Chapter X · THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM, THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR (continued 2)
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In September, 1942, Speer arranged to bring this new source of labor within his jurisdiction. Speer convinced Hitler that significant production could be obtained only if the concentration camp prisoners were employed in factories under the technical control of the Speer Ministry instead of in camps. In fact, without Speer’s cooperation, it would have been difficult to utilize the prisoners on any large scale for war production since he would not allocate to Himmler the machine tools and other necessary equipment. Accordingly, it was agreed that the prisoners were to be exploited in factories under Speer’s control. To compensate Himmler for surrendering this jurisdiction to Speer, Speer proposed, and Hitler agreed, that Himmler would receive a share of the armaments output, fixed in relation to the man hours contributed by his prisoners. The minutes of Speer’s conference with Hitler on 20, 21, 22 September 1942, are as follows (R-124):
“* * * I pointed out to the Fuehrer that, apart from an insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament production in the concentration camps, because:
“1. the machine tools required are missing,
“2. there are no suitable premises.
“Both these assets would be available in the armaments industry, if use could be made of them by a second shift.
“The Fuehrer agrees to my proposal, that the numerous factories set up outside towns for ARP reasons, should release their workers for supplementing the second shift in town factories and should in return be supplied with labor from the concentration camps—also two shifts.
“I pointed out to the Fuehrer the difficulties which I expect to encounter if Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should be able, as he requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these factories. The Fuehrer, too, does not consider such an influence necessary.
“The Fuehrer however agrees that Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler should draw advantages from making his prisoners available; he should get equipment for his division.
“I suggest to give him a share in kind (war equipment) in ratio to the working hours done by his prisoners. A 3-5% share is discussed, the equipment also being calculated according to working hours. The Fuehrer would agree to such a solution.
“The Fuehrer is prepared to order the additional delivery of this equipment and weapons to the SS, according to a list submitted to him.” (R-124)
After a demand for concentration camp labor had been created, and a mechanism set up by Speer for exploiting this labor in armament factories, measures were evolved for increasing the supply of victims for extermination through work. A steady flow was assured by the agreement between Himmler and the Minister of Justice mentioned above. This was implemented by such programs as the following, expressed in Sauckel’s letter of 26 November 1942 to Presidents of Landes Employment Offices regarding the program for the evacuation of Poles from the Lublin district:
“The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure will be put into concentration camps and put to work where they are criminal or asocial elements.” (L-61)
General measures were supplemented by special drives for persons who would not otherwise have been sent to concentration camps. For example, for “reasons of war necessity” Himmler ordered on 17 December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be transferred immediately to concentration camps, (1063-D-PS). The order provided that:
“For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 14 December 1942 has ordered that until the end of January 1943, at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work, are to be sent to the concentration camps. In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:
“1. As of now (so far until 1 Feb. 1943) all eastern workers or such foreign workers who have been fugitives, or who have broken contracts, and who do not belong to allied, friendly or neutral States are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps * * *.
“2. The commanders and the commandants of the security police and the security service, and the chiefs of the State Police Headquarters will check immediately on the basis of a close and strict ruling
a. the prisons
b. the labor reformatory camps
“All prisoners qualified for work, if it is essentially and humanly possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, according to the following instructions, for instance also if penal procedures were to be established in the near future. Only such prisoners who in the interest of investigation procedures are to remain absolutely in solitary confinement can be left there.
“Every single laborer counts!” (1063-D-PS)
Measures were also adopted to insure that extermination through work was practiced with maximum efficiency. Subsidiary concentration camps were established near important war plants. Speer has admitted that he personally toured Upper Austria and selected sites for concentration camps near various munitions factories in the area. This admission appears in the transcript of an interrogation of Speer under oath on 18 October 1945, in which Speer stated:
“The fact that we were anxious to use workers from concentration camps in factories and to establish small concentration camps near the factories in order to use the manpower that was available there was a general fact. But it did not only come up in connection with this trip.” [i.e. Speer’s trip to Austria]. (3720-PS)
Goering endorsed this use of concentration camp labor and asked for more. In a teletype which Goering sent to Himmler on 14 February 1944, he stated:
“At the same time I ask you to put at my disposal as great a number of concentration camp (KZ-) convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work of this kind concentration camp (KZ-) convicts can be especially well concentrated at work and in the camp.” (1584-I-PS)
Speer subsequently assumed responsibility for this program, and Hitler promised Speer that if the necessary labor for the program could not be obtained, a hundred thousand Hungarian Jews would be brought in by the SS. Speer’s record of conferences with Hitler on April 6 and 7, 1944, contain the following quotation:
“* * * Suggested to the Fuehrer that, due to lack of builders and equipment, the second big building project should not be set up in German territory, but in close vicinity to the border on suitable soil (preferable on gravel base and with transport facilities) on French, Belgian or Dutch territory. The Fuehrer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set up behind a fortified zone. For the suggestion of setting this plant up in French territory speaks mainly the fact that it would be much easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless, the Fuehrer asks an attempt be made to set up the second works in a safer area, namely in the Protectorate. If it should prove impossible there, too, to get hold of the necessary workers, the Fuehrer himself will contact the Reichsfuehrer SS and will give an order that the required 100,000 men are to be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary. Stressing the fact that the building organization of the Industriegemeinschaft Schlesien Silesia was a failure, the Fuehrer demands that these works must be built by the O.T. exclusively and that the workers should be made available by the Reichsfuehrer SS. He wants to hold a meeting shortly in order to discuss details with all the men concerned.” (R-124)
The character of the treatment inflicted on Allied nationals and other victims of concentration camps while they were being worked to death is described in an official report prepared by a U.S. Congressional Committee which inspected the liberated camps at the request of General Eisenhower (L-159). The report states in part:
“* * * The treatment accorded to these prisoners in the concentration camps was generally as follows: They were herded together in some wooden barracks not large enough for one-tenth of their number. They were forced to sleep on wooden frames covered with wooden boards in tiers of two, three and even four, sometimes with no covering, sometimes with a bundle of dirty rags serving both as pallet and coverlet.
