Chapter XIV · Concerning the Doctrines held by the different sects of Ṣúfís. (continued 2)

Discourse on the difference between Evidentiary Miracles (mu`jizát) and Miracles (karámát).

Inasmuch as it has been shown that neither class of miracles can be wrought by an impostor, we must now distinguish more clearly between them. Mu`jizát involve publicity and karámát secrecy, because the result of the former is to affect others, while the latter are peculiar to the person by whom they are performed. Again, the doer of mu`jizát is quite sure that he has wrought an extraordinary miracle, whereas the doer of karámát cannot be sure whether he has really wrought a miracle or 221whether he is insensibly deceived (istidráj). He who performs mu`jizát has authority over the law, and in arranging it he denies or affirms, according as God commands him, that he is insensibly deceived.<sup>[121]</sup> On the other hand, he who performs karámát has no choice but to resign himself (to God’s will) and to accept the ordinances that are laid upon him, because the karámát of a saint are never in any way incompatible with the law laid down by a prophet. It may be said: “If evidentiary miracles are the proof of a prophet’s veracity, and if nevertheless you assert that miracles of the same kind may be performed by one who is not a prophet, then they become ordinary events (mu`tád): therefore your proof of the reality of mu`jizát annuls your argument establishing the reality of karámát.” I reply: “This is not the case. The karámat of a saint is identical with, and displays the same evidence as, the mu`jizat of a prophet: the quality of i`jáz (inimitability) exhibited in the one instance does not impair the same quality in the other instance.” When the infidels put Khubayb on the gallows at Mecca, the Apostle, who was then seated in the mosque at Medína, saw him and told the Companions what was being done to him. God also lifted the veil from the eyes of Khubayb, so that he saw the Apostle and cried, “Peace be with thee!” and God caused the Apostle to hear his salutation, and caused Khubayb to hear the Apostle’s answer. Now, the fact that the Apostle at Medína saw Khubayb at Mecca was an evidentiary miracle, and the fact that Khubayb at Mecca saw the Apostle at Medína was likewise an extraordinary act. Accordingly there is no difference between absence in time and absence in space; for Khubayb’s miracle (karámat) was wrought when he was absent from the Apostle in space, and the miracles of later days were wrought by those who were absent from the Apostle in time. This is a clear distinction and a manifest proof that karámát cannot possibly be in contradiction with i`jáz (miracles performed by a prophet). Karámát are not established unless they bear testimony to the truth of one who has performed a mu`jizat, 222and they are not vouchsafed except to a pious believer who bears such testimony. Karámát of Moslems are an extraordinary miracle (mu`jizat) of the Apostle, for as his law is permanent so must his proof (ḥujjat) also be permanent. The saints are witnesses to the truth of the Apostle’s mission, and it is impossible that a miracle (karámat) should be wrought by an unbeliever (bégána).

On this topic a story is related of Ibráhím Khawwáṣ, which is very apposite here. Ibráhím said: “I went down into the desert in my usual state of detachment from worldly things (tajríd). After I had gone some distance a man appeared and begged me to let him be my companion. I looked at him and was conscious of a feeling of repugnance. He said to me: ‘O Ibráhím, do not be vexed. I am a Christian, and one of the Ṣábians among them. I have come from the confines of Rúm in the hope of being thy companion.’ When I knew that he was an unbeliever, I regained my equanimity, and felt it more easy to take him as my companion and to fulfil my obligations towards him. I said: ‘O monk, I fear that thou wilt suffer from want of meat and drink, for I have nothing with me.’ ‘O Ibráhím,’ said he, ‘is thy fame in the world so great, and art thou still concerned about meat and drink?’ I marvelled at his boldness and accepted him as my companion in order to test his claim. After journeying seven days and nights we were overtaken by thirst. He stopped and cried: ‘O Ibráhím, they trumpet thy praise throughout the world. Now let me see what privileges of intimacy (gustákhíhá) thou hast in this court (i.e. to what extent thou art a favourite with God), for I can endure no more.’ I laid my head on the earth and cried: ‘O Lord, do not shame me before this unbeliever, who thinks well of me!’ When I raised my head I saw a dish on which were placed two loaves of bread and two cups of water. We ate and drank and went on our way. After seven days had passed I resolved to test him ere he should again put me to the proof. ‘O monk,’ I said, ‘now it is thy turn. Let me see the fruits of thy mortification.’ He laid his head 223on the earth and muttered something. Immediately a dish appeared containing four loaves and four cups of water. I was amazed and grieved, and I despaired of my state. ‘This has appeared,’ I said, ‘for the sake of an unbeliever: how can I eat or drink thereof?’ He bade me taste, but I refused, saying, ‘Thou art not worthy of this, and it is not in harmony with thy spiritual condition. If I regard it as a miracle (karámat), miracles are not vouchsafed to unbelievers; and if I regard it as a contribution (ma`únat) from thee, I must suspect thee of being an impostor.’ He said: ‘Taste, O Ibráhím! I give thee joy of two things: firstly, of my conversion to Islam (here he uttered the profession of faith), and secondly, of the great honour in which thou art held by God.’ ‘How so?’ I asked. He answered: ‘I have no miraculous powers, but my shame on account of thee made me lay my head on the earth and beg God to give me two loaves and two cups of water if the religion of Muḥammad is true, and two more loaves and cups if Ibráhím Khawwáṣ is one of God’s saints.’” Then Ibráhím ate and drank, and the man who had been a monk rose to eminence in Islam.

Now, this violation of custom, although attached to the karámat of a saint, is identical with the evidentiary miracles which are wrought by prophets, but it is rare that in a prophet’s absence an evidence should be vouchsafed to another person, or that in the presence of a saint some portion of his miraculous powers should be transferred to another person. In fact, the end of saintship is only the beginning of prophecy. That monk was one of the hidden (saints), like Pharaoh’s magicians. Ibráhím confirmed the Prophet’s power to violate custom, and his companion also was endeavouring both to confirm prophecy and to glorify saintship; a purpose which God in His eternal providence fulfilled. This is a clear difference between karámat and i`jáz. The manifestation of miracles to the saints is a second miracle, for they ought to be kept secret, not intentionally divulged. My Shaykh used to say that if a saint reveals his saintship and claims to be a saint, the soundness of his spiritual state is not 224impaired thereby, but if he takes pains to obtain publicity he is led astray by self-conceit.

Discourse on the performance of miracles belonging to the evidentiary class by those who pretend to godship.

The Shaykhs of this sect and all orthodox Moslems are agreed that an extraordinary act resembling a prophetic miracle (mu`jizat) may be performed by an unbeliever, in order that by means of his performance he may be shown beyond doubt to be an impostor. Thus, for example, Pharaoh lived four hundred years without once falling ill; and when he climbed up to any high ground the water followed him, and stopped when he stopped, and moved when he moved. Nevertheless, intelligent men did not hesitate to deny his pretensions to godship, inasmuch as every intelligent person acknowledges that God is not incarnate (mujassam) and composite (murakkab). You will judge by analogy the wondrous acts related of Shaddád, who was the lord of Iram, and Nimrod. Similarly, we are told on trustworthy authority that in the last days Dajjál will come and will claim godship, and that two mountains will go with him, one on his right hand and the other on his left; and that the mountain on his right hand will be the place of felicity, and the mountain on his left hand will be the place of torment; and that he will call the people to himself and will punish those who refuse to join him. But though he should perform a hundredfold amount of such extraordinary acts, no intelligent person would doubt the falsity of his claim, for it is well known that God does not sit on an ass and is not blind. Such things fall under the principle of Divine deception (istidráj). So, again, one who falsely pretends to be an apostle may perform an extraordinary act, which proves him an impostor, just as a similar act performed by a true apostle proves him genuine. But no such act can be performed if there be any possibility of doubt or any difficulty in distinguishing the true claimant from the impostor, for in that case the principle of allegiance (bay`at) would be nullified. It is possible, moreover, that something of the same 225kind as a miracle (karámat) may be performed by a pretender to saintship who, although his conduct is bad, is blameless in his religion, inasmuch as by that miraculous act he confirms the truth of the Apostle and manifests the grace of God vouchsafed to him and does not attribute the act in question to his own power. One who speaks the truth, without evidence, in the fundamental matter of faith (ímán), will always speak the truth, with evidence and firm belief, in the matter of saintship, because his belief is of the same quality as the belief of the saint; and though his actions do not square with his belief, his claim of saintship is not demonstrably contradicted by his evil conduct, any more than his claim of faith could be. In fact, miracles (karámát) and saintship are Divine gifts, not things acquired by Man, so that human actions (kasb) cannot become the cause of Divine guidance.

I have already said that the saints are not preserved from sin (ma`ṣúm), for sinlessness belongs to the prophets, but they are protected (maḥfúẕ) from any evil that involves the denial of their saintship; and the denial of saintship, after it has come into being, depends on something inconsistent with faith, namely, apostasy (riddat): it does not depend on sin. This is the doctrine of Muḥammad b. `Alí Ḥakím of Tirmidh, and also of Junayd, Abu ´l-Ḥasan Núrí, Ḥárith Muḥásibí, and many other mystics (ahl-i ḥaqá´iq). But those who attach importance to conduct (ahl-i mu`ámalát), like Sahl b. `Abdalláh of Tustar, Abú Sulaymán Dárání, Ḥamdún Qaṣṣár, and others, maintain that saintship involves unceasing obedience (ṭá`at), and that when a great sin (kabíra) occurs to the mind of a saint he is deposed from his saintship. Now, as I have stated before, there is a consensus of opinion (ijmá`) among Moslems that a great sin does not put anyone outside the pale of faith; and one saintship (wiláyat) is no better than another. Therefore, since the saintship of knowledge of God (ma`rifat), which is the foundation of all miracles vouchsafed by Divine grace (karámathá), is not lost through sin, it is impossible that what is inferior to that in 226excellence and grace (karámat) should disappear because of sin. The controversy among the Shaykhs on this matter has run to great length, and I do not intend to record it here.

