammer." At St. Helena, Napoleon said to Montholon ("Captivity," vol. iii., ch. iii.): "Poland and its resources were but poetry in the first months of the year 1812."

[263]

"Toll," vol. i., p. 239; Wilson, "Invasion of Russia," p. 384.

[64:]

We may here also clear aside the statements of some writers who aver that Napoleon intended to strike at St. Petersburg. Perhaps he did so for a time. On July 9th he wrote at Vilna that he proposed to march both on Moscow and St. Petersburg. But that was while he still hoped that Davoust would entrap Bagration, and while Barclay's retreat on Drissa seemed likely to carry the war into the north. Napoleon always aimed first at the enemy's army; and Barclay's retreat from Drissa to Vitepsk, and thence to Smolensk, finally decided Napoleon's move towards Moscow. If he had any preconceived scheme—and he always regulated his moves by events rather than by a cast-iron plan—it was to strike at Moscow. At Dresden he said to De Pradt: "I must finish the war by the end of September.... I am going to Moscow: one or two battles will settle the business. I will burn Tula, and Russia will be at my feet. Moscow is the heart of that Empire. I will wage war with Polish blood." De Pradt's evidence is not wholly to be trusted; but I am convinced that Napoleon never seriously thought of taking 200,000 men to the barren tracts of North Russia late in the summer, while the English, Swedish, and Russian fleets were ready to worry his flank and stop supplies.

[265]

Letter of August 24th to Maret; so too Labaume's "Narrative," and Garden, vol. xiii., p. 418. Mr. George thinks that Napoleon decided on August 21st to strike at Moscow on grounds of general policy.

[266]

Labaume, "Narrative"; Lejeune's "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. vi.

[267]

Marbot's "Mems." Bausset, a devoted servant to Napoleon, refutes the oft-told story that he was ill at Borodino. He had nothing worse than a bad cold. It is curious that such stories are told about Napoleon after every battle when his genius did not shine. In this case, it rests on the frothy narrative of Ségur, and is out of harmony with those of Gourgaud and Pelet. Clausewitz justifies Napoleon's caution in withholding his Guard.

[268]

Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon." Tolstoi ("War and Liberty") asserts that the fires were the work of tipsy pillagers. So too Arndt, "Mems.," p. 204. Dr. Tzenoff, in a scholarly monograph (Berlin, 1900), comes to the same conclusion. Lejeune and Bourgogne admit both causes.

[269]

Garden, vol. xiii., p. 452; vol. xiv., pp. 17-19.

[270]

Cathcart, p. 41; see too the Czar's letters in Sir Byam Martin's "Despatches," vol. ii., p. 311. This fact shows the frothiness of the talk indulged in by Russians in 1807 as to "our rapacity and perfidy" in seizing the Danish fleet.

[271]

E.g., the migration of Rostopchin's serfs en masse from their village, near Moscow, rather than come under French dominion (Wilson, "French Invasion of Russia," p. 179).

[272]

Letter of October 16th; see too his undated notes ("Corresp.," No. 19237). Bausset and many others thought the best plan would be to winter at Moscow. He also says that the Emperor's favourite book while at Moscow was Voltaire's "History of Charles XII."

[273]

Lejeune, vol. ii., chap. vi. As it chanced, Kutusoff had resolved on retreat, if Napoleon attacked him. This is perhaps the only time when Napoleon erred through excess of prudence. Fezensac noted at Moscow that he would not see or hear the truth.

[274]

It has been constantly stated by Napoleon, and by most French historians of this campaign, that his losses were mainly due to an exceptionally severe and early winter. The statement will not bear examination. Sharp cold usually sets in before November 6th in Russia at latitude 55°; the severe weather which he then suffered was succeeded by alternate thaws and slighter frosts until the beginning of December, when intense cold is always expected. Moreover, the bulk of the losses occurred before the first snowstorm. The Grand Army which marched on Smolensk and Moscow may be estimated at 400,000 (including reinforcements). At Viasma, before severe cold set in, it had dwindled to 55,000. We may note here the curious fact, substantiated by Alison, that the French troops stood the cold better than the Poles and North Germans. See too N. Senior's "Conversations," vol. i., p. 239.

[275]

Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon"; Wilson, pp. 271-277.

[276]

Oudinot, "Mémoires."

[277]

Hereford George, pp. 349-350.

[278]

Bourgogne, ch. viii.

[279]

Pasquier, vol. ii., ad init.

[280]

Colonel Desprez, who accompanied the retreat, thus described to King Joseph its closing scenes: "The truth is best expressed by saying that the army is dead. The Young Guard was 8,000 strong when we left Moscow: at Vilna it scarcely numbered 400.... The corps of Victor and Oudinot numbered 30,000 men when they crossed the Beresina: two days afterwards they had melted away like the rest of the army. Sending reinforcements only increased the losses."

The following French official report, a copy of which I have found in our F.O. Records (Russia, No. 84), shows how frightful were the losses after Smolensk. But it should be noted that the rank and file in this case numbered only 300 at Smolensk, and had therefore lost more than half their numbers—and this in a regiment of the Guard.

GARDE IMPÉRIALE: 6^ME RÉGIMENT DE TIRAILLEURS. l^ère Division. Situation à l'époque du 19 Décembre, 1812.

|——————-+——————+—————-+—————-+—————+—————+————| | | Perte depuis le départ de Smolensk | | +——————+—————-+—————-+—————+—————+————| |Présents sous|Restés sur |Blessés qui|Morts de |Restés en |Total des|Reste | |les armes au |le champ |n'ont pu |froid ou de|en arrière |Pertes |présents| |départ de |de bataille |suivre, |misère |gelés, ou | |sous les| |Smolensk | |restés au | |pour cause | |armes | | | |pouvoir de | |de maladie | | | | | |l'ennemi | |au pouvoir | | | | | | | |de l'ennemi| | | |——-+———-+———+——-+———+——+———+——+———+——+——-+—-+——+—-| | Off.|Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off. |Tr. | Off.|Tr.|Off.|Tr.| | 31 |300 | — |13 | 4 |52 | — |24 | 13 |201 | 17|290| 14|10 | |——-+———-+———+——-+———+——+———+——+———+——+——-+—-+——+—-|

Signé le Colonel Major Commandant le dit Regiment. CARRÉ.

Les autres régiments sont plus ou moins dans le même état.

[281]

"Corresp.," December 20th, 1812. For the so-called Concordat of 1813, concluded with the captive Pius VII. at Fontainebleau, see "Corresp." of January 25th, 1813. The Pope repudiated it at the first opportunity. Napoleon wanted him to settle at Avignon as a docile subject of the Empire.

[282]

Mollien, vol. iii., ad fin. For his vague offers to mitigate the harsh terms of Tilsit for Prussia, and to grant her a political existence if she would fight for him, see Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iv., p. 350.

[283]

Walpole reports (December 19th and 22nd, 1812) Metternich's envy of the Russian successes and of their occupation of the left bank of the Danube. Walpole said he believed Alexander would grant Austria a set-off against this; but Metternich seemed entirely Bonapartist ("F.O.," Russia, No. 84). See too the full account, based on documentary evidence, in Luckwaldt's "Oesterreich und die Anfange des Befreiungskrieges" (Berlin, 1898).

[284]

Hardenberg, "Mems.," vol. iv., p. 366.

[285]

Oncken, "Oesterreich und Preussen," vol. ii.; Garden, vol. xiv., p. 167; Seeley's "Stein," vol. ii., ch. iii.

[286]

Arndt, "Wanderungen"; Steffens, "Was ich erlebte."

[287]

At this time she had only 61,500 men ready for the fighting line; but she had 28,000 in garrison and 32,000 in Pomerania and Prussia (Proper), according to Scharnhorst's report contained in "F.O.," Russia, No. 85.

[288]

Letters of March 2nd and 11th.

[289]

Metternich's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 159; Luckwaldt, op. cit., ch. vi.

[290]

See the whole note in Luckwaldt, Append. No. 4.

[291]

Oncken, op. cit., vol. ii., p. 205. So too Metternich's letter to Nesselrode of April 21st ("Memoirs," vol. i., p. 405, Eng. ed.): "I beg of you to continue to confide in me. If Napoleon will be foolish enough to fight, let us endeavour not to meet with a reverse, which I feel to be only too possible. One battle lost for Napoleon, and all Germany will be under arms."

[292]

"F.O.," Austria, No. 105. Doubtless, as Oncken has pointed out with much acerbity, Castlereagh's knowledge that Austria would suggest the modification of our maritime claims contributed to his refusal to consider her proposal for a general peace: but I am convinced, from the tone of our records, that his chief motive was his experience of Napoleon's intractability and a sense of loyalty to our Spanish allies: we were also pledged to help Sweden and Russia.

