Chapter VI · EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY (contd.)
Reading edition
THE RETREAT
The reply of the British drummer-boy when asked by the great Napoleon to beat the “Retreat,” is historical, and, following the traditions of the British infantry, the word will not be found in the index of Infantry Training. Nevertheless, although British infantry never retreat, they may be called upon to perform that most difficult operation of war—“a retirement in the face of the enemy.”
Field Service Regulations, Part I., 1909, speaking of the retreat says: “The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance, and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible, of a rear guard in support of the mounted troops, will move as rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately to secure any bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force. Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they should take precautions that all ground commanding their line of retreat is occupied by flank guards.”
There are three distinct ways of employing machine guns with infantry to assist in covering the retreat, as will be seen from the portions of the above quoted in italics, viz. (1) With the rear guard. (2) To secure vital points on the line of retreat. (3) To occupy commanding positions on the flanks. The use of machine guns with the rear guard will be dealt with separately, so we will see how they should be employed to fulfil the two latter duties.
Let us suppose that the moment has arrived when the commander of the force decides to break off the engagement and to effect a retreat. We have already seen how the cavalry and their machine guns will co-operate, and we may assume that their intervention will enable the infantry to break off the fight under cover of the fire of the rear guard and their machine guns. In anticipation of this, the commander of the machine-gun batteries—other than those allotted to the rear guard—will assemble them in a central position and receive from the commander of the force his plan of action and instructions for the co-operation of the machine guns. These instructions should definitely state the positions to be occupied on the line of retreat, and for how long such positions are to be held (e.g. until the infantry are past such-and-such a place, or to the last possible moment, etc.); but they should leave all details as to unit of guns, fire positions, opening fire, etc., to the machine-gun commander, who should be given a free hand in carrying out his instructions. The machine-gun commander will then issue his orders to battery commanders, allotting the battery for the flank and the battery which is to occupy positions on the line of retreat. In like manner the battery commander will tell off sections to occupy certain positions, if these have already been selected, and if not he will direct his battery to a position of readiness and will gallop off with his section commanders to select the positions for each section and explain the course of action to be taken. The position of readiness must be in the vicinity of the position to be occupied, and section commanders must take steps to ensure that their sections keep in signalling connection with them and can be brought up by signal to the position selected.
The choice of the position will depend upon the nature of the country and the features favourable to delaying the enemy, but it may be laid down that the machine guns should not be placed in one line, but should be broken up as much as possible, so that no two guns are at the same range. In the same way, guns placed in well-concealed positions on the lower slopes of hills should have the other guns of their sections higher up, where they can command a wide extent of country and at the same time cover the retirement of the guns below. All guns must be so placed that they can be retired under cover of the ground immediately they move. The guns on the higher ground will open fire at long range, and the opportunity may be afforded at this stage for using “deliberate” fire at the most rapid rate possible, in imitation of rifle fire, for the double purpose of concealing the guns and deceiving the enemy by causing them to believe that the position is held by infantry. The guns at the lower position should watch their opportunity for opening fire on a large and vulnerable target; but should none be presented, it is possible by reserving fire to catch the enemy in close formation should they press on when the guns have ceased fire, thinking the position has been vacated.
It may be possible to surprise the enemy from close range at bridge-heads or on roads through defiles leading to the line of retreat, if guns are carefully concealed in positions commanding such approaches. Indeed, the opportunities for ambushing pursuing cavalry or infantry will be frequent during the early stages of a retreat, and no chance must be lost in making the enemy pay dearly for his temerity during the pursuit. One successful ambush by machine guns is worth more than the most stubborn stand, for it imposes caution as nothing else can; and caution in the pursuit means delay, and delay spells failure. When machine guns get a really good target at close range, the result is little short of annihilation, and the morale effect of such a heavy loss, totally unexpected and inflicted in a few moments, takes the life out of the pursuit more completely than even a long stand.
The machine guns allotted to the flanks will find positions in the way already described. These positions must be chosen along the line of retreat so as to hold all ground from which fire can be brought to bear on the retreating columns, and from which the enemy can be successfully repulsed when he attempts to break through. If there has been time to form infantry flank guards, the machine guns will assist in strengthening their resistance, and in covering their withdrawal. When acting alone they should open fire on suitable targets at the longest ranges, but when supporting infantry they may be able to reserve fire and surprise the enemy from close range. Guns working together on a flank must keep in touch with each other by signal, and guns should work in sections in mutual support. A battery acting as a flank guard to a force retreating must be prepared to occupy a front of some two or three miles, and sections will often be in positions a mile apart in open ground. Directly the guns have taken up positions the battery commander should go off with scouts from each gun and select fresh positions along the line of retreat. He will give the signal for retirement, and if in action at the time one gun of each section should move off first under cover of the fire of the others; or where the situation permits, a flank section may be ordered to move first. It must sometimes occur that the cavalry on the flanks will be compelled to retire by a superior force, and when this is the case machine guns in position may be able to inflict considerable loss, should the pursuing cavalry follow them too closely while retiring.
