JOURNAL. RECEIVED ORDERS TO PROCEED TO KANDAHAR. (continued 3)
Reading edition
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Retrograde movement on Kushki-Nakud.
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Burrows thought it right to fall back to a place 25 miles nearer to Kandahar, called Kushki-Nakud. There were many good reasons, I confess, for this move, but personally I would never willingly, in Eastern warfare, take a retrograde step, except under the strongest compulsion, as Afghans know nothing, and care less, about the laws of strategy, and see only defeat in any but forward movements. The fact is, had we known that the Wāli's army intended to mutiny, we would never have advanced beyond Kushki-Nakud, as there are many good objections to the position at Girishk. That we did not know the shaky state of the Wāli's troops is all the fault of the Political officer with the Wāli, who, wishing to see all things
couleur de rose
, persuaded himself that all was right, and could not, or would not, believe any evil of them. Even he must now see what we have felt sure of all along, that Shere Ali is quite without power or influence, and quite unable to maintain his own authority for a day without our assistance. We have, of course, here, the reflex of the events at Girishk, as there has been a very marked increase of excitement and turbulence in the city, since the news of the mutiny of the Wāli's troops has arrived, and had not, at the same time, the intelligence of the licking they had received from us reached the city, we should certainly have had an outbreak there.
July 18th.
—Moved another 40 pounder gun into the fort, and mounted it on a very commanding position, from which we could soon destroy the best part of the city. Of course there is no intention of a measure of this kind, but a big gun ready for action has a very
soothing
effect on the warlike feelings of Afghans, or Easterns generally. Intelligence was brought in, that attacks on the posts of Mandi Hissar and Abdul Rahmon were likely, and though it was not thought there was much chance of these places, which are now very fairly strong, being attacked, it was thought wise to send some cavalry to reconnoitre, which was done; but the officer, on arrival at Abdul Rahmon (25 miles off), was able to telegraph that all was quiet and no sign of gatherings or excitement. If, however, the existing state of feeling in the country grows or becomes intensified, it is quite possible these posts may be attacked, but if so they should be well able to hold their own.
Cavalry patrol fired upon—officer wounded.
July 19th.
—Was suddenly woke at 2 a.m. by the sound of a volley of musketry close to our quarters, followed by the noise of horses galloping. I at once recognised what had happened—indeed it was the only thing which could have happened—that the cavalry patrol had been fired on by some of the enemy. I lost no time in getting to the best place for a view, and presently one of the patrol rode up and reported that as they had been passing along, about 200 yards from our quarters, a volley had been fired into them from behind a low wall, and that several men and horses had been hit. I immediately sent off orders for 2 companies of the 7th Fusiliers and a troop of cavalry to turn out, and getting dressed as quickly as possible, was mounted and ready before the troops could come. We then carefully swept the whole ground round the camp, but of course failed to find the attackers, although we certainly were on their track ten minutes after they had fired. The country round our camp lends itself in the most unsatisfactory manner to small attacks of this kind, as on all sides there are enormous cemeteries, with thousands of graves and vaults, into any of which a few men could get and hide with absolute safety. The night was dark, the moon having set, and a haze come up, as it generally does here towards morning. On investigation I found that the native officer commanding the patrol was badly wounded in the arm, and that 2 horses were slightly wounded, and one soldier and one horse were killed. While I and the Brigade-Major, and the Cavalry Colonel, were standing together, near the man who was killed, an intelligent? native sentry who was posted about 400 yards off, took it into his wise head to decide that we were a party of the enemy, and putting a bullet into his rifle, took a deliberate and, I must say, extremely good shot at us, aiming, I am glad to say, just a few feet too high. I had not heard the whiz of a rifle bullet since the China days, but I had no difficulty in recognizing it again, and as soon as weightier matters allowed, I had my friend, the sentry, made a prisoner of, and properly punished the next morning. All things considered, we have had very little wild firing by sentries here, but, as is always the case, there have been some few instances which I have not failed to punish without accepting any excuses. This little affair of the patrol is another excellent instance of how little Sir Donald Stewart did to make the position here as good in a military sense as it could be—as had he done so, he would not have left a wall or enclosure standing within a thousand yards of our camp anywhere. He, however, would have none of them touched, first because he wanted to conciliate the people; and next, because he wanted to save the expense of pulling them down. When General Primrose came he accepted the existing state of affairs, and would allow nothing to be done, although General Burrows and I naturally have wished to have things more ship-shape. I lost no time in pointing a moral, and adorning a tale after the affair of the patrol, and got permission to take down all walls and enclosures in the
immediate
vicinity of the Barracks, of which permission I have availed myself to the full, and a little over, and made a very perceptible improvement, though I am by no means contented yet. I asked General Primrose to insist on the Wāli's people levelling various big enclosures between our position and the city walls, but as they surround very holy shrines and mosques, they begged for a respite on promise of good behaviour, and I am sorry to say it has been granted. However, what has been done is most useful, and makes the work of the patrols easier and safer. It was very unfortunate that the native officer commanding the patrol should have been shot in the right arm, and his horse wounded, as he was unable to pull up the horse for some distance, and so did not succeed in seeing where the men who attacked him went to.
Daily visits into city—all quiet.
July 20th.
—Paid my usual visit to the city, and found all very quiet, and the people by no means uncivil. In the evening I took all the cavalry officers, English and native, round the camp, and gave them my ideas of the way in which they should patrol, and what a patrol should do when fired on (
i.e.
,
not
run away).
July 21.
—Having arranged with Major Adam, the Assistant Quartermaster-General, to make a reconnaisance through the villages in the Argandab, we started from camp at half-past 4 o'clock (a lovely fresh morning), and, crossing the Baba-i-Wali Pass, rode for several miles up the Valley as far as a village called Sardeh Bala.—(N.B.—You will find all these places on the big map I sent you last mail, which will give you a capital idea of the events I have now to tell of). Turning back from there we proposed to return into the Kandahar plain by the pass across the range of hills (which separates the plain from the Argandab Valley) which is called the Kotal-i-Murcha. This range of hills, which is very clearly marked on the big map, rises to a considerable height, being often as much as 2,000 to 2,500 feet above the plain. The two passes through the range are the Baba-i-Wali and the Kotal-i-Murcha. The first is passable by men and horses, and we have made a road for guns over it. The second is a mere mountain track, up which not more than one man can go abreast, and part of which is so strewn with detached rocks that it is absolutely necessary to dismount and lead a horse along it. This pass, however, is a short cut from the city into the Argandab, and we have all used it regularly when riding out there. I myself rode that way on the 16th, and there was, therefore, nothing rash or unwise in our returning that way. From the commencement of the ascent to the top of the pass is about ½ a mile, and the rise in that distance is 700 to 800 feet, and therefore very steep. We had just commenced the ascent when one of our escort drew our attention to some men dodging behind the rocks over our head, who had guns, and were evidently trying to avoid being seen. An armed man is so usual a sight in this country that I did not for the moment think anything of the matter, and indeed prevented Major Adam, who said he would like to take a shot at the nearest man from doing so. As a precaution, however, I ordered 3 of the escort to dismount and get out their carbines, and Major Adam took a carbine, and so did I, and we slowly ascended, keeping our eye on our friends, or rather on the place they had been, for we could not see them then. Presently (all this occurred in less time than I write it) we saw one scoundrel pop his head up from behind a stone and take aim. We were too
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Fired upon in Kotal-i-Murcha pass.
