4. THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA (continued 2)

“1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:

“The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.

“It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (388-PS, Item 38)

J. Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the Munich Agreement.

Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on the night of 29 September 1938. This treaty provided for the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. (TC-23)

On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland.

During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehrmacht had been fully deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the assault. With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30 September Keitel promulgated Directive #1 on “Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia” (388-PS, Item 39). This directive contained a timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German armed forces. The fourth and fifth paragraphs provided:

“2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

“The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. “The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation ‘Gruen’.” (388-PS, Item 39)

It contained one further provision about the Henlein forces:

“Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” (388-PS, Item 39)

The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland and showing the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the occupational area of the army and the units under its command; arranging for communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments of the government were issued over Keitel’s signature on 30 September (388-PS, Items 40, 41, 42). By 10 October von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the occupied area and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. (388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49)

On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced that the civil authorities would take over responsibility for the Sudeten-German territory on 21 October and that the OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of that date (388-PS, Item 51). On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Keitel. Three days later the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the reversion of the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (388-PS, Items 52, 53)

As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche Partei was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the Sudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still free the Sudetendeutsche Partei constituted itself as the National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei (NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein’s deputies. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS; 3061-PS)

The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators.

K. Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia.

With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of the German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might have been expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in the Nazi program of aggression the conspirators had used as a pretext for their conquests the union of the Volksdeutsche, the people of German descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all the Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia had been returned to German rule. On 26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke these words:

“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.”

* * * * * *

“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee. We don’t want any Czechs at all.” (2358-PS)

Yet no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia. Item 48 of the Schmundt file is a top secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to the OKW. These were the questions:

“Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?

“Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or moving up of new forces?

“Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return measures?

“Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the state of readiness of October 1st?” (388-PS, Item 48)

Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler the considered answers of the OKH and the Luftwaffe.

On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. In this Top Secret Order, of which 10 copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking forward to new conquests:

“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.

“Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

“1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.

“2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

“3. The occupation of the Memelland.”

* * * * * *

“It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for ‘Gruen’; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time ‘Grenzsicherung West’ (the measures of frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.

“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

“a. Army

“The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.

“b. Air Force

“The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

“For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can only be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.” (C-136)

This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was distributed to the OKH, to Goering’s Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy headquarters.

Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this Top Secret order was the same as for the 21 October order. The order provides:

“2. COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.

“Reference ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia’ the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.

“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

“The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilization. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.

“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.

“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.

“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.

“Chief of the Supreme Command

of the Armed Forces.

“KEITEL”

(C-138)

This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff, and of Raeder.

As the Wehrmacht moved forward with plans for what it clearly considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January 1939, Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a “quick reduction” in the size of the Czech army. The captured German Foreign Office notes of this discussion bear the following footnote, in Ribbentrop’s handwriting:

“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.” (2795-PS)

L. Extension of Fifth Column Activity

As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on the Wehrmacht alone to accomplish their calculated objective of “liquidating” Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry, “home to the Reich.” One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government had made every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with an autonomous cabinet and parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found men ready to take their money and do their bidding. The following picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS; 3061-PS)

Nazi propaganda and “research” groups had long been interested in maintaining close connections with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly anti-clerical government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka’s party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the September agitation when, at the proper moment, the Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy. (See 2858-PS.)

By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct contact with figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later to become Volksgruppenfuehrer, had been appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak autonomy while on the Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his money at the German Legation in person. The telegram, sent from the German Legation at Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as follows:

“Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy.

“HENCKE” (2859-PS)

Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November 1939—eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia—throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office:

“On the question of payments to KARMASIN

“Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples’ League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks monthly.

“Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) has deposited 300,000 Marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in an emergency.

“Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the payments will continue.

“Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up new demands himself.

“Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister.

“/s/ WOERMANN” (2794-PS)

This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their under-cover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds even after the declaration of the so-called independent State of Slovakia.

Some time in the winter of 1938-1939 Goering conferred with Durcansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for what they called “independence,” with strong political, economic, and military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be solved as it had been in Germany and that the Communist Party would be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that the Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, although his motives were scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic style:

“To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKS never want to belong to HUNGARY. The SLOVAKS want full independence with strongest political, economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital. The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police are SLOVAK.

