NOTES. (continued 2)

A Canon containing the same regulation as the preceding; and whence, moreover, it appears, that the faithful, for the salvation of their souls, were accustomed to offer their slaves to God and the Saints.

(Ex eodem, anno 864.)

"Injustum videtur et impium, ut mancipia, quæ fideles Deo et sanctis ejus pro remedio animæ suæ consecrarunt, cujuscumque muneris mancipio, vel commutationis commercio iterum in servitutem secularium redigantur, cum canonica auctoritas servos tantummodo permittat distrahi fugitives. Et ideo ecclesiarum rectores summopere caveant, ne eleemosyna unius, alterius peccatum fiat. Et est absurdum, ut ab ecclesiastica dignitate servus discedens, humanæ sit obnoxius servituti." (Ibid. cap. 4.)

Freedom shall be granted to slaves who wish to embrace the monastic state, yet without neglecting useful precautions to ascertain the reality of their vocation.

(Concilium Romanum sub S. Gregorio I., anno 597.)

"Multos de ecclesiastica seu sæculari familia, novimus ad omnipotentis Dei servitium festinare, ut ab humana servitute liberi in divino servitio valeant familiarius in monasteriis conversari, quos si passim dimittimus, omnibus fugiendi ecclesiastici juris dominium occasionem præbemus: si vero festinantes ad omnipotentis Dei servitium, incaute retinemus, illi invenimur negare quædam qui dedit omnia. Unde necesse est, ut quisquis ex juris ecclesiastici vel sæcularis militiæ servitute ad Dei servitium converti desiderat, probetur prius in laico habitu constitutus: et si mores ejus atque conversatio bona desiderio ejus testimonium ferunt, absque retractatione servire in monasterio omnipotenti Domino permittatur, ut ab humano servitio liber recedat, qui in divino obsequio districtiorem appetit servitutem." (S. Greg. epist. 44. lib. iv).

The abuse of ordaining slaves without the consent of their masters had spread; this abuse is checked.

(Ex epistolis Gelasii Papæ.)

"Ex antiquis regulis et novella synodali explanatione comprehensum est, personas obnoxias servituti, cingulo cœlestis militiæ non præcingi. Sed nescio utrum ignorantia an voluntate rapiamini, ita ut ex hac causa nullus pene Episcoporum videatur extorris. Ita enim nos frequens et plurimorum querela nos circumstrepit, ut ex hac parte nihil penitus putetur constitutum." (Distin. 54. c. 9.)

"Frequens equidem, et assidua nos querela, circumstrepit de his pontificibus, qui nec antiquas regulas nec decreta nostra noviter directa cogitantes, obnoxias possessionibus obligatasque personas, venientes ad clericalis officii cingulum non recusant." (Ibid. c. 10.)

"Actores siquidem filiæ nostræ illustris et magnificæ feminæ, Maximæ, petitorii nobis insinuatione conquesti sunt, Sylvestrum atque Candidum, originarios suos, contra constitutiones, quæ supradictæ sunt, et contradictione præeunte a Lucerino Pontifice diaconos ordinatos." (Ibid c. 11.)

"Generalis etiam querelæ vitanda præsumptio est, qua propemodum causantur universi, passim servos et originarios, dominorum jura, possessionumque fugientes, sub religiosæ conversationis obtentu, vel ad monasteria sese conferre, vel ad ecclesiasticum famulatum, conniventibus quippe præsulibus, indifferenter admitti. Quæ modis omnibus est amovenda pernicies, ne per Christiani nominis institutum aut aliena pervadi, aut publica videatur disciplina subverti." (Ibid. c. 12.)

The parish priests are allowed to choose some clerics from the slaves of the Church.

(Concilium Emeritense, anno 666.)

"Quidquid unanimiter digne disponitur in sancta Dei ecclesia, necessarium est ut a parochitanis presbyteris custoditum maneat. Sunt enim nonnulli, qui ecclesiarum suarum res ad plenitudinem habent, et sollicitudo illis nulla est habendi clericos, cum quibus omnipotenti Deo laudum debita persolvant officia. Proinde instituit hæc sancta synodus, ut omnes parochitani presbyteri, juxta ut in rebus sibi a Deo creditis sentiunt habere virtutem, de ecclesiæ suæ familia clericos sibi faciant; quos per bonam voluntatem ita nutriant, ut et officium sanctum digne paragant, et ad servitium suum aptos eos habeant. Hi etiam victum et vestitum dispensatione presbyteri merebuntur, et domino et presbytero suo, atque utilitati ecclesiæ fideles esse debent. Quod si inutiles apparuerint ut culpa patuerit, correptione disciplinæ feriantur; si quis presbyterorum hanc sententiam minime custodierit, et non adimpleverit, ab episcopo suo corrigatur: ut plenissime custodiat, quod digne jubetur." (Canon 18.)

It is prescribed to the Bishops to confer liberty on the slaves of the Church before they admit them into the clerical body.

(Concilium Toletanum nonum, anno 655.)

"Qui ex familiis ecclesiæ servituri devocantur in clerum ab episcopis suis, necesse est, ut libertatis percipiant donum: et si honestæ vitæ claruerint meritis, tunc demum majoribus fungantur officiis." (Canon 11.)

It is allowed to ordain the slaves of the Church, liberty having been previously conferred on them.

(Concilium quartem Toletanum, anno 633.)

"De familiis ecclesiæ constituere presbyteros ut diaconos per parochias liceat; quos tamen vitæ rectitudo et probitas morum commendat: ea tamen ratione, ut antea manumissi libertatem status sui percipiant, et denuo ad ecclesiasticos honores succedant; irreligiosum est enim obligatos existere servituti, qui sacri ordinis suscipiunt dignitatem."

§ VII.

We have shown in the text by what means, with what wisdom and perseverance Christianity abolished slavery in the ancient world; Christian and Catholic Europe was free at the time when Protestantism appeared. Let us now see what Catholicity has done in modern times, with respect to slaves in other parts of the world. We can present to our readers in one document, which is the evidence of the ideas and feelings of the Sovereign Pontiff Gregory XVI., an interesting history of the solicitude of the Roman See in favor of the slaves of the whole universe. I mean the apostolical letters published at Rome, November 3, 1839, against the slave-trade; and I recommend the perusal of them. It will be there seen, in the most authentic and decisive manner, that the Catholic Church, on this important subject of slavery, has always showed, and shows still, the most lively spirit of charity, without in the least offending against justice, or for a moment departing from the path of prudence.

"Gregorius P. P. XVI. ad futuram rei memoriam.

"Raised to the supreme degree of the apostolical dignity, and filling, although without any merit on our part, the place of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who, by the excess of His charity, has deigned to become man, and die for the redemption of the world; we consider that it belongs to our pastoral solicitude to exert all our efforts to prevent Christians from engaging in the trade in blacks or any other men, whoever they may be.

"As soon as the light of the Gospel began to spread, the unfortunate men who fell into the hard fate of slavery during the numerous wars of that period, felt their condition improved; for the apostles, inspired by the Spirit of God, on the one hand, taught slaves to obey their earthly masters, as Jesus Christ Himself, and to be resigned from the bottom of their heart to the will of God; but, on the other, they commanded masters to behave well to their slaves, to grant them what was just and equitable, and not to treat them with anger, knowing that the Lord of both is in heaven, and that with Him there is no distinction of persons.

"The law of the Gospel having very soon universally and fundamentally ordained sincere charity towards all, and the Lord Jesus having declared that He would regard as done or refused to Himself all the acts of beneficence and mercy done or refused to the poor and little ones—it naturally followed that Christians not only regarded their slaves as brethren, above all when they were become Christians, but that they were more inclined to give liberty to those who rendered themselves worthy of it. This usually took place particularly on the solemn feasts of Easter, as St. Gregory of Nyssa relates. There were even found some who, inflamed with more ardent charity, embraced slavery for the redemption of their brethren; and an apostolic man, our predecessor, Pope Gregory I., of sacred memory, attests that he had known a great many who performed this work of mercy. Wherefore the darkness of Pagan superstition being entirely dissipated in the progress of time, and the manners of the most barbarous nations being softened,—thanks to the benefit of faith working by charity,—things advanced so far, that for many centuries there have been no slaves among the greater part of Christian nations. Yet (we say it with profound sorrow) men have been since found, even among Christians, who, shamefully blinded by the desire of sordid gain, have not hesitated to reduce into slavery, in distant countries, Indians, Negroes, and other unfortunate races; or to assist in this scandalous crime, by instituting and organizing a traffic in these unfortunate beings, who had been loaded with chains by others. A great number of the Roman Pontiffs, our predecessors of glorious memory, have not forgotten to stigmatize, throughout the extent of their jurisdiction, the conduct of these men as injurious to their salvation, and disgraceful to the Christian name; for they clearly saw that it was one of the causes which tended most powerfully to make infidel nations continue in their hatred to the true religion.

