Chapter XIV · Concerning the Doctrines held by the different sects of Ṣúfís.

I have already stated, in the notice of Abu ´l-Ḥasan Núrí, that the Ṣúfís are divided into twelve sects, of which two are reprobated and ten are approved. Every one of these ten sects has an excellent system and doctrine as regards both purgation (mujáhadat) and contemplation (musháhadat). Although they differ from each other in their devotional practices and ascetic disciplines, they agree in the fundamentals and derivatives of the religious law and Unification. Abú Yazíd said: “The disagreement of divines is a mercy except as regards the detachment (tajríd)^[109] of Unification”; and there is a famous tradition to the same effect. The real essence of Ṣúfiism lies amidst the traditions (akhbár) of the Shaykhs, and is divided only metaphorically and formally. Therefore I will briefly divide their sayings in explanation of Ṣúfiism and unfold the main principle on which the doctrine of each one of them is based, in order that the student may readily understand this matter.

1.The Muḥásibís.

They are the followers of Abú `Abdalláh Ḥárith b. Asad al-Muḥásibí, who by consent of all his contemporaries was a man of approved spiritual influence and mortified passions (maqbúl al-nafas ú maqtúl al-nafs), versed in theology, jurisprudence, and mysticism. He discoursed on detachment from the world and Unification, while his outward and inward dealings (with God) were beyond reproach. The peculiarity of his doctrine is this, that he does not reckon satisfaction 177(riḍá) among the “stations” (maqámát), but includes it in the “states” (aḥwál). He was the first to hold this view, which was adopted by the people of Khurásán. The people of `Iráq, on the contrary, asserted that satisfaction is one of the “stations”, and that it is the extreme of trust in God (tawakkul). The controversy between them has gone on to the present day.^[110]

Discourse on the true nature of Satisfaction and the explanation of this doctrine.

In the first place I will establish the true nature of satisfaction and set forth its various kinds; then, secondly, I will explain the real meaning of “station” (maqám) and “state” (ḥál) and the difference between them.

Satisfaction is of two kinds: (a) the satisfaction of God with Man, and (b) the satisfaction of Man with God. Divine satisfaction really consists in God’s willing that Man should be recompensed (for his good works) and in His bestowing grace (karámat) upon him. Human satisfaction really consists in Man’s performing the command of God and submitting to His decree. Accordingly, the satisfaction of God precedes that of Man, for until Man is divinely aided he does not submit to God’s decree and does not perform His command, because Man’s satisfaction is connected with God’s satisfaction and subsists thereby. In short, human satisfaction is equanimity (istiwá-yi dil) towards Fate, whether it withholds or bestows, and spiritual steadfastness (istiqámat) in regarding events, whether they be the manifestation of Divine Beauty (jamál) or of Divine Majesty (jalál), so that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the fire of wrath or illuminated by the light of mercy, because both wrath and mercy are evidences of God, and whatever proceeds from God is good in His eyes. The Commander of the Faithful, Husayn b. `Alí, was asked about the saying of Abú Dharr Ghifárí: “I love poverty better than riches, and sickness better than health.” 178Ḥusayn replied: “God have mercy on Abú Dharr! but I say that whoever surveys the excellent choice made by God for him does not desire anything except what God has chosen for him.” When a man sees God’s choice and abandons his own choice, he is delivered from all sorrow. This, however, does not hold good in absence from God (ghaybat); it requires presence with God (ḥuḍúr), because “satisfaction expels sorrows and cures heedlessness”, and purges the heart of thoughts relating to other than God and frees it from the bonds of tribulation; for it is characteristic of satisfaction to deliver (rahánídan).

From the standpoint of ethics, satisfaction is the acquiescence of one who knows that giving and withholding are in God’s knowledge, and firmly believes that God sees him in all circumstances. There are four classes of quietists: (1) those who are satisfied with God’s gift (`aṭá), which is gnosis (ma`rifat); (2) those who are satisfied with happiness (nu`má), which is this world; (3) those who are satisfied with affliction (balá), which consists of diverse probations; and (4) those who are satisfied with being chosen (iṣṭifá), which is love (maḥabbat). He who looks away from the Giver to the gift accepts it with his soul, and when he has so accepted it trouble and grief vanish from his heart. He who looks away from the gift to the Giver loses the gift and treads the path of satisfaction by his own effort. Now effort is painful and grievous, and gnosis is only realized when its true nature is divinely revealed; and inasmuch as gnosis, when sought by effort, is a shackle and a veil, such gnosis is non-cognition (nakirat). Again, he who is satisfied with this world, without God, is involved in destruction and perdition, because the whole world is not worth so much that a friend of God should set his heart on it or that any care for it should enter his mind. Happiness is happiness only when it leads to the Giver of happiness; otherwise, it is an affliction. Again, he who is satisfied with the affliction that God sends is satisfied because in the affliction he sees the Author thereof and can endure its pain by contemplating Him who sent it; nay, he 179does not account it painful, such is his joy in contemplating his Beloved. Finally, those who are satisfied with being chosen by God are His lovers, whose existence is an illusion alike in His anger and His satisfaction; whose hearts dwell in the presence of Purity and in the garden of Intimacy; who have no thought of created things and have escaped from the bonds of “stations” and “states” and have devoted themselves to the love of God. Their satisfaction involves no loss, for satisfaction with God is a manifest kingdom.

Section.

It is related in the Traditions that Moses said: “O God, show me an action with which, if I did it, Thou wouldst be satisfied.” God answered: “Thou canst not do that, O Moses!” Then Moses fell prostrate, worshipping God and supplicating Him, and God made a revelation to him, saying: “O son of `Imrán, My satisfaction with thee consists in thy being satisfied with My decree,” i.e. when a man is satisfied with God’s decrees it is a sign that God is satisfied with him.

Bishr Ḥáfí asked Fuḍayl b. `Iyáḍ whether renunciation (zuhd) or satisfaction was better. Fuḍayl replied: “Satisfaction, because he who is satisfied does not desire any higher stage,” i.e. there is above renunciation a stage which the renouncer desires, but there is no stage above satisfaction that the satisfied man should wish for it. Hence the shrine is superior to the gate. This story shows the correctness of Muḥásibí’s doctrine, that satisfaction belongs to the class of “states” and Divine gifts, not to the stages that are acquired (by effort). It is possible, however, that the satisfied man should have a desire. The Apostle used to say in his prayers: “O God, I ask of Thee satisfaction after the going forth of Thy ordinance (al-riḍá ba`d al-qaḍá),” i.e. “keep me in such a condition that when the ordinance comes to me from Thee, Destiny may find me satisfied with its coming”. Here it is affirmed that satisfaction properly is posterior to the advent of Destiny, because, if it preceded, it would only be a resolution to be satisfied, which is not the same thing as actual 180satisfaction. Abu ´l-`Abbás b. `Aṭá says: “Satisfaction is this, that the heart should consider the eternal choice of God on behalf of His creature,” i.e. whatever befalls him, he should recognize it as the eternal will of God and His past decree, and should not be distressed, but should accept it cheerfully. Ḥárith Muḥásibí, the author of the doctrine, says: “Satisfaction is the quiescence (sukún) of the heart under the events which flow from the Divine decrees.” This is sound doctrine, because the quiescence and tranquillity of the heart are not qualities acquired by Man, but are Divine gifts. And as an argument for the view that satisfaction is a “state”, not a “station”, they cite the story of `Utba al-Ghulám, who one night did not sleep, but kept saying: “If Thou chastise me I love Thee, and if Thou have mercy on me I love Thee,” i.e. “the pain of Thy chastisement and the pleasure of Thy bounty affect the body alone, whereas the agitation of love resides in the heart, which is not injured thereby”. This corroborates the view of Muḥásibí. Satisfaction is the result of love, inasmuch as the lover is satisfied with what is done by the Beloved. Abú `Uthmán Ḥírí says: “During the last forty years God has never put me in any state that I disliked, or transferred me to another state that I resented.” This indicates continual satisfaction and perfect love. The story of the dervish who fell into the Tigris is well known. Seeing that he could not swim, a man on the bank cried out to him: “Shall I tell some one to bring you ashore?” The dervish said, “No.” “Then do you wish to be drowned?” “No.” “What, then, do you wish?” The dervish replied: “That which God wishes. What have I to do with wishing?”

The Ṣúfí Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on satisfaction, which differ in phraseology but agree in the two principles that have been mentioned.

The distinction between a “State” (ḥál) and a “Station” (maqám).

You must know that both these terms are in common use among Ṣúfís, and it is necessary that the student should be 181acquainted with them. I must discuss this matter here, although it does not belong to the present chapter.

“Station” (maqám) denotes anyone’s “standing” in the Way of God, and his fulfilment of the obligations appertaining to that “station” and his keeping it until he comprehends its perfection so far as lies in a man’s power. It is not permissible that he should quit his “station” without fulfilling the obligations thereof. Thus, the first “station” is repentance (tawbat), then comes conversion (inábat), then renunciation (zuhd), then trust in God (tawakkul), and so on: it is not permissible that anyone should pretend to conversion without repentance, or to renunciation without conversion, or to trust in God without renunciation.

“State” (ḥál), on the other hand, is something that descends from God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort. Accordingly, while the term “station” denotes the way of the seeker, and his progress in the field of exertion, and his rank before God in proportion to his merit, the term “state” denotes the favour and grace which God bestows upon the heart of His servant, and which are not connected with any mortification on the latter’s part. “Station” belongs to the category of acts, “state” to the category of gifts. Hence the man that has a “station” stands by his own self-mortification, whereas the man that has a “state” is dead to “self” and stands by a “state” which God creates in him.