“An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where a large SLOVAK population lives.

“The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited.

“The Germans in SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but wish to stay in SLOVAKIA.

“The German influence with the SLOVAK Government considerable; the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has been promised.

“At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians than the SLOVAKS.

“The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.

“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.” (2801-PS)

In mid-February 1939 a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of Tuca, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows:

“After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with ‘My Fuehrer’ and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view.” (2790-PS)

It is noteworthy that Tuca addressed Hitler as “My Fuehrer”. During this meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. The final sentence of this document, spoken by Tuca, is conclusive:

“I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” (2790-PS)

It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal attention of such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop, and subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the Nazi conspirators.

In addition to the Slovaks, the Nazi conspirators made use of the few Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czech republic. Kundt, Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi “political activity” was designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and propaganda levels, the Czech government was unable to take adequate measures against these trespasses on its sovereignty. (998-PS; 3061-PS)

In early March, with the date for the invasion of Czechoslovakia already close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase. In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork for the events of 14 and 15 March. An article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Karl Hermann Frank, published in Boehmen und Maehren, the official periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1941, page 79, reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations:

“The SS on March 15, 1939

“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable without political troops. To these are allotted the special task of being the advance guard of the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (Freiwilliger Selbstschutz), called ‘FS’ for short. This troop was trained essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the homeland, actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.

“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the isolated German communities which remained in the second republic. This was also natural because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * *”

* * * * * *

“In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS.

“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *” (2826-PS)

The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two British diplomatic despatches (D-571, D-572) and excerpts from despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939, and published in the French Yellow Book. (2943-PS)

In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Prime Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is related in the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British government:

“Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 P. M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague.” (D-571)

Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German Offices in Engerau, across the Danube, into Slovakia where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guard to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks:

“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows—

“1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the production of explosives which his department was manufacturing for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.

“2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin, Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a revolution.

“3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned to Berlin.

“4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time.

“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

“(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks

“ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS”

(3030-PS)

At this time the German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak government. And, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. (998-PS; 3061-PS; 2943-PS)

M. Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military Force.

At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what the Nazi leaders liked to call the “liquidation” of Czechoslovakia were progressing with a gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in the attack. It appears from a letter Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office files, that Horthy was flattered by the invitation:

“Your Excellency,

“My sincere thanks.

“I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region—I dislike using big words—is of vital importance to the life of Hungary.

“In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday.

“I shall never forget this proof of friendship and your Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all times.

“Your devoted friend.

“(Signed) HORTHY”

“Budapest. 13.3.1939.” (2816-PS)

From this letter it may be inferred that the Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian government of their plans for military action against Czechoslovakia. As it turned out, the timetable was advanced somewhat.

On the diplomatic level Ribbentrop was active. On 13 March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the German minister in Prague, outlining the course of conduct he should pursue during the coming diplomatic pressure:

“Telegram in secret code

“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.

“In case you should get any written communication from President HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech government wants to communicate with you during the next few days.

“(Signed) RIBBENTROP”. (2815-PS)

On the afternoon of 13 March, Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by Durcansky and by Karmasin, the local Nazi leader, arrived in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by Hitler in his study in the Reichs Chancellery and was presented with an ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: either to declare the independence of Slovakia or to be left, without German assistance, to the mercies of Poland and Hungary. This decision, Hitler said, was not a question of days, but of hours. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of this meeting between Hitler and Tiso on 13 March show that in the inducements Hitler held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his customary disregard for truth:

“* * * Now he [Hitler] had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people or even a single soldier to something which was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability. He would not tolerate it, and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was no longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged to Germany.

“The Fuehrer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Fuehrer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Fuehrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.” (2802-PS)

Those present at this meeting included Ribbentrop, Keitel, State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, and Minister of State Meissner.

While in Berlin, the Slovaks also conferred separately with Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials. Ribbentrop solicitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak, of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia. On the night of 13 March a German plane was placed at Tiso’s disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava proclaimed the independence of Slovakia.