“Their food consisted generally of about one-half of a pound of black bread per day and a bowl of watery soup for noon and night, and not always that. Owing to the great numbers crowded into a small space and to the lack of adequate sustenance, lice and vermin multiplied, disease became rampant, and those who did not soon die of disease or torture began the long, slow process of starvation. Notwithstanding the deliberate starvation program inflicted upon these prisoners by lack of adequate food, we found no evidence that the people of Germany as a whole were suffering from any lack of sufficient food or clothing. The contrast was so striking that the only conclusion which we could reach was that the starvation of the inmates of these camps was deliberate.
“Upon entrance into these camps, newcomers were forced to work either at an adjoining war factory or were placed ‘in commando’ on various jobs in the vicinity, being returned each night to their stall in the barracks. Generally a German criminal was placed in charge of each ‘block’ or shed in which the prisoners slept. Periodically he would choose the one prisoner of his block who seemed the most alert or intelligent or showed the most leadership qualities. These would report to the guards’ room and would never be heard from again. The generally-accepted belief of the prisoners was that these were shot or gassed or hanged and then cremated. A refusal to work or an infraction of the rules usually meant flogging and other types of torture, such as having the fingernails pulled out, and in each case usually ended in death after extensive suffering. The policies herein described constituted a calculated and diabolical program of planned torture and extermination on the part of those who were in control of the German Government * * *.”
* * * * * *
“On the whole, we found this camp to have been operated and administered much in the same manner as Buchenwald had been operated and managed. When the efficiency of the workers decreased as a result of the conditions under which they were required to live, their rations were decreased as punishment. This brought about a vicious circle in which the weak became weaker and were ultimately exterminated.” (L-159)
Such was the cycle of work, torture, starvation and death for concentration camp labor—labor which Goering, while requesting that more of it be placed at his disposal, said had proved very useful; labor which Speer was “anxious” to use in the factories under his control.
8. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL
Sauckel bears special responsibility for the Nazi slave labor program and the manner in which it was executed. Sauckel was appointed as Plenipotentiary General for Manpower because he was an old and trusted Nazi. He has certified, on 17 November 1945, that he held the following positions:
“1. Member of Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (1925-1945). (Member of National Socialist German Workers Party. Member No. 1395.)
2. Member of Reichstag (Mitglied des Reichstags) (1933-1945).
3. Gauleiter of Thuringia (1927-1945).
4. Member of Thuringian legislature (Landtag) (1927-1933/34).
5. Minister of Interior and head of Thuringian State Ministry (May 1933).
6. Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia (1933-1945).
7. SA Obergruppenfuehrer (November 1937-1945).
8. SS Obergruppenfuehrer (January 1942-1945).
9. Administrator Berlin-Suhler Waffen & Fahrzeugwerke (1935).
10. Head of Gustloff-Werke Nationalsozialistische Industrie-Stiftung (1936). Honorary Head of Foundation.
11. General Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation (Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz) (21 March 1942-1945).” (2974-PS)
Sauckel’s official responsibilities are borne out by other evidence. His appointment as Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower was effected by a decree of 21 March 1942 signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Keitel. By that decree (1666-PS) Sauckel was given authority as well as responsibility subordinate only to that of Hitler and Goering for all matters relating to recruitment, allocation, and handling of foreign and domestic manpower. Goering, to whom Sauckel was directly responsible, abolished the recruitment and allocation agencies for the Four Year Plan, delegated their powers to Sauckel and placed his far-reaching authority, as deputy for the Four Year Plan, at Sauckel’s disposal. This was the result of Goering’s decree dated 27 March 1942 (1666-PS) and providing as follows:
“In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, 179), I decree as follows:
“1. My manpower sections (Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz) are hereby abolished (circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St M. Dev. 265). Their duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor conditions (Arbeitsbedingungen)) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.
“2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the Reich Territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.
“3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws required to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.
“4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated organisms and also the Reich Protector, the General Governor, the Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance a report is to be submitted to me in advance.” (1666-PS)
By a Hitler decree of 30 September 1942 Sauckel was given extraordinary powers over the civil and military authorities of the territories occupied by Germany. The decree (1903-PS) provided as follows:
“I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Reich-governor and district leader (Gauleiter) Fritz Sauckel to take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree referring to a Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 21 March 1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt, I, page 179) according to his own judgment in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorate, and in the Government General (General-gouvernement) as well as in the occupied territories, measures which will safeguard under all circumstances the regulated deployment of labor (Geordneter Arbeitseinsatz) for the German war-economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners (Beauftragte) to the bureaux of the military and civilian administration. These are subordinated directly to Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz. In order to carry out their tasks, they are entitled to issue directives to the competent military and civilian authorities in charge of the Arbeitseinsatz and of wage-policy.
“More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz.
“Fuehrer-Headquarters, 30 Sept. 1942.
“The Fuehrer
“(signed) Adolph Hitler.” (1903-PS)
Within a month after his appointment, Sauckel sent Rosenberg his “Labor Mobilization Program”, which might more appropriately be termed Sauckel’s “Charter of Enslavement.” This program envisaged the forcible recruitment and the maximum exploitation of the entire labor resources of the conquered areas and of prisoners of war in the interests of the Nazi war machine, at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure to the German State. Sauckel explained his plans in these terms:
“It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous number of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that purpose are the occupied territories of the East. Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of the Conquered Soviet Territory to the fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.
“Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied territories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or unskilled male and female labor from the Soviet territory from the age of 15 up for the labor mobilization * * *.”
