II. Account of the Ship's Journey Across the Atlantic, the Messages She Received, and the Disaster.

THE SAILING ORDER.

The masters of vessels belonging to the White Star Line are not given any special "sailing orders" before the commencement of any particular voyage. It is understood, however, that the "tracks" or "lane routes" proper to the particular time of the year, and agreed upon by the great steamship companies, are to be generally adhered to. Should any master see fit during this passage to deviate from his route he has to report on and explain this deviation at the end of his voyage. When such deviation has been in the interests of safety, and not merely to shorten his passage, his action has always been approved of by the company.

A book of general ship's rules and uniform regulations is also issued by the company as a guide; there are in this book no special instructions in regard to ice, but there is a general instruction that the safety of the lives of the passengers and ship are to be the first consideration.

Besides the book of ship's rules, every master when first appointed to command a ship is addressed by special letter from the company, of which the following passage is an extract:

You are to dismiss all idea of competitive passages with other vessels and to concentrate your attention upon a cautious, prudent, and ever-watchful system of navigation, which shall lose time or suffer any other temporary inconvenience rather than incur the slightest risk which can be avoided.

Mr. Sanderson, one of the directors, in his evidence says with reference to the above letter:

We never fail to tell them in handing them these letters that we do not wish them to take it as a mere matter of form; that we wish them to read these letters, and to write an acknowledgment to us that they have read them, and that they will be influenced by what we have said in those letters.

THE ROUTE FOLLOWED.

The Titanic left Southampton on Wednesday, April 10, and after calling at Cherbourg, proceeded to Queenstown, from which port she sailed on the afternoon of Thursday, April 11, following what was at that time the accepted outward-bound route for mail steamers from the Fastnet Light, off the southwest coast of Ireland, to the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, off the coast of the United States. It is desirable here to explain that it has been, since 1899, the practice, by common agreement between the great North Atlantic steamship companies, to follow lane routes, to be used by their ships at the different seasons of the year. Speaking generally, it may be said that the selection of these routes has hitherto been based on the importance of avoiding as much as possible the areas where fog and ice are prevalent at certain seasons, without thereby unduly lengthening the passage across the Atlantic, and also with the view of keeping the tracks of "outward" and "homeward" bound mail steamers well clear of one another. A further advantage is that, in case of a breakdown, vessels are likely to receive timely assistance from other vessels following the same route. The decisions arrived at by the steamship companies referred to above have, from time to time, been communicated to the Hydrographic Office, and the routes have there been marked on the North Atlantic route charts printed and published by the Admiralty; and they have also been embodied in the sailing directions.

Before the Titanic disaster the accepted mail steamers outward track between January 15 and August 14 followed the arc of a great circle between the Fastnet Light and a point in latitude 42° N. and 47° W. (sometimes termed the "turning point"), and from thence by Rhumb Line so as to pass just south of the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, and from this point on to New York. This track, usually called the outward southern track, was that followed by the Titanic on her journey.

An examination of the North Atlantic route chart shows that this track passes about 25 miles south (that is outside) of the edge of the area marked "field ice between March and July," but from 100 to 300 miles to the northward (that is inside) of the dotted line on the chart marked, "Icebergs have been seen within this line in April, May, and June."

That is to say, assuming the areas indicated to be based on the experience of many years, this track might be taken as passing clear of field ice under the usual conditions of that time of year, but well inside the area in which icebergs might be seen.

It is instructive here to remark that had the "turning point" been in longitude 45° W. and latitude 38° N., that is some 240 miles to the south-eastward, the total distance of the passage would only have been increased by about 220 miles, or some 10 hours' steaming for a 22-knot ship. This is the route which was provisionally decided on by the great trans-Atlantic companies subsequent to the Titanic disaster.

It must not be supposed that the lane routes referred to had never been changed before. Owing to the presence of ice in 1903, 1904, and 1905 from about early in April to mid-June or early in July, westward-bound vessels crossed the meridian of 47° W. in latitude 41° N., that is 60 miles further south than the then accepted track.

The publications known as "Sailing Directions," compiled by the hydrographic office at the Admiralty, indicate the caution which it is necessary to use in regions where ice is likely to be found.

