Part 3 — CHAPTER XI THE FUTURE OF CHINA—MAINTENANCE OR PARTITION OF THE CELESTIAL EMPIRE?

Necessity of proceeding slowly with the Reform movement in China, if the overthrow of the Empire is to be averted—Weakness of the Government at Peking—The Emperor and the Reformer, Kang-Yu-Wei—The Empress Dowager and Li Hung-chang—Palace revolution in September, 1898—Enormous obstacles in the way of the Celestial Empire reforming itself—Reasons why it cannot follow the example of Japan in 1868—The possibility of partition—The interests of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, partizans of the ‘open door’ policy, and of Germany, Russia, and France—The dangers incurred by partition—Difficulties of effecting it pacifically, and also for Europeans to govern the hundreds of millions of Chinese—The anarchy that might result—Services which might be rendered to progress by the Chinese Government in preventing too rapid a transition—Possibility of converting the Chinese to material progress.

‘Every time that the bones of China are rattled—and they have never been more vigorously than at present’—said a technical English paper, ‘an increase of commerce follows.’ Nothing can be truer; but, at the same time, it might be prudent not to shake the old skeleton too violently, too often, or too long, if we do not wish to see it tumble to pieces. China is a sort of amorphous State whose different parts are joined together by the very weakest ties, concerning which we know little or nothing, and whose main force consists in tradition and in the existence of a governing class of literati, recruited throughout the Empire, even among the very people. On the other hand, germs of serious disaffection do exist; the actual Dynasty is a foreign one, which, at the beginning of the century, the terrible Taiping Rebellion—only suppressed with the assistance of Europeans—nearly ruined, and the descendants of the old national Ming Dynasty are still living. The accession 277to the throne of the present Emperor was irregular, it seems, according to Chinese procedure, and the country is honeycombed by secret societies, whose object is the overthrow of the existing state of affairs. The mass of the people are totally indifferent to politics, and very rarely exhibit hostility to foreigners, if the latter behave with circumspection, unless, indeed, they are urged on by fanatics or malcontents, when, unfortunately, they are easily roused. In the principal towns of every prefecture and sub-prefecture there exists a heterogeneous mass of soured and fanatical literati, who pursue the humblest trades in order to keep themselves from starvation, who are intimately mixed up with the people, by whom they are treated with great respect, and who will obey their commands to overthrow the Europeans and their innovations.

The Government of Peking is too thoroughly convinced of its external weakness to openly resist any demand imposed upon it by the Powers, but if it be too hardly pressed, and forced to introduce or allow the premature introduction of all sorts of innovations, and in too many places at once, it may run the risk of exciting against it the literati, who regard, and not without reason, any extension of European influence as a menace to their privileges. Such action might easily lead to active opposition to all reform, especially in the central and southern provinces, more backward than those of the north, and, if leaders of the movement can be discovered, lead to the complete disorganization of the Celestial Empire. Trouble has already occurred in Sze-chuan, as well as further in the lower valley of the Yang-tsze. A rather serious insurrection broke out in 1898 in the Kwang-si and Kwang-tung, but without any result. We know that local troubles in so badly governed a country as China of a necessity must become chronic, but in many cases the news concerning them reaches Europe considerably embellished and exaggerated.

It is certain that the elements of disorder are just now greatly excited. Even at Peking rival factions are disputing for power; the events which occurred there in September, 1898, are little, and possibly never will be completely, known, and it would be impossible to relate with any approach to truth the tragedies and comedies that are constantly being enacted within the walls of the Forbidden City.

The Emperor Kuang-Su, a young man of twenty-five, with a sickly body, and, it is said, a weak mind, had been completely 278won over to the Reform movement by a literate of the new school, named Kang-Yu-Wei, who hailed from Canton. His Celestial Majesty, with all the zeal of a neophyte, was induced during the summer to issue a distinctly revolutionary edict. It was said that he went so far as to presume to wear a European costume, and that he even intended going personally to Japan to observe there for himself the transformation which had been effected in the last thirty years. The Reform party undoubtedly had entertained Japanese as well as English sympathies, and its chief, Kang-Yu-Wei, passed his last night at Peking in the Japanese Legation. Marquis Ito, it is said, discouraged the precipitation with which it was intended to carry out in a few weeks reforms that had taken more than a quarter of a century to accomplish in Japan.