"This was the object of the apostolical letters of Paul III., of the 29th of May, 1537, addressed to the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo, under the ring of the fisherman, and other letters, much more copious, of Urban VIII., of the 22d April, 1639, addressed to the collector of the rights of the Apostolic Chamber in Portugal,—letters, in which the most severe censures are cast upon those who venture to reduce the inhabitants of the East or West Indies into slavery, buy, sell, give, or exchange them, separate them from their wives and children, strip them of their property, take or send them into strange places, or deprive them of their liberty in any way; to retain them in slavery; or aid, counsel, succor, or favor those who do these things under any color or pretence whatever; or preach or teach that this is lawful, and, in fine, co-operate therewith in any way whatever. Benedict XIV. has since confirmed and renewed these pontifical ordinances before mentioned by new apostolical letters to the Bishops of Brazil and some other countries, dated the 20th December, 1741, by means of which he calls forth the solicitude of the Bishops for the same purpose. A long time before, another of our more ancient predecessors, Pius II., whose pontificate saw the empire of the Portuguese extended in Guinea and in the country of the blacks, addressed letters, dated the 7th of October, 1482, to the Bishop of Ruvo, who was ready to depart for those countries: in these letters he did not confine himself to giving to this prelate the means requisite for exercising the sacred ministry in those countries with the greatest fruit, but he took occasion very severely to blame the conduct of those who reduced the neophytes into slavery. In fine, in our days, Pius VII., animated by the same spirit of charity and religion as his predecessors, zealously interposed his good offices with men of authority for the entire abolition of the slave-trade among Christians.

"These ordinances, and this solicitude of our predecessors, have availed not a little, with the aid of God, in defending the Indians, and other nations who have just been mentioned, against the barbarity of conquest, and the cupidity of Christian merchants; but the Holy See is far from being able to boast of the complete success of its efforts and zeal, for, if the slave-trade has been partially abolished, it is still carried on by a great many Christians. Wherefore, desiring to remove such a disgrace from all Christian countries, after having maturely considered the matter with many of our venerable brethren, the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, assembled in Council, following the example of our predecessors, by virtue of the apostolic office, we warn and admonish in the Lord all Christians, of whatever condition they may be, and enjoin upon them that, for the future, no one shall venture unjustly to oppress the Indians, Negroes, or other men, whoever they may be; to strip them of their property or reduce them into servitude: or give aid or support to those who commit such excesses, or carry on that infamous traffic, by which the blacks, as if they were not men, but mere impure animals, reduced like them into servitude, without any distinction, contrary to the laws of justice and humanity, are bought, sold, and devoted to endure the hardest labors; and on account of which dissensions are excited and almost continual wars are fomented among nations by the allurements of gain offered to those who first carry away the Negroes.

"Wherefore, by virtue of the apostolical authority, we condemn all these things aforesaid, as absolutely unworthy of the Christian name; and, by the same authority, we absolutely prohibit and interdict all ecclesiastics and laymen from venturing to maintain that this traffic in blacks is permitted, under any pretext or color whatsoever; or to preach or teach in public or in private, in any way whatever, anything, contrary to these apostolic letters. And in order that these letters may come to the knowledge of all, and that no one may pretend ignorance, we ordain and decree that they be published and posted up, according to custom, by one of our officers, on the doors of the basilica of the Prince of the Apostles, of the Apostolic Chancery, of the Palace of Justice, of Monte Citorio, and at the Campo di Fiori. Given at Rome, at St. Mary Major's, under the seal of the fisherman, the 3d of November, 1839, the ninth year of our Pontificate.

Louis, Cardinal Lambruschini."

I again particularly invite attention to the document which I have just inserted—to these letters which magnificently crown the united efforts of the Church for the abolition of slavery. As the abolition of the slave-trade—the object of a treaty recently made between the great powers—is at this moment one of the affairs which occupy the chief attention of Europe, it is proper to pause a few moments, to reflect on the contents of the apostolic letters of the Sovereign Pontiff Gregory XVI. Let us observe, in the first place, that in the year 1482, Pope Pius II. addressed apostolical letters to the Bishop of Ruvo, about to depart for the newly discovered countries—letters, in which he did not exclusively confine himself to giving the prelate the powers necessary to exercise his holy ministry with the greatest fruit in those countries, but in which he takes occasion to censure very severely the conduct of Christians who reduced the neophytes into slavery. Exactly at the end of the fifteenth century, at the time when it may be said that the Church gathering the last fruit of her long labors, at length saw Europe emerge from the chaos in which the irruption of the barbarians had plunged her; at the time when the social and political institutions were developed with daily increasing ardor, and began to form a regular and coherent body; at this moment the Church resumes her secular contest with another barbarism which reappeared in distant countries; she opposes the abuse of the superiority of strength and intelligence, which the conquerors possessed over the conquered nations.

This fact alone proves that, for the true liberty and well-being of nations, for the just pre-eminence of right over might, and for the triumph of justice over force, the intelligence and refinement of nations are not enough—religion also is required. In ancient times, we see nations cultivated to the highest point commit unheard of atrocities; and in modern times, Europeans, so proud of their knowledge and advancement, introduce slavery among the unfortunate nations who have fallen under their dominion. Now, who was the first to raise a voice against such injustice—against such horrible barbarity? It was not policy, which perhaps rejoiced to see its conquests consolidated by slavery; it was not commerce which found in this infamous traffic an easy means of making shameful but abundant profits; it was not philosophy, which, fully explaining the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, would perhaps have seen without concern the resuscitation of the degrading theory of races born for slavery; but it was the Catholic religion, expressing herself by the mouth of the Vicar of Jesus Christ.

It is certainly a consolatory spectacle for Catholics to see a Roman Pontiff, four centuries ago, condemn what Europe, with all her civilization and refinement, condemns only at the present day. Still, Europe only does so with difficulty; and all those who take part in this tardy condemnation are not exempt from the suspicion of being actuated by motives of interest. No doubt the Roman Pontiff did not effect all the good he intended; but doctrines do not remain sterile when they emanate from a high quarter, whence, diffusing themselves to great distances, they descend on persons who receive them with veneration, if it were only on account of him who teaches them. The conquering nations were then Christians, and sincere ones; it is therefore indubitable, that the admonitions of the Pope, transmitted by the mouths of Bishops and other priests, must have had very salutary effects. If, in cases like this, where we see a measure taken against an evil, the evil nevertheless resists and continues, we imagine, by a grievous mistake, that the measure has been vain, and that its author has produced no effect. It is one thing to extirpate, and another to diminish an evil; and it cannot be doubted that, if the Bulls of the Popes had not all the effect intended, they must nevertheless have served to diminish the evil, by improving the lot of nations fallen under the yoke. The evil prevented and avoided is not seen; the preservative has hindered its existence: but the existing evil is palpable—it affects us, it excites our regret, and we often forget the gratitude due to the hand which has preserved us from greater evils. How often is it thus with respect to religion! She cures many things, but she prevents still more. If she takes possession of the heart of man, it is in order to destroy there even the very roots of a thousand evils.

Let us imagine the Europeans of the fifteenth century invading the East and West Indies, without any check, guided only by the inspirations of cupidity, and by the caprices of arbitrary power, full of the pride of conquerors, and of the contempt with which the Indians must have inspired them, on account of the inferiority of their knowledge, and of their backwardness in civilization and refinement: what must have happened? If, in spite of the incessant cries of religion, in spite of the influence which she had on laws and manners, the conquered nations have had so much to suffer, would not the evil have been carried to an intolerable extent, without those powerful causes which incessantly combated, prevented or diminished it? The conquered would have been reduced into slavery en masse; they would have been condemned en masse to perpetual degradation; they would have been deprived even of the hope of one day entering on the career of civilization.

If the conduct of Europeans at that time with respect to men of other races—if the conduct of some nations of our own days is to be deplored, it cannot be said at least that the Catholic religion has not opposed such excesses with all her strength; it cannot be said that the Head of the Church has ever allowed these evils to pass without raising his voice to recall to mind the rights of men, to stigmatize injustice, to excite abhorrence of cruelty, and energetically to plead the cause of humanity, without distinction of races, climates, or colors.

Whence does Europe derive this lofty idea and this generous feeling, which urge her to declare herself so strongly against the traffic in men, and to demand the complete abolition of slavery in the colonies? When posterity shall call to mind these glorious facts; when it shall adopt them as marking a new era in the annals of civilization; when, studying and analyzing the causes which have conducted European legislation and manners to so high a pitch, and, passing over temporary and unimportant motives, insignificant circumstances, and secondary agents, it shall seek for the vital principle which impelled European civilization towards so glorious an end, it will find that this principle was Christianity; and if, desiring to fathom the question more and more, it should inquire whether this was Christianity, under a vague and general form—Christianity without authority—Christianity without Catholicity—the answer of history will be this: Catholicity, exclusively prevailing in Europe, abolished slavery among the European races; she introduced the principle of the abolition of slavery into European civilization, by showing practically, and in opposition to the opinion of antiquity, that slavery was not necessary for society; and she made it understood, that the sacred work of enfranchisement was the foundation of all great and life-giving civilization. She has therefore inoculated European civilization with the principle of the abolition of slavery; it is owing to her that, wherever this civilization has come into contact with slavery, it has been profoundly disturbed—an evident proof that there were at the bottom two opposite elements, two contending principles, which were compelled to struggle incessantly, until the more powerful, noble, and fruitful prevailing, and reducing the other under the yoke, in the end annihilated it. I will say more: by searching whether facts really confirm this influence of Catholicity, not only in all that concerns the civilization of Europe, but also in the countries which Europeans have conquered two centuries ago, in the East and West, we shall meet with Catholic Bishops and priests working without intermission in improving the lot of colonial slaves; we shall call to mind what is due to the Catholic missions; we shall read and understand the apostolical letters of Pius II., issued in 1482, and mentioned above; those of Paul III., in 1537; those of Urban VIII., in 1639; those of Benedict XIV., in 1741; and those of Gregory XVI., in 1839.