The following is an extract from one of these books, named "United States Pilot (East Coast)," Part I (second edition, 1909, p. 34), referring to the ocean passages of the large trans-Atlantic mail and passenger steamers:

To these vessels one of the chief dangers in crossing the Atlantic lies in the probability of encountering masses of ice, both in the form of bergs and of extensive fields of solid compact ice, released at the breaking up of winter in the Arctic regions, and drifted down by the Labrador current across their direct route. Ice is more likely to be encountered in this route between April and August, both months inclusive, than at other times, although icebergs have been seen at all seasons northward of the parallel of 43° N., but not often so far south after August.

These icebergs are sometimes over 200 feet in height and of considerable extent. They have been seen as far south as latitude 39° N., to obtain which position they must have crossed the Gulf Stream impelled by the cold Arctic current underrunning the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. That this should happen is not to be wondered at when it is considered that the specific gravity of fresh-water ice, of which these bergs are composed, is about seven-eighths that of sea water; so that, however vast the berg may appear to the eye of the observer, he can in reality see one-eighth of its bulk, the remaining seven-eighths being submerged and subject to the deep-water currents of the ocean. The track of an iceberg is indeed directed mainly by current, so small a portion of its surface being exposed to the action of the winds that its course is but slightly retarded or deflected by moderate breezes. On the Great Bank of Newfoundland bergs are often observed to be moving south or southeast; those that drift westward of Cape Race usually pass between Green and St. Pierre Banks.

The route chart of the North Atlantic, No. 2058, shows the limits within which both field ice and icebergs may be met with, and where it should be carefully looked out for at all times, but especially during the spring and summer seasons. From this chart it would appear that whilst the southern and eastern limits of field ice are about latitude 42° N., and longitude 45° W., icebergs may be met with much farther from Newfoundland; in April, May, and June they have been seen as far South as latitude 39° N. and as far east as longitude 38° 30´ W."

And again, on page 35:

It is, in fact, impossible to give, within the outer limits named, any distinct idea of where ice may be expected, and no rule can be laid down to insure safe navigation, as its position and the quantity met with differs so greatly in different seasons. Everything must depend upon the vigilance, caution, and skill with which a vessel is navigated when crossing the dangerous ice-bearing regions of the Atlantic Ocean.

Similar warnings as to ice are also given in the "Nova Scotia (Southeast Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot" (sixth edition, 1911), which is also published by the hydrographic office.

Both the above quoted books were supplied to the master of the Titanic (together with other necessary charts and books) before that ship left Southampton.

The above extracts show that it is quite incorrect to assume that icebergs had never been encountered or field ice observed so far south, at the particular time of year when the Titanic disaster occurred; but it is true to say that the field ice was certainly at that time farther south than it has been seen for many years.

It may be useful here to give some definitions of the various forms of ice to be met with in these latitudes, although there is frequently some confusion in their use.

An iceberg may be defined as a detached portion of a polar glacier carried out to sea. The ice of an iceberg formed from a glacier is of quite fresh water. Only about an eighth of its mass floats above the surface of sea water.

A "growler" is a colloquial term applied to icebergs of small mass, which therefore only show a small portion above the surface. It is not infrequently a berg which has turned over, and is therefore showing what has been termed "black ice" or, more correctly, dark-blue ice.

Pack ice is the floating ice which covers wide areas of the polar seas, broken into large pieces, which are driven ("packed") together by wind and current, so as to form a practically continuous sheet. Such ice is generally frozen from sea water, and not derived from glaciers.

Field ice is a term usually applied to frozen sea water floating in much looser form than pack ice.

An icefloe is the term generally applied to the same ice (i.e., field ice) in a smaller quantity.

A floe berg is a stratified mass of floe ice (i.e., sea-water ice).

ICE MESSAGES RECEIVED.

The Titanic followed the outward southern track until Sunday, April 14, in the usual way. At 11.40 p. m. on that day she struck an iceberg and at 2.20 a. m. on the next day she foundered.

At 9 a. m. (Titanic time) on that day a wireless message from the steamship Caronia was received by Capt. Smith. It was as follows:

CAPTAIN, Titanic:

West-bound steamers report bergs, growlers, and field ice in 42° N., from 49° to 51° W., April 12. Compliments.