Here the Shaykhs are at variance. Some hold that a “state” may be permanent, while others reject this view. Ḥárith Muḥásibí maintained that a “state” may be permanent. He argued that love and longing and “contraction” (qabḍ) and “expansion” (basṭ) are “states”: if they cannot be permanent, then the lover would not be a lover, and until a man’s “state” becomes his attribute (ṣifat) the name of that “state” is not properly applied to him. It is for this reason that he holds satisfaction to be one of the “states”, and the same view is indicated by the saying of Abú `Uthmán: “During the last forty years God has never put me in a ‘state’ that I disliked.” 182Other Shaykhs deny that a “state” can be permanent. Junayd says: “‘States’ are like flashes of lightning: their permanence is merely a suggestion of the lower soul (nafs).” Some have said, to the same effect: “‘States’ are like their name,” i.e. they vanish almost as soon as they descend (taḥillu) on the heart. Whatever is permanent becomes an attribute, and attributes subsist in an object which must be more perfect than the attributes themselves; and this reduces the doctrine that “states” are permanent to an absurdity. I have set forth the distinction between “state” and “station” in order that you may know what is signified by these terms wherever they occur in the phraseology of the Ṣúfís or in the present work.

In conclusion, you must know that satisfaction is the end of the “stations” and the beginning of the “states”: it is a place of which one side rests on acquisition and effort, and the other side on love and rapture: there is no “station” above it: at this point mortifications (mujáhadát) cease. Hence its beginning is in the class of things acquired by effort, its end in the class of things divinely bestowed. Therefore it may be called either a “station” or a “state”.

This is the doctrine of Muḥásibí as regards the theory of Ṣúfiism. In practice, however, he made no difference, except that he used to warn his pupils against expressions and acts which, though sound in principle, might be thought evil. For example, he had a “king-bird” (sháhmurghí), which used to utter a loud note. One day Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, who was Ḥárith’s pupil and an ecstatic man, came to see him. The bird piped, and Abú Ḥamza gave a shriek. Ḥárith rose up and seized a knife, crying, “Thou art an infidel,” and would have killed him if the disciples had not separated them. Then he said to Abú Ḥamza: “Become a Moslem, O miscreant!” The disciples exclaimed: “O Shaykh, we all know him to be one of the elect saints and Unitarians: why does the Shaykh regard him with suspicion?” Ḥárith replied: “I do not suspect him: his opinions are excellent, and I know that he is a profound Unitarian, but why should he do something 183which resembles the actions of those who believe in incarnation (ḥulúliyán) and has the appearance of being derived from their doctrine? If a senseless bird pipes after its fashion, capriciously, why should he behave as though its note were the voice of God? God is indivisible, and the Eternal does not become incarnate, or united with phenomena or commingled with them.” When Abú Ḥamza perceived the Shaykh’s insight, he said: “O Shaykh, although I am right in theory, nevertheless, since my action resembled the actions of heretics, I repent and withdraw.”

May God keep my conduct above suspicion! But this is impossible when one associates with worldly formalists whose enmity is aroused by anyone who does not submit to their hypocrisy and sin.

2. The Qaṣṣárís.

They are the followers of Abú Ṣáliḥ Ḥamdún b. Aḥmad b. `Umára al-Qaṣṣár, a celebrated divine and eminent Ṣúfí. His doctrine was the manifestation and divulgation of “blame” (malámat). He used to say: “God’s knowledge of thee is better than men’s knowledge,” i.e. thy dealings with God in private should be better than thy dealings with men in public, for thy preoccupation with men is the greatest veil between thee and God. I have given some account of al-Qaṣṣár in the chapter on “Blame”. He relates the following story: “One day, while I was walking in the river-bed in the Ḥíra quarter of Níshápúr, I met Núḥ, a brigand famous for his generosity, who was the captain of all the brigands of Níshápúr. I said to him, ‘O Núḥ, what is generosity?’ He replied, ‘My generosity or yours?’ I said, ‘Describe both.’ He replied: ‘I put off the coat (qabá) and wear a patched frock and practise the conduct appropriate to that garment, in order that I may become a Ṣúfí and refrain from sin because of the shame that I feel before God; but you put off the patched frock in order that you may not be deceived by men, and that men may not be deceived by thee: accordingly, my generosity 184is formal observance of the religious law, while your generosity is spiritual observance of the Truth.’” This is a very sound principle.

3. The Ṭayfúrís.

They are the followers of Abú Yazíd Ṭayfúr b. Ísá b. Surúshán al-Bisṭámí, a great and eminent Ṣúfí. His doctrine is rapture (ghalabat) and intoxication (sukr). Rapturous longing for God and intoxication of love cannot be acquired by human beings, and it is idle to claim, and absurd to imitate, anything that lies beyond the range of acquisition. Intoxication is not an attribute of the sober, and Man has no power of drawing it to himself. The intoxicated man is enraptured and pays no heed to created things, that he should manifest any quality involving conscious effort (taklif). The Ṣúfí Shaykhs are agreed that no one is a proper model for others unless he is steadfast (mustaqím) and has escaped from the circle of “states”; but there are some who allow that the way of rapture and intoxication may be trodden with effort, because the Apostle said: “Weep, or else make as though ye wept!” Now, to imitate others for the sake of ostentation is sheer polytheism, but it is different when the object of the imitator is that God may perchance raise him to the rank of those whom he has imitated, in accordance with the saying of the Apostle: “Whoever makes himself like unto a people is one of them.” And one of the Shaykhs said: “Contemplations (musháhadát) are the result of mortifications (mujáhadát).” My own view is that, although mortifications are always excellent, intoxication and rapture cannot be acquired at all; hence they cannot be induced by mortifications, which in themselves never become a cause of intoxication. I will now set forth the different opinions of the Shaykhs concerning the true nature of intoxication (sukr) and sobriety (ṣaḥw), in order that difficulties may be removed.

Discourse on Intoxication and Sobriety.

You must know that “intoxication” and “rapture” are terms used by spiritualists to denote the rapture of love for God, while 185the term “sobriety” expresses the attainment of that which is desired. Some place the former above the latter, and some hold the latter to be superior. Abú Yazíd and his followers prefer intoxication to sobriety. They say that sobriety involves the fixity and equilibrium of human attributes, which are the greatest veil between God and Man, whereas intoxication involves the destruction of human attributes, like foresight and choice, and the annihilation of a man’s self-control in God, so that only those faculties survive in him that do not belong to the human genus; and they are the most complete and perfect. Thus David was in the state of sobriety; an act proceeded from him which God attributed to him and said, “David killed Goliath” (Kor. ii, 252): but our Apostle was in the state of intoxication; an act proceeded from him which God attributed to Himself and said, “Thou didst not throw, when thou threwest, but God threw” (Kor. viii, 17). How great is the difference between these two men! The attribution of a man’s act to God is better than the attribution of God’s act to a man, for in the latter case the man stands by himself, while in the former case he stands through God.

Junayd and his followers prefer sobriety to intoxication. They say that intoxication is evil, because it involves the disturbance of one’s normal state and loss of sanity and self-control; and inasmuch as the principle of all things is sought either by way of annihilation or subsistence, or of effacement or affirmation, the principle of verification cannot be attained unless the seeker is sane. Blindness will never release anyone from the bondage and corruption of phenomena. The fact that people remain in phenomena and forget God is due to their not seeing things as they really are; for if they saw, they would escape. Seeing is of two kinds: he who looks at anything sees it either with the eye of subsistence (baqá) or with the eye of annihilation (faná). If with the eye of subsistence, he perceives that the whole universe is imperfect in comparison with his own subsistence, for he does not regard phenomena as self-subsistent; and if he looks with the eye of annihilation, he 186perceives that all created things are non-existent beside the subsistence of God. In either case he turns away from created things. On this account the Apostle said in his prayer: “O God, show us things as they are,” because whoever thus sees them finds rest. Now, such vision cannot be properly attained except in the state of sobriety, and the intoxicated have no knowledge thereof. For example, Moses was intoxicated; he could not endure the manifestation of one epiphany, but fell in a swoon (Kor. vii, 139): but our Apostle was sober; he beheld the same glory continuously, with ever-increasing consciousness, all the way from Mecca, until he stood at the space of two bow-lengths from the Divine presence (Kor. liii, 9).

My Shaykh, who followed the doctrine of Junayd, used to say that intoxication is the playground of children, but sobriety is the death-field of men. I say, in agreement with my Shaykh, that the perfection of the state of the intoxicated man is sobriety. The lowest stage in sobriety consists in regarding the powerlessness of humanity: therefore, a sobriety that appears to be evil is better than an intoxication that is really evil. It is related that Abú `Uthmán Maghribí, in the earlier part of his life, passed twenty years in retirement, living in deserts where he never heard the sound of a human voice, until his frame was wasted and his eyes became as small as the eye of a sack-needle. After twenty years he was commanded to associate with mankind. He resolved to begin with the people of God who dwelt beside His Temple, since by doing so he would gain a greater blessing. The Shaykhs of Mecca were aware of his coming and went forth to meet him. Finding him so changed that he hardly seemed to be a human creature, they said to him: “O Abú `Uthmán, tell us why you went and what you saw and what you gained and wherefore you have come back.” He replied: “I went because of intoxication, and I saw the evil of intoxication, and I gained despair, and I have come back on account of weakness.” All the Shaykhs said: “O Abú `Uthmán, it is not lawful for anyone after you to explain the meaning of sobriety 187and intoxication, for you have done justice to the whole matter and have shown forth the evil of intoxication.”