With Slovak extremists, acting at Nazi bidding, in open revolt against the Czechoslovak government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move against Prague. On the evening of 14 March, at the suggestion of the German Legation in Prague M. Hacha, the president of the Czechoslovak republic, and M. Chvalkovsky, his foreign minister, arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves was hostile. Since the preceding weekend the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence against the Slovaks and especially against members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger, that the situation was intolerable and that it was necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble which Prague had become in the heart of Europe.

After midnight on the 15 March, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and Chvalkovsky were ushered into the Reichs Chancellery. They found there Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Goering, Keitel, and other high Nazi officials. The captured German Foreign Office account of this meeting furnishes a revealing picture of Nazi behaviour and tactics. It must be remembered that this account of the conference of the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and must be read as an account biased by its source.

Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory, even humble. He thanked Hitler for receiving him and said he knew that the fate of Czechoslovakia rested in the Fuehrer’s hands. Hitler replied that he regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin, particularly because of the great age of the President. (Hacha was then in his seventies.) But this journey, Hitler told the President, could be of great advantage to his country, because “it was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene.” The conference proceeded as follows, with Hitler speaking:

“Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia had kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the Lower Carpathian Mts. Last autumn he had not wanted to draw the final consequences because he had believed that it was possible to live together. But even at that time, and also later in his conversations with Chvalkovsky, he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Benes’ tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkovsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans and many other things, which, to him, were a symbol of the whole situation. At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his conclusions because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission, such an army is meaningless. He enumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army would be a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the protests from national groups which could no longer endure life as it was.

“Last Sunday, therefore, for me the die was cast. I summoned the Hungarian envoy and notified him that I was withdrawing my [restraining] hands from that country. We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany’s attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkovsky but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.

“At 6 o’clock in the morning the German army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy and a certain national liberty.

“We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him because of his instinct of self-preservation not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he read the foreign press. It gave him the impression expressed in a German proverb: ‘The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.’

“That was the state of affairs. There were two courses open to Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory of the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his proposals stated above.

“That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the bloodshed would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be much more far-reaching for Czechoslovakia than she could ever have hoped for in old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people.

“The hours went past. At 6 o’clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire with Chvalkovsky in order to discuss what should be done.” (2798-PS)

In reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the German minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless. He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary orders to the Czech Army in the four hours left to him before the German Army crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, that might be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision was final, that it was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding him, which included Goering, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, for their support. The only possibility of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention of the German Army. At this point Hacha and Chvalkovsky retired from the room. (2798-PS)

A dispatch from the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, published in the British Blue Book, describes a conversation with Goering in which the events of this early morning meeting are set forth (2861-PS). Dispatch No. 77 in the French Yellow Book from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, gives another well-informed version of this same midnight meeting (2943-PS). The following account of the remainder of this meeting is drawn from these two sources, as well as from the captured German minutes (2787-PS). (Cf. also 3061-PS.)

When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reichs Chancellery, he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed medical attention from a physician who was on hand for that purpose. It appears that he was given an injection to sustain him during the ordeal. When the two Czechs returned to the room the Nazi conspirators again told them of the power and invincibility of the Wehrmacht. They reminded him that in three hours, at 6 in the morning, the German Army would cross the border. Goering boasted of what the German Wehrmacht would do if Czech forces resisted the invading Germans. If German lives were lost, Goering said, his Luftwaffe would blast half Prague into ruins in two hours. And that, Goering said, would be only the beginning. Under this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and air, the President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 in the morning signed the document with which the Nazi conspirators confronted him. This Declaration of 15 March 1939 reads:

“the President of the Czechoslovak State * * * entrusts with entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people and the Czech country to the hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich.” (TC-49)

While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the representatives of the Czech government, the Wehrmacht had in some areas already crossed the Czech border. The Czech industrial centres of Maehrisch-Ostrau and Witkowitz, close to the Silesian and Polish borders, were occupied by German troops and SS units during the early evening of 14 March. An article in the German military magazine, the Wehrmacht, of 29 March 1939 describes the movement of German troops during the occupation:

“From Silesia, Saxony and Northern Bavaria and the Ostmark, seven Army Corps moved on the morning of March 15 past the former Czech border. On the evening of March 14 parts of the VIII Army Corps and the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, under the command of the Commanding General of the VIII Army Corps, had already occupied the industrial centers of Witkowitz and Maehrisch Ostrau.