[293]

Letters of April 24th.

[294]

Napoleon's troops in Thorn surrendered on April 17th; those in Spandau on April 24th (Fain, "Manuscrit de 1813," vol. ii., ch. i.).

[295]

Oncken, vol. ii., p. 272.

[296]

Cathcart's report in "F.O.," Russia, No. 85. Müffling ("Aus meinem Leben") regards the delay in the arrival of Miloradovitch, and the preparations for defence which the French had had time to make at Gross Görschen, as the causes of the allies' failure. The chief victim on the French side was Bessières, commander of the Guard.

[297]

"Corresp.," Nos. 20017-20031. For his interview with Bubna, see Luckwaldt, p. 257.

[298]

Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iii., pp. 490-492. Marmont gives the French 150,000; Thiers says 160,000.

[299]

In his bulletin Napoleon admitted having lost 11,000 to 12,000 killed and wounded in the two days at Bautzen; his actual losses were probably over 20,000. He described the allies as having 150,000 to 160,000 men, nearly double their actual numbers.

[300]

Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben."

[301]

"Lettres inédites." So too his letters to Eugène of June 11th and July 1st; and of June 11th, 17th, July 6th and 29th, to Augereau, who was to threaten Austria from Bavaria.

[302]

See his conversation with our envoy, Thornton, reported by the latter in the "Castlereagh Letters," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. 314.

[303]

"Castlereagh Letters," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. 344.

[304]

Garden, vol. xiv., p. 356. We also stipulated that Sweden should not import slaves into Guadeloupe, and should repress the slave trade. When, at the Congress of Vienna, that island was given back to France, we paid Bernadotte a money indemnity.

[305]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," June 18th, 1813. See too that of July 16th, ibid.

[306]

Letters of F. Perthes.

[307]

Joseph to Marmont, July 21st, 1812.

[308]

"Méms. du Roi Joseph," vols. viii. and ix.; Napier, book xix., ch. v.

[309]

"Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 195.

[310]

Napier and Alison say March 18th, which is refuted by the "Méms. du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 131.

[311]

Ibid., vol. ix., p. 464.

[312]

As a matter of fact he had 50,000 there for three months, and did not succeed. See Clarke's letter to Clausel, "Méms. du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 251.

[313]

Stanhope's "Conversations with Wellington," p. 20.

[314]

"Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 60.

[315]

Thiers, bk. xlix.; "Nap. Corresp.," No. 20019; Baumgarten vol i., p. 577.

[316]

"Mémoires du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., pp. 284, 294. Joseph's first order to Clausel was sent under protection of an escort of 1,500 men.

[317]

See Lord Melville's complaint as to Wellington's unreasonable charges on this head in the "Letters of Sir B. Martin" ("Navy Records," 1898).

[318]

Miot de Melito, vol. ii., ch. xviii.

[319]

Clausel afterwards complained that if he had received any order to that effect he could have pushed on so as to be at Vittoria ("Méms. du Roi Joseph," vol. ix., p. 454). The muster-rolls of the French were lost at Vittoria. Napier puts their force at 70,000; Thiers at 54,000; Jourdan at 50,000.

[320]

Wellington's official account of the fight states that the French got away only two of their cannon; and Simmons, "A British Rifleman," asserts that the last of these was taken near Pamplona on the 24th. Wellington generously assigned much credit to the Spanish troops—far more than Napier will allow.

[321]

Ducasse, "Les rois, frères de Napoléon."

[322]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," July 1st, 3rd, 15th, and 20th.

[323]

Stadion to Metternich, May 30th, June 2nd and 8th; in Luckwaldt, p. 382.

[324]

Cathcart's "most secret" despatch of June 4⁄16 from Reichenbach. Just a month earlier he reported that the Czar's proposals to Austria included all these terms in an absolute form, and also the separation of Holland from France, the restoration of the Bourbons to Spain, and "L'Italie libre dans toutes ses parties du Gouvernement et de l'influence de la France." Such were also Metternich's private wishes, with the frontier of the Oglio on the S.W. for Austria. See Oncken, vol. ii., p. 644. The official terms were in part due to the direct influence of the Emperor Francis.

[325]

In a secret article of the Treaty we promised to advance to Austria a subsidy of £500,000 as soon as she should join the allies.

[326]

Martens, vol. ix., pp. 568-575. Our suspicion of Prussia reappears (as was almost inevitable after her seizure of Hanover), not only in the smallness of the sum accorded to her—for we granted £2,000,000 in all to the Swedish, Hanseatic, and Hanoverian contingents—but also in the stipulation that she should assent to the eventual annexation of the formerly Prussian districts of East Frisia and Hildesheim to Hanover. We also refused to sign the Treaty of Reichenbach until she, most unwillingly, assented to this prospective cession. This has always been thought in Germany a mean transaction; but, as Castlereagh pointed out, those districts were greatly in the way of the development of Hanover. Prussia was to have an indemnity for the sacrifice; and we bore the chief burden in the issue of "federative paper notes," which enabled the allies to prepare for the campaign ("Castlereagh Papers," 2nd series, vol. iv., p. 355; 3rd series, vol. i., pp. 7-17; and "Bath Archives," vol. ii., p. 86). Moreover, we were then sending 30,000 muskets to Stralsund and Colberg for the use of Prussian troops (Despatch from "F.O.," July 28th, to Thornton, "Sweden," No. 79). On July 6th we agreed to pay the cost of a German Legion of 10,000 men under the Czar's orders. Its Commissary was Colonel Lowe.

[327]

For the official reports see Garden, vol. xiv., pp. 486-499; also Bausset's account, "Cour de Napoléon."

[328]

Any account of a private interview between two astute schemers must be accepted with caution; and we may well doubt whether Metternich really was as firm, not to say provocative, as he afterwards represented in his "Memoirs." But, on the whole, his account is more trustworthy than that of Fain, Napoleon's secretary, in his "Manuscrit de 1813," vol. ii., ch. ii. Fain places the interview on June 28th; in "Napoleon's Corresp." it is reprinted, but assigned to June 23rd. The correct date is shown by Oncken to have been June 26th. Bignon's account of it (vol. xii., ch. iv.) is marked by his usual bias.

[329]

Cathcart reported, on July 8th, that Schwarzenberg had urged an extension of the armistice, so that Austria might meet the "vast and unexpected" preparations of France ("Russia," No. 86).

[330]

"Russia," No. 86.

[331]

Thornton's despatch of July 12th ("Castlereagh Papers," 2nd Series, vol. iv., ad fin.).

[332]

Ibid., pp. 383 and 405.

[333]

For details see Oncken, Luckwaldt, Thiers, Fain, and the "Mems." of the Duc de Broglie; also Gentz, "Briefe an Pilat," of July 16th-22nd, 1813. Humboldt, the Prussian ambassador, reported on July 13th to Berlin that Metternich looked on war as quite unavoidable, and on the Congress merely as a means of convincing the Emperor Francis of the impossibility of gaining a lasting peace.

[334]

Thiers; Ernouf's "Maret, Duc de Bassano," p. 571.

[335]

Bignon "Hist. de France," vol. xii., p. 199; Lefebvre, "Cabinets de l'Europe," vol. v., p. 555.

[336]

Letter of July 29th.

[337]

Gentz to Sir G. Jackson, August 4th ("Bath Archives," vol. ii., p. 199). For a version flattering to Napoleon, see Ernouf's "Maret" (pp. 579-587), which certainly exculpates the Minister.

[338]

Metternich, "Memoirs," vol. ii., p. 546 (Eng. ed.).

[339]

"F.O.," Russia, No. 86. A letter of General Nugent (July 27th), from Prague, is inclosed. When he (N.) expressed to Metternich the fear that Caulaincourt's arrival there portended peace, M. replied that this would make no alteration, "as the proposals were such that they certainly would not be accepted, and they would even be augmented."

[340]

"Souvenirs du Duc de Broglie," vol. i., ch. v.

[341]

British aims at this time are well set forth in the instructions and the accompanying note to Lord Aberdeen, our ambassador designate at Vienna, dated Foreign Office, August 6th, 1813: " ... Your Lordship will collect from these instructions that a general peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and independence of Europe, ought, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government, to confine France at least within the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine: and if the other Great Powers of Europe should feel themselves enabled to contend for such a Peace, Great Britain is fully prepared to concur with them in such a line of policy. If, however, the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, rather than encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it never has been the policy of the British Government to attempt to dictate to other States a perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to be essential to their own as well as to the common safety." As regards details, we desired to see the restoration of Venetia to Austria, of the Papal States to the Pope, of the north-west of Italy to the King of Sardinia, but trusted that "a liberal establishment" might be found for Murat in the centre of Italy. Napoleon knew that we desired to limit France to the "natural frontiers" and that we were resolved to insist on our maritime claims. As our Government took this unpopular line, and went further than Austria in its plans for restricting French influence, he had an excellent opportunity for separating the Continental Powers from us. But he gave out that those Powers were bought by England, and that we were bent on humiliating France.

