Part 2 — APPENDIX.

The following information is derived from trustworthy sources, and may be of some interest:—

Table of Heights above mean Sea-level.

Feet.

Cabul Plain 5,840

Luttabund Kotal 7,400

Kata Sung 5,000

Jugdulluck Kotal 5,200

Gundamak 4,500

Futtehabad 3,095

Jellalabad 1,950

Table of Marches from Jumrood to Cabul.

The corrected road distances are:—

Miles.

Jumrood to Ali Musjid 8·30

Ali Musjid to Lundi Kotal 10·50

Lundi Kotal to Dakka 12·00

Dakka to Basaule 11·10

Basaule to Barikab 9·98

Barikab to Jellalabad 17·76

Jellalabad to Rosabad 12·88

Rosabad to Sufed Sang 16·12

Sufed Sang to Pezwan Kotal 12·75

Pezwan Kotal to Jugdulluck Fort 10·50

Jugdulluck Fort to Sei Baba 10·00

Sei Baba to Luttabund 9·50

Luttabund to Butkhak 9·50

Butkhak to Bala Hissar 9·20

———

Total 160·09

Transport for the Indian Army.

The transport arrangements have always been the great stumbling-block when war has been declared in India, and in the hope that something will be done to form a permanent establishment, I republish the following letter, written in Sherpur on June 15th, 1880:—

56615th June.

Lieutenant-Colonel Low, of the 13th Bengal Lancers, Chief Director of Transport with the Cabul Force, has suggested a plan for establishing a permanent transport service, the details of which I will try to explain. He advocates a system—the expense of which should be moderate in time of peace, and not extravagant in time of war—which should admit of rapid expansion when war breaks out, and, most important of all, which should allow of the animals being employed for ordinary purposes of commerce in peace time, yet always be ready to fall into their places when the State requires them. Colonel Low takes an army of 36,000 of all arms with fifteen days’ food as the unit to be treated, this being about the strength of a force which is likely to be mobilized in case of war breaking out, and he believes that under his system transport for such an army could be raised, at any time, in a fortnight.

Taking the mule as the only transport animal in the “first line,” he calculates that 70,000 mules (of which number 1,028 would be spare animals) would be required for the 36,000 men, the estimate being as follows:—

Mules.

7,000 British Infantry 15,435

1,500 ” Cavalry 6,036

2,800 Artillery and Engineers 11,267

4,000 Native Cavalry 9,900

21,000 ” Infantry 26,334

——————

Total 68,972

Spare animals 1,028

——————

Grand total 70,000

This calculation is made on the Cabul scale of baggage, and each animal would have to carry two maunds only; allowance is made for forage and grain also being carried. The 70,000 mules required would be located in the three Presidencies, in the following proportion: Bengal, 35,000; Bombay and Madras, 17,500 each. Regarding Northern India, it is calculated that the N.-W. Provinces would furnish 9,750, Oudh 750 and Rohilkund 2,000. The Punjab would be responsible for 27,500. The system of maintenance would be the division of all the country into a certain number of districts; as, for instance, the N.-W. Provinces into thirteen, and the Punjab into twenty, each of which would have a fixed number of mules ready for the State when occasion might arise. Colonel Low’s explanation of the organization he would create is so clear, that I will give his own words. He says:—“The districts would all have been numbered off in the transport books, and I will suppose I am visiting the Rawalpindi or No. 20 district. The first village I enter, might have, perhaps, fifteen mules, nine of which were over three and under fourteen years old. To the owners of these animals I would say: ‘Government will give you, through me, one rupee per month for each of these animals. Government does not want them now and may never want them at all. Keep them, therefore, and use them as you have been accustomed to. All that Government asks is that you will agree to give the use of the mules in time of war. You must bring them with their saddles, &c., arranging among yourselves that at least one man shall accompany every three mules. On Government calling for the mules, you will receive war rates of pay from that day till the animals are discharged, when they will revert to peace rates of one rupee per month. This present agreement is to last twelve months, after which notice of three months on either side may end the bargain: the one proviso 567being that when Government has called for the service of the mules, the notice cannot be given until the mules are discharged. Meanwhile the mules must be branded with the district mark ‘R 20;’ and here is Rs. 36, the firstfirst quarter’s payment in advance.’” Colonel Low states that from his personal knowledge, and from opinions expressed by native gentlemen, he is convinced the people would eagerly accept such a system, as it is one which they could easily understand, and is quite in keeping with their customs and traditions.