It is most important, however, that you should know with certainty in what state this miraculous grace is manifested to the saint: in sobriety or intoxication, in rapture (ghalabat) or composure (tamkín). I have fully explained the meaning of intoxication and sobriety in my account of the doctrine of Abú Yazíd. He and Dhu ´l-Nún the Egyptian and Muḥammad b. Khafíf and Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) and Yaḥyá b. Mu`ádh Rází and others hold that miracles are not vouchsafed to a saint except when he is in the state of intoxication, whereas the miracles of the prophets are wrought in the state of sobriety. Hence, according to their doctrine, this is a clear distinction between mu`jizát and karámát, for the saint, being enraptured, pays no heed to the people and does not call upon them to follow him, while the prophet, being sober, exerts himself to attain his object and challenges the people to rival what he has done. Moreover, the prophet may choose whether he will manifest or conceal his extraordinary powers, but the saints have no such choice; sometimes a miracle is not granted to them when they desire it, and sometimes it is bestowed when they do not desire it, for the saint has no propaganda, so that his attributes should be subsistent, but he is hidden and his proper state is to have his attributes annihilated. The prophet is a man of law (ṣáḥib shar`), and the saint is a man of inward feeling (ṣáḥib sirr). Accordingly, a miracle (karámat) will not be manifested to a saint unless he is in a state of absence from himself and bewilderment, and unless his faculties are entirely under the control of God. While saints are with themselves and maintain the state of humanity (bashariyyat), they are veiled; but when the veil is lifted they are bewildered and amazed through realizing the bounties of God. A miracle cannot be manifested except in the state of unveiledness (kashf), which is the rank of proximity (qurb); and whoever is in that state, to him 227worthless stones appear even as gold. This is the state of intoxication with which no human being, the prophets alone excepted, is permanently endowed. Thus, one day, Ḥáritha was transported from this world and had the next world revealed to him; he said: “I have cut myself loose from this world, so that its stones and its gold and its silver and its clay are all one to me.” Next day he was seen tending asses, and on being asked what he was doing, he said: “I am trying to get the food that I need.” Therefore, the saints, while they are sober, are as ordinary men, but while they are intoxicated their rank is the same as that of the prophets, and the whole universe becomes like gold unto them. Shiblí says—

“Gold wherever we go, and pearls

Wherever we turn, and silver in the waste.”

I have heard the Master and Imám Abu ´l-Qásim Qushayrí say: “Once I asked Ṭábarání about the beginning of his spiritual experience. He told me that on one occasion he wanted a stone from the river-bed at Sarakhs. Every stone that he touched turned into a gem, and he threw them all away.” This was because stones and gems were the same to him, or rather, gems were of less value, since he had no desire for them. And I have heard Khwája Imám Khazá´iní at Sarakhs relate as follows: “In my boyhood I went to a certain place to get mulberry leaves for silkworms. When it was midday I climbed a tree and began to shake the branches. While I was thus employed Shaykh Abu ´l-Faḍl b. al-Ḥasan passed by, but he did not see me, and I had no doubt that he was beside himself and that his heart was with God. Suddenly he raised his head and cried with the boldness of intimacy: ‘O Lord, it is more than a year since Thou hast given me a small piece of silver (dángí) that I might have my hair cut. Is this the way to treat Thy friends?’ No sooner had he spoken than I saw all the leaves and boughs and roots of the trees turned to gold. Abu ´l-Faḍl exclaimed: ‘How strange! The least hint that I utter is a backsliding 228(hama ta`ríḍ-i má í`ráḍ ast). One cannot say a word to Thee for the sake of relieving one’s mind.’” It is related that Shiblí cast four hundred dínárs into the Tigris. When asked what he was doing, he replied: “Stones are better in the water.” “But why,” they said, “don’t you give the money to the poor?” He answered: “Glory to God! what plea can I urge before Him if I remove the veil from my own heart only to place it on the hearts of my brother Moslems? It is not religious to wish them worse than myself.” All these cases belong to the state of intoxication, which I have already explained.

On the other hand, Junayd and Abu ´l-`Abbás Sayyárí and Abú Bakr Wásiṭí and Muḥammad b. `Alí of Tirmidh, the author of the doctrine, hold that miracles are manifested in the state of sobriety and composure (ṣaḥw ú tamkín), not in the state of intoxication. They argue that the saints of God are the governors of His kingdom and the overseers of the universe, which God has committed absolutely to their charge: therefore their judgments must be the soundest of all, and their hearts must be the most tenderly disposed of all towards the creatures of God. They are mature (rasídagán); and whereas agitation and intoxication are marks of inexperience, with maturity agitation is transmuted into composure. Then, and only then, is one a saint in reality, and only then are miracles genuine. It is well known among Ṣúfís that every night the Awtád must go round the whole universe, and if there should be any place on which their eyes have not fallen, next day some imperfection will appear in that place; and they must then inform the Quṭb, in order that he may fix his attention on the weak spot, and that by his blessing the imperfection may be removed. As regards the assertion that gold and earth are one to the saint, this indifference is a sign of intoxication and failure to see truly. More excellent is the man of true sight and sound perception, to whom gold is gold and earth is earth, but who recognizes the evil of the former and says: “O yellow ore! O white ore! beguile some one 229else, for I am aware of your corruptedness.” He who sees the corruptedness of gold and silver perceives them to be a veil (between himself and God), and God will reward him for having renounced them. Contrariwise, he to whom gold is even as earth is not made perfect by renouncing earth. Ḥáritha, being intoxicated, declared that stones and gold were alike to him, but Abú Bakr, being sober, perceived the evil of laying hands on worldly wealth, and knew that God would reward him for rejecting it. Therefore he renounced it, and when the Apostle asked him what he had left for his family he answered, “God and His Apostle.” And the following story is related by Abú Bakr Warráq of Tirmidh: “One day Muḥammad b. `Alí (al-Ḥakím) said that he would take me somewhere. I replied: ‘It is for the Shaykh to command.’ Soon after we set out I saw an exceedingly dreadful wilderness, and in the midst thereof a golden throne placed under a green tree beside a fountain of running water. Seated on the throne was a person clad in beautiful raiment, who rose when Muḥammad b. `Alí approached, and bade him sit on the throne. After a while, people came from every side until forty were gathered together. Then Muḥammad b. `Alí waved his hand, and immediately food appeared from heaven, and we ate. Afterwards Muḥammad b. `Alí`Alí asked a question of a man who was present, and he in reply made a long discourse of which I did not understand a single word. At last the Shaykh begged leave and took his departure, saying to me: ‘Go, for thou art blest.’ On our return to Tirmidh, I asked him what was that place and who was that man. He told me that the place was the Desert of the Israelites (tíh-i Baní Isrá´íl) and that the man was the Quṭb on whom the order of the universe depends. ‘O Shaykh,’ I said, ‘how did we reach the Desert of the Israelites from Tirmidh in such a brief time?’ He answered: ‘O Abú Bakr, it is thy business to arrive (rasídan), not to ask questions (pursídan).’“ This is a mark, not of intoxication, but of sanity.

Now I will mention some miracles and stories of the Ṣúfís, 230and link thereto certain evidence which is to be found in the Book (the Koran).

Discourse concerning their Miracles.

The reality of miracles having been established by logical argument, you must now become acquainted with the evidence of the Koran and the genuine Traditions of the Apostle. Both Koran and Tradition proclaim the reality of miracles and extraordinary acts wrought by saints. To deny this is to deny the authority of the sacred texts. One example is the text, ”And We caused the clouds to overshadow you and the manna and the quails to descend upon you” (Kor. ii, 54). If any sceptic should assert that this was an evidentiary miracle (mu`jizat) of Moses, I raise no objection, because all the miracles of the saints are an evidentiary miracle of Muḥammad; and if he says that this miracle was wrought in the absence of Moses, although it occurred in his time, and that therefore it was not necessarily wrought by him, I reply that the same principle holds good in the case of Moses, when he quitted his people and went to Mount Sinai, as in the case of Muḥammad; for there is no difference between being absent in time and being absent in space. We are also told of the miracle of Áṣaf b. Barkhiyá, who brought the throne of Bilqís to Solomon in the twinkling of an eye (Kor. xxvii, 40). This cannot have been a mu`jizat, for Áṣaf was not an apostle; had it been a mu`jizat, it must have been wrought by Solomon: therefore it was a karámat. We are told also of Mary that whenever Zacharias went into her chamber he found winter fruits in summer and summer fruits in winter, so that he said: “‘Whence hadst thou this?’ She answered, ‘It is from God’” (Kor. iii, 32). Everyone admits that Mary was not an apostle. Furthermore, we have the story of the men of the cave (aṣḥáb al-kahf), how their dog spoke to them, and how they slept and turned about in the cave (Kor. xviii, 17). All these were extraordinary acts, and since they certainly were not a mu`jizat, they must have been a karámat. Such miracles (karámat) may be, for example, the 231answering of prayers through the accomplishment of wishes conceived by one who is subject to the religious law (ba-ḥuṣúl-i umúr-i mawhúm andar zamán-i taklíf), or the traversing of great distances in a short time, or the appearance of food from an unaccustomed place, or power to read the thoughts of others, etc.