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quick for him, for Major Adam and one of the escort let fly at him, and so threw out his aim, that he fired high, and no one was touched. Immediately, however, 3 more shots were fired, one killing one of the horses of the escort, our fire in return being quite harmless, as our assailants were behind rocks, and we were out in the open. Still it served to unsteady their aim, and we got to the top and under cover without further damage, though most of the shots had been fairly well directed for us. I had one shot as I came up, which, I am sorry to say, was not successful, though I made my friend "leave that," as Paddy Roe used to say when I fired at a hare and, according to my custom, missed it. As soon as I got the party under cover I sent men down on each side of the hill (having first sent off to Kandahar, 4½ miles off, for 20 infantry to help in the hunt through the rocks) to prevent the enemy getting down and running away, and Major Adam and I, each with 2 men and a pocketful of ammunition, essayed climbing the hill. He first descended a good bit and hit off a fairish path which took him a long way up, and during the ascent he had 4 or 5 shots, but never could get near the fellows at all, they being all mountaineers, and we being burdened with heavy riding boots, spurs, &c., and knowing nothing of the paths. I, with my two men, made excellent progress at first, but found ourselves regularly stuck on the top of a precipice, across which, at about 300 yards, we could see one of the men making off. I took, as I thought, very good aim, making one of the men with me fire too, but we again missed, whereupon the runaway turned round and let fly at us, but expecting this we were safely behind a rock, and I don't think his bullet came near us. I had then to descend, and before I could hit off another path, the whole lot were out of sight. It was dreadfully hot, and we were dying of thirst, and not a drop of water within 3 miles, but of course had to stay until the infantry came. I sent off one of my two men to Kandahar with news to tell them the direction the enemy had run in, and I and the other man comfortably behind a good rock with our carbines ready, waited in hopes of getting a better shot, but never saw our assailants again. In due course first some cavalry, and then, after a considerable interval, some infantry came out to me, and we hunted the hill, but it was so precipitous and so full of caves that our search was without result. I did not, of course, accompany this party as I wanted to get back to camp, and besides was nearly dead with thirst. I cannot, I fear, give a good idea of the difficulties of climbing or searching this range of hills which are nothing but limestone rocks, not a tree, blade of grass, or inch of earth on them, so one might as well be trying to climb the cliffs at Bundoran, only that these hills are much higher. I dare say you will think it was a good deal of trouble and time to spend over a small party of marauders of this kind, and so it was, but my reason was that I was anxious to impress by practice what I have so often preached, the necessity for officers and men on such occasions as this always trying to give as good as they get, and not considering they had done their duty when they followed the example of Captain Carey and others by galloping away as fast as they could. With this object in view, I don't think I was wrong to turn myself for an hour or so into a private soldier, and do a little skirmishing on foot with a carbine. We had eight men of the Native Cavalry with us, and they were as staunch as steel
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Attack exaggerated by messengers sent.
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and very quiet and cool, except the 2 men who I sent into Kandahar with the order to send me out help, which order I
wrote
, and in a most guarded way, saying "I want 20 infantry, and a few cavalry as scouts." However, once away from the influence of the officers, the imagination of my orderlies magnified the whole affair, and as they rode through the camp they told every one that the General Sahib had been fired at and was engaged in a great battle with thousands of the enemy who were pressing on to Kandahar. This, unfortunately, was believed, and all the troops were turned out, and a regular commotion got up in the city, and altogether a very objectionable state of alarm was arrived at. When I came in and heard of it, I gave all concerned a lecture which they won't forget, for if there is one thing I hate more than another it is false alarms, and so far I have not had one. And now I must defend myself against the idea everyone seems to have that I go about here rashly, as I really do not, as I always have my escort, and till the last ten days it was quite safe to move about, and in this particular instance it never for a moment entered Major Adam's or my mind that there was the slightest risk going over the Murcha Pass. Had we thought so we would have avoided it, but once being in the business there was only one thing for us to do, and that was to see it through. Lots of men, women, and children had crossed the pass that morning, and we had met them and spoken to them. My rides are now much circumscribed, and I don't think just at present of going any distance from camp merely for
amusement
. Yesterday we went on business, and with what is considered, and what proved to be, a quite sufficient escort. I was riding my white horse, Selim, and he behaved like an angel, and took no notice of the firing, and when I had to dismount at the bad piece of the pass, followed me up without any difficulty. Afterwards I fastened him to a stone, and he stood quite quietly there for 4 hours without giving any trouble. I did not get in till ½ past one, very thirsty, very hungry, and very hot, but this kind of work never does me any harm, and I was as fit as possible as soon as I had a bath and my breakfast.
July 22nd.
—Heard from the Government of India that Abdul Rahman is to be proclaimed Amir of Kabul forthwith by Sir D. Stewart. I cannot think this a wise step, but the desire to get out of the war at any cost is, I think, blinding the Government to the many weak points in the arrangement.
July 23rd.
—Visited the city in order that I might give General Primrose my views of an idea of his to occupy a certain portion of it without troops should we be attacked here. The arrangement does not seem to me to be either necessary or desirable, as I would prefer keeping all our small force, except the garrison of the Fort and the City walls, in the open, striking at the enemy whenever opportunity offered. I have explained this, and I hope it will, if necessity arise, be carried out. When riding to the Fort this morning I was stopped by a native who informed me he had something very important to tell me, which was, that this being the Mahomedan
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Rumours of a rising.
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Sunday (Friday) a rising was to take place to-day. The old gentleman, who belonged to the Moghul or Persian tribe, who hate the Afghans, was in an awful fright, and I think he allowed his fears to magnify matters much. However, I am keeping my eyes open, have taken all precautions, and am ready, but fear the Afghans won't come to the point.
July 24th.
