Note 196 — Chapter VII

Compare Veitch, Institutes of Logic, pp. 307 to 310, and 367, 8. “Hamilton would introduce some only into the theory of propositions, without, however, discarding the meaning of some at least. It is not correct to say that Hamilton discarded the ordinary logical meaning of some. He simply supplemented it by introducing into the propositional forms that of some only.” “Some, according to Hamilton, is always thought as semi-definite (some only) where the other term of the judgment is universal.” Mr Lindsay, however, in expounding Hamilton’s doctrine (Appendix to Ueberweg’s System of Logic, p. 580) says more decisively,—“Since the subject must be equal to the predicate, vagueness in the predesignations must be as far as possible removed. Some is taken as equivalent to some but not all.” Spalding (Logic, p. 184) definitely chooses the other alternative. He remarks that in his own treatise “the received interpretation some at least is steadily adhered to.”