In these letters there is taught and defined all that has been or can be said on this point in favor of humanity. We shall there find blamed, condemned, and punished, all that European civilization has at length resolved to condemn and punish; and when calling to mind also that it was Pius VII., who, at the beginning of this century, zealously interposed his good offices with men in power for the complete abolition of slavery among Christians, we shall not be able to avoid acknowledging and confessing that Catholicity has had the principal share in this great work. It is she indeed who has laid down the principle on which the work rests, who has established the precedents which guide it, who has constantly proclaimed the principles which have suggested it and has constantly condemned those who have opposed it; it is she, in fine, who at all times has declared open war against cruelty and cupidity,—the support and perpetual motives for injustice and inhumanity. Let us hear the testimony of a celebrated Protestant author, Robertson, the historian of America: "From the time that ecclesiastics were sent as instructors into America, they perceived that the rigor with which their countrymen treated the natives rendered their ministry altogether fruitless. The missionaries, in conformity with the mild spirit of that religion which they were employed to publish, soon remonstrated against the maxims of the planters with respect to the Americans, and condemned the repartimientos, or distributions, by which they were given up as slaves to their conquerors, as no less contrary to natural justice and the precepts of Christianity, than to sound policy. The Dominicans, to whom the instruction of the Americans was originally committed, were the most vehement in attacking the repartimientos. In the year 1511, Motesino, one of their most eminent preachers, inveighed against this practice in the great church at St. Domingo, with all the impetuosity of his natural eloquence. Don Diego Columbus, the principal officers of the colony, and all the laymen who had been his hearers, complained of the monk to his superiors; but they, instead of condemning, applauded his doctrine, as equally pious and seasonable. The Franciscans, influenced by the spirit of opposition and rivalship which subsists between the two orders, discovered some inclination to take part with the laity, and to espouse the defence of the repartimientos. But as they could not with decency give their approbation to a system of oppression so repugnant to the spirit of religion, they endeavored to palliate what they could not justify, and alleged in excuse for the conduct of their countrymen, that it was impossible to carry on any improvement in the colony, unless the Spaniards possessed such dominion over the natives, that they could compel them to labor. The Dominicans, regardless of such political and interested considerations, would not relax in any degree the rigor of their sentiments, and even refused to absolve, or admit to the sacrament, such of their countrymen as continued to hold the natives in servitude. Both parties applied to the king for his decision in a matter of such importance. Ferdinand empowered a committee of his Privy Council, assisted by some of the most eminent civilians and divines in Spain, to hear the deputies sent from Hispaniola in support of their respective opinions. After a long discussion, the speculative point in controversy was determined in favor of the Dominicans; the Indians were declared to be a free people, entitled to all the natural rights of man; but notwithstanding this decision, the repartimientos were continued upon their ancient footing. As this determination admitted the principle upon which the Dominicans founded their opinion, they renewed their efforts to obtain relief for the Indians with additional boldness and zeal. At length, in order to quiet the colony, which was alarmed by their remonstrances and censures, Ferdinand issued a decree of his Privy Council (1513), declaring that after mature consideration of the apostolic Bull, and other titles by which the Crown of Castile claimed a right to its possessions, in the new world, the servitude of the Indians was warranted both by the laws of God and man; that unless they were subjected to the dominion of the Spaniards, and compelled to reside under their inspection, it would be impossible to reclaim them from idolatry, or to instruct them in the Christian faith; that no further scruple ought to be entertained concerning the lawfulness of the repartimientos, as the King and Council were willing to take the charge of that upon their own consciences; and that therefore the Dominicans, and monks of other religious orders, should abstain for the future from those invectives which, from an excess of charitable but ill-informed zeal, they had uttered against the practice. That his intention of adhering to this decree might be fully understood, Ferdinand conferred new grants of Indians upon several of his courtiers. But in order that he might not seem altogether inattentive to the rights of humanity, he published an edict in which he endeavored to provide for the mild treatment of the Indians under the yoke to which he subjected them; he regulated the nature of the work which they should be required to perform; he prescribed the mode in which they should be clothed and fed, and gave directions with respect to their instruction in the principles of Christianity. But the Dominicans, who, from their experience of what had passed, judged concerning the future, soon perceived the inefficacy of those provisions, and foretold that, as long as it was the interest of individuals to treat the Indians with rigor, no public regulations would render their servitude mild or tolerable. They considered it as vain to waste their own time and strength in attempting to communicate the sublime truths to men whose spirits were broken, and their faculties impaired by oppression. Some of them, in despair, requested the permission of their superiors to remove to the continent, and pursue the object of their mission among such of the natives as were not hitherto corrupted by the example of the Spaniards, or alienated by their cruelty from the Christian faith. Such as remained in Hispaniola continued to remonstrate, with decent firmness, against the servitude of the Indians.

"The violent operations of Albuquerque, the new distributor of the Indians, revived the zeal of the Dominicans against the repartimientos, and called forth an advocate for that oppressed people who possessed all the courage, the talents, and the activity requisite in supporting such a desperate cause. This was Bartholomew de las Casas, a native of Seville, and one of the clergymen sent out with Columbus in his second voyage to Hispaniola, in order to settle in that Island. He early adopted the opinion prevalent among ecclesiastics with respect to the unlawfulness of reducing the natives to servitude; and that he might demonstrate the sincerity of his conviction, he relinquished all the Indians who had fallen to his share in the division of the inhabitants among their conquerors, declaring that he should ever bewail his own misfortune and guilt, in having exercised for a moment this impious dominion over his fellow-creatures. From that time he became the avowed patron of the Indians; and by his bold interpositions in their behalf, as well as by the respect due to his abilities and character, he had often the merit of setting some bounds to the excesses of his countrymen." (History of America, book 3.)

It would be too long to relate here the energetic efforts of De las Casas in favor of the colonies of the new world; all know them—all must know that, filled with zeal for the liberty of the Indians, he conceived and undertook an attempt at civilization analogous to that which was realized later, to the immortal honor of the Catholic clergy, in Paraguay. If the efforts of De las Casas had not all the success that might naturally have been expected, we find the cause of this in the thousand passions with which history makes us acquainted, and perhaps also in the impetuosity of this man, whose sublime zeal was not always accompanied by the consummate prudence which the Church displays.

However this may be, Catholicity has completely accomplished her mission of peace and love; without injustice or catastrophe, she has broken the chains under which a large portion of the human race groaned; and if it had been given her to prevail for some time in Asia and Africa, she would have achieved their destruction in the four quarters of the globe, by banishing the degradations and the abominations introduced and established in those countries by Mahometanism and idolatry. It is melancholy, no doubt, that Christianity has not yet exercised over these latter countries all the influence which would have been necessary to ameliorate the social and political condition of those nations, by changing their ideas and manners. But if we seek for the causes of this lamentable delay, we certainly shall not find them in the conduct of Catholicity. This is not the place to point out these causes; nevertheless, while reserving the analysis and complete examination of this matter for another part of the work, I will make the remark en passant, that Protestantism may justly criminate itself for the obstacles which, during three centuries, it has opposed to the universality and efficacy of the Christian influence on infidel nations. These few words will suffice here; we shall return to this important subject later.

We can scarcely believe how far the ideas of the ancients went astray with regard to the respect which is due to man. Can it be believed that they went so far, as to regard the lives of all who could not be useful to society as of no value? and yet nothing is more certain. We might lament that this or that city had adopted a barbarous law; that a ferocious custom was introduced among a people by the effect of particular circumstances; yet as long as philosophy protested against such attempts, human reason would have been unstained, and could not have been accused without injustice of taking part in infamous attempts at abortion or infanticide. But when we find crime defended and taught by the most important philosophers of antiquity; when we see it triumph in the minds of the most illustrious men, who, with fearful calmness and serenity, prescribe the atrocities which we have named, we are confounded, and our blood runs cold; we would fain shut our eyes, not to see so much infamy thrown upon philosophy and human reason. Let us hear Plato in his Republic, in that book in which he undertook to collect all the theories in his opinion the most distinguished and the best adapted to lead human society towards its beau ideal. This is his scandalous language: "Oportet profecto secundum ea quæ supra concessimus, optimos viros mulieribus optimis ut plurimum congredi: deterrimos autem contra, deterrimis. Et illorem quidem prolem nutrire, horum minime, si armentum excellentissimum sit futurum. Et hæc omnia dum agantur, ab omnibus præterquam a principibus ignorari, si modo armentum custodum debeat seditione carere." "Prope admodum;" "Very good," replies another speaker. (Plat. Rep. l. v.)