Such an attempt had no chance of success, for it not only opposed many prejudices and interests, but was opposed by all the Manchu functionaries, by Li Hung-chang, who had been recently disgraced, and by the Empress Dowager. His Celestial Majesty pretended to arrest this last-named personage, who is his aunt, and not his mother; but the astute Princess defeated his object. The great majority of the mandarins being hostile to the movement, she soon possessed herself of the necessary tools for her purpose. The Emperor was in his turn imprisoned in his palace, and forced to apologize and sign an edict placing the reins of Government entirely in the hands of the Dowager. The immediate consequence of this act was that all the mandarins of the old school, among them Li Hung-chang, returned forthwith to power; Kang-Yu-Wei took flight on board an English vessel, and most of his partizans were either beheaded or sent into exile, and very soon all trace of their work was effaced.

From this imprudent attempt at reform we may derive a few useful lessons. In the first place it showed the instability of the Peking Government, and also the existence, but at the same time the impotence, of the Reform party among the literati; and in the second it accentuated that dangerous factor in the politics of the Far East, the inflexible antagonism existing between England and Russia. The Empress Tze-Hsi is undoubtedly a very clever woman; she first governed the Empire in the capacity of Regent, but since 1887 she has, with the assistance of Li Hung-chang, who is said to have been a former lover, done so in the name of her nephew, absolutely 279refusing to abdicate. Her rule has been undoubtedly pernicious to China, for it has invariably been reactionary. As an instance in point, an important Viceroy has been recently reprimanded for attempting to reorganize on the European system the troops in the provinces which he administered. The Tsung-li-Yamen has likewise in a very short time contrived to strengthen the party opposed to innovation, and all sorts of restrictions have been placed in the way of the exploitation of the mines. For all this, be it bad or good, the Government of Tze-Hsi and of Li Hung-chang is nevertheless a Government; but both the Empress and her Minister are aged, and one may naturally ask what will occur when they are no longer of this world.

The Reform party, which seems to have the sympathy of a few high functionaries, does not apparently include many of the mandarin class; the unsuccessful literati, who struggle for existence in the towns of the interior, and who are in immediate contact with the people, apparently remain outside of all notion of progress, being absolutely convinced of the immense superiority of the Chinese over the barbarians. It is therefore very difficult to imagine how a handful of innovators can ever be able to impose their ideas against so much prejudice. A revolution, such as occurred in Japan in 1868, which rushed that Empire into the ways of reform, stands no chance of being effected in China, and even if it were, it would only receive just such another rebuff as happened in 1898, or else lead to anarchy and the dismemberment of the Empire.

The situation in China to-day is essentially different from that of Japan thirty years ago. In the first place the Chinese civilization which gave way in Japan to European was not of domestic growth, but essentially an imported article of extreme antiquity, which never succeeded in stultifying the Japanese people as it has done the Chinese; what is more, ancestors and classics were never held by the Japanese in the same veneration as is bestowed upon them by the Chinese. Far above the traditions of Confucius and of the Wise Men of old stood the Mikado of divine descent and the spirit of national independence. The first object of the Japanese Revolution in 1868 was to restore the Emperor to the plenitude of his power, a result attained by the union of the principal clans, as we have already explained. Although it resulted in the suppression of feudalism and the introduction of European civilization, it was 280originally not presented in this form, and if the entire nation eventually accepted these innovations, it was because they had been consecrated by the divine Emperor, and, moreover, were approved of by a powerful army which had always been friendly to progress and prompt to resist reaction.

Those advantages that so greatly favoured the Japanese reformers are non-existent in China. There is no military party in Peking friendly to Reform or eager to assist the reformers in seizing supreme power at the right moment and helping them to retain it. The initiative, therefore, cannot come from either the capital or the provinces. Instead of the Japanese daimios, or hereditary chieftains, surrounded by innumerable and faithful vassals, we have in China viceroys who are invariably strangers in the provinces they administer, and are spied upon by Tatar marshals having at their disposal by way of an army a horde of ill-disciplined ragamuffins, whom, even if an attempt were made to transform them into genuine soldiers, a task which would require many years to effect, the Court at Peking, being against the scheme, would soon disband. No martial spirit or feeling of patriotism exists in China to induce the governing classes to give up their privileges, even though it were for the benefit of the country. The tenacious attachment of the Chinese to their very ancient but stationary civilization is their greatest impediment to progress, especially as love of country is a mere empty sound to the vast majority of Chinamen.