“The troops of Army Group 3 under the command of General of Infantry Blaskowitz were to take Bohemia under their protection, while the troops of Army Group 5 under General of Inf. List were given the same mission for Moravia.

“For this purpose parts of the Air Force (particularly reconnaissance planes and antiaircraft artillery) as well as parts of the SS Verfuegungstruppen were placed at the disposal of the two army groups.

“On the evening of March 14, the march order was received by the troops. On March 15 at 6 A. M. the columns moved past the border and then moved on with utmost precision. * * *” (3571-PS)

(Other descriptions of the military movements of 14 and 15 March are contained in documents 2860-PS, 3618-PS, and 3619-PS.)

At dawn on 15 March German troops poured into Czechoslovakia from all sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed Forces and a proclamation to the German people, which stated succinctly, “Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.” (TC-50)

On the following day, in direct contravention of Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into the German Reich under the name of the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” This decree, signed in Prague on 16 March 1939 by Hitler, Lammers, Frick, and Ribbentrop, commenced with this declaration:

“The Bohemian-Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to the living space of the German people.” (TC-51)

The remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which Czechoslovakia henceforth was to be subjugated to Germany. A German Protector was to be appointed by the Fuehrer for the so-called Protectorate. The German Government assumed charge of their foreign affairs and of their customs and their excise. It was specified that German garrisons and military establishments would be maintained in the Protectorate. (TC-51)

At the same time the extremist leaders in Slovakia, who at German insistence had done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that the independence of their week-old state was in fact qualified. A Treaty of Protection between Slovakia and the Reich was signed in Vienna on 18 March and by Ribbentrop in Berlin on 23 March (1439-PS). A secret protocol to this treaty was also signed in Berlin on 23 March by Ribbentrop for Germany, and by Tuka and Durcansky for Slovakia (2793-PS). The first four articles of this treaty provide:

“The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments have agreed on the following provisions.

“ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its territory.

“ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have the right, at all times, to construct military installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains.

“The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military installations.

“Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.

“German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

“ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.

“ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German Government.” (1439-PS)

The secret protocol provided for close economic and financial collaboration between Germany and Slovakia. Mineral resources and subsoil rights were placed at the disposal of the German government. Article I, Paragraph 3, provided:

“(3) Investigation, development and utilization of the Slovak natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia’s own requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany’s disposal. The entire soil-research (Bodenforschung) will be placed under the Reich agency for soil-research (Reichsstelle fuer Bodenforschung). The government of the Slovak State will soon start an investigation to determine whether the present owners of concessions and privileges have fulfilled the industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have been neglected.” (2793-PS)

In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave abundant evidence that they considered Slovakia a puppet State, in effect a German possession. A memorandum of information given by Hitler to von Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939 deals in the main with problems arising from recently occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia. It states in part:

“Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed Slovak units (Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferred to the new Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.

“Slovak shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to us against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.

“Czech Protectorate.

“H. Gr. [translator’s note: probably Army groups] shall be asked again whether the request shall be repeated again for the delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the threat of severe penalties.

“We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February though shall be paid for.

“Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.” (R-100)

The German conquest of Czechoslovakia in direct contravention of the Munich agreement was the occasion for formal protests from the British (TC-52) and French (TC-53) governments, both dated 17 March 1939. On the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States issued a statement which read in part as follows:

“* * * This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making known this country’s condemnation of the acts which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a free and independent people with whom, from the day when the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people of the United States have maintained specially close and friendly relations.” (2862-PS)

N. The Importance of Czechoslovakia in Future Aggressions.

With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had accomplished the program they had set for themselves in the meeting in Berlin on 5 November 1937 (386-PS). This program of conquest had been intended to shorten Germany’s frontiers, to increase its industrial and food reserves, and to place it in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which the Nazis could launch more ambitious and more devastating campaigns of aggression. In less than a year and a half this program had been carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi leaders.