* * * * * *
“The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has become an undisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of labor program in this war.” (016-PS)
Sauckel proceeded to implement this “Charter of Enslavement” with certain basic directives. In Regulation No. 4, which he issued on 7 May 1942, Sauckel provided that if voluntary recruitment of foreign workers was unsuccessful, compulsory service should be instituted. This regulation provides:
“The recruitment of foreign labor will be done on the fundamental basis of volunteering. Where, however, in the occupied territories the appeal for volunteers does not suffice, obligatory service and drafting must, under all circumstances, be resorted to. This is an indisputable requirement of our labor situation.” (3044-PS)
Sauckel provided also for the allocation of foreign labor in the order of its importance to the Nazi war machine. Sauckel’s regulation No. 10 of 22 August 1942 had these aims:
“* * * 3. The resources of manpower that are available in the occupied territories are to be employed primarily to satisfy the requirements of importance for the war, in Germany itself. In allocating the said labor resources in the Occupied Territories, the following order of priority will be observed:
“(a) Labor required for the troops, the occupation authorities, and the civil authorities;
“(b) Labor required for the German armaments (Ruestungen);
“(c) Labor required for food and agriculture;
“(d) Labor required for industrial work other than armaments, which is in the interest of Germany;
“(e) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of the population of the territory in question.” (3044-A-PS)
Sauckel and agencies subordinate to him exercised exclusive authority over the recruitment of workers from every area in Europe occupied by, controlled by, or friendly to the German nation. Sauckel affirmed this authority in the following decree:
“The recruitment of foreign labor in the areas occupied by Germany, in allied, friendly or neutral states will be carried out exclusively by my commissioners, or by the competent German military or civil agencies for the tasks of labor mobilization.”
* * * * * *
“For the carrying out of recruitment in allied, friendly or neutral foreign countries, my commissioners are solely responsible.” (3044-PS)
Sauckel participated in the formulation of overall labor requirements for Germany and assigned quotas to be filled by and with the assistance of the individuals and agencies mentioned above, with knowledge that force and brutality were the only means whereby his demands could be met. Thus, the Lammer’s report states (1292-PS):
“1. A conference took place with the Fuehrer today which was attended by:
“The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor Gauleiter Sauckel,
“The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel, General Field Marshal Milch,
“The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture State Secretary Backe,
“The Minister of the Interior, Reichfuehrer SS Himmler, and myself.
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the Conference, but the Fuehrer did not wish their attendance.)
“The Fuehrer declared in his introductory remarks:
‘I want a clear picture:
(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of German War Economy?
(a) For the maintenance of present output?
(b) To increase its output?
(2) How many workers can be obtained from Occupied Countries, or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means (increased output)? For one thing, it is this matter of making up for losses by death, infirmity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so forth, and further it is a matter of procuring additional workers.’
“The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers, he would have to add at least 2½ but probably 3 million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off. Reichsminister Speer declared that he needs an additional 1.3 million laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this not be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of additional workers from Occupied Territory would, however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who are already working in France in industries mentioned above, must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuehrer agreed with the opinions of Reichsminister Speer and emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor should order no circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied territories, because such a shift of workers would only cause disturbance of production in occupied countries.
“The Fuehrer further called attention to the fact that at least 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna alone, 2,000-2,500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor must add at least 4 million workers to the manpower pool, considering that he requires 2½ million workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers, and that the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.”
* * * * * *
“The Reichsfuehrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder. The Reichsfuehrer SS made immediately available 2,000 to 2,500 men from concentration camps for air raid preparations in Vienna.”
* * * * * *
“Results of the Conference:
“(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.” (1292-PS)
Moreover, Sauckel, in requesting the assistance of the Army for the recruitment of 1,000,000 men and women from the occupied Eastern territories, informed Keitel that prompt action was required; and that, as in all other occupied countries, pressure had to be used if other measures were not successful (3012-PS). Finally, Sauckel was informed by Rosenberg that the enslavement of foreign labor was achieved by force and brutality (018-PS). Notwithstanding his knowledge of conditions, Sauckel continued to request greater supplies of manpower from the areas in which the most ruthless methods had been applied. Indeed, when German Field Commanders on the Eastern Front attempted to resist Sauckel’s demands, because forced recruitment was swelling the ranks of the partisans and making the army’s task more difficult, Sauckel sent a telegram to Hitler, dated 10 March 1943, in which he implored him to intervene:
“Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor * * *.”
* * * * * *
“If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not possible any more, then the German war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent.” (407-II-PS)
In addition to being responsible for the recruitment of foreign civilian labor by force, Sauckel was responsible for the conditions under which foreign workers were deported to Germany and for the treatment to which they were subjected within Germany. The conditions under which Sauckel’s slaves were transported to Germany, were known to Sauckel (2241-PS). Moreover, he accepted responsibility for these conditions. Regulation Number 4 of 7 May 1942, issued by Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for the Mobilization of Labor, deals with recruitment, care, lodging, feeding, and treatment of foreign workers of both sexes (3044-PS). By this decree, Sauckel expressly directed that the assembly and operation of rail transports and the supplying of food therefor was the responsibility of his agents until the transports arrived in Germany. By the same regulation, Sauckel directed that within Germany the care of foreign industrial workers was to be carried out by the German Labor Front and that care of foreign agricultural workers was to be carried out by the Reich Food Administration. By the terms of the regulation, Sauckel reserved for himself ultimate responsibility for all aspects of care, treatment, lodging, and feeding of foreign workers while in transit to and within Germany. The regulation reads (3044-PS):
“The care of foreign labor will be carried out.
“a. up to the Reichs border “by my commissioners or—in the occupied areas by the competent military or civil labor mobilization agencies. Care of the labor will be carried out in cooperation with the respective competent foreign organization.
