NOTES. (continued 4)

If such language is taxed with flattery, it would be difficult to comprehend what is meant by telling the truth. And observe, that the above truths are not told without reflection; the good religious takes such pains to inculcate them, that were it not for the childlike candor of his language, which discloses the purest of intentions, we might accuse him of irreverence. This passage is long, but exceedingly interesting, for it faithfully reflects the spirit of the age. Innumerable other texts might be adduced to prove how unjustly the Catholic clergy are accused of being favorable to despotism. I cannot conclude without inserting here two excellent passages from the learned Father Fr. Ferdinand de Zeballos, a religious of the order of St. Jerome in the Monastery of St. Isidore del Campo, and known by a work intituled, "False Philosophy, or Atheism, Deism, Materialism, and other new sects convicted of State Crimes against their Sovereigns and Rulers, against the Magistrates and Lawful Authorities." Madrid, 1776. Observe with what tact the learned writer appreciates the influence of religion upon society. (Book ii. dissertation 12, art. 2.)

"A mild and moderate government is most agreeable to the spirit of the gospel.

§ I.

"One excellent and estimable point in our holy religion is, that she offers to human policy, in her important truths, assistance in preserving good order among men with less trouble. 'The Christian religion,' says Montesquieu, with much truth, 'is far removed from pure despotism. Mildness being so strongly recommended in the gospel, it is opposed to the despotic fury with which princes might administer justice and practise cruelties.' This opposition on the part of Christianity to the cruelty of the monarch should not be active, but passive and full of mildness, which Christianity can never lose sight of without losing its character. This is the difference between Catholic Christians and the Calvinists and other Protestants. Basnages and Jurieu, in the name of all their reformation, wrote that it is allowable for the people to wage war against their princes whenever they are oppressed by them, or their conduct appears tyrannical.

"The Catholic Church has never changed the doctrines she received from Jesus Christ and His Apostles. She loves moderation, she rejoices in good: but she does not resist evil, she overcomes it by patience. Governments established under the direction of false religions cannot be satisfied with a moderate policy. With them the despotism or tyranny of princes, the ferocity of penalties, the rigor of an inflexible and cruel legislation, are so many necessary evils. But why has it been given to the Catholic religion only to purge human governments from such inhumanity? First, on account of the forcible impression produced by her dogmas; secondly, through the effect of the grace of Jesus Christ, which renders men docile in doing good, and energetic in combating evil. Wherever false religion predominates, and where, in consequence, these two means of aid are wanting, the government is under the necessity of supplying them as far as possible by efforts of a severe, harsh, and terror-inspiring policy, in default of that virtue which ought to exist in religion to restrain citizens.

"Hence the Catholic religion, by the influence of her dogmas over human affairs, relieves governments from the necessity of being harsh. In Japan, where the prevailing religion has no dogmas, and gives no idea of heaven or hell, laws are made to supply this defect—laws rendered useful by the cruelty with which they are conceived and the punctuality with which they are executed. In every society in which deists, fatalists, and philosophers have promulgated this error, that our actions are unavoidable, it is impossible to prevent laws from becoming more terrible and sanguinary than any we have known among barbarian nations; for in such a society, men, after the manner of brutes, being urged by palpable motives to do what they are commanded and omit what they are forbidden, these motives, with chastisements, must be daily more formidable, in order to avoid losing from habit the power of making themselves felt. The Christian religion, which admirably teaches and explains the dogmas of rational liberty, has no need of an iron rod to govern mankind. The fear of the pains of hell, whether eternal, to punish crimes unrepented of, or temporal, to wash away the stains of sins confessed, relieves judges from the necessity of augmenting punishments. On the other hand, the hope of gaining heaven, as a reward for laudable actions, words, and thoughts, induces men to be just, not only in public but also in the secrecy of the heart. What laws or penalties would avail governments not possessed of this dogma of hell and of glory, to make their citizens men of real merit? Materialists, denying the dogma of a future state, and deists, holding out to the wicked the flattering security of paradise, place governments under the painful necessity of arming themselves with all the instruments of terror, and of always inflicting the most cruel punishments, to restrain the people from destroying one another.

"Protestants have already come to this point by rejecting the dogma of the eternity of hell, or, at least, by preserving merely the fear of a temporary pain. The first reformers, as d'Alembert observes to the clergy of Geneva, denied the doctrine of purgatory, and retained that of hell; but the Calvinists, and modern reformers, by their limitation of the duration of hell, leave only what may be properly termed purgatory. Is not the dogma of the last judgment, when each one's secret offences, however small, shall be exposed to the whole world, of singular efficacy in restraining the thoughts and desires, and all the perversity of the heart and of the passions? It is evident that this dogma so far relieves political governments from the painful and continual vigilance which it would have to exercise over a town in which the idea of this judgment has perished, together with the thoughts which it inspires."

§ II.

"There are certain aberrations observable among philosophers, which lead us to think that these men were possessed of some true discernment in their lucid moments, or whilst they were in the Catholic religion. Hence they have said, 'that religion was invented for a political purpose, to spare sovereigns the necessity of being just, of making good laws, and of governing well.' This folly, which stands self-condemned when we come to speak of religion previously formed, supposes, nevertheless, the truth we are speaking of. It is evident to every one, even to the philosophers whose extravagant assertion we have just adduced, that the Christian religion, by her dogmas, is serviceable to human governments, and aids in making good citizens, even in this world. Yet they avail themselves of this very point to put forth their insane malice: but, in reality, and in spite of themselves, they mean to say, that the dogmas of religion are of such service to governments, and so efficacious in facilitating a great part of their work, that they appear to be formed on purpose, and according to the designs of a magistrate or a political government. We cannot say, on this account, that religion alone is sufficient to govern men, without any judicial aid, without the intervention of the laws and of penalties. In speaking of this efficacy of the dogmas inculcated by religion, we are not rash and presumptuous; we do not reject as superfluous the office of law and police. We are told by the Apostle, that for the just there would have been no need of laws; but there are so many wicked, who, through their forgetfulness of their destiny and the terrible judgments of God, live under the exclusive rule of their passions, that it has been found necessary to make laws and institute punishments, in order to restrain them. Hence, the Catholic religion does not reject the wise vigilance of police, nor abrogate its office; she seconds it, on the contrary, and receives assistance from it, to the very great advantage of good governments; the people, through its influence, are ruled better, and with less austerity and severity."

§ III.

"The second reason which renders the most mild and moderate governments sufficient in Catholic States is, the assistance which the grace of the gospel affords for doing good and avoiding evil,—an assistance imparted by the use of the sacraments, or other means employed by the Spirit from above. Without this, every law is harsh; this unction softens every yoke, renders every burden light."

In his third article, Father Zeballos repels the accusation of despotism with which the enemies of monarchy reproach it. On this occasion he points out the just limits of royal authority, and overthrows an argument which some persons have pretended to found on the Scriptures, for the exaggeration of the prerogatives of the throne. He expresses himself as follows:

"When the objection, that the sovereign had the power of seizing the property of every citizen, was made against monarchy, it was rather an argument against the nature of despotism than against the form of monarchical government. 'What does it avail,' says Theseus in Euripides, 'to amass riches for our heirs, to bring up our daughters with care, if we are to be deprived of the greater portion of these riches by a tyrant, if our daughters are to serve the most unruly passions?' You perceive, then clearly, that in pretending to argue against the office of a monarch, it is a tyrant only that is spoken of. True, the frequent abuse of power resorted to by kings has caused these names and forms to be confounded. Others have already observed that the ancients were scarcely acquainted with the nature of true monarchy; this was very natural, since they never witnessed any thing but the abuse of it. This gives me the opportunity of making a remark upon the circumstance of the Hebrews asking to be governed by kings. 'Make us a king to judge us, as all nations have,' said they to the prophet. Samuel saw with grief this levity, which was about to cause a total revolution in the government appointed by God. Nevertheless, God commands the prophet to take no notice of this affront, which was principally offered to the Lord; for they were abandoning Him, being unwilling that He should rule over them any longer. 'As they have forsaken Me, and served strange gods, so do they also unto thee,' and ask for kings like unto those of the nations. Observe what an intimate connection always exists between a change of government and a change in religion, especially when the change is from a true to a false one.

"But what is particularly deserving of notice is, the acquiescence granted to the people's demand. They wish to be ruled by kings, exactly as all other nations were. The Lord chastises their spirit of revolt by leaving them to their desires. He commands Samuel to comply with their request, but to point out to them, at the same time, the rights of the king who was to rule over them like unto the nations, and said: 'This will be the right of the king that shall reign over you: he will take your sons, and will put them in his chariots, and will make them his horsemen, and his running footmen, to run before his chariots; and he will appoint them to be his tribunes, and his centurions, and to plough his fields, and to reap his corn, and to make him arms and chariots. Your daughters also will he take to make him ointments, and to be his cooks and bakers; and he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your best olive-yards, and give them to his servants. Moreover, he will take the tenth of your corn, and of the revenues of your vineyards, to give to his eunuchs and servants. Your servants also, and hand-maids, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, he will take away, and put them to his work. Your flocks also he will tithe, and you shall be his servants; and you shall cry out in that day from the face of the king whom you have chosen to yourselves; and the Lord will not hear you in that day, because you desired unto yourselves a king. And the people would not hear the voice of Samuel, and they said, Nay, but there shall be a king over us, and we also will be like all nations.' (1st Kings, chap. viii., from verse 11 to middle of verse 20 inclusively.)