Another and very important difference between China to-day and Japan in 1868 is that thirty years ago Europe permitted the Island Empire to accomplish its own revolution without interference, whereas to-day the Powers would assuredly prevent any attempt at a too sudden evolution in the Government of the Celestial Empire, which would only plunge the country into a deplorable condition of turmoil. Even now the Dowager Empress’s party is known as the Russian, and that of Kang-Yu-Wei as the Anglo-Japanese. Possibly this may be an exaggerated view of the case, and that neither party is in the service of any particular Power; but the incorruptibility of Li Hung-chang must be taken with a grain of salt. It is, however, certain that the Legations watch with a jealous eye the intrigues of the various factions, and that the disgrace of Li Hung-chang is looked upon as a victory for England, and each return to power of the Viceroy of Pe-chi-li 281as a Russian success. No worse sign could possibly exist for a State than the perpetual interference of foreign Powers in its affairs.

‘Are we about to witness the dismemberment of China?’ is a question people are constantly asking themselves. No one in particular wishes for it, since the division of such an inheritance would be disputed by at least five or six claimants, who will only settle their differences at the sword’s point. For the past twenty-five years Europe has trembled at the bare thought of war, and we must not be surprised if she dreads the mere mention of the disruption of China, which would be even more dreadful, since it means universal war, in which the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, as well as the Continental Powers, would each take a share. Even if the matter were settled amicably, what country would care to govern eighty or a hundred millions of Chinamen? Some people say that it could easily be settled by not attempting to govern them at all, in other words, to let things go their way; but no European Power would, or could, do otherwise than rule them methodically, according to our modern ideas of government. To-day, if a band of brigands exists in any obscure corner of China, nobody troubles about it, but once that corner belongs to a European Power, the irresistible desire of attempting to establish order would assuredly lead to an insurrection. The introduction of European methods is certain to upset many of the old customs and traditions to which the Chinese hold with almost pathetic tenacity. It requires an amazing tact to govern the Chinese, a fact made daily manifest in Hong-Kong, and illustrated by the recent serious outbreak in the French concession at Shanghai, where a disturbance took place over the removal of a time-honoured sanctuary to make way for a public road. The difficulties encountered by Europeans in every country imbued with Chinese ideas—those of the English in Burmah, the French in Tongking, and the Japanese at Formosa—prove, if proof were needed, how great is the resisting power and the risks any European nation would have to encounter which attempted to govern even a fragment of the vast Chinese Empire.

On the other hand, each Power, whilst dreading the consequences of a partition, is equally unwilling to behold a rival carry off the lion’s share. It is, therefore, with an eye to an eventual partition that each nation endeavours to obtain a 282privileged position in certain regions, and to possess itself of spheres of interest by forcing China to make the singular promise never to cede any portion of territory in certain defined provinces to any nation but to the one which obtains the promise. But this sort of promise is fraught with difficulties, and a source of eventual hostilities between nations having pretensions upon the same region, just as it is between the partizans of ‘spheres of interest’ and those of the ‘open door.’