[342]

Boyen, "Erinnerungen," Pt. III., p. 66.

[343]

Fain, vol. ii., p. 27. The italicized words are given thus by him; but they read like a later excuse for Napoleon's failures.

[344]

"Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany," p. 195.

[345]

In his letters of August 16th to Macdonald and Ney he assumed that the allies might strike at Dresden, or even as far west as Zwickau: but meanwhile he would march "pour enlever Blücher."

[346]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon." The Emperor forwarded this suggestion to Savary (August 11th): it doubtless meant an issue of false paper notes, such as had been circulated in Russia the year before.

[347]

Cathcart, "Commentaries," p. 206.

[348]

"Extrait d'un Mémoire sur la Campagne de 1813." With characteristic inaccuracy Marbot remarks that the defection of Jomini, with Napoleon's plans, was "a disastrous blow." The same is said by Dedem de Gelder, p. 328.

[349]

The Emperor's eagerness is seen by the fact that on August 21st he began dictating despatches, at Lauban, at 3 a.m. On the previous day he had dictated seventeen despatches; twelve at Zittau, four after his ride to Görlitz, and one more on his arrival at Lauban at midnight.

[350]

Letters of August 23rd to Berthier.

[351]

Boyen, vol. iii., p. 85. But see Wiehr, "Nap. und Bernadotte in 1813," who proves how risky was B.'s position, with the Oder fortresses, held by the French, on one flank, and Davoust and the Danes on the other. He disposes of many of the German slanders against Bernadotte.

[352]

Hausser, pp. 260-267. Oudinot's "Memoirs" throw the blame on the slowness of Bertrand in effecting the concentration on Grossbeeren and on the heedless impetuosity of Reynier. Wiehr (pp. 74-116) proves from despatches that Bernadotte meant to attack the French south of Berlin: he discredits the "bones" anecdote.

[353]

Letters of August 23rd.

[354]

So called to distinguish it from the two other Neisses in Silesia.

[355]

Blasendorfs "Blücher"; Müffling's "Aus meinem Leben" and "Campaigns of the Silesian Army in 1813 and 1814"; Bertin's "La Campagne de 1813." Hausser assigns to the French close on 60,000 at the battle; to the allies about 70,000.

[356]

Jomini, "Vie de Napoléon," vol. iv., p. 380; "Toll," vol. iii., p. 124.

[357]

"Toll," vol. iii., p. 144. Cathcart reports (p. 216) that Moreau remarked to him: "We are already on Napoleon's communications; the possession of the town [Dresden] is no object; it will fall of itself at a future time." If Moreau said this seriously it can only be called a piece of imbecility. The allies were far from safe until they had wrested from Napoleon one of his strong places on the Elbe; it was certainly not enough to have seized Pirna.

[358]

"Corresp." No. 20461.

[359]

Cathcart's "Commentaries," p. 230: Bertin, "La Campagne de 1813," p. 109; Marmont, "Mems.," bk. xvii.; Sir Evelyn Wood's "Achievements of Cavalry."

[360]

It is clear from Napoleon's letters of the evening of the 27th that he was not quite pleased with the day's work, and thought the enemy would hold firm, or even renew the attack on the morrow. They disprove Thiers' wild statements about a general pursuit on that evening, thousands of prisoners swept up, etc.

[361]

Vandamme on the 28th received a reinforcement of eighteen battalions, and thenceforth had in all sixty-four; yet Marbot credits him with only 20,000 men.

[362]

Thiers gives Berthier's despatch in full. See also map, p. 336.

[363]

Marmont, bk. xvii., p. 158. He and St. Cyr ("Mems.," vol. iv., pp. 120-123) agree as to the confusion of their corps when crowded together on this road. Napoleon's aim was to insure the capture of all the enemy's cannon and stores; but his hasty orders had the effect of blocking the pursuit on the middle road. St. Cyr sent to headquarters for instruction; but these were now removed to Dresden; hence the fatal delay.

[364]

Thiers has shown that Mortier did not get the order from Berthier to support Vandamme until August 30th. The same is true of St. Cyr, who did not get it till 11.30 a.m. on that day. St. Cyr's best defence is Napoleon's letter of September 1st to him ("Lettres inédites de Napoléon"): "That unhappy Vandamme, who seems to have killed himself, had not a sentinel on the mountains, nor a reserve anywhere.... I had given him positive orders to intrench himself on the heights, to encamp his troops on them, and only to send isolated parties of men into Bohemia to worry the enemy and collect news." With this compare Napoleon's approving statement of August 29th to Murat ("Corresp.," No. 20486): "Vandamme was marching on Teplitz with all his corps."

[365]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon," September 3rd.

[366]

Häusser, vol. iv., p. 343, and Boyen, "Erinnerungen," vol. ii., pp. 345-357, for Bernadotte's suspicious delays on this day; also Marmont, bk. xviii., for a critique on Ney. Napoleon sent for Lejeune, then leading a division of Ney's army, to explain the disaster; but when Lejeune reached the headquarters at Dohna, south of Dresden, the Emperor bade him instantly return—a proof of his impatience and anger at these reverses.

[Footnote 367: Thornton, our envoy at Bernadotte's headquarters, wrote to Castlereagh that that leader's desire was to spare the Swedish corps; he expected that Bernadotte would aim at the French crown ("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., pp. 48-59). See too Boyen, vol. ii., p. 378.]

[368]

Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol. iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The Emperor's plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.

[369]

Thiers asserts that he had. But if so, how could the Emperor have written to Macdonald (October 2nd) that the Silesian army had made a move on Grossenhain: "It appears that this is so as to attack the intrenched camp [ at Dresden] by the side of the plain, by the roads of Berlin and Meissen."? On the same day he scoffs at Lefebre-Desnoëttes for writing that Bernadotte had crossed the Elbe, and retorts that if he had, it would be so much the worse for him: the war would soon be over.}

[370]

Letter of October 10th to Reynier. This and his letter to Maret seem to me to refute Bernhardi's contention ("Toll," vol. iii., pp. 385-388) that Napoleon only meant to drive the northern allies across the Elbe, and then to turn on Schwarzenberg. The Emperor's plans shifted every few hours: but the plan of crossing the Elbe in great force was distinctly prepared for.

[371]

Martens, "Traités," vol. ix., p. 610. This secret bargain cut the ground from under the German unionists, like Stein, who desired to make away with the secondary princes, or strictly to limit their powers.

[372]

Thiers and Bernhardi ("Toll," vol. iii., p. 388) have disposed of this fiction.

[373]

Sir E. Wood, "Achievements of Cavalry."

[374]

"Corresp.," No. 20814. Marmont, vol. v., p. 281, acutely remarks that Napoleon now regarded as true only that which entered into his combinations and his thoughts.

[375]

Bernadotte was only hindered from retreat across the Elbe by the remonstrances of his officers, by the forward move of Blücher, and by the fact that the Elbe bridges were now held by the French. For the council of war at Köthen on October 14th, see Boyen, vol. ii., p. 377.

[376]

Müffling, "Campaign of 1813."

[377]

Colonel Lowe, who was present, says it was won and lost five times (unpublished "Memoirs").

[378]

Napoleon's bulletin of October 16th, 1813, blames Ney for this waste of a great corps; but it is clear, from the official orders published by Marmont (vol. v., pp. 373-378), that Napoleon did not expect any pitched battle on the north side on the 16th. He thought Bertrand's corps would suffice to defend the north and west, and left the defence on that side in a singularly vague state.

[379]

Dedem de Gelder, "Mems.," p. 345, severely blames Napoleon's inaction on the 17th; either he should have attacked the allies before Bennigsen and Bernadotte came up, or have retreated while there was time.

[380]

Lord Burghersh, Sir George Jackson, Odeleben, and Fain all assign this conversation to the night of the 16th; but Merveldt's official account of it (inclosed with Lord Cathcart's despatches), gives it as on October 17th, at 2 p.m. ("F.O.," Russia, No. 86). I follow this version rather than that given by Fain.

[381]

That the British Ministers did not intend anything of the kind, even in the hour of triumph, is seen by Castlereagh's despatch of November 13th, 1813, to Lord Aberdeen, our envoy at the Austrian Court: "We don't wish to impose any dishonourable condition upon France, which limiting the number of her ships would be: but she must not be left in possession of this point [Antwerp]" ("Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 76).