"Some persons, being determined to extend the power of kings beyond its limits, draw from these words the formula of royal right. A blind pretension, and reflecting little honor on legitimate monarchs such as the Catholic sovereigns. Unless a person wishes knowingly to deceive himself on this portion of the Scripture, or is blind, he may see by the context, and by comparing this passage with others, that it is not legitimate right that is here meant, but de facto right. I mean to say, that the Holy Spirit does not explain what just monarchs ought to do; but what had been done, and was still done, by the kings of Pagan nations, mere tyrants, and commonly so called. Observe, that the people demanded nothing but to be placed on an equality with the Pagan nations in a political point of view. They had not the prudence to demand a king such as he ought to be, but such as was common in those days; and this was what God granted them. If God, as the prophet observes, has sometimes given the people kings in His wrath, what people were more deserving of this than those who had abandoned God himself, and refused to be ruled by Him? Indeed, God did chastise His people severely by granting them their foolish demand. He did give them a king, but a king who was to exercise what, according to the perverse custom of the times, formed the royal right described in the sacred text just quoted.

"What man in our days, conversant with what has been written upon the different natures of governments, upon their abuse, and without even understanding what is said in the Scriptures, could imagine that the text of Samuel contains the legitimate form of royalty or of monarchy? Does this power impart the right of seizing the property of the subjects, their lands, their riches, their sons and daughters, and even their natural liberty? Is this the model of a monarchy, or of the most tyrannical despotism? To dispel every illusion on this point, we need only compare with what we have just read the 21st chap. of the third Book of Kings, in which the history of Naboth, an inhabitant of Jezrael, is narrated. Achab, the king of Israel, wished to enlarge the palace, or pleasure-house which he possessed in that town. A vineyard of Naboth's, near the palace, came within the plan of the gardens that were to be added. The king did not seize it at once, of his own authority, but asked the proprietor to let him have it on the honest condition of paying him the price at which he should value it, or giving him a better in another place. Naboth would not consent to this, because it was the inheritance of his ancestors. The king, not being accustomed to meet with a refusal, threw himself upon his couch oppressed with grief; the queen, Jezabel, came, and told him to calm his agitation: 'Thy authority is great indeed,' said she to him; Grandis authoritatis es: she promises to put him in possession of the vineyard. This abominable woman wrote to the judges of Jezrael to commence an action against Naboth for a calumny, to be proved against him by two suborned witnesses; and she demanded that he should be condemned to death. The queen was obeyed; Naboth was stoned to death. All this was necessary that the vineyard might enter into the royal treasury, and that, watered by the blood of the proprietor, it might produce flowers for the palace of these princes. But, in reality, it produced none, neither for the king nor for the queen; it furnished them with nothing but briars and mortal poisons. Elias presents himself before Achab when he was going to take possession of Naboth's vineyard; he announces to him that he, and all his house, even to the dog that approacheth the wall, shall be erased from the face of the earth.

"You look upon royal right as explained to the people by Samuel as legitimate; tell me, then why Achab and Jezabel are so severely punished for taking the vineyard and the life of Naboth, since the king had a right to take from his subjects their most valuable vineyards and olive trees, according to the declaration of the prophet. If Achab possesses this right after he is established the king of the people of God, whence comes it that he, so violent a prince, should entreat Naboth with so much civility? And why is it necessary to accuse Naboth of some calumny? His resistance to the king's right, by refusing to accept the just value of what was suitable to the enlargement of the palace and gardens, would have been a sufficient motive for instituting an action against him. We find, however, that Naboth committed no injustice against the king by refusing to sell his patrimony, not even in the estimation of the queen, who boasted of her husband's great authority. This great authority, which Jezabel admitted in the king, was neither more nor less than the royal right spoken of by Samuel to the people; it was, as I have said, a de facto right to take and seize upon every thing by mere force, as Montesquieu says of the tyrant.

"Do not therefore, mention this passage, nor any other of the Scriptures, to justify the idea of a government so ill-conceived. The doctrine of the Catholic religion is attached to legitimate monarchy, with its suitable characteristics, and in accordance with the qualities which modern publicists recognise, viz. as a paternal and sovereign power, but conformable to the fundamental laws of the state. Within limits so suitable, nothing can be more regular than this power, the most extensive of all temporal powers, and that which is most favored and supported by the Catholic Church."

Such is the horrible despotism taught by these men so basely calumniated! Happy the people who are ruled by a prince whose government is regulated by these doctrines!

The importance of the matter treated of in this part of my work obliges me to insert here, at some length, passages proving the truth of what I have advanced. I did not think it advisable to give a translation of the Latin passages, that I might avoid augmenting excessively the number of pages; besides, among the persons who may wish to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the subject, and who will consequently take an interest in consulting the original texts, there are few ignorant of the Latin language.

Observe how St. Thomas expresses himself on royal power, and with what solid and generous doctrine he points out its duties in the third book, chap. 11, of his treatise De Regimine Principum.

DIVUS THOMAS.

"De Regimine Principum, liber iii. caput XI.

"Hic Sanctus Doctor declarat de dominio regali, in quo consistit, et in quo differt a politico, et quo modo distinguitur diversimodo secundum diversas rationes.

"Nunc autem ad regale dominium est procedendum, ubi est distinguendum de ipso secundum diversas regiones, et prout a diversis varie invenitur traditum. Et primo quidem, in Sacra Scriptura aliter leges regalis dominii traduntur in Deuteronomio per Moysen, aliter in 1 Regum per Samuelem prophetam, uterque tamen in persona Dei differenter ordinat regem ad utilitatem subditorum, quod est proprium regum, ut Philosophus tradit in 8 ethic. Cum, inquit, constitutus fuerit rex, non multiplicabit sibi equos, nec reducet populum in Ægyptum, equitatus numero sublevatus, non habebit uxores plurimas, quæ alliciant animam ejus, neque argenti, aut auri immensa pondera: quod quidem qualiter habet intelligi, supra traditur in hoc lib. describetque sibi Deuteronomium legis hujus, et habebit secum, legetque illud omnibus diebus vitæ suæ, ut discat timere dominum Deum suum, et custodire verba ejus et cæremonias, et ut videlicet possit populum dirigere secundum legem divinam, unde et rex Salomon in principio sui regiminis hanc sapientiam a Deo petivit, ad directionem sui regiminis pro utilitate subditorum, sicut scribitur in 3 lib. Regum. Subdit vero dictus Moyses in eodem lib. Nec elevetur cor ejus in superfluum super fratres suos, neque declinet in partem dexteram, vel sinistram, ut longo tempore regat ipse et filius ejus super Israel. Sed in primo Regum, traduntur leges regni, magis ad utilitatem Regis, ut supra patuit in lib. 2 hujus operis, ubi ponuntur verba omnino pertinentia ad conditionem servilem, et tamen Samuel leges quas tradit cum sint penitus despoticæ dicit esse regales. Philosophus autem in 8 ethic. magis concordat cum primis legibus. Tria enim ponit de rege in eo. 4, videlicet, quod ille legitimus est rex qui principaliter bonum subditorum intendit. Item, ille rex est, qui curam subditorum habet, ut bene operentur quemadmodum pastor ovium. Ex quibus omnibus manifestum est, quod juxta istum, modum despoticum multum differat a regali, ut idem Philosophus videtur dicere in 1 politic. Item, quod regnum non est propter regem, sed rex propter regnum, quia ad hoc Deus providit de eis, ut regnum regant et gubernent, et unumquemque in suo jure conservent: et hic est finis regiminis, quod si ad aliud faciunt in seipsos commodum retorquendo, non sunt reges sed tyranni. Contra quos dicit Dominus in Ezech. Væ pastoribus Israel, qui pascunt semetipsos. Nonne greges pascuntur a pastoribus? Lac comedebatis, et lanis operiebamini, et quod crassum erat occidebatis: gregem autem meum non pascebatis: quod infirmum fuit, non consolidastis, et quod ægrotum non sanastis, quod confractum non alligastis, quod abjectum non reduxistis, et quod perierat non quæsistis; sed cum austeritate imperabatis eis et cum potentia. In quibus verbis nobis sufficienter forma regiminis traditur redarguendo contrarium. Amplius autem regnum ex hominibus constituitur, sicut domus ex parietibus, et corpus humanum ex membris, ut Philos. dicit in 3 politic. Finis ergo regis est, ut regimen prosperetur, quod homines conserventur per regem. Et hinc habet commune bonum cujuslibet principatus participationem divinæ bonitatis: unde bonum commune dicitur a Philosopho in 1 ethic. esse quod omnia appetunt, et esse bonum divinum, ut sicut Deus qui est rex regum, et dominus dominantium, cujus virtute principes imperant, ut probatum est supra, nos regit et gubernat non propter seipsum, sed propter nostram salutem: ita et reges faciant et alii dominatores in orbe."

I have noticed the opinion of D. Felix Amat, Archbishop of Palmyra, with respect to the obedience due to de facto governments. I have remarked, that this writer's principles, besides being false, are opposed to the rights of the people. The Archbishop of Palmyra appears to have been at a loss to discover a maxim to which it is possible to conform under all circumstances that may occur, and which do occur but too often. He dreaded the obscurity and confusion of ideas when the legitimacy of a given case was to be defined; he wished to remedy an evil, but he appears to have aggravated it to an extraordinary degree. Observe how he sets forth his opinion in his work entitled Idea of the Church Militant, chap. iii. art. 2:

"The more I reflect," says he, "on the difficulties I have just pointed out, the more I am convinced that it is impossible to resolve them, even those which are ancient, with any degree of certainty; and it is equally impossible to derive any light from them to aid us in resolving those which are formed at the present day by the struggle between the prevailing spirit of insubordination in opposition to the judgment and will of the governor, and the contrary effort made to limit more and more the liberty of those who obey. Starting from the divers points and notions that I have laid down relative to the supreme power in all really civil societies, it appears to me, that, instead of losing time in mere speculative discussions, it will be more useful to propose a practical, just, and opportune maxim for the preservation of public tranquillity, especially in Christian kingdoms and states, and for affording the means of re-establishing it when it has been troubled or destroyed.