In order to understand the policy of the various Powers in China, in which they see a very important field for exploitation, we must first consider their commercial interests in the Celestial Empire. The British Empire incontestably occupies first place in the foreign commerce of China, which in 1897 stood at 366,000,000 hai-kwan taels, or £54,900,000 (1 tael = 3s.). Of this 236,934,000 taels, or £35,540,100, two-thirds of the whole, belongs, according to the Imperial Chinese Customs Report, to Great Britain. Here, however, we must not be misled, for if we subdivide this sum, we shall see that about £5,500,000 alone belong to England, £5,000,000 to her colonies other than Hong-Kong, through which the remainder, that is to say, about £23,000,000 worth of goods, passes, Hong-Kong being merely a point of transit. Goods imported from Germany, America and Russia into China, passing through this island port, or being exported thence to the four corners of the globe, are put down to England. Then, again, a very important trade is carried on between the North and the South of China through Hong-Kong, and thus it comes to pass that Great Britain gets the credit for commerce which does not really belong to her. If Hong-Kong possessed proper Custom-house statistics, it would be easy to account for the origin and destination of the merchandise which passes through this port; but such statistics do not exist. Under these circumstances, we must turn either to those of the various countries of Europe and America, or to the detailed statistics of the Chinese Customs, which frequently rectify the total amounts, whereby we learn that £692,700 worth of Russian petroleum is imported, whereas the total imports from Russia by sea are only estimated at £485,100. The difference must, therefore, be accounted for as having passed through Hong-Kong. A comparison between the Chinese Customs statistics and those of Germany, the United States, French Indo-China, and other countries, obliges us, however, to admit that three-fifths at least of the 283trade of Hong-Kong really belongs to the British Empire, which leaves to the latter about £27,000,000, that is, 40 to 50 per cent. of the total foreign commerce of the Celestial Empire. In the matter of imports, the English reign supreme, holding at least three-fourths in their hands, and dominating the market by the two principal articles, opium and cotton. Moreover, their flag floats over 65 per cent. of the total tonnage registered in the Chinese ports; of 636 foreign houses of business established in the open ports, 374 are English; of 11,600 foreigners, 5,000 are British subjects; and English is the language most spoken throughout the ports of the Far East. When we take all these facts into consideration, we are obliged to acknowledge that, having so many interests to defend in this part of the globe, England has a right to let her voice be heard clearly in commercial affairs. We must not be surprised, therefore, if she insists upon the ‘open door’ policy in China. The question now arises, Does she seek territory in the Celestial Empire? She has apparently sacrificed the ‘spheres of interest’ theory by exacting from China an engagement not to cede anything in the basin of the Yang-tsze, and the English Jingoes are already dreaming that Great Britain will be mistress not only from the Cape to Cairo, but from Cairo to Shanghai. ‘Are not the Arabian Coast and the Persian Gulf,’ I recently read in an English paper, ‘already ours, and morally subject to our protectorate? Once we possess the valley of the Yang-tsze, who is to prevent our constructing a rival line to the Trans-Siberian from the mouth of the Nile to that of the Blue River?’^[28] Although just at present it were best not to count too much on the wisdom and coolness of the British, nevertheless, their statesmen seem to appreciate the dangers of so beautiful a dream. They, at least, understand that the peril of the British Empire lies in its enormous extent. The majority of the British would, no doubt, be satisfied if they were allowed to place their capital and their commerce on a footing of equality with that of other countries in the Celestial Empire, if the territorial encroachments of the Powers did not justify the fear of the creation of a protectionist tariff. We may, therefore, hope that Great Britain, having obtained all that she desires in the way of strategic 284points for the benefit of her naval forces, and also a great number of commercial concessions, will remain contented with her lot, and not dream of attacking the independence of China, but rather be inclined to help her to regain power.^[29]

After England the United States do the greatest business with China. They only figure for £4,500,000 in the Chinese Customs statistics, but their own official publications give £7,840,000. Petroleum and cotton goods are the principal articles of their commerce, which is sure to be enormously increased in the future as the Middle Kingdom requires more and more machinery, which is manufactured to-day much more cheaply in America than anywhere else. The United States are represented in China by thirty-two houses of business and 1,564 citizens; their mercantile marine is, however, very insignificant, but having of late assumed a position among the world’s Powers, and being already installed in the Philippines, they are sure to increase their mercantile fleet very rapidly, and as they aspire to become one day mistress of the Pacific, they watch with a very jealous eye all that happens in the Far East. However protectionist they may be at home, they are resolute partizans of the ‘open door’ in this market, of which they justly hope to eventually acquire a large part through their enterprise. Already a coolness has occurred in their friendship with Russia, and in January, 1900, they obtained a guarantee that none of the Powers should establish differential tariffs in leased ‘spheres of interest.’