Intoxication, then, is to fancy one’s self annihilated while the attributes really subsist; and this is a veil. Sobriety, on the other hand, is the vision of subsistence while the attributes are annihilated; and this is actual revelation. It is absurd for anyone to suppose that intoxication is nearer to annihilation than sobriety is, for intoxication is a quality that exceeds sobriety, and so long as a man’s attributes tend to increase he is without knowledge; but when he begins to diminish them, seekers (of God) have some hope of him.

It is related that Yaḥyá b. Mu`ádh wrote to Abú Yazíd: “What do you say of one who drinks a single drop of the ocean of love and becomes intoxicated?” Báyazíd wrote in reply: “What do you say of one who, if all the oceans in the world were filled with the wine of love, would drink them all and still cry for more to slake his thirst?” People imagine that Yahyá was speaking of intoxication, and Báyazíd of sobriety, but the opposite is the case. The man of sobriety is he who is unable to drink even one drop, and the man of intoxication is he who drinks all and still desires more. Wine being the instrument of intoxication, but the enemy of sobriety, intoxication demands what is homogeneous with itself, whereas sobriety takes no pleasure in drinking.

There are two kinds of intoxication: (1) with the wine of affection (mawaddat) and (2) with the cup of love (maḥabbat). The former is “caused” (ma`lúl), since it arises from regarding the benefit (ni`mat); but the latter has no cause, since it arises from regarding the benefactor (mun`im). He who regards the benefit sees through himself and therefore sees himself, but he who regards the benefactor sees through Him and therefore does not see himself, so that, although he is intoxicated, his intoxication is sobriety.

Sobriety also is of two kinds: sobriety in heedlessness (ghaflat) and sobriety in love (maḥabbat). The former is the greatest of veils, but the latter is the clearest of revelations. 188The sobriety that is connected with heedlessness is really intoxication, while that which is linked with love, although it be intoxication, is really sobriety. When the principle (aṣl) is firmly established, sobriety and intoxication resemble one another, but when the principle is wanting, both are baseless. In short, where true mystics tread, sobriety and intoxication are the effect of difference (ikhtiláf), and when the Sultan of Truth displays his beauty, both sobriety and intoxication appear to be intruders (ṭufaylí), because the boundaries of both are joined, and the end of the one is the beginning of the other, and beginning and end are terms that imply separation, which has only a relative existence. In union all separations are negated, as the poet says—

“When the morning-star of wine rises,

The drunken and the sober are as one.”

At Sarakhs there were two spiritual directors, namely, Luqmán and Abu ´l-Faḍl Ḥasan. One day Luqmán came to Abu ´l-Faḍl and found him with a piece (of manuscript) in his hand. He said: “O Abu ´l-Faḍl, what are you seeking in this paper?” Abu ´l-Faḍl replied: “The same thing as you are seeking without a paper.” Luqmán said: “Then why this difference?” Abu ´l-Faḍl answered: “You see a difference when you ask me what I am seeking. Become sober from intoxication and get rid of sobriety, in order that the difference may be removed from you and that you may know what you and I are in search of.”

The Ṭayfúrís and Junaydís are at variance to the extent which has been indicated. As regards ethics, the doctrine of Báyazíd consists in shunning companionship and choosing retirement from the world, and he enjoined all his disciples to do the same. This is a praiseworthy and laudable Path.

4. The Junaydís.

They are the followers of Abu ´l-Qásim al-Junayd b. Muḥammad, who in his time was called the Peacock of the 189Divines (Ṭá´ús al-`Ulamá). He is the chief of this sect and the Imám of their Imáms. His doctrine is based on sobriety and is opposed to that of the Ṭayfúrís, as has been explained. It is the best known and most celebrated of all doctrines, and all the Shaykhs have adopted it, notwithstanding that there is much difference in their sayings on the ethics of Ṣúfiism. Want of space forbids me to discuss it further in this book: those who wish to become better acquainted with it must seek information elsewhere.

I have read in the Anecdotes that when Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) in his rapture broke off all relations with `Amr b. `Uthmán (al-Makkí) and came to Junayd, Junayd asked him for what purpose he had come to him. Ḥusayn said: “For the purpose of associating with the Shaykh.” Junayd replied: “I do not associate with madmen. Association demands sanity; if that is wanting, the result is such behaviour as yours in regard to Sahl b. `Abdalláh Tustarí and `Amr.” Ḥusayn said: “O Shaykh, sobriety and intoxication are two attributes of Man, and Man is veiled from his Lord until his attributes are annihilated.” “O son of Manṣúr,” said Junayd, “you are in error concerning sobriety and intoxication. The former denotes soundness of one’s spiritual state in relation to God, while the latter denotes excess of longing and extremity of love, and neither of them can be acquired by human effort. O son of Manṣúr, in your words I see much foolishness and nonsense.”

5. The Núrís.

They are the followers of Abu ´l-Ḥasan Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Núrí, one of the most eminent and illustrious Ṣúfí divines. The principle of his doctrine is to regard Ṣúfiism (taṣawwuf) as superior to poverty (faqr). In matters of conduct he agrees with Junayd. It is a peculiarity of his “path” that in companionship (ṣuḥbat) he prefers his companion’s claim to his own, and holds companionship without preference (íthár) to be unlawful. He also holds that companionship is obligatory 190on dervishes, and that retirement (`uzlat) is not praiseworthy, and that everyone is bound to prefer his companion to himself. It is related that he said: “Beware of retirement! for it is in connexion with Satan; and cleave to companionship, for therein is the satisfaction of the Merciful God.”

Now I will explain the true nature of preference, and when I come to the chapter on companionship and retirement I will set forth the mysteries of the subject in order to make it more generally instructive.

Discourse on Preference (íthár).

God said: “And they prefer them to themselves, although they are indigent” (Kor. lix, 9). This verse was revealed concerning the poor men among the Companions in particular. The true nature of preference consists in maintaining the rights of the person with whom one associates, and in subordinating one’s own interest to the interest of one’s friend, and in taking trouble upon one’s self for the sake of promoting his happiness, because preference is the rendering of help to others, and the putting into practice of that which God commanded to His Apostle: “Use indulgence and command what is just and turn away from the ignorant” (Kor. vii, 198). This will be explained more fully in the chapter on the rules of companionship.

Now, preference is of two kinds: firstly, in companionship, as has been mentioned; and secondly, in love. In preferring the claim of one’s companion there is a sort of trouble and effort, but in preferring the claim of one’s beloved there is nothing but pleasure and delight. It is well known that when Ghulám al-Khalíl persecuted the Ṣúfís, Núrí and Raqqám and Abú Ḥamza were arrested and conveyed to the Caliph’s palace. Ghulám al-Khalíl urged the Caliph to put them to death, saying that they were heretics (zanádiqa), and the Caliph immediately gave orders for their execution. When the executioner approached Raqqám, Núrí rose and offered himself in Raqqám’s place with the utmost cheerfulness and submission. All the spectators were astounded. The executioner said: 191“O young man, the sword is not a thing that people desire to meet so eagerly as you have welcomed it; and your turn has not yet arrived.” Núrí answered: “Yes; my doctrine is founded on preference. Life is the most precious thing in the world: I wish to sacrifice for my brethren’s sake the few moments that remain. In my opinion, one moment of this world is better than a thousand years of the next world, because this is the place of service (khidmat) and that is the place of proximity (qurbat), and proximity is gained by service.” The tenderness of Núrí and the fineness of his saying astonished the Caliph (who was informed by a courier of what had passed) to such a degree, that he suspended the execution of the three Ṣúfís and charged the chief Cadi, Abu ´l-`Abbás b. `Alí, to inquire into the matter. The Cadi, having taken them to his house and questioned them concerning the ordinances of the Law and the Truth, found them perfect, and felt remorse for his indifference to their fate. Then Núrí said: “O Cadi, though you have asked all these questions, you have not yet asked anything to the point, for God has servants who eat through Him, and drink through Him, and sit through Him, and live through Him, and abide in contemplation of Him: if they were cut off from contemplating Him they would cry out in anguish.” The Cadi was amazed at the subtlety of his speech and the soundness of his state. He wrote to the Caliph: “If the Ṣúfís are heretics, who in the world is a Unitarian?” The Caliph called them to his presence and said: “Ask a boon.” They replied: “The only boon we ask of thee is that thou shouldst forget us, and neither make us thy favourites nor banish us from thy court, for thy favour and displeasure are alike to us.” The Caliph wept and dismissed them with honour.