Among the genuine Traditions is the story of the cave (ḥadíth al-ghár), which is told as follows. One day the Companions of the Apostle begged him to relate to them some marvellous tale of the ancient peoples. He said: “Once three persons were going to a certain place. At eventide they took shelter in a cave, and while they were asleep a rock fell from the mountain and blocked the mouth of the cave. They said to one another, ‘We shall never escape from here unless we make our disinterested actions plead for us before God.’ So one of them began: ‘I had a father and mother and I had no worldly goods except a goat, whose milk I used to give to them; and every day I used to gather a bundle of firewood and sell it and spend the money in providing food for them and myself. One night I came home rather late, and before I milked the goat and steeped their food in the milk they had fallen asleep. I kept the bowl in my hand and stood there, without having eaten anything, until morning, when they awoke and ate; then I sat down.’ ‘O Lord’ (he continued), ‘if I speak the truth concerning this matter, send us deliverance and come to our aid!’” The Apostle said: “Thereupon the rock moved a little and a crevice appeared. The next man said: ‘There was a beautiful blind girl, with whom I was deeply in love, but she would not listen to my suit. I managed to send to her a hundred and twenty dínárs with a promise that she should keep the money if she would be mine for one night. When she came the fear of God seized my heart. I turned from her and let her keep the money.’ He added, ‘O God, if I speak the truth, deliver us!’” The Apostle said: “Then the rock moved a little further and the crevice widened, but they could not yet go forth. The third man said: ‘I had some 232labourers working for me. When the work was done they all received their wages except one, who disappeared. With his wages I bought a sheep. Next year there were two, and in the year after that there were four, and they soon became a large flock. After several years the labourer returned and asked me for his wages. I said to him, “Go and take all these sheep; they are your property.” He thought I must be mocking him, but I assured him that it was true, and he went off with the whole flock.’ The narrator added, ‘O Lord, if I speak the truth, deliver us!’” “He had scarcely finished,” said the Apostle, “when the rock moved away from the mouth of the cave and let the three men come forth.”^[122] It is related that Abú Sa`íd Kharráz said: “For a long time I used to eat only once in three days. I was journeying in the desert, and on the third day I felt weak through hunger. A voice from heaven cried to me, ‘Dost thou prefer food that will quiet thy lower nature, or an expedient that will enable thee to overcome thy weakness without food?’ I replied, ‘O God, give me strength!’ Then I rose and travelled twelve stages 233without meat or drink.” It is well known that at the present day the house of Sahl b. `Abdalláh at Tustar is called the House of the Wild Beasts (bayt al-sibá`), and the people of Tustar are agreed that many wild beasts used to come to him, and that he fed and tended them. Abu ´l-Qásim of Merv tells the following story: “As I was walking on the seashore with Abú Sa`íd Kharráz, I saw a youth clad in a patched frock and carrying a bucket (rakwa), to which an ink-bottle was fastened. Kharráz said: ‘When I look at this youth he seems to be one of the adepts (rasídagán), but when I look at his ink-bottle I think he is a student. Let me question him.’ So he accosted the youth and said, ‘What is the way to God?’ The youth answered: ‘There are two ways to God: the way of the vulgar and the way of the elect. Thou hast no knowledge of the latter, but the way of the vulgar, which thou pursuest, is to regard thine own actions as the cause of attaining to God, and to suppose that an ink-bottle is one of the things that interfere with attainment.’” Dhu ´l-Nún the Egyptian says: “Once I embarked in a ship voyaging from Egypt to Jidda. Among the passengers was a youth wearing a patched frock. I was eager to be his companion, but he inspired me with such awe that I did not venture to address him, for his spiritual state was very exalted and he was constantly engaged in devotion. One day a certain man lost a purse of jewels, and suspicion fell on this youth. They were about to maltreat him, but I said, ‘Let me question him courteously.’ I told him that he was suspected of theft and that I had saved him from maltreatment. ‘And now,’ I said, ‘what is to be done?’ He looked towards Heaven and spoke a few words. The fishes came to the surface of the sea, each with a jewel in its mouth. He took a jewel and gave it to his accuser; then he set his foot on the water and walked away. Thereupon the real thief dropped the purse, and the people in the ship repented.” Ibráhím Raqqí^[123] is related to have said: “In my novitiate I set out to visit Muslim Maghribí. I found him in his mosque, 234acting as precentor. He pronounced al-ḥamd incorrectly. I said to myself, ‘My trouble has been wasted.’ Next day, when I was going to the bank of the Euphrates to perform the religious ablution, I saw a lion asleep on the road. I turned back, and was faced by another lion which had been following me. Hearing my cry of despair, Muslim came forth from his cell. When the lions saw him they humbled themselves before him. He took the ear of each one and rubbed it, saying, ‘O dogs of God, have not I told you that you must not interfere with my guests?’ Then he said to me: ‘O Abú Isḥáq, thou hast busied thyself with correcting thy exterior for the sake of God’s creatures, hence thou art afraid of them; but it has been my business to correct my interior for God’s sake, hence His creatures are afraid of me.’” One day my Shaykh set out from Bayt al-Jinn to Damascus. Heavy rain had begun to fall, and I was walking with difficulty in the mire. I noticed that the Shaykh’s shoes and clothes were perfectly dry. On my pointing this out to him, he said: “Yes; God has preserved me from mud ever since I put unquestioning trust in Him and guarded my interior from the desolation of cupidity.” Once an experience occurred to me which I could not unravel. I set out to visit Shaykh Abu `l-Qásim Gurgání at Ṭús. I found him alone in his chamber in the mosque, and he was expounding precisely the same difficulty to a pillar, so that I was answered without having asked the question. “O Shaykh,” I cried, “to whom art thou saying this?” He replied: “O son, God just now caused this pillar to speak and ask me this question.” In Farghána, at a village called Ashlátak,<sup>[124]</sup> there was an old man, one of the Awtád of the earth. His name was Báb `Umar^[125]—all the dervishes in that country give the title of Báb to their great Shaykhs—and he had an old wife called Fáṭima. I went from Uzkand to see him. When I entered his presence he said: “Why have you come?” I replied: “In order that I might see the Shaykh in person and that he might look on me with kindness.” He said: “I have been seeing you continually 235since such and such a day, and I wish to see you as long as you are not removed from my sight.” I computed the day and year: it was the very day on which my conversion began. The Shaykh said: “To traverse distance (sipardan-i masáfat) is child’s play: henceforth pay visits by means of thought (himmat); it is not worth while to visit any person (shakhṣ), and there is no virtue in bodily presence (ḥuḍúr-i ashbáḥ).” Then he bade Fáṭima bring something to eat. She brought a dish of new grapes, although it was not the season for them, and some fresh ripe dates, which cannot possibly be procured in Farghána. On another occasion, while I was sitting alone, as is my custom, beside the tomb of Shaykh Abú Sa`íd at Mihna, I saw a white pigeon fly under the cloth (fúṭa) covering the sepulchre. I supposed that the bird had escaped from its owner, but when I looked under the cloth nothing was to be seen. This happened again next day, and also on the third day. I was at a loss to understand it, until one night I dreamed of the saint and asked him about my experience. He answered: “That pigeon is my good conduct (ṣafá-yi mu`ámalat), which comes every day to my tomb to feast with me (ba-munádamat-i man).”^[126] I might adduce many more of these tales without exhausting them, but my purpose in this book is to establish the principles of Ṣúfiism. As regards derivatives and matters of conduct books have been compiled by the traditionists (naqqálán), and these topics are disseminated from the pulpit by preachers (mudhakkirán). Now I will give, in one or two sections, an adequate account of certain points bearing on the present discussion, in order that I may not have to return to it again.

Discourse on the Superiority of the Prophets to the Saints.