—The guard on the Shikarpore Gate of the City was fired on by some armed men during the night, the fire being returned by the guard. In reporting the matter to General Primrose, I strongly urged that the walls and buildings outside the City gates, which afforded cover to villains of sorts to approach and fire at our guards, should be demolished. This, however, would have involved much distress and annoyance to the Afghans, and he did not care to push the matter strongly (after events, however, proved that the suggestion was a proper one). We received news that 150 of our cavalry, under General Nuttall, had completely routed 600 of Ayoob Khan's Cavalry.
July 25th.
—3 companies of the 28th N.I. arrived from Chaman, a most welcome addition, small as it is, to our painfully weak force.
July 26th.
—The guard on the Herat Gate was fired on during the early morning. I again urged the necessity for demolishing all cover near the gates, but the measure was deemed too strong. I am determined, if possible, to catch the scoundrels who go about, and hold parties of Cavalry and Infantry in readiness all night to go without delay to any place where firing of this desultory nature is heard. This is harassing to the troops, but cannot be helped. 2 more companies of the 28th N.I. arrived.
July 27th.
—I got information that some of the enemy were concealed in the hills above old Kandahar, so, obtaining permission from General Primrose to make a raid on them, I despatched parties of the 7th Fusiliers and 4th N.I. to see if the report was correct, and if so to attack and defeat them. I rode out myself in the afternoon to see how the search through the very difficult ground was being carried on, and quite approved the arrangements made by Major Marshall who was in command. No one, however, was found, though there were evident signs that several places had been recently inhabited, and very hurriedly evacuated.
First alarming account of disaster.
July 28th.
—I was woke at 1·30 a.m. by Colonel La Touche, of the Cavalry, who came to report to me that a small portion (a native officer and 30 men) of one of the Cavalry regiments with General Burrows' Force had just reached camp, having, they said, rode 60 miles without drawing rein to bring the information of the total annihilation, by Ayoob Khan's army, of the force under General Burrows. They declared that a great battle had been fought the previous day about noon; that after holding out for 5 hours under a terrible fire, that the whole force had been broken up and taken to flight, and been cut to pieces in detail. Both Generals, Burrows and Nuttall, were said to be dead, that no one, but these men themselves, was saved. The story was a terrible one, and enough to shock the stoutest heart and nerves. I could not, and would not, believe it in its entirety, and told Colonel La Touche that I felt sure things were not as black as they were painted, though I feared they were bad enough. The first thing, however, was to take the news to General Primrose, so, pulling on a few clothes, I ran over to his house with Colonel La Touche and told him the bad news, at the same time recommending caution in accepting, without some reserve, the story of the native officer and men of the Sind Horse. A disaster had, without doubt, occurred, and the only question was whether or not a remnant had escaped, and if so of what strength. A hurried consultation was held, and it was unanimously agreed that, with the certainty of the whole country rising like one man against us, it would be worse than madness for our small force to attempt to hold the altogether indefensible military position which the parsimony and want of military forethought on the part of Sir Donald Stewart had bequeathed to us. As I have often remarked hitherto on the hopeless position, from a military point of view, of the Kandahar Cantonments, it is useless repeating all the objections to them again. Suffice it to say, that they have no independant water supply; that they are commanded on one side by two low hills, and that they are straggling, and entirely without military defences of any kind, and that no amount of labor or money could have made them tenable in
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City to be occupied versus cantonments.
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the few days at our disposal. Our only alternative was to accept another utterly false military position, and to occupy the whole City of Kandahar, it being impossible to place our force, small as it was, in the Citadel, nor (could we have done so) to have held the Citadel against an enemy in possession of the City. It is hardly necessary to point out the dangers in, and objections to, the occupation of the City, as they are self-evident, the first and chief one being the vastness of its size in comparison with the force at our disposal. The City, of which I give a rough plan on one of the foregoing pages, is a sort of irregular parallelogram, one side (N.) being 1,200 yards long; the W. 1,900 yards long, the S. 1,300 yards long, and the E. 2,000 yards long, a total length of wall of something under 4 miles, to protect which, and an additional half mile of wall in the Citadel, we should have, unless some portion of General Burrows' force returned, not quite 1,500 men. When I mention that to defend lines of this length, according to military rules, a force of 18,000 men is considered the correct thing—the almost hopelessness of the position may be imagined. Behind and within these walls lay a city with a population of 30,000, of whom 14,000 were men, out of whom it was no exaggeration to feel that half at least must of necessity be our deadly enemies, and that consequently, in addition to offering resistance to hordes without, we had to guard against treachery from within. The position, for these two reasons alone, was utterly wrong, but it was the sole possible alternative, and had to be accepted, and its difficulties and dangers dealt with as might be possible. The question of water was the urgent one, but as we knew the City had a sufficient supply for its inhabitants, of which we purposed to turn out at least one half, we trusted we should get enough for ourselves. The walls vary in height from 18 feet in the lowest place to 25 feet in the highest, and are about 20 feet thick at the base, and 12 to 14 feet broad at the parapet. There are 6 Gates—four principal ones—from which the various faces take their names, and 2 minor ones. The northern gate is called the Eedgah; the southern the Shikarpore, being the gate from which the main road to India leads; the western gate is the Kabul gate, and near it a smaller one known as the Bar Dourani; the eastern gate is the Herat gate, and close to it another called the Topkhana or Artillery gate. Along the walls, at intervals of 100 yards, are high turrets, which give the only flanking defence, very poor in quality and degree. This point hurriedly, but definitely and decidedly, settled, we had no time for conversation or consideration, as immediate action was necessary, the carrying out of which General Primrose placed unreservedly in my hands. The first thing to be done was to have the sick and ammunition conveyed to a place of safety in the Citadel, and as it was clear we could not use our heavy battery (viz., 4 40-pounders and 2 six-inch mortars), drawn by bullocks in the field, I sent it also without delay into the Citadel, and issued orders to all commanding officers to move all public and private property belonging to their regiments to the Citadel also.
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Further details of General Burrows' defeat.