[382]

Boyen describes the surprising effects of the fire of the British rocket battery that served in Bernadotte's army. Captain Bogue brought it forward to check the charge of a French column against the Swedes. He was shot down, but Lieutenant Strangways poured in so hot a fire that the column was "blown asunder like an ant-heap," the men rushing back to cover amidst the loud laughter of the allies.

[383]

The premature explosion was of course due, not to Napoleon, but to the flurry of a serjeant and the skilful flanking move of Sacken's light troops, for which see Cathcart and Marmont. The losses at Leipzig were rendered heavier by Napoleon's humane refusal to set fire to the suburbs so as to keep off the allies. He rightly said he could have saved many thousand French had he done so. This is true. But it is strange that he had given no order for the construction of other bridges. Pelet and Fain affirm that he gave a verbal order; but, as Marbot explains, Berthier, the Chief of the Staff, had adopted the pedantic custom of never acting on anything less than a written order, which was not given. The neglect to secure means for retreat is all the stranger as the final miseries at the Beresina were largely due to official blundering of the same kind. Wellington's criticism on Napoleon's tactics at Leipzig is severe (despatch of January 10th, 1814): "If Bonaparte had not placed himself in a position that every other officer would have avoided, and remained in it longer than was consistent with any ideas of prudence, he would have retired in such a state that the allies could not have ventured to approach the Rhine."

[384]

Sir Charles Stewart wrote (March 22nd, 1814): "On the Elbe Napoleon was quite insane, and his lengthened stay there was the cause of the Battle of Leipzig and all his subsequent misfortunes" ("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 373).

[385]

Napier, vol. v., pp. 368-378.

[386]

On November 10th Lord Aberdeen, our ambassador at the Austrian Court, wrote to Castlereagh: " ... As soon as he [Murat] received the last communication addressed to him by Prince Metternich and myself at Prague, he wrote to Napoleon and stated that the affairs of his kingdom absolutely demanded his presence. Without waiting for any answer, he immediately began his journey, and did not halt a moment till he arrived at Basle. While on the road he sent a cyphered dispatch to Prince Cariati, his Minister at Vienna, in which he informs him that he hopes to be at Naples on the 4th of this month: that he burns with desire to revenge himself of [sic] all the injuries he has received from Bonaparte, and to connect himself with the cause of the allies in contending for a just and stable peace. He proposes to declare war on the instant of his arrival." Again, on December 19th, Aberdeen writes: "You may consider the affair of Murat as settled.... It will probably end in Austria agreeing to his having a change of frontier on the Papal territory, just enough to satisfy his vanity and enable him to show something to his people. I doubt much if it will be possible, with the claims of Sicily, Sardinia, and Austria herself in the north of Italy, to restore to him the three Legations: but something adequate must be done" ("Austria," No. 102). The disputes between Murat and Napoleon will be cleared up in Baron Lumbroso's forthcoming work, "Murat." Meanwhile see Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 181 et seq.; Desvernois, "Mems.," ch. xx.; and Chaptal (p. 305), for Fouché's treacherous advice to Murat.

[387]

Lady Burghersh's "Journal," p. 182.

[388]

Fain, "Manuscrit de 1814," pp. 48-63. Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," p. 606, states that Napoleon touched up Maret's note; the sentence quoted above is doubtless the Emperor's. The same author proves that Maret's advice had always been more pacific than was supposed, and that now, in his old position of Secretary of State, he gave Caulaincourt valuable help during the negotiations at Châtillon.

[389]

"Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. i., p. 74. This was written, of course, before he heard of the Frankfurt proposals; but it anticipates them in a remarkable way. Thiers states that Castlereagh, after hearing of them, sent Aberdeen new instructions. I cannot find any in our archives. This letter warned Aberdeen against any compromise on the subject of Antwerp; but it is clear that Castlereagh, when he came to the allied headquarters, was a partisan of peace, as compared with the Czar and the Prussian patriots. Schwarzenberg wrote (January 26th) at Langres: "We ought to make peace here: our Kaiser, also Stadion, Metternich, even Castlereagh, are fully of this opinion—but Kaiser Alexander!"

[390]

Fournier, "Der Congress von Châtillon," p. 242.

[391]

"Castlereagh Papers," loc. cit., p. 112.

[392]

Metternich. "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 214.

[393]

"F.O.," Austria, No. 102.

[394]

"Lettres inédites" (November 6th, 1813).

[395]

The memorandum is endorsed, "Extract of Instructions delivered to me by Gen. Pozzo di Borgo, 18 Dec, 1813" ("Russia," No. 92).

[396]

Metternich's letter to Hudelist, in Fournier, p. 242.

[397]

Houssaye's "1814," p. 14; Metternich, "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 308.

[398]

"Our success and everything depend upon our moderation and justice," he wrote to Lord Bathurst (Napier, bk. xxiii., ch. ii.).

[399]

"Lettres inédites" (November 12th). The date is important: it refutes Napier's statement (bk. xxiii., ch. iv.) that the Emperor had planned that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in November when the disputes between Wellington and the Cortès at Madrid were at their height. Bignon (vol. xiii., p. 88 et seq.) says that Talleyrand's indiscretion revealed the negotiations to the Spanish Cortès and Wellington; but our general's despatches show that he did not hear of them before January 9th or 10th. He then wrote: "I have long suspected that Bonaparte would adopt this expedient; and if he had had less pride and more common sense, it would have succeeded."

[400]

On January 14th the Emperor ordered Soult, as soon as the ratification of the treaty was known, to set out northwards from Bayonne "with all his army, only leaving what is necessary to form a screen." Suchet was likewise to hurry with 10,000 foot, en poste, and two-thirds of his horse, to Lyons. On the 22nd the Emperor blames both Marshals for not sending off the infantry, though the Spanish treaty had not been ratified. After long delays Ferdinand set out for Spain on March 13th, when the war was almost over.

[401]

Houssaye's "1814," ch. ii.; Müffling's "Campaign of 1814."

[402]

Letter of January 31st to Joseph.

[403]

"Méms. de Langeron" in Houssaye, p. 62; but see Müffling.

[404]

Letter of February 2nd to Clarke.

[405]

Metternich said of Castlereagh, "I can't praise him enough: his views are most peaceful, in our sense" (Fournier, p. 252).

[406]

Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, January 22nd and 30th, 1814.

[407]

Letter to Hudelist (February 3rd), in Fournier, p. 255.

[408]

Stewart's Mem. of January 27th, 1814, in "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 535. On that day Hardenberg noted in his diary: "Discussion on the plan of operations, and misunderstandings. Intrigue of Stein to get the army straight to Paris, as the Czar wants. The Austrians oppose this: others don't know what they want" (Fournier, p. 361).

[409]

Stewart's notes in "Castlereagh Papers," pp. 541-548. On February 17th Castlereagh promised to give back all our conquests in the West Indies, except Tobago, and to try to regain for France Guadaloupe and Cayenne from Sweden and Portugal; also to restore all the French possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope except the Iles de France (Mauritius) and de Bourbon (Fournier, p. 381).

[410]

Letters of January 31st and February 2nd to Joseph.

[411]

Printed in Napoleon's "Corresp." of February 17th. I cannot agree with Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," and Fournier, that Caulaincourt could have signed peace merely on Maret's "carte blanche" despatch. The man who had been cruelly duped by Napoleon in the D'Enghien affair naturally wanted an explicit order now.

[412]

Given by Ducasse, "Les Rois Frères de Napoléon," p. 64.

[413]

Hausser, p. 503. According to Napoleon, 6,000 men and forty cannon were captured!

[414]

Letter of February 18th, 1814.

[415]

At Elba Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that he would have made peace at Châtillon had not England insisted on his giving up Antwerp, and that England was therefore the cause of the war continuing. This letter, however, proves that he was as set on retaining Mainz as Antwerp. Caulaincourt then wished him to make peace while he could do so with credit ("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 287).

[416]

Fournier, pp. 132-137, 284-294, 299.

[417]

See Metternich's letter to Stadion of February 15th in Fournier, pp. 319, 327.

[418]

Houssaye, p. 102.

[419]

Instructions of February 24th to Flahaut, "Corresp.," No. 21359; Hardenberg's "Diary," in Fournier, pp. 363-364.

[420]

Fournier, pp. 170, 385.

[421]

Ibid., pp. 178-181, 304; Martens, vol. ix., p. 683. Castlereagh, vol. ix., p. 336, calls it "my treaty," and adds that England was practically supplying 300,000 men to the Coalition. One secret article invited Spain and Sweden to accede to the treaty; another stated that Germany was to consist of a federation of sovereign princes, that Holland must receive a "suitable" military frontier, and that Italy, Spain, and Switzerland must be independent, that is, of France; a third bound the allies to keep their armies on a war footing for a suitable time after the peace.