BARR.

It will be noticed that this message referred to bergs, growlers, and field ice sighted on April 12—at least 48 hours before the time of the collision. At the time this message was received the Titanic's position was about latitude 43° 35´ N. and longitude 43° 50´ W. Capt. Smith acknowledged the receipt of this message.

At 1.42 p. m., a wireless message from the steamship Baltic was received by Capt. Smith. It was as follows:

Capt. SMITH, Titanic:

Have had moderate, variable winds and clear, fine weather since leaving. Greek steamer Athenai reports passing icebergs and large quantities of field ice to-day in latitude 41° 51´ N., longitude 49° 52´ W. Last night we spoke German oiltank steamer Deutschland, Stettin to Philadelphia, not under control, short of coal, latitude 40° 42´ N., longitude 55° 11´ W. Wishes to be reported to New York and other steamers. Wish you and Titanic all success.

COMMANDER.

At the time this message was received the Titanic position was about 42° 35´ N., 45° 50´ W. Capt. Smith acknowledged the receipt of this message also.

Mr. Ismay, the managing director of the White Star Line, was on board the Titanic, and it appears that the master handed the Baltic's message to Mr. Ismay almost immediately after it was received. This no doubt was in order that Mr. Ismay might know that ice was to be expected. Mr. Ismay states that he understood from the message that they would get up to the ice "that night." Mr. Ismay showed this message to two ladies, and it is therefore probable that many persons on board became aware of its contents. This message ought in my opinion to have been put on the board in the chart room as soon as it was received. It remained, however, in Mr. Ismay's possession until 7.15 p. m., when the master asked Mr. Ismay to return it. It was then that it was first posted in the chart room.

This was considerably before the time at which the vessel reached the position recorded in the message. Nevertheless, I think it was irregular for the master to part with the document, and improper for Mr. Ismay to retain it, but the incident had, in my opinion, no connection with or influence upon the manner in which the vessel was navigated by the master.

It appears that about 1.45 p. m. (Titanic time) on the 14th a message was sent from the German steamer Amerika to the Hydrographic Office in Washington, which was in the following terms:

Amerika passed two large icebergs in 41° 27´ N., 50° 8´ W., on April 14.

This was a position south of the point of the Titanic's disaster. The message does not mention at what hour the bergs had been observed. It was a private message for the hydrographer at Washington, but it passed to the Titanic because she was nearest to Cape Race, to which station it had to be sent in order to reach Washington. Being a message affecting navigation, it should in the ordinary course have been taken to the bridge. So far as can be ascertained, it was never heard of by anyone on board the Titanic outside the Marconi room. There were two Marconi operators in the Marconi room, namely, Phillips, who perished, and Bride, who survived and gave evidence. Bride did not receive the Amerika message nor did Phillips mention it to him, though the two had much conversation together after it had been received. I am of opinion that when this message reached the Marconi room it was put aside by Phillips to wait until the Titanic would be within call of Cape Race (at about 8 or 8.30 p. m.), and that it was never handed to any officer of the Titanic.

At 5.50 p. m. the Titanic's course (which had been S. 62° W.) was changed to bring her on a westerly course for New York. In ordinary circumstances this change in her course should have been made about half an hour earlier, but she seems on this occasion to have continued for about 10 miles longer on her southwesterly course before turning, with the result that she found herself, after altering course at 5.50 p. m., about 4 or 5 miles south of the customary route on a course S. 86° W. true. Her course, as thus set, would bring her at the time of the collision to a point about 2 miles to the southward of the customary route and 4 miles south and considerably to the westward of the indicated position of the Baltic's ice. Her position at the time of the collision would also be well to the southward of the indicated position of the ice mentioned in the Caronia message. This change of course was so insignificant that in my opinion it can not have been made in consequence of information as to ice.

In this state of things, at 7.30 p.m. a fourth message was received, and is said by the Marconi operator Bride to have been delivered to the bridge. This message was from the steamship Californian to the steamship Antillian, but was picked up by the Titanic. It was as follows:

To CAPTAIN, Antillian:

Six-thirty p. m., apparent ship's time; latitude 42° 3´ N., longitude 49° 9´ W. Three large bergs 5 miles to southward of us. Regards.