Of all the Nazi conspirators perhaps Goering was the most aware of the economic and strategic advantages which would accrue from the possession of Czechoslovakia. The Top Secret minutes of a conference with Goering in the Air Ministry, held on 14 October 1938—just two weeks after the occupation of the Sudetenland—reports a discussion of economic problems. At this date Goering’s remarks were somewhat prophetic:

“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czechia and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler.” (1301-PS, Item 10)

In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich, Goering again revealed the great interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czechoslovak economic potential. The minutes dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, and signed Mueller, of a conference two days earlier between Goering and a group of officials from the OKW and from other agencies of the German government concerned with war production, read as follows:

“1. In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the German war potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, such as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics—S 10 402/39 of 10 July 39—as well as a letter with similar meaning to the JUNKERS firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate, are contrary to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists, in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible. * * *” (R-133)

In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for war, the conquest of Czechoslovakia provided the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next war of aggression, the attack on Poland. It will be recalled that the minutes of the conference between Goering and a pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-39 state Goering’s conclusions as follows:

“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.” (2801-PS)

In a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano on 15 April 1939, one month after the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Goering told his junior partners in the Axis of the progress of German preparations for war. He compared the strength of Germany with the strength of England and France. He mentioned the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in these words:

“However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s action the situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.”

* * * * * *

“* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located again in the proximity of the border.” (1874-PS)

The absorption of the Sudetenland, effected on 1 October 1938, in practical effect destroyed Czechoslovakia as a military power. The final conquest of Czechoslovakia came on 15 March 1939. This conquest had been the intention and aim of the Nazi leaders during the preparations for Case Green in the summer of 1938, and had been forestalled only by the Munich agreement. With Czechoslovakia, less than six months after the Munich agreement, securely in German hands, the Nazi conspirators had achieved their objective. Bohemia and Moravia were incorporated into the Reich, shortening German frontiers and adding the Czech manufacturing plant to the German war potential. The puppet state of Slovakia, conceived in Berlin and independent only in name, had been set up to the east of Moravia. In this state, which outflanked Poland to the south, the Nazi army, under the terms of the treaty drafted by Ribbentrop, took upon itself the establishment of bases and extensive military installations. From this state in September 1939 units of the German Army did, in fact, carry out the attack on Poland.

Logic and premeditation are patent in each step of the German aggression. Each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was deliberately planned as a stepping-stone to new and more ambitious aggression. The words of Hitler in the conference in the Reichs Chancellery on 23 May 1939, when he was planning the Polish campaign, are significant,

“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.” (L-79)

It is appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi leaders. In his lecture at Munich on 7 November 1943 Jodl spoke as follows:

“The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.” (L-172)

In the speech to his military commanders on 23 November 1939, Hitler described the process by which he had rebuilt the military power of the Reich:

“The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortifications had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid.” (789-PS)

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DocumentDescriptionVol.Page

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6 (a).I5

International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 3 (a, c); V.I22, 29

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Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.

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*375-PSCase Green with wider implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938. (USA 84)III280

*386-PSNotes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25)III295

*388-PSFile of papers on Case Green (the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, April-October 1938. (USA 26)III305

*789-PSSpeech of the Fuehrer at a conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme Commanders were ordered. (USA 23)III572

*998-PS“German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia”. Excerpts from Czechoslovak Official Report for the prosecution and trial of the German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal established according to Agreement of four Great Powers of 8 August 1945. (USA 91)III656

*1301-PSFile relating to financing of armament including minutes of conference with Goering at the Air Ministry, 14 October 1938, concerning acceleration of rearmament. (USA 123)III868

*1439-PSTreaty of Protection between Slovakia and the Reich, signed in Vienna 18 March and in Berlin 23 March 1939. 1939 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 606. (GB 135)IV18

*1536-PSReport of Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, 12 August 1938, on reconnaissance by German Air Attache at Prague for airfields in Czechoslovakia, enclosing report of the Air Attache, Major Moericke, 4 August 1938. (USA 83)IV96

*1780-PSExcerpts from diary kept by General Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA 72)IV360

*1874-PSNotes on conference between Goering, Mussolini and Ciano, 15 April 1939. (USA 125)IV518

2358-PSSpeech by Hitler in Sportspalast, Berlin, 26 September 1938, from Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, 27 September 1938.IV1100

*2360-PSSpeech by Hitler before Reichstag, 30 January 1939, from Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31 January 1939. (GB 134)IV1101