It is related that Náfi`<sup>[111]</sup> said: “Ibn `Umar^[112] desired to eat a fish. I sought through the town, but did not find one until several days had passed. Having procured it, I gave orders 192that it should be placed on a cake of bread and presented it to him. I noticed an expression of joy on his face as he received it, but suddenly a beggar came to the door of his house and he ordered the fish to be given to him. The servant said: ‘O master, you have been desiring a fish for several days; let us give the beggar something else.’ Ibn `Umar replied: ‘This fish is unlawful to me, for I have put it out of my mind on account of a Tradition which I heard from the Apostle: Whenever anyone feels a desire and repels it and prefers another to himself, he shall be forgiven.’“

I have read in the Anecdotes that ten dervishes lost their way in the desert and were overtaken by thirst. They had only one cup of water, and everyone preferred the claim of the others, so that none of them would drink and they all died except one, who then drank it and found strength to escape. Some person said to him: “Had you not drunk, it would have been better.” He replied: “The Law obliged me to drink; if I had not, I should have killed myself and been punished on that account.” The other said: “Then did your friends kill themselves?” “No,” said the dervish; “they refused to drink in order that their companions might drink, but when I alone survived I was legally obliged to drink.”^[113]

Among the Israelites there was a devotee who had served God for four hundred years. One day he said: “O Lord, if Thou hadst not created these mountains, wandering for religion’s sake (siyáḥat) would have been easier for Thy servants.” The Divine command came to the Apostle of that time to say to the devotee: “What business have you to interfere in My kingdom? Now, since you have interfered, I blot your name from the register of the blest and inscribe it in the register of the damned.” On hearing this, the devotee trembled with joy and bowed to the ground in thanksgiving. The Apostle 193said: “O fool, it is not necessary to bow down in thanksgiving for damnation.” “My thanksgiving,” the devotee replied: “is not for damnation, but because my name is at least inscribed in one of His registers. But, O Apostle, I have a boon to ask. Say unto God, ‘Since Thou wilt send me to Hell, make me so large that I may take the place of all sinful Unitarians, and let them go to Paradise.’” God commanded the Apostle to tell the devotee that the probation which he had undergone was not for the purpose of humiliating him, but to reveal him to the people, and that on the Day of Resurrection both he and those for whom he had interceded would be in Paradise.

I asked Aḥmad Ḥammádí of Sarakhs what was the beginning of his conversion. He replied: “Once I set out from Sarakhs and took my camels into the desert and stayed there for a considerable time. I was always wishing to be hungry and was giving my portion of food to others, and the words of God—‘They‘They prefer them to themselves, although they are indigent’indigent’ (Kor. lix, 9)—were ever fresh in my mind; and I had a firm belief in the Ṣúfís. One day a hungry lion came from the desert and killed one of my camels and retired to some rising ground and roared. All the wild beasts in the neighbourhood, hearing him roar, gathered round him. He tore the camel to pieces and went back to the higher ground without having eaten anything. The other beasts—foxes, jackals, wolves, etc.—began to eat, and the lion waited until they had gone away. Then he approached in order to eat a morsel, but seeing a lame fox in the distance he withdrew once more until the new-comer had eaten his fill. After that, he came and ate a morsel. As he departed he spoke to me, who had been watching from afar, and said: ‘O Aḥmad, to prefer others to one’s self in the matter of food is an act only worthy of dogs: a man sacrifices his life and his soul.’ When I saw this evidence I renounced all worldly occupations, and that was the beginning of my conversion.”

Ja`far Khuldí says: “One day, when Abu ´l-Ḥasan Núrí was praying to God in solitude I went to overhear him, for he 194was very eloquent. He was saying, ‘O Lord, in Thy eternal knowledge and power and will Thou dost punish the people of Hell, whom Thou hast created; and if it be Thy inexorable will to make Hell full of mankind, Thou art able to fill that Hell and all its limbos with me alone and to send them to Paradise.’ I was amazed by his speech, but I dreamed that some one came to me and said: ‘God bids thee tell Abu ´l-Ḥasan that he has been forgiven on account of his compassion for God’s creatures and his reverence for God.’”

He was called Núrí because when he spoke in a dark room the whole room was illuminated by the light (núr) of his spirituality. And by the light of the Truth he used to read the inmost thoughts of his disciples, so that Junayd said: “Abu ´l-Ḥasan is the spy on men’s hearts (jásús al-qulúb).“

This is his peculiar doctrine. It is a sound principle, and one of great importance in the eyes of those who have insight. Nothing is harder to a man than spiritual sacrifice (badhl-i rúḥ) and to refrain from the object of his love, and God hath made this sacrifice the key of all good, as He said: ”Ye shall never attain to righteousness until ye give in alms of that which ye love” (Kor. iii, 86). When a man’s spirit is sacrificed, of what value are his wealth and his health and his frock and his food? This is the foundation of Ṣúfiism. Some one came to Ruwaym and asked him for direction. Ruwaym said: “O my son, the whole affair consists in spiritual sacrifice. If you are able for this, it is well; if not, do not occupy yourself with the futilities (turrahát) of the Ṣúfís,” i.e. all except this is futile; and God said: “Do not call dead those who are slain in the way of God. Nay, they are living” (Kor. ii, 149). Eternal life is gained by spiritual sacrifice and by renunciation of self-interest in fulfilling God’s commandment and by obedience to His friends. But from the standpoint of gnosis (ma`rifat) preference and free choice are separation (tafriqat), and real preference consists in union with God, for the true basis of self-interest is self-abandonment. So long as the seeker’s progress is connected with acquisition 195(kasb) it is pernicious, but when the attracting influence (jadhb) of the Truth manifests its dominion all his actions are confounded, and he loses all power of expression; nor can any name be applied to him or any description be given of him or anything be imputed to him. On this subject Shiblí says in verse—

“I am lost to myself and unconscious,

And my attributes are annihilated.

To-day I am lost to all things:

Naught remains but a forced expression.”

6. The Sahlís.

They are the followers of Sahl b. `Abdalláh of Tustar, a great and venerable Ṣúfí, who has been already mentioned. His doctrine inculcates endeavour and self-mortification and ascetic training, and he used to bring his disciples to perfection in self-mortification (mujáhadat). It is related in a well-known anecdote that he said to one of his disciples: “Strive to say continuously for one day, ‘O Allah! O Allah! O Allah!’ and do the same next day and the day after that,” until he became habituated to saying those words. Then he bade him repeat them at night also, until they became so familiar that he uttered them even during his sleep. Then he said: “Do not repeat them any more, but let all your faculties be engrossed in remembering God.” The disciple did this, until he became absorbed in the thought of God. One day, when he was in his house, a piece of wood fell on his head and broke it. The drops of blood which trickled to the ground bore the legend “Allah! Allah! Allah!”

The “path” of the Sahlís is to educate disciples by acts of self-mortification, and austerities; that of the Ḥamdúnís^[114] is to serve and reverence dervishes; and that of the Junaydís is to keep watch over one’s spiritual state (muráqaba-i báṭin).

196The object of all austerities and acts of self-mortification is resistance to the lower soul (nafs), and until a man knows his lower soul his austerities are of no use to him. Now, therefore, I will explain the knowledge and true nature of the lower soul, and in the next place I will lay down the doctrine concerning self-mortification and its principles.

Discourse touching the true nature of the Lower Soul (nafs) and the meaning of Passion (hawá).

You must know that nafs, etymologically, is the essence and reality of anything, but in popular language it is used to denote many contradictory meanings, e.g. “spirit”, “virility” (muruwwat), “body”, and “blood”. The mystics of this sect, however, are agreed that it is the source and principle of evil, but while some assert that it is a substance (`ayn) located in the body, as the spirit (rúḥ) is, others hold it to be an attribute of the body, as life is. But they all agree that through it base qualities are manifested and that it is the immediate cause of blameworthy actions. Such actions are of two kinds, namely, sins (ma`áṣí) and base qualities (akhláq-i daní), like pride, envy, avarice, anger, hatred, etc., which are not commendable in law and reason. These qualities can be removed by discipline (riyáḍat): e.g., sins are removed by repentance. Sins belong to the class of external attributes, whereas the qualities above mentioned belong to the class of internal attributes. Similarly, discipline is an external act, and repentance is an internal attribute. A base quality that appears within is purged by excellent outward attributes, and one that appears without is purged by laudable inward attributes. Both the lower soul and the spirit are subtle things (laṭá´if) existing in the body, just as devils and angels and Paradise and Hell exist in the universe; but the one is the seat of good, while the other is the seat of evil. Hence, resistance to the lower soul is the chief of all acts of devotion and the crown of all acts of self-mortification, and only thereby can Man find the way to 197God, because submission to the lower soul involves his destruction and resistance to it involves his salvation.^[115]

Now, every attribute needs an object whereby it subsists, and knowledge of that attribute, namely, the soul, is not attained save by knowledge of the whole body, which knowledge in turn demands an explanation of the qualities of human nature (insániyyat) and the mystery thereof, and is incumbent upon all seekers of the Truth, because whoever is ignorant of himself is yet more ignorant of other things; and inasmuch as a man is bound to know God, he must first know himself, in order that by rightly perceiving his own temporality he may recognize the eternity of God, and may learn the everlastingness of God through his own perishableness. The Apostle said: “He who knows himself already knows his Lord,” i.e., if he knows himself as perishable he knows God as everlasting, or if he knows himself as humble he knows God as Almighty, or if he knows himself as a servant he knows God as the Lord. Therefore one who does not know himself is debarred from knowledge of all things.