You must know that, by universal consent of the Ṣúfí Shaykhs, the saints are at all times and in all circumstances subordinate to the prophets, whose missions they confirm. 236The prophets are superior to the saints, because the end of saintship is only the beginning of prophecy. Every prophet is a saint, but some saints are not prophets. The prophets are constantly exempt from the attributes of humanity, while the saints are so only temporarily; the fleeting state (ḥál) of the saint is the permanent station (maqám) of the prophet; and that which to the saints is a station (maqám) is to the prophets a veil (ḥijáb). This view is held unanimously by the Sunní divines and the Ṣúfí mystics, but it is opposed by a sect of the Ḥashwiyya—the Anthropomorphists (mujassima) of Khurásán—who discourse in a self-contradictory manner concerning the principles of Unification (tawḥíd), and who, although they do not know the fundamental doctrine of Ṣúfiism, call themselves saints. Saints they are indeed, but saints of the Devil. They maintain that the saints are superior to the prophets, and it is a sufficient proof of their error that they declare an ignoramus to be more excellent than Muḥammad, the Chosen of God. The same vicious opinion is held by another sect of Anthropomorphists (mushabbiha), who pretend to be Ṣúfís, and admit the doctrines of the incarnation of God and His descent (into the human body) by transmigration (intiqál), and the division (tajziya) of His essence. I will treat fully of these matters when I give my promised account of the two reprobated sects (of Ṣúfís). The sects to which I am now referring claim to be Moslems, but they agree with the Brahmans in denying special privileges to the prophets; and whoever believes in this doctrine becomes an infidel. Moreover, the prophets are propagandists and Imáms, and the saints are their followers, and it is absurd to suppose that the follower of an Imám is superior to the Imám himself. In short, the lives, experiences, and spiritual powers of all the saints together appear as nothing compared with one act of a true prophet, because the saints are seekers and pilgrims, whereas the prophets have arrived and have found and have returned with the command to preach and to convert the people. If any one of the above-mentioned heretics should urge that an 237ambassador sent by a king is usually inferior to the person to whom he is sent, as e.g. Gabriel is inferior to the Apostles, and that this is against my argument, I reply that an ambassador sent to a single person should be inferior to him, but when an ambassador is sent to a large number of persons or to a people, he is superior to them, as the Apostles are superior to the nations. Therefore one moment of the prophets is better than the whole life of the saints, because when the saints reach their goal they tell of contemplation (musháhadat) and obtain release from the veil of humanity (bashariyyat), although they are essentially men. On the other hand, contemplation is the first step of the apostle; and since the apostle’s starting-place is the saint’s goal, they cannot be judged by the same standard. Do not you perceive that, according to the unanimous opinion of all the saints who seek God, the station of union (jam`) belongs to the perfection of saintship? Now, in this station, a man attains such a degree of rapturous love that his intelligence is enraptured in gazing upon the act of God (fi`l), and in his longing for the Divine Agent (fá`il) he regards the whole universe as that and sees nothing but that. Thus Abú `Alí Rúdbárí says: “Were the vision of that which we serve to vanish from us, we should lose the name of servantship (`ubúdiyyat)” for we derive the glory of worship (`ibádat) solely from vision of Him. This is the beginning of the state of the prophets, inasmuch as separation (tafriqa) is inconceivable in relation to them. They are entirely in the essence of union, whether they affirm or deny, whether they approach or turn away, whether they are at the beginning or at the end. Abraham, in the beginning of his state, looked on the sun and said: “This is my Lord,” and he looked on the moon and stars and said: “This is my Lord” (Kor. vi, 76-8), because his heart was overwhelmed by the Truth and he was united in the essence of union. Therefore he saw naught else, or if he saw aught else he did not see it with the eye of “otherness” (ghayr), but with the eye of 238union (jam`), and in the reality of that vision he disavowed his own and said: “I love not those that set” (Kor. vi, 76). As he began with union, so he ended with union. Saintship has a beginning and an end, but prophecy has not. The prophets were prophets from the first, and shall be to the last, and before they existed they were prophets in the knowledge and will of God. Abú Yazíd was asked about the state of the prophets. He replied: “Far be it from me to say! We have no power to judge of them, and in our notions of them we are wholly ourselves. God has placed their denial and affirmation in such an exalted degree that human vision cannot reach unto it.” Accordingly, as the rank of the saints is hidden from the perception of mankind, so the rank of the prophets is hidden from the judgment of the saints. Abú Yazíd was the proof (ḥujjat) of his age, and he says: “I saw that my spirit (sirr) was borne to the heavens. It looked at nothing and gave no heed, though Paradise and Hell were displayed to it, for it was freed from phenomena and veils. Then I became a bird, whose body was of Oneness and whose wings were of Everlastingness, and I continued to fly in the air of the Absolute (huwiyyat), until I passed into the sphere of Purification (tanzíh), and gazed upon the field of Eternity (azaliyyat) and beheld there the tree of Oneness. When I looked I myself was all those. I cried: ‘O Lord, with my egoism (maní-yi man) I cannot attain to Thee, and I cannot escape from my selfhood. What am I to do?’ God spake: ‘O Abú Yazíd, thou must win release from thy “thou-ness” by following My beloved i.e. (Muḥammad). Smear thine eyes with the dust of his feet and follow him continually.‘” This is a long narrative. The Ṣúfís call it the Ascension (mi`ráj) of Báyazíd;^[127] and the term “ascension” denotes proximity to God (qurb). The ascension of prophets takes place outwardly and in the body, whereas that of saints takes place inwardly and in the spirit. The body of an apostle resembles the heart 239and spirit of a saint in purity and nearness to God. This is a manifest superiority. When a saint is enraptured and intoxicated he is withdrawn from himself by means of a spiritual ladder and brought near to God; and as soon as he returns to the state of sobriety all those evidences have taken shape in his mind and he has gained knowledge of them. Accordingly, there is a great difference between one who is carried thither in person and one who is carried thither only in thought (fikrat), for thought involves duality.

Discourse on the Superiority of the Prophets and Saints to the Angels.

The whole community of orthodox Moslems and all the Ṣúfí Shaykhs agree that the prophets and such of the saints as are guarded from sin (maḥfúẕ) are superior to the angels. The opposite view is held by the Mu`tazilites, who declare that the angels are superior to the prophets, being of more exalted rank, of more subtle constitution, and more obedient to God. I reply that this is not as you imagine, for an obedient body, an exalted rank, and a subtle constitution cannot be causes of superiority, which belongs only to those on whom God has bestowed it. Iblís had all the qualities that you mention, yet he is universally acknowledged to have become accursed. The superiority of the prophets is indicated by the fact that God commanded the angels to worship Adam; for the state of one who is worshipped is higher than the state of the worshipper. If they argue that, just as a true believer is superior to the Ka`ba, an inanimate mass of stone, although he bows down before it, so the angels may be superior to Adam, although they bowed down before him, I reply: “No one says that a believer bows down to a house or an altar or a wall, but all say that he bows down to God, and it is admitted by all that the angels bowed down to Adam (Kor. ii, 32). How, then, can the Ka`ba be compared to Adam? A traveller may worship God on the back of the animal which he is riding, and he is excused if his face be not turned towards the Ka`ba; and, in like manner, one who 240has lost his bearings in a desert, so that he cannot tell the direction of the Ka`ba, will have done his duty in whatever direction he may turn to pray. The angels offered no excuse when they bowed down to Adam, and the one who made an excuse for himself became accursed.” These are clear proofs to any person of insight.

Again, the angels are equal to the prophets in knowledge of God, but not in rank. The angels are without lust, covetousness, and evil; their nature is devoid of hypocrisy and guile, and they are instinctively obedient to God; whereas lust is an impediment in human nature; and men have a propensity to commit sins and to be impressed by the vanities of this world; and Satan has so much power over their bodies that he circulates with the blood in their veins; and closely attached to them is the lower soul (nafs), which incites them to all manner of wickedness. Therefore, one whose nature has all these characteristics and who, in spite of the violence of his lust, refrains from immorality, and notwithstanding his covetousness renounces this world, and, though his heart is still tempted by the Devil, turns back from sin and averts his face from sensual depravity in order to occupy himself with devotion and persevere in piety and mortify his lower soul and contend against the Devil, such a one is in reality superior to the angel who is not the battle-field of lust, and is naturally without desire of food and pleasures, and has no care for wife and child and kinsfolk, and need not have recourse to means and instruments, and is not absorbed in corrupt ambitions. A Gabriel, who worships God so many thousands of years in the hope of gaining a robe of honour, and the honour bestowed on him was that of acting as Muḥammad’s groom on the night of the Ascension—how should he be superior to one who disciplines and mortifies his lower soul by day and night in this world, until God looks on him with favour and grants to him the grace of seeing Himself and delivers him from all distracting thoughts? When the pride of the angels passed all bounds, and every one of them vaunted the purity of his conduct and spoke with an unbridled tongue 241in blame of mankind, God resolved that He would show to them their real state. He therefore bade them choose three of the chief among them, in whom they had confidence, to go to the earth and be its governors and reform its people. So three angels were chosen, but before they came to the earth one of them perceived its corruption and begged God to let him return. When the other two arrived on the earth God changed their nature so that they felt a desire for food and drink and were inclined to lust, and God punished them on that account, and the angels were forced to recognize the superiority of mankind to themselves.^[128] In short, the elect among the true believers are superior to the elect among the angels, and the ordinary believers are superior to the ordinary angels. Accordingly those men who are preserved (ma`ṣúm) and protected (maḥfúẕ) from sin are more excellent than Gabriel and Michael, and those who are not thus preserved are better than the Recording Angels (ḥafaẕa) and the noble Scribes (kirám-i kátibín).

Something has been said on this subject by every one of the Shaykhs. God awards superiority to whom He pleases, over whom He pleases. You must know that saintship is a Divine mystery which is revealed only through conduct (rawish). A saint is known only to a saint. If this matter could be made plain to all reasonable men it would be impossible to distinguish the friend from the foe or the spiritual adept from the careless worldling. Therefore God so willed that the pearl of His love should be set in the shell of popular contempt and be cast into the sea of affliction, in order that those who seek it may hazard their lives on account of its preciousness and dive to the bottom of this ocean of death, where they will either win their desire or bring their mortal state to an end.

8.The Kharrázís.

They are the followers of Abú Sa`íd Kharráz, who wrote brilliant works on Ṣúfiism and attained a high degree in 242detachment from the world. He was the first to explain the state of annihilation and subsistence (faná ú baqá), and he comprehended his whole doctrine in these two terms. Now I will declare their meaning and show the errors into which some have fallen in this respect, in order that you may know what his doctrine is and what the Ṣúfís intend when they employ these current expressions.

Discourse on Subsistence (baqá) and Annihilation (faná).

You must know that annihilation and subsistence have one meaning in science and another meaning in mysticism, and that formalists (ẕáhiriyán) are more puzzled by these words than by any other technical terms of the Ṣúfís. Subsistence in its scientific and etymological acceptation is of three kinds: (1) a subsistence that begins and ends in annihilation, e.g. this world, which had a beginning and will have an end, and is now subsistent; (2) a subsistence that came into being and will never be annihilated, viz. Paradise and Hell and the next world and its inhabitants; (3) a subsistence that always was and always will be, viz. the subsistence of God and His eternal attributes. Accordingly, knowledge of annihilation lies in your knowing that this world is perishable, and knowledge of subsistence lies in your knowledge that the next world is everlasting.