Behold, then, the human race reduced to the condition of mere brutes; in truth, the philosopher had reason to use the word flock (armentum)! There is this difference, however, that magistrates imbued with such feelings must have been more harsh towards their subjects than a shepherd towards his flock. If the shepherd finds among the lambs which have just been born a weak and lame one, he does not kill it or allow it to die of hunger; he carries it to the sheep who ought to nourish it, he caresses it to stop its cries.

But perhaps the expressions which we have just quoted escaped the philosopher in a moment of inadvertence; perhaps the idea which they reveal was only one of those sinister inspirations which glide into the mind of a man, and pass away without leaving any more impression than is made by a reptile moving through the grass. We wish it were so, for the fame of Plato; but unhappily he returns to it so often, and insists on the point with so systematic a coldness, that no means of justifying him are left. "With respect," he says lower down, "to the children of citizens of inferior rank, and even those of other citizens, if they are born deformed, the magistrates shall hide them, as is proper, in some secure place, which it shall be forbidden to reveal." "Yes," replies one of the interlocutors; "if we desire to preserve the race of warriors in its purity."

Plato also lays down various rules with respect to the relations of the two sexes; he speaks of the case in which the man and woman shall have reached an advanced age: "Quando igitur jam mulieres et viri ætatem generationi aptam egressi fuerint, licere viris dicemus, cuicumque voluerint, præterquam filiæ atque matri et filiarum natis matrisve majoribus: licere et mulieribus cuilibet, præterquam filio atque patri, ac superioribus et inferioribus eorumdem. Cum vero hæc omnia mandaverimus, interdicemus fœtum talem (si contigeret) edi et in lucem produci. Si quid autem matrem parere coegerit, ita exponere præcipiemus, quasi ei nulla nutritio sit."

Plato seems to have been very well pleased with his doctrine; for, in the very book in which he writes what we have just seen, he lays down the famous maxim, that the evils of states will never be remedied, that societies will never be well governed, until philosophers shall become kings, or kings become philosophers. God preserve us from seeing on the throne a philosophy such as his! Moreover, his wish for the reign of philosophy has been realized in modern times. What do I say? It has had more than empire; it has been deified, and divine honors have been paid to it in public temples. I do not believe, however, that the happy days of the worship of reason are now much regretted.

The horrible doctrine which we have just seen in Plato was transmitted with fidelity to future schools. Aristotle, who on so many points took the liberty of departing from the doctrines of his master, did not think of correcting those which regard abortion and infanticide. In his Politics he teaches the same crimes with the same calmness as Plato: "In order," he says, "to avoid nourishing weak or lame children, the law should direct them to be exposed or made away with." "Propter multitudinem autem liberorum, ne plures sint quam expediat, si gentium instituta et leges vetent procreata exponi, definitum esse oportet procreandorum liberorum numerum. Quod si quibus inter se copulatis et congressis, plures liberi, quam definitum sit, nascantur, priusquam sensus et vita inseratur, abortus est fœtui inferendus." (Polit. l. vii. c. 16.)

It will be seen how much reason I had to say that man, as man, was esteemed as nothing among the ancients; that society entirely absorbed him; that it claimed unjust rights over him, and regarded him as an instrument to be used when of service, and which it had a right to destroy.

We observe in the writings of the ancient philosophers, that they make of society a kind of whole, consisting of individuals, as the mass of iron consists of the atoms that compose it; they make of it a sort of unity, to which all must be sacrificed; they have no consideration for the sphere of individual liberty; they do not appear to dream that the object of society is the good, the happiness of individuals and families. According to them, this unity is the principal good, with which nothing else can be compared; the greatest evil that can happen is, that this unity should be broken—an evil which must be avoided by all imaginable means. "Is not the worst evil of a state," says Plato, "that which divides it, and makes many out of one? and is not the greatest excellence of a state, that which binds all its parts together, and makes it one?" Relying on this principle, and pursuing the development of his theory, he takes individuals and families, and kneads them, as it were, in order to form them into ONE compact whole. Thus, besides education and life in common, he wishes also to have women and children in common; he considers it injurious that there should be personal enjoyments or sufferings; he desires that all should be common and social; he allows individuals to live, think, feel, and act only as parts of a great whole. If you read his Republic with attention, and particularly the fifth book, you will see that the prevailing idea of this philosopher is what we have just explained. Let us hear Aristotle on the same point: "As the object of society," he says, "is one, it is clear that the education of all its members ought necessarily to be one and identical. Education ought to be public, and not private; as things now are, each one takes care of his children as he thinks proper, and teaches them as he pleases. Each citizen is a particle of society, and the care to be given to a particle ought naturally to extend to what the whole requires." (Polit. l. viii. c. 1.) In order to explain to us what he means by this common education, he concludes by quoting with honor the education which was given at Sparta, which every one knows consisted in stifling all feelings except a ferocious patriotism, the traits of which still make us shudder.

With our ideas and customs, we do not know how to confine ourselves to considering society in this way. Individuals among us are attached to the social body, forming a part of it, but without losing their own sphere—that of the family; and they preserve around them a vast career, where they are allowed to exert themselves, without coming into collision with the colossus of society. Nevertheless, patriotism exists; but it is no longer a blind instinctive passion, urging man on to the sacrifice, like a victim, with bandaged eyes, but it is no reasonable, noble, and exalted feeling, which forms heroes like those of Lepanto and Baylen; which converts peaceful citizens, like those of Gyronna and Saragossa, into lions; which, as by an electric spark, makes a whole people rise on a sudden without arms, and brave death from the artillery of a numerous and disciplined army: such was Madrid, following the sublime Mourons of Daoiz and of Velarda.

I have already hinted, in the text, that society among the ancients claimed the right of interfering in all that regards individuals. I will add, that the thing went to a ridiculous extent. Who would imagine that the law ought to interfere in the food of a woman who was enceinte, or in the exercise which she should take every day? This is what Aristotle gravely says: "It is necessary that women who are enceinte should take particular care of their bodies; that they should avoid indulgence in luxury, and using food which is too light and weak. The legislator easily attains his end by prescribing and ordering them a daily walk, in order to go to honor and venerate the gods, to whom it has been confided by fate to watch over the formation of beings. Atque hoc facile assequitur scriptor legum, si eis iter aliquod quotidianum ad cultum venerationemque deorum eorum, quibus sorte obtigit, ut præsint gignendis animantibus, injunxerit ac mandaverit." (Polit. l. vii. c. 16.)

The action of laws extended to every thing; it seems that, in certain cases, even the tears of children could not escape this severity. "Those," says Aristotle, "who, by means of laws, forbid children to cry and weep, are wrong; cries and tears serve as exercise for children, and assist them in growing; they are an effort of nature, which relieves and invigorates those who are in pain." (Polit. l. vii. c. 17.)

These doctrines of the ancients—this manner of considering the relations of individuals with society—very well explain how castes and slavery could be regarded as natural among them. Who can be astonished at seeing whole races deprived of liberty, or regarded as incapable of partaking of the rights of other superior classes, when we see generations of innocent beings condemned to death, and these conscientious philosophers not having the slightest scruple with respect to the legitimacy of so inhuman an act? It was not that these philosophers had not happiness in view as the object of society; but they had monstrous ideas with respect to the means of obtaining that happiness.

The reader will easily dispense with my entering into details on the abject and shameful condition of women among the ancients, and in which they still are among the moderns where Christianity does not prevail; moreover, my pen would be checked every moment by strict laws of modesty, if I were to attempt to represent the characteristic features of this wretched picture. The inversion of ideas was such, that we hear men the most renowned for their gravity and moderation rave in the most incredible manner on this point. We will lay aside hundreds of examples which it would be easy to adduce; but who is ignorant of the scandalous advice of the sage Solon, with respect to the lending of women for the purpose of improving the race? Who has not blushed to read what the divine Plato, in his Republic, says of the propriety and manner of making women share in the public games? Let us throw a veil over recollections so dishonourable to human wisdom. When the chief legislators and sages so far forgot the first elements of morality, and the most ordinary inspirations of nature, what must have been the case with the vulgar? How fearfully true those words of the sacred text which represent to us the nations deprived of the light of Christianity as sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death!

There is nothing more fatal to woman, nothing more apt to degrade her, than that which is injurious to modesty; and yet we see that the unlimited power granted to man over woman contributed to this degradation, and reduced her, among certain nations, to be nothing but a slave. Losing sight of the manners of other nations, let us consider those of the Romans for a moment. Among them the formula, ubi tu Cayus ego Caya, seemed to indicate a subjection so slight, that it might almost be called an equality; but in order to appreciate this equality, it is enough to recollect that, at Rome, a husband could put his wife to death by his own authority, and that not only in the case of adultery, but for offences infinitely less serious. In the time of Romulus, Egnacius Menecius was acquitted of a similar crime, although his wife had done nothing more than drink wine from a cask. These traits describe a nation, whatever importance you may besides think proper to attach to the solicitude of the Romans to prevent their matrons from becoming addicted to wine. When Cato directed an embrace, as a proof of affection, among relations, for the purpose, as Pliny relates, of ascertaining whether the women smelt of wine, an temetum olerent, it is true he showed his strictness; but it was an unworthy outrage offered to the honor of the women themselves whose virtue it pretended to preserve. There are some remedies worse than the disease.

