PROBLEMS

I have heard men express preferences. They have made mention of whom they desire to rule over them if the worst should come upon us nationally. Some are rampant after American associations; some are enamoured of the English; some would have the Germans, others the French. Personally I indulge no such predilections. They argue an abandonment of hope; they display a lack of vitality; they are an absolute admission of incapacity and of failure. For my part I am a Liberian first and last and my desire is that Liberia should endure till the heavens fall, that this country be controlled by Liberians for Liberians. But I also desire that these Liberians be tolerant; that they be prescient; that they be energetic, industrious, and public-spirited; that they be courageous in shouldering their national responsibilities; that they be liberal and that they become a great and glorious people, unanimous in sentiment, united in action, abounding in all the virtues which make a nation powerful, perpetual and enduring.—E. Barclay.

BOUNDARY QUESTIONS.

The most pressing and ever urgent question which the Republic has to face is the protection of its frontier against aggression; Liberia has two powerful neighbors, both of which are land-hungry and are continually pressing upon her borders; she has already lost large slices of her territory and is still menaced with further loss.

FIRST BRITISH AGGRESSION.

Shortly after his election to the presidency of the Republic, President J. J. Roberts visited Europe. He was well received both in England and France. On one occasion, in 1848, when he was dining in London with the Prussian Ambassador, the conversation dealt with the difficulties which the Liberian settlers had with the native chiefs along the Gallinhas River; these hostilities were kept alive by slave traders who had their trading stations near the river’s mouth; these difficulties had generally been incited and directed by a chief named Mano. Among the guests who were present at the dinner were Lord Ashley and Mr. Gurney; it was suggested that an end might be put to these difficulties and the anti-slavery cause advanced, if Liberia would purchase this territory; considerable interest was aroused by the suggestion, and through Lord Ashley’s effort the necessary money was raised for consummating the purchase. On his return to Liberia, President Roberts entered into negotiations which extended from 1849 to 1856, by which the land was gradually acquired; the area secured stretched from the Mano River to the Sewa and Sherbro Island on the west. Through the annexation of this territory, Liberia’s domain extended from Cape Lahon to the eastward of Cape Palmas, west to the border of Sierra Leone, a distance of 600 miles. This acquisition of territory was attended with considerable difficulty; the influence of traders, of slavers, and even of England herself was thrown in the way of the negotiations—so Commodore Foote tells us. Nor did the acquisition of the territory put an end to the difficulties in that region. In the year 1860 John Myers Harris, an English trader, had established himself in the country between the Mano and Sulima Rivers and refused to acknowledge Liberia’s authority; as he was conducting a flagrant trade in contravention of Liberian laws of commerce, President Benson sent a coast guard to seize two schooners, the Phoebe and Emily, which had been consigned to him; the seizure was made between Cape Mount and Mano Point, clearly Liberian territory. It is curious that this seizure was made by a Liberian government vessel, the Quail, which had been a gift to the Republic from Great Britain. We have, then, a vessel, contributed through British sympathy, operating within an area secured through British philanthropy, against law-breaking indulged in by British subjects. The captured schooners were taken to Liberia and were held for legal adjudication; under the orders of the Sierra Leone Government, the British gunboat, Torch, appeared at Monrovia, and seized the two schooners by force on December 17; at the same time the commander of this gunboat demanded from the Liberian Government a penalty of fifteen pounds per day for nineteen days’ detention. Shortly after these events, President Benson, on his way to England for public business, visited the government of Sierra Leone and tried to adjust the difficulties which had arisen; he was, however, referred to London. At about this time part of the disputed territory was annexed by Sierra Leone to her own area. While in London, Benson took up the matter with the British Government. Lord Russell acknowledged the territorial rights of Liberia to extend from the coast east of Turner Point (Mattru) to the San Pedro River on the east, thus admitting the point for which Liberia contended. This decision was by no means satisfactory to the troublers in Africa. Harris agitated the matter in dispute. Backed by Governor Hall of Sierra Leone, he and neighboring traders protested against the concession Russell had made. A commission was therefore appointed and met at Monrovia April 25, 1863, continuing in session until May 4, when it adjourned without decision. The British Commissioners examined the title deeds held by Liberia and were inclined to recognize some of these and to refuse others; they objected to Liberia’s possessing any territory beyond the Mano River, and proposed that river as the boundary. The Liberian Commissioners demurred, urging the validity of the deeds they showed and proposing that the Sherbro should be their northwest boundary; they asserted a good title to the territories known as Cassee, Gumbo, and Muttru. The British Commissioners based their claims upon letters from the chiefs of the territories involved and on statements which they asserted had been made by them. The Commission broke up without a settlement, as the Liberians held strictly to the concession which Lord Russell had previously made. London, however, yielding to the colonial pressure, regretted that no solution had been reached, and claimed that it was “justified in view of the facts” in only recognizing Liberia’s sovereignty over Sugaree. The closing episode in this exchange of views was the sending of a letter by Dr. Blyden, who was then Secretary of State for the Republic, which ran as follows: “The President is equally grieved that the oral statements of barbarous and heathen chiefs on a subject affecting the prosperity of a rising Christian state should be regarded by Her Majesty’s Government as entitled to more weight than the statements of Christian men supported by written documents and by the known local conduct of the chiefs towards the Liberian Government since the cession of their territories until very recently.”