[422]

See his instructions of March 2nd to Caulaincourt: "Nothing will bring France to do anything that degrades her national character and deposes her from the rank she has held in the world for centuries." But it was precisely that rank which the allies were resolved to assign to her, neither more nor less. The joint allied note of February 29th to the negotiators at Châtillon bade them "announce to the French negotiator that you are ready to discuss, in a spirit of conciliation, every modification that he might be authorized to propose"; but that any essential departure from the terms already proposed by them must lead to a rupture of the negotiations.

[423]

Letters of March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, to Clarke.

[424]

Houssaye, p. 156, note. So too Müffling, "Aus meinem Leben," shows that Blücher could have crossed the Aisne there or at Pontavaire or Berry-au-Bac.

[425]

See Napoleon's letters to Clarke of March 4th-6th.

[426]

Houssaye, pp. 176-188.

[427]

Müffling says that Blücher and Gneisenau feared an attack by Bernadotte on their rear. Napoleon on February 25th advised Joseph to try and gain over that prince, who had some very suspicious relations with the French General Maison in Belgium. Probably Gneisenau wished to spare his men for political reasons.

[428]

Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., p. 697. Lord Burghersh wrote from Troyes (March 12th): "I am convinced this army will not be risked in a general action.... S. would almost wish to be back upon the Rhine." So again on the 19th he wrote to Colonel Hudson Lowe from Pougy: "I cannot say much for our activity; I am unable to explain the causes of our apathy—the facts are too evident to be disputed. We have been ten days at Troyes, one at Pont-sur-Seine, two at Arcis, and are now at this place. We go tomorrow to Brienne" ("Unpublished Mems. of Sir H. Lowe"). Stewart wittily said that Napoleon came to Arcis to feel Schwarzenberg's pulse.

[429]

Letters of March 20th to Clarke.

[430]

"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 325, 332.

[431]

These letters were written in pairs—the one being official, the other confidential. Caulaincourt's replies show that he appreciated them highly (see Fain, Appendix).

[432]

From Caulaincourt's letter of March 3rd to Napoleon; Bignon, vol. xiii., p. 379.

[433]

"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 555.

[434]

"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 335, 559. Caulaincourt's project of March 15th much resembled that dictated by Napoleon three days later; Austria was to have Venetia as far as the Adige, the kingdom of Italy to go to Eugène, and the duchy of Warsaw to the King of Saxony, etc. The allies rejected it (Fain, p. 388).

[435]

Fournier, p. 232, rebuts, and I think successfully, Houssaye's objections (p. 287) to its genuineness. Besides, the letter is on the same moral level with the instructions of January 4th to Caulaincourt, and resembles them in many respects. No forger could have known of those instructions. At Elba, Napoleon admitted that he was wrong in not making peace at this time. "Mais je me croyais assez fort pour ne pas la faire, et je me suis trompé" (Lord Holland's "Foreign Rem.," p. 319). The same writer states (p. 296) that he saw the official correspondence about Châtillon: it gave him the highest opinion of Caulaincourt, but N.'s conduct was "full of subterfuge and artifice."

[436]

Castlereagh to Clancarty, March 18th.

[437]

Napier, bk. xxiv., ch. iii. Wellington seems to have thought that the allies would probably make peace with Napoleon.

[438]

Broglie, "Mems.," bk. iii., ch. i.

[439]

Letter of February 25th to Joseph. Thiébault gives us an odd story that Bernadotte sent an agent, Rainville, to persuade Davoust to join him in attacking the rear of the allies; but that Rainville's nerve so forsook him in Davoust's presence that he turned and bolted for his life!

[440]

Caulaincourt to Metternich on March 25th: "Arrived only this [last] night near the Emperor, His Majesty has ... given me all the powers necessary to sign peace with the Ministers of the allied Courts" (Fain, p. 345; Ernouf, "Vie de Maret," p. 634).

Thiers does not mention these overtures of Napoleon, which are surely most characteristic. His whole eastward move was motived by them. Efforts have been made (e.g., by M. de Bacourt in Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. 4) to prove that on the 25th Napoleon was ready to agree to all the allied terms, and thus concede more than was done by Louis XVIII. But there is no proof that he meant to do anything of the sort. The terms of Caulaincourt's note were perfectly vague. Moreover, even on the 28th, when Napoleon was getting alarmed, he had an interview with a captured Austrian diplomatist, Wessenberg, whom he set free in order that he might confer with the Emperor Francis. He told the envoy that France would yet give him support: he wanted the natural frontiers, but would probably make peace on less favourable terms, as he wished to end the war: "I am ready to renounce all the French colonies if I can thereby keep the mouth of the Scheldt for France. England will not insist on my sacrificing Antwerp if Austria does not support her" (Arneth's "Wessenberg," vol. i., p. 188). This extract shows no great desire to meet the allied terms, but rather to separate Austria from her allies. According to Lady Burghersh ("Journals," p. 216), Napoleon admitted to Wessenberg that his position was desperate. I think this was a pleasing fiction of that envoy. There is no proof that Napoleon was wholly cast down till the 29th, when he heard of La Fère Champenoise (Macdonald's "Souvenirs").

[441]

Bignon, vol. xiii., pp. 436, 437.

[442]

On hearing of their withdrawal Stein was radiant with joy: "Now, he said, the Czar will go on to Paris, and all will soon be at an end" (Tourgueneff quoted by Häusser, vol. iv., p. 553).

[443]

Bernhardi's "Toll," vol. iv., pp. 737 et seq.; Houssaye, pp. 354-362; also Nesselrode's communication published in Talleyrand's "Mems." Thielen and Radetzky have claimed that the initiative in this matter was Schwarzenberg's; and Lord Burghersh, in his despatch of March 25th ("Austria," No. 110), agrees with them. Stein supports Toll's claim. I cannot agree with Houssaye (p. 407) that "Napoleon had resigned himself to the sacrifice of Paris." His intercepted letter, and also the official letters, Nos. 21508, 21513, 21516, 21526, 21538, show that he believed the allies would retreat and that his communications with Paris would be safe.

[444]

I take this account largely from Sir Hudson Lowe's unpublished memoirs. Napoleon blamed Marmont for not marching to Rheims as he was ordered to do. At Elba, Napoleon told Colonel Campbell that Marmont's disobedience spoilt the eastern movement, and ruined the campaign. But had Marmont and Mortier joined Napoleon at Vitry, Paris would have been absolutely open to the allies.

[445]

Houssaye, pp. 485 et seq.; Napoleon's letters of February 8th and March 16th; Mollien, vol. iv., p. 128. In Napoleon's letter of April 2nd to Joseph ("New Letters") there is not a word of reproach to Joseph for leaving Paris.

[446]

"Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 420; Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xiii.

[447]

We do not know definitely why Alexander dropped Bernadotte so suddenly. On March 17th he had assured the royalist agent, Baron de Vitrolles, that he would not hear of the Bourbons, and that he had first thought of establishing Bernadotte in France, and then Eugène. We do know, however, that Bernadotte had made suspicious overtures to the French General Maison in Belgium ("Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., pp. 383, 445, 512).

[448]

De Pradt, "Restauration de la Royauté, le 31 Mars, 1814"; Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xiii. Vitrolles ("Mems.," vol. i., pp. 95-101) says that Metternich assured him on March 15th that Austria would not insist on the Regency of Marie Louise, but would listen to the wishes of France.

[449]

For the first draft of this Declaration, see "Corresp.," No. 21555 (note).

[450]

Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xv.; Macdonald, "Souvenirs."

[451]

Houssaye, pp. 593-623; Marmont, vol. vi., pp. 254-272; Macdonald, chs. xxvii.-xxviii. At Elba, Napoleon told Lord Ebrington that Marmont's troops were among the best, and his treachery ruined everything ("Macmillan's Mag.," Dec, 1894).

[452]

Pasquier, vol. iii., ch. xvi.; "Castlereagh Papers," vol. ix., p. 442. Alison wrongly says that Napoleon chose Elba.

[453]

Martens, vol. ix., p. 696.

[454]

Thiers and Constant assign this event to the night of 11th-12th. I follow Fain and Macdonald in referring it to the next night.

[455]

Bausset, "Cour de Napoléon."

[456]

Sir Neil Campbell's "Journal," p. 192.

[457]

Ussher, "Napoleon's Last Voyages," p. 29.

[458]

A quondam Jacobin, Pons (de l'Hérault), Commissioner of Mines at Elba, has left "Souvenirs de l'Ile d'Elbe," which are of colossal credulity. In chap. xi. he gives tales of plots to murder Napoleon—some of them very silly. In part ii., chap, i., he styles him "essentiellement réligieux," and a most tender-hearted man, who was compelled by prudence to hide his sensibility! Yet Campbell's official reports show that Pons, at that time, was far from admiring Napoleon.