“b. Within the area of the Reich “1. By the German Labor Front in the cases of non-agricultural workers. “2. By the Reich Food administration in the case of agricultural workers. “The German Labor Front and the German Food Administration are bound by my directives in the carrying out of their tasks of caring for the workers.
“The agencies of the labor mobilization administration are to give far-reaching support to the German Labor Front and the German Food Administration in the fulfillment of their assigned tasks.
“My competence for the execution of the care of foreign labor is not prejudiced by the assignment of these tasks to the German Labor Front and the Reichs Food Administration.”
* * * * * *
“b. Composition and operation of the transports.
“The composition and operations of the transports up to the place of work is the task of my representatives, in the occupied territories of the labor mobilization agencies of the military and civil administration. In the countries in which foreign representatives are to direct the transports up to the frontier, the German recruiting agency must take part in the supervision and care of the transports.”
* * * * * *
“c. Supply for the Transports.
“The food supply for the industrial workers in transit within the Reich, is the duty of the (DAF) German workers front, office for labor mobilization.
For the rest, my offices effect the supply for the transport.” (3044-PS)
Sauckel, in an agreement with Ley, the head of the German Labor Front (DAF) dated 2 June 1943, again emphasized his ultimate responsibility by creating a central inspectorate charged with examining the working and living conditions of foreign workers, and reporting thereon to Sauckel’s agency (1913-PS). The agreement reads in part as follows:
“* * * 2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationleiter Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a ‘central inspection’ for the continuous supervision of all measures concerning the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the designation:
‘Central inspection for care of foreign workers.’
“The central inspection for the care of foreign workers exercises its functions upon directives and in the name of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz and of the Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front. In order to avoid all duplication of work, it will be its sole responsibility, to scrutinize all measures taken for the care of foreign workers employed in the factories and camps, also to remove immediately all defects discovered—as far as possible—on the spot and to issue the necessary instructions for this.
“The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state employment offices to get direct information on the conditions regarding the employment of foreigners in the factories and camps, will remain untouched.
“3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will be continuously in touch with the main office VI of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz. It will instruct the office on the general observations made and will make suggestions for changes, if that should become necessary.
“4. The offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz will be constantly informed by the ‘central inspection for the care of foreign workers’ of its observations, in particular immediately in each case in which action of State organizations seems to be necessary.” (1913-PS)
Sauckel was also responsible for compelling citizens of the occupied countries against their will to manufacture implements of war for use in operations against their own country and its allies. These functions were included in the terms of Sauckel’s appointment. (1666-PS)
In a series of reports to Hitler, Sauckel described how successful he had been in carrying out his program. One such report, dated 14 April 1943, states that in a single year Sauckel had incorporated 1,622,829 prisoners of war into the German economy:
“My Fuehrer,
* * * * * *
“1. After having been active as Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz for one year I have the honor to report to you that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to the German war economy between April 1st. of the last year and March 31st of this year.”
* * * * * *
“Besides the foreign civilian workers another 1,622,829 prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.” (407-V-PS)
A subsequent report dated 3 June 1943, states that 846,511 additional foreign laborers and prisoners of war were incorporated into the German war industry:
“My Fuehrer:
“1. I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the Arbeitseinsatz for the first five months of 1943. For the first time the following number of new foreign laborers and prisoners of war were employed in the German war industry: * * * Total: 846,511”. (407-IX-PS)
9. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL CONSPIRATORS
In addition, the following conspirators who were informed by Sauckel of the quotas of foreign laborers which he required, collaborated with Sauckel and his agents in filling these quotas:
A. Keitel, Chief of the OKW.
The record of a telephone conversation of the Chief of the Economic Staff East of the German Army, dated 11 March 1943, reads in part as follows (3012-PS):
“The plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype, that the Arbeitseinsatz in German agriculture as well as all the most urgent armament programs, ordered by the Fuehrer, make the most rapid procurement of approx. 1 million women and men from the newly occupied territories an imperative necessity. For this purpose, Gauleiter Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000 workers daily beginning 15 March, 10,000 workers male and female beginning 1 April from the newly occupied territories.
“The daily quota of 5,000 (10,000) workers was distributed with the consent of the GBA as follows:
Reich Commissioner Ukraine daily 3,000 (6,000) workers.
Wl Jn South daily 1,000 (2,000) workers.
Wl Jn Center daily 500 (1,000) workers.
Commissioner General White Ruthenia daily 500 (1,000) workers.
“In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers, which occurred in German war industry because of the developments of the past months, it is now necessary, that the recruiting of workers be taken up again everywhere with all emphasis. The tendency momentarily noticeable in that territory, to limit and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program is absolutely not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gauleiter Sauckel, who is informed about these events, has because of this, turned immediately to General Fieldmarshal Keitel on 10 March 1943, in a teletype, and has emphasized on this occasion, that, as in all other occupied territories, there, where all other methods fail, by order of the Fuehrer a certain pressure must be used.” (3012-PS)
Confirmation of Keitel’s collaboration with Sauckel is also found in the transcript of an interrogation under oath of Sauckel held on the morning of 5 October 1945:
“Q. Was it necessary in order to accomplish the completion of the quotas given to have liaison with the OKW?
“A. I remember that the Fuehrer had given directives to Marshal Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important one, and I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such discussions with the Fuehrer, when I asked him for his support.
“Q. It was his task to supervise the proper performance of the military commanders in the occupied countries in carrying out their missions, was it not?
“A. Yes, the Fuehrer had told me that he would inform the Chief of the OKW, and the Chief of the Reichs chancellery, as to these missions. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.” (3722-PS)
B. Alfred Rosenberg, Reichs Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
The following colloquy is taken from the transcript of an interrogation under oath of Alfred Rosenberg on the afternoon of 6 October 1945:
“Q. Isn’t it a fact, that Sauckel would allocate to the various areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be obtained for labor purposes?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And that thereafter, your agents would obtain that labor, in order to meet the quota which had been given; isn’t that right?