As might be expected, the troubles did not cease. Traders continued to smuggle; local chiefs continued to harass; shipping continued to bid defiance to Liberian laws; vessels continued to be seized; threats continued to be made. Harris began to act almost as if he were an independent chief within this territory; there were various tribes about him, and some of them were inclined to resist his exactions; disputes with him aroused the Vai to undertake reprisals; Harris organized the Gallinhas peoples in an attack upon the Vai; the Liberian Government sent forces in 1869 to aid the Vai, who were loyal to them. The Gallinhas natives were defeated, fled, and in their rage turning on Harris, destroyed one of his factories; this of course gave him a basis for new claims for damages. On this military expedition some property had been destroyed or confiscated. Thus new difficulties grew up; there were occasional seizures, retaliatory threats, demands for damages, shows of force. Naturally, the hostile chiefs living in the Mano District, encouraged by the unsettled conditions, raided and destroyed Liberian settlements; things presently were critical, and in 1871 another expedition was despatched by the Liberian Government into Mano and Sulima; property was destroyed, including powder and goods belonging to British owners; the usual demands for damages were made, and these demands known as the “Mano River Claims” were pending until 1882.

Between the constant pushing of the “Harris Claims” and the “Mano River Claims,” things finally came to a head in December, 1878. A new commission was then appointed which met in 1879, first at Sierra Leone, then at Sulima; Commodore Shufeldt, of the American navy, was chosen as an arbitrator between the two contestants. The “Harris Claims” by this time amounted to some 6000 pounds. The conduct of Great Britain on this occasion was supercilious. The Liberian Commissioners, after reaching Sierra Leone, were kept waiting for three weeks before the British Commissioners made their appearance; the commissioners examined the title deeds of the Liberian Government and took oral testimony of witnesses favorable to and hostile to the Liberian claims. The Liberians claimed the territories known as Sugaree, Mano, Rock River, and Sulima; the British Commissioners took the ground that no such countries were in existence. The meeting was rather stormy; Shufeldt reduced the “Harris Claims” to £3000, but the British Commissioners were not inclined either in this matter or in others to abide by the decision of the umpire; finally the Commission broke up without accomplishing any good results. The British claimed that Sierra Leone should undertake the protectorate of the whole country as far as the Mano River, as they said Liberia was unable to maintain order west of that point. “Undoubtedly they were unable to fight British traders, since every time they used force, marine or military, the said traders were able to command the armed interference of the Sierra Leone Government.” The matter was again referred to London; nothing final was there done.

Matters reached a crisis when, on March 20, 1882, Sir Arthur Havelock, governor of Sierra Leone, with four gunboats appeared before Monrovia and demanded that the Republic should pay an indemnity of £8,500 to settle all outstanding claims, and that it should accept the Maffa River as a boundary. The Liberian Government yielded to these insistent claims. They promised to pay the indemnity, admitted the Maffa River as a temporary boundary, and agreed to receive from Great Britain a money payment in return for what she had expended for the purchase of the disputed territory. Before the Liberian Government yielded, she set up a statement of her own position which was just and dignified. As soon as the action of the government was known at Monrovia, Havelock having returned to Sierra Leone, violent hostility arose; the Senate rejected the treaty; the Liberians asked that the whole matter be submitted to arbitration. On September 7, Sir Arthur Havelock again appeared with gunboats, demanding immediate ratification of the treaty. Liberia again raised her defense: “If the contested territory was British, why did the British Government claim from Liberia an indemnity for acts of violence amongst the natives which had taken place thereon? If, however, Liberia acknowledged her responsibility, as she had done, and agreed to pay an indemnity, why should she be in addition deprived of territories for the law and order of which she was held responsible, and which were hers by acts of purchase admitted by the British Government?” The Senate again refused to ratify the treaty. Sir Arthur Havelock sailed away; but in March, 1883, the Sierra Leone Government seized the territories in question between Sherbro and the Mano River, territories which from first to last had cost Liberia £20,000. The whole matter was finally settled by a treaty signed at London, Nov. 11, 1885, whereby the river Mano was admitted to be the western boundary; a badly defined interior line was agreed upon; a repayment of £4750 of purchase money was made to Liberia.