But the subsistence and annihilation of a state (ḥál) denotes, for example, that when ignorance is annihilated knowledge is necessarily subsistent, and that when sin is annihilated piety is subsistent, and that when a man acquires knowledge of his piety his forgetfulness (ghaflat) is annihilated by remembrance of God (dhikr), i.e., when anyone gains knowledge of God and becomes subsistent in knowledge of Him he is annihilated from (entirely loses) ignorance of Him, and when he is annihilated from forgetfulness he becomes subsistent in remembrance of Him, and this involves the discarding of blameworthy attributes and the substitution of praiseworthy attributes. A different signification, however, is attached to the terms in question by 243the elect among the Ṣúfís. They do not refer these expressions to “knowledge” (`ilm) or to “state” (ḥál), but apply them solely to the degree of perfection attained by the saints who have become free from the pains of mortification and have escaped from the prison of “stations” and the vicissitude of “states”, and whose search has ended in discovery, so that they have seen all things visible, and have heard all things audible, and have discovered all the secrets of the heart; and who, recognizing the imperfection of their own discovery, have turned away from all things and have purposely become annihilated in the object of desire, and in the very essence of desire have lost all desires of their own, for when a man becomes annihilated from his attributes he attains to perfect subsistence, he is neither near nor far, neither stranger nor intimate, neither sober nor intoxicated, neither separated nor united; he has no name, or sign, or brand, or mark.

In short, real annihilation from anything involves consciousness of its imperfection and absence of desire for it, not merely that a man should say, when he likes a thing, “I am subsistent therein,” or when he dislikes it, that he should say, “I am annihilated therefrom”; for these qualities are characteristic of one who is still seeking. In annihilation there is no love or hate, and in subsistence there is no consciousness of union or separation. Some wrongly imagine that annihilation signifies loss of essence and destruction of personality, and that subsistence indicates the subsistence of God in Man; both these notions are absurd. In India I had a dispute on this subject with a man who claimed to be versed in Koranic exegesis and theology. When I examined his pretensions I found that he knew nothing of annihilation and subsistence, and that he could not distinguish the eternal from the phenomenal. Many ignorant Ṣúfís consider that total annihilation (faná-yi kulliyyat) is possible, but this is a manifest error, for annihilation of the different parts of a material substance (ṭínatí) can never take place. I ask these ignorant and mistaken men: “What do you mean by this kind of annihilation?” If they answer, 244“Annihilation of substance” (faná-yi `ayn), that is impossible; and if they answer, “Annihilation of attributes,” that is only possible in so far as one attribute may be annihilated through the subsistence of another attribute, both attributes belonging to Man; but it is absurd to suppose that anyone can subsist through the attributes of another individual. The Nestorians of Rúm and the Christians hold that Mary annihilated by self-mortification all the attributes of humanity (awṣáf-i násútí) and that the Divine subsistence became attached to her, so that she was made subsistent through the subsistence of God, and that Jesus was the result thereof, and that he was not originally composed of the stuff of humanity, because his subsistence is produced by realization of the subsistence of God; and that, in consequence of this, he and his mother and God are all subsistent through one subsistence, which is eternal and an attribute of God. All this agrees with the doctrine of the anthropomorphistic sects of the Ḥashwiyya, who maintain that the Divine essence is a locus of phenomena (maḥall-i ḥawádith) and that the Eternal may have phenomenal attributes. I ask all who proclaim such tenets: “What difference is there between the view that the Eternal is the locus of the phenomenal and the view that the phenomenal is the locus of the Eternal, or between the assertion that the Eternal has phenomenal attributes and the assertion that the phenomenal has eternal attributes?” Such doctrines involve materialism (dahr) and destroy the proof of the phenomenal nature of the universe, and compel us to say that both the Creator and His creation are eternal or that both are phenomenal, or that what is created may be commingled with what is uncreated, and that what is uncreated may descend into what is created. If, as they cannot help admitting, the creation is phenomenal, then their Creator also must be phenomenal, because the locus of a thing is like its substance; if the locus (maḥall) is phenomenal, it follows that the contents of the locus (ḥáll) are phenomenal too. In fine, when one thing is linked and united and commingled with another, both things are in principle as one.

245Accordingly, our subsistence and annihilation are attributes of ourselves, and resemble each other in respect of their being our attributes. Annihilation is the annihilation of one attribute through the subsistence of another attribute. One may speak, however, of an annihilation that is independent of subsistence, and also of a subsistence that is independent of annihilation: in that case annihilation means “annihilation of all remembrance of other”, and subsistence means “subsistence of the remembrance of God” (baqá-yi dhikr-i ḥaqq). Whoever is annihilated from his own will subsists in the will of God, because thy will is perishable and the will of God is everlasting: when thou standest by thine own will thou standest by annihilation, but when thou art absolutely controlled by the will of God thou standest by subsistence. Similarly, the power of fire transmutes to its own quality anything that falls into it, and surely the power of God’s will is greater than that of fire; but fire affects only the quality of iron without changing its substance, for iron can never become fire.

Section.

All the Shaykhs have given subtle indications on this subject. Abú Sa’íd Kharráz, the author of the doctrine, says: “Annihilation is annihilation of consciousness of manhood (`ubúdiyyat), and subsistence is subsistence in the contemplation of Godhead (iláhiyyat),” i.e., it is an imperfection to be conscious in one’s actions that one is a man, and one attains to real manhood (bandagí) when one is not conscious of them, but is annihilated so as not to see them, and becomes subsistent through beholding the action of God. Hence all one’s actions are referred to God, not to one’s self, and whereas a man’s actions that are connected with himself are imperfect, those which are attached to him by God are perfect. Therefore, when anyone becomes annihilated from things that depend on himself, he becomes subsistent through the beauty of Godhead. Abú Ya`qúb Nahrajúrí says: “A man’s true servantship (`ubúdiyyat) lies in annihilation and subsistence,” because no 246one is capable of serving God with sincerity until he renounces all self-interest: therefore to renounce humanity (ádamiyyat) is annihilation, and to be sincere in servantship is subsistence. And Ibráhím b. Shaybán says: “The science of annihilation and subsistence turns on sincerity (ikhláṣ) and unity (wáḥid—iyyat) and true servantship; all else is error and heresy,” i.e., when anyone acknowledges the unity of God he feels himself overpowered by the omnipotence of God, and one who is overpowered (maghlúb) is annihilated in the might of his vanquisher; and when his annihilation is rightly fulfilled on him, he confesses his weakness and sees no resource except to serve God, and tries to gain His satisfaction (riḍá). And whoever explains these terms otherwise, i.e. annihilation as meaning “annihilation of substance” and subsistence as meaning “subsistence of God (in Man)”, is a heretic and a Christian, as has been stated above.

Now I, `Alí b. `Uthmán al-Jullábí, declare that all these sayings are near to each other in meaning, although they differ in expression; and their real gist is this, that annihilation comes to a man through vision of the majesty of God and through the revelation of Divine omnipotence to his heart, so that in the overwhelming sense of His majesty this world and the next world are obliterated from his mind, and “states” and “stations” appear contemptible in the sight of his aspiring thought, and what is shown to him of miraculous grace vanishes into nothing: he becomes dead to reason and passion alike, dead even to annihilation itself; and in that annihilation of annihilation his tongue proclaims God, and his mind and body are humble and abased, as in the beginning when Adam’s posterity were drawn forth from his loins without admixture of evil and took the pledge of servantship to God (Kor. vii, 171).

Such are the principles of annihilation and subsistence. I have discussed a portion of the subject in the chapter on Poverty and Ṣúfiism, and wherever these terms occur in the present work they bear the meaning which I have explained.

247

9.The Khafífís.

They are the followers of Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. Khafíf of Shíráz, an eminent mystic in his time and the author of celebrated treatises on various branches of Ṣúfiism. He was a man of great spiritual influence, and was not led by his lusts. I have heard that he contracted four hundred marriages. This was due to the fact that he was of royal descent, and that after his conversion the people of Shíráz paid great court to him, and the daughters of kings and nobles desired to marry him for the sake of the blessing which would accrue to them. He used to comply with their wishes, and then divorce them before consummation of the marriage. But in the course of his life forty wives, who were strangers to him (bégána), two or three at a time, used to serve him as bed-makers (khádimán-i firásh), and one of them—she was the daughter of a vizier—lived with him for forty years. I have heard from Abu ´l-Ḥasan `Alí b. Bakrán of Shíráz that one day several of his wives were gathered together, and each one was telling some story about him. They all agreed sese nunquam eum vidisse libidini obsequentem. Hitherto each of them had believed that she was peculiarly treated in this respect, and when they learned that the Shaykh’s behaviour was the same towards them all, they were astonished and doubted whether such was truly the case. Accordingly, they sent two of their number to question the vizier’s daughter, who was his favourite, as to his dealings with her. She replied: “When the Shaykh wedded me and I was informed that he would visit me that night, I prepared a fine repast and adorned myself assiduously. As soon as he came and the food was brought in, he called me to him and looked for a while first at me and then at the food. Then he took my hand and drew it into his sleeve. From his breast to his navel there were fifteen knots (`aqd) growing out of his belly. He said, ‘Ask me what these are’; so I asked him and he replied, ‘They are knots made by the tribulation and anguish of my abstinence in renouncing a face like this and viands like these.’ 248He said no more, but departed; and that is all my intimacy with him.”

The form of his doctrine in Ṣúfiism is “absence” (ghaybat) and “presence” (ḥuḍúr). I will explain it as far as possible.

Discourse on Absence (ghaybat) and Presence (ḥuḍúr).

These terms, although apparently opposed to each other, express the same meaning from different points of view. “Presence” is “presence of the heart”, as a proof of intuitive faith (yaqín), so that what is hidden from it has the same force as what is visible to it. “Absence” is “absence of the heart from all things except God” to such an extent that it becomes absent from itself and absent even from its absence, so that it no longer regards itself; and the sign of this state is withdrawal from all formal authority (ḥukm-i rusúm), as when a prophet is divinely preserved from what is unlawful. Accordingly, absence from one’s self is presence with God, and vice versâ. God is the lord of the human heart: when a divine rapture (jadhbat) overpowers the heart of the seeker, the absence of his heart becomes equivalent to its presence (with God); partnership (shirkat) and division (qismat) disappear, and relationship to “self” comes to an end, as one of the Shaykhs has said in verse—

“Thou art the Lord of my heart,

Without any partner: how, then, can it be divided?”