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About 4 a.m. one or two native stragglers from General Burrows' Force came in and gave a less terrible account of the destruction which had befallen it than the Sind Horse had done, and at ¼ to 5 a.m. Veterinary-Surgeon Oliver, of the Horse Artillery, arrived and was brought to me. He was greatly exhausted, but I learned from him that there was a very considerable proportion of the force saved, and that the main body was covering the retreat, and was probably then about 10 miles off, Generals Burrows and Nuttall being with them. I sent Mr. Oliver on to General Primrose, who had ridden down to the Citadel to start work there, to tell his story, and convey a message from me that I requested permission to take a small force and move out in the direction of Kokeran to cover General Burrows' retirement. Feeling sure the proposal would be approved, I ordered
1troop of Cavalry,
2guns,
4companies of Infantry,
to be held in readiness to march at once. About ¾ of an hour later General Primrose arrived from the Citadel and authorized my starting at once, urging on me, however, to use great caution, and avoid, as far as possible, any considerable loss of life. Being anxious to be off at once, I had no time to give any attention to getting my own property into the Citadel, but had to leave the matter to my native servant, telling him to do the best he could, and to take the most useful things into safety first, and I may here say that he must have worked admirably, as, when I got to the Fort at 7 o'clock in the evening, I found he had brought off in safety every single thing I possessed. At ½ past 5 o'clock (¾ of an hour after I first heard that any remnants of Burrows' force was saved, and trying to return) I paraded my little force, which was, I was horrified to find, much smaller than I had intended, as the full number of men were not at the moment available. Time was precious to our poor comrades wearily fighting their way back to Camp, so I decided not to wait till I could get my numbers, and started with only
40Sabres Native Cavalry,
2Guns R. A.,
70of the 7th Fusiliers.
100of the 28th Native Infantry,
I knew there could be no organized resistance, and that if I was cautious I could come to no harm, but, all the same, I am free to confess that I could not avoid feeling anxious about my guns, as the loss of 2 more would have been simply ruin to us. I must here describe the route I had to follow, as its peculiarities added much to the difficulties and dangers of the enterprise. Immediately after leaving the Barracks the road passes for about ½ a mile through walled gardens, each garden forming a little fortification of itself, and giving cover for any number of armed men. These passed through, the Village of Abasabad is reached through the main street of which the road goes. This street is so narrow that in places it was a close shave to get the R.A. carriages through, and it twists and winds about most unpleasantly. Beyond the village is another quarter of a mile of walled gardens, and then an open plain is come to with, however, commanding hills all along the road to the right (about 300 yards off), and on the left a string of strongly placed villages about the same distance from the road. It is evident, therefore, that every inch of road offered extraordinary facilities for the enemy to resist our |Terrible accounts of the retreat.| advance. As we left the camp we began to meet the first of the long string of fugitives, who continued afterwards to pass us till we reached Kokeran, a more terrible sight I never witnessed; all appearance of organization or discipline gone; each man, whether European or native, was fighting, as it were, for his own life, careful of nothing but getting into safety. All were wearied and harrassed, and many unable hardly to move one foot before the other, as indeed was not wonderful, considering that since 4 p.m. the previous day they had been marching, with a cruel enemy on all sides of them, shooting and stabbing every man who, too wearied to drag on, sat down for a moment's rest. To add to the horrors of the march they had, in the whole distance of over 50 miles, found water only twice, and what this means no one who has not lived and worked in this climate can tell. From all I can hear there were some marvellous instances of self-denial in this matter: men giving up their last drop of water, which was more than their lives to them, to men more feeble than themselves, and, apparently, none equalled or exceeded in this respect Captain Slade, of the Horse Artillery, as noble a soldier as ever lived. Officers and men have since told me of his heroic efforts to save his guns, to give assistance and to sacrifice his life, or deny himself to save or help anyone; all also join in saying General Burrows' conduct was splendid, and that he had fairly won the Victoria Cross 3 or 4 times. Once when all hope seemed lost, for dismounted men he got off his horse, put two wounded officers on it, and led it himself for 3 miles, with a howling crowd of savages following him, anxious for his life. I had never seen the retreat of a panic-stricken military force before, and I trust I never may do so again, as it is too horrible for description, and this retreat excelled in terror any that I have ever read of. As each inch of the road (till my little force was seen) had to be fought for against a set of blood-thirsty savages, rather than fall into whose hands alive, it is said several men shot themselves, knowing the horrible fate that would otherwise be in store for them. Then the want of water was a fearful aggravation of the sufferings of the wretched men, and the length of the march, 50 miles, made the hope of escape seem impossible. I must now go back to my own enterprise, which, I rejoice to think, was successful, and resulted in the saving of many valuable lives. I had hardly got my little force in column of route outside the Barrack gates, when the enemy commenced |Relieving force meet with oppositions.| a desultory and harmless fire on us from behind the walls of the neighbouring gardens. I at once sent forward some skirmishers to the front, and a cavalry picquet to the extreme right and left, and was glad to see the spirit with which all advanced, which at once told on the rabble opposed to us, who gave up their positions and ran for their lives, several being killed as they ran. In this way, pressing on steadily, I cleared the gardens and the Village of Abasadad, and was able to bring my guns and remainder of my column through that extremely awkward position. On the other side of the village the skirmishers had advanced, driving the enemy before them, till the more open ground was reached. Here I formed up my column once more, preparatory to pushing on for Kokeran. On the range of high hills which ran along the left of the road, at about 300 yards off, were small bodies of the enemy, as also in the strongly placed villages on my left. Before advancing I had to send out small parties on either flank to dislodge these people, which they did with the greatest ease. My way was again clear, and I advanced without opposition for about a mile, when, on a low hill, about 2,000 yards to my right-front, I saw a considerable force posted, which was being increased every moment by contingents from the villages in the rear of the hill, from which we could see people hurrying in great numbers. Seeing a good position about 1,000 yards ahead, I pushed on to it rapidly, and getting my guns into action, threw forward the Cavalry to threaten the left flank, while the Infantry moved slowly to the front. A couple of shells planted, with charming precision, by my friend Captain Law had a most happy effect, and, as we could see, shook the confidence of the enemy, good as their position was. They did not, however, seem disposed to take the hint, and kept up a constant, but, owing to the distance, harmless fire on us as we advanced. Presently, however, on a repetition of the dose equally well administered, assisted by a few volleys from our rifles, they broke, the greater part rushing to the rear, but some, as I had hoped, trying to cross the road and gain the shelter of the hills on the left. This was the moment for the Cavalry, who charged with excellent effect, doing good execution at the same time. I gave the fugitives to the rear a couple of shells at 2,000 yards where, thinking themselves safe, they had halted to breathe. Serious as the work on hand was, we could not help a hearty laugh at the consternation caused by the unexpected visitors. The mass of people broke away in all directions, leaving, as we could see afterwards as we advanced, a good percentage on the ground. I dare say there are some critics who will think that this position ought to have been carried at the point of the bayonet, in order that a severe lesson might have been inflicted, and under other circumstances I might have thought so myself, but, placed as we were when the loss of every man was serious, I had determined to utilize to the utmost the long range of our weapons, and to do all the fighting I could at long bowls, and by sticking steadily to this, I succeeded in carrying out my object which entailed a march of 14 miles, every inch of which had to be contested or defended, with the loss only of 1 man killed and two or three slightly wounded. I quite acknowledge there are objections to the arrangement, but I feel sure it was the right one for the occasion. After this no regular opposition was offered till I reached Kokeran, which is a large village with a fortified enclosure in its midst, which was full of the enemy, who had been ill treating the stragglers of General Burrows' force all morning. Knowing the ground well, I at once selected my position, and was quickly placed to command the whole of the country round. I was |Kokeran—General Burrows' force sighted.