Then comes the all-important question of cost. Regarding the permanent establishment, Colonel Low suggests that a Director, who would have control all over India, should be appointed with staff pay of Rs. 1,000 per month. His subordinates in Bengal would be two superintendents (Rs. 500 each), and four assistants (Rs. 150 to 200); in Bombay and Madras just half this establishment. There would also be a number of native officers, and non-commissioned officers, and five sowars would be told off to each district. The staff in Bengal would cost Rs. 9,210 per month (in peace time), in Bombaya and Madras Rs. 4,030 each, or a total of Rs. 17,270 for establishment. The premium to owners of Re. 1 per animal would be Rs. 70,000, making a grand total of Rs. 87,270. When war broke out, the staff would be available for instant service at their normal pay, while the owner of each animal would receive his Rs. 12 per month, in all Rs. 8,40,000, or a total expenditure on service of Rs. 8,57,270. To put the matter in simpler form, Colonel Low remarks:—“If we suppose a period of four years in which there was war for four months, the cost would be:—

Rs.

44 months’ peace, at Rs. 87,270 per mensem 37,29,880

4 months’ war, at Rs. 8,57,270 per mensem 33,29,080

——————

Total 70,58,960

This is, in round numbers, £700,000;” and Colonel Low significantly adds:—“This can no doubt be compared with transport expenses in the last campaign”—an allusion, perhaps, to the enormous compensation we had to pay to camel-owners for animals lost or killed. The second line of transport in a campaign, Colonel Low considers, should be wheeled carriages, a certain number of carts being always kept ready at stations near the bases of supply, such as Multan, Rawalpindi, &c. With this scheme, and no doubt several others before them, it will be strange if the Government does not once for all make up its mind to an expenditure in peace time upon transport service: it may seem, for the time being, money wasted, but any one seeing the accounts of the present war cannot help being convinced that a permanent transport would have saved the country many lakhs of rupees.

THE END.

Woodfall and Kinder, Printers, Milford Lane, Strand, London, W.C.

Footnotes

NOTES ON ILLUSTRATION AT p. 512

1st Brigade 1 3rd Brigade 4

6 S.R.A. 11-9 R.A.

92nd Highlanders 2-60 Rifles

2nd Goorkhas 4th Goorkhas

23rd Pioneers 15th Sikhs

24th P.N.I. 25th P.N.I.

2nd Brigade 2 Cavalry Brigade

No. 2 M.B. 9th Lancers

72nd Highlanders 3rd B.C.

5th Goorkhas 3rd R.C.

2nd Sikhs C.I.H.

3rd Sikhs

2nd Biluchi

Bombay Troop 3 Afghan Positions

6 Co. 7th Fusiliers Gundimisila

4 Co. 66th Foot Gundigan

6 Co. 28th N.I. Walled Gardens between G and G

4th N.I. Pir Paimal and Spur of Hill

19th N.I. Kharoti and Hill

2 Co. 1st N.I.

Detachment S. and M.

E.B., R.H.A.

C-2 R.A.

5-11 R.A.

3rd I. Cavalry

3rd Sinde Horse (Sd.) E.P. Leach, Captain &

Poona Horse Brevet-Major.

[Back]

NOTES ON ILLUSTRATION AT p. 532

DISPOSITION OF GUNS

Guns. Position. Officers Comdg. Face.

9-Pr. M.L.H. Gun C-2, R.A. N. E. Bastion Major Greig R.A.

9-Pr. ditto ditto Durrance Gate

9-Pr. ditto ditto Cabul Gate

40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun S. E. Bastion Capt. Hornsby Comg. 5-11 R.A.

6-Pr. S.B. Gun Shikapoor Gate

40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun S. W. Bastion

9-Pr. M.L.R. Gun E-B., R.H.A.

9-Pr. ditto ditto Herat Gate Capt. Slade R.A.

9-Pr. ditto C-2 R.A. Topkhana Gate

9-40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun N.W. Bastion

9-Pr. M.L.R. Gun E-B., R.H.A.

9-Pr. ditto ditto Eedgah Gate

40-Pr. B.L.R. Gun S. W. Bastion of Citadel.

Eedgah Gate Front, 400 men under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, Lieutenant-Colonel Nimmo, 28th N.I., commanding Eedgah Gate. After 16th August, Colonel Edwardes, 2nd N.I., took command of Front under Brigadier-General Burrows, with Major Singleton, 28th N.I. commanding the Gate.