THE KANRE-LAHUN AFFAIR.

The next act of serious aggression on the part of Great Britain grew out of the bad definition of the interior boundary by the treaty of 1885. The Mano River had been recognized as the boundary between Sierra Leone and Liberia. The question now arose as to whether the two parties enjoyed equal rights of freedom on the river. The Liberian Government attempted to secure to Liberian traders and to foreigners resident in Liberia the rights to free navigation on the river without subjection to the payment of customs dues and other charges to the Sierra Leone Government. The matter became of sufficient consequence to call for a commission in the year 1901. Three Liberians, among them Arthur Barclay, then Secretary of the Treasury (later President of the Republic), were appointed; the meeting was held in London and led to the following memorandum of agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Liberian Republic.

1. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to accede to the requests of the Liberian Government that a British officer should be deputed to demarcate the Anglo-Liberian Boundary.

2. They are also ready to lend the services of a British officer for employment by the Liberian Government in the demarcation of the Franco-Liberian Boundary whenever the Liberian Government shall have made an arrangement with the French Government for such demarcation.

3. The Liberian Government undertakes to repay to His Majesty’s Government the whole of any cost incurred by them in connection with the survey and demarcation of the Anglo-Liberian Frontier.

4. His Majesty’s Government are willing that, in lieu of the Governor of Sierra Leone acting as British Consul to Liberia, arrangements shall be made whereby some other British officer shall be Consul in the Republic.

5. His Majesty’s Government undertakes the survey of the Kru Coast, provided the Liberian Government will throw open to foreign trade the native ports on the coast.

6. With regard to the navigation on the Mano River, His Majesty’s Government are prepared to permit the Government of the Liberian Republic and its citizens to trade on that river, provided that it is not to be considered actual right, and if, in return, the Government of Sierra Leone is allowed to connect by bridges and ferries the two banks of the river with any roads or trade-routes in the neighborhood.

7. The Government of the Liberian Republic have expressed a desire for closer union with Great Britain: His Majesty’s Government are actuated by the most friendly feelings toward the Republic; and with the view of meeting their wishes in this respect, so far as it is consistent with the declaration made by His Majesty’s government in connection with other powers, will at all times be ready to advise them in matters affecting the welfare of Liberia, and to confer with the Government of the Republic as to the best means of securing its independence and the integrity of its territory.

When this agreement was submitted to the Senate of Liberia for ratification, they made the following amendments:

Section 1. Amended to read, that the Liberian Government shall depute an officer or officers to be associated with the British officer in demarcating the Anglo-Liberian Boundary.

Section 2. Amended to read, that the Liberian Government shall depute an officer or officers to be associated with the British and French officers in demarcating the Franco-Liberian Frontier.

Section 5. The Senate, not perceiving the advisability of throwing the coast open for the present, is under the necessity of withholding its vote in favor of this section.

Section 7. Amended to read, “One bridge at the place where the Liberian Customs House is now erected, and one ferry at the place where the second Liberian Customs House may hereafter be erected; that said bridge and ferry will be accessible to the citizens of the Liberian Government without any restrictions or extra toll, or charges, more than is required to be paid by the subjects of His Majesty’s Government.”

The British Government left the settlement of the details of that portion of the agreement which had reference to the navigation of the Mano River to be settled between the Liberian Government and the Government of Sierra Leone. The colonial government imposed such restrictions that no understanding was ever arrived at. However, a joint commission for the demarcation of the Anglo-Liberian frontier was appointed and in 1903 proceeded with its work. In due time the boundary was satisfactorily settled by this commission. This boundary, however, very soon gave rise to a serious difficulty and to a flagrant aggression. By the delimitation, the town and district of Kanre-Lahun fell to Liberia; Colonel Williams, the Liberian Commissioner, hoisted the Liberian flag at that town which, at the time, was occupied by a detachment of the Sierra Leone Frontier Force; curiously enough, the British force was not withdrawn.