"The Maxim.—No one can doubt the legitimacy of the obligation of every member of any civil society whatever to obey the government which is de facto and unquestionably established. I say 'unquestionably established,' because there is here no question of a mere invasion or temporary occupation in time of war. From this maxim follow two consequences: 1st, to take part in insurrections, or assemblages of people, addressing themselves to the constituted authorities with a view to compel them to grant what they consider unjust, is always an act contrary to right reason; always unlawful, condemned by the natural law and by the Gospel. 2dly, individual members of society, who combine together and take up arms, in small or large numbers, for the purpose of attacking the established government by physical force, are always guilty of rebellion, a crime strongly opposed to the spirit of our divine religion."

I will not here repeat what I have already said on the unsoundness, the inconveniences, and the dangers of such a doctrine, but merely add, that with respect to governments only established de facto, to grant them the right of commanding and exacting obedience involves a contradiction. To say that a de facto government is bound, whilst it does exist, to protect justice, to avoid crimes, to prevent the dissolution of society, is merely to maintain truths universally admitted, and denied by no one; but to add, that it is unlawful, and contrary to our holy religion, to combine together and raise forces for the overthrow of a de facto government, is a doctrine which Catholic theologians have never professed, which true philosophy has never admitted, and which no nation has ever observed.

I insert here certain remarkable passages from St. Thomas and Suarez, in which these authors explain the opinions to which I have alluded in the text, respecting the differences which may arise between governors and the governed. I refer to what I have already pointed out in another place; we are not about to examine so much whether such or such doctrines are true, as to discover what were the doctrines at the time we are speaking of, and what opinion the most distinguished doctors formed on the delicate questions of which we are treating.

D. THOMAS.

(2. 2. Q. 42. art. 2^o ad tertium.—Utrum seditio sit semper peccatum mortale?)

3. Arg. Laudantur qui multitudinem a potestate tyrannica liberant, sed hoc non de facili potest fieri sine aliqua dissensione multitudinis, dum una pars multitudinis nititur retinere tyrannum, alia vero nititur eum abjicere, ergo seditio potest fieri sine peccato.

Ad tertium dicendum; quod regimen tyrannicum non est justum quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis ut patet per Philosophum; et ideo perturbatio hujus regiminis non habet rationem seditionis, nisi forte quando sic inordinate perturbatur tyranni regimen, quod multitudo subjecta majus detrimentum patitur ex perturbatione consequenti quam ex tyranni regimine; magis autem tyrannus seditiosus est, qui in populo sibi subjecto discordias et seditiones nutrit, ut tutius dominari possit; hoc enim tyrannicum est, cum sit ordinatum ad bonum proprium præsidentis cum multitudinis nocumento.

Cardinalis Cayetanus in hunc textum. "Quis sit autem modus ordinatus perturbandi tyrannum et qualem tyrannum, puta secundum regimen tantum, vel secundum regimen et titulum, non est præsentis intentionis: sat est nunc, quod utrumque tyrannum licet ordinate perturbare absque seditione quandoque; illum ut bono reipublicæ vacet, istum ut expellatur."

LIB. I.

De Regimine Principum. (Cap. x.)

Quod rex et princeps studere debet ad bonum regimen propter bonum sui ipsius, et utile quod inde sequitur, cujus contrarium sequitur regimen tyrannicum.

Tyrannorum vero dominium diuturnum esse non potest, cum sit multitudini odiosum. Non potest enim diu conservari, quod votis multorum repugnat. Vix enim a quoquam præsens vita transigitur quin aliquas adversitates patiatur. Adversitatis autem tempore occasio deesse non potest contra tyrannum insurgendi; et ubi adsit occasio, non deerit ex multis vel unus qui occasione non utatur. Insurgentem autem populus votive prosequitur: nec de facili carebit effectu, quod cum favore multitudinis attentatur. Vix ergo potest contingere, quod tyranni dominium protendatur in longum. Hoc etiam manifeste patet, si quis consideret unde tyranni dominium conservatur. Non n. conservatur amore, cum parva, vel nulla sit amicitia subjectæ multitudinis ad tyrannum ut ex præhabitis patet: de subditorum autem fide tyrannis confidendum non est. Non n. invenitur tanta virtus in multis, ut fidelitatis virtute reprimantur, ne indebitæ servitutis jugum, si possint, excutiant. Fortassis autem nec fidelitati contrarium reputabitur secundum opinionem multorum, si tyrannicæ nequitiæ qualitercumque obvietur. Restat ergo ut solo timore tyranni regimen sustentetur; unde et timeri se a subditis tota intentione procurant. Timor autem est debile fundamentum. Nam qui timore subduntur, si occurrat occasio qua possint impunitatem sperare, contra præsidentes insurgunt eo ardentius, quo magis contra voluntatem ex solo timore cohibebantur. Sicut si aqua per violentiam includatur, cum aditum invenerit, impetuosius fluit. Sed nec ipse timor caret periculo, cum ex nimio timore plerique in desperationem inciderint. Salutis autem desperatio audacter ad quælibet attentanda præcipitat. Non potest igitur tyranni dominium esse diuturnum. Hoc etiam non minus exemplis, quam rationibus apparet.

LIB. I. CAP. VI.

Conclusio; quod regimen unius simpliciter sit optimum; ostendit qualiter multitudo se debet habere circa ipsum, quia auferenda est ei occasio ne tyrannizet, ei quod etiam in hoc est tolerandus propter majus malum vitandum.

Quia ergo unius regimen præ eligendum est, quod est optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyrannidem converti, quod est pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, laborandum est diligenti studio, ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege, ut non incidat in tyrannum. Primum autem est necessarium, ut talis conditionis homo ab illis ad quos hoc spectat officium, promoveatur in regem, quod non sit probabile in tyrannidem declinare. Unde Samuel Dei providentiam erga institutionem regis commendans, ait, 1 Regum xiii.: Quæsivit sibi Dominus, virum secundum cor suum: deinde sic disponenda est regni gubernatio, ut regi jam instituto tyrannidis subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic ejus temperetur potestas, ut in tyrannidem de facili declinare non possit. Quæ quidem ut fiant, insequentibus considerandum erit. Demum vero curandum est, si rex in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset occuri. Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus, quam tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis, quæ sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide. Potest, n. contingere ut qui contra tyrannum agunt prævalere non possint, et sic provocatus tyrannus magis desæviat. Quod si prævalere quis possit adversus tyrannum, ex hoc ipso proveniunt multoties gravissimæ dissensiones in populo, sive dum in tyrannum insurgitur, sive post dejectionem tyranni erga ordinationem regiminis multitudo separatur in partes. Contingit etiam ut interdum dum alicujus auxilio multitudo expellit tyrannum, ille potestate accepta tyrannidem arripiat, et timens pati ab alio quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute subditos opprimat. Sic enim in tyrannide solet contingere, ut posterior gravior fiat quam præcedens, dum præcedentia gravamina non deserit, et ipse ex sui cordis malitia nova excogitat: unde Syracusis quondam Dyonisii mortem omnibus desiderantibus, anus quædem ut incolumnis et sibi superstes esset, continue orabat: quod ut tyrannus cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum illa, puella, inquit, existens cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, mortem ejus cupiebam, quo interfecto, aliquantulum durior successit; ejus quoque dominationem finiri magnum existimabam, tertium te importuniorem habere cœpimus rectorem; itaque si tu fueris absumptus, deterior in locum tuum succedet. Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam visum fuit, ut ad fortium virorum virtutem pertineat tyrannum interimere, seque pro liberatione multitudinis exponere periculis mortis: cujus rei exemplum etiam in veteri Testamento habetur. Nam Ajoth quidam Eglon regem Moab, qui gravi servitute populum Dei premebat, sica infixa in ejus femore interemit, et factus est populi judex. Sed hoc Apostolicæ doctrinæ non congruit. Docet n. nos Petrus, non bonis tantum et modestis, verum etiam discolis Dominis reverenter subditos esse. 2 Petr. ii. Hæc est enim gratia, si propter conscientiam Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens injuste: unde cum multi Romani Imperatores fidem Christi persequerentur tyrannice, magnaque multitudo tam nobilium, quam populi esset ad fidem conversa, non resistendo, sed mortem patienter et armati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur, ut in sacra Thebæorum legione manifeste apparet; magisque Ajoth judicandus est hostem interemisse, quam populi rectorem, licet tyrannum; unde et in veteri Testamento leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui occiderunt Joas regem Juda, quamvis a cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filiis reservatis secundum legis præceptum. Esset autem hoc multitudini periculosum et ejus rectoribus, si privata præsumptione aliqui attentarent præsidentium necem etiam tyrannorum. Plerumque enim hujusmodi periculis magis exponunt se mali quam boni. Malis autem solet esse grave dominium non minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia secundum sententiam Salomonis: Dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis igitur ex hujus præsumptione immineret periculum multitudini de amissione regis, quam remedium de subtractione tyranni. Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum sævitiam non privata præsumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad jus multitudinis alicujus pertineat sibi providere de rege, non injuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui, vel refrænari ejus potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiamsi eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat: quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur. Sic Romani Tarquinium superbum quem in regem susceperant, propter ejus et filiorum tyrannidem a regno ejecerunt substituta minori, scilicet consularia potestate. Sic etiam Domitianus, qui modestissimis Imperatoribus Vespasiano patri, et Tito fratri ejus successerat, dum tyrannidem exercet, a senatu Romano interemptus est, omnibus quæ perverse Romanis fecerat per Senatusconsultum juste et salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo factum est, ut beatus Joannes Evangelista dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum Domitianum in Pathmos insulam fuerat exilio relegatus, ad Ephesum per Senatusconsultum remitteretur. Si vero ad jus alicujus superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rege, spectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in Judæa pro Herode patre suo regnare jam cœperat, paternam malitiam imitantis, Judæis contra eum querimoniam ad Cesarem Augustum deferentibus, primo quidem potestas diminuitur, ablato sibi regio nomine, et medietate regni sui inter duos fratres suos divisa: deinde cum nec sic a tyrannide compesceretur a Tiberio Cesare relegatus est in exilium apud Lugdunum Galliæ civitatem. Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non potest, recurrendum est ad regem omnium Deum, quid est adjutor in opportunitatibus in tribulatione. Ejus enim potentiæ subest, ut cor tyranni crudele convertat in mansuetudinem, secundum Salomonis sententiam. Proverb. xii. Cor regis in manu Dei quocumque voluerit inclinavit illud. Ipse enim regis Assueri crudelitatem, qui Judæis mortem parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit. Ipse est qui ita Nabuchodonosor, crudelem regem convertit, quod factus est divinæ potentiæ prædicator. Nunc igitur, inquit, ego Nabuchodonosor laudo, et magnifico, et glorifico regem cœli, quia opera ejus vera et viæ ejus judicia, et gradientes in superbia potest humiliare. Dan. iv. Tyrannos vero quos reputat conversione indignos, potest auferre de medio vel ad infimum statum reducere, secundum illud Sapientes Eccles. x. Sedem ducum superborum destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse enim qui videns afflictionem populi sui in Ægypto, et audiens eorum clamorem Pharaonem tyrannum dejecit cum exercitu suo in mare; ipse est qui memoratum Nabuchodonosor prius superbientem non solum ejectum de regni solio, sed etiam de hominum consortio, in similitudinem bestiæ commutavit. Nec enim abreviata manus ejus est, ut populum suum a tyrannis liberare non possit. Promittit enim populo suo per Isaiam, requiem se daturum a labore et confusione, ac servitute dura, qua ante servierat, et per Ezech. xxxiv. dicit: Liberabo meum gregem de ore eorum pastorum, qui pascunt seipsos. Sed ut, hoc beneficium populus a Deo consequi mereatur, debet a peccatis cessare, quia in ultionem peccati divina permissione impii accipiunt principatum, dicente Domino per Osee xiii.: Dabo tibi regem in furore meo, et in Job. xxxiv. dicitur, quod regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Tollenda est igitur culpa, ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga.