As soon as it is known that the main body has reached the rallying position and is ready to hold it, the machine guns can be withdrawn. This will not usually be possible in daylight, and as a rule it will take place after dark. The dispositions of the machine guns in the rallying positions will be the same as in the case with infantry in the defence.
REAR GUARDS
The prime necessity for the machine guns with a rear guard of a retreating force is mobility, and without this they will be of little service and become a hindrance rather than a help.
“A rear guard carries out its mission best by compelling the enemy’s troops to halt and deploy for attack as frequently and at as great a distance as possible. It can usually effect this by taking up a succession of defensive positions which the enemy must attack in turn. When the enemy’s dispositions are nearly complete, the rear guard moves off by successive retirements, each party as it falls back covering the retirement of the next by its fire. This action is repeated on the next favourable ground.... A rear guard may also effectually check an enemy by attacking his advanced troops as they emerge from a defile or difficult country.”[32]
Machine guns, by reason of their concentrated fire and shallow beaten zone, are peculiarly suited for compelling troops to deploy at long range. They are also suited for quickly taking up a defensive position, and, when mobile, can instantly cease fire and move off in a few moments with considerable rapidity.
Their power for suddenly developing an intense fire will enable them quickly to overwhelm an enemy caught “emerging from a defile or difficult country.” It would appear therefore that the machine guns are far more fitted than infantry to perform the duties of a rear guard as quoted above.
“The first consideration in selecting a position for the artillery is that it shall be able to open fire on an enemy at long range, and thus compel his infantry to assume an extended formation at the greatest possible distance. The second is that it should be possible to withdraw without difficulty.”[33]
When the infantry arrive within effective rifle range of the artillery, the latter will be compelled to retire, especially if the former are supported by cavalry. This will also be the moment when the infantry will require to retire to a fresh position in rear. Machine guns that have been well concealed, or which have taken up fresh positions in good cover in rear of the infantry line, should be able to unmask and by their fire hold off the enemy until both guns and infantry have effected their retreat. The facility with which they can traverse and sweep widely extended lines, and instantly concentrate fire on any portion of it, make them of great service in covering a retirement at effective range, as they can render the hottest fire ineffective and aimed fire impossible for a short time.
Machine guns with a rear guard must be prepared to work from place to place with great rapidity, and for this purpose they must arrange to bring the gun horses close up to their fire position. Alternative positions are essential, but must be reached under cover and unobserved by the enemy. Sections will act independently, using their guns in mutual support; but the retirement of one section may often afford another the opportunity, from a well-chosen position on a flank, to surprise the enemy from close range as they press forward to occupy the abandoned position.
A ruse that may sometimes be successful where guns are really well concealed is to bring up the gun horses and retire at a gallop by a pre-arranged signal all along the position, but leaving one gun of each section still in position but flat on the ground, where it will be completely concealed even from glasses. This is almost certain to draw a hot pursuit, especially if the artillery and infantry have retired previously, and if fire is reserved till close range a severe check may be administered to the enemy. “Skilfully laid ambushes will cause the enemy to move with caution in pursuit.”[34]
Machine guns should never retire for a few hundred yards, except where absolutely necessary for covering the retirement of those in front. Once in position, they should only be moved to alternative positions when discovered, and these will usually be more or less on the same general alignment. When they retire they should move to such a distance in rear as to give them time to select, or if necessary improvise, good cover in the new positions and to replenish ammunition, etc. “The positions should be sufficiently far apart to induce the enemy, after seizing one, to re-form column of route before advancing against the next.”[35]
General Alderson, speaking at the Aldershot Military Society in 1904 and referring to the South African War, said: “I had two Maxims with tripod mountings on pack-saddles, which belonged to the 1st Battalion Mounted Infantry. These guns had well-trained mounted detachments, and a pushing officer, with a good eye for ground, in command. They were most useful, and more than once saved the flank of their unit from being turned by galloping up and coming into action on the flank of the out-flanking Boers.... I am of opinion that if the most is to be got out of the guns, the detachments, even with infantry, should be mounted.... With the detachment mounted ... there is no question about the guns not keeping up, and they can be sent quickly to any desired position. They can hold on to any such position as long as required to cover the advance or retirement of their infantry, and then easily catch them up or get into another position. In fact, if the detachment is mounted the value of the guns is more than doubled.”