In 1904 the British Government complained to the Liberian Government that the Kissi were making raids into British territory in consequence of a war between Fabundah, a chief of the Kanre-Lahun District, and Kah Furah, a Kissi chief, and asked permission for the entrance of British troops into Liberian territory for the purpose of repressing the disorder which, it was said, threatened British interests. The request was granted; British troops advanced to the Mafisso where they established a post. In November the British Vice-Consul sent word to the President of Liberia saying that the chief Kah Furah had been driven out of the Kissi country, and that the people, at the invitation of the military authorities, had elected a new chief, and had pledged themselves not to receive Kah Furah among them again. The Liberian Government assumed that the matter was at an end and that the British force had been withdrawn. In 1906 Mr. Lomax, the Liberian Commissioner for the French frontier, was instructed to proceed to this point; he reached Kanre-Lahun in December, and found Waladi, a town in Liberian territory, garrisoned by a Sierra Leone force. While Mr. Lomax was at Kanre-Lahun, complaints were made against him by the Chief Fabundah and others. These complaints were examined in the presence of Governor Probyn, Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. Lamont, and leading military officers, and Mr. Lomax justified himself completely, except in a single case where damages of five pounds were suggested and paid. Later on, British officers sent in complaints that the escort with Mr. Lomax were plundering the country. It was impossible in such districts and under such circumstances to prevent some petty thieving. Mr. Lomax, however, accepted the complaints and paid the damages claimed. With a view to permanently settling the country under Liberian rule, Mr. Lomax ordered a local election to be held. Three chiefs were chosen—Fabundah for the lower section, Gardi for the Bombali section, and Bawma for the Gormah section. Fabundah, who before had been exercising jurisdiction over the Bombali, was dissatisfied. The Sierra Leone authorities promised to support him against the Liberian Government; they placed a frontier force at his disposal for the purpose of ruining the chiefs who were favorable to Liberian control or who had received commissions from the President; efforts to arouse opposition and dissatisfaction were made; Lomax was hounded from the district; the chief, Gardi, was driven from the country, his town was plundered, and his brother made a prisoner in Kanre-Lahun.

In 1908 attempts had been made in Europe to settle difficulties pending with Great Britain and France. Mr. F. E. R. Johnson, the Liberian Secretary of State, who had been sent to arrange these matters, found conditions threatening. In London the British Government stated that it had no designs against Liberia, but that they believed the French were planning encroachment, and that, if Liberia lost territory to France, Great Britain would find it necessary to take a new piece of territory contingent to Sierra Leone in her own defense. Matters appeared so serious that President Barclay was advised to come to Europe himself; he arrived in London on the 29th of August, accompanied by T. McCants Stewart, and there met Mr. Johnson. He told the British Government of his fears regarding further aggression upon Liberian territory and expressed the desire that Great Britain and America should jointly guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. The reply was that Great Britain would on no account enter into any such guarantee; if the Liberian Government obtained a settled frontier with France, and inaugurated certain reforms, there would be little danger of any one’s troubling it; if the reforms desired by England were not undertaken, nothing would save it from the end which threatened. At the same time London refused to treat of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River difficulties until after the troubles with France had been arranged. In France, as will be shortly seen, the Liberian envoys met with no success; a treaty was indeed arranged by means of which the Republic was robbed of a large amount of valuable territory. The envoys were again in London in September to take up the matters of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River negotiations. The British officials now demanded that Fabundah should come entirely under the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that the frontier line on the northwest should be so altered as to place his territory within the British colony; the area thus demanded contained something like 250 square miles of territory. At no time had the area actually in charge of Fabundah amounted to any such quantity; the Liberians demurred at the largeness of the territorial claim—the British officials themselves stated that they were surprised at its extent, but insisted upon receiving the entire amount. No decision was actually reached, the matter being postponed until the delimitation of the new Franco-Liberian boundary should be achieved.