Inasmuch as God is sole lord of the heart, He has absolute power to keep it absent or present as He will, and, in regard to the essence of the case, this is the whole argument for the doctrine of His favourites; but when a distinction is made, the Shaykhs hold various opinions on the subject, some preferring “presence” to “absence”, while others declare that “absence” is superior to “presence”. There is the same controversy as that concerning sobriety and intoxication, which I have explained above; but these terms indicate that the human attributes are still subsistent, whereas “absence” and “presence” indicate 249that the human attributes are annihilated: therefore the latter terms are in reality more sublime. “Absence” is preferred to “presence” by Ibn `Aṭá, Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj), Abú Bakr Shiblí, Bundár b. al-Ḥusayn, Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, Sumnún Muḥibb, and a number of the Shaykhs of `Iráq. They say: “Thou thyself art the greatest of all veils between thee and God: when thou hast become absent from thyself, the evils implicit in thy being are annihilated in thee, and thy state undergoes a fundamental change: the ‘stations’ of novices become a veil to thee, and the ‘states’ of those who seek God become a source of mischief to thee; thine eye is closed to thyself and to all that is other than God, and thy human attributes are consumed by the flame of proximity to God (qurbat). This is the same state of ‘absence’ in which God drew thee forth from the loins of Adam, and caused thee to hear His exalted word, and distinguished thee by the honorary robe of Unification and the garment of contemplation; so long as thou wert absent from thyself, thou wert present with God face to face, but when thou becamest present with thine own attributes, thou becamest absent from thy proximity to God. Therefore thy ‘presence’ is thy perdition. This is the meaning of God’s word, ‘And now are ye come unto us alone, as We created you at first’” (Kor. vi, 94). On the other hand, Ḥárith Muḥásibí, Junayd, Sahl b. `Abdalláh, Abú Ja`far Ḥaddád,^[129] Ḥamdún Qaṣṣár, Abú Muḥammad Jurayrí, Ḥuṣrí, Muḥammad b. Khafíf, who is the author of the doctrine, and others hold that “presence” is superior to “absence”. They argue that inasmuch as all excellences are bound up with “presence”, and as “absence” from one’s self is a way leading to “presence” with God, the way becomes an imperfection after you have arrived at the goal. “Presence” is the fruit of “absence”, but what light is to be found in “absence” without “presence”? A man must needs renounce heedlessness in order that, by means of this “absence”, he may attain to “presence”; and 250when he has attained his object, the means by which he attained it has no longer any worth.

“The ‘absent’ one is not he who is absent from his country,

But he who is absent from all desire.

The ‘present’ one is not he who hath no desire,

But he who hath no heart (no thought of worldly things),

So that his desire is ever fixed on God.”

It is a well-known story that one of the disciples of Dhu ´l-Nún set out to visit Abú Yazíd. When he came to Abú Yazíd’s cell and knocked at the door Abú Yazíd said: “Who art thou, and whom dost thou wish to see?” He answered: “Abú Yazíd.” Abú Yazíd said: “Who is Abú Yazíd, and where is he, and what thing is he? I have been seeking Abú Yazíd for a long while, but I have not found him.” When the disciple returned to Dhu ´l-Nún and told him what had passed, Dhu ´l-Nún said: “My brother Abú Yazíd is lost with those who are lost in God.” A certain man came to Junayd and said: “Be present with me for a moment that I may speak to thee.” Junayd answered: “O young man, you demand of me something that I have long been seeking. For many years I have been wishing to become present with myself a moment, but I cannot; how, then, can I become present with you just now?” Therefore, “absence” involves the sorrow of being veiled, while “presence” involves the joy of revelation, and the former state can never be equal to the latter. Shaykh Abú Sa`íd says on this subject—

Taqashsha`a ghaymu ´l-hajri `an qamari ´l-ḥubbi

Wa-asfara núru ´l-ṣubḥi `an ẕulmati ´l-ghaybi.

“The clouds of separation have been cleared away from the moon of love,

And the light of morning has shone forth from the darkness of the Unseen.”

The distinction made by the Shaykhs between these two terms is mystical, and on the surface merely verbal, for they 251seem to be approximately the same. To be present with God is to be absent from one’s self—what is the difference?—and one who is not absent from himself is not present with God. Thus, forasmuch as the impatience of Job in his affliction did not proceed from himself, but on the contrary he was then absent from himself, God did not distinguish his impatience from patience, and when he cried, “Evil hath befallen me” (Kor. xxi, 83), God said, “Verily, he was patient.” This is evidently a judgment founded on the essential nature of the case (ḥukm ba-`ayn). It is related that Junayd said: “For a time I was such that the inhabitants of heaven and earth wept over my bewilderment (ḥayrat); then, again, I became such that I wept over their absence (ghaybat); and now my state is such that I have no knowledge either of them or of myself.” This is an excellent indication of “presence”.

I have briefly explained the meaning of “presence” and “absence” in order that you may be acquainted with the doctrine of the Khafífís, and may also know in what sense these terms are used by the Ṣúfís.

10. Sayyárís.

They are the followers of Abu ´l-`Abbás Sayyárí, the Imám of Merv. He was learned in all the sciences and associated with Abú Bakr Wásiṭí. At the present day he has numerous followers in Nasá and Merv. His school of Ṣúfiism is the only one that has kept its original doctrine unchanged, and the cause of this fact is that Nasá and Merv have never been without some person who acknowledged his authority and took care that his followers should maintain the doctrine of their founder. The Sayyárís of Nasá carried on a discussion with those of Merv by means of letters, and I have seen part of this correspondence at Merv; it is very fine. Their expositions are based on “union” (jam`) and “separation” (tafriqa). These words are common to all scientists and are employed by specialists in every branch of learning as a means of rendering their explanations intelligible, but they bear different 252meanings in each case. Thus, in arithmetic jam` denotes the addition and tafriqa the subtraction of numbers; in grammar jam` is the agreement of words in derivation, while tafriqa is the difference in meaning; in law jam` is analogy (qiyás) and tafriqa the characteristics of an authoritative text (ṣifát-i nuṣṣ), or jam` is the text and tafriqa the analogy; in divinity jam` denotes the essential and tafriqa the formal attributes of God.^[130] But the Ṣúfís do not use these terms in any of the significations which I have mentioned. Now, therefore, I will explain the meaning attached to them by the Ṣúfís and the various opinions of the Shaykhs on this subject.

Discourse on Union (jam`) and Separation (tafriqa).

God united all mankind in His call, as He says, “And God calls to the abode of peace”; then He separated them in respect of Divine guidance, and said, “and guides whom He willeth into the right way” (Kor. x, 26). He called them all, and banished some in accordance with the manifestation of His will; He united them all and gave a command, and then separated them, rejecting some and leaving them without succour, but accepting others and granting to them Divine aid; then once more he united a certain number and separated them, giving to some immunity from sin and to others a propensity towards evil. Accordingly the real mystery of union is the knowledge and will of God, while separation is the manifestation of that which He commands and forbids: e.g., He commanded Abraham to behead Ishmael, but willed that he should not do so; and He commanded Iblís to worship Adam, but willed the contrary; and He commanded Adam not to eat the corn, but willed that he should eat it; and so forth. Union is that which He unites by His attributes, and separation is that which He separates by His acts. All this involves cessation of human volition and affirmation of the Divine will so as to exclude all personal initiative. As regards what has been said on the subject of union and separation, all the Sunnís, except the 253Mu`tazilites, are in agreement with the Ṣúfí Shaykhs, but at this point they begin to diverge, some applying the terms in question to the Divine Unity (tawḥíd), some to the Divine attributes, and some to the Divine acts. Those who refer to the Divine Unity say that there are two degrees of union, one in the attributes of God and the other in the attributes of Man. The former is the mystery of Unification (tawḥíd), in which human actions have no part whatever; the latter denotes acknowledgment of the Divine Unity with sincere conviction and unfailing resolution. This is the opinion of Abú `Alí Rúdbárí. Those, again, who refer these terms to the Divine attributes say that union is an attribute of God, and separation an act of God in which Man does not co-operate, because God has no rival in Godhead. Therefore union can be referred only to His substance and attributes, for union is equality in the fundamental matter (al-taswiyat fi ´l-aṣl), and no two things are equal in respect of eternity except His substance and His attributes, which, when they are separated by expository analysis (`ibárat ú tafṣíl), are not united. This means that God has eternal attributes, which are peculiar to Him and subsist through Him; and that He and His attributes are not two, for His Unity does not admit difference and number. On this ground, union is impossible except in the sense indicated above.