| just going to give the order for the guns to come into action, when, to my delight, at about a mile off, at the spot where I knew was the ford of the Argandab, where the road from Girishk crossed the river, I saw a mass of men which I at once recognized as what remained of General Burrows' Force. I decided, therefore, before hammering Kokeran to communicate with them, and sent some Cavalry to make a circuit to the right and join General Burrows, informing him that I was clearing his way, and that he might, I felt sure, advance in 20 minutes, by which time I would have his way open. The Cavalry had hardly started before I recognized that the enemy, seeing that the position I had taken up had rendered Kokeran untenable, had suddenly evacuated that place, and taken up an extremely strong position on my right flank, from which, without delay, they opened a heavy fire on us. A few shells and a rapid demonstration, for it never reached a hand-to-hand fight, soon, however, did their business, and, to my great satisfaction, I found myself able to ask General Burrows to come on along a perfectly safe road. It was a sad cavalcade, many wounded, all well nigh tired to death. The gun carriages, alas, reduced by 2, which had been lost, covered with sick, wounded, dead and dying, while the wretched horses, dying themselves of thirst and fatigue, were hardly able to drag them along. Many poor fellows, wounded almost to death, trying with a terrible anxiety to cling to the back of a horse or a camel, knowing too well the fate that would await them if they failed to keep their seats. To these latter my appearance was a double blessing, as I had brought with me 25 litters (palanquins), into which the worst cases were placed, and they were able to finish their journey in comparative comfort. One poor fellow (Major Iredell) had a compound fracture of the ankle, and his foot was merely hanging on by the skin, and yet he had ridden for 18 hours, and was wonderfully well, and is, I hope, now in a fair way to recovery. Almost last of all, followed only by a Cavalry escort, came poor Burrows himself, who, poor fellow, completely broke down when he saw me, and could not say a word. I made him get off his horse and take a little whiskey and water I had with me, and a bit of biscuit, and soon he was more composed and better. He, like them all, was relieved beyond measure to see me, and my diminutive following, as they knew their troubles were at an end. I agreed that they should all, to the last straggler, pass me, and that when they were half a mile ahead I should follow slowly, and bring up the rear of all, covering them from all annoyance. Soon (all too soon, for they were but a very little company) they had filed passed, and I then recalled my Cavalry, which had been watching the ford of the Argandab a mile to |Small cavalry charge—one man killed.| my front. On their return over this mile the enemy, emboldened by our preparations for departure, suddenly rushed down in great numbers to cut them off, but Captain Anderson was equal to the occasion, and setting at nought the difference of numbers, charged them, and cut his way through, leaving, however, his very best soldier dead on the ground. Although I would have liked to have punished the enemy for this affair, prudence said no, and so I commenced my return for Kandahar, keeping half a mile in rear of General Burrows' column, and picking up many poor fellows (putting them on my guns), who, even in this short distance, had begun to fall out again. For the first three miles after leaving Kokeran, all was absolute quiet, the result of the lessons of the morning, and the wearied column from Girishk passed along in unaccustomed peace. At this time, however, I received information from the front, that the enemy had collected in great force on the hills around and in the Village of Abasabad, and that help to turn them out was wanted. I immediately hurried my guns and Cavalry to the front, and followed on with the Infantry, desiring Captain Law to pass General Burrows' force, and getting to his front open fire on the enemy. This he did in good style, and was making an advance to a second position, when I and the Infantry, who had also passed through General Burrows' Force, which were halted, came up. We completed the dispersion of the enemy with Artillery fire, and then throwing out skirmishers swept, for a second time that day, the gardens round Abasabad. This accomplished, and the road again clear for General Burrows' Force, I formed up on one flank and allowed them again to pass me, following them into the Cantonments, which I reached about ½ past one or two o'clock, very thankful indeed that I had gone out, and but little less delighted that I had managed to effect my object at such a very small loss. To ensure a safe conduct to any unfortunate straggler that might, by accident, have escaped notice, I sent a fresh company of the 7th Regiment to hold the entrance to the Village of Abasabad, and kept them there till all hopes of anyone coming in had gone, when I withdrew them. My column had constantly been on the move from half-past 5 a.m. till half-past one p.m., the most of the time under a burning sun, which made us all, even those who were riding, suffer from an intolerable thirst, and as there was no water between Kokeran and Kandahar, this was a great addition to our labors. On arrival in Cantonments General Burrows' |Property in cantonments taken into fort.| Force received orders to pass on to the Citadel, while I was desired to take in hands, without delay, measures for the evacuation of the Cantonments, and the safe conduct of all the troops there into the Citadel. The operation was most distasteful, but I had agreed to the necessity for it, and quite saw it was the only possible course. When I came to enquire into the position of affairs I was horrified to find that the 8 precious hours while I had been absent had been wasted in the most inexplicable way. Apparently little or nothing of the Government or private property in charge of regiments had been moved to the Fort, and all had yet to be done. It was then past 2 o'clock, and General Primrose telegraphed to me from the Citadel, to say he wished me to move in there as quickly as possible. (I ought to explain that the Citadel or Fort of Kandahar is about 1¼ miles from the Cantonments.) I at once set everyone to work, excusing no one and superintending all personally, to get as much property as possible into the Fort, sending there for all available carts, camels, ponies and mules, each of which, immediately it had got rid of its load, came back again, and so the afternoon passed away all too rapidly. At last all was safely sent in, except the baggage of the 66th, which was one of the regiments of General Burrows' Brigade, who, when going out to Girishk, had left some tons of things in a most careless and unpacked condition. I saw it would be hopeless had I had a day instead of an hour to get all in, but I put on big working parties, and worked away, putting off my departure from half hour to half hour, until it approached 6 o'clock, and I had been called on three or four times by General Primrose to move into the Citadel. I then saw it was useless to try and save more, and so I fixed ¼ past 6 o'clock as the hour for our departure, deciding that all not packed then must be abandoned. All this time I had been pressed all round by marauding bands of armed men, who were sweeping round, trying to kill and steal who and what they could. These necessitated strong picquets, and, from time to time, small expeditions, so my hands were full. At ¼ past 6 I paraded my force as follows:—