“A. Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which one couldn’t fulfill unless one looked very closely into the matter.
“Q. Never mind about Sauckel’s desires being far-reaching or not being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it. You were given quotas for the areas over which you had jurisdiction, and it was up to you to meet that quota?
“A. Yes; it was the responsibility of the administrative officials to receive this quota and to distribute the allotments over the districts in such a way, according to number and according to the age groups, so they would be most reasonably met.
“Q. These administrative officials were part of your organization, isn’t that right?
“A. They were functionaries or officials of the Reichskommissar for the Ukraine, but, as such, they were placed in their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories.” (3719-PS)
Corroboration is to be found in letters written by Sauckel to Rosenberg requesting the latter’s assistance in the recruitment of additional foreign laborers. (017-PS; 019-PS)
C. Seyss-Inquart, Reichscommissar for the Occupied Netherlands.
The transcript of an interrogation under oath of Sauckel on the morning of 5 October 1945, reads in part, as follows:
“Q. For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland. It is my understanding that the quotas for the workers from Holland were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to the Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that correct?
“A. Yes, that is correct.
“Q. After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives; was it not?
“A. Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do and the same applied to other countries.” (3722-PS)
D. Frank, Governor-General of the Government-General of Poland.
The transcript of interrogation under oath of Sauckel on the morning of 5 October 1945 reveals the part played by Frank:
“Q. Was the same procedure substantially followed of allocating quotas in the General Government Poland?
“A. Yes. I have to basically state again that the only possibility I had in carrying through these missions was to get in touch with the highest German military authority in the respective country and to transfer to them the orders of the Fuehrer and ask them very urgently, as I have always done, to fulfill these orders.
“Q. Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the General Governor Frank?
“A. Yes. I spent a morning and afternoon in Krakov twice or three times, and I personally spoke to General Governor Frank. Naturally, there was also present Secretary Dr. Goebble.” (3722-PS)
E. The SS, as in all matters involving the use of force and brutality, extended its assistance.
This is clearly indicated in Reichschancellor Lammers’ report of a conference with Hitler attended by, among others, Sauckel, Speer, and Himmler (the Reichsfuehrer SS). The conference proceeded as follows:
“The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain these workers. Until now, he has always kept his promises as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his powers to furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends primarily on what German enforcement agents will be made available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement agents. The Reichsfuehrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder.” (1292-PS)
10. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SPEER
The use of prisoners of war in the manufacture of arms and munitions, allocated thereto by Sauckel, was confirmed by Speer. Speer stated in an interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945 that 40% of all prisoners of war were employed in the production of weapons and munitions and in subsidiary industries:
“* * * A. In the last phase of production, that is, in the year 1944 when everything collapsed, I had 40% of all prisoners of war employed in the production. I wanted to have this percentage increased.
“Q. And when you say employed in the production, you mean in these subsidiary industries that you have discussed and also in the production of weapons and munitions, is that right?
“A. Yes. That is the total extent of my task.” (3720-PS)
The minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Central Planning Board, of 22 April 1943, report Speer’s statement that:
“* * * 90,000 Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole of the armament industry are for the greatest part skilled men.” (R-124)
Speer actively participated in the planning and execution of the vast program of forcible deportation and enslavement of the citizens of the occupied countries. As Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and Chief of the Organization Todt, both of which positions he acquired on 15 February 1942, and by virtue of his later acquisition of control over the armament offices of the Army, Navy and Airforce and the production offices of the Ministry of Economics, Speer was responsible for the entire war production of the Reich, as well as for the construction of fortifications and installations for the Wehrmacht. Proof of the positions held by Speer is supplied by his signed statement. (2980-PS)
The industries under Speer’s control were the most important users of manpower in Germany. According to Sauckel, Speer’s labor requirements received unconditional priority over all other demands for labor. In an interrogation under oath on 22nd September 1945, Sauckel stated:
“The others I only got whatever was left. Because Speer told me once in the presence of the Fuehrer that I am here to work for Speer and that mainly I am his man.” (3721-PS)
Speer has admitted under oath that he participated in the discussions during which the decision to use foreign forced labor was made, that he concurred in the decision, and that it was the basis for the program of bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion. The transcript of the interrogation under oath of Speer, on 18 October 1945, contains the following colloquy:
“Q. But is it clear to you Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the decisions were being taken concerning the use of forced foreign labor that you participated in the discussions yourself?
“A. Yes.
“Q. So that I take it that the execution of the program of bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been taken with your agreement?
“A. Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of the manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made available to me; a far larger part of it was allocated to other departments that demanded them.” (3720-PS)
This admission is confirmed by minutes of Speer’s conferences with Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 (R-124). In these meetings Speer related the outcome of negotiations concerning the forcible recruitment of a million Russian laborers for the German armaments industry, and stated that Hitler would agree to any necessary compulsion.
The use of force was again discussed by Hitler and Speer on 4 January 1943. It was decided that stronger measures were to be used to accelerate the conscription of French civilian workers. (556-13-PS).
Speer demanded foreign workers for the industries under his control and used these workers with the knowledge that they had been deported by force and were being compelled to work. Speer has stated under oath, in an interrogation on 18 October 1945 that:
“I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny the fact that I demanded manpower and foreign manpower from Sauckel very energetically.” (3720-PS)
Speer also admitted, in the course of the same interrogation, that he knew he was obtaining foreign labor, a large part of which was forced labor:
“Q. So that during the period when you were asking for labor, it seems clear, does it not, that you knew that you were obtaining foreign labor as well as domestic labor in response to your requests and that a large part of the foreign labor was forced labor.
“A. Yes.
“Q. So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on January 1, 1944 you required 50,000 workers for a given purpose, would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, knowing that in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers?