The antichristian philosophy must have had considerable influence on the desire to find among the barbarians the origin of the elevation of the female character in Europe, and of some other principles of our civilization. Indeed as soon as you discover the source of these admirable qualities in the forests of Germany, Christianity is stripped of a portion of its honors; and what was its own and peculiar glory is divided among many. I will not deny that the Germans of Tacitus are sufficiently poetical; but it is difficult to believe that the real Germans were so to any extent. Some passages inserted in the text add great force to our conjecture; but what appears to me eminently calculated to dissipate all these illusions is, the history of the invasion by the barbarians, above all that which has been written by eye-witnesses. The picture, far from continuing poetical, then becomes disgusting in the extreme. This interminable succession of nations passes before the eyes of the reader, like an alarming vision in an evil dream; and certainly the first idea which occurs to us at the sight of this picture is, not to seek for any of the qualities of modern civilization in these invading hordes; but the great difficulty is, to know how this chaos has been reduced to order, and how it has been possible to produce from such barbarism the noblest and most brilliant civilization that has ever been seen on earth. Tacitus appears to be an enthusiast; but Sidonius, who wrote at no great distance from the barbarians, who saw them, and suffered from meeting them, does not partake of this enthusiasm. "I find myself," he said, "among long-haired nations, compelled to hear the German language, and to applaud, at whatever cost, the song of the drunken Burgundian, with hair plastered with rancid grease. Happy your eyes who do not see them; happy your ears who do not hear them?" If space permitted, it would be easy for me to accumulate a thousand passages which would evidently show what the barbarians were, and what could be expected from them in all respects. It is as clear as the light of day, that it was the design of Providence to employ these nations to destroy the Roman empire, and change the face of the world. The invaders seem to have had a feeling of their terrible mission. They march, they advance, they know not whither they go; but they know well that they go to destroy. Attila called himself the scourge of God. The same barbarian himself defined his formidable duty in these words: "The star falls, the sea is moved; I am the hammer of the earth. Where my horse passes, the grass never grows." Alaric, marching towards the capital of the world, said: "I cannot stop; there is some one urges me, who excites me to sack Rome." Genseric prepares a naval expedition; his troops are on board, he himself embarks: no one knows the point towards which he will direct his sails. The pilot approaches the barbarian, and asks him; "My lord, against what nations will you wage war?" "Against those who have provoked the anger of God," replies Genseric.

If Christianity, in the midst of this catastrophe, had not existed in Europe, civilization would have been lost and annihilated, perhaps forever. But a religion of light and love was sure to triumph over ignorance and violence. Even during the times of the calamities of the invasion, that religion prevented many disasters, owing to the ascendency which it began to exercise over the barbarians; the most critical moment being past, the conquerors having become in some degree settled, she immediately employed a system so vast, so efficacious, so decisive, that the conquerors found themselves conquered, not by arms, but by charity. It was not in the power of the Church to prevent the invasion; God had decreed it, and His decree must be accomplished. Thus the pious monk who went to meet Alaric approaching Rome, could not stop him on his march, because the barbarian answered him, that he could not stop,—that there was some one who urged him on, and that he advanced against his own will. But the Church awaited the barbarians after the conquest, knowing that Providence would not abandon His own work, that the hope of the future lot of nations was left in the hands of the spouse of Jesus Christ; on this account does Alaric advance on Rome, sack, and destroy it; but on a sudden, finding himself in presence of religion, he stops, becomes mollified, and appoints the Churches of St. Peter and St. Paul as places of refuge. A remarkable fact, and an admirable symbol of the Christian religion preserving the universe from total ruin.

The great benefit conferred on modern society by the formation of a pure and correct public conscience, would acquire extraordinary value in our eyes, if we compared our moral ideas with those of all other nations, ancient and modern; the result of such an examination would be, to show in how lamentable a manner good principles become corrupted, when they are confided to the reason of man. I will content myself, however, with a few words on the ancients, in order to show how correct I was in saying that our manners, however corrupt they may be, would have appeared a model of morality and dignity to the heathens.

The temples consecrated to Venus in Babylon and Corinth are connected with abominations such as to be even incomprehensible. Deified passion required sacrifices worthy of it; a divinity without modesty required the sacrifice of modesty; and the sacred name of Temple was applied to asylums of the most unbridled licentiousness. There was not a veil even for the greatest crimes. It is known how the daughters of Chypre gained a dowry for their marriage; all have heard of the mysteries of Adonis, Priapus, and other impure divinities. There are vices which, as it were, want a name among the moderns; or if they have one, it is accompanied by the recollection of a terrible chastisement inflicted on some criminal cities. In reading the histories of antiquity descriptive of the manners of their times, the book falls from our hands. On this subject we must be content with these few hints, calculated to awaken in the minds of our readers the recollection of what has a thousand times excited their indignation in reading the history and studying the literature of pagan antiquity. The author is compelled to be satisfied with a recollection: he abstains from a description.

It is now so common to exalt beyond measure the power of ideas, that some persons will perhaps consider exaggerated what I have said with respect to their want of power, not only to influence society, but even to preserve themselves, while, remaining in the mere sphere of ideas, they do not become realized in institutions, which are their organ, and at the same time their rampart and defence.

I am very far, as I have clearly stated in the text, from denying or calling in question what is called the power of ideas: I only mean to show that, alone and by themselves, ideas have little power; and that science, properly so called, as far as the organization of society is concerned, is a much less important thing than is generally supposed. This doctrine has an intimate connection with the system followed by the Catholic Church, which, while constantly endeavoring to develop the human mind by means of the propagation of the sciences, has nevertheless assigned to them a secondary part in the regulation of society. While religion has never been opposed to true science, never, on the other hand, has she ceased to show a certain degree of mistrust with respect to all that was the exclusive production of human thought; and observe that this is one of the chief differences between religion and the philosophy of the last age; or, we should rather say, it was the cause of their violent antipathy. Religion did not condemn science; on the contrary, she loved, protected, and encouraged it; but at the same time she marked out its limits, warned it that it was blind on some points, announced to it that it would be powerless in some of its labors, and that in others its action would be destructive and fatal. Philosophy, on the contrary, loudly proclaimed the sovereignty of science, declared it to be all-powerful, and deified it; it attributed to it strength and courage to change the face of the world, and wisdom and foresight enough to work this change for the good of humanity. This pride of knowledge, this deification of thought, is, if you observe closely, the foundation of Protestant doctrine. All authority being taken away, reason is the only competent judge, the intellect receives directly and immediately from God all the light which is necessary. This is the fundamental doctrine of Protestantism, that is to say, the pride of the mind.

If we closely observe, even the triumph of revolutions has in no degree nullified the wise anticipations of religion; and knowledge, properly so called, instead of gaining any credit from this triumph, has entirely lost what it had: there remains nothing of the revolutionary knowledge; what remains is the effects of the revolution, the interests created by it, the institutions which have arisen from those interests, and which, since that time, have sought in the department of science itself our principles to support them,—principles altogether different from those which had been proclaimed in the beginning.

I have said that every idea has need of being realized in an institution; this is so true, that revolutions themselves, warned by the instinct which leads them to preserve, with more or less integrity, the principles whence they have arisen, tend from the first to create those institutions in which the revolutionary doctrines may be perpetuated, or to constitute successors to represent them when they shall have disappeared from the schools. This may lead to many reflections on the origin and present condition of several forms of governments in different countries of Europe.

When speaking of the rapidity with which scientific theories succeed each other, when pointing out the immense development which the press has given to the field of discussion, I have shown that this was not an infallible sign of scientific progress, still less a guarantee for the fertility of human thought in realizing great things in the material and social order. I have said that grand conceptions proceed rather from intuition than from discourses; and on this subject I have recalled to mind historical events and personages which place this matter beyond a doubt. In support of this assertion, ideology might have furnished us with abundant proofs, if it were necessary to have recourse to science itself to prove its own sterility. But mere good sense, taught by the lessons of experience daily, is enough to convince us that the men who are the most able in theory are, often enough, not only mediocre, but even weak in the exercise of authority. With regard to the hints which I have thrown out with respect to "intuition" and "discourses," I leave them to the judgment of any one who has applied to the study of the human mind. I am confident that the opinion of those who have reflected will not differ from my own.

I have attributed to Christianity the gentleness of manners which Europe now enjoys. Yet, in spite of the decline of religious belief in the last century, this gentleness of manners, instead of being destroyed, has only been raised to a higher degree. This contrast, the effect of which, at first sight, is to destroy what I have established, requires some explanation. First of all, we must recollect the distinction pointed out in the text between effeminacy and gentleness of manners. The first is a fault, the second a valuable quality; the first emanates from enervation of the mind and weakening of the body; the second is owing to the preponderance of reason, the empire of the mind over the body, the triumph of justice over force, of right over might. There is a large portion of real gentleness in manners at the present day, but luxury has also a considerable part therein. This luxury of manners has certainly not arisen from religion, but from infidelity; the latter, never extending its view beyond the present life, causes the lofty destinies, and even the very existence of the soul, to be forgotten, puts egotism upon the throne, constantly excites and keeps alive the love of pleasure, and makes man the vile slave of his passions. On the contrary, at the first sight, we perceive that our manners owe all their gentleness to Christianity; all the ideas, all the feelings, on which this gentleness is founded, bear the mark of Christianity. The dignity of man, his rights, the obligation of treating him with the respect which is due to him, and of appealing to his mind by reason rather than to his body by violence, the necessity imposed on every one of keeping within the line of his duty, of respecting the property and the persons of others,—all this body of principles, to which real gentleness of manners is owing, is due, in Europe, to the influence of Christianity, which, after a struggle of many centuries against the barbarism and ferocity of invading nations, succeeded in destroying the system of violence which these same nations had made general.