SUAREZ.

(Disp. 13. De Bello. sect. 8.—Utrum seditio sit intrinsece mala?)

Seditio dicitur bellum commune intra eamdem Rempublicam, quod geri potest, vel inter duas partes ejus, vel inter Principem et Rempublicam. Dico primo: Seditio inter duas partes Reipublicæ semper est mala ex parte aggressoris: ex parte vero defendentis se justa est. Hoc secundum per se est notum. Primum ostenditur: quia nulla cernitur ibi legitima auctoritas ad indicendum bellum; hæc enim residet in supremo Principe, ut vidimus sect. 2. Dices, interdum poterit Princeps eam auctoritatem concedere, si magna necessitas publica urgeat. At tunc jam non censetur aggredi pars Reipublicæ, sed Princeps ipse; sicque nulla erit seditio de qua loquimur. Sed, quid si illa Reipublicæ pars sit vere offensa ab alia neque possit per Principem jus suum obtinere? Respondeo, non posse plus efficere, quam possit persona privata, ut ex superioribus constare facile potest.

Dico secundo: Bellum Reipublicæ contra Principem, etiamsi aggressivum, non est intrinsece malum; habere tamen debet conditiones justi alias belli, ut honestetur. Conclusio solum habet locum, quando Princeps est tyrannus; quod duobus modis contingit, ut Cajet. not. 2. 2. q. 64 articulo primo ad tertium: primo si tyrannus sit quoad dominium, et potestatem: secundo solum quoad regimen. Quando priori modo accidit tyrannus, tota Respublica, et quodlibet ejus membrum jus habet contra illum; unde quilibet potest se ac Rempublicam a tyrannide vindicare. Ratio est; quia tyrannus ille aggressor est, et inique bellum movet contra Rempublicam, et singula membra; unde omnibus competit jus defensionis. Ita Cajetanus eo loco, sumique potest ex D. Thom. in secundo, distinctione 44, quæstione secunda, articulo secundo. De posteriori tyranno idem docuit Joann. Hus, imo de omni iniquo superiore; quod damnatum est in Concilio Constant. Sessione 8 et 15. Unde certa veritas est, contra hujusmodi tyrannum nullam privatam personam, aut potestatem imperfectam posse juste movere bellum aggressivum, atque illud esset propie seditio. Probatur, quoniam ille, ut supponitur, verus est Dominus: inferiores autem jus non habent indicendi bellum, sed defendendi se tantum; quod non habet locum in hoc tyranno: namque ille non semper singulis facit injuriam, atque si invaderent, id solum possent efficere, quod ad suam defensionem sufficeret. At vero tota Respublica posset bello insurgere contra ejusmodi tyrannum, neque tunc excitaretur propia seditio (hoc siquidem nomen in malam partem sumi consuevit). Ratio est: quia tunc tota Respublica superior est Rege: nam, cum ipsa dederit illi potestatem, ea conditione dedisse censetur, ut politice, non tyrannice regeret, alias ab ipsa posset deponi. Est tamen observandum, ut ille vere, et manifeste tyrannice agat; concurrantque aliæ conditiones ad honestatem belli positas. Lege Divum Thomum 1 de regimine Principum, cap. 6.

Dico tertio: Bellum Reipublicæ contra Regem neutro modo tyrannum, est propiissime seditio, et intrinsece malum. Est certa, et inde constat: quia deest tunc et causa justa, et potestas. Ex quo etiam e contrario constat, bellum Principis contra Rempublicam sibi subditam, ex parte potestatis posse esse justum, si adsint aliæ conditiones; si vero desint, injustum omnino esse.[E]

Listen to the language of P. Marquez in Spain, in the so-called despotic times: it is well known that his work intituled El Gobernador Cristiano was not one of those obscure books which are never widely circulated; it met with such success that it went through several editions, as well in Spain as in foreign countries. I will give the title at length, and I will add, at the same time, a note of the editions published at different epochs, in different countries, in different languages,—a note which is to be found in the edition of Madrid in 1773.

"The Christian Magistrate (El Gobernador Cristiano), according to the Life of Moses, the Ruler of the People of God, by the R. P. M. J. R. John Marquez, O. S. A., preacher to his Majesty King Philip III., Examiner of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, and Evening Professor of Theology at the University of Salamanca. New and sixth edition, with permission. Madrid, 1773."

"The Christian Magistrate, composed at the request and in honor of His Excellency the Duke of Feria, first published at Salamanca, in the year 1612; a second edition in the same town in 1619; a third edition at Alcala in 1634, and a fourth at Madrid in 1640; the fifth edition was published out of Spain, at Brussels, in 1664. This is the masterpiece among works of this nature which have been written among us.

"Father Martin of St. Bernard, of the Order of Cîteaux, translated this work into Italian, and had it printed at Naples, in 1646. It was also translated into French by M. de Virion, counsellor to the Duke of Lorraine, and it was printed at Nancy in 1621."

BOOK I. CHAP. 8.

"We have now to answer the contrary objections. We maintain that neither the divine nor the natural law has given to states the power of arresting the progress of tyranny by means so violent as that of shedding the blood of princes, they being the vicars of God, divinely invested with the right of life and death over other men. But so far as resisting their cruelty is concerned, it is incontestable that it may and ought to be done. They are not to be obeyed in any thing opposed to the law of God; we must, therefore, escape from their wicked commands, and prevent their blows, as Jonathan did with regard to Saul, his father, when he saw him take his spear to smite David, and when, rising from the table, he went in search of the latter, and warned him of his danger. It is also sometimes allowable to resist princes by force of arms, in order to prevent them from executing notoriously rash and cruel determinations; for, according to the words of St. Thomas, this is not to excite sedition, but to stop and prevent it. Tertullian affirms the same thing when he says: 'Illis nomen factionis accommodandum est, qui in odium bonorum et proborum conspirant, cum boni, cum pii congregantur, non est factio dicenda, sed curia.'

"This is the reason why the blessed St. Hermenegildus, a glorious Spanish martyr, took up arms and entered the field against King Leovigildus, an Arian, to resist the great persecution directed by this prince against the Catholics. This fact is related by the contemporary historians. True, St. Gregory of Tours condemns this act of our king-martyr, not for having resisted his sovereign, but because the former was both his king and his father: and he maintains that although he was a heretic, his son ought not to have resisted him. This reply, however, is not well founded, as Baronius observes. Moreover, the authority of this Gregory was combated by another Gregory, greater than he, St. Gregory the Great, who, in the preface to his book of Morales, approves of the embassy of Leander, sent to Constantinople by St. Hermenegildus, to solicit the aid of Tiberius against Leovigildus, his father. It is indubitable that however strong may be the obligation of filial piety, that of religion is still stronger. The latter obliges us to sacrifice every thing if it be necessary; and it is on account of cases of this nature, that it is written of the tribe of Levi: 'Qui dixerunt patri suo et matri suæ, nescio vos, et fratribus suis ignoro vos, nescierunt filios suos.' Such was the conduct of the Levites when they took up arms, by the command of Moses, to punish their relations for the sin of idolatry.

"If the prince should go so far as personally to make an attempt upon the life of the subject who has no other means of defending himself than killing him,—as when Nero, parading the streets of Rome, followed by a troop of armed men, attacked the quiet and unsuspecting citizens; I say, that in such a case it would be allowable to kill him; for if it is true, as Fr. Dominic de Soto observes, that the subject in this extremity is to suffer himself to be killed, and so prefer the monarch's life to his own, it is solely in the case when the death of the monarch would give rise to great troubles and civil wars in the state; in any other case it would be monstrously inhuman to force men to a thing so insupportable. But when the subject's property is merely to be defended against the cupidity of the monarch, it should not be allowable to lay hands on him; for it is a privilege granted to princes by divine and human laws, that their blood shall not be spilt for any outrage which, committed by any other violator of private property, would be a sufficient motive for taking away his life. The reason of this is, that the life of the king is the soul and bond of the state; that it is of more importance than the property of individuals; that it is better to tolerate grievances of this nature, than to destroy the head of the state."