*2786-PSLetter from Ribbentrop to Keitel, 4 March 1938. (USA 81)V419

*2788-PSNotes of conference in the Foreign Office between Ribbentrop, Konrad Henlein, K. H. Frank and others on program for Sudeten agitation, 29 March 1938. (USA 95)V422

*2789-PSLetter from Konrad Henlein to Ribbentrop, 17 March 1938. (USA 94)V424

*2790-PSGerman Foreign Office minutes of conference between Hitler, Ribbentrop, Tuca and Karmasin, 12 February 1939. (USA 110)V425

*2791-PSGerman Foreign Office minutes of conversation between Ribbentrop and Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 23 August 1938. (USA 86)V426

*2792-PSGerman Foreign Office minutes of conversations between Ribbentrop and Attolico, 27 August 1938 and 2 September 1938. (USA 87)V426

*2793-PSConfidential protocol concerning economic and financial collaboration between the German Reich and State of Slovakia. (USA 120)V427

*2794-PSGerman Foreign Office memorandum on payments to Karmasin, 29 November 1939. (USA 108)V429

*2795-PSHandwritten postscript by Ribbentrop to German Foreign Office notes of Ribbentrop-Chvalkovsky conversation, 21 January 1939. (USA 106)V430

*2796-PSGerman Foreign Office notes on conversations between Hitler, Ribbentrop and von Weizsäcker and the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and von Kanya, 23 August 1938. (USA 88)V430

*2797-PSGerman Foreign Office memorandum of conversation between Ribbentrop and von Kanya, 25 August 1938. (USA 89)V432

*2798-PSGerman Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and President Hacha of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939. (USA 118; GB 5)V433

*2800-PSGerman Foreign Office notes of a conversation with Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, 18 July 1938. (USA 85)V442

*2801-PSMinutes of conversation between Goering and Slovak Minister Durkansky (probably late fall or early winter 1938-39). (USA 109)V442

*2802-PSGerman Foreign Office notes of conference on 13 March 1939 between Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117)V443

*2815-PSTelegram from Ribbentrop to the German Minister in Prague, 13 March 1939. (USA 116)V451

*2816-PSLetter from Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, to Hitler, dated Budapest, 13 March 1939. (USA 115)V451

*2826-PSThe SS on March 15, 1939, an article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank, in magazine Bohemia and Moravia, May 1941, p. 179. (USA 111)V472

*2853-PSTelegram from German Foreign Office to German Legation in Prague, 24 September 1938. (USA 100)V521

*2854-PSTelegram from German Foreign Office to German Legation in Prague, 17 September 1938. (USA 99)V521

*2855-PSTelegram from German Foreign Office to German Legation in Prague, 16 September 1938. (USA 98)V522

*2856-PSTelegram from German Foreign Office to German Legation in Prague, 24 September 1938. (USA 101)V522

*2858-PSTelegram from German Foreign Office to German Legation in Prague, 19 September 1938. (USA 97)V523

*2859-PSTelegram from German Legation, Prague, to Consulate at Bratislava, 22 November 1938. (USA 107)V523

*2860-PSDocument No. 10 in the British Blue Book. Speech by Lord Halifax in the House of Lords, 20 March 1939. (USA 119)V523

*2861-PSDocument No. 12 in the British Blue Book. Dispatch from Sir Nevile Henderson to British Foreign Office, 28 May 1939, relating details of conversation with Goering. (USA 119)V524

*2862-PSDocument No. 126 in Peace and War. Statement by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 17 March 1939. (USA 122)V525

**2863-PSLecture by Konrad Henlein, delivered in Vienna, 4 March 1941. Quoted in “Four Fighting Years”, Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 1943, pp. 29-30. (Referred to but not offered in evidence.) (USA 92)V525

2906-PSGerman Foreign Office minutes of meeting between Hitler and Chvalkovsky, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, 21 January 1939.V571

*2943-PSDocuments Numbers 55, 57, 62, 65, 66, 73, 77 and 79 in the French Yellow Book. Excerpts from eight dispatches from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to the French Foreign Office, between 13 and 18 March 1939. (USA 114)V608