As philosophy has taken care to change the ancient names consecrated by religion, and authorized by the usage of a succession of ages, it happens that some ideas, although the produce of Christianity, are scarcely acknowledged as such, only because they are disguised under a worldly dress. Who does not know that mutual love among men and fraternal charity are ideas entirely due to Christianity? Who does not know that pagan antiquity did not acknowledge them, that it even despised them? And nevertheless, this affection, which was formerly called charity, because charity was the virtue from which it took its legitimate origin, has constantly taken care to assume other names, as if it were ashamed to be seen in public with any appearance of religion. The mania for attacking the Christian religion being passed, it is openly confessed that the principle of universal charity is owing to her; but language remains infected with Voltairian philosophy even since the discredit into which that philosophy has fallen. Whence it follows, that we very often do not appreciate as we ought the influence of Christianity on the society which surrounds us, and that we attribute to other ideas and other causes the phenomena which are evidently owing to religion. Society at present, in spite of all its indifference, is more indebted to religion than is commonly supposed; it resembles those men, who, born of an illustrious family, in which good principles and a careful education are transmitted as an inheritance from generation to generation, preserve in their manners and behavior, even in the midst of their disorders, their crimes, and I will even venture to say, their degradation, some traits which denote their noble origin.

A few regulations of Councils, quoted in the text, are sufficient to give an idea of the system pursued by the Church for the purpose of reforming and softening manners. It may be remarked that, on previous occasions during this work, I have a strong inclination to call to mind monuments of this kind; I will state here that I have two reasons for doing this: 1. When having to compare Protestantism with Catholicity, I believe that the best means of representing the real spirit of the latter is, to show it at work; this is done when we bring to light the measures which were adopted, according to different circumstances, by Popes and Councils. 2. Considering the direction which historical studies take in Europe, and the taste, which is daily becoming more general, not for histories, but for historical documents, it is proper always to bear in mind that the proceedings of Councils are of the highest importance, not only in historical and ecclesiastical matters, but also in political and social ones; so that to pay no attention to the data which are found in the records of Councils, is monstrously to mutilate, or rather wholly to destroy, the history of Europe.

On this account it is very useful, and even necessary in many things, to consult these records, although it may be painful to our indolence, on account of their enormous extent and the ennui of finding many things devoid of interest for our times. The sciences, above all those which have society for their object, lead to satisfactory results only by means of painful labors. What is useful is frequently mixed and confounded with what is not. The most valuable things are sometimes found by the side of repulsive objects; but in nature, do we find gold without having removed rude masses of earth?

Those who have attempted to find the germ of the precious qualities of European civilization among the barbarians of the north, should undoubtedly have attributed the gentleness of our manners to the same barbarians; they would have had in support of this paradox a fact certainly more specious than that which they have relied on to give the honor of elevating European women to the Germans. I allude to the well-known custom of avoiding the infliction of corporal punishments, and of chastising the gravest offences by fines only. Nothing is more likely to make us believe that these nations were happily inclined to gentleness of manners, since, in the midst of their barbarism, they used the right of punishment with a moderation which is not found even among the most civilized and refined nations. If we regard the thing in this point of view, it seems as if the influence of Christianity on the barbarians had the effect of rendering their manners more harsh instead of more gentle; indeed, after Christianity was introduced, the infliction of corporal punishments became general, and even that of death was not excluded.

But when we attentively consider this peculiarity of the criminal code of the barbarians, we shall see that, far from showing the advancement of their civilization and the gentleness of their manners, it is, on the contrary, the most evident proof that they were behindhand; it is the strongest index of the harshness and barbarism which reigned among them. In the first place, inasmuch as crimes among them were punished by means of fines, or, as it was called, by composition, it is clear that the law paid much more attention to repairing an injury than to punishing a crime; a circumstance which clearly shows us how little they thought about the morality of the action, as they attended not so much to the action itself, as to the wrong which it inflicted. Therefore this was not an element of civilization but of barbarism; this tended to nothing less than the banishment of morality from the world. The Church combated this principle, as fatal in public as in private affairs; she introduced into criminal legislation a new set of ideas, which completely changed its spirit. On this point M. Guizot has done full justice to the Catholic Church. I am delighted to acknowledge and to insert this homage here by transcribing his own words. After having pointed out the difference which existed between the laws of the Visigoths, derived in great part from the Councils of Toledo, and the other barbarian laws, M. Guizot signalizes the immense superiority of the ideas of the Church in matters of legislation, of justice, and in all that concerns the search after truth and the lot of men; he adds: "In criminal matters, the relation of crimes to punishments is fixed (in the laws of the Visigoths) according to sufficiently just, philosophical, and moral notions. We there perceive the efforts of an enlightened legislator, who contends against the violence and rashness of barbarian manners. The chapter De cæde et morte hominum, compared with the corresponding laws of other nations, is a very remarkable example of this. Elsewhere, it is almost exclusively the injury which seems to constitute the crime, and the punishment is sought in that material reparation which is the result of composition. Here, the crime is referred to its real and moral element, the intention. The different shades of criminality, absolutely voluntary homicide, homicide by inadvertence, provoked homicide, homicide with or without premeditation, are distinguished and defined almost as well as in our own codes, and the punishments vary in a proportion equally just. The justice of the legislator has gone still further. He has attempted, if not to abolish, at least to diminish the diversity of legal value established among men by the other barbarian laws. The only distinction which it preserves is that of freeman and slave. With respect to freeman, the punishment varies neither with the origin nor the rank of the deceased, but only according to the different degrees of the culpability of the murderer. With regard to slaves, not venturing completely to withdraw from the masters the right of life and death, it has been attempted at least to restrain it by subjecting it to a public and regular procedure. The text of the law deserves to be cited.

"'If no one guilty of, or an accomplice in, a crime ought to remain unpunished, with how much more reason ought he to be condemned who has wickedly and rashly committed a homicide! Thus, as masters, in their pride, often put their slaves to death without any fault of the latter, it is proper altogether to extirpate this license, and to ordain that the present law shall be forever observed by all. No master or mistress shall put to death, without public trial, any of their slaves, male or female, or any person dependent on them. If a slave or any other servant shall commit a crime which may subject him to capital punishment, his master or his accuser shall immediately inform the judge or the count or duke of the place where the deed has been committed. After the affair has been inquired into, if the crime be proved, let the criminal undergo, either by the judge or his own master, the sentence of death which he has deserved; so that, nevertheless, if the judge be unwilling to put the accused to death, he shall draw up in writing a capital sentence, and then it shall be in the power of the master to put him to death or not. Indeed, if the slave, with a fatal audacity, resisting his master, has struck, or attempted to strike, him with a weapon, with a stone, or with any other kind of blow, and if the master, in defending himself, has killed the slave in his passion, the master shall be in no way subject to the punishment of homicide. But it shall be necessary to prove that the event took place thus, and that by the testimony or oath of the slaves, male or female, who shall have been present, and by the oath of the author of the deed himself. Whoever from mere malice, either by his own hand or that of another, shall have killed his slave without public trial, shall be marked with infamy, declared incapable of appearing as a witness, shall be obliged to pass the rest of his life in exile and penance, and his goods shall go to the nearest relations to whom they are given by the law.'—For. Jud. liv. vi. tit. xv. l. 12." (Hist. Génér. de la Civilisation en Europe, leçon 6.)

I have copied this passage from M. Guizot with pleasure, because I find there a confirmation of what I have just said on the subject of the influence of the Church in softening manners, and of what I have before stated with respect to the great amelioration which the Church made in the condition of slaves, by limiting the excessive power of their masters. This truth is proved in its place by so many documents, that it seems useless to revert to it here; it is enough now for my purpose, to point out that M. Guizot fully allows that the Church gave morality to the legislation of the barbarians, by making them consider the wickedness of the crime, whereas they had previously attended only to the injury of which it was the cause; she has thus transferred the action from the physical to the moral order, giving to punishments their real character, and not allowing them to remain reduced to the level of a mere material reparation. Hence we see that the criminal system of the barbarians, which, at the first view, seemed to indicate progress in civilization, was, in reality, owing to the little ascendency which moral principles exercised over these nations, and to the fact, that the views of the legislator were very slightly raised above the purely material order.

