1660-1783
Reading edition
By
A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
Author of "The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812," etc.
TWELFTH EDITION
BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
Copyright, 1890, By Captain A. T. Mahan.
Copyright, 1918, By Ellen Lyle Mahan.
Printed in the United States of America
PREFACE.
The definite object proposed in this work is an examination of the general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history. Historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues has consequently been overlooked. This is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments.
A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of maritime power upon events may be drawn from two writers of that English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea. "Twice," says Arnold in his History of Rome, "Has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo." Sir Edward Creasy, quoting this, adds: "One point, however, of the similitude between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on; that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave the last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymen's confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe."
Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the victor. The Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to that long, perilous march through Gaul in which more than half his veteran troops wasted away; it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from the Rhone on to Spain, to intercept Hannibal's communications, to return in person and face the invader at the Trebia. Throughout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and unwearied, between Spain, which was Hannibal's base, and Italy, while the issue of the decisive battle of the Metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of Italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action of the Roman generals.
On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little about the connection between general history and their own particular topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the English; the genius and training of the former people leading them to more careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the mutual relation of events.
There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in general history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were modified by them.
The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American Revolution. While the thread of general history upon which the successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline. Writing as a naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the author has not hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics; but as technical language has been avoided, it is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be found of interest to the unprofessional reader.
A. T. MAHAN
December, 1889.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTORY.
History of Sea Power one of contest between nations, therefore largely military 1
Permanence of the teachings of history 2
Unsettled condition of modern naval opinion 2
Contrasts between historical classes of war-ships 2
Essential distinction between weather and lee gage 5
Analogous to other offensive and defensive positions 6
Consequent effect upon naval policy 6
Lessons of history apply especially to strategy 7
Less obviously to tactics, but still applicable 9
Illustrations:
The battle of the Nile, A.D. 1798 10
Trafalgar, A.D. 1805 11
Siege of Gibraltar, A.D. 1779-1782 12
Actium, B.C. 31, and Lepanto, A.D. 1571 13
Second Punic War, B.C. 218-201 14
Naval strategic combinations surer now than formerly 22
Wide scope of naval strategy 22
CHAPTER I.
Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power.
The sea a great common 25
Advantages of water-carriage over that by land 25
Navies exist for the protection of commerce 26
Dependence of commerce upon secure seaports 27
Development of colonies and colonial posts 28
Links in the chain of Sea Power: production, shipping, colonies 28
General conditions affecting Sea Power:
I. Geographical position 29
II. Physical conformation 35
III. Extent of territory 42
IV. Number of population 44
V. National character 50
VI. Character and policy of governments 58
England 59
Holland 67
France 69
Influence of colonies on Sea Power 82
The United States:
Its weakness in Sea Power 83
Its chief interest in internal development 84
Danger from blockades 85
Dependence of the navy upon the shipping interest 87
Conclusion of the discussion of the elements of Sea Power 88
Purpose of the historical narrative 89
CHAPTER II.
State of Europe in 1660.—Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665-1667.—Sea Battles of Lowestoft and of the Four Days
Accession of Charles II. and Louis XIV. 90
Followed shortly by general wars 91
French policy formulated by Henry IV. and Richelieu 92
Condition of France in 1660 93
Condition of Spain 94
Condition of the Dutch United Provinces 96
Their commerce and colonies 97
Character of their government 98
Parties in the State 99
Condition of England in 1660 99
Characteristics of French, English, and Dutch ships 101
Conditions of other European States 102
Louis XIV. the leading personality in Europe 103
His policy 104
Colbert's administrative acts 105
Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665 107
Battle of Lowestoft, 1665 108
Fire-ships, compared with torpedo-cruisers 109
The group formation 112
The order of battle for sailing-ships 115
The Four Days' Battle, 1666 117
Military merits of the opposing fleets 126
Soldiers commanding fleets, discussion 127
Ruyter in the Thames, 1667 132
Peace of Breda, 1667 132
Military value of commerce-destroying 132
CHAPTER III.
War of England and France in Alliance against the United Provinces, 1672-1674.—Finally, of France against Combined Europe, 1674-1678.—Sea Battles of Solebay, the Texel, and Stromboli.
