X. 2.

X. 2.

His Treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis.

Grotius may be considered as the founder of the modern school of the Law of Nature and of Nations. He was struck with the ruthless manner, in which wars were generally conducted; the slight pretences, upon which they were generally begun; and the barbarity and injustice, with which they were generally attended. He attributed these evils to the want of settled principles respecting the rights and duties of nations and individuals in a state of war. These, he observed, must depend on the previous rights and duties of mankind, in a state of peace: this led him to the preliminary inquiry into their rights and duties in a state of nature.

Thus, an ample field was opened to him. He brought to it, a vigorous discerning mind, and stupendous erudition. From antient and modern history, philosophy, oratory, and poetry, he collected facts and sayings, which appeared to him to establish a general agreement of all civilized nations upon certain principles. From these, he formed his system; applying them, as he proceeded in his work, to a vast multitude of circumstances. These are so numerous, that some persons have not scrupled to say, that no case or international law, either in war or in peace, can be stated, to which the work of Grotius does not contain an applicable rule.

X. 2. The Treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis.

CHAP. X. 1621-1634

Three important objections have been made to this celebrated work,-one, that the author defers in it, too little, to principle, too much, to authority;-another, that the work is written in a very desultory manner, with small attention to order, or classification;-a third, that his authorities are often feeble, and sometimes whimsical. "Grotius," says Condillac, "was able to think for himself; but he constantly labours to support his conclusions by the authority of others. Upon many occasions; even in support of the most obvious and indisputable propositions, he introduces a long string of quotations from the Mosaic law, from the Gospels, from the fathers of the church, from the casuists, and not unfrequently, even in the very same paragraph, from Ovid, and Aristophanes." This strange mixture is subject of many witticisms of Voltaire. But let us hear what is urged in the defence of Grotius, by a gentleman, of whose praise the ablest of writers may be proud:

"Few writers," says Sir James Mackintosh, in his Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations, "were more celebrated than Grotius in his own days, and in the age which succeeded. It has, however, been the fashion of the last half century to depreciate his work, as a shapeless compilation, in which reason lies buried under a mass of authorities and quotations. This fashion originated among French wits and declaimers, and it has been, I know not for what reason, adopted, though with far greater moderation and decency, by some respectable writers among ourselves. As to those, who first used this language, the most candid supposition that we can make with respect to them is, that they never read the work; for, if they had not been deterred from the perusal of it by such a formidable display of Greek characters, they must soon have discovered that Grotius never quotes, on any subject, till he has first appealed to some principles; and often, in my humble opinion, though, not always, to the soundest and most rational principles.

His treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis.

"But another sort of answer is due to some of those, who have criticised Grotius; and that answer might be given in the words of Grotius himself. He was not of such a stupid and servile cast of mind as to quote the opinions of poets or orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges, from whose decision there was no appeal. He quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty, and the fundamental principles of morals. Of such matters, poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses; for they address themselves to the general feelings and sympathies of mankind; they are neither warped by system, nor perverted by sophistry; they can attain none of their objects; they can neither please nor persuade, if they dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their readers. No system of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature, and the according judgment of all ages and nations. But, where are these feelings and that judgment recorded and preserved? In those very writings which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and law of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them, are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophise without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundation of all true philosophy.

Chap. X. 1621-1634

"If this were merely an objection of taste, I should be willing to allow, that Grotius has indeed poured forth his learning with a profusion, that sometimes rather encumbers than adorns his work, and which is not always necessary to the illustration of his subject. Yet, even in making, that concession, I should rather yield to the tastes of others, than speak from my own feelings. I own that such richness and splendour of literature have a powerful charm for me. They fill my mind with an endless variety of delightful recollections and associations. They relieve the understanding in its progress through a vast science, by calling up the memory of great men and of interesting events. By this means we see the truths of morality clothed with all the eloquence (not that could be produced by the powers of one man, but) that could be bestowed on them by the collective genius of the world. Even virtue and wisdom themselves acquire new majesty in my eyes, when I thus see all the great masters of thinking and writing called together, as it were, from all times and countries, to do them homage and to appear in their train.

X. 2. His Treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis

"But this is no piece for discussions of taste, and I am very ready to own, that mine may be corrupted. The work of Grotius is liable to a more serious objection, though I do not recollect that it has ever been made. His method is inconvenient and unscientific. He has inverted the natural order. That natural order undoubtedly dictates, that we should first search for the original principles of the science, in human nature; then apply them to the regulation of the conduct of individuals; and lastly employ them for the decision of those difficult and complicated questions that arise with respect to the intercourse of nations. But Grotius has chosen the reverse of this method. He begins with the consideration of the states of peace and war, and he examines original principles, only occasionally and incidentally, as they grow out of the questions, which he is called upon to decide. It is a necessary consequence of this disorderly method, which exhibits the elements of the science in the form of scattered digressions, that he seldom employs sufficient discussion on those fundamental truths, and never in the place where such a discussion would be most instructive to the reader. This defect in the plan of Grotius was perceived, and supplied by Puffendorf, who restored natural law to that superiority which belonged to it, and with great propriety, treated the law of nations as only one main branch of the parent stock."

CHAP X. 1621-1634

Whatever may be the merit of the work of which we are speaking, it must be admitted, that few, on their first appearance, and during a long subsequent period after publication, have received greater or warmer applause. The stores of erudition displayed in it, recommended it to the classical scholar, while the happy application of the author's reading to the affairs of human life, drew to it the attention of common readers. Among those, whose approbation of it, deserved to be recorded, Gustavus Adolphus,-his prime minister the Chancellor Oxenstiern,-and the Elector Palatine Charles Lewis, deserve particular mention.^[035] As the trophies of Miltiades are supposed to have kept Themistocles awake, it has been said that the trophies of Grotius drove sleep from Selden, till be produced his celebrated treatise, "De Jure naturali et gentium secundum leges Ebræorim." This important work equals that of Grotius in learning; but, from the partial and recondite nature of its subject, never equalled it in popularity.

X. 9. His Treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis

The supposed want of general elementary principles in the work of Grotius gave occasion to Puffendorf's treatise de Jure Naturae et Gentium; afterwards abridged by him into the small octavo volume De Officio hominis et civis: an edition of it in octavo was published by Professor Garschen Carmichael, of Glasgow, in 1724.

The best edition of Grotius's treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis was published at Amsterdam in 1730, by John Barbeyrac.

Foreigners observe, that the study of the law of nature and nations is less cultivated in England than upon the continent. Is it not, because Englishmen are blessed with a free constitution; are admitted into a general participation of all its blessings; are thus personally interested in the national concerns; and have therefore a jurisprudence, which comes nearer to their bosoms? Is it not also, because the law of nature and nations, with all its merit, is so loose, that its principles seldom admit of that practical application, which renders them really useful; and which an English mind always requires?