FOOTNOTES:

Even in the learned disputations of his Wittenberg pupils similar assertions are found: The Papists have ever taught that the powers of man after the Fall still remained unimpaired (“adhuc integras”), and that therefore he could fulfil the whole law; doctrines no better than those of the Turks and Jews had been set up (“non secus apud Turcas et Iudæos,” etc.). “Disputationes,” ed. Drews, p. 340.

And so Luther goes on down to the last sermon he preached at Eisleben just before his death: The Pope destroyed Baptism and only left works, tonsures, etc., in the Church (ibid., 20², 2, p. 534); the “purest monks” had usually been the “worst lewdsters” (p. 542); the monks had done nothing for souls, but “merely hidden themselves in their cells” (p. 543); “the monks think if they keep their Rule they are veritable saints” (p. 532).

In his accusations against the religious life we find him making statements which, from his own former experience, he must have known to be false. For instance, when he says, that, in their hypocritical holiness, they had regarded it as a mortal sin to leave their cell without the scapular (“Werke,” Erl. ed., 44, p. 347; 38, p. 203; 60, p. 270). Denifle proves convincingly (1², p. 54), that all monks were well aware that such customs, prescribed by the Constitutions, were not binding under sin, but merely exposed transgressors to punishment by their superiors.—Luther also frequently declared, that in the Mass every mistake in the ceremonies was looked upon as a mortal sin, even the omission of an “enim” or an “æterni” in the Canon (ibid., 28, p. 65), and that the incorrect use of the frequently repeated sign of the cross had caused such apprehension, that they were “plagued beyond measure with the Mass” (ibid., 59, p. 98). And yet his own words (“Werke,” Weim. ed., 6, p. 164) show he was aware that such involuntary mistakes were no sin: “cum casus quispiam nullum peccatum fuerit.”

W. Walther, in the article quoted above (p. 81, n. 1), admits that Luther taught “in the clearest possible manner that cases might occur where a departure from truth became the Christian’s duty.... It is probable that many Evangelicals will strongly repudiate this thesis, but, in our opinion, almost everybody follows it in practice”; if charity led to untruth then the latter was no evil act, and it could not be said that Luther accepted the principle that the end justifies the means. It was not necessary for Walther, having made Luther’s views on lying his own, to assure us, “that they were not shared by every Christian, not even by every Evangelical.” As regards the end justifying the means, Walther should prove that the principle does not really underlie much of what Luther says (cp. also above, p. 94 f.). Cp. what A. Baur says, with praiseworthy frankness, in a work entitled “Johann Calvin” (“Religionsgeschichtl. Volksb.,” Reihe 4, Hft. 9), p. 29, concerning the reformer of Geneva whom he extols: “Consciously, or unconsciously, the principle that the end justifies the means became necessarily more and more deeply rooted in Calvin’s mind, viz. the principle that the holy purpose willed by God justifies the use of means—the employment of which would otherwise appear altogether repugnant and reprehensible to a refined moral sense—at least when no other way presents itself for the attainment of the end. To renounce the end on account of the means appeared to Calvin a betrayal of God’s honour and cause.” And yet it is clear that only a theory which “transcends good and evil” can approve the principle that the end justifies the means.

We may add that, according to Walther (“Die Sittlichkeit nach Luther,” 1909, p. 11 f.), Luther, in view of the exalted end towards which the means he used were directed, “gradually resolved” to set the law of charity above that of truth; he did not, however, do this in his practical writings, fearing its abuse; yet Luther still contends that Abraham was permitted to tell an untruth in order “to prevent the frustration of God’s Will,” i.e. from love of God (ibid., p. 13).

In the same way that the Invitatories just quoted expressly reserve adoration for the Divine Son, so the veneration of the Mother of God in the Church’s Offices is justified on exactly the same grounds as those which, according to Luther, result from the mystery of the Visitation and from the Magnificat. The Church has always extolled Mary simply in the spirit of the Magnificat.—Luther himself had published a printed exposition of the Magnificat in 1521. There he still speaks of the Blessed Virgin in the usual way (“Werke,” Weim. ed., 7, p. 545 f.; Erl. ed., 45, p. 214 f.). At the commencement of the work he invokes her assistance with the words: “May the same tender Mother of God obtain for me the spirit to interpret her song usefully and practically ... that we may sing and chant this Magnificat eternally in the life to come. So help us God. Amen” (p. 546 = 214). In the same way, at the close, he expresses his hope that a right understanding of the Magnificat “may not only illumine and teach, but burn and live in body and soul; may Christ grant us this by the intercession and assistance of His dear Mother Mary. Amen” (p. 601 = 287). Thus he was then still in favour of the invocation and intercession of the Holy Mother of God, whereas later he set aside the invocation of any Saint, and declared it to be one of “the abuses of Antichrist.” (See Köstlin, “Luthers Theologie,” 1², p. 370 ff.)—Luther wrote his exposition of the Magnificat in the spirit which must inspire every theologian who studies the canticle, and which had been even stronger in him during his Catholic period. At the same time he obviously wished to work upon the wavering and cautious Court of the Elector, and for this reason dedicated this work, which, though peaceful in tone, contained hidden errors, to Prince Johann Frederick in a submissive letter. It should be noted that Luther wrote this dedication soon after receiving his summons to Worms. It is dated March 10, 1521 (ibid., p. 545=212. Cp. “Briefwechsel,” 3, p. 109).