4th Native Infantry,
28th Native Infantry,
C/2 Royal Artillery,
7th Fusiliers,
Poona Horse,
Detacht.3rd Light Cavalry,
——3rd Sind Horse,
and in this order commenced my mournful and humiliating march. I had previously gone carefully round the whole place myself, had had it carefully searched by an officer with a picquet, and had made each Commanding Officer and the Chief Medical Officer report to me that nothing was left behind. |Marched into Citadel after hard day's work.| At the moment I marched I withdrew my picquets and guards, and covering my rear with Cavalry, moved on the Fort. When every man had left the large Barrack square I returned to it myself and made my Staff and escort, who were with me, pass out before me, so that I might have the melancholy satisfaction of being the last man in the place. At 7 p.m. I followed the last man of the Force into the Citadel and shut the gates, and so began a fresh act of this extremely painful drama. With the exception of a portion of the clothing of the 66th Regiment, I had succeeded in getting the property of the regiments which were under me into safety, but I fear much, owing to some mismanagement, I am inclined almost to fear a panic, after we had started for Kokeran, several of the regiments hurriedly and unnecessarily evacuated their barracks early in the morning, when they were at once entered by the enemy and plundered. On starting, I made over the command to the next senior officer, giving him distinct instructions how to act, but as he himself lost some of the baggage of his regiment (in my absence), he cannot have paid much attention to them. Late as it was when I entered the Citadel, my work was not yet done, as I was the only General Officer available to issue orders or do work, as General Primrose, who was seedy, was thoroughly wearied out, and Generals Burrows and Nuttall were sound asleep, and poor fellows badly they needed it after the terrible night they had gone through. I had, therefore, to set to work to put the Guards and necessary defences for the night in some state of order, and as this involved a walk and ride round the City and Fort walls, 4½ miles, it was a pleasant ending to a long day. At 8 o'clock I snatched a hurried dinner with General Primrose, the first food, except a cup of chocolate and a biscuit, I had had in the day, and at half-past nine went the round of the ramparts and guards, getting to bed at 1 a.m., having had 23½ hours of intense work of mind and body, 18 of which I had spent in the saddle. I did not want much rocking, and was horrified to find, long before I was half satisfied with sleep, that it was 5 a.m. on the 29th July, and that I had to get up to start off a reconnoitering party of Cavalry to ascertain the state of affairs round our old Cantonments. They found the whole country covered with armed men, and the Cantonment looted, and such parts of it as would burn, burned down. They were fired on at several places, but returned unopposed to Camp. We were hard at work all day, improving our defences and removing the cover which surrounded the outside of the gates, but it was clear this was, with our small force, the work of many days, and that if we were soon attacked we would have to make the best of things as they were. In the afternoon the enemy's Cavalry appeared in large numbers on our left front. We immediately turned out our Cavalry Brigade, who, however, could not get near the enemy's, as they retired under the shelter of their guns, where we did not care to follow them. The night passed quite quietly, there being strong guards on all the walls, and everyone sleeping in their clothes, ready to turn out at a moment's notice. It is necessary I should mention that on the previous day, while I was at Kokeran, General Primrose was busy in the City, seizing on all the principal parts, closing and securing the Gates, and keeping the inhabitants overawed—all works, any failure in which would have been utter destruction to us. On the morning of the 28th, therefore, our small force had three important duties to perform: 1st, to go out and assist the retiring column; 2nd, to seize and hold the City, and fortify it, and prepare for the siege; 3rd, to hold the Cantonments—any one of them a task quite sufficient for the strength of the Force, so that our accomplishing all three was a matter of great satisfaction.
Enemy cavalry treated to some shells.
July 30.
—Sent out a reconnoitering party of Cavalry, and directed the Officer so to approach the enemy's Camp as to try and draw him out, which he did very successfully, giving us an excellent opportunity of treating him with good effect to a few shells. General Burrows and I urged on General Primrose the absolute necessity for turning out of the City the whole of the Pathans, and he authorized us to go to the Political Officer and the Wāli, and urge the great importance of this matter, and notify his determination to have it carried out. A little explanation on this subject is necessary. The population of the City of Kandahar is made up of three sections, the largest of which are Pathans, who are all Orthodox Mahomedans, very bitter against all foreigners or infidels, and our irreconcilable enemies. The next are the Moghuls or Parsiwans, who, though Mahomedans, are accounted a species of dissenter by the true Mahomedans, and hated and persecuted by them accordingly. Their sympathies are therefore (speaking comparatively) with us. The third and last are the Hindoo Merchants, an influential and numerous community, settlers from India, intent only on making money, despised by both sects of Mahomedans, who, in turn, prey on them and rob them. They are quite valueless as friends or foes, but such as they were their feelings are with us. The Pathans, to a man, were our enemies, and their presence in the City our deadliest danger, and it seemed to me quite useless to fortify our position or take measures against the enemy without, if we wilfully permitted a base and treacherous foe to remain within, our walls. The measure of turning out many innocent people was a hard and painful one, but it was one on which our very existence rested, and so I was most urgent on the point. As
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Politicals objected to Pathan ejectment.
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I expected, the Political Officers objected, and tried to persuade us that the risk was imaginary, &c. However, I was firm, and after a long and hot conversation which, at one time, seemed likely to culminate in a row, I carried the day, and an order was issued that all Pathans (men) should leave the City, and that in the afternoon search parties would go round to ascertain that the order was being obeyed. This unpleasant duty was confided to me, and I made all preparations for resistance, but in no case met with any, and it was clear the exodus had commenced, and eventually resulted in about 12,000 persons leaving the City of their own free will. This was a gain not only in getting rid of a certain set of desperate enemies, but also in reducing the number of mouths to be fed and supplied with water, the latter more especially. Though this was a good beginning, I was by no means satisfied that all the dangerous element had been removed, and from time to time persistently urged my views to this effect, until eventually it seemed we had reduced the evil to a minimum. I cannot say that even yet (written August 14th) I am quite satisfied, but I hope and believe the internal danger is greatly reduced. Throughout we got no hearty assistance from the Political Officers, the Wāli, or the City Authorities, the Chief of which (called the Kotwal) is, I believe, the prime villain of the lot, and I informed Colonel St. John (the Political Officer) that I considered he ought to be arrested, and that I should myself, on my own responsibility, assuredly seize him if there was the sign of an emeute in the town. I have no doubt Colonel St. John will hereafter try to prove I was too decided, and too hard in this matter, but I am convinced I was right, and only wish I had more certainty that we were as safe from danger from within as he tries to make me believe. If I were General Primrose I would relieve him of all political powers while the present state of affairs lasted, and constitute myself
only
and chief Political Officer, and this I have urged on him. When I found it quite impossible, as it seemed to be at first, to move the Pathans out, I threatened (having received authority from General Primrose to act as might seem best) to throw a few shells into the Pathan quarter, and certainly would have done so when all other means failed, but never desired or wished to resort to so extreme a measure until all fair means had been tried.