“A. Yes.” (3720-PS)
Speer has furthermore stated under oath that he knew at least as early as September 1942 that workers from the Ukraine were being forcibly deported for labor in Germany. He also knew that the great majority of the workers of the Western occupied countries were slave laborers forced against their will to come to Germany. These facts are revealed in his interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945:
“Q. When did you first find out then that some of the manpower from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily?
“A. It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that at some particular point of time that the manpower from the Ukraine did not come voluntarily.
“Q. And does that apply also to the manpower from other occupied countries, that is, did there come a time when you knew that they were not coming voluntarily?
“A. Yes.
“Q. When, in general, would you say that time was, without placing a particular month of the year?
“A. As far as the Ukraine situation goes, I believe that they did not come voluntarily any more after a few months, because immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I should say offhand that this time was either in July, August or September of 1942.
* * * * * *
“Q. But many workers did come from the West, did they not, to Germany?
“A. Yes.
“Q. That means then that the great majority of the workers that came from the Western countries, the Western occupied countries, came against their will to Germany.
“A. Yes.” (3720-PS)
This admission is borne out by other evidence. In April 1943 Speer was informed at a meeting of the Central Planning Board, that in all countries conscription for work in Germany could be carried out only with the active assistance of the police, and that the prevailing methods of recruitment had provoked such violence that many German recruiting agents had been killed (R-124). Again, at a meeting with Hitler to discuss overall manpower requirements for 1944, Speer was informed by Sauckel that labor requirements for the German war economy (including Speer’s requirements of 1,300,000 additional laborers) could be met only if German enforcement agents were furnished to carry out the enslavement program in the occupied countries. (1292-PS)
Notwithstanding his knowledge that foreign workers were being conscripted and deported for use as slave laborers in Germany, Speer formulated requirements for the foreign workers and requested their allocation to industries subject to his control. At another meeting of the Central Planning Board, Speer stated:
“Speer: Now, the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is still possible to transfer some from the western territories. The Fuehrer stated only recently he wishes to dissolve these foreign volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups were carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if we cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call a meeting with the Fuehrer to clear up the coal situation. Keitel and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order to determine the number of Russians from the rear army territories who can be sent to us. However, I see another possibility; we might organize another drive to screen out workers for the mines from the Russian Ps/W in the Reich. But this possibility is none too promising.” (R-124)
At another meeting of the Central Planning Board, Speer rejected a suggestion that labor for industries under his control be furnished from German sources instead of from foreign countries, for these reasons:
“Speer: We do it that way: Kehrl collects the demands for labor necessary to complete the coal-and-iron-plan and communicates the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a conference at the Reich Marshal’s in the next week, and an answer from Sauckel should have arrived by then. The question of recruitment for the armaments industry will be solved together with Weger.
“Kehrl: I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should not be made dependent on the recruitment of men abroad. We were completely frustrated these last three months because this principle had been applied. We ended December with a deficit of 25,000 and we never get replacements. The number must be made up by men from Germany.
“Speer: No, nothing doing!” (R-124)
Speer also advocated terror and brutality as a means of maximizing production by slave laborers who worked in the industries under his control. In the course of a discussion concerning the supply and exploitation of labor, Speer stated:
“Speer: We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that the sick list decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in factories where doctors are on the staff who are examining the sick men. There is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen several times and the news will soon go round.” (R-124)
Speer is also guilty of compelling Allied nationals and prisoners of war to engage not only in the production of armaments and munitions, but also in direct military operations, against their own country and its actively resisting allies. Speer, as Chief of the Organization Todt, is accountable for its policies which were in direct conflict with the laws of war. The Organization Todt, in violation of the laws of war, impressed allied nationals into its service. Proof of its activity is furnished by an International Labor Office Study of Exploitation of Foreign Labor by Germany:
“The methods used for the recruitment of foreign workers who were destined for employment in the Organization did not greatly differ from the methods used for the recruitment of foreigners for deportation to Germany. The main difference was that, since the principal activities of the Organization lay outside the frontiers of Germany, foreigners were not transported to Germany, but had either to work in their own country or in some other occupied territory.
“In the recruitment drives for foreign workers for the Organization methods of compulsion as well as methods of persuasion were used, the latter usually with very little result * * *.” (L-191)
Similar violations of the laws of warfare are disclosed in (407-VIII-PS).
As Chief of German war production, Speer sponsored and approved the use of prisoners of war in the production of armaments and munitions which were used against their own country and its actively resisting allies. This fact has been demonstrated by the evidence already discussed. To recapitulate:
1. After Speer assumed responsibility for armament production, his primary concern in his discussions with his co-conspirators was to secure a larger allocation of prisoners of war for his armament factories. In a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 22 April 1943, Speer complained that only 30% of the Russian prisoners of war were engaged in the armament industry. (R-124)
2. In an earlier speech, Speer stated that 10,000 prisoners of war were put at the disposal of the armaments industry upon his orders. (1435-PS)
3. Finally, Speer advocated returning escaped prisoners of war to factories as convicts. He said, at a meeting of the Central Planning Board:
“We have to come to an arrangement with the Reichsfuehrer SS as soon as possible so that prisoners of war he picks up are made available for our purposes. The Reichsfuehrer SS gets from 30 to 40,000 men per month. First of all they have to be divided up. From what classes do these people come, anyhow? There certainly is a certain percentage of miners among these people who are picked up. These few thousand men have to go to the mines automatically. Certainly, some educational work has to be done. The men should be put into the factories as convicts. But they have to return to the factories where they were before * * *.” (R-124)
Speer is also guilty of having approved and sponsored the program for using concentration camp labor in Nazi armament factories, which was part of the larger program of extermination through work. The proof of this activity may be summarized and supplemented as follows:
1. Speer proposed measures for the exploitation of the concentration camp labor in armament factories under his jurisdiction. At a meeting with Hitler Speer proposed and Hitler agreed that armament production should not be established within concentration camps but that concentration camp labor should be made available to established armament factories. (R-124)
2. Speer, by arranging for the use of concentration camp laborers in factories under his control, created an increasing demand for such labor. This demand was filled in part by placing in concentration camps persons who would not ordinarily have been sent there. (1063-D-PS)
3. Speer participated in the exploitation of the victims of the Nazi program of extermination through work. He personally selected sites for subsidiary concentration camps which were established near factories in Upper Austria, and knew and approved of the general practice of locating concentration camps near industrial plants which they supplied with labor (Speer’s interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945. (3720-PS)
Speer visited the concentration camp Mauthaussen and factories such as those of Krupp, where concentration camp labor was exploited under barbarous conditions. Despite personal and first-hand knowledge of these conditions, Speer continued to direct the use of concentration camp labor in factories under his jurisdiction. In Speer’s interrogation under oath on 18 October 1945, he stated:
“Q. But, in general, the use of concentration camp labor was known to you and approved by you as a source of labor?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates of the concentration camps there were both Germans and foreigners?