Separation in predicament (al-tafriqat fi ´l-ḥukm) refers to the actions of God, all of which are separate in this respect. The predicament of one is being (wujúd); of another, not-being (`adam), but a not-being that is capable of being; of another, annihilation (faná), and of another subsistence (baqá). There are some, again, who refer these terms to knowledge (`ilm) and say that union is knowledge of the Divine Unity and separation knowledge of the Divine ordinances: hence theology is union and jurisprudence is separation. One of the Shaykhs has said, to the same effect: “Union is that on which theologians (ahl al-`ilm) are agreed, and separation is that on which they differ.” Again, all the Ṣúfí mystics, whenever they use the term “separation” in the course of their expositions and 254indications, attach to it the meaning of “human actions” (makásib), e.g. self-mortification, and by “union” they signify “divine gifts” (mawáhib), e.g. contemplation. Whatever is gained by means of mortification is “separation”, and whatever is solely the result of Divine favour and guidance is “union”. It is Man’s glory that, while his actions exist and mortification is possible, he should escape by God’s goodness from the imperfection of his own actions, and should find them to be absorbed in the bounties of God, so that he depends entirely on God and commits all his attributes to His charge and refers all his actions to Him and none to himself, as Gabriel told the Apostle that God said: “My servant continually seeks access to Me by means of works of supererogation until I love him; and when I love him, I am his ear and his eye and his hand and his heart and his tongue: through Me he hears and sees and speaks and grasps,” i.e., in remembering Me he is enraptured by the remembrance (dhikr) of Me, and his own “acquisition” (kasb) is annihilated so as to have no part in his remembrance, and My remembrance overpowers his remembrance, and the relationship of humanity (ádamiyyat) is entirely removed from his remembrance: then My remembrance is his remembrance, and in his rapture he becomes even as Abú Yazíd in the hour when he said: “Glory to me! how great is my majesty!” These words were the outward sign of his speech, but the speaker was God. Similarly, the Apostle said: “God speaks by the tongue of `Umar.” The fact is that when the Divine omnipotence manifests its dominion over humanity, it transports a man out of his own being, so that his speech becomes the speech of God. But it is impossible that God should be mingled (imtizáj) with created beings or made one (ittiḥád) with His works or become incarnate (ḥáll) in things: God is exalted far above that, and far above that which the heretics ascribe to Him.

It may happen, then, that God’s love holds absolute sway over the heart of His servant, and that his reason and natural faculties are too weak to sustain its rapture and intensity, and that he loses all control of his power to act (kasb). This state 255is called “union”.^[131] Herewith are connected all extraordinary miracles (i`jáz) and acts of miraculous grace (karámát). All ordinary actions are “separation”, and all acts which violate custom are “union”. God bestows these miracles on His prophets and saints, and refers His actions to them and theirs to Himself, as He hath said: “Verily, they who swear fealty unto thee, swear fealty unto God” (Kor. xlviii, 10), and again: “Whosoever obeys the Apostle has obeyed God” (Kor. iv, 82). Accordingly, His saints are united (mujtami`) by their inward feelings (asrár) and separated (muftariq) by their outward behaviour, so that their love of God is strengthened by the internal union, and the right fulfilment of their duty as servants of God is assured by their external separation. A certain great Shaykh says—

“I have realized that which is within me, and my tongue hath conversed with Thee in secret,

And we are united in one respect, but we are separated in another.

Although awe has hidden Thee from the glances of mine eye,

Ecstasy has made Thee near to my inmost parts.”^[132]

The state of being inwardly united he calls “union”, and the secret conversation of the tongue he calls “separation”; then he indicates that both union and separation are in himself, and attributes the basis (qá`ida) of them to himself. This is very subtle.

Section.

Here I must notice a matter of controversy between us and those who maintain that the manifestation of union is the denial of separation, because the two terms contradict each 256other, and that when anyone passes under the absolute sway of Divine guidance he ceases to act and to mortify himself. This is sheer nullification (ta`ṭíl), for a man must never cease to practise devotion and mortify himself as long as he has the possibility and power of doing so. Moreover, union is not apart from separation, as light is apart from the sun, and accident from substance, and attribute from object: therefore, neither is self-mortification apart from Divine guidance, nor the Truth from the Law, nor discovery from search. But mortification may precede or follow Divine guidance. In the former case a man’s tribulation is increased, because he is in “absence” (ghaybat), while in the latter case he has no trouble or pain, because he is in “presence” (haḍrat). Those to whom negation is the source (mashrab) of actions, and to whom it seems to be the substance (`ayn) of action, commit a grave error. A man, however, may attain such a degree that he regards all his qualities as faulty and defective, for when he sees that his praiseworthy qualities are vicious and imperfect, his blameworthy qualities will necessarily appear more vicious. I adduce these considerations because some ignorant persons, who have fallen into an error that is closely akin to infidelity, assert that no result whatever depends upon our exertion, and that inasmuch as our actions and devotions are faulty and our mortifications are imperfect a thing left undone is better than a thing done. To this argument I reply: “You are agreed in supposing that everything done by us has an energy (fi`l), and you declare that our energies are a centre of defect and a source of evil and corruption: consequently you must also suppose that things left undone by us have an energy; and since in both cases there is an energy involving defect, how can you regard that which we leave undone as better than that which we do?” This notion evidently is a noxious delusion. Here we have an excellent criterion to distinguish the believer from the infidel. Both agree that their energies are inherently defective, but the believer, in accordance with God’s command, deems a thing done to be better than a thing left undone, while the 257infidel, in accordance with his denial of the Creator (t`aṭíl), deems a thing left undone to be better than a thing done.

Union, then, involves this—that, although the imperfection of separation is recognized, its authority (ḥukm) should not be let go; and separation involves this—that, although one is veiled from the sight of union, he nevertheless thinks that separation is union. Muzayyin the Elder^[133] says in this sense: “Union is the state of privilege (khuṣúṣiyyat) and separation is the state of a servant (`ubúdiyyat), these states being indissolubly combined with each other,” because it is a work of the privileged state to fulfil the duties of servantship; therefore, although the tediousness and painfulness of self-mortification and personal effort may be removed from one who performs all that is required of him in this respect, it is impossible that the substance (`ayn) of self-mortification and religious obligation should be removed from anyone, even though he be in the essence of union, unless he has an evident excuse that is generally acknowledged by the authority of the religious law. Now I will explain this matter in order that you may better understand it.

Union is of two kinds: (1) sound union (jam`-i salámat), and (2) broken union (jam`-i taksír). Sound union is that which God produces in a man when he is in the state of rapture and ecstasy, and when God causes him to receive and fulfil His commandments and to mortify himself. This was the state of Sahl b. `Abdalláh and Abú Ḥafṣ Ḥaddád and Abu ´l-`Abbás Sayyárí, the author of the doctrine. Abú Yazíd of Bisṭám, Abú Bakr Shiblí, Abu ´l-Ḥasan Ḥuṣrí, and a number of great Shaykhs were continually in a state of rapture until the hour of prayer arrived; then they returned to consciousness, and after performing their prayers became enraptured again. While thou art in the state of separation, thou art thou, and thou fulfillest the command of God; but when God transports thee He has the best right to see that thou performest His command, for two reasons: firstly, in order that the token of servantship may 258not be removed from thee, and secondly, in order that He may keep His promise that He will never let the law of Muḥammad be abrogated. “Broken union” (jam`-i taksír) is this: that a man’s judgment becomes distraught and bewildered, so that it is like the judgment of a lunatic: then he is either excused from performing his religious obligations or rewarded (mashkúr) for performing them; and the state of him who is rewarded is sounder than the state of him who is excused.

You must know, in short, that union does not involve any peculiar “station” (maqám) or any peculiar “state” (ḥál), for union is the concentration of one’s thoughts (jam`-i himmat) upon the object of one’s desire. According to some the revelation of this matter takes place in the “stations” (maqámát), according to others in the “states” (aḥwál), and in either case the desire of the “united” person (ṣáḥib jam`) is attained by negating his desire. This holds good in everything, e.g., Jacob concentrated his thoughts on Joseph, so that he had no thought but of him; and Majnún concentrated his thoughts on Laylá, so that he saw only her in the whole world, and all created things assumed the form of Laylá in his eyes. One day, when Abú Yazíd was in his cell, some one came and asked: “Is Abú Yazíd here?” He answered: “Is anyone here except God?” And a certain Shaykh relates that a dervish came to Mecca and remained in contemplation of the Ka`ba for a whole year, during which time he neither ate nor drank, nor slept, nor cleansed himself, because of the concentration of his thoughts upon the Ka`ba, which thereby became the food of his body and the drink of his soul. The principle in all these cases is the same, viz. that God divided the one substance of His love and bestows a particle thereof, as a peculiar gift, upon every one of His friends in proportion to their enravishment with Him; then He lets down upon that particle the shrouds of humanity and nature and temperament and spirit, in order that by its powerful working it may transmute to its own quality all the particles that are attached to it, until the lover’s clay is wholly converted into love, and all 259his actions and looks become so many indispensable conditions of love. This state is named “union” alike by those who regard the inward meaning and those who regard the outward expression. Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) says in this sense:

“Thy will be done, O my Lord and Master!

Thy will be done, O my purpose and meaning!

O essence of my being, O goal of my desire,

O my speech and my hints and my gestures!

O all of my all, O my hearing and my sight,

O my whole and my element and my particles!”

Therefore, to one whose qualities are only borrowed from God, it is a disgrace to affirm his own existence, and an act of dualism (zunnár) to pay any heed to the phenomenal universe; and all created objects are despicable to his soaring thought. Some have been led by their dialectical subtlety and their admiration of phraseology to speak of “the union of union” (jam` al-jam`). This is a good expression as phrases go, but if you consider the meaning, it is better not to predicate union of union, because the term “union” cannot properly be applied except to separation. Before union can be united it must first have been separated, whereas the fact is that union does not change its state. The expression, therefore, is liable to be misunderstood, because one who is “united” does not look forth from himself to what is above or to what is below him. Do not you perceive that when the two worlds were displayed to the Apostle on the night of the Ascension he paid no heed to anything? He was in “union”, and one who is “united” does not behold “separation”. Hence God said: “His gaze swerved not, nor did it stray” (Kor. liii, 17). In my early days I composed a book on this subject and entitled it Kitáb al-bayán li-ahl al-`iyán,^[134] and I have also discussed the matter at length in the Baḥr al-qulúb^[135] in the chapter on 260“Union”. I will not now burden my readers by adding to what I have said here.

This sketch of the doctrine of the Sayyárís concludes my account of those Ṣúfí sects which are approved and follow the path of true theosophy. I now turn to the opinions of those heretics who have connected themselves with the Ṣúfís and have adopted Ṣúfiistic phraseology as a means of promulgating their heresy. My aim is to expose their errors in order that novices may not be deceived by their pretensions and may guard themselves from mischief.