[459]

"F.O.," Austria, No. 117. Talleyrand, in his letters to Louis XVIII., claims to have broken up the compact of the Powers. But it is clear that fear of Russia was more potent than Talleyrand's finesse. Before the Congress began Castlereagh and Wellington advised friendship with France so as to check "undue pretensions" elsewhere.

[460]

Stanhope's "Conversations," p. 26. In our archives ("Russia," No. 95) is a suspicious letter of Pozzo di Borgo, dated Paris, July 10/22, 1814, to Castlereagh (it is not in his Letters) containing this sentence: "L'existence de Napoléon, comme il était aisé à prévoir, est un inconvénient qui se rencontre partout." For Fouché's letter to Napoleon, begging him voluntarily to retire to the New World, see Talleyrand's "Mems.," pt. vii., app. iv. Lafayette ("Mems.," vol. v., p. 345) asserts that French royalists were plotting his assassination. Brulart, Governor of Corsica, was suspected by Napoleon, but, it seems, wrongly (Houssaye's "1815," p. 172).

[461]

Pallain, "Correspondance de Louis XVIII avec Talleyrand," pp. 307, 316.

[462]

"Recollections," p. 16; "F.O.," France, No. 114. The facts given above seem to me to refute the statements often made that the allies violated the Elba arrangement and so justified his escape. The facts prove that the allies sought to compel Louis XVIII. to pay Napoleon the stipulated sum, and that the Emperor welcomed the non-payment. His words to Lord Ebrington on December 6th breathe the conviction that France would soon rise.

[463]

Fleury de Chaboulon's "Mems.," vol. i., pp. 105-140; Lafayette, vol. v., p. 355.

[464]

Campbell's "Journal"; Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 275.

[465]

Houssaye's "1815," p. 277.

[466]

Guizot, "Mems.," ch. iii.; De Broglie, "Mems.," bk. ii., ch. ii.; Fleury, vol. i., p. 259.

[467]

Peyrusse, "Mémorial," p. 277.

[468]

As Wellington pointed out ("Despatches," May 5th, 1815), the phrase "il s'est livré à la vindicte publique" denotes public justice, not public vengeance. At St. Helena, Napoleon told Gourgaud that he came back too soon from Elba, believing that the Congress had dissolved! (Gourgaud's "Journals," vol. ii., p. 323.)

[469]

"Diary," April 15th and 18th, 1815.

[470]

"Parl. Debates"; Romilly's "Diary," vol. ii., p. 360.

[471]

Napoleon told Cockburn during his last voyage that he bestowed this constitution, not because it was a wise measure, but as a needful concession to popular feeling. The continental peoples were not fit for representative government as England was ("Last Voyages of Nap.," pp. 115, 137). So, too, he said to Gourgaud he was wrong in summoning the Chambers at all "especially as I meant to dismiss them as soon as I was a conqueror" (Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 93).

[472]

Mercer's "Waterloo Campaign," vol. i., p. 352. For Fleury de Chaboulon's mission to sound Austria, see his "Mems.," vol. ii., and Madelin's "Fouché," ch. xxv.

[473]

In the "English Hist. Review" for July, 1901, I have published the correspondence between Sir Hudson Lowe (Quartermaster-General of our forces in Belgium up to May, 1815) and Gneisenau, Müffling, and Kleist. These two last were most reluctant to send forward Prussian troops into Belgium to guard the weak frontier fortresses from a coup de main: but Lowe's arguments prevailed, thus deciding the main features of the war.

[474]

"F.O.," France, No. 116. On June 9th the Duke charged Stuart, our envoy at Ghent, to defend this course, on the ground that Blücher and he had many raw troops, and could not advance into France with safety and invest fortresses until the Russians and Austrians co-operated.

[475]

Sir H. Vivian states ("Waterloo Letters," No. 70) that the Duke intended to give a ball on June 21st, the anniversary of Vittoria. See too Sir E. Wood's "Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign," ch. ii.

[476]

"F.O.," France, No. 115. A French royalist sent a report, dated June 1st, recommending "point d'engagement avec Bonaparte.... Il faut user l'armée de Bonaparte: elle ne peut plus se recruter."

[477]

Ropes's "Campaign of Waterloo," ch. v.; Chesney, "Waterloo Lectures," p. 100; Sir H. Maxwell's "Wellington" (vol. ii., p. 14); and O'Connor Morris, "Campaign of 1815," p. 97.

[478]

Janin, "Campagne de Waterloo," p. 7.

[479]

Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 195.

[480]

Credit is primarily due to Constant de Rebecque, a Belgian, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, for altering the point of concentration from Nivelles, as ordered by Wellington, to Quatre Bras; also to General Perponcher for supporting the new movement. The Belgian side of the campaign has been well set forth by Boulger in "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901).

[481]

Gourgaud, "Campagne de 1815," ch. iv.

[482]

Houssaye, "1815," pp. 133-138, 186, notes.

[483]

Hamley, "Operations of War," p. 187.

[484]

For Gérard's delays see Houssaye, p. 158, and Horsburgh, "Waterloo," p. 36. Napoleon's tardiness is scarcely noticed by Houssaye or by Gourgaud; but it has been censured by Jomini, Charras, Clausewitz, and Lord Wolseley.

[485]

Ollech (p. 125) sees in it a conditional offer of help to Blücher. But on what ground? It states that the Prince of Orange has one division at Quatre Bras and other troops at Nivelles: that the British reserve would reach Genappe at noon, and their cavalry Nivelles at the same hour. How could Blücher hope for help from forces so weak and scattered? See too Ropes (note to ch. x.). Horsburgh (ch. v.) shows that Wellington believed his forces to be more to the front than they were: he traces the error to De Lancey, chief of the staff. But it is fair to add that Wellington thought very highly of De Lancey, and after his death at Waterloo severely blamed subordinates.

[486]

Stanhope, "Conversations," p. 109.

[487]

Reiche, "Memoiren," vol. ii., p. 183.

[488]

The term corps is significant. Not till 3.15 did Soult use the term armée in speaking of Blücher's forces. The last important sentence of the 2 p.m. despatch is not given by Houssaye (p. 159), but is printed by Ropes (p. 383), Siborne (vol. i., p. 453), Charras (vol. i., p. 136), and Ollech (p. 131). It proves that as late as 2 p.m. Napoleon expected an easy victory over the Prussians.

[489]

The best authorities give the Prussians 87,000 men, and the French 78,000; but the latter estimate includes the corps of Lobau, 10,000 strong, which did not reach Fleurus till dark.

[490]

I follow Houssaye's solution of this puzzle as the least unsatisfacty, but it does not show why Napoleon should have been so perplexed. D'Erlon debouched from the wood of Villers Perwin exactly where he might have been expected. Was Napoleon puzzled because the corps was heading south-east instead of east?

[491]

Delbrück ("Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 190) shows how the storm favoured the attack.

[492]

I here follow Delbrück's "Gneisenau" (vol. ii., p. 194) and Charras (vol. i., p. 163). Reiche ("Mems.," vol ii., p. 193) says that his corps of 30,800 men lost 12,480 on the 15th and 16th: he notes that Blücher and Nostitz probably owed their escape to the plainness of their uniforms and headgear.

[493]

"Waterloo Letters," Nos. 163 and 169, prove that the time was 3 p.m. and not 3.30; see also Kincaid's account in Fitchett's "Wellington's Men" (p. 120).

[494]

"Waterloo Letters," No. 169.

[495]

See Houssaye, p. 205, for the sequence of these events.

[496]

Ollech, pp. 167-171. Colonel Basil Jackson, in his "Waterloo and St. Helena" (printed for private circulation), p. 64, states that he had been employed in examining and reporting on the Belgian roads, and did so on the road leading south from Wavre. This report had been sent to Gneisenau, and must have given him greater confidence on the night of the 16th.

[497]

O'Connor Morris, p. 176, approves Napoleon's criticism, and censures Gneisenau's move on Wavre: but surely Wavre combined more advantages than any other position. It was accessible for the whole Prussian army (including Bülow); it was easily defensible (as the event proved); and it promised a reunion with Wellington for the defence of Brussels. Houssaye says (p. 233) that Gneisenau did not at once foresee the immense consequences of his action. Of course he did not, because he was not sure of Wellington; but he took all the steps that might lead to immense consequences, if all went well.

[498]

Müffling, "Passages," p. 238: Charras, vol. i., p. 226, discredits it.

[499]

Basil Jackson, op. cit., p. 24; Cotton, "A Voice from Waterloo," p. 20.

[500]

Grouchy suppressed this despatch, but it was published in 1842.

[501]

Mercer, vol. i., p. 270.

[502]

Pétiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 204.

[503]

Ropes, pp. 212, 246, 359. I follow the "received" version of this despatch. For a comparison of it with the "Grouchy" version see Horsburgh, p. 155, note.