In order to give an idea of the means employed at this epoch to limit the power of the monarch, by forming associations, whether among the people themselves, or between the people, the grandees, and the clergy, I insert here the letter, or Charter of Fraternity (Hermandad), which the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia made with Castile. I have extracted this piece literally from the collection intituled Bullarium ordinis militiæ sancti Jacobi Gloriosissimi Hispaniarum patroni, p. 223. It will prove to us the existence already, at a remote epoch of our history, of a lively instinct for liberty, although ideas were still limited to a secondary order.

"1. In the name of God and of the blessed Virgin. Amen.

"Be it known to all those who shall read this letter, that on account of the innumerable acts of injustice, injuries, deeds of violence, murders, imprisonments, insolent refusals of audience, opprobriums, and other outrages without measure, committed against us by the king D. Alphonso, to the contempt of God, of justice, of right, and to the great detriment of all these kingdoms; we, the infantes, the prelates, the rich men, the councils, the orders, the knights of the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia, seeing ourselves overwhelmed with injustice and ill-treatment, as we have stated above, and finding it insupportable; our lord the infante Don Sancho has thought good and appointed that we should be of one mind and of one heart, he with us and we with him, to maintain our laws, our privileges, and our charters, in our usages, our manners, our liberties, and franchises, which we enjoyed under king Don Alphonso, his great-grandfather, the conqueror at the battle of Merida, and under king Don Ferdinand, his grandfather; under the emperor and all the other kings of Spain, their predecessors; and under the king Don Alphonso, his father,—all princes who have best merited our gratitude; and our said lord the infante Don Sancho has bound us to this effect by oath and promise, as it is certain by letters between him and us. Considering that it is agreeable to the service of God, of the blessed Virgin, of the court of Heaven, to the defence and honor of the holy Church, of the infante Don Sancho, and of the kings who shall succeed him, in fine, to the advantage of the whole country, we ordain and establish fraternity (hermandad), now and for ever, we the whole of the kingdoms above named, with the councils of the kingdom of Castile, with the infantes, the rich men, the hidalgos, the prelates, the orders, the knights, and all others who are in this kingdom, and who are willing to be with us, as it has just been said.

"2. Be it known to them, that we will insure to our lord the infante Don Sancho, and to all other kings who shall succeed him, all their rights, all their suzerainty, wholly and entirely, as we have promised, and as they are contained in the privilege which he has given us to this effect. Justice shall continue to be decreed by the suzerainty. The Martiniega[F] shall be paid in the place and in the manner in which it was customary to pay it, according to right, to Don Alphonso, the conqueror at the battle of Merida. The money[G] shall be paid at the end of seven years in the usual place and manner, the kings not enjoining the coining of money. The repast (yantar)[H] shall be taken in the place in which it was usual for the kings to take it, according to the fuero, once a year, while visiting the very place, as it was given to the king Don Alphonso, his great-grandfather, and to the king Don Ferdinand, his grandfather. The fonsadera,[I] when the king is with the army, in the customary place, according to the fuero and right in the days of the above-named kings, guaranteeing to each the privileges, charters, liberties, and franchises appertaining to us.

"3. Be it known to them moreover, that we will maintain all our rights, usages, customs, privileges, charters, all our liberties and franchises, always and in such a manner, that should the king, the infante Don Sancho, or the kings who shall succeed them, or any of the lords, alcades, merinos, or any other persons, attempt to infringe upon them, in whole or in part, in any way or at any time, we will unite into one entire whole, and inform the king, the infante Don Sancho, or those who shall succeed them, of the nature of our complaint, and ask them if they are willing to reform; and if not, we will unite into one entire body to defend and protect ourselves, as it is ordained in the charter granted us by the infante Don Sancho.

"4. Moreover, be it known to them that no member of this hermandad shall be chastised, and nothing shall be taken from him contrary to right and the custom of the place, in the councils of the said hermandad; and it shall not be allowable to take from him more than is demanded by the fuero, in the place in which he shall be.

"5. We protest, that if an alcade, a merino, or any other person, on the authority of a letter of the king, of the infante Don Sancho, by his command, or that of the kings who shall succeed him, shall kill a man of our hermandad without hearing him and judging him according to law, that we, the hermandad, will take away his life for such an act. And if we cannot arrest him, he shall be declared an enemy to the hermandad; every member of the hermandad who shall have concealed him shall fall under the penalty of perjury and felony, and shall be treated in his turn as an enemy to this hermandad.

"6. We declare, moreover, that the port-duties shall be paid by us only in conformity to the rights and usages of the times of Don Alphonso, or the king Don Ferdinand, and the councils of the hermandad will not permit any person to receive them beyond this measure.

"7. Moreover, no infante or rich man shall be a merino or grand bailiff in the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia. Neither can these functions be exercised by an infançon, or a knight having notoriously a great number of knights or other men of the country in vassalage; neither can they be exercised by a stranger to the country. And we so will it, because such was the custom in the days of the king Don Alphonso and of the king Don Ferdinand.

"8. All those who may wish to appeal from the judgment of the king, or of Don Sancho, or of other kings who shall succeed him, may do so; they shall have recourse to the book of the Fuero Juzgo, in the kingdom of Leon, as was usual in the days of the kings who preceded this. That if the right of appeal be refused to any who may wish to invoke it, we, on our part, will act according to the injunctions contained in the charters granted us by Don Sancho.

"9. That we may guarantee and execute all the acts of this hermandad, we make a seal of two plates, bearing the following impressions: upon one of the plates, the figure of a lion; and upon the other, the figure of St. James on horseback, with a sword in his right hand; in his left, a standard with a cross at the top, and shells. The inscription shall be thus expressed: 'The Seal of the Hermandad of the Kingdoms of Leon and Galicia.' This seal shall be affixed to the documents which shall be required by this hermandad.

"10. We the whole hermandad of Castile, make a promise and render homage to all the hermandad of the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia, that we will assist each other well and loyally to keep and maintain every one of the above-named things. That if we fail to do so, we are traitors for this alone, like him who slays his lord or surrenders a castle; and may we never in that case have either hands, or tongues, or arms to protect ourselves.

"11. But lest there should be any doubt about the pact we are now making, in order that this pact may be for ever inviolate, we seal this letter with the two seals of the hermandad of Castile, Leon, and Galicia, and place it in the hands of D. Pedro Nunez, and the Order of the Knights of St. John, who are united with us in this hermandad. Given at Valladolid, the 8th day of July, in the year one thousand three hundred and twenty."

Spain had passed through many centuries without knowing of any other religion than the Catholic. She still preserved in all its force and vigor, the idea that the king should be the first to observe the laws; that he could not rule the people according to his caprice; that he ought to govern by principles of justice and views of public expediency. Saavedra, in his Devises, thus expressed himself:—

"1st. Laws are vain when the prince who promulgates them does not confirm and uphold them by his own life and example. A law will appear lenient to the people when observed by its author.

"The laws promulgated by Servius Tullius were not only intended for the people, but also for kings. The disputes between the monarch and his subjects were to be settled in conformity with these laws, as Tacitus relates of Tiberius: 'Although we are not subject to the laws,' said the emperors Severus and Antonius, 'let us conform our lives to these laws.' The monarch is bound by the law not merely from the fact of its being a law, but from the very reason upon which it is founded, when it is natural and common to all, and not particular and exclusively destined to the right government of subjects; for in this case the observance of the law merely concerns the subject, although the monarch, if it should so happen, is bound to obey it, in order to render it tolerable to others. Such appears to have been the meaning of the mysterious command given by God to Ezechiel, to eat the volume, that others seeing him the first to taste the laws and declare them good, might be induced to imitate him. The kings of Spain are so far subject to the laws, that the Treasury, in causes relating to the royal patrimony, is absolutely subject to the same laws as the least of his subjects; and in doubtful cases, the Treasury is condemned. Philip II. thus ordained it; and on an occasion in which his grandson Philip IV., the glorious father of V. A., was personally brought to judgment in an important trial of the Chamber, before the royal council, the judges had the noble determination to condemn him, and his majesty had the rectitude to hear the sentence without expressing any indignation. Happy empire, in which the cause of the monarch is always the least favored!"

Sufficient attention has not perhaps been paid to the merit of the industrial organization introduced into Europe from the earliest ages, and which became more and more diffused after the twelfth century. I allude to the trades-unions, and other associations, which, established under the influence of the Catholic religion, commonly placed themselves under the patronage of some Saint, and had pious foundations for the celebration of their feasts, and for assisting each other in their necessities. Our celebrated Capmany, in his Historical memoirs on the Marine, Commerce, and the Arts of the ancient City of Barcelona, has published a collection of documents, very valuable for the history of the working classes and of the development of their influence on politics. Few works have appeared in foreign countries, in the latter part of the last century, of such great merit as that of our fellow-countryman, published in 1779. One very interesting chapter of this work is devoted to the institution of trades-corporations. I give here a copy of the chapter, which I particularly recommend to the perusal of those persons who imagine that nothing had been thought of in Europe for the benefit of the laboring classes, of those who are so foolish as to look upon that as a means of slavery and exclusivism, which was in reality a means of encouragement and of mutual support. It also appears to me that, by reading the philosophical remarks of Capmany, every sensible man will be convinced that Europe, from the earliest ages, has possessed systems adapted to the encouragement of industry, to the preservation of it from the fatal agitations of those times, to secure esteem for it, and to the legitimate and salutary development of the popular element. It will be no less useful to present this sketch to certain foreign writers, continually occupied with social and political economy, and who, nevertheless, in compiling the history of that science, have not even been acquainted with a work so important for every thing connected with the middle ages of Europe, from the eleventh to the eighteenth century.