Great Britain’s claim to this region was based upon the flimsiest pretext. It is true that she had had relations with Fabundah before the boundary had been delimited; it is true that, previous to that date, she had had a force in Kanre-Lahun; however, when the boundary was actually fixed, Kanre-Lahun was clearly within Liberian territory, and no objection whatever was made to the Republic’s taking possession and to the withdrawal of the Sierra Leone force. When, later on, Great Britain sent soldiers into the area, it was done on the pretext that intertribal difficulties in the region threatened British interests; permission was given as a favor to Great Britain and with the expectation that, as soon as the difficulty had been adjusted, the British force would be withdrawn. Such was not the case; once in Kanre-Lahun, it remained there; Major Lomax was hounded from the country; the Liberian customs officer, Mr. Hughes, was ordered to abandon his post of duty and to surrender the customs house to the British commander. This act of occupation was bad enough; but soon Great Britain demanded that the army of occupation should be paid by the Liberian Government before it would evacuate the district; no such understanding had been arranged, and the claim was unjustified and ridiculous; the frontier force of Sierra Leone was not increased, nor put to any extra expense in the matter. In asking for a new boundary line which should cut out Fabundah’s territory, flagrant injustice was committed; it is true that the boundary which had been arranged cut the land controlled by the chief; about one-twenty-fifth of his territory was on the British side, the remaining twenty-four-twenty-fifths being in Liberia; if a new line were to be drawn, it should have given the one-twenty-fifth to Liberia and reduced the Sierra Leone territory. The matter dragged along for months. December 8, 1909, President Barclay accepted a proposition to exchange or sell the district in dispute; the legislature refused to accept the proposition. In May, 1911, however, an agreement was finally arranged; the British authorities took over the Kanre-Lahun District, an area of extraordinary wealth and dense population; in return for this valuable and most needed area, Liberia received a piece of country lying between the Morro and Mano Rivers, which had formerly been a part of the Colony of Sierra Leone; this territory is almost without population, densely forested, and practically worthless. Even so, it is little likely that the Republic will be left in peaceful possession of it. On some pretext, in the future, Great Britain will no doubt regain it.

THE FRENCH BOUNDARY QUESTION.

When Maryland was added to the Liberian Republic, it possessed lands acquired by deeds of purchase and treaties as far east as the San Pedro River, sixty miles east of the Cavalla; this country was occupied by Kru tribes, and its eastern boundary practically marked their limit; it was hence not only a geographical, but an ethnographical boundary. For years no one questioned Liberia’s right to the whole area, and on maps and in repeated descriptions of the country its rights were recognized. In 1885, however, the French Government claimed that the French possessions extended continuously from the Ivory Coast westward beyond the Cavalla River and Cape Palmas as far as Garawé; at the same time it suggested certain shadowy claims to Cape Mount, Grand Bassa, and Grand Butu;—in other words, points at intervals along the whole coast of the Liberian Republic; these claims were based on agreements stated to have been drawn up between native chiefs and the commanders of war vessels. In 1891 the French Government officially communicated to Great Britain her intention of taking possession of and administering the district mentioned as far as Garawé; she modified her claim, however, in such a way as to extend her rights only to the Cavalla River. In 1891 a French commissioner was authorized to treat with Liberia in this matter. He claimed that the French had deeds to Grand Cesters, dating to 1788, and to Garawé, dating to 1842; he referred to other shadowy rights and mentioned treaties which, he asserted, chiefs in the neighborhood of the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers had made with French authorities; asked to produce these documents, he admitted that he did not have them with him. The French Government asked that Liberia should recognize the right of France from the Cavalla River to the San Pedro, saying that, if this recognition were granted, they might not revive their old claims. Liberia urged that the treaty formed with her by the French Government in 1852 clearly recognized her rights to the region in question; a French war map, dated 1882, was shown, on which Liberia’s area was clearly shown to extend to the San Pedro River; at the same time Liberia asked that the whole matter should be referred to arbitration. Arbitration was refused; a treaty drawn up by France was offered for approval in August, 1892; the Liberian legislature refused absolutely to ratify it, and the Liberian Government appealed to the United States for assistance and advice. The country was greatly aroused over the manifest injustice of its powerful neighbor. Especially in Maryland, feeling ran high. A printed appeal was issued to the world. In it occurs the following passage:

“We appeal to all the civilized nations of the world.—Consider, we pray you, the situation. Having been carried away into slavery, and, by the blessing of God, returned from exile to our fatherland, are we now to be robbed of our rightful inheritance? Is there not to be a foot of land in Africa, that the African, whether civilized or savage, can call his own? It has been asserted that the race is not capable of self-government, and the eyes of many are watching the progress of Liberia with a view to determining that question. We only ask, in all fairness, to be allowed just what any other people would require—free scope for operation. Do not wrest our territory from us and hamper us in our operations, and then stigmatize the race with incapacity, because we do not work miracles. Give us a fair chance, and then if we utterly fail, we shall yield the point. We pray you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence in our behalf. We have no power to prevent this aggression on the part of the French Government: but we know that we have right on our side, and are willing to have our claims to the territory in question examined. We do not consent to France’s taking that portion of our territory lying between the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers; nor do we recognize its claims to points on our Grain Coast which, as shown above, our government has been in possession of for so long. We protest, too, against that government’s marking off narrow limits of interior land for us. We claim the right to extend as far interiorward as our necessities require. We are not foreigners: we are Africans, and this is Africa. Such being the case, we have certain natural rights—God-given rights—to this territory which no foreigners can have. We should have room enough, not only for our present population, but also to afford a home for our brethren in exile who may wish to return to their fatherland and help us to build up a negro nationality. We implore you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence to have these, our reasonable requirements secured to us.” But neither the official appeal to the United States nor the unofficial appeal to the Christian nations of the world availed. France seized the territory and threatened to refuse to recognize rights beyond Grand Cesters on the seaboard, and Boporo in the interior. After fruitless remonstrance, the Republic was forced to yield and a treaty was accepted on December 8, 1892. By it the Cavalla River was recognized as the boundary between France and Liberia, from its mouth “as far as a point situated at a point” about twenty miles south of its confluence with the River “Fodedougouba” at the intersection of the parallel 6° 30′ north and the Paris meridian 9° 12′ west; thence along 6° 30′ as far as 10° west, with the proviso that the basin of the Grand Cesters River should belong to Liberia and the basin of the Fodedougouba to France; then north along 10° to 8° north; and then northwest to the latitude of Tembi Kunda (supposed 8° 35′), after which due west along the latitude of Tembi Kunda, until it intersects the British boundary near that place. But the entire Niger Basin should be French; Bamaquilla and Mahommadou should be Liberian; Mousardou and Naalah, French.

LATER FRENCH DIFFICULTIES.

Notwithstanding this delimitation, difficulties with the French continued. In 1895 French posts along the northern border began to crowd in upon the Republic. The town of Lola, in Liberia, was attacked by Senegalese soldiers; these were repulsed and two French officers were killed. Aggressions continued until, finally, in 1903, Liberia begged that a final delimitation might be arranged, as the old had proved completely unsatisfactory. In 1904 F. E. R. Johnson and J. J. Dossen were sent to France to arrange matters. On their way, they called at the British Foreign Office and asked their aid and interest in bringing about an understanding. Arrived in Paris, it was quickly found that the French were planning to possess themselves of all the territory situated in the basin of the Cavalla and the Upper St. Paul’s Rivers; the British Foreign Office expressed sympathy, but did nothing more. In 1905 several efforts were made toward bringing about an agreement. Dr. Blyden was sent to France, but accomplished nothing; in November Sir Harry Johnston was asked to treat with the French Government which, however, refused to recognize him as an official negotiator. In 1907 Secretary Johnson was commissioned to treat with the French Government, but found its attitude most hostile and unfriendly. President Barclay himself was summoned to Europe; taking T. McCants Stewart with him, they joined Johnson, and interviewed the French officials. A treaty was submitted to them by which Liberia would be deprived of a large portion of her territory situated in the richest and most prosperous districts of the Republic. It was in vain that the Liberian commissioners remonstrated; the French were inflexible. The English Government had refused to deal with the commissioners in regard to the British boundary difficulty until they had come to some arrangement with France. In this unhappy condition of affairs, the commissioners decided to consult the American Ambassador in Paris; they asked that the United States should assist Liberia and prevent her being robbed of so large a portion of her territory, and should use her influence in bringing the French Government to submit the whole matter in dispute to arbitration. Ambassador White replied that he doubted whether the United States would aid Liberia in this crisis; he advised President Barclay to accept the treaty, urging that, if he failed to do so, the French would make further encroachments, and the Republic would meet with greater losses. As the case seemed hopeless, the commissioners accepted the treaty. It involved the delimitation of a fixed boundary by an international commission. Liberia engaged two Dutch officials as her commissioners. They were on hand ready to fix the boundary in February, 1898, but were kept waiting until May by the dilatoriness of the French commissioners; in order to have a permanent boundary fixed, the Republic made great concessions and lost valuable regions. It was willing, however, to sacrifice much for peace.