11. The Ḥulúlís.

Of those two reprobate sects which profess to belong to Ṣúfiism and make the Ṣúfís partners in their error, one follows Abú Ḥulmán of Damascus.^[136] The stories which his adherents relate of him do not agree with what is written about him in the books of the Shaykhs, for, while the Ṣúfís regard him as one of themselves, these sectaries impute to him the doctrines of incarnation (ḥulúl) and commixture (imtizáj) and transmigration of spirits (naskh-i arwáḥ). I have seen this statement in the book of Muqaddasí,^[137] who attacks him; and the same notion of him has been formed by theologians, but God knows best what is the truth. The other sect refer their doctrine to Fáris,^[138] who pretends to have derived it from Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj), but he is the only one of Ḥusayn’s followers who holds such tenets. I saw Abú Ja`far Ṣaydalání<sup>[139]</sup> with four thousand men, dispersed throughout `Iráq, who were Ḥallájís; and they all cursed Fáris on account of this doctrine. Moreover, in the compositions of al-Ḥalláj himself there is nothing but profound theosophy.

261I, `Alí b. `Uthmán al-Jullábí, say that I do not know who Fáris and Abú Hulmán were or what they said, but anyone who holds a doctrine conflicting with Unification and true theosophy has no part in religion at all. If religion, which is the root, is not firmly based, Ṣúfiism, which is the branch and offspring of religion, must with more reason be unsound, for it is inconceivable that miracles and evidences should be manifested except to religious persons and Unitarians. All the errors of these sectaries are in regard to the spirit (rúḥ). Now, therefore, I will explain its nature and principles according to the Sunní canon, and in the course of my explanation I will notice the erroneous and delusive opinions of the heretics in order that your faith may be strengthened thereby.

Discourse on the Spirit (al-rúḥ).

You must know that knowledge concerning the existence of the spirit is intuitive (darúrí), and the intelligence is unable to apprehend its (the spirit’s) nature. Every Moslem divine and sage has expressed some conjectural opinion on this point, which has also been debated by unbelievers of various sorts. When the unbelievers of Quraysh, prompted by the Jews, sent Naḍr b. al-Ḥárith to question the Apostle concerning the nature and essence of the spirit, God in the first place affirmed its substance and said, “And they will ask thee concerning the spirit”; then He denied its eternity, saying, “Answer, ‘The spirit belongs to that which (i.e. the creation of which) my Lord commanded’” (Kor. xvii, 87). And the Apostle said: “The spirits are hosts gathered together: those that know one another agree, and those that do not know one another disagree.” There are many similar proofs of the existence of the spirit, but they contain no authoritative statement as to its nature. Some have said that the spirit is the life whereby the body lives, a view which is also held by a number of scholastic philosophers. According to this view the spirit is an accident (`araḍ), which at God’s command keeps the body alive, and from which proceed conjunction, motion, cohesion. 262and similar accidents by which the body is changed from one state to another. Others, again, declare that the spirit is not life, but that life does not exist without it, just as the spirit does not exist without the body, and that the two are never found apart, because they are inseparable, like pain and the knowledge of pain. According to this view also the spirit is an accident, like life. All the Ṣúfí Shaykhs, however, and most orthodox Moslems hold that the spirit is a substance, and not an attribute; for, so long as it is connected with the body, God continually creates life in the body, and the life of Man is an attribute and by it he lives, but the spirit is deposited in his body and may be separated from him while he is still living, as in sleep. But when it leaves him, intelligence and knowledge can no longer remain with him, for the Apostle has said that the spirits of martyrs are in the crops of birds: consequently it must be a substance; and the Apostle has said that the spirits are hosts (junúd), and hosts are subsistent (báqí), and no accident can subsist, for an accident does not stand by itself.

The spirit, then, is a subtle body (jismí laṭíf), which comes and goes by the command of God. On the night of the Ascension, when the Apostle saw in Heaven Adam, Joseph, Moses, Aaron, Jesus, and Abraham, it was their spirits that he saw; and if the spirit were an accident, it would not stand by itself so as to become visible, for it would need a locus in substances, and substances are gross (kathíf). Accordingly, it has been ascertained that the spirit is subtle and corporeal (jasím), and being corporeal, it is visible, but visible only to the eye of intelligence (chashm-i dil). And spirits may reside in the crops of birds or may be armies that move to and fro, as the Apostolic Traditions declare.

Here we are at variance with the heretics, who assert that the spirit is eternal (qadím), and worship it, and regard it as the sole agent and governor of things, and call it the uncreated spirit of God, and aver that it passes from one body to another. No popular error has obtained such wide acceptance as this 263doctrine, which is held by the Christians, although they express it in terms that appear to conflict with it, and by all the Indians, Tibetans, and Chinese, and is supported by the consensus of opinion among the Shí`ites, Carmathians, and Ismá`ílís (Báṭiniyán), and is embraced by the two false sects abovementioned. All these sectaries base their belief on certain propositions and bring forward proofs in defence of their assertion. I ask them this question: “What do you mean by ‘eternity’ (qidam)? Do you mean the pre-existence of a non-eternal thing, or an eternal thing that never came into being?” If they mean the pre-existence of a non-eternal thing, then there is no difference between us in principle, for we too say that the spirit is non-eternal (muḥdath), and that it existed before the body, as the Apostle said: “God created the spirits two thousand years before the bodies.” Accordingly, the spirit is one sort of God’s creatures, and He joins it to another sort of His creatures, and in joining them together He produces life through His predestination. But the spirit cannot pass from body to body, because, just as a body cannot have two lives, so a spirit cannot have two bodies. If these facts were not affirmed in Apostolic Traditions by an Apostle who speaks the truth, and if the matter were considered purely from the standpoint of a reasonable intelligence, then the spirit would be life and nothing else, and it would be an attribute, not a substance. Now suppose, on the other hand, they say that the spirit is an eternal thing that never came into being. In this case, I ask: “Does it stand by itself or by something else?” If they say, “By itself,” I ask them, “Is God its world (`álam) or not?” If they answer that God is not its world, they affirm the existence of two eternal beings, which is contrary to reason, for the eternal is infinite, and the essence of one eternal being would limit the other. But if they answer that God is its world, then I say that God is eternal and His creatures are non-eternal: it is impossible that the eternal should be commingled with the non-eternal or made one with it, or become immanent in it, or that the non-eternal should be 264the place of the eternal or that the eternal should carry it; for whatever is joined to anything must be like that to which it is joined, and only homogeneous things are capable of being united and separated. And if they say that the spirit does not stand by itself, but by something else, then it must be either an attribute (ṣifat) or an accident (`araḍ). If it is an accident, it must either be in a locus or not. If it is in a locus, its locus must be like itself, and neither can be called eternal; and to say that it has no locus is absurd, for an accident cannot stand by itself. If, again, they say that the spirit is an eternal attribute—and this is the doctrine of the Ḥulúhs and those who believe in metempsychosis (tanásukhiyán)—and call it an attribute of God, I reply that an eternal attribute of God cannot possibly become an attribute of His creatures; for, if His life could become the life of His creatures, similarly His power could become their power; and inasmuch as an attribute stands by its object, how can an eternal attribute stand by a non-eternal object? Therefore, as I have shown, the eternal has no connexion with the non-eternal, and the doctrine of the heretics who affirm this is false. The spirit is created and is under God’s command. Anyone who holds another belief is in flagrant error and cannot distinguish what is non-eternal from what is eternal. No saint, if his saintship be sound, can possibly be ignorant of the attributes of God. I give praise without end to God, who hath guarded us from heresies and dangers, and hath bestowed on us intelligence to examine and refute them by our arguments, and hath given us faith in order that we may know Him. When men who see only the exterior hear stories of this kind from theologians, they imagine that this is the doctrine of all aspirants to Ṣúfiism. They are grossly mistaken and utterly deceived, and the consequence is that they are blinded to the beauty of our mystic knowledge and to the loveliness of Divine saintship and to the flashes of spiritual illumination, because eminent Ṣúfís regard popular applause and popular censure with equal indifference.

265Section.

One of the Shaykhs says: “The spirit in the body is like fire in fuel; the fire is created (makhlúq) and the coal is made (maṣnú`).” Nothing can be described as eternal except the essence and attributes of God. Abú Bakr Wásiṭí has discoursed on the spirit more than any of the Ṣúfí Shaykhs. It is related that he said: “There are ten stations (maqámát) of spirits: (1) the spirits of the sincere (mukhliṣán), which are imprisoned in a darkness and know not what will befall them; (2) the spirits of pious men (pársá-mardán), which in the heaven of this world rejoice in the fruits of their actions and take pleasure in devotions, and walk by the strength thereof; (3) the spirits of disciples (murídán), which are in the fourth heaven and dwell with the angels in the delights of veracity, and in the shadow of their good works; (4) the spirits of the beneficent (ahl-i minan) which are hung in lamps of light from the Throne of God, and their food is mercy, and their drink is favour and proximity; (5) the spirits of the faithful (ahl-i wafá), which thrill with joy in the veil of purity and the station of electness (iṣṭifá); (6) the spirits of martyrs (shahídán), which are in Paradise in the crops of birds, and go where they will in its gardens early and late; (7) the spirits of those who yearn (mushtáqán), which stand on the carpet of respect (adab) clad in the luminous veils of the Divine attributes; (8) the spirits of gnostics (`árifán), which, in the precincts of holiness, listen at morn and eve to the word of God and see their places in Paradise and in this world; (9) the spirits of lovers (dústán), which have become absorbed in contemplation of the Divine beauty and the station of revelation (kashf), and perceive nothing but God and rest content with no other thing; (10) the spirits of dervishes, which have found favour with God in the abode of annihilation, and have suffered a transformation of quality and a change of state.”