There is another observation to be made on this point, viz. that the mildness with which crimes were punished is the best proof of the frequency with which they were committed. When in a country assassinations, mutilations, and other similar attempts are very rare, they are regarded with horror; those who are guilty of them are chastised with severity. But when crimes are very frequently committed, they insensibly lose their enormity; not only those who commit them, but all the world become accustomed to their hideous aspect, and the legislator is then naturally induced to treat them with indulgence. This is shown us by the experience of every day; and the reader will have no difficulty in finding in society at the present time more than one crime to which the remark which I have just made is applicable. Among the barbarians, it was common to appeal to force, not only with respect to property, but also to persons; wherefore it was natural that crimes of this kind should not be regarded by them with the same aversion, it may be said with the same horror, as among a people where the triumph of the ideas of reason, justice, right, and law, render it impossible to conceive even the existence of a society where each individual should believe himself self-entitled to do justice to himself. Thus the laws against these crimes naturally became milder, the legislator contenting himself with repairing the injury, without paying much attention to the culpability of the delinquent. And this is intimately connected with what I have said above with respect to public conscience; for the legislator is always more or less the organ of this public conscience. Where an action, in any society whatever, is regarded as a heinous offence, the legislator cannot decree a mild punishment for it; on the other hand, it is not possible for him to chastise with great severity what the society absolves or excuses. It will sometimes happen that this proportion will be altered, that this harmony will be destroyed; but things soon quitting the path into which violence forced them, will not be long in returning to their ordinary course. Manners being chaste and pure, offences against them will be covered with abhorrence and infamy; but if morals be corrupted, the same acts will be regarded with indifference; at the most they will be denominated slight weaknesses. Among a people where religious ideas exercise great influence, the violation of all that is consecrated to God is regarded as a horrible outrage, worthy of the greatest chastisements; among another people, where infidelity has made its ravages, the same violation is not even placed on the list of ordinary offences; instead of drawing on the guilty the justice of the law, scarcely does it draw on them the slight correction of the police. The reader will understand the appropriateness of this digression on the criminal legislation of the barbarians, when he reflects that, in order to examine the influence of Catholicity on the civilization of Europe, it is indispensable to take into consideration the other elements which have concurred in forming that civilization. Without this, it would be impossible properly to appreciate the respective action of each of these elements, either for good or evil; impossible to bring to light the share which the Church can exclusively claim in the great work of our civilization; impossible to resolve the high question which has been raised by the partisans of Protestantism on the subject of the assumed advantages which the religious revolution of the sixteenth century has conferred on modern society. It is because the barbarian nations are one of these elements, that it is so often necessary to attend to them.

In the middle ages, almost all the monasteries and colleges of canons had a hospital annexed to them, not only to receive pilgrims, but also to aid in the support and consolation of the poor and the sick. If you desire to see the noblest symbol of religion sheltering all kinds of misfortune, consider the houses devoted to prayer and the most sublime virtues converted into asylums for the miserable. This was exactly what took place at that time, when the public authority not only wanted the strength and knowledge necessary to establish a good administration for the relief of the unfortunate, but did not even succeed in covering with her ægis the most sacred interests of society; this shows us that when all was powerless, religion was still strong and fruitful; that when all perished, religion not only preserved herself, but even founded immortal establishments. And pay attention to what we have so many times pointed out, viz. that the religion which worked these prodigies was not a vague and abstract religion—the Christianity of the Protestants; but religion with all her dogmas, her discipline, her hierarchy, her supreme Pontiff, in a word, the Catholic Church.

They were far from thinking in ancient times that the support of the unfortunate could be confided to the civil administration alone, or to individual charity; it was then thought, as I have already said, that it was a very proper thing that the hospitals should be subjected to the Bishops; that is to say, that there should be a kind of assimilation made between the system of public beneficence and the hierarchy of the Church. Hence it was that, by virtue of an ancient regulation, the hospitals were under the control of the Bishops as well in temporals as in spirituals, whether the persons appointed to the care of the establishments were clerical or lay, whether the hospital had been erected by order of the Bishop or not.

This is not the place to relate the vicissitudes which this discipline underwent, nor the different causes which produced the successive changes; it is enough to observe, that the fundamental principle, that is, the interference of the ecclesiastical authority in establishments of beneficence, always remained unimpaired, and that the Church never allowed herself to be entirely deprived of so noble a privilege. Never did she think that it was allowable for her to regard with indifference the abuses which were introduced on this point to the prejudice of the unfortunate; wherefore she has reserved at least the right to remedy the evils which might result from the wickedness or the indolence of the administrators. The Council of Vienne ordains, that if the administrators of a hospital, lay or clerical, become relaxed in the exercise of their charge, proceedings shall be taken against them by the Bishops, who shall reform and restore the hospital of their own authority, if it has no privilege of exemption, and by delegation, if it has one. The Council of Trent also granted to Bishops the power of visiting the hospitals, even with the power of delegates of the Apostolic See in the cases fixed by law; it ordains, moreover, that the administrators, lay or clerical, shall be obliged every year to render their accounts to the ordinary of the place, unless the contrary has been provided in the foundation; and that if, by virtue of a particular privilege, custom, or statute, the accounts must be presented to any other than the ordinary, at least he shall be added to those who are appointed to receive them.

Without paying attention to the different modifications which the laws and customs of various countries may have introduced in this matter, we will say that one thing remains manifest, viz. the vigilance of the Church in all that regards beneficence; it is her constant tendency, by virtue of her spirit and maxims, to take part in affairs of this kind, sometimes to direct them exclusively, sometimes to remedy the evils which may have crept in. The civil power acknowledged the motives of this holy and charitable ambition; we see that the Emperor Justinian does not hesitate to give public authority over the hospitals to the Bishops, thereby conforming to the discipline of the Church and the general good.

On this point there is a remarkable fact, which it is necessary to mention here, in order to signalize its beneficent influence; I mean, the regulation by which the property of hospitals was looked upon as Church property,—a regulation which was very far from being a matter of indifference, although at first sight it might appear so. Their property, thereby invested with the same privileges as that of the Church, was protected by an inviolability so much the more necessary as the times were the more difficult, and the more abounding in outrages and usurpations. The Church which, notwithstanding all the public troubles, preserved great authority and a powerful ascendency over governments and nations, had thus a simple and powerful claim to extend her protection over the property of hospitals, and to withdraw them as much as possible from the cupidity and the rapacity of the powerful. And it must not be supposed that this doctrine was introduced with any indirect design, nor that this kind of community, this assimilation between the Church and the poor, was an unheard-of novelty; on the contrary, this assimilation was so well suited to the common order of things, it was so entirely founded on the relations between the Church and the poor, that if the property of the hospitals had the privilege of being considered as the property of the Church, that of the Church, on the other hand, was called the property of the poor. It is in these terms that the holy Fathers express themselves on this point: these doctrines had so much affected the ordinary language, that when, at a later period, the canonical question with respect to the ownership of the goods of the Church had to be solved, there were found by the side of those who directly attributed this property to God, to the Pope, to the clergy, some who pointed out the poor as being the real proprietors. It is true that this opinion was not the most conformable to the principles of law; but the mere fact of its appearing on the field of controversy is a matter for grave consideration.

A few reflections, in the form of a note, on a certain maxim of toleration professed by a philosopher of the last century, Rousseau, would not be out of place here; but the analogy of the following chapter with that which we have just finished induces us to reserve them for note 25. The considerations to which the opinion of Rousseau will lead, apply to the question of toleration in religious matters, as well as to the right of coercion exercised by the civil and political power; I therefore beg my reader to reserve for the following note the attention which he might be willing to afford me now.

For the purpose of clearing up ideas on toleration as far as lay in my power, I have presented this matter in a point of view but little known; in order to throw still more light upon it, I will say a few words on religious and civil intolerance,—things which are entirely different, although Rousseau absolutely affirms the contrary. Religious or theological intolerance consists in the conviction, that the only true religion is the Catholic,—a conviction common to all Catholics. Civil intolerance consists in not allowing in society any other religions than the Catholic. These two definitions are sufficient to make every man of common sense understand that the two kinds of intolerance are not inseparable; indeed, we may very easily conceive that men firmly convinced of the truth of Catholicity may tolerate those who profess another religion, or none at all. Religious intolerance is an act of the mind, an act inseparable from faith; indeed, whoever has a firm belief that his own religion is true, must necessarily be convinced that it is the only true one; for the truth is one. Civil intolerance is an act whereby the will rejects those who do not profess the same religion; this act has different results, according as the intolerance is in the individuals or in the government. On the other hand, religious tolerance consists in believing that all religions are true; which, when rightly understood, means that none are true, since it is impossible for contradictory things to be true at the same time. Civil tolerance is, to allow men who entertain a different religion to live in peace. This tolerance, as well as the co-relative intolerance, produces different effects, according as it exists in individuals or in the government.