July 31st.
—After a quiet night I was up at 4·30 and sent out a reconnoitering party, which got well into Cantonments without resistance, and returned almost unopposed. While, however, they were so employed, a large body of Cavalry and Infantry appeared on our right front, in the direction of Mandi Hissar, and occupied 2 villages within 1,000 yards of the wall. General Primrose ordered me to take out some Cavalry and Infantry to clear them off, which I did, and had a smart little fight, effecting our object, and killing about 30 of the enemy, with a loss to ourselves of one man killed and 3 wounded. I sent in to ask General Primrose to send me some guns, as the enemy had fallen back into a strong village, against the loopholed walls of which I did not care to rush the men until I had got a practicable breach. No guns coming, and the object of the little expedition having been effected, I withdrew my party to the Fort, where I found that General Primrose had not wished to push the affair further, and had sent to tell me so, but the message had not reached me. Hard at work all day improving our defences. Everyone is on duty always, and despite the hot sun and incessant labor, all are in first-rate
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Demolitions of cover outside city gates.
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health. Now the General regrets that he did not take advantage of the opportunity offered by the firing on our guards and picquets, to have all the cover, which lies round the City Gates outside, down. It must all be done now, and as our working parties are always opposed, we lose men daily over the business. We all feel that we owe more than half our troubles and difficulties to the happy-go-lucky style adopted by General Stewart, who steadily objected to any military precautions whatever being taken at Kandahar. He is certainly the luckiest man in the world—having got safe away before his faults and oversights began to bear fruit.
August 1st.
—Sent out very heavy working parties to clear the front of the Kabul Gate, which is a mass of houses and bazaars. These parties are relieved every four hours, and have to be protected by strong covering parties who are in conflict with the enemy the whole day, but both sides taking advantage of the cover afforded by the numerous walls, little serious loss results as a rule, though there is seldom a day that 4, 5, or more men are not killed and wounded. At 2 p.m. took direction of a small force to endeavour to find more of the Pathans, who are, I am confident, still lurking in the City intent on no good. It was a most unpleasant duty, but I hardened my heart, and made all I found go out. We got over 700 out on this occasion. I cannot say I am yet satisfied, and think we are being fooled and possibly betrayed by the Wāli and his servants.
August 2nd.
—Up at 5 a.m. to direct an attack on a garden opposite our S.W. Bastion, which is the salient of my line of defence. Gave the executive charge to Colonel Bannerman, who carried out the affair in accordance with my instruction in an excellent manner, and most successfully, and though the resistance was steady, our loss was only 1 man killed and 1 wounded, the enemy losing very considerably.
Walls divided into separate commands.
August 3rd.
—My birthday; 44 years old to-day; could not help thinking much of all the dear ones at home, knowing how anxious they would be, and feeling sure I would not be forgotten on this day especially. Still working hard at our defences. The walls were divided into 4 sections for commands, as follows:—
General Primrose— The North or Eedgah Front.
General Burrows— W. or Herat Front.
General Nuttall— E. or Kabul Front.
General Brooke— S. or Shikarpore Front.
Though mine is shorter a good deal than either General Burrows' or General Nuttall's, it has the drawback of being farthest from the Citadel, and it is generally supposed it will be the one on which the heaviest attack will come. Each front is covered outside with a net-work of walls which must be destroyed.
August 4th.
—All at the works. The enemy was rather troublesome, but a few shot and shell, and a steady fire from our selected marksmen, kept them off. The Wāli's Cavalry—about 80 men—went out of the Shikarpore Gate and looted some forage, about a mile to the front, in very good style. Prepared an Abatis in front of my gate, and cut off the water supply of a village 1,000 yards due south. Slept on the ramparts, and visited all my line twice between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. I have a camp bed up on the walls, but no one undresses, and sleep is taken in very small snatches. I may say now I live on my wall, as, except returning to the Citadel for breakfast and dinner and a wash, I never leave the ramparts. We have rather a snug little mess, managed by Colonel Beville, consisting of General Burrows and his Brigade Major, Captain Law; Colonel Beville, and Captain Leckie, my Brigade Major, and myself. So far we have fared very comfortably, as there is a good deal to be bought, and we had a good deal of stores, &c., when we came in. I have quite given up any sort of wine or spirits during the day, and drink nothing but water or cold tea until dinner, when I have one glass of sherry, and sometimes a little hock and water, but generally, when I can get it, lime juice and water. I never touch spirits at all, and am convinced that for hard work there is nothing like drinks that do not inebriate.
August 5th.
—Large covering and working parties in front of the Herat Gate to remove heavy cover between it and the General's old garden. Hardly any resistance offered by the enemy. I completed the Abatis and wire entanglements opposite my gate, and the S.E. and S.W. Bastions, both of which come within my charge. I consider the S.W. Bastion the weakest point of my line, and the one where the heaviest and worst attack will be. I have a 40-pounder gun in the S.E. Bastion, and 2 9-pounders in the S.W. Bastion. Urged thereto by General Burrows and myself, General Primrose had the Kotwal of the City arrested, and in the presence of General Burrows, Colonel St. John, the Nawab Hussun Ali, and myself, warned him of the precarious position in which he stood in case of any outbreak in the City, and told him of the reason of his arrest, &c. He was then conveyed to safe quarters, where he is kept under a European guard, no one seeing him except in the presence of the officer. I feel sure he was a traitor to us, and had some bad scheme in contemplation, and his arrest will nip his machinations in the bud. Even Colonel St. John was glad he was arrested.
August 6th.
—At 3 a.m. every man was turned out and occupied the post he would hold in case of attack, to ascertain that all knew their places. Everything was very quietly done, and the arrangements worked well. The working parties in front of my gate were much annoyed by the enemy firing at long distances. One officer, Lieut. De Trafford, 7th Fusiliers, was wounded. We brought down a mortar and cleared out one of the most troublesome villages. Ayoob Khan's Camp was observed to be pitched behind Picquet Hill in the old Cantonments.
Enemy's camp successfully shelled.
August 7th.