"Of the institution of the Trades-Corporations and other Associations of Artisans at Barcelona.

"No memoir has hitherto been discovered which might serve to enlighten and guide us in fixing the exact epoch of the institution of the trades-associations at Barcelona.[J] But according to all the conjectures furnished by ancient monuments, it is very probable that the political erection or formation of the bodies of laborers took place in the time of Don Jaime I., under whose glorious reign the arts were developed under a favorable influence; whilst commerce and navigation took a higher flight, owing to the expeditions of the Aragonese arms beyond the seas. Increased facilities in the means of transport have given an impetus to industry; and an increasing population, the natural result of labor, by its reaction upon labor, augmented the demand for it. At Barcelona, as every where else, trades-corporations naturally arose when the wants and the tastes of society had, of necessity, grown so multifarious, that artisans were forced, with a view to secure protection to their industry, to form themselves into communities. Luxury, and the tastes of society, like every other object of commerce, are subject to continual change; hence, new branches of trade are continually springing up and displacing others; so that at one period each separate art runs into various branches, whilst at another, several arts are combined into one. At Barcelona, corporate industry has passed through all these vicissitudes in the course of five centuries. The hardware trade has comprised at different periods eleven or twelve branches, and consequently afforded subsistence to as many classes of families, whilst at the present time these same branches are reduced to eight, in consequence of certain changes in fashions and customs.

"In accordance with the social system which generally prevailed at that time in most European countries, it was found necessary to bestow liberty and privileges upon an industrious and mercantile people, who thus became a great source of strength and support to kings; and this could not be effected without classifying the citizens. But these lines of demarcation could not be maintained distinct and inviolate without a political division of the various corporations in which both men and their occupations were classified. This division was the more necessary in a city like Barcelona, which, ever since the middle of the thirteenth century, had assumed a sort of democratic independence in its mode of government. Thus, in Italy, the first country in the West that re-established the name and the influence of the people, after these had been effaced in the iron ages by Gothic rule, the industrial classes had already been formed into corporations, which gave stability to the arts and trades, and conferred great honors upon them in those free cities, where, amidst the flux and reflux of invasions, the artisan became a senator, and the senator an artisan. Wars and factions, endemic evils in that delightful country at the time of which we are speaking, could not, in spite of all their ravages, effect the destruction of the associated trades, whose political existence, when once their members were admitted to a share in the government, formed the very basis of the constitution of both nations, inasmuch as both were industrial and mercantile. At Barcelona the trades were well regulated, prosperous, and flourishing, under that municipal system, and that consular jurisprudence, of which commerce, and its invariable concomitant, industry, have always stood in need. It was thus that this capital became one of the most celebrated centres of the manufacturing industry of the middle ages—a reputation which it has maintained and increased up to the present time. In like manner, it was under the name and rule of corporations and brotherhoods that trades were established in Flanders, in France, and in England, countries in which the arts have been carried to their highest degree of perfection and renown. The trades-corporations of Barcelona, even when viewed merely as a necessary institution for the due regulation of the primitive form of municipal government, should be regarded as most important, whether for the preservation of the arts, or as forming the basis of the influence of the artisans themselves. It is at once evident, from the experience of five centuries, that trades-unions have effected unspeakable good in Barcelona, were it only by preserving, as an imperishable deposit, the love, the tradition, and the memory of the arts. They have formed so many rallying points, so many banners, as it were, under which more than once the shattered forces of industry have found refuge; and have thus been enabled to recover their energy and activity, and to perpetuate their existence to our own days, in spite of pestilence, wars, factions, and a multitude of other calamities, which exhaust men's energies, overthrow their habitations, and change their manners. If Barcelona, so often visited by these physical and political plagues, had possessed no community, no bond, no common interest among its artisans, it would certainly have witnessed the destruction of their skill, their economy, and their activity, as is the case with beavers, when their communities have been broken up and dispersed by the hunters.[K]

"By a happy effect of the security enjoyed by families in their different trades, and thanks to the aid, or mont-de-piété, established in the very bosom of the corporation for its necessitous members, who, without this assistance, might have been plunged into misery, these economical establishments at Barcelona have directly contributed to maintain the prosperity of the arts, by shutting out misery from the workshop, and preserving the operatives from indigence. Without this corporate police, by which each trade is surrounded, the property and the fortune of the artisan would have been exposed to the greatest risks; moreover, the credit and stability of the trades themselves would have been perilled; for then the quack, the unskilled operative, and the obscure adventurer, might have imposed upon the public with impunity, and a pernicious latitude might have taken the place of liberty. On the other hand, the trades-corporations being powerful associations, each one by itself being governed by a unanimity of intelligence and a community of interests, could purchase their stocks of raw materials seasonably and advantageously. They supplied the wants of the masters; they made advances, or stood security, for those of their members who lacked either time or funds for making great preliminary disbursements of capital at their own cost. Besides, these corporations, comprehending and representing the industry of the nation, and consequently feeling an interest in its maintenance, addressed from time to time memorials to the Municipal Council, or to the Cortes, relative to the injuries they were sustaining, or the approach of which they, as it often happened, foresaw from the introduction of counterfeit goods, or of foreign productions, which is a cause of ruin to our industry. In fine, without the institution of trades-corporations, instruction would have been void of order and fixed rules; for where there are no masters duly authorized and permanently established, neither will there be any disciples; and all regulations, in default of an executive power to see them observed, will be disregarded and trodden under foot. Trades-corporations are so necessary to the preservation of the arts, that the various trades known at the present day in this capital have derived their appellations and their origin from the economical divisions, and from the arts established by these corporations. When the blacksmith in his shop made ploughshares, nails, keys, knives, swords, &c., the names of the trades of the blacksmith, the nailer, the cutler, the armorer, &c. were unknown; and as there was no special and particular instruction in each of these branches of labor, the separation of which afterwards formed so many new arts maintained by their respective communities, these trades were unknown.

"The second political advantage resulting from the institution of trades-corporations at Barcelona was, the esteem and consideration in which at all times these establishments caused both the artisans and the arts to be held. This wise institution won respect for the operative classes, by constituting them a visible and permanent order in the state. Hence it is that the conduct and the mode of life of the Barcelonians have ever been such as are to be found only amongst an honorable people. Never having been confounded with any exempted and privileged body (for the trades-corporations draw a circle around their members, and let them know what they are, and what they are worth), these people learned that there was honor and virtue within their own sphere, and labored to preserve these qualities; so certain is it that social distinctions in a nation have more influence than is sometimes believed in upholding the spirit of each social class.

"Another view of this question shows us that trades-corporations form communities, governed by an economic code, which assigns to each corporation certain employments and certain honors, to which every individual member may aspire. Even men's prejudices, when wisely directed, sometimes produce admirable effects. Thus the government, the administration of these bodies, in which the artisan always enjoyed the prerogative of managing the resources and the interests of his trade and of his fellow-members, with the title of Counsellor, or Elder (Prohombre), won for the mechanical arts of Barcelona public and general esteem; whilst the pre-eminence in a festival or an assembly serves with these men to soften the rigors of manual labor, and the disadvantages of their inferior condition. At the same time that the trades of Barcelona, formed into well-organized bodies, fixed and preserved the arts in that capital, they had the further credit, by acting as political bodies of the most numerous class of the people, of gaining a high esteem for their members. The obscure artisan, without matriculation, or a common bond, continues isolated and wandering; he dies, and with him perishes his art; or at the first reverse of fortune, he emigrates and abandons his craft. What consideration can wretched wandering followers of any trade obtain in a country? Just such as knife-grinders and tinkers possess in the provinces of Spain. At Barcelona, all the trades have constantly enjoyed the same general esteem, because all have been established and governed upon a system which has rendered them fixed, respectable, and prosperous.

"The esteem in which the trades of Barcelona were held from the time when the municipal government had formed them into national corporations, the agents of public economy, gave rise to the laudable and useful custom of perpetuating trades in the same families. In fact the people having learned that, without quitting the class to which they belonged, they could preserve the respect and consideration due to useful and honorable citizens, no longer desired to quit it, and were no longer ashamed of their condition. When trades are held in honor, which is the consequence of the stability and civil properties of corporations, they naturally become hereditary. Now, the advantages both to the artisan and the arts, resulting from this transmission of trades, are so real and so well known, that it is needless to specify them here, or to dwell upon their salutary effects. This demarcation and classification of trades caused many of the arts to become sure possessions for those who adopted them. Hence fathers aimed at transmitting their trade to their sons; and thus was formed an indestructible mass of national industry, which made labor honorable, by implanting steady and homogeneous manners, if we may so speak, in the bosom of the class of artisans.