Aggressions of Louis XIV. on Spanish Netherlands 139
Policy of the United Provinces 139
Triple alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden 140
Anger of Louis XIV. 140
Leibnitz proposes to Louis to seize Egypt 141
His memorial 142
Bargaining between Louis XIV. and Charles II. 143
The two kings declare war against the United Provinces 144
Military character of this war 144
Naval strategy of the Dutch 144
Tactical combinations of De Ruyter 145
Inefficiency of Dutch naval administration 145
Battle of Solebay, 1672 146
Tactical comments 147
Effect of the battle on the course of the war 148
Land campaign of the French in Holland 149
Murder of John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland 150
Accession to power of William of Orange 150
Uneasiness among European States 150
Naval battles off Schoneveldt, 1673 151
Naval battle of the Texel, 1673 152
Effect upon the general war 154
Equivocal action of the French fleet 155
General ineffectiveness of maritime coalitions 156
Military character of De Ruyter 157
Coalition against France 158
Peace between England and the United Provinces 158
Sicilian revolt against Spain 159
Battle of Stromboli, 1676 161
Illustration of Clerk's naval tactics 163
De Ruyter killed off Agosta 165
England becomes hostile to France 166
Sufferings of the United Provinces 167
Peace of Nimeguen, 1678 168
Effects of the war on France and Holland 169
Notice of Comte d'Estrées 170
CHAPTER IV.
English Revolution.—War of the League of Augsburg, 1688-1697.—Sea Battles of Beachy Head and La Hougue.
Aggressive policy of Louis XIV. 173
State of French, English, and Dutch navies 174
Accession of James II. 175
Formation of the League of Augsburg 176
Louis declares war against the Emperor of Germany 177
Revolution in England 178
Louis declares war against the United Provinces 178
William and Mary crowned 178
James II. lands in Ireland 179
Misdirection of French naval forces 180
William III. lands in Ireland 181
Naval battle of Beachy Head, 1690 182
Tourville's military character 184
Battle of the Boyne, 1690 186
End of the struggle in Ireland 186
Naval battle of La Hougue, 1692 189
Destruction of French ships 190
Influence of Sea Power in this war 191
Attack and defence of commerce 193
Peculiar characteristics of French privateering 195
Peace of Ryswick, 1697 197
Exhaustion of France: its causes 198
CHAPTER V.
War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713.—Sea Battle Of Malaga.
Failure of the Spanish line of the House of Austria 201
King of Spain wills the succession to the Duke of Anjou 202
Death of the King of Spain 202
Louis XIV. accepts the bequests 203
He seizes towns in Spanish Netherlands 203
Offensive alliance between England, Holland, and Austria 204
Declarations of war 205
The allies proclaim Carlos III. King of Spain 206
Affair of the Vigo galleons 207
Portugal joins the allies 208
Character of the naval warfare 209
Capture of Gibraltar by the English 210
Naval battle of Malaga, 1704 211
Decay of the French navy 212
Progress of the land war 213
Allies seize Sardinia and Minorca 215
Disgrace of Marlborough 216
England offers terms of peace 217
Peace of Utrecht, 1713 218
Terms of the peace 219
Results of the war to the different belligerents 219
Commanding position of Great Britain 224
Sea Power dependent upon both commerce and naval strength 225
Peculiar position of France as regards Sea Power 226
Depressed condition of France 227
Commercial prosperity of England 228
Ineffectiveness of commerce-destroying 229
Duguay-Trouin's expedition against Rio de Janeiro, 1711 230
War between Russia and Sweden 231
CHAPTER VI.
The Regency in France.—Alberoni in Spain.—Policies of Walpole and Fleuri.—War of the Polish Succession.—English Contraband Trade in Spanish America.—Great Britain declares War against Spain.—1715-1739.
Death of Queen Anne and Louis XIV. 232
Accession of George I. 232
Regency of Philip of Orleans 233
Administration of Alberoni in Spain 234
Spaniards invade Sardinia 235
Alliance of Austria, England, Holland, and France 235
Spaniards invade Sicily 236
Destruction of Spanish navy off Cape Passaro, 1718 237
Failure and dismissal of Alberoni 239
Spain accepts terms 239
Great Britain interferes in the Baltic 239
Death of Philip of Orleans 241
Administration of Fleuri in France 241
Growth of French commerce 242
France in the East Indies 243
Troubles between England and Spain 244
English contraband trade in Spanish America 245
Illegal search of English ships 246
Walpole's struggles to preserve peace 247
War of the Polish Succession 247
Creation of the Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies 248
Bourbon family compact 248
France acquires Bar and Lorraine 249
England declares war against Spain 250
Morality of the English action toward Spain 250
Decay of the French navy 252
Death of Walpole and of Fleuri 253
CHAPTER VII.