LORD

Bride does not remember to what officer he delivered this message.

By the time the Titanic reached the position of the collision (11.40 p. m.) she had gone about 50 miles to the westward of the indicated position of the ice mentioned in this fourth message. Thus it would appear that before the collision she had gone clear of the indicated positions of ice contained in the messages from the Baltic and Californian. As to the ice advised by the Caronia message, so far as it consisted of small bergs and field ice, it had before the time of the collision possibly drifted with the Gulf Stream to the eastward; and so far as it consisted of large bergs (which would be deep enough in the water to reach the Labrador current) it had probably gone to the southward. It was urged by Sir Robert Finlay, who appeared for the owners, that this is strong evidence that the Titanic had been carefully and successfully navigated so as to avoid the ice of which she had received warning. Mr. Ismay, however, stated that he understood from the Baltic message that "we would get up to the ice that night."

There was a fifth message received in the Marconi room of the Titanic at 9.40 p. m. This was from a steamer called the Mesaba. It was in the following terms:

From "Mesaba" to "Titanic" and all east-bound ships:

Ice report in latitude 42° N. to 41° 25´ N., longitude 49° to longitude 50° 30´ W. Saw much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs. Also field ice. Weather good, clear.

This message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate vicinity of the Titanic, and if it had reached the bridge would perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have been delivered to the master or to any of the officers. The Marconi operator was very busy from 8 o'clock onward transmitting messages via Cape Race for passengers on board the Titanic, and the probability is that he failed to grasp the significance and importance of the message, and put it aside until he should be less busy. It was never acknowledged by Capt. Smith, and I am satisfied that it was not received by him. But, assuming Sir Robert Finlay's contentions to be well founded that the Titanic had been navigated so as to avoid the Baltic and the Californian ice, and that the Caronia ice had drifted to the eastward and to the southward, still there can be no doubt, if the evidence of Mr. Lightoller, the second officer, is to be believed, that both he and the master knew that the danger of meeting ice still existed. Mr. Lightoller says that the master showed him the Caronia message about 12.45 p. m. on April 14, when he was on the bridge. He was about to go off watch, and he says he made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied him that the Titanic would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he came on watch again at 6 p. m. At 6 p. m. Mr. Lightoller came on the bridge again to take over the ship from Mr. Wilde, the chief officer (dead). He does not remember being told anything about the Baltic message, which had been received at 1.42 p. m. Mr. Lightoller then requested Mr. Moody, the sixth officer (dead), to let him know "at what time we should reach the vicinity of ice," and says that he thinks Mr. Moody reported "about 11 o'clock." Mr. Lightoller says that 11 o'clock did not agree with a mental calculation he himself had made and which showed 9.30 as the time. This mental calculation he at first said he had made before Mr. Moody gave him 11 o'clock as the time, but later on he corrected this, and said his mental calculation was made between 7 and 8 o'clock, and after Mr. Moody had mentioned 11. He did not point out the difference to him, and thought that perhaps Mr. Moody had made his calculations on the basis of some "other" message. Mr. Lightoller excuses himself for not pointing out the difference by saying that Mr. Moody was busy at the time, probably with stellar observations. It is, however, an odd circumstance that Mr. Lightoller, who believed that the vicinity of ice would be reached before his watch ended at 10 p.m., should not have mentioned the fact to Mr. Moody, and it is also odd that if he thought that Mr. Moody was working on the basis of some "other" message, he did not ask what the other message was or where it came from. The point, however, of Mr. Lightoller's evidence is that they both thought that the vicinity of ice would be reached before midnight. When he was examined as to whether he did not fear that on entering the indicated ice region he might run foul of a growler (a low-lying berg) he answers: "No, I judged I should see it with "sufficient distinctness" and at a distance of a "mile and a half, more probably 2 miles." He then adds:

In the event of meeting ice there are many things we look for. In the first place, a slight breeze. Of course, the stronger the breeze the more visible will the ice be, or, rather, the breakers on the ice.