"Another circumstance contributed still more to render the exercise of the mechanical arts honorable at Barcelona, not only more than in most other parts of Spain, but more than in any other state, ancient or modern. This was the admission of the trades-corporations upon the register of municipal offices in this city, which enjoyed so many royal grants and extraordinary privileges of independence. Thus the nobility—that Gothic nobility—with their great domains, sought to be incorporated with the operatives in the Ayuntamiento, there to fill the offices and supreme stations in the political government, which, during more than five hundred years, continued in Barcelona under a form and in a spirit truly democratic.[L] All mechanical offices, without any odious distinction or exclusion, were held worthy to be declared qualified for the consistorial council of magistrates; all had a voice and a vote among the conscript fathers who represented this city, the most highly privileged perhaps that ever existed; one of the most renowned for its laws, its power, and its influence; one of the most respected in the middle ages amongst all the states and monarchies of Europe, Asia, and Africa.[M]

"This political system, and this municipal form of government, resembled that which prevailed in the middle ages amongst all the principal towns of Italy, whence Catalonia borrowed many of its customs and usages. Genoa, Pisa, Milan, Pavia, Florence, Sienna, and other towns, had a municipal government composed of the leading men in commerce, and the arts, under the name of consuls, counsellors, &c. Priores Artium—such was the name of a popular form of elective government, distributed among the different classes of citizens, without excluding the artisans, who, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, were in their most flourishing condition, forming the most respectable part of the population, and consequently the richest, the most powerful, and the most independent. This democratic liberty, besides giving stability and permanency to industry in the towns of Italy, conferred a singular degree of honor on the mechanical professions. The grand council of these towns was summoned by the tolling of the bell, when the artisans arranged themselves under the banners or gonfalons of their respective trades. Such was also the political constitution of Barcelona from the middle of the thirteenth to the commencement of the present century. With these facts before us, need we feel surprise that, in our own days, arts and artisans in Barcelona still retain undiminished esteem and consideration; that a love for mechanical professions has become hereditary; that the dignity and self-respect of the artisan class have become traditional, even to the last generations, in which the customs of their ancestors have been transmitted by the succession of example, even after the extinction of the political reasons in which these customs had their origin? Several trades-corporations still preserve in the halls of their juntas the portraits of those of their members who formerly obtained the first employments in the state. Must not this laudable practice have engraven on the memory of the members of the corporation all the ideas of honor and dignity consistent with the condition of an artisan? Assuredly the popular form of the ancient government of Barcelona could not fail to imprint itself generally and forcibly on the manners of the people; indeed, where all the citizens were equal in the participation of honors, it is easy to see that no one would willingly remain inferior to another in virtue or in merit, although inferior, in other respects, by his condition and fortune. This noble emulation, which must naturally have been awakened to activity in the concourse of all orders in the state, gave birth to the dignity, the lofty and inviolate probity of the artisans of Barcelona; and this character they have maintained to our own times, to the admiration of Spain and of foreign nations. Such has been the negligence of our national authors, that this narrative will have the appearance of a discovery: up to the present time Barcelona and the Principality had not attracted the scrutinizing notice of the political historian, so that a dark shadow still concealed the real principles (always unknown to the crowd) from which in all times, have sprung the virtues and the vices of nations.

"To these causes may be attributed, in great part, the esteem which the artisans have acquired. Nothing could be more salutary than this obligation they were always under of comporting themselves with dignity and distinction in public employments, whether in the corporation or the municipal government. Moreover the constant example of the master of the house, who, up to the present time, has always lived in common with his apprentices in a praiseworthy manner, has confirmed the children in ideas of order and dignity; for the manners and habits of a people, which are as powerful as law, must be inculcated from the tenderest age. Thus, in Barcelona, the operative has never been confounded by the slovenliness of his dress with the mendicant, whose idle and dissipated habits, says an illustrious writer, are easily contracted when the dress of the man of respectability is in no way distinguished from that of the rabble. Nor are the laboring population ever seen wearing those cumbersome garments which, serving as a cover for rags and a cloak for idleness, cramp the movements and activity of the body, and invite to a life of indolent ease. The people have not contracted a habit of frequenting taverns, where example leads to drunkenness and moral disorders. Their amusements, so necessary for working people to render their daily toils supportable, have always been innocent recreations, which either afforded them repose from their fatigues or varied them. The games formerly permitted were either the ring (la bague), nine pins, bowls, ball, shooting at a mark, fencing, and public dancing, authorized and watched over by the authorities; an amusement which from time immemorial has been general amongst the Catalans, in certain seasons and on certain festivals of the year.

"The respect for the artisan of Barcelona has never been diminished on account of the material on which his art was exercised, whether it was silver, steel, iron, copper, wood, or wool. We have seen that all the trades were equally eligible to the municipal offices of the state; none were excluded—not even butchers. Ancient Barcelona did not commit the political error of establishing preferences that might have produced some odious distinctions of trades. The inhabitants considered that all the citizens were in themselves worthy of esteem, since all contributed to the growth and maintenance of the property of a capital whose opulence and power were founded upon the industry of the artisan and the merchant. In fact, Barcelona has ever been free from that idea, so generally entertained, that every mechanical profession is low and vulgar—a mischievous and very common prejudice, which, in the provinces of Spain, has made an irreparable breach in the progress of the arts. At Barcelona, admission into certain trades-corporations has never been refused to the members of other trades: in this city all the trades are held in the same estimation. In a word, neither Barcelona nor any other town in Catalonia has ever entertained those vulgar prejudices that are enough to prevent honorable men from devoting themselves to the arts, or to cause the son to forsake the art practised by the father."[N]

I have spoken of the numerous Councils held by the Church at different epochs; why, it will be asked, does she not hold them more frequently now? I will answer this question by quoting a judicious passage from Count de Maistre, in his work On the Pope, book i. chap. 2:—

"In the first ages of Christianity," says he, "it was more easy to assemble Councils, because the Church was not so numerous as now, and because the emperors possessed powers that enabled a sufficient number of Bishops to assemble, so that their decisions needed only the assent of other Bishops. Yet these Councils were not assembled without much difficulty and embarrassment. But in modern times, since the civilized world has been divided into so many sovereignties, and immeasurably increased by our intrepid navigators, an Œcumenical Council has become a chimera.[O] Simply to convoke all the Bishops, and to bring legally together such a convocation, five or six years would not suffice."

That my readers may be convinced of the truth and accuracy of what I here affirm, I invite them to read the history of the heresies that have afflicted the Church since the first ages, but particularly from the tenth century down to our own days.

It was not, I have said, without prejudice to the liberty of the people that the influence of the clergy was withdrawn from the working of the political machine. In order to ascertain how far this is true, it may be well to remark, that a great number of theologians were favorable to tolerably liberal doctrines in political matters, and that it was the clergy who exercised the greatest freedom in speaking to kings, even after the people had almost entirely lost the right of intervention in political affairs. Observe what opinions St. Thomas held on forms of government.

(Quest. cv. 1^a 2^æ.)

De ratione judicialium præceptorum art. 1. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa bonam ordinationem principum in aliqua civitate, vel gente, duo sunt attendenda, quorum unum est, ut omnes aliquam partem habeant in principatu; per hoc enim conservatur pax populi et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custodiunt ut dicitur (II. Polit., cap. i.); aliud est quod attenditur secundum speciem regiminis vel ordinationis principatum, cujus cum sint diversæ species, ut philosophus tradit in III. Polit. cap. v., præcipue tamen unum regimen est, in quo unus principatur secundum virtutem: et aristocratia, id est potestas optimorum, in qua aliqui pauci principantur secundum virtutem. Unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate vel regno, in quo unus præficitur secundum virtutem qui omnibus præsit et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum virtutem, et tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia ex omnibus eligi possunt, tum quia etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis vero est omnis politia bene commixta ex regno in quantam unus præest, et aristocratia in quantum multi principantur secundum virtutem, et ex democratia, id est potestate populi in quantum ex popularibus possunt eligi principes, et ad populum pertinet electio principum, et hoc fuit institutum secundum legem divinam.

Divus Thomas. (1^a 2^æ Q. 90, art. 4^o.)

Et sic ex quatuor prædictis potest colligi definitio legis quæ nihil est aliud quam quædam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune ab eo qui curam communitatis habet promulgata. Q. 95, art. 4.

Tertio est de ratione legis humanæ ut instituatur a gubernante communitatem civitatis: sicut supra dictum est. (Quest. 90, art. 3.) Et secundum hoc distinguuntur leges humanæ secundum diversa regimina civitatum, quorum unum, secundum philosophum in III. Polit., cap. xi., est regnum, quando scilicet civitas gubernatur ab uno, et secundum hoc accipiuntur constitutiones principum; aliud vero regimen est aristocratia, id est principatus optimorum vel optimatum, et secundum hoc sumuntur responsa prudentum et etiam senatusconsulta. Aliud regimen est oligarchia, id est principatus paucorum divitum et potentum; et secundum hoc sumitur jus prætorium, quod etiam honorarium dicitur. Aliud autem regimen est populi, quod nominatur democratia; et secundum hoc sumuntur plebiscita. Aliud autem est tyrannicum, quod est omnino corruptum unde ex hoc non sumitur aliqua lex. Est etiam et aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est optimum, et secundum hoc sumitur lex quam majores natu simul cum plebibus sanxerunt, ut Isidorus dicit lib. 5, Etym. O. cap. x.

If certain declaimers are to be believed, it would seem that the principle, that it is the law which governs, and not the will of man, is quite a recent discovery. But observe with what solidity and perspicuity the angelic doctor expounds this doctrine.

(1^a 2^æ Q. 93, art. 1.)

Utrum fuerit utile aliquas leges poni ab hominibus.

Ad 2^m dicendum, quod sicut Philosophus dicit. 1. Rhetor. Melius est omnia ordinari lege, quam dimittere judicum arbitrio, et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia facilius est invenire paucos sapientes, qui sufficiant ad rectas leges ponendas, quam multos; qui requirerentur ad recte judicandum de singulis. Secundo, quia illi qui leges ponunt, ex multo tempore considerant quid lege ferendum sit: sed judicia de singularibus factis fiunt ex casibus subito exortis. Facilius autem ex multis consideratis potest homo videre quid rectum sit, quam solum ex aliquo uno facto. Tertio, quia legislatores judicant in universali, et de futuris: sed homines judiciis præsidentes judicant de præsentibus; ad quæ afficientur amore vel odio, aut aliqua cupiditate; et sic eorum depravatur judicium. Quia ergo justitia animata judicis non invenitur in multis, et quia flexibilis est: ideo necessarium fuit in quibuscumque est possibile, legem determinare quid judicandum sit, et paucissima arbitrio hominum committere.

In Spain, the Procuradores of the Cortes dared not raise their voices against the excesses of power; and their timidity drew down the keen reproaches of P. Mariana. In the examination to which he was subjected in the celebrated suit commenced against him on the subject of the seven treatises, he confesses having applied to the Procuradores the epithets of vile, superficial, and utterly venal, only striving to obtain the favor of the prince, and their own particular interests, without solicitude for the public good. He added, that such was the public cry, the general complaint, at least at Toledo, where he was residing.