War between Great Britain and Spain, 1739.—War of the Austrian Succession, 1740.—France joins Spain against Great Britain, 1744.—Sea Battles of Matthews, Anson, and Hawke.—Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.
Characteristics of the wars from 1739 to 1783 254
Neglect of the navy by French government 254
Colonial possessions of the French, English, and Spaniards 255
Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in India 258
Condition of the contending navies 259
Expeditions of Vernon and Anson 261
Outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession 262
England allies herself to Austria 262
Naval affairs in the Mediterranean 263
Influence of Sea Power on the war 264
Naval battle off Toulon, 1744 265
Causes of English failure 267
Courts-martial following the action 268
Inefficient action of English navy 269
Capture of Louisburg by New England colonists, 1745 269
Causes which concurred to neutralize England's Sea Power 269
France overruns Belgium and invades Holland 270
Naval actions of Anson and Hawke 271
Brilliant defence of Commodore l'Étenduère 272
Projects of Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in the East Indies 273
Influence of Sea Power in Indian affairs 275
La Bourdonnais reduces Madras 276
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748 277
Madras exchanged for Louisburg 277
Results of the war 278
Effect of Sea Power on the issue 279
CHAPTER VIII.
Seven Years' War, 1756-1763.—England's Overwhelming Power and Conquests on the Seas, in North America, Europe, and East and West Indies.—Sea Battles: Byng off Minorca; Hawke and Conflans; Pocock and D'Aché in East Indies.
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle leaves many questions unsettled 281
Dupleix pursues his aggressive policy 281
He is recalled from India 282
His policy abandoned by the French 282
Agitation in North America 283
Braddock's expedition, 1755 284
Seizure of French ships by the English, while at peace 285
French expedition against Port Mahon, 1756 285
Byng sails to relieve the place 286
Byng's action off Port Mahon, 1756 286
Characteristics of the French naval policy 287
Byng returns to Gibraltar 290
He is relieved, tried by court-martial, and shot 290
Formal declarations of war by England and France 291
England's appreciation of the maritime character of the war 291
France is drawn into a continental struggle 292
The Seven Years' War (1756-1763) begins 293
Pitt becomes Prime Minister of England 293
Operations in North America 293
Fall of Louisburg, 1758 294
Fall of Quebec, 1759, and of Montreal, 1760 294
Influence of Sea Power on the continental war 295
English plans for the general naval operations 296
Choiseul becomes Minister in France 297
He plans an invasion of England 297
Sailing of the Toulon fleet, 1759 298
Its disastrous encounter with Boscawen 299
Consequent frustration of the invasion of England 300
Project to invade Scotland 300
Sailing of the Brest fleet 300
Hawke falls in with it and disperses it, 1759 302
Accession of Charles III. to Spanish throne 304
Death of George II. 304
Clive in India 305
Battle of Plassey, 1757 306
Decisive influence of Sea Power upon the issues in India 307
Naval actions between Pocock and D'Aché, 1758, 1759 307
Destitute condition of French naval stations in India 309
The French fleet abandons the struggle 310
Final fall of the French power in India 310
Ruined condition of the French navy 311
Alliance between France and Spain 313
England declares war against Spain 313
Rapid conquest of French and Spanish colonies 314
French and Spaniards invade Portugal 316
The invasion repelled by England 316
Severe reverses of the Spaniards in all quarters 316
Spain sues for peace 317
Losses of British mercantile shipping 317
Increase of British commerce 318
Commanding position of Great Britain 319
Relations of England and Portugal 320
Terms of the Treaty of Paris 321
Opposition to the treaty in Great Britain 322
Results of the maritime war 323
Results of the continental war 324
Influence of Sea Power in countries politically unstable 324
Interest of the United States in the Central American Isthmus 325
Effects of the Seven Years' War on the later history of Great Britain 326
Subsequent acquisitions of Great Britain 327
British success due to maritime superiority 328
Mutual dependence of seaports and fleets 329
CHAPTER IX.