**3029-PSAffidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 November 1945, on activities of the SD along the Czechoslovak border during September 1938. (USA 103) (Objection to admission in evidence upheld.)V738

3030-PSAffidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 November 1945, on relationship between the SD and pro-Nazi Slovak groups in March 1939.V739

**3036-PSAffidavit of Gottlob Berger on the composition and activity of the Henlein Free Corps in September 1938. (Objection to admission in evidence upheld.) (USA 102)V742

3037-PSAffidavit of Fritz Wiedemann, 21 November 1945, on the meeting between Hitler and his principal advisers in Reichs Chancellery on 28 May 1938.V743

*3054-PS“The Nazi Plan”, script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)V801

*3059-PSGerman Foreign Office memorandum, 19 August 1938, on payments to Henlein’s Sudeten-German Party between 1935 and 1938. (USA 96)V855

*3060-PSDispatch from German Minister in Prague to Foreign Office in Berlin about policy arrangements with Henlein, 16 March 1938. (USA 93)V856

*3061-PSSupplement No. 2 to the Official Czechoslovak Report entitled German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia” (document 998-PS). (USA 126)V857

3571-PSReport of U. S. Military Attache, Berlin, including an article in magazine Wehrmacht, 29 March 1939, describing occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops.VI264

3618-PSReport of U. S. Military Attache in Berlin, 20 March 1939, concerning occupation of Czechoslovakia.VI389

3619-PSReport of U. S. Military Attache in Berlin, 19 April 1939, concerning occupation of Czechoslovakia.VI398

3638-PSMemorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 October 1938, concerning his conversation with Ciano about the Polish demands made on Czechoslovakia.VI400

*3842-PSStatement of Fritz Mundhenke, 7 March 1946, concerning the activities of Kaltenbrunner and SS in preparation for occupation of Czechoslovakia. (USA 805)VI778

*C-2Examples of violations of International Law and proposed counter-propaganda, issued by OKW, 1 October 1938. (USA 90)VI799

*C-136OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 October 1938, signed by Hitler and initialled by Keitel. (USA 104)VI947

*C-138Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the OKW. (USA 105)VI950

*C-175OKW Directive for Unified Preparation for War 1937-1938, with covering letter from von Blomberg, 24 June 1937. (USA 69)VI1006

*D-571Official report of British Minister in Prague to Viscount Halifax, 21 March 1939. (USA 112)VII88

*D-572Dispatch from Mr. Pares, British Consul in Bratislava to Mr. Newton, 20 March 1939, describing German support of Slovak separatists. (USA 113)VII90

*L-79Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims”. (USA 27)VII847

*L-172“The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)VII920

*R-100Minutes of instructions given by Hitler to General von Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939. (USA 121)VIII83

*R-133Notes on conference with Goering in Westerland on 25 July 1939, signed Mueller, dated Berlin 27 July 1939. (USA 124)VIII202

*R-150Extracts from Luftwaffe Group Command Three Study on Instruction for Deployment and Combat “Case Red”, 2 June 1938. (USA 82)VIII268

*TC-14Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia, signed at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB 14)VIII325

*TC-23Agreement between Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, 29 September 1938. (GB 23)VIII370

*TC-27German assurances to Czechoslovakia, 11 and 12 March 1938, as reported by M. Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister to London to Viscount Halifax. (GB 21)VIII377

*TC-49Agreement with Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1939, signed by Hitler, von Ribbentrop, Hacha and Chvalkovsky, from Documents of German Politics, Part VII, pp. 498-499. (GB 6)VIII402

*TC-50Proclamation of the Fuehrer to the German people and Order of the Fuehrer to the Wehrmacht, 15 March 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Part VII, pp. 499-501. (GB 7)VIII402

*TC-51Decree establishing the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 16 March 1939. (GB 8)VIII404

*TC-52Formal British protest against the annexation of Czechoslovakia in violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 March 1939. (GB 9)VIII407

*TC-53Formal French protest against the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in violation of the Munich Agreement, 17 March 1939. (GB 10)VIII407

Affidavit HAffidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November 1945.VIII643

**Chart No. 11Aggressive Action 1938-39. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)VIII780

**Chart No. 12German Aggression. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)VIII781

**Chart No. 13Violations of Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)VIII782