As regards the knowledge of human nature and the various opinions held on that topic, some Moslems assert that Man is nothing but spirit (rúḥ), of which this body is the cuirass and temple and residence, in order to preserve it from being injured by the natural humours (ṭabáyi`), and of which the attributes are sensation and intelligence. This view is false, because a body from which the soul (ján) has departed is still called “a human being” (insán); if the soul is joined with it it is “a live human being”, and if the soul is gone it is “a dead human being”. Moreover, a soul is located in the bodies of animals, yet they are not called “human beings”. If the spirit (rúḥ) were the cause of human nature, it would follow that 198the principle of human nature must exist in every creature possessed of a soul (ján-dárí); which is a proof of the falsity of their assertion. Others, again, have stated that the term “human nature” is applicable to the spirit and the body together, and that it no longer applies when one is separated from the other; e.g., when two colours, black and white, are combined on a horse, it is called “piebald” (ablaq), whereas the same colours, apart from each other, are called “black” and “white”. This too is false, in accordance with God’s word: “Did there not come over Man a space of time during which he was not a thing worthy of mention?” (Kor. lxxvi, 1): in this verse Man’s clay, without soul—for the soul had not yet been joined to his body—is called “Man”. Others aver that “Man” is an atom, centred in the heart, which is the principle of all human attributes. This also is absurd, for if anyone is killed and his heart is taken out of his body he does not lose the name of “human being”; moreover, it is agreed that the heart was not in the human body before the soul. Some pretenders to Ṣúfiism have fallen into error on this subject. They declare that “Man” is not that which eats and drinks and suffers decay, but a Divine mystery, of which this body is the vesture, situated in the interfusion of the natural humours (imtizáj-i ṭab`) and in the union (ittiḥád) of body and spirit. To this I reply, that by universal consent the name of “human being” belongs to sane men and mad, and to infidels and immoral and ignorant persons, in whom there is no such “mystery” and who suffer decay and eat and drink; and that there is not anything called “Man” in the body, either while it exists or after it has ceased to exist. God Almighty has given the name of “Man” to the sum of the substances which He compounded in us, excluding those things which are not to be found in some human beings, e.g. in the verses “And We have created Man of the choicest clay,” etc. (Kor. xxiii, 12-14). Therefore, according to the word of God, who is the most veracious of all who speak the Truth, this particular form, with all its ingredients and with all the changes which it undergoes, 199is “Man”. In like manner, certain Sunnís have said that Man is a living creature whose form has these characteristics, and that death does not deprive him of this name, and that he is endowed with a definite physiognomy (ṣúrat-i ma`húd) and a distinct organ (álat-i mawsúm) both externally and internally. By “a definite physiognomy” they mean that he has either good or ill health, and by “a distinct organ” that he is either mad or sane. It is generally allowed that the more sound (ṣaḥíḥ) a thing is, the more perfect it is in constitution. You must know, then, that in the opinion of mystics the most perfect composition of Man includes three elements, viz. spirit, soul, and body; and that each of these has an attribute which subsists therein, the attribute of spirit being intelligence, of soul, passion, and of body, sensation. Man is a type of the whole universe. The universe is the name of the two worlds, and in Man there is a vestige of both, for he is composed of phlegm, blood, bile, and melancholy, which four humours correspond to the four elements of this world, viz. water, earth, air, and fire, while his soul (ján), his lower soul (nafs), and his body correspond to Paradise, Hell, and the place of Resurrection. Paradise is the effect of God’s satisfaction, and Hell is the result of His anger. Similarly, the spirit of the true believer reflects the peace of knowledge, and his lower soul the error which veils him from God. As, at the Resurrection, the believer must be released from Hell before he can reach Paradise and attain to real vision and pure love, so in this world he must escape from his lower soul before he can attain to real discipleship (irádat), of which the spirit is the principle, and to real proximity (to God) and gnosis. Hence, whoever knows Him in this world and turns away from all besides and follows the highway of the sacred law, at the Resurrection he will not see Hell and the Bridge (Ṣiráṭ). In short, the believer’s spirit calls him to Paradise, of which it is a type in this world, and his lower soul calls him to Hell, of which it is a type in this world. Therefore it behoves those who seek God never to relax their resistance to the lower soul, in 200order that thereby they may reinforce the spirit and the intelligence, which are the home of the Divine mystery.

Section.

As regards what has been said by the Shaykhs concerning the lower soul, Dhu ´l-Nún the Egyptian says: “Vision of the lower soul and its promptings is the worst of veils,” because obedience to it is disobedience to God, which is the origin of all veils. Abú Yazíd Bisṭámí says: “The lower soul is an attribute which never rests save in falsehood,” i.e. it never seeks the Truth. Muḥammad b. `Alí al-Tirmidhí says: “You wish to know God while your lower soul subsists in you; but your lower soul does not know itself, how should it know another?” Junayd says: “To fulfil the desires of your lower soul is the foundation of infidelity,” because the lower soul is not connected with, and is always striving to turn away from, the pure truth of Islam; and he who turns away denies, and he who denies is an alien (bégána). Abú Sulaymán Dárání says: “The lower soul is treacherous and hindering (one who seeks to please God); and resistance to it is the best of actions.”

Now I come to my main purpose, which is to set forth the doctrine of Sahl concerning the mortification and discipline of the lower soul, and to explain its true nature.

Discourse on the Mortification of the Lower Soul.

God has said: “Those who strive to the utmost (jáhadú) for Our sake, We will guide them into Our ways” (Kor. xxix, 69). And the Prophet said: “The (mujáhid) is he who struggles with all his might against himself (jáhada nafsahu) for God’s sake.” And he also said: “We have returned from the lesser war (al-jihád al-aṣghar) to the greater war (al-jihád al-akbar)”(al-jihád al-akbar)”. On being asked, “What is the greater war?” he replied, “It is the struggle against one’s self” (mujáhadat al-nafs). Thus the Apostle adjudged the mortification of the lower soul to be superior to the Holy War against unbelievers, 201because the former is more painful. You must know, then, that the way of mortification is plain and manifest, for it is approved by men of all religions and sects, and is observed and practised by the Ṣúfís in particular; and the term “mortification” (mujáhadat) is current among Ṣúfís of every class, and the Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on this topic. Sahl b. `Abdalláh Tustarí carries the principle to an extreme point. It is related that he used to break his fast only once in fifteen days, and he ate but little food in the course of his long life. While all mystics have affirmed the need of mortification, and have declared it to be an indirect means (asbáb) of attaining contemplation (musháhadat), Sahl asserted that mortification is the direct cause (`illat) of the latter, and he attributed to search (ṭalab) a powerful effect on attainment (yáft), so that he even regarded the present life, spent in search, as superior to the future life of fruition. “If,” he said, “you serve God in this world, you will attain proximity to Him in the next world: without that service there would not be this proximity: it follows that self-mortification, practised with the aid of God, is the direct cause of union with God.” Others, on the contrary, hold that there is no direct cause of union with God, and whoever attains to God does so by Divine grace (faḍl), which is independent of human actions. Therefore, they argue, the object of mortification is to correct the vices of the lower soul, not to attain real proximity, and inasmuch as mortification is referred to Man, while contemplation is referred to God, it is impossible that one should be caused by the other. Sahl, however, cites in favour of his view the words of God: “Those who strive to the utmost for Our sake, We will guide them into Our ways” (Kor. xxix, 69), i.e. whoever mortifies himself will attain to contemplation. Furthermore, he contends that inasmuch as the books revealed to the Prophets, and the Sacred Law, and all the religious ordinances imposed on mankind involve mortification, they must all be false and vain if mortification were not the cause of contemplation. Again, both in this world and the next, 202everything is connected with principles and causes. If it is maintained that principles have no causes, there is an end of all law and order: neither can religious obligations be justified nor will food be the cause of repletion and clothes the cause of warmth. Accordingly, to regard actions as being caused is Unification (tawḥíd), and to rebut this is Nullification (ta`ṭíl). He who asserts it is proving the existence of contemplation, and he who denies it is denying the existence of contemplation. Does not training (riyáḍat) alter the animal qualities of a wild horse and substitute human qualities in their stead, so that he will pick up a whip from the ground and give it to his master, or will roll a ball with his foot? In the same way, a boy without sense and of foreign race is taught by training to speak Arabic, and take a new language in exchange for his mother tongue; and a savage beast is trained to go away when leave is given to it, and to come back when it is called, preferring captivity to freedom.^[116] Therefore, Sahl and his followers argue, mortification is just as necessary for the attainment of union with God as diction and composition are necessary for the elucidation of ideas; and as one is led to knowledge of the Creator by assurance that the universe was created in time, so one is led to union with God by knowledge and mortification of the lower soul.

I will now state the arguments of the opposing party. They maintain that the verse of the Koran (xxix, 69) cited by Sahl is a hysteron proteron, and that the meaning of it is, “Those whom We guide into Our ways strive to the utmost for Our sake.” And the Apostle said: “Not one of you shall be saved by his works.” “O Apostle,” they cried, “not even thou?” “Not even I,” he said, “unless God encompass me with His mercy.” Now, mortification is a man’s act, and his act cannot possibly become the cause of his salvation, which depends on the Divine Will, as God hath said: “Whomsoever God wishes to lead aright, He will open his breast to receive 203Islam, but whomsoever He wishes to lead astray, He will make his breast strait and narrow” (Kor. vi, 125). By affirming His will, He denies the (effect of the) religious ordinances which have been laid upon mankind. If mortification were the cause of union Iblís would not have been damned, or if neglect of mortification were the cause of damnation Adam would never have been blessed. The result hangs on predestined grace (`ináyat), not on abundance of mortification. It is not the case that he who most exerts himself is the most secure, but that he who has most grace is nearest to God. A monk worshipping in his cell may be far from God, and a sinner in the tavern may be near to Him. The noblest thing in the world is the faith of a child who is not subject to the religious law (mukallaf) and in this respect belongs to the same category as madmen: if, then, mortification is not the cause of the noblest of all gifts, no cause is necessary for anything that is inferior.

I, `Alí b. `Uthmán al-Jullábí, say that the difference between the two parties in this controversy lies in expression (`ibárat). One says, “He who seeks shall find,” and the other says, “He who finds shall seek.” Seeking is the cause of finding, but it is no less true that finding is the cause of seeking. The one party practises mortification for the purpose of attaining contemplation, and the other party practises contemplation for the purpose of attaining mortification. The fact is that mortification stands in the same relation to contemplation as Divine blessing (tawfíq), which is a gift from God, to obedience (ṭá`at): as it is absurd to seek obedience without Divine blessing, so it is absurd to seek Divine blessing without obedience, and as there can be no mortification without contemplation, so there can be no contemplation without mortification. Man is guided to mortification by a flash of the Divine Beauty, and inasmuch as that flash is the cause of the existence of mortification, Divine guidance (hidáyat) precedes mortification.