Course of Events from the Peace of Paris to 1778.—Maritime War Consequent upon the American Revolution.—Sea Battle off Ushant.
French discontent with the Treaty of Paris 330
Revival of the French navy 331
Discipline among French naval officers of the time 332
Choiseul's foreign policy 333
Domestic troubles in Great Britain 334
Controversies with the North American colonies 334
Genoa cedes Corsica to France 334
Dispute between England and Spain about the Falkland Islands 335
Choiseul dismissed 336
Death of Louis XV. 336
Naval policy of Louis XVI. 337
Characteristics of the maritime war of 1778 338
Instructions of Louis XVI. to the French admirals 339
Strength of English navy 341
Characteristics of the military situation in America 341
The line of the Hudson 342
Burgoyne's expedition from Canada 343
Howe carries his army from New York to the Chesapeake 343
Surrender of Burgoyne, 1777 343
American privateering 344
Clandestine support of the Americans by France 345
Treaty between France and the Americans 346
Vital importance of the French fleet to the Americans 347
The military situation in the different quarters of the globe 347
Breach between France and England 350
Sailing of the British and French fleets 350
Battle of Ushant, 1778 351
Position of a naval commander-in-chief in battle 353
CHAPTER X.
Maritime War in North America and West Indies, 1778-1781.—Its Influence upon the Course of the American Revolution.—Fleet Actions off Grenada, Dominica, and Chesapeake Bay.
D'Estaing sails from Toulon for Delaware Bay, 1778 359
British ordered to evacuate Philadelphia 359
Rapidity of Lord Howe's movements 360
D'Estaing arrives too late 360
Follows Howe to New York 360
Fails to attack there and sails for Newport 361
Howe follows him there 362
Both fleets dispersed by a storm 362
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Boston 363
Howe's activity foils D'Estaing at all points 363
D'Estaing sails for the West Indies 365
The English seize Sta. Lucia 365
Ineffectual attempts of D'Estaing to dislodge them 366
D'Estaing captures Grenada 367
Naval battle of Grenada, 1779; English ships crippled 367
D'Estaing fails to improve his advantages 370
Reasons for his neglect 371
French naval policy 372
English operations in the Southern States 375
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Savannah 375
His fruitless assault on Savannah 376
D'Estaing returns to France 376
Fall of Charleston 376
De Guichen takes command in the West Indies 376
Rodney arrives to command English fleet 377
His military character 377
First action between Rodney and De Guichen, 1780 378
Breaking the line 380
Subsequent movements of Rodney and De Guichen 381
Rodney divides his fleet 381
Goes in person to New York 381
De Guichen returns to France 381
Arrival of French forces in Newport 382
Rodney returns to the West Indies 382
War between England and Holland 382
Disasters to the United States in 1780 382
De Grasse sails from Brest for the West Indies, 1781 383
Engagement with English fleet off Martinique 383
Cornwallis overruns the Southern States 384
He retires upon Wilmington, N.C., and thence to Virginia 385
Arnold on the James River 385
The French fleet leaves Newport to intercept Arnold 385
Meets the English fleet off the Chesapeake, 1781 386
French fleet returns to Newport 387
Cornwallis occupies Yorktown 387
De Grasse sails from Hayti for the Chesapeake 388
Action with the British fleet, 1781 389
Surrender of Cornwallis, 1781 390
Criticism of the British naval operations 390
Energy and address shown by De Grasse 392
Difficulties of Great Britain's position in the war of 1778 392
The military policy best fitted to cope with them 393
Position of the French squadron in Newport, R.I., 1780 394
Great Britain's defensive position and inferior numbers 396
Consequent necessity for a vigorous initiative 396
Washington's opinions as to the influence of Sea Power on the American contest 397
CHAPTER XI.
Maritime War in Europe, 1779-1782.