Machine guns with the rear guard will certainly be exposed to artillery fire, and they will seldom have the time or opportunity for making sufficient cover to protect themselves. It will be necessary therefore either to withdraw the gun on coming under artillery fire or to find shelter from it. If good natural cover has been obtained, it will only be necessary to lower the gun flat on the ground behind it, and for the detachment to lie flat close against it, when they will be practically safe. The artillery will cease fire as soon as they find there is nothing to fire at, but the detachment should not move for some time after this, as the guns, having got the range, will be able to inflict considerable damage if the detachment exposes itself.
It is always advisable to keep one or two sections in reserve with a rear guard to be used to protect the flanks or any point where the pursuit threatens to break through in the manner mentioned by General Alderson. These sections should remain with the rear-guard commander and be under his immediate command; they should be in readiness for instant action.
OUTPOSTS
The duties of the outposts are:
(1) To provide protection against surprise.
(2) In case of attack, to gain time for the commander of the force to put his plan of action into execution.[36]
The first duty of outposts, which is reconnaissance, cannot be assisted by machine guns; but their second duty, which is resistance, may be materially strengthened and aided by them, as we have already seen in dealing with the defence. Little can be said about tactics, and it will be necessary to use the guns in positions on the line of resistance where their fire power is most likely to be of value. In order clearly to understand where and how machine guns should be used with outposts, it will be necessary first to examine the composition and distribution of outposts of a force of all arms. Field Service Regulations, Part I., 1909, says: “When there is any possibility of a force coming in conflict with an enemy, its commander, when halting for the night, should first decide on his dispositions in case of attack, and then arrange the quartering of his command and the position of the outposts accordingly.... Command, co-operation, and inter-communication will be facilitated by placing the advanced troops along well-defined natural features, such as ridges, streams, the outer edges of woods, etc., or in the vicinity of roads, but this must not be allowed to outweigh the necessity for making the best tactical dispositions possible. In enclosed country, and at night, the movements of troops are generally confined to the roads and tracks, which should be carefully watched. If the outpost position is extensive, it may be divided into sections, each section being numbered from the right. The extent of a section depends upon the amount of ground which can be supervised conveniently by one commander. The extent of frontage to be allotted to each company will depend on the defensive capabilities of the outpost position, and, where they exist, on the number of approaches to be guarded. The outpost position will invariably be strengthened and communications improved where necessary. Piquets and supports will do this without waiting for definite orders.... The outposts of a force of all arms consist of outpost mounted troops, outpost companies, and, where necessary, the reserve. Machine guns will generally be included and sometimes artillery.... When stationary, the duty of local protection will fall almost entirely on the infantry, most of the outposts mounted troops being withdrawn, their place in this case being with the reserve, if there be one. In certain cases, however, standing mounted patrols may be left out at night with advantage....
“Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches, and to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to pass or occupy.”[37]
Machine guns must be used on the principles given above, which naturally fall under two distinct headings, viz. use by day and use by night. Machine guns with outposts by day will not occupy their fire positions unless an attack is imminent, but should be posted with the reserves in their own section of the defence. This must not prevent emplacements or pits for the guns being made, ranges carefully taken and written up, and everything being ready in case of action. These positions and the subsequent action will correspond so closely with those already suggested for infantry in the defence in the last chapter, that they need not be repeated. By night, however, the case is very different, and it is necessary to select very carefully the position of each gun, so that it commands a road, a bridge, or other ground which the enemy in advancing may be compelled to pass or occupy. These places must be selected in order of importance, and an endeavour made to leave no approach by which a body of troops might move uncovered by fire. The machine guns must occupy their positions before dark and be carefully laid to sweep the area of ground necessary for protecting the position, the angle of elevation of the gun being taken by clinometer afterwards in order that it may be relaid if necessary in the dark. Great care must be taken to conceal these guns from observation when bringing them into position or withdrawing them, and it is worth while going to some considerable trouble to do this. One method of many is suggested to show what is meant. Field guns might be placed in the positions by day and withdrawn before night, the machine guns being brought up on the limbers and dropped in the position behind a screen of brushwood, and withdrawn again in the morning when the field gun is brought up.
The detachment of each machine gun must find two double sentries and their reliefs, who will remain at their posts with the gun, which should have the belt ready in the feed block, but not actually loaded. These men may either take it in turn to stand to the gun or both be directed to watch. When there are no infantry sentries on piquet duty in front of the gun, it will be necessary to detail two who will be posted in the usual way some little distance in front of the gun to prevent it being rushed in the dark. The method of preparing the sights and laying the gun for night work is given in Chapter VII.
The value of machine guns with the outposts at night is shown by an incident at the Battle of Mukden, March 6th, 1905. Two Russian battalions made a night attack against the hill north of Tung-chia-wen, which was occupied by the 2nd Japanese Regiment. There was no moon and the night was very dark. Two Japanese machine guns did great execution at ranges between 50 and 100 yards, and the Russians were repulsed with a loss of 450 men, the Japanese casualties being only 48.