Length of Front 1,178 yards.

Cabul Gate Front, 500 men under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with Colonel Bannerman, 4th N.I., commanding the Cabul Gate, and Colonel Mainwaring, 30th N.I., commanding the Durrance Gate.

Length of Front 1,700 yards.

Herat Gate Front, 500 men under command of Colonel Edwardes, 2nd N.I., with Major Marshall, 4th N.I., commanding the Herat Gate, and Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith, 1st N.I., commanding the Topkhana Gate. After 16th August, Brigadier-General Daubeny commanded this Front and Major Ready, 66th, the Gate.

Length of Front 1,987 yards.

Shikarpoor Gate Front, 400 men under Brigadier-General Brooke, with Major Trench, 19th N.I., in command of Shikapoor Gate. After 16th August, Colonel Heathcote, 19th N.I. commanded this front, and Major Marshall, 4th N.I., the Gate.

Length of Front 1,300 yards.

[Back]

Transcriber’s Note

The cover image has been prepared specifically for this project, and is hereby placed in the public domain.

Compound words (e.g., ‘loophole’) may be hyphenated inconsistently. When the hyphen appears on a line or page break, the hyphen is retained or removed based on the preponderance of other instances.

Variant spellings of place names or tribal names are retained if there are more than one instance of each.

The abbreviation ‘lbs.’ appears multiple times with and without a preceding space, as ‘300 lbs.’ or ‘300lbs’, and is given here as printed.

Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original. The following issues should be noted, along with the resolutions.

29.32 the village of Charasia about eleven o[’]clock Inserted.

46.32 General Massy ordered his v[e/i]dettes Replaced.

59.36 against the wooden framewor[d/k] of the pavilion Replaced.

77.35 the large earthe[r]n jars and dubbers Removed.

79.8 It was by [no ]mean safe walking Added.

90.8 to submit to ou[t]side interference Inserted.

112.10 a guide to some troops marching up the Bala Hissar [B/R]idge Replaced.

112.26 has sunk very low of [l]ate Added.

113.28 of w[h]ich 9½ will appear in the accounts Inserted.

114.4 Arrival of Stores from the Shutargard[e/a]n Replaced.

125.7 upon the safety of the Shutargard[e/a]n Replaced.

152.18 and v[a/o]lleys> from the Martinis and Sniders Replaced.

156.14 and his inter[w/v]iew with Cavagnari Replaced.

171.2 can scar[c]ely admit of a doubt Inserted.

186.35 on the Ghazni [B/R]oad. Replaced.

257.32 To[-]night we are resting on our arms Restored.

268.26 We had not suffic[i]ent ammunition Inserted.

288.16 to live on [peacable] terms with the people sic

291.13 Ataullah Khan, Anitoollah Khan[,] Habibulla Khan (the Mustaufi) Added.

324.14 the gro[o]ves were filled with lead Inserted.

337.7 and the tough shaft [as it] had been of tinder as if? as though?

354.9 Daoud Shah accompa[in/ni]ed Yakub Khan to Cabul Inverted.

362.20 an important mission to fu[l]fil in Central Asian politics Inserted.

363.25 vi[a/â] Maizena and Peshbolak Replaced.

379.30 with the advanced party [a/o]f the Candahar column Replaced.

400.9 without fear of an [e/é]meute Replaced.

424.19 has been gained in a short intercou[r]se Inserted.

427.11 The Battle[ ]field of Ahmed Khel Removed.

441.2 Sirdars and servants mingled in famil[i]ar groups Inserted.

454.5 It now rema[i]ns for Abdur Rahman to show Inserted.

471.3 That would indeed be a disappointme[u/n]t too grievous to be borne. Inverted.

499.7 When, howev[ev]er, we reached Khel-i-Akhund Removed.

503.20 Sir Frederick Robert[s]’s Plan of Attack Inserted.

521.25 and to examine th[o/e] contents of Ayub’s tents Replaced.

538.36 The contin[u]ous firing showed the village Inserted.

545.7 Reti[o/r]ement of the Brigade upon Khusk[l]-i-Nakhud Replaced Removed.

551.11 to clear G[e/a]rmao of the Naib and his advanced cavalry Replaced.

561.18 in their slack disc[lip/ipl]ine Transposed.

567.3 the [fi]rst> quarter’s payment Restored.