Objectives of the allied operations in Europe 401
Spain declares war against England 401
Allied fleets enter the English Channel, 1779 402
Abortive issue of the cruise 403
Rodney sails with supplies for Gibraltar 403
Defeats the Spanish squadron of Langara and relieves the place 404
The allies capture a great British convoy 404
The armed neutrality of the Baltic powers, 1780 405
England declares war against Holland 406
Gibraltar is revictualled by Admiral Derby 407
The allied fleets again in the Channel, 1781 408
They retire without effecting any damage to England 408
Destruction of a French convoy for the West Indies 408
Fall of Port Mahon, 1782 409
The allied fleets assemble at Algesiras 409
Grand attack of the allies on Gibraltar, which fails, 1782 410
Lord Howe succeeds in revictualling Gibraltar 412
Action between his fleet and that of the allies 412
Conduct of the war of 1778 by the English government 412
Influence of Sea Power 416
Proper use of the naval forces 416
CHAPTER XII.
Events in the East Indies, 1778-1781.—Suffren sails from Brest for India, 1781.—His Brilliant Naval Campaign in the Indian Seas, 1782, 1783.
Neglect of India by the French government 419
England at war with Mysore and with the Mahrattas 420
Arrival of the French squadron under Comte d'Orves 420
It effects nothing and returns to the Isle of France 420
Suffren sails from Brest with five ships-of-the-line, 1781 421
Attacks an English squadron in the Cape Verde Islands, 1781 422
Conduct and results of this attack 424
Distinguishing merits of Suffren as a naval leader 425
Suffren saves the Cape Colony from the English 427
He reaches the Isle of France 427
Succeeds to the chief command of the French fleet 427
Meets the British squadron under Hughes at Madras 427
Analysis of the naval strategic situation in India 428
The first battle between Suffren and Hughes, Feb. 17, 1782 430
Suffren's views of the naval situation in India 433
Tactical oversights made by Suffren 434
Inadequate support received by him from his captains 435
Suffren goes to Pondicherry, Hughes to Trincomalee 436
The second battle between Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782 437
Suffren's tactics in the action 439
Relative injuries received by the opposing fleets 441
Contemporaneous English criticisms upon Hughes's conduct 442
Destitute condition of Suffren's fleet 443
His activity and success in supplying wants 443
He communicates with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore 443
Firmness and insight shown by Suffren 445
His refusal to obey orders from home to leave the Indian Coast 446
The third battle between Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782 447
Qualities shown by Hughes 449
Stubborn fighting by the British admiral and captains 449
Suffren deprives three captains of their commands 449
Dilatory conduct of Admiral Hughes 450
Suffren attacks and takes Trincomalee 450
Strategic importance of this success 451
Comparative condition of the two fleets in material for repairs 451
The English government despatches powerful reinforcements 452
The French court fails to support Suffren 452
The fourth battle between Suffren and Hughes, Sept. 3, 1782 453
Mismanagement and injuries of the French 455
Contrast between the captains in the opposing fleets 456
Two ships of Suffren's fleet grounded and lost 457
Arrival of British reinforcements under Admiral Bickerton 458
Approach of bad-weather season; Hughes goes to Bombay 458
Military situation of French and English in India 459
Delays of the French reinforcements under Bussy 460
Suffren takes his fleet to Achem, in Sumatra 460
He returns to the Indian coast 461
Arrival of Bussy 461
Decline of the French power on shore 461
The English besiege Bussy in Cuddalore by land and sea 462
Suffren relieves the place 462
The fifth battle between Suffren and Hughes, June 20, 1783 463
Decisive character of Suffren's action 463
News of the peace received at Madras 463
Suffren sails for France 464
His flattering reception everywhere 464
His distinguishing military qualities 465
His later career and death 466
CHAPTER XIII.
Events in the West Indies after the Surrender of Yorktown.— Encounters of De Grasse with Hood.—The Sea Battle of the Saints.—1781-1782.