Japan takes the third rank with a rapidly increasing commerce, which in 1897 reached £5,850,000. Her spun cotton rivals that of England and India. Seven hundred Japanese are registered as residing in the different ports. The Celestial Empire has no warmer friends at the present moment than the Japanese. The Japanese papers are full of articles which compare the position of the two countries to that of Prussia and Austria after Sadowa, and preach reconciliation, and a close alliance was already spoken of with enthusiasm at the close of the War. Many Japanese statesmen are studying this question, among them the Marquis Ito, four times Prime Minister, and Prince Konoye, President of the Chamber of Peers, who travelled in China, and stayed in Peking in 1898 and 1899. 285According to certain signs, their overtures have not been altogether fruitless. The Government of the Empress Dowager does not seem to entertain any particular rancour against the Japanese for the sympathies which they expressed for the Reformer Kang-Yu-Wei, and undoubtedly seeks some support in order to withdraw itself from the over-exclusive domination of Russia. If this last Power is feared in Peking, it would seem that Japan is at the present time the most considered, whose counsels are best heard, and who best serves as the intermediary for progress into China. It is from Japan that China obtains instructors for her army, and that the Viceroy Chang-Chih-tung not only borrowed money, but also engineers for his foundry at Hanyang. The cementing of a formal alliance will no doubt be prevented through fear of Russia, and very probably China does not desire it very sincerely. Possibly at Peking they continue to despise the Japanese as much as they do Europeans, although they may have a preference for the former. One thing is certain, and that is, that the relations between the Governments at Peking and Tokio are better than they were before the War. Of the Western Powers, England is most preferred by the Mikado’s subjects, although even with her they are a little suspicious. A feeling of intense resentment is still expressed by the vast majority of the Japanese against Russia. A small minority, however, desire that an understanding should be arrived at with her. This party, however, also wishes for the ‘open door,’ China being the only outlet for their young and already important cotton industry.

These three nations—England, the United States, and Japan—complete the group of the whole-hearted partizans of the ‘open door.’ The British press has often expressed a desire to see an alliance effected between them, and if this were only created between England and Japan it would be very formidable in the Far East. The Japanese fleet is excellent, and whatever may be our opinion of the ability of the Mikado’s sailors, it is certain that, once united to the English fleet under the command of an English admiral, it could soon sweep the China Seas, and it would then be easy to embark an army of a hundred, even of two hundred thousand men, whom it would be difficult, even according to Russian officers, for the Tsar’s army in the Far East to resist. Perhaps Russia has pushed the Empire of the Rising Sun too much and too soon into the arms of England.

286Germany, who, according to her own statistics, carries on a trade with China valued at £3,400,000, of which £2,320,000 are imports into China, and who counts 104 commercial houses instead of the 78 in 1892, and registers 870 residents in the Treaty Ports, divides her preferences between the policy of the ‘spheres of influence’ and the ‘open door.’ If she has reserved a right of preference in the public works to be undertaken in Shan-tung, she soothes the irritation of the English by making Kiao-chau a free port; but, notwithstanding the antipathy which exists at heart between the two nations and the progress of German commerce, often at the cost of British trade, and thanks to the more obliging manners and greater activity of the German merchants, a distinct amelioration has taken place since the end of 1898 in the relations between the two Governments, and Germany seems for the present to have turned her back upon the Franco-Russian group in the Far East in order to support British policy. One province alone in China is not enough for her commercial enterprise, and she fears to see protection closing the other ports.

We now come to Russia. Her total commerce with the Celestial Empire does not amount to more than about £3,000,000, half of which passes overland by way of Siberia. Petroleum as an import and tea as an export are the two great articles of Russian trade with the Celestial Empire. There are very few Russians living in China, and those who do so are mainly established in the port of Hankow. Russia’s objects in the East are almost entirely political, and it is very probable that her protective tariff will follow her territorial aggrandizement. Being already mistress of Manchuria, she officially fixed the southern limits of her sphere of influence, at the time of the affair of the Niu-chwang Railway, at the Great Wall. To the north is a vast stretch of land almost entirely desert. In all probability this limit is merely temporary, and possibly none really exists in Russian aspirations; but before declaring her policy she awaits the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Empire of the Tsar, notwithstanding the 60,000 to 80,000 men already massed between the Amur, Korea, and Pe-chi-li, does not yet feel sufficiently safe to take a step forward for fear of bringing herself into conflict with England and Japan. The day the Trans-Siberian Railway is finished a step southwards may no doubt be made. The antagonism between Russia and 287Great Britain, both of whom aspire to be the leading Asiatic Power, will then no doubt become bitterer than ever.

The policy of France has been more often than not ostentatious, timid at heart and often vexatious in form. She has made a great fuss over a few commercial advantages obtained in the sterile provinces which border on Tongking, and she has opposed England without doing her any injury with respect to the opening of the West River. In certain affairs relating to European concessions at Shanghai and Hankow, France has unfortunately succeeded not only in vexing England, but in alarming the Germans, Americans, and Japanese by the excessive regulations which she has introduced in those territories which have fallen into her hands. It does not seem, however, that the French have contrived to obtain sufficient compensation for the enmities which they have provoked in defending, not without peril, interests which after all were not their own.