—Threw some shells (40-pounders) with excellent effect into Ayoob's Camp. A regular stampede ensued, and many tents were seen to be on fire, and the Camp was quickly deserted. The distance from us being 3,500 yards (2 miles) they thought they were quite safe, and their horror and astonishment was all the greater. We heard afterwards that one shell had killed 10 and wounded 2 men, burning down the tent in which they were lying. Busy all day on my walls improving the fire capacity which, owing to the peculiar formation of the walls and towers, is very defective, and, do what we may, will never be really good. The heat is very great, inducing great lassitude, which is not wonderful, seeing one barely gets 4 hours sleep out of 24, and never has one's clothes off except for one's tub, the great luxury of the day, and which I always have now just before dinner.
August 8th.
—Heavy firing from the enemy on the working parties in front of the Durani and Kabul Gates, and it took a serious administration of mortar shells to quiet the enemy. For the first time the enemy opened their Artillery on us from a well constructed battery on Picquet Hill. Our 40-pounder at the N.W. angle, however, made excellent practice, and dismounted one of their guns. The enemy have moved their Camp to a position beyond Abasabad, 5,000 yards from our guns. They are busy throwing up batteries against the Herat face.
First proposal to attack Deh Kojah.
August 9th.
—Large working and covering parties (under Colonel Daubeny) in front of the S.W. Bastion to complete necessary demolitions. We lost several men, killed and wounded, but did good work. A large force of the enemy collected in the village opposite Shikarpore Gate, but were turned out by our mortar fire. It was proposed to attack the village of Deh Kojah, which is 900 yards from the Kabul Gate, in view to inflicting a lesson on the enemy. It was clear we could not think of holding it, or any other place beyond the walls, and therefore we should have no real advantage to recompense us for the certain loss the enterprise would entail. For many good reasons I objected to the plan, as useless and involving a certain heavy loss and discouragement to the men, and eventually it was given up, a short bombardment being substituted for it, which was, I fear, not very useful either.
August 10th.
—Quiet night; but at 6·30 a.m. enemy opened, on the S.W. Bastion, with a gun which had been placed in position during the night in village opposite Shikarpore Gate. The shells fell short, doing no damage, and our artillery forced him to evacuate the position. Enemy appear to be busy throwing up entrenchments on Picquet Hill, also in a corner of the garden opposite S.W. Bastion. He threw some shells into the Citadel, one bursting in a room next to the Church. For the first time I had leisure, and went round and visited all the wounded officers and men, all doing well, though Major Iredell's wound is very serious. Threw some shells into enemy's work in front of S.W. Bastion. Effect not satisfactory, and the distance being only 400 yards, portions of the shells flew back over us, and one bit killed one of our mules. On going my rounds at 10 p.m. I heard decided indications of men at work in the village opposite the Shikarpore Gate, and also sounds of wheels (artillery), from which I judged the enemy were
throwing
up a battery there. Reinforced parties on walls, and remained expecting an attack all night, but none came.
August 11th.
—At daylight discovered that the village in front of my Gate has, as I anticipated, been much fortified since the previous evening, but were quite unable to discover where the battery, if there is one, is placed. Letters received for the first time from India, but only two in cypher, for General Primrose and Colonel St. John. By them we are informed that Sir F. Roberts left Kabul on the 7th, with a division to assist us—he cannot be here before the 1st of next month—and that General Phayre was doing all he could to gather a force to bring to our relief. He was at Quetta on the 6th, so it is unlikely that he either can arrive until the end of the month. Bombarded village in front of Shikarpore Gate with good effect.
August 12th.
—A quiet night. Being grouse-shooting day, we acted as grouse, and were heavily shot at as we had a large covering and working party out opposite the S.W. Bastion, in hopes of effecting some much wanted demolitions. The whole were under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Griffiths, 1st N.I., who, in my judgment, by no means made the most of his opportunities, and little or no work was done. The gardens which had to be taken were full of the enemy, who were, however, smartly driven out by the Fusiliers and 19th N.I., but owing to supports not being brought up, the enemy returned in force, and the position became untenable, unless we wished to precipitate a general action, which was undesirable. All sorts of wild reports were sent in of large gatherings of the enemy approaching, which I did not credit, but it was considered wiser to recall the parties, which was done, and all fell back under a fierce fire, during which many of our men fell. I was standing on the parapet, directing matters as far as I could, when I
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Gallant act of two R.E. Officers.
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witnessed, just 20 feet beneath me, a grand piece of gallantry on the part of two young R.E. Officers (Lieuts. Jones and Waller), who, under a galling fire, returned from safe cover and carried into safety a wounded sepoy, during which operation one of the men who was with them, a private of the 7th, was killed—shot through the head. I can personally testify to the hotness of the fire, and I have recommended both for the V. C., which I think they fully deserve. I am opposed altogether to these small fights which cost many lives and have but little results, but the next there is I shall, I think, take myself and try to make a better job of it than was done to-day.
August 13th.
—Quiet night and morning. Not a soul to be seen all round. After breakfast went on the Signal Tower to watch the effect of a few 40-pounder shells, which we were going to throw into the enemy's new camp, at 5,000 yards' range. The shots were excellent, and evidently created much consternation, but the enemy had evidently seen our group on the Signal Tower, and at once sent a 12-pounder shell at us, which went beyond the Tower, his second trial was short and went into the City, but his third shot was so far successful that he hit the lower part of the Tower. At 6 p.m. we shelled a Battery in Deh Khoja. The enemy replied briskly for ½ an hour, and then finding it too hot, shut up. On this occasion we used 7-pounder shells in the 9-pounder guns, to which they had been adapted by an ingenious contrivance of Major Caldecott. They proved a great success, and are a grand addition to our firing powers, as we have 1,100 of them in the Arsenal. On coming back to the walls after dinner I found a telegram from the Herat Gate, to say that large bodies of men were advancing with music, &c. Knowing the anxious nature of my friend in command there the information did not much excite me, and I waited till I could get down to the S.W. Bastion before deciding if any special measures were necessary. Getting there I heard the music (most discordant), and concluded it was in the Engineer Garden in our old Cantonments, and was merely the enemy having a musical evening. The fact that there was music was rather a proof that the enemy did not contemplate an attack. There were, no doubt, many people about, but on the whole I decided there was nothing at the moment worth turning out the Garrison for, so sent a re-assuring telegram to Head Quarters, which was justified by a quiet night.
Further attacks on the Shikapore Gate.
August 14th.
—At 6·30 the enemy opened a Battery on the Shikarpore Gate, to which we quickly replied, shutting him and his guns up in ½ an hour. A spy came in who reports our shells have created much damage among the enemy; also that they lost 60 men in the little affair of the 12th, among them Mahomed Azim Khan, Governor of Furrah, a very great man indeed. The spy says there is an Artillery Officer prisoner with Ayoub Khan, and that he is very well treated in every way; he also says that the enemy have 1,500 wounded now lying at Maiwand.
Here the Diary ends!