Now, as regards the argument of Sahl and his followers 204that failure to affirm mortification involves the denial of all the religious ordinances which have come down in the books revealed to the Prophets, this statement requires correction. Religious obligations (taklíf) depend on Divine guidance (hidáyat), and acts of mortification only serve to affirm the proofs of God, not to effect real union with Him. God has said: “And though We had sent down the angels unto them and the dead had spoken unto them and We had gathered before them all things together, they would not have believed unless God had so willed” (Kor. vi, 111), for the cause of belief is Our will, not evidences or mortification. Accordingly, the revelations of the Prophets and the ordinances of religion are a means (asbáb) of attaining to union, but are not the cause (`illat) of union. So far as religious obligations are concerned, Abú Bakr was in the same position as Abú Jahl, but Abú Bakr, having justice and grace, attained, whereas Abú Jahl, having justice without grace, failed. Therefore the cause of attainment is attainment itself, not the act of seeking attainment, for if the seeker were one with the object sought the seeker would be one, and in that case he would not be a seeker, because he who has attained is at rest, which the seeker cannot be.

Again, in reference to their argument that the qualities of a horse are altered by mortification, you must know that mortification is only a means of bringing out qualities that are already latent in the horse but do not appear until he has been trained. Mortification will never turn a donkey into a horse or a horse into a donkey, because this involves a change of identity; and since mortification has not the power of transforming identity it cannot possibly be affirmed in the presence of God.

Over that spiritual director, namely, Sahl, there used to pass a mortification of which he was independent and which, while he was in the reality thereof, he was unable to express in words. He was not like some who have made it their religion to talk about mortification without practising it. How absurd that what ought to consist wholly in action should become 205nothing but words! In short, the Ṣúfís are unanimous in recognizing the existence of mortification and discipline, but hold that it is wrong to pay regard to them. Those who deny mortification do not mean to deny its reality, but only to deny that any regard should be paid to it or that anyone should be pleased with his own actions in the place of holiness, inasmuch as mortification is the act of Man, while contemplation is a state in which one is kept by God, and a man’s actions do not begin to have value until God keeps him thus. The mortification of those whom God loves is the work of God in them without choice on their part: it overwhelms and melts them away; but the mortification of ignorant men is the work of themselves in themselves by their own choice: it perturbs and distresses them, and distress is due to evil. Therefore, do not speak of thine own actions while thou canst avoid it, and never in any circumstances follow thy lower soul, for it is thy phenomenal being that veils thee from God. If thou wert veiled by one act alone, thou mightest be unveiled by another, but since thy whole being is a veil thou wilt not become worthy of subsistence (baqá) until thou art wholly annihilated. It is related in a well—known anecdote that Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) came to Kúfa and lodged in the house of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-`Alawí. Ibráhím Khawwáṣ also came to Kúfa, and, having heard of al-Ḥalláj, went to see him. Al-Ḥalláj said: “O Ibráhím, during these forty years of your connexion with Ṣúfiism, what have you gained from it?” Ibráhím answered: “I have made the doctrine of trust in God (tawakkul) peculiarly my own.” Al-Ḥalláj said: “You have wasted your life in cultivating your spiritual nature: what has become of annihilation in Unification (al-faná fi ´l-tawḥíd)?” i.e. “trust in God is a term denoting your conduct towards God and your spiritual excellence in regard to relying on Him: if a man spends his whole life in remedying his spiritual nature, he will need another life for remedying his material nature, and his life will be lost before he has found a trace or vestige of God”. And a story is told of Shaykh Abú `Alí Siyáh of Merv, that he said: “I saw my lower 206soul in a form resembling my own, and some one had seized it by its hair and gave it into my hands. I bound it to a tree and was about to destroy it, when it cried out, ‘O Abú `Alí, do not trouble yourself. I am God’s army (lashkar-i khudáyam): you cannot reduce me to naught.’” And it is related concerning Muḥammad b. `Ulyán of Nasá, an eminent companion of Junayd, that he said: “In my novitiate, when I had become aware of the corruptions of the lower soul and acquainted with its places of ambush, I always felt a violent hatred of it in my heart. One day something like a young fox came forth from my throat, and God caused me to know that it was my lower soul. I cast it under my feet, and at every kick that I gave it, it grew bigger. I said: ‘Other things are destroyed by pain and blows: why dost thou increase?’ It replied: ‘Because I was created perverse: that which is pain to other things is pleasure to me, and their pleasure is my pain.’” Shaykh Abu ´l-`Abbás Shaqání, who was the Imám of his time, said: “One day I came into my house and found a yellow dog lying there, asleep. Thinking it had come in from the street, I was about to turn it out. It crept under my skirt and vanished.” Shaykh Abu ´l-Qásim Gurgání, who to-day is the Quṭb—may God prolong his life!—relates, speaking of his novitiate, that he saw his lower soul in the form of a snake. A dervish said: “I saw my lower soul in the shape of a mouse. ‘Who art thou?’ I asked. It answered: ‘I am the destruction of the heedless, for I urge them to evil, and the salvation of those who love God, for if I were not with them in my corruption they would be puffed up with pride in their purity.’”

All these stories prove that the lower soul is a real substance (`ayní), not a mere attribute, and that it has attributes which we clearly perceive. The Apostle said: “Thy worst enemy is thy lower soul, which is between thy two sides.” When you have obtained knowledge of it you recognize that it can be mastered by discipline, but that its essence and substance do not perish. If it is rightly known and under control, the seeker need not care though it continues to exist in him. 207Hence the purpose of mortifying the lower soul is to destroy its attributes, not to annihilate its reality. Now I will discuss the true nature of passion and the renunciation of lusts.

Discourse on the true nature of Passion (hawá).

You must know that, according to the opinion of some, passion is a term applied to the attributes of the lower soul, but, according to others, a term denoting the natural volition (irádat-i ṭab`) whereby the lower soul is controlled and directed, just as the spirit is controlled by the intelligence. Every spirit that is devoid of the faculty of intelligence is imperfect, and similarly every lower soul that is devoid of the faculty of passion is imperfect. Man is continually being called by intelligence and passion into contrary ways. If he obeys the call of intelligence he attains to faith, but if he obeys the call of passion he arrives at error and infidelity. Therefore passion is a veil and a false guide, and man is commanded to resist it. Passion is of two kinds: (1) desire of pleasure and lust, and (2) desire of worldly honour and authority. He who follows pleasure and lust haunts taverns, and mankind are safe from his mischief, but he who desires honour and authority lives in cells (ṣawámi`) and monasteries, and not only has lost the right way himself but also leads others into error. One whose every act depends on passion, and who finds satisfaction in following it, is far from God although he be with you in a mosque, but one who has renounced and abandoned it is near to God although he be in a church. Ibráhím Khawwáṣ relates this anecdote: “Once I heard that in Rúm there was a monk who had been seventy years in a monastery. I said to myself: ‘Wonderful! Forty years is the term of monastic vows: what is the state of this man that he has remained there for seventy years?’ I went to see him. When I approached, he opened a window and said to me: ‘O Ibráhím, I know why you have come. I have not stayed here for seventy years because of monastic vows, but I have a dog foul with passion, and I have taken my 208abode in this monastery for the purpose of guarding the dog (sagbání), and preventing it from doing harm to others.’ On hearing him say this I exclaimed: ‘O Lord, Thou art able to bestow righteousness on a man even though he be involved in sheer error.’ He said to me: ‘O Ibráhím, how long will you seek men? Go and seek yourself, and when you have found yourself keep watch over yourself, for this passion clothes itself every day in three hundred and sixty diverse garments of godhead and leads men astray.’“

In short, the devil cannot enter a man’s heart until he desires to commit a sin: but when a certain quantity of passion appears, the devil takes it and decks it out and displays it to the man’s heart; and this is called diabolic suggestion (waswás). It begins from passion, and in reference to this fact God said to Iblís when he threatened to seduce all mankind: ”Verily, thou hast no power over My servants” (Kor. xv, 42), for the devil in reality is a man’s lower soul and passion. Hence the Apostle said: “There is no one whom his devil (i.e. his passion) has not subdued except `Umar, for he has subdued his devil.” Passion is mingled as an ingredient in the clay of Adam; whoever renounces it becomes a prince and whoever follows it becomes a captive. Junayd was asked: “What is union with God?” He replied: “To renounce passion,” for of all the acts of devotion by which God’s favour is sought none has greater value than resistance to passion, because it is easier for a man to destroy a mountain with his nails than to resist passion. I have read in the Anecdotes that Dhu ´l-Nún the Egyptian said: “I saw a man flying through the air, and asked him how he had attained to this degree. He answered: ‘I set my feet on passion (hawá) in order that I might ascend into the air (hawá).’” It is related that Muḥammad b. Faḍl al-Balkhí said: “I marvel at one who goes with his passion into God’s House and visits Him: why does not he trample on his passion that he may attain to Him?”