“A. I didn’t think about it at that time.
“Q. As a matter of fact you visited the Austrian concentration camp personally, did you not?”
“A. I didn’t—well I was in Mauthaussen once but at that time I was not told just to what categories the inmates of the concentration camps belonged.
“Q. But in general everybody knew, did they not, that foreigners who were taken away by the Gestapo, or arrested by the Gestapo, as well as Germans, found their way into the concentration camps?
“A. Of course, yes. I didn’t mean to imply anything like that.”
* * * * * *
“Q. Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of Krupp for foreign labor?
“A. It is certain that it was reported to me what Krupp had in foreign workers.
“Q. Did you ever discuss it with any of the members of the Krupp first?
“A. I cannot say that exactly, but during the time of my activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and it is certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of manpower.” (3720-PS)
LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM, THE ILLEGAL USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SAUCKEL AND SPEER THEREFOR
DocumentDescriptionVol.Page
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6 (b, c).I5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections III; VIII (B, C, H); X; Appendix A.I15, 39, 41, 50,
3737-PSHague Convention of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Articles 6, 46, 52.VI590, 597, 598
3738-PSGeneva Convention of 1929 relative to treatment of Prisoners of War, Articles 2, 3, 6.VI600, 601
—————
Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.
—————
*016-PSSauckel’s Labor Mobilization Program, 20 April 1942. (USA 168)III46
*017-PSLetter from Sauckel to Reichminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 5 October 1942, concerning mobilization of foreign labor forces. (USA 180)III60
*018-PSLetter from Rosenberg to Sauckel, 21 December 1942, concerning labor in the East. (USA 186)III61
*019-PSLetter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 17 March 1943, concerning draft of workers from the East. (USA 181)III65
*031-PSMemorandum, 12 June 1944, concerning evacuation of youths from the territory of Army Group “Center”, and interoffice memorandum, Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories, 14 June 1944. (USA 171)III71
*054-PSReport to Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories, 7 October 1942, concerning treatment of Ukrainian Specialists. (USA 198)III90
*084-PSInterdepartmental report of Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 September 1942, concerning status of Eastern laborers. (USA 199)III130
*204-PSMemorandum of conference,
18 February 1944, concerning release of Indigenous Labor for purposes of the Reich. (USA 182)III215
*254-PSLetter from Raab to Reichminister for Occupied Eastern Territories, 7 June 1944, concerning burning of houses in Wassilkow district. (USA 188)III231
*265-PSMemorandum of oral report by Lyser to Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on situation in district Shitomir. (USA 191)III234
*290-PSLetter from Rosenberg Ministry, 12 November 1943, concerning burning of houses in Mueller’s district. (USA 189)III240
*294-PSTop secret memorandum signed by Brautigam, 25 October 1942, concerning conditions in Russia. (USA 185)III242
*407-II-PSLetter from Sauckel to Hitler, 10 March 1943, concerning difficulty in recruiting of workers in former Soviet territories. (USA 226)III389
*407-V
and VI-PSLetter from Sauckel to Hitler, 15 April 1943, concerning labor questions. (USA 209; USA 228)III391
*407-VIII-PSTelegram from Sauckel to Hitler, 17 May 1943, concerning foreign labor. (USA 210)III394
*407-IX-PSLetter from Sauckel to Hitler, 3 June 1943, concerning foreign labor situation. (USA 229)III395
*556-2-PSOrder initialled by Keitel, 8 September 1942, for civilians to work on “West Wall”. (USA 194)III443
*556-13-PSSauckel note for the files, 5 January 1943. (USA 194)III444
*654-PSThierack’s notes, 18 September 1942, on discussion with Himmler concerning delivery of Jews to Himmler for extermination through work. (USA 218)III467
*1063-D-PSMueller’s order, 17 December 1942, concerning prisoners qualified for work to be sent to concentration camps. (USA 219)III778
*1130-PSNote, 11 April 1943, and report of speech by Koch in Kiev on 5 March 1943, concerning treatment of civilian population in Ukraine. (USA 169)III797
*1206-PSNotes of Goering’s remarks at the Air Ministry, 7 November 1941, concerning employment of laborers in war industries. (USA 215)III841
*1292-PSMemorandum of conference with Hitler, 4 January 1944, concerning allocation of labor, 1944. (USA 225)III866
*1352-PSReports concerning the confiscation of Polish agricultural properties, 16 and 29 May 1940, signed Kusche. (USA 176)III916
*1375-PSLetter from Frank to Goering, 25 January 1940. (USA 172)III925
1381-PSSecret report of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories on Political and Economic Situation in these Territories, December 1942.III932
*1435-PSSpeech of Speer to Gauleiters, 24 February 1942. (USA 216)IV16
*1526-PSLetter from Ukrainian Main Committee to Frank, February 1943. (USA 178)IV79
*1584-I-PSTeletype from Goering to Himmler, 14 February 1944, concerning formation of 7th Airforce Group squadron for special purposes. (USA 221)IV117