I will leave unnoticed his work intituled De Rege et Regis institutione, of which I have spoken elsewhere. Confining myself to his History of Spain, I will observe with what liberty he expresses himself on the most delicate points, without meeting with any opposition, either from the civil or from the ecclesiastical authority. In his 1st book, chap. 4, speaking of the Aragonese, in his usual grave and severe tone, he says: "The Aragonese possess and enjoy laws and fueros very different from those of the other people of Spain; they possess every thing most adapted for preserving liberty against the excessive power of kings, for preventing this power from degenerating and changing, by its natural tendency, into tyranny; for they are not ignorant of this truth, that the right of liberty is generally lost by degrees."

It was precisely at this epoch that the clergy expressed themselves with the greatest freedom on the most delicate of all subjects, that of contributions. The venerable Palafox, in his memorial or petition to the king for ecclesiastical immunity, said: "According to St. Augustine, to the great Tostat, and other weighty authors, the Son of God appointed that the children of God—that is the ministers of the Church, his priests—should not pay tribute to the pagan princes. In fact, he addressed to St. Peter the following question, already resolved by the eternal wisdom of the Father: Reges gentium a quibus accipiunt tributum, a filiis, an ab alienis? St. Peter answered, Ab alienis; and our Lord concluded with these words: Ergo liberi sunt filii. I may be allowed, sire, to make this delicate observation, that the Divine Majesty does not say, Reges gentium a quibus capiunt tributum, but a quibus accipiunt. By this word accipiunt, we understand the mildness and mansuetude with which the payment of a tribute should always be exacted, in order to diminish the bitterness and repugnance accompanying a tribute.

"46. It is doubtless useful for the preservation of the state, that, in the first place, subjects should give, in order that princes may then receive. It is proper that kings should receive, and employ the tribute paid them, for on this depends the safety of crowns; but it is well that subjects should first give it voluntarily. It is doubtless from this passage of Scripture, from this expression of the Eternal Word, that the Catholic Crown, always so pious, has received the holy doctrine, by virtue of which neither your majesty nor your illustrious predecessors have ever permitted a tribute to be levied without its having first received the consent of the kingdoms themselves, and been offered by them; and your majesty is incomparably more exalted by limiting and moderating your power, than by exercising it to its utmost extent.

"47. Sire, if laymen, who have no exemption in matters of tribute, enjoy that which the kindness of your majesty and of the most Catholic kings grant them; if they do not pay till they choose to make a voluntary offering; if nothing is received from them except on this condition, will religion, your majesty's renowned piety, and the devoted zeal of the Council, allow the clergy—the sons, the ministers of God, the privileged, those who are exempt by divine and human law in all the nations of the world, and among the very pagans—to enjoy less favor than strangers, who are not, like them, either ministers of the Church or priests of God? Is the word capiunt, sire, to be applied exclusively to the ministers of God, and the word accipiunt to men of the world?"

In his work intituled Historia Real Sagrada, the same writer raises his voice against tyranny with extreme severity:

"12. Such," says he, "is the law which the king whom you wish for will maintain in your regard. The word law is here employed ironically, as if God should say: 'You imagine, without doubt, that this king of yours would govern according to law; on this supposition you asked for him, since you complained that my tribunal did not govern you. Now, the law which this king will exercise towards you will be, to disregard all law; and his law will eventually be tyranny respected.' The politician who, relying upon this passage, should attribute as a right to the monarch a power which is merely pointed out by God to the people as a chastisement, would be an uncivilized being, unworthy of being treated as a rational creature. The Lord, in this instance, does not define what is the best; he does not say what he is giving them; these words are no appreciation of power; he merely declares what would be the case, and what he condemns. Who shall dare to found the origin of tyranny on justice itself? God says, that he whom they desire for a king will be a tyrant—not a tyrant approved of by him, but a tyrant that he reprobates and chastises. And subsequent events clearly shewed it, since there were in Israel wicked kings, by whom the prophecy was fulfilled, and Saints who obtained on the throne the mercy of God. The wicked kings literally accomplished the divine threat, by doing what they were forbidden; the good ones established their dignity upon propriety and justice within prescribed limits."

Father Marquez, in his Christian Prince or Magistrate (Gobernador Cristiano), also enlarges on the same question; he expounds his opinion both theoretically and practically.

(Chapter xvi. 53.)

"Thus far we have heard the words of Philo, writing on this event. As these words afforded me an opportunity of reasoning on the obligations of Christian kings, I have taken care to quote them at length. I will not expect these kings to act like Moses; for they have not the miraculous aid which the Hebrew legislator received for the relief of the people, nor the rod which God gave him to make water flow from the rock at need. But I will recommend them to reflect maturely on the additional services they shall attempt to exact from their subjects, and the burdens they shall impose on them. Let them reflect that they are bound to justify the motive of their request in all truth, and without any false coloring; always and constantly aware that they are in the presence of God, that the eyes of God are fixed on their hands, that He will require from them a strict account of their actions. For, as the holy doctor of Nazianzen says, the Son of God came designedly into the world at the taking of a census and a resettlement of the imposts, in order to confound kings who would have appointed them through caprice; so that kings may now know that the Son of God takes account of every item, and weighs in the balance of his strict justice things which we should account of little moment.

"The above reflection will serve to dispel the false ideas of certain flatterers, who, to obtain the favor of princes, persuade them that they are perfectly independent and the masters of the lives and property of their subjects, free to dispose of them as they may think proper. In support of this pretended maxim, they allege, as we have seen, the history of Samuel, who answered the people on the part of God, when they were demanding a king, 'You shall have one, but on terrible conditions.' This king was to take from them their fields, their vineyards, their olive-yards, to give them to his servants; he was to take their daughters for slaves, 'to make him ointments, and to be his cooks and bakers.' And they have not observed that, as John Bodin says, this is the interpretation of Philip Melancthon, which alone is sufficient to render it suspicious. Moreover, as St. Gregory, and after him other doctors, have observed, this passage of Scripture does not establish the just right of kings, but rather announces beforehand the tyranny of a great number of princes; in fine, these words do not explain what good princes might do, but merely what bad ones would usually do. Hence, when Achab seized upon the vineyard of Naboth, God was angry with him, and we know how He treated him. When David, the elect of God, demanded a spot whereon to set up the altar of Jebusee, he only asked it on condition of paying the value of the land.

"For this reason princes should examine with scrupulous attention whether contributions are just; for if they are not, doctors decide that they cannot, without manifest injustice, thus more or less infringe on the rights of their subjects. This doctrine is so Catholic and certain, that men holding sound doctrine affirm that, in this case, princes cannot impose fresh tributes, even though necessary, without the consent of the nation. For, say they, the prince not being (which he certainly is not) the master of his subjects' property, cannot make use of it without the consent of those from whom he is to receive it. This custom has been long in practice in the kingdom of Castile, where the laws of royalty prohibit the levying of any new impost without the intervention of the Cortes: after having received the sanction of the Cortes, the impost is submitted to the vote of the towns; and the prince does not consider his demand granted till it has received the sanction of the majority of the towns. Edward I. of England made a similar law, according to many authors of weight; and Philip of Commines says, that it was the same in France till the time of Charles VII., who, urged by an extreme necessity, suppressed these formalities, and levied a tax without waiting for the consent of the States, and this inflicted on the kingdom so deep a wound, that it will long continue unhealed. If we may credit certain affirmations, this author reports, that it was then asserted that the king had escaped from the guardianship exercised by the kingdom; but that his own opinion is, that kings cannot, without the consent of their people, exact a single farthing; princes acting otherwise, says he, fall under the Pope's excommunication; no doubt that of the bull In Cœna Domini. For my own part, I ought to confess that I do not find this in Philip de Commines.... With respect to this second point, it is evident, that the prince cannot, on his own authority, impose new tributes without the consent of the nation, whenever this nation shall have acquired by any of the reasons mentioned a contrary right, which I consider to be the case in Castile. No one, in fact, will deny that kingdoms at their commencement have a right to choose their kings on this condition, or render them such services as to obtain in return that no new imposts shall be laid on them without their consent. Now, in either case, there will be a compact made, from which kings cannot depart; and it is of no consequence, as some imagine it to be, whether they have obtained their kingdoms through the election of their subjects, or by mere force of arms. Although it is probable, indeed, that a State yielding itself of its own accord, will obtain greater privileges and better conditions than those acquired by a just war, it would not, however, be impossible for a State, in choosing a king, to confer upon him all its power in an absolute manner, and without this restriction, with a view to lay him under greater obligations, and to testify to him a greater degree of devotedness; and, on the other hand, a king, who had subjected a kingdom by force of arms, might nevertheless voluntarily grant it this privilege, with a view to obtain its gratitude, and more affectionate obedience on its part. The positive rule, therefore, for this particular right, will be the contract made, whether virtually or expressly, between the State and the prince; a contract which should be inviolable, especially if it is sealed by an oath."

The Prince, or Christian Magistrate.

(Liv. ii. ch. xxxix. § 2.)

"Princes, it is said, may compel their subjects to sell at half-price, or to give gratuitously, a part of their property. This opinion is generally founded on the law which ordains that, when a ship in a tempest has been saved by throwing overboard a part of the cargo, the proprietors of the remaining part are obliged to make a proportionate contribution to indemnify the sufferers for the loss they have sustained. Bartholus and other authors have inferred from this, that in a time of necessity and famine the monarch may require his subjects to give gratuitously, and a fortiori to sell at a lower price, a portion of their property to those in need. The monarch, say they, might, without any doubt, render property common, as it was before the establishment of social rights; he may consequently take it from one of his subjects and give it to another.