He is then asked whether there was any breeze on this night, and he answers:

When I left the deck at 10 o'clock there was a slight breeze. Oh, pardon me, no; I take that back. No, it was calm, perfectly calm—

And almost immediately afterwards he describes the sea as "absolutely flat." It appeared, according to this witness, that about 9 o'clock the master came on the bridge and that Mr. Lightoller had a conversation with him which lasted half an hour. This conversation, so far as it is material, is described by Mr. Lightoller in the following words:

We commenced to speak about the weather. He said, "there is not much wind." I said, "No, it is a flat calm," as a matter of fact. He repeated it, he said, "A flat calm." I said, "Quite flat; there is no wind." I said something about it was rather a pity the breeze had not kept up whilst we were going through the ice region. Of course, my reason was obvious: he knew I meant the water ripples breaking on the base of the berg * * * We then discussed the indications of ice. I remember saying, "In any case, there will be a certain amount of reflected light from the bergs." He said, "Oh, yes, there will be a certain amount of reflected light." I said or he said—blue was said between us—that even though the blue side of the berg was towards us, probably the outline, the white outline, would give us sufficient warning, that we should be able to see it at a good distance, and as far as we could see, we should be able to see it. Of course, it was just with regard to that possibility of the blue side being toward us, and that if it did happen to be turned with the purely blue side toward us, there would still be the white outline.

Further on Mr. Lightoller says that he told the master nothing about his own calculation as to coming up with the ice at 9.30 or about Mr. Moody's calculation as to coming up with it at 11.

The conversation with the master ended with the master saying, "If it becomes at all doubtful let me know at once; I will be just inside." This remark Mr. Lightoller says undoubtedly referred to ice.

At 9.30 the master went to his room, and the first thing that Mr. Lightoller did afterwards was to send a message to the crow's nest "to keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers," until daylight. There seems to be no doubt that this message was in fact sent, and that it was passed on to the next lookouts when they came on watch. Hitchins, the quartermaster, says he heard Mr. Lightoller give the message to Mr. Moody, and both the men in the crow's nest at the time (Jewell and Symons) speak to having received it. From 9.30 to 10 o'clock, when his watch ended, Mr. Lightoller remained on the bridge "looking out for ice." He also said that the night order book for the 14th had a footnote about keeping a sharp lookout for ice, and that this note was "initialed by every officer." At 10 o'clock Mr. Lightoller handed over the watch to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer (dead), telling him that "we might be up around the ice any time now." That Mr. Murdoch knew of the danger of meeting ice appears from the evidence of Hemming, a lamp trimmer, who says that about 7.15 p. m. Mr. Murdoch told him to go forward and see the forescuttle hatch closed—

as we are in the vicinity of ice and there is a glow coming from that, and I want everything dark before the bridge.

The foregoing evidence establishes quite clearly that Capt. Smith, the master; Mr. Murdoch, the first officer; Mr. Lightoller, the second officer; and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all knew on the Sunday evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be expected; and this being so, it seems to me to be of little importance to consider whether the master had by design or otherwise succeeded in avoiding the particular ice indicated in the three messages received by him.

SPEED OF THE SHIP.

The entire passage had been made at high speed, though not at the ship's maximum, and this speed was never reduced until the collision was unavoidable. At 10 p. m. the ship was registering 45 knots every two hours by the Cherub log.

The quartermaster on watch aft when the Titanic struck states that the log, reset at noon, then registered 260 knots, and the fourth officer, when working up the position from 7.30 p. m. to the time of the collision, states he estimated the Titanic's speed as 22 knots, and this is also borne out by evidence that the engines were running continuously at 75 revolutions.

THE WEATHER CONDITIONS.

From 6 p. m. onward to the time of the collision the weather was perfectly clear and fine. There was no moon, the stars were out, and there was not a cloud in the sky. There was, however, a drop in temperature of 10° in slightly less than two hours, and by about 7.30 p. m. the temperature was 33° F., and it eventually fell to 32° F. That this was not necessarily an indication of ice is borne out by the sailing directions. The Nova Scotia (S. E. Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot (sixth edition, 1911, p. 16) says:

No reliance can be placed on any warning being conveyed to a mariner by a fall of temperature, either of the air or sea, on approaching ice. Some decrease in temperature has occasionally been recorded, but more often none has been observed.