The most manifest attribute of the lower soul is lust (shahwat). 209Lust is a thing that is dispersed in different parts of the human body, and is served by the senses. Man is bound to guard all his members from it, and he shall be questioned concerning the acts of each. The lust of the eye is sight, that of the ear is hearing, that of the nose is smell, that of the tongue is speech, that of the palate is taste, that of the body (jasad) is touch, and that of the mind is thought (andíshídan). It behoves the seeker of God to spend his whole life, day and night, in ridding himself of these incitements to passion which show themselves through the senses, and to pray God to make him such that this desire will be removed from his inward nature, since whoever is afflicted with lust is veiled from all spiritual things. If anyone should repel it by his own exertions, his task would be long and painful. The right way is resignation (taslím). It is related that Abú `Alí Siyáh of Merv said: “I had gone to the bath and in accordance with the custom of the Prophet I was using a razor (pubis tondendæ causâ). I said to myself: ‘O Abú `Alí, amputate this member which is the source of all lusts and keeps thee afflicted with so much evil.’ A voice in my heart whispered: ‘O Abú `Alí, wilt thou interfere in My kingdom? Are not all thy limbs equally at My disposal? If thou do this, I swear by My glory that I will put a hundredfold lust and passion in every hair in that place.’”

Although a man has no power over what is vicious in his constitution, he can get an attribute changed by Divine aid and by resigning himself to God’s will and by divesting himself of his own power and strength. In reality, when he resigns himself, God protects him; and through God’s protection he comes nearer to annihilating the evil than he does through self-mortification, since flies are more easily driven away with an umbrella (mikanna) than with a fly-whisk (midhabba). Unless Divine protection is predestined to a man, he cannot abstain from anything by his own exertion, and unless God exerts Himself towards a man, that man’s exertion is of no use. All acts of exertion fall under two heads: their object is either to avert the predestination of God or to acquire something in spite 210of predestination; and both these objects are impossible. It is related that when Shiblí was ill, the physician advised him to be abstinent. “From what shall I abstain?” said he, “from that which God bestows upon me, or from that which He does not bestow? It is impossible to abstain from the former, and the latter is not in my hands.” I will discuss this question carefully on another occasion.

7. The Ḥakímís.

They are the followers of Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. `Alí al-Ḥakím al-Tirmidhí, who was one of the religious leaders of his time and the author of many works on every branch of exoteric and esoteric science. His doctrine was based on saintship (wiláyat), and he used to explain the true nature of saintship and the degrees of the saints and the observance of the proper arrangement of their ranks.

As the first step towards understanding his doctrine, you must know that God has saints (awliyá), whom He has chosen out of mankind, and whose thoughts He has withdrawn from worldly ties and delivered from sensual temptations; and He has stationed each of them in a particular degree, and has opened unto them the door of these mysteries. Much might be said on this topic, but I must briefly set forth several points of capital importance.

Discourse on the Affirmation of Saintship (wiláyat).

You must know that the principle and foundation of Ṣúfiism and knowledge of God rests on saintship, the reality of which is unanimously affirmed by all the Shaykhs, though every one has expressed himself in different language. The peculiarity of Muḥammad b. `Alí (al-Ḥakím) lies in the fact that he applied this term to the theory of Ṣúfiism.

Waláyat means, etymologically, “power to dispose” (taṣarruf), and wiláyat means “possession of command” (imárat). Waláyat also means “lordship” (rubúbiyyat); hence God hath said: “In this case the lordship (al-waláyat) belongs to God who is the 211Truth” (Kor. xviii, 42), because the unbelievers seek His protection and turn unto Him and renounce their idols. And wiláyat also means “love” (maḥabbat). Walí may be the form fa`íl with the meaning of maf`úl, as God hath said: “And He takes charge of (yatawallá) the righteous” (Kor. vii, 195), for God does not leave His servant to his own actions and attributes, but keeps him under His protection. And walí may be the form fa`íl, equivalent to fá`il, with an intensive force, because a man takes care (tawallí kunad) to obey God and constantly to fulfil the obligations that he owes to Him. Thus walí in the active meaning is “one who desires” (muríd), while in the passive meaning it denotes “one who is the object of God’s desire” (murád). All these meanings, whether they signify the relation of God to Man or that of Man to God, are allowable, for God may be the protector of His friends, inasmuch as He promised His protection to the Companions of the Apostle, and declared that the unbelievers had no protector (mawlá).^[117] And, moreover, He may distinguish them in an exclusive way by His friendship, as He hath said, “He loves them and they love Him” (Kor. v, 59), so that they turn away from the favour of mankind: He is their friend (walí) and they are His friends (awliyá). And He may confer on one a “friendship” (wiláyat) that enables him to persevere in obedience to Him, and keeps him free from sin, and on another a “friendship” that empowers him to loose and bind, and makes his prayers answered and his aspirations effectual, as the Apostle said: “There is many a one with dirty hair, dust-stained, clad in two old garments, whom men never heed; but if he were to swear by God, God would verify his oath.” It is well known that in the Caliphate of `Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb, the Nile, in accordance with its usual habit, ceased to flow; for in the time of Paganism they used annually to adorn a maiden and throw her into the river to make it flow again. `Umar therefore wrote on a piece of paper: “O river, if thou hast stopped of thy own will, thou 212doest wrong, and if by command of God, `Umar bids thee flow.“ When this paper was thrown in, the Nile resumed its course.

My purpose in discussing saintship and affirming its reality is to show you that the name of saint (walí) is properly applied to those in whom the above-mentioned qualities are actually present (ḥál) and not merely reputed (qál). Certain Shaykhs formerly composed books on this subject, but they became rare and soon disappeared. Now I will commend to you the explanation given by that venerable spiritual director who is the author of the doctrine—for my own belief in it is greater—in order that much instruction may be gained, not only by yourself, but also by every seeker of Ṣúfiism who may have the good fortune to read this book.

Section.

You must know that the word walí is current among the vulgar, and is to be found in the Koran and the Apostolic Traditions: e.g., God hath said, ”Verily, on the friends (awliyá) of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve“ (Kor. x, 63); and again, ”God is the friend (walí) of those who believe” (Kor. ii, 258). And the Apostle said: “Among the servants of God there are some whom the prophets and martyrs deem happy.” He was asked: “Who are they? Describe them to us that perchance we may love them.” He replied: “Those who love one another, through God’s mercy, without wealth and without seeking a livelihood: their faces are luminous, and they sit on thrones of light; they are not afraid when men are afraid, nor do they grieve when men grieve.” Then he recited: “Verily, on the friends of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve” (Kor. x, 63). Furthermore, the Apostle said that God said: “He who hurts a saint (walí) has allowed himself to make war on Me.”

These passages show that God has saints (awliyá) whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured 213with diverse kinds of miracles (karámát) and has purged of natural corruptions and has delivered from subjection to their lower soul and passion, so that all their thoughts are of Him and their intimacy is with Him alone. Such have been in past ages, and are now, and shall be hereafter until the Day of Resurrection, because God has exalted this (Moslem) community above all others and has promised to preserve the religion of Muḥammad. Inasmuch as the traditional and intellectual proofs of this religion are to be found among the divines (`ulamá), it follows that the visible proof is to be found among the Saints and elect of God. Here we have two parties opposed to us, namely, the Mu`tazilites and the rank and file of the Anthropomorphists (Ḥashwiyya). The Mu`tazilites deny that one Moslem is specially privileged more than another; but if a saint is not specially privileged, neither is a prophet specially privileged; and this is infidelity. The vulgar Anthropomorphists allow that special privileges may be conferred, but assert that such privileged persons no longer exist, although they did exist in the past. It is all the same, however, whether they deny the past or the future, since one side of denial is no better than another.

God, then, has caused the prophetic evidence (burhán-i nabawí) to remain down to the present day, and has made the Saints the means whereby it is manifested, in order that the signs of the Truth and the proof of Muḥammad’s veracity may continue to be clearly seen. He has made the Saints the governors of the universe; they have become entirely devoted to His business, and have ceased to follow their sensual affections. Through the blessing of their advent the rain falls from heaven, and through the purity of their lives the plants spring up from the earth, and through their spiritual influence the Moslems gain victories over the unbelievers. Among them there are four thousand who are concealed and do not know one another and are not aware of the excellence of their state, but in all circumstances are hidden from themselves and from mankind. Traditions have come down to this effect, and the 214sayings of the Saints proclaim the truth thereof, and I myself—God be praised!—have had ocular experience (khabar-i `iyán) of this matter. But of those who have power to loose and to bind and are the officers of the Divine court there are three hundred, called Akhyár, and forty, called Abdál, and seven, called Abrár, and four, called Awtád, and three, called Nuqabá, and one, called Quṭb or Ghawth. All these know one another and cannot act save by mutual consent.

Here the vulgar may object to my assertion that they know one another to be saints, on the ground that, if such is the case, they must be secure as to their fate in the next world. I reply that it is absurd to suppose that knowledge of saintship involves security. A believer may have knowledge of his faith and yet not be secure: why should not the same hold good of a saint who has knowledge of his saintship? Nevertheless, it is possible that God should miraculously cause the saint to know his security in regard to the future life, while maintaining him in a state of spiritual soundness and preserving him from disobedience. The Shaykhs differ on this question for the reason which I have explained. Those belonging to the four thousand who are concealed do not admit that the saint can know himself to be such, whereas those of the other class take the contrary view. Each opinion is supported by many lawyers and scholastics. Abú Isḥáq Isfará´iní^[118] and some of the ancients hold that a saint is ignorant of his saintship, while Abú Bakr b. Fúrak^[119] and others of the past generation hold that he is conscious of it. I ask the former party, what loss or evil does a saint suffer by knowing himself? If they allege that he is conceited when he knows himself to be a saint, I answer that Divine protection is a necessary condition of saintship, and one who is protected from evil cannot fall into self-conceit. It is a very common notion (sukhan-i sakht `ámiyána) that a saint, to whom extraordinary miracles (karámát) are continually vouchsafed, does not know himself to be a saint or these 215miracles to be miracles. Both parties have adherents among the common people, but opinion is of no account.