[504]

Ropes, pp. 266, 288; Houssaye, p. 316, with a good note.

[505]

Ollech, pp. 187-192; Delbrück's "Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 205. I cannot credit the story told by Hardinge in 1837 to Earl Stanhope ("Conversations," p. 110), that, on the night of the 16th June, Gneisenau sought to dissuade Blücher from joining Wellington. Hardinge only had the story at second hand, and wrongly assigns it to Wavre. On the afternoon of the 17th Gneisenau ordered Ziethen to keep open communications with Wellington (Ollech, p. 170). The story that Wellington rode over to Wavre on the night of the 18th on his horse "Copenhagen" is of course a myth.

[506]

"Blackwood's Magazine," October, 1896; "Cornhill," January, 1901.

[507]

Beamish's "King's German Legion," vol. ii., p. 352. Sir Hussey Vivian asserts that the allied position was by no means strong; but General Kennedy, in his "Notes on Waterloo" (p. 68), pronounces it "good and well occupied." A year previously Wellington noted it as a good position. Sir Hudson Lowe then suggested that it should be fortified: "Query, in respect to the construction of a work at Mt. Jean, being the commanding point at the junction of two principal chaussées" ("Unpublished Memoirs").

[508]

Wellington has been censured by Clausewitz, Kennedy and Chesney for leaving so large a force at Hal. Perhaps he desired to protect the King of France at Ghent, though he was surely relieved of responsibility by his despatch of June 18th, 3 a.m., begging the Duc de Berri to retire with the King to Antwerp. It seems to me more likely that he was so confident of an early advance of the Prussians (see his other despatch of the same hour and Sir A. Frazer's statement—"Letters," p. 553—"We expected the Prussian co-operation early in the day") as to assume that Napoleon would stake all on an effort against his right; and in that case the Hal force would have crushed the French rear, though it was very far off.

[509]

Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 25th, 1815. The Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote under the Duke's influence, stated that not more than 7,000 of the British troops had seen a shot fired. This is incorrect. Picton's division, still 5,000 strong, was almost wholly composed of tried troops; and Lambert's brigade counted 2,200 veterans; many of the Guards had seen fire, and the 52nd was a seasoned regiment. Tomkinson (p. 296) reckons all the 5,220 British and 1,730 King's German troopers as "efficient," and Wellington himself, so Mercer affirms, told Blücher he had 6,000 of the finest cavalry in the world.

[510]

"A British Rifleman," p. 367.

[511]

I distrust the story told by Zenowicz, and given by Thiers, that Napoleon at 10 a.m. was awaiting Grouchy with impatience; also Marbot's letter referred to in his "Memoirs," ad fin., in which he says the Emperor bade him push on boldly towards Wavre, as the troops near St. Lambert "could be nothing else than the corps of Grouchy." Grouchy's despatch and the official reply show that Napoleon knew Grouchy to be somewhere between Gembloux and Wavre. Besides, Bülow's report (Ollech, p. 192) states that, while at St. Lambert, he sent out two strong patrols to the S.W., and was not observed by the French, "who appeared to have no idea of our existence." This completely disposes of Marbot's story.

[512]

Houssaye, ch. vii. In the "Eng. Hist. Rev." for October, 1900, p. 815, Mr. H. George gives a proof of this, citing the time it took him to pace the roads by which Grouchy might have advanced.

[Footnote 513 "Waterloo Letters," pp. 60-63, 70-77, 81-84, 383. The whole brigade was hardly 1,000 sabres strong. Sir E. Wood, pp. 126-146; Siborne, vol. ii., pp. 20-45.]

[514]

Houssaye, pp. 354, 499, admits the repulse.

[Footnote 515 B. Jackson, p. 34. Müffling says the defaulters numbered 10,000! While sympathizing with the efforts of Dutch-Belgian writers on behalf of their kin, I must accept Jackson's evidence as conclusive here. See also Mr. Oman's article in "Nineteenth Century," Oct., 1900.]

[516]

B. Jackson, p. 35; "Waterloo Letters," pp. 129-144, 296; Cotton, p. 79.

[517]

Houssaye, pp. 365, 371-376; Kennedy, pp. 117-120; Mercer, vol. i., pp. 311-324.

[518]

Gourgaud (ch. vi.) states that the time of Lobau's move was 4.30, though he had reconnoitred on his right earlier. Napoleon's statements on this head at St. Helena are conflicting. One says that Lobau moved at 1.30, another at 4.30. Perhaps Janin's statement explains why Lobau did nothing definite till the later hour.

[519]

Baring's account ("King's German Legion," App. xxi.) shows that the farm was taken about the time of the last great cavalry charge. Kennedy (p. 122) and Ompteda (ad fin.) are equally explicit; and the evidence of the French archives adduced by Houssaye (p. 378) places the matter beyond doubt.

[520]

Ollech, pp. 243-246. Reiche's exorbitant claims (vol. ii., pp. 209-215) are refuted by "Waterloo Letters," p. 22.

[521]

Lacoste (Decoster), Napoleon's Flemish guide, told this to Sir W. Scott, "Life of Napoleon," vol. viii., p. 496.

[522]

See Boulger's "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901), p. 33.

[523]

The formation and force of the French Guards in this attack have been much discussed. Thiers omits all notice of the second column; Houssaye limits its force to a single battalion, but his account is not convincing. On p. 385 he says nine battalions of the Guard advanced into the valley, but, on p. 389, he accounts only for six. Other authorities agree that eight joined in the attack. As to their formation, Houssaye advances many proofs that it was in hollow squares. Here is one more. On the 19th Basil Jackson rode along the slope and ridge near the back of Hougoumont and talked with some of the wounded of the Imperial Guard. "As they lay they formed large squares, of which the centres were hollow" (p. 57). Maitland ("Waterloo Letters," p. 244.) says: "There was one great column at first, which separated into two parts." Gawler (p. 292) adds that: "The second column was subdivided in two parts, close together, and that its whole flank was much longer than the front of our 52nd regiment." It is difficult to reconcile all this with the attack in hollow squares; but probably the squares (or oblongs?) followed each other so closely as to seem like a serried column. None of our men could see whether the masses were solid or hollow, but naturally assumed them to be solid, and hence greatly over-estimated their strength. A column made up of hollow squares is certainly an odd formation, but perhaps is not unsuitable to withstand cavalry and overthrow infantry.

I cannot accept Houssaye's statement (p. 393) that the French squares attacked our front at four different places, from the 52nd regiment on our right to the Brunswickers in our centre, a quarter of a mile to the east. The only evidence that favours this is Macready's ("Waterloo Letters," p. 330); he says that the men who attacked his square (30th and 73rd regiments) were of the Middle Guard; for their wounded said so; but Kelly, of the same square, thought they were Donzelot's men, who certainly attacked there. Siborne, seemingly on the strength of Macready's statement, says that part of the Guards' column diverged thither: but this is unlikely. Is it credible that the Guards, less than 4,000 strong, should have spread their attacks over a quarter of a mile of front? Was not the column the usual method of attack? I submit, then, that my explanation of the Guard attacking in hollow oblongs, formed in two chief columns, harmonizes the known facts. See Petit's "Relation" in "Eng. Hist. Rev.," April, 1903.

[524]

Janin, p. 45.

[525]

Bertrand at St. Helena said he heard Michel utter these words (Montholon, vol. iii., ch. iv.).

[526]

Maitland's "Narrative," p. 222. Basil Jackson, who knew Gourgaud well at St. Helena, learnt from him that he could not finish his account of Waterloo, "as Napoleon could never decide on the best way of ending the great battle: that he (Gourgaud) had suggested no less than six different ways, but none were satisfactory" ("Waterloo and St. Helena," p, 102). Gourgaud's "Journal" shows that Napoleon blamed in turn the rain, Ney, Grouchy, Vandamme, Guyot, and Soult; but he ends—"it was a fatality; for in spite of all, I should have won that battle."

[527]

"Lettres inédites de Napoléon."

[528]

Gourgaud, "Journal inédit de Ste. Hélène," vol. ii., p. 321, small edit.

[529]

Lucien, "Mems.," vol. iii., p. 327.

[530]

Stuart's despatch of June 28th, "F.O.," France, No. 117; Gneisenau to Müffling, June 27th, "Passages," App.

[531]

Croker ("Papers," vol. iii., p. 67) had this account from Jaucourt, who had it from Becker.

[532]

Ollech, pp. 350-360. The French cavalry success near Versailles was due to exceptional circumstances.