This distinction, which, from its clearness and simplicity, is within the reach of the most ordinary minds, has nevertheless been mistaken by Rousseau, who affirms that it is a vain fiction, a chimera, which cannot be realized, and that the two kinds of intolerance cannot be separated from each other. Rousseau might have been content with observing, that religious intolerance, that is to say, as I have explained above, the firm conviction that a religion is true, if it is general in a country, must produce, in the ordinary intercourse of life as well as in legislation, a certain tendency not to tolerate any one who thinks differently, principally when those who dissent are very limited in number; his observation would then have been well founded, and would have agreed with the opinion which I have expressed on this point, when I attempted to represent the natural course of ideas and events in this matter. But Rousseau does not consider things under this aspect: desiring to attack Catholicity, he affirms that the two kinds of intolerance are inseparable; "for," says he, "it is impossible to live in peace with those whom one believes to be damned; to love them would be to hate God, who punishes them." It is impossible to carry misrepresentation further: who told Rousseau that the Catholics believe in the damnation of any man, whoever he may be, as long as he lives; and that they think that to love a man who is in error would be to hate God? On the contrary, could he be ignorant that it is a duty, an indispensable precept, a dogma, for Catholics to love all men? Could he be ignorant that even children, in the first rudiments of Christian doctrine, learn that we are obliged to love our neighbor as ourselves, and that by this word neighbor is meant whoever has gained heaven, or may gain it; so that no man, so long as he lives, is excluded from this number? But Rousseau will say, you are at least convinced that those who die in that fatal state are condemned. Rousseau does not observe that we think exactly the same with respect to sinners, although their sin be not that of heresy; now, it has not come into the head of any body that good Catholics cannot tolerate sinners, and that they consider themselves under the obligation of hating them. What religion shows more eagerness to convert the wicked? The Catholic Church is so far from teaching that we ought to hate them, that she causes to be repeated a thousand times, in pulpits, in books, and in conversations, those words whereby God shows that it is His will that sinners shall not perish, that He wills that they shall be converted and live, that there is more joy in heaven when one of them has done penance, than upon the ninety-nine just who need not penance. And let it not be imagined that the man who thus expresses himself against the intolerance of Catholics was the partizan of complete toleration; on the contrary, in society, such as he imagined it, he did not desire toleration for those who did not belong to the religion which the civil power thought proper to establish. It is true that he is not at all anxious that the citizens should belong to the true religion. "Laying aside," he says, "political considerations, let us return to the right, and let us lay down principles on this important point. The right which the social pact gives to the sovereign over his subject does not exceed, as I have said, the bounds of public utility. Subjects, therefore, are accountable to their sovereign for their opinions, inasmuch as those opinions are of importance to the community. Now, it is of great importance to the state, that every citizen should have a religion which shall make him love his duties; but the dogmas of that religion interest the state and its members only inasmuch as those dogmas affect morality and the duties which those who profess it are bound to perform towards others. As for the rest, each one may have what opinions he pleases, without being subject to the cognizance of the sovereign, for he has no power in the other world; it is not his affair what may be the lot of his subjects in the life to come, provided they be good citizens in this. There is, therefore, a profession of faith purely civil, the articles whereof it belongs to the sovereign to fix, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but as social sentiments, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject. Without being able to compel any one to believe them, it can banish from the state him who does not believe them; it can banish him, not as wicked, but as anti-social, as incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing his life to his duty. If any one, after having publicly acknowledged these dogmas, conducts himself as if he did not believe them, let him be punished with death; he has committed the greatest of crimes, he has lied against the laws." (Du Contrat Social, l. iv. c. 8.)

Such, then, is the final result of the toleration of Rousseau, viz. to give to the sovereign the power of fixing articles of faith, to grant to him the right of punishing with banishment, or even death, those who will not conform to the decisions of this new Pope, or who shall violate after having embraced them. However strange the doctrine of Rousseau may appear, it is not excluded from the general system of those who do not acknowledge the supremacy of authority in religious matters. When this supremacy is to be attributed to the Catholic Church, or its head, it is rejected; and, by the most striking contradiction, it is granted to the civil power. It is very singular that Rousseau, when banishing or putting to death the man who quits the religion fashioned by the sovereign, does not wish him to be punished as impious, but as anti-social. Rousseau, following an impulse very natural in him, did not wish that impiety should be at all taken into account when punishments were to be inflicted; but of what consequence is the name given to his crime to the man who is banished or put to death? In the same chapter, he allows an expression to escape him, which reveals at once the object which he had in view in all this show of philosophy: "Whoever dares to affirm that out of the Church there is no salvation, ought to be driven from the state." Which means, in other words, that toleration ought to be given to all except Catholics. It has been said, that the Contrat Social was the code of the French revolution; and, indeed, the latter did not forget what the tolerant legislator has prescribed with respect to Catholics. Few persons now venture to declare themselves the disciples of the philosopher of Geneva, although some of his timid partisans still lavish on him unmeasured eulogies. Let us have sufficient confidence in the good sense of the human race, to hope that all posterity, with a unanimous voice, will confirm the stamp of ignominy with which all men of sense have already marked that turbulent sophist, the impudent author of the Confessions.

When comparing Protestantism with Catholicity, I was obliged to treat of intolerance, as it is one of the reproaches which are most frequently made against the Catholic religion; but my respect for truth compels me to state, that all Protestants have not preached universal toleration; and that many of them have acknowledged the right of checking and punishing certain errors. Grotius, Puffendorf, and some more of the wisest men that Protestantism can boast of, are agreed on this point; therein they have followed the example of all antiquity, which, in theory as well as in practice, has constantly conformed to these principles. A cry has been raised against the intolerance of Catholics, as if they had been the first to teach it to the world; as if intolerance was a cursed monster, which was engendered only where the Catholic Church prevailed. In default of any other reason, good faith at least required that it should not be forgotten that the principle of universal toleration was never acknowledged in any part of the world; the books of philosophers, and the codes of legislators, contain the principle of intolerance with more or less rigor. Whether it were desired to condemn this principle as false, or to limit it, or to leave it without application, it is clear that an accusation ought not to have been made against the Catholic Church in particular, on account of a doctrine and conduct, wherein she only conformed to the example of the whole human race. Refined as well as barbarous nations would be culpable therein, if there were any crime; and the stigma, far from deserving to fall upon governments directed by Catholicity, or on Catholic writers, ought to be inflicted on all the governments of antiquity, including those of Greece and Rome; on all the ancient sages, including Plato, Cicero, and Seneca; on modern governments and sages, including Protestants. If men had had this present to their minds, the doctrine would not have appeared so erroneous, nor the facts so black; they would have seen that intolerance, as old as the world, was not the invention of Catholics, and that the whole world, ought to bear the responsibility of it.

Assuredly the toleration which, in our days, has become so general, from causes previously pointed out, will not be affected by the doctrines, more or less severe, more or less indulgent, which shall be proclaimed in this matter; but for the very reason, that intolerance, such as it was practised in other times, has at last become a mere historical fact, whereof no one can fear the reappearance, it is proper to enter into an attentive examination of questions of this kind, in order to remove the reproach which her enemies have attempted to cast upon the Catholic Church.

The recollection of the encyclical letter of the Pope against the doctrines of M. de Lamennais, and the profound wisdom contained therein appropriately presents itself here. That writer maintained that universal toleration, the absolute liberty of worship, is the normal and legitimate state of society,—a state which cannot be changed without injury to the rights of the man and the citizen. M. de Lamennais, combating the encyclical letter, attempted to show that it established new doctrines, and attacked the liberty of nations. No; the Pope, in his encyclical letter, does not maintain any other doctrines than those which have been professed up to this time by the Church—we may say by all governments—with respect to toleration. No government can sustain itself if it is refused the right of repressing doctrines dangerous to social order, whether those doctrines are covered with the mantle of philosophy, or disguised under the veil of religion. The liberty of man is not thereby assailed; for the only liberty which is worthy of the name, is liberty in conformity with reason. The Pope did not say that governments cannot, in certain cases, tolerate different religions; but he did not allow it to be established as a principle, that absolute toleration is an obligation on all governments. This proposition is contrary to sound religious doctrines, to reason, to the practice of all governments, in all times and countries, and the good sense of mankind. The talent and eloquence of the unfortunate author have not availed against this, and the Pope has obtained the most solemn assent of all sensible men of all creeds; while the man of genius, covering his brow with the shades of obstinacy, has not feared to seize upon the ignoble arms of sophistry. Unhappy genius! who scarcely preserves a shadow of himself, who has folded up the splendid wings on which he sailed through the azure sky, and now, like a bird of evil omen, broods over the impure waters of a solitary lake.

When speaking of the Spanish Inquisition, I do not undertake to defend all its acts either in point of justice, or of the public advantage. Without denying the peculiar circumstances in which this institution was placed, I think that it would have done much better, after the example of the Inquisition of Rome, to avoid as much as possible the effusion of blood. It might have perfectly watched over the preservation of the faith, prevented the evils wherewith religion was threatened by the Moors and the Jews, and preserved Spain from Protestantism, without employing that excessive rigor, which drew upon it the severe and deserved reprimands and admonitions of the Sovereign Pontiffs, provoked the complaints of the people, made so many accused and condemned persons appeal to Rome, and furnished the adversaries of Catholicity with a pretext for charging that religion with being sanguinary which has a horror of the effusion of blood. I repeat, that the Catholic religion is not responsible for any of the excesses which have been committed in her name; and when men speak of the Inquisition, they ought not to fix their eyes principally on that of Spain, but on that of Rome. There, where the Sovereign Pontiff resides, and where they best understand how the principle of intolerance should be understood, and what use ought to be made of it, the Inquisition has been mild and indulgent in the extreme. Rome is the part of the world where humanity has suffered the least for the sake of religion; and that, without the exception of any countries, either of those where the Inquisition has existed, or of those where it has been unknown; of those where Catholicity has been predominant, or where Protestantism has triumphed. This fact, which cannot be denied, should suffice to convince every sincere man what is the spirit of Catholicity in this matter.