The Mu`tazilites, however, deny special privileges and miracles, which constitute the essence of saintship. They affirm that all Moslems are friends (awliyá) of God when they are obedient to Him, and that anyone who fulfils the ordinances of the Faith and denies the attributes and vision of God and allows believers to be eternally damned in Hell and acknowledges only such obligations as are imposed by Reason, without regard to Revelation, is a “friend” (walí). All Moslems agree that such a person is a “friend”, but a friend of the Devil. The Mu`tazilites also maintain that, if saintship involved miracles, all believers must have miracles vouchsafed to them, because they all share in faith (ímán), and if they share in what is fundamental they must likewise share in what is derivative. They say, further, that miracles may be vouchsafed both to believers and to infidels, e.g. when anyone is hungry or fatigued on a journey some person may appear in order to give him food or mount him on an animal for riding. If it were possible, they add, for anyone to traverse a great distance in one night, the Apostle must have been that man; yet, when he set out for Mecca, God said, “And they (the animals) carry your burdens to a land which ye would not have reached save with sore trouble to yourselves” (Kor. xvi, 7). I reply: “Your arguments are worthless, for God said, ‘Glory to Him who transported His servant by night from the sacred mosque to the farther mosque’” (Kor. xvii, 1). Miracles are special, not general; but it would have been a general instance if all the Companions had been miraculously conveyed to Mecca, and this would have destroyed all the principles of faith in the unseen. Faith is a general term, applicable to the righteous and the wicked alike, whereas saintship is special. The journey of the Companions to Mecca falls under the former category, but inasmuch as the case of the Apostle was a special one, God conveyed him in one night from Mecca to Jerusalem, and thence to a space of two bow-lengths from the Divine 216presence; and he returned ere the night was far spent. Again, to deny special privileges is manifestly unreasonable. As in a palace there are chamberlains, janitors, grooms, and viziers, who, although they are equally the king’s servants, are not equal in rank, so all believers are equal in respect of their faith, but some are obedient, some wise, some pious, and some ignorant.

Section.

The Shaykhs, every one, have given hints as to the true meaning of saintship. Now I will bring together as many of these selected definitions as possible.

Abú `Alí Júzajání says: “The saint is annihilated in his own state and subsistent in the contemplation of the Truth: he cannot tell anything concerning himself, nor can he rest with anyone except God,” because a man has knowledge only of his own state, and when all his states are annihilated he cannot tell anything about himself; and he cannot rest with anyone else, to whom he might tell his state, because to communicate one’s hidden state to another is to reveal the secret of the Beloved, which cannot be revealed except to the Beloved himself. Moreover, in contemplation it is impossible to regard aught except God: how, then, can he be at rest with mankind? Junayd said: “The saint hath no fear, because fear is the expectation either of some future calamity or of the eventual loss of some object of desire, whereas the saint is the son of his time (ibn waqtihi): he has no future that he should fear anything; and as he hath no fear so he hath no hope, since hope is the expectation either of gaining an object of desire or of being relieved from a misfortune, and this belongs to the future; nor does he grieve, because grief arises from the rigour of time, and how should he feel grief who is in the radiance of satisfaction (riḍá) and the garden of concord (muwáfaqat)?” The vulgar imagine this saying to imply that, inasmuch as the saint feels neither fear nor hope nor grief, he has security (amn) in their place; but he has not security, for 217security arises from not seeing that which is hidden, and from turning one’s back on “time”; and this (absence of security) is characteristic of those who pay no regard to their humanity (bashariyyat) and are not content with attributes. Fear and hope and security and grief all refer to the interests of the lower soul, and when that is annihilated satisfaction (riḍá) becomes an attribute of Man, and when satisfaction has been attained his states become steadfast (mustaqím) in vision of the Author of states (muḥawwil), and his back is turned on all states. Then saintship is revealed to his heart and its meaning is made clear to his inmost thoughts. Abú `Uthmán Maghribí says: “The saint is sometimes celebrated (mashhúr), but he is not seduced (maftún),” and another says: “The saint is sometimes hidden (mastúr), but he is not celebrated.” Seduction consists in falsehood: inasmuch as the saint must be veracious, and miracles cannot possibly be performed by a liar, it follows that the saint is incapable of being seduced. These two sayings refer to the controversy whether the saint knows himself to be such: if he knows, he is celebrated, and if he does not know, he is seduced; but the explanation of this is tedious. It is related that Ibráhím b. Adham asked a certain man whether he desired to be one of God’s saints, and on his replying “Yes”, said: “Do not covet anything in this world or the next, and devote thyself entirely to God, and turn to God with all thy heart.” To covet this world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is transitory, and to covet the next world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is everlasting: that which is transitory perishes and its renunciation becomes naught, but that which is everlasting cannot perish, hence its renunciation also is imperishable. Abú Yazíd was asked: “Who is a saint?” He answered: “That one who is patient under the command and prohibition of God,” because the more a man loves God the more does his heart revere what He commands and the farther is his body from what He forbids. It is related that Abú Yazíd said: “Once I was told that a saint of God was 218in such and such a town. I set out to visit him. When I arrived at his mosque he came forth from his chamber and spat on the floor of the mosque. I turned back without saluting him, and said to myself: ‘A saint must keep the religious law in order that God may keep him in his spiritual state. Had this man been a saint his respect for the mosque would have prevented him from spitting on its floor, or God would have preserved him from marring the grace vouchsafed to him.’ The same night I dreamed that the Apostle said to me, ‘O Abú Yazíd, the blessing of that which thou hast done is come to thee.’ Next day I attained to this degree which ye behold.” And I have heard that a man who came to visit Shaykh Abú Sa`íd entered the mosque with his left foot foremost. The Shaykh gave orders that he should be dismissed, saying: “He who does not know how to enter the house of the Friend is not suitable for us.” Some heretics who have adopted this perilous doctrine assert that service of God (khidmat) is necessary only while one is becoming a saint, but that after one has become a saint service is abolished. This is clearly wrong. There is no “station” on the way to the Truth where any obligation of service is abolished. I will explain this matter fully in its proper place.

Discourse on the Affirmation of Miracles (karámát).

You must know that miracles may be vouchsafed to a saint so long as he does not infringe the obligations of the religious law. Both parties of the orthodox Moslems agree on this point, nor is it intellectually impossible, because such miracles are a species of that which is predestined by God, and their manifestation does not contradict any principle of the religious law, nor, on the other hand, is it repugnant to the mind to conceive them as a genus. A miracle is a token of a saint’s veracity, and it cannot be manifested to an impostor except as a sign that his pretensions are false. It is an extraordinary act (fi`lí náqiḍ-i `ádat), performed while he is still subject to the obligations of religion; and whoever is able, through knowledge 219given him by God, to distinguish by the method of deduction what is true from what is false, he too is a saint. Some Sunnís maintain that miracles are established, but not to the degree of an evidentiary miracle (mu`jizat<sup>[120]</sup>): they do not admit, for example, that prayers may be answered and fulfilled, and so forth, contrary to custom. I ask in reply: “What do you consider wrong in the performance by a true saint, while he is subject to religious obligations, of an act which violates custom?” If they say that it is not a species of that which is predestined by God, this statement is erroneous; and if they say that it is a species of that which is predestined, but that its performance by a true saint involves the annulment of prophecy and the denial of special privileges to the prophets, this assertion also is inadmissible, since the saint is specially distinguished by miracles (karámát) and the prophet by evidentiary miracles (mu`jizát); and inasmuch as the saint is a saint and the prophet is a prophet, there is no likeness between them to justify such precaution. The pre-eminence of the prophets depends on their exalted rank and on their being preserved from the defilement of sin, not on miracles or evidentiary miracles or acts which violate custom. All the prophets are equal so far as they all have the power of working such miracles (i`jáz), but some are superior to others in degree. Since, then, notwithstanding this equality in regard to their actions, some prophets are superior to others, why should not miracles (karámát) which violate custom be vouchsafed also to the saints, although the prophets are superior to them? And since, in the case of the prophets, an act which violates custom does not cause one of them to be more exalted or more specially privileged than another, so, in the case of the saints, a similar act does not cause a saint to be more specially privileged than a prophet, i.e. the saints do not become like in kind (hamsán) to the prophets. This proof will clear away, for reasonable men, any difficulties that this matter may have 220presented to them. “But suppose,” it may be said, “that a saint whose miracles violate custom should claim to be a prophet.” I reply that this is impossible, because saintship involves veracity, and he who tells a falsehood is no saint. Moreover, a saint who pretends to prophesy casts an imputation on (the genuineness of) evidentiary miracles, which is infidelity. Miracles (karámát) are vouchsafed only to a pious believer, and falsehood is impiety. That being so, the miracles of the saint confirm the evidence of the prophet. There is no difficulty in reconciling the two classes of miracles. The apostle establishes his prophecy by establishing the reality of evidentiary miracles, while the saint, by the miracles which he performs, establishes both the prophecy of the apostle and his own saintship. Therefore the veracious saint says the same thing as the veracious prophet. The miracles of the former are identical with the evidentiary miracles of the latter. A believer, seeing the miracles of a saint, has more faith in the veracity of the prophet, not more doubt, because there is no contradiction between the claims made by them. Similarly, in law, when a number of heirs are agreed in their claim, if one of them establishes his claim the claim of the others is established; but not so if their claims are contradictory. Hence, when a prophet adduces evidentiary miracles as evidence that his prophecy is genuine, and when his claim is confirmed by a saint, it is impossible that any difficulty should arise.