*1666-PSDecree appointing Sauckel General Plenipotentiary for Manpower, 21 March 1942 and decree of Goering conferring certain powers on Sauckel, 27 March 1942. 1942 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, pp. 179-180. (USA 208)IV182
*1702-PSReport on evacuation of Kasatin November-December 1943. (USA 193)IV205
*1726-PSStatement of Netherlands Government in view of Prosecution and punishment of the German Nazi War Criminals. (USA 195)IV227
*1742-PSDirectives to Army Commands from Goering, 26 October 1942, concerning combatting of partisan activities. (USA 789)IV262
*1903-PSDecree of Fuehrer on execution of decree concerning Deputy General for mobilization of labor. Decrees, Regulations, Announcements, Vol. II, p. 510. (USA 206)IV546
*1913-PSAgreement between Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz and German Labor Front concerning care of non-German workers. 1943 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 588. (USA 227)IV547
*1919-PSHimmler’s speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA 170)IV558
*2220-PSLammers report to Himmler, 12 April 1943, concerning the situation in the Government General. (USA 175)IV855
*2233-A-PSFrank Diary, Abteilungsleitersitzungen, 1939-1940. Minutes of conferences, December and May 1940. (USA 173)IV883
*2233-B-PSFrank Diary. Tagebuch. 1940. Part I. January-March. (USA 174)IV885
*2241-PSSauckel Order, 20 July 1942, concerning employment of foreign labor forces in Germany. (USA 200)IV923
*2280-PSLetter from Reichs Commissar for Ostland, 3 May 1943, concerning recruiting of manpower in Baltic Countries for Reich territories. (USA 183)IV969
*2520-PSAffidavit of Edward L. Deuss, 1 November 1945, concerning approximate number of foreigners put to work for German War Effort in Old Reich. (USA 197)V257
*2974-PSStatement by Fritz Sauckel concerning positions held. (USA 15)V680
*2980-PSStatement of Albert Speer, concerning positions held. (USA 18)V685
*3000-PSReport, from Chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk to Reicke, 28 June 1943, on experiences in political and economic problems in the East, particularly White Ruthenia. (USA 192)V726
*3003-PSReport of Lt. Haupt concerning the situation of war economy in Netherlands. (USA 196)V726
*3005-PSLetter from Reich Labor Ministry to Presidents of Regional Labor Offices, 26 August 1941, concerning use of Russian PWs. (USA 213)V727
*3010-PSSecret organization order from Economic Inspection South, 17 August 1943, concerning recruitment of Workers for the Reich. (USA 184)V728
*3012-PSOrder signed Christiansen, 19 March 1943, to all group leaders of Security Service, and record of telephone conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March 1943. (USA 190)V731
*3040-PSSecret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 February 1942, concerning commitment of manpower from the East. (USA 207)V744
*3044-PSSauckel Order Number 4, 7 May 1942, published in Decrees, Regulations, Announcements. (USA 206)V756
3044-A-PSSauckel Order Number 10, 22 August 1942, published in Decrees, Regulations, Announcements.V764
3044-B-PSInstructions concerning Eastern Household workers, published in Decrees, Regulations, Announcements.V765
3057-PSStatement of Fritz Sauckel, 5 September 1945.V853
**3719-PSTestimony of Alfred Rosenberg, 6 October 1945. (USA 187) (Referred to but not offered in evidence.)VI436
*3720-PSTestimony of Albert Speer, 18 October 1945. (USA 220)VI438
*3721-PSTestimony of Fritz Sauckel, 22 September 1945. (USA 230)VI458
*3722-PSTestimony of Fritz Sauckel, 5 October 1945. (USA 224)VI459
*3787-PSReport of the Second Meeting of the Reich Defense Council, 25 June 1939. (USA 782)VI718
*3819-PSLetter from Sauckel to Fuehrer, 17 March 1944; letter from Speer to Fuehrer, 5 April 1944; and Minutes of conference on 11 July 1944 concerning Labor Problem. (GB 306)VI760
*D-288Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Jaeger, 15 October 1945. (USA 202)VII2
D-305Affidavit of Heinrich Buschhauer, 5 October 1945.VII13
*D-316Memorandum to Mr. Hupe, 14 March 1942, concerning employment of Russians. (USA 201)VII20
*EC-68Confidential letter from Minister of Finance and Economy, Baden, containing directives on treatment of Polish Farmworkers, 6 March 1941. (USA 205)VII260
*EC-194Secret memorandum of Keitel concerning use of prisoners of war in the war industry, 31 October 1941. (USA 214)VII336
*L-61Express letter from Sauckel to Presidents of Landes Employment Offices, 26 November 1942, concerning employment of Jews and exchange of Jews in essential employment against Polish labor. (USA 177)VII816
*L-79Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims”. (USA 27)VII847
*L-191“The Exploitation of Foreign Labor by Germany” (International Labor Office Study). (USA 231)VII1026
*R-103Letter from Polish Main Committee to General Government of Poland on situation of Polish workers in the Reich, 17 May 1944. (USA 204)VIII104
*R-124Speer’s conference minutes of Central Planning Board, 1942-44, concerning labor supply. (USA 179)VIII146
*R-129Letter and enclosure from Pohl to Himmler, 30 April 1942, concerning concentration camps. (USA 217)VIII198
Statement XIIPolitical Testament of Robert Ley written in Nurnberg Prison, October 1945.VIII742
Statement XIIIOutline of Defense of Dr. Robert Ley, written in Nurnberg Prison, 24 October 1945.VIII751