Sir Ernest Shackleton was, however, of opinion that—

if there was no wind and the temperature fell abnormally for the time of the year, I would consider that I was approaching an area which might have ice in it.

ACTION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

The question is what ought the master to have done. I am advised that with the knowledge of the proximity of ice which the master had, two courses were open to him: The one was to stand well to the southward instead of turning up to a westerly course; the other was to reduce speed materially as night approached. He did neither. The alteration of the course at 5.50 p. m. was so insignificant that it can not be attributed to any intention to avoid ice. This deviation brought the vessel back to within about 2 miles of the customary route before 11.30 p. m. And there was certainly no reduction of speed. Why, then, did the master persevere in his course and maintain his speed? The answer is to be found in the evidence. It was shown that for many years past, indeed, for a quarter of a century or more, the practice of liners using this track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp lookout to enable them to avoid the danger. This practice, it was said, had been justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it. I accept the evidence as to the practice and as to the immunity from casualties which is said to have accompanied it. But the event has proved the practice to be bad. Its root is probably to be bound in competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the judgment of navigators. But unfortunately experience appeared to justify it. In these circumstances I am not able to blame Capt. Smith. He had not the experience which his own misfortune has afforded to those whom he has left behind, and he was doing only that which other skilled men would have done in the same position. It was suggested at the bar that he was yielding to influences which ought not to have affected him; that the presence of Mr. Ismay on board and the knowledge which he perhaps had of a conversation between Mr. Ismay and the chief engineer at Queenstown about the speed of the ship and the consumption of coal probably induced him to neglect precautions which he would otherwise have taken. But I do not believe this. The evidence shows that he was not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick passage. He was not trying to please anybody, but was exercising his own discretion in the way he thought best. He made a mistake, a very grievous mistake, but one in which, in face of the practice and of past experience, negligence can not be said to have had any part; and in the absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix Capt. Smith with blame. It is, however, to be hoped that the last has been heard of the practice and that for the future it will be abandoned for what we now know to be more prudent and wiser measures. What was a mistake in the case of the Titanic would without doubt be negligence in any similar case in the future.

THE COLLISION.

Mr. Lightoller turned over the ship to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, at 10 o'clock, telling him that the ship was within the region where ice had been reported. He also told him of the message he had sent to the crow's nest, and of his conversation with the master, and of the latter's orders.

The ship appears to have run on, on the same course, until, at a little before 11.40, one of the lookouts in the crow's nest struck three blows on the gong, which was the accepted warning for something ahead, following this immediately afterward by a telephone message to the bridge "Iceberg right ahead." Almost simultaneously with the three-gong signal Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order "Hard-a-starboard," and immediately telegraphed down to the engine room "Stop. Full speed astern." The helm was already "hard over," and the ship's head had fallen off about two points to port, when she collided with an iceberg well forward on her starboard side.

Mr. Murdoch at the same time pulled the lever over which closed the water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms.

The master "rushed out" onto the bridge and asked Mr. Murdoch what the ship had struck.

Mr. Murdoch replied:

An iceberg, sir. I hard-a-starboarded and reversed the engines, and I was going to hard-a-port round it, but she was too close. I could not do any more. I have closed the water-tight doors.

From the evidence given it appears that the Titanic had turned about two points to port before the collision occurred. From various experiments subsequently made with the steamship Olympic, a sister ship to the Titanic, it was found that traveling at the same rate as the Titanic, about 37 seconds would be required for the ship to change her course to this extent after the helm had been put hard-a-starboard. In this time the ship would travel about 466 yards, and allowing for the few seconds that would be necessary for the order to be given, it may be assumed that 500 yards was about the distance at which the iceberg was sighted either from the bridge or crow's nest.

That it was quite possible on this night, even with a sharp lookout at the stemhead, crow's nest, and on the bridge, not to see an iceberg at this distance is shown by the evidence of Capt. Rostron, of the Carpathia.

The injuries to the ship, which are described in the next section, were of such a kind that she foundered in 2 hours and 40 minutes.