[533]

Maitland's "Narrative," pp. 23-39, disproves Thiers' assertion that Napoleon was not expected there. Maitland's letter of July 10th to Hotham ("F.O.," France, No. 126, not in the "Narrative") ends: "It appears to me from the anxiety the bearers express to get away, that they are very hard pressed by the Government at Paris." Hotham's instructions of July 8th to Maitland were most stringent. See my Essay in "Napoleonic Studies" (1904).

[534]

The date of the letter disproves Las Cases' statement that it was written after his second interview with Maitland, and in consequence of the offers Maitland had made!

Napoleon's reference to Themistocles has been much admired. But why? The Athenian statesman was found to have intrigued with Persia against Athens in time of peace; he fled to the Persian monarch and was richly rewarded as a renegade. No simile could have been less felicitous.

[535]

"Narrative," p. 244. [This work has been republished by Messrs. Blackwood, 1904.]

[536]

"F.O.," France, No. 126; Allardyce, "Mems. of Lord Keith."

[537]

Maitland, pp. 206, 239-242; Montholon, vol. i., ch. iii.

[538]

"Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp. 434,438. Beatson's Mem. is in "F.O.," France, No. 123. This and other facts refute Lord Holland's statement ("Foreign Reminiscences," p. 196) that the Government was treating for the transfer of St. Helena from the East India Company early in 1815.—Why does Lord Rosebery, "Napoleon: last Phase," p. 58, write that Lord Liverpool thought that Napoleon should either (1) be handed over to Louis XVIII. to be treated as a rebel; or (2) treated as vermin; or (3) that we would (regretfully) detain him? In his letters to Castlereagh at Paris, Liverpool expressly says it would be better for us, rather than any other Power, to detain him, and writes not a word about treating him as vermin. Lord Rosebery is surely aware that our Government and Wellington did their best to preclude the possibility of the Prussians treating him as vermin.

[539]

Keith's letter of August 1st, in "F.O.," France, No. 123: "The General and many of his suite have an idea that if they could but put foot on shore, no power could remove them, and they are determined to make the attempt if at all possible: they are becoming most refractory."

[540]

In our Colonial Office archives, St. Helena, No. 1, is a letter of August 2nd, 1815, from an Italian subject of Napoleon (addressed

to Mme. Bertrand, but really for him), stating that £16,000 had been placed in good hands for his service, one-fourth of which would be at once intrusted to firms at New York, Boston, "Philadelfi," and Charlestown, to provide means for effecting his escape, and claiming again "le plus beau trône de l'univers." It begs him to get his departure from Plymouth put off, for a plot had been formed by discontented British officers to get rid of the Premier and one other Minister. Napoleon must not build any hopes on the Prince Regent: "Le Silène de cette isle.... Je fonds donc mon espoir avant tout sur les navires marchands, Anglais comme autres, par l'apas du gain." The writer's name is illegible: so is the original postmark: the letter probably came from London: it missed Mme. Bertrand at Plymouth, followed her to St. Helena, and was opened by Sir G. Cockburn, who sent it back to our Government. I have published it

in extenso

in my volume, "Napoleonic Studies " (1904), as also an accompanying letter from Miss McKinnon of Binfield, Berks, to Napoleon, stating that her mother, still living, had known him and given him hospitality when a lieutenant at Valence.]

[541]

Las Cases, "Mémorial," vol, i., pp. 55, 65.

[542]

I wish I had space to give a whole chapter to the relations between Napoleon and the Whigs, and to show how their championship of him worked mischief on both sides in 1803-21, enticing him on to many risky ventures, and ruining the cause of Reform in England for a generation.

[543]

"F.O.," France, No. 123. Keith adds: "I accompanied him to look at the accommodation on board the 'Northumberland,' with which he appeared to be well satisfied, saying, 'the apartments are convenient, and you see I carry my little tent-bed with me.'" The volume also contains the letter of Maingaud, etc. Bertrand requested permission from our Government to return in a year; Gourgaud, when his duty to his aged mother recalled him; O'Meara stipulated that he should still be a British surgeon on full pay and active service.

[544]

"Extract from a Diary of Sir G. Cockburn," pp. 21, 51, 94.

[545]

"Napoleon's last Voyages," p. 163.

[546]

I found this return in "Admiralty Secret Letters," 1804-16.

Lord Rosebery, in his desire to apologize for our treatment of Napoleon at every point, says ("Nap.: last Phase," p. 64): "They [the exiles] were packed like herrings in a barrel. The 'Northumberland,' it was said, had been arrested on her way back from India in order to convey Napoleon: all the water on board, it was alleged, had also been to India, was discoloured and tainted, as well as short in quantity."—On the contrary, the diary of Glover, in "Last Voyages of Nap.," p. 91, shows that the ship was in the Medway in July, and was fitted out at Portsmouth (where it was usual to keep supplies of water): also (p. 99) that Captain Ross gave up his cabin to the Bertrands, and Glover his to the Montholons: Gourgaud and Las Cases slept in the after cabin until cabins could be built for them. We have already seen (p. 529) that Napoleon was well satisfied with his own room. Water, wine, cattle, and fruit were taken in at Funchal in spite of the storm.

[547]

Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 47, 59 (small edition); "Last Voyages of Nap.," p. 198.

[548]

Sir G. Bingham's Diary in "Blackwood's Mag.," October, 1896, and "Cornhill," January, 1901.

[549]

Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 64.

[550]

"Last Voyages," p. 130.

[551]

"Castlereagh Papers," 3rd series, vol. ii., pp. 423, 433, 505; Seeley's "Stein," vol. iii., pp. 333-344.

[552]

See Gourgaud's "Journal," vol. ii., p. 315, for Napoleon's view as to our stupidity then: "In their place I would have stipulated that I alone could sail and trade in the eastern seas. It is ridiculous for them to leave Batavia (Java) to the Dutch and L'Ile de Bourbon to the French."

[553]

Forsyth, "Captivity of Napoleon," vol. i., p. 218. Plantation House was also the centre of the semaphores of the island.

[554]

Mrs. Abell ("Betsy" Balcombe), "Recollections," ch. vii. These were compiled twenty-five years later, and are not, as a rule, trustworthy, but the "blindman's buff" is named by Glover. Balcombe later on infringed the British regulations, along with O'Meara.

[555]

Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 77, 94, 136, 491.

[556]

Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., pp. 135, 298. See too "Cornhill" for January, 1901.

[557]

Surgeon Henry of the 66th, in "Events of a Military Life," ch. xxviii., writes that he found side by side at Plantation House the tea shrub and the English golden-pippin, the bread-fruit tree and the peach and plum, the nutmeg overshadowing the gooseberry. In ch. xxxi. he notes the humidity of the uplands as a drawback, "but the inconvenience is as nothing compared with the comfort, fertility, and salubrity which the clouds bestow." He found that the soldiers enjoyed far better health at Deadwood Camp, behind Longwood, than down in Jamestown.

[558]

Despatch of Jan. 12th, 1816, in Colonial Office, St. Helena, No. 1.

[559]

Lord Rosebery ("Napoleon: last Phase," p. 67), following French sources, assigns the superiority of force to Lowe; but the official papers published by Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 397-416, show that the reverse was the case. Lowe had 1,362 men; the French, about 3,000.

[560]

From a letter in the possession of Miss Lowe.

[561]

Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 139-147.

[562]

See the interview in "Monthly Rev.," Jan., 1901.

[563]

Bingham's Diary in "Cornhill" for Jan., 1901; Gourgaud, vol. i., pp. 152, 168.

[564]

Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 171-177.

[565]

Lowe's version (Forsyth, vol. i., pp. 247-251) is fully borne out by Admiral Malcolm's in Lady Malcolm's "Diary of St. Helena," pp. 55-65; Gourgaud was not present.

[566]

B. Jackson's "Waterloo and St. Helena," pp. 90-91. The assertion in the article on B. Jackson, in the "Dict. of Nat. Biography," that he was related to Lowe, and therefore partial to him, is incorrect. Miss Lowe assures me that he did not see her father before the year 1815.

[567]

"Mems. of a Highland Lady," p. 459.

[568]

In "Blackwood's," Oct., 1896, and "Cornhill," Jan., 1901. I cannot accept Stürmer's hostile verdict on Lowe as that of an impartial witness. The St. Helena Records show that Stürmer persisted in evading the Governor's regulations by secretly meeting the French Generals. He was afterwards recalled for his irregularities. Balmain, the Russian, and Montchenu, the French Commissioner, are fair to him. The latter constantly pressed Lowe to be stricter with Napoleon! See M. Firmin-Didot's edition of Montchenu's reports in "La Captivité de Ste. Hélène," especially App. iii. and viii.

[569]

"Waterloo and St. Helena," p. 104.

[570]

Lowe had the "Journal" copied out when it came into his hands in Dec., 1816. This passage is given by Forsyth, vol. i., p. 5, and by Seaton, "Sir H. Lowe and Napoleon," p. 52.