Maritime struggle transferred from the continent to West Indies 468
De Grasse sails for the islands 469
French expedition against the island of St. Christopher, January, 1782 469
Hood attempts to relieve the garrison 470
Manœuvres of the two fleets 471
Action between De Grasse and Hood 472
Hood seizes the anchorage left by De Grasse 473
De Grasse attacks Hood at his anchorage 474
Hood maintains his position 475
Surrender of the garrison and island 475
Merits of Hood's action 476
Criticism upon De Grasse's conduct 477
Rodney arrives in West Indies from England 479
Junction of Rodney and Hood at Antigua 479
De Grasse returns to Martinique 479
Allied plans to capture Jamaica 479
Rodney takes his station at Sta. Lucia 480
The French fleet sails and is pursued by Rodney 480
Action of April 9, 1782 481
Criticism upon the action 483
The chase continued; accidents to French ships 484
The naval battle of the Saints, April 12, 1782 485
Rodney breaks the French line 488
Capture of the French commander-in-chief and five ships-of-the-line 489
Details of the action 489
Analysis of the effects of Rodney's manœuvre 491
Tactical bearing of improvements in naval equipment 493
Lessons of this short naval campaign 495
Rodney's failure to pursue the French fleet 496
Examination of his reasons and of the actual conditions 497
Probable effect of this failure upon the conditions of peace 498
Rodney's opinions upon the battle of April 12 499
Successes achieved by Rodney during his command 500
He is recalled by a new ministry 500
Exaggerated view of the effects of this battle upon the war 500
Subsequent career of De Grasse 501
Court-martial ordered upon the officers of the French fleet 502
Findings of the court 502
De Grasse appeals against the finding 503
He is severely rebuked by the king 503
Deaths of De Grasse, Rodney, and Hood 504
CHAPTER XIV.
Critical Discussion of the Maritime War of 1778.
The war of 1778 purely maritime 505
Peculiar interest therefore attaching to it 506
Successive steps in the critical study of a war 507
Distinction between "object" and "objective" 507
Parties to the war of 1778 507
Objects of the different belligerents 508
Foundations of the British Empire of the seas 510
Threatened by the revolt of the colonies 510
The British fleet inferior in numbers to the allies 511
Choice of objectives 511
The fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere 513
Elements essential to an active naval war 514
The bases of operations in the war of 1778:—
In Europe 515
On the American continent 515
In the West Indies 516
In the East Indies 518
Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons 518
The bases abroad generally deficient in resources 519
Consequent increased importance of the communications 519
The navies the guardians of the communications 520
Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India 520
Inquiry into the disposition of the naval forces 521
Difficulty of obtaining information at sea 521
Perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition 522
Disadvantages of the defensive 523
England upon the defensive in 1778 523
Consequent necessity for wise and vigorous action 524
The key of the situation 525
British naval policy in the Napoleonic wars 525
British naval policy in the Seven Years' War 527
Difficulties attending this policy 527
Disposition of the British navy in the war of 1778 528
Resulting inferiority on many critical occasions 528
Effect on the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases 529
The distribution of the British navy exposes it to being out-numbered at many points 531
The British naval policy in 1778 and in other wars compared 532
Naval policy of the allies 535
Divergent counsels of the coalition 536
"Ulterior objects" 537
The allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude 538
Dangers of this line of action 538
Glamour of commerce-destroying 539
The conditions of peace, 1783 540
Index 543
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
LIST OF MAPS.
I. Mediterranean Sea 15
II. English Channel and North Sea 107
III. Indian Peninsula and Ceylon 257
IV. North Atlantic Ocean 532
PLANS OF NAVAL BATTLES.
In these plans, when the capital letters A, B, C, and D are used, all positions marked by the same capital are simultaneous.
I. Four Days' Battle, 1666 119
II. Four Days' Battle, 1666 124
III. Battle of Solebay, 1672 146
IV. Battle of the Texel, 1673 153
V. Battle of Stromboli, 1676 161
Va. Pocock and D'Aché, 1758 161
VI. Battle of Beachy Head, 1690 183
VIa. Battle of La Hougue, 1692 183
VII. Matthews's Action off Toulon, 1744 265
VIIa. Byng's Action off Minorca, 1756 265
VIII. Hawke and Conflans, 1759 303
IX. Battle of Ushant, 1778 351
X. D'Estaing and Byron, 1779 368
XI. Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780 378
XII. Arbuthnot and Destouches, 1781 386
XIII. Suffren at Porto Praya, 1781 423
XIV. Suffren and Hughes, February 17, 1782 431
XV. Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782 438
XVI. Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782 447
XVII. Suffren and Hughes, September 3, 1782 454
XVIII. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 470
XIX. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 472
XX. Rodney and De Grasse, April 9, 1782 482
XXI. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782 486