The part which France has wished to play in China has not been a strictly commercial one. French highly-finished and expensive fabrics are of no good in the Chinese market. If she only had the common-sense and enterprise to send to Tongking first-class weavers, and establish there a manufactory under French direction, with cheap native labour, she should soon be able, if she copied the cotton industries of India, to compete with Japan in the Chinese market. It is therefore the exportation of capital which ought to be her object in the Far East, in China as well as in Indo-China. Notwithstanding their activity, it is not countries like Japan and Russia, which are without capital, that can attempt to exploit the riches of China, but countries that are already advanced in civilization like Germany, the United States, and above all, France and England, who, by the introduction of the vast resources of their capital, are in a position to work the mines, railways, and other resources of the Middle Kingdom. If, instead of trying to obtain exclusive privileges in a poor region, which are of no use and only irritate other nations, France had supported them in their ‘open door’ policy, she would have gained a good deal, without losing anything from the purely commercial point of view, and thus Frenchmen might have placed themselves on a common footing with men of all nations, in the same manner that the English and the Germans contrived to come to an agreement in business transactions, notwithstanding the divergence which tends to separate them more 288and more, and she would then have been able to place her capital to great advantage, and thereby have added immensely to her prosperity, not only abroad but at home, as was the case under the Second Empire, when she covered Europe with railways.

France might, moreover, from the purely political point of view, have played a conciliatory part, and have thus managed to prevent the dominant influences at Peking from becoming too exclusive, which might ultimately result in a terrible conflict, and she should have worked to maintain the independence of China. Now that the Chinese are permitting Europeans to take their riches in hand by constructing their railways and exploiting their mines, it seems to us that France ought to allow her to retain a sort of communal existence, in which the civilized nations might carry on their economic activity precisely as they do in Turkey, with the difference that the Empire of the Son of Heaven is much vaster, richer, and populated by a far more industrious people than that of Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid.

This is, of course, a solution of an apparently temporary character, but which might have a chance here, as elsewhere, of lasting longer than a score of other solutions which are deemed definitive, always provided that the Powers do not exert too much pressure on the feeble Government at Peking, and especially if Russia, once the Trans-Siberian Railway is finished, does not insist upon her demands in so violent a manner as to provoke simultaneous action on the part of the Powers, and thereby bring about a partition. The destinies of the Celestial Empire are, however, in a great measure in the hands of the Tsar, who has, fortunately, already given many proofs of sagacity.

The maintenance of the Chinese Government seems for the moment preferable, even in the interests of the opening up of the country and in the introduction of our civilization in its immense territory, to the partition of China between the various European nations. We do not say this because we believe that the Chinese Government is converted to progress, for we hold that, with very few exceptions, those who direct the fortunes of the Chinese Empire are quite as fossilized in their prejudices, as firmly believe in their decrepit wisdom, as eager to prove their hatred of Western civilization, and, moreover, as corrupt, as ever they were. At the same time, they are convinced 289of the impossibility of China resisting the encroachments of European civilization, and as resigned as ever to yield to external pressure. Undoubtedly the era of subterfuges on the one side and of menaces on the other is by no means closed, and in spite of reforms which have been, and are still to be, obtained in the future by Europeans, a considerable part of the pecuniary advantages to be obtained from the transformation of China will remain in the hands and up the sleeves of the mandarins. But if progress is somewhat retarded by this resistance, which, after all, will only be temporary, it will be better so than that it should be introduced too suddenly and cause unnecessary trouble. Meanwhile, the Government of Peking plays an extremely useful part. Some people have not hesitated to say that if it ceased to exist progress would be much more rapid, forgetting that anarchy would ensue, the end of which would be as difficult to foresee as it would be to find a means of terminating it, or of discovering a manner in which any European Government could govern 200,000,000 Chinamen. The losses which the re-establishment of a stable regime would entail, and the vast expense of subduing rebellion, would certainly exceed those resulting from the procrastination under the actual form of Government.

At the end of a certain period it is highly probable that the march of events may be accelerated, and when the mass of the Chinese people have been placed in contact with the results of Western progress, it is very probable that its great common-sense will do the rest. It is an appeal to their essentially commercial and money-making instincts that we must make if we wish to convert the Chinese, the most realistic and the least idealistic of nations. Railways will be the best missionaries of civilization in China.

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