Of course the sacrifice was without result. At the present time the whole question of the Franco-Liberian boundary is again open, and from the points urged by the French Government it is evident that it aims at new acquisition of territory and new restriction of the power of the little Republic.

We stand at the threshold of a new era; new political theories are being advanced; new interpretations are being given to the principles of international law; larger fulfilments of national obligations are being required of individual nations; new duties are being thrust upon us. They cannot be shirked, we must keep pace with world requirements. Regeneration and reform must be our watchword. The people must see that they become so. The process must operate from within outwards, or else influences from without will compass our ruin.—E. Barclay.

THE FRONTIER FORCE.

When President Barclay was in London, the British Government demanded that certain internal reforms should take place in the Republic before it would discuss a final settlement of either the Mano River or Kanre-Lahun difficulties. Shortly after the President’s return to Monrovia, Mr. Braithwait Wallis, Consul-General of Great Britain to Liberia, issued a memorandum on the subject—apparently under the fear “lest we forget”. This memorandum, which bears the date of January 14, 1908, occupies four printed pages, and condenses into that brief space an astonishing amount of venom and insolence. A few quotations will show its spirit:

“Your Excellency will remember then being informed that a critical moment had arrived in the history of the Republic, that however it might have been twenty or even ten years ago, the time had now gone by when Liberia could re-enact the part of a hermit kingdom, and that she must not lose a moment in setting herself seriously to work to put her house in order, or be prepared at no distant date, to disappear from the catalogue of independent countries. His Majesty’s Government, as Your Excellency is aware, have absolutely no designs against either the independence or the integrity of the Republic. Their only desire is that a country which, on one of its frontiers, marches with an important British Colony, and with which not only that Colony, but Great Britain itself, has large and growing commercial relations, should have such a stable or effective Government as will conduce to its own prosperity, and remove any danger of its losing its independence. His Majesty’s Government do not consider that the Government of the Republic is either stable or effective. Improvement has indeed resulted from the appointment of two Customs Officers, and the Customs revenue of the country has largely developed. But it is also considered as absolutely essential, if such improvement is to continue and to extend to other branches of the Government, that the finances of the country be placed, at any rate for the time being, in the hands of an European financial expert, and that at least three more European Customs experts be appointed. And further, no Government can be said to have a stable basis, when it is without any means of enforcing its authority. His Majesty’s Government, therefore, considers that it is essential that a trustworthy police, under European officers, should be at once established. With regard to the appointment of a financial expert, who could advise and assist the Secretary of the Treasury, in the financial affairs of the Country, Mr. Lamont has already been appointed Financial Adviser to the Republic. He is, however, only so in name, but should now be made so in actual fact. His Majesty’s Government further consider that the Liberian judiciary ought to undergo drastic reform.” Mr. Wallis recapitulates the reforms demanded in the following statement: (a) the appointment of a financial expert, who will place the finances of the country on a sound footing, and will advise the Secretary of the Treasury on financial matters. (b) The establishment of an efficient, well armed, and well disciplined police force under competent European Officers; and one that will command the respect of the Powers. (c) The appointment of at least three more European Customs experts. (d) The reform of the judiciary. “If the Liberian Government carry out the reforms herein indicated within SIX MONTHS, counted from the date of Your Excellency’s return to Monrovia from England, His Majesty’s Government will on their side be happy to assist in carrying them into effect in the same way as they have recently been assisting in the work of re-organizing the Liberian Customs. They will further be happy to suspend pressing the monetary and other claims which they have against Liberia, and will endeavor to come to a settlement, on a mutually satisfactory basis, on the long outstanding question of the navigation of the Mano River and the trouble on the Anglo-Liberian Frontier.”

In other words, Great Britain was quite willing to assume the whole running of Liberian affairs; she would be glad to manage her financial matters, to train and handle her frontier force, to collect her customs duties, and manage them, to interfere with, and control her government completely. She hinted at what she might do if these reforms were not carried into effect; she ended with a querulous complaint regarding advantages which German shipping was said to be securing to the disadvantage of British interests. This truly extraordinary document was signed in the following highly dignified fashion:

I have the honor to be, with great truth and regard Sir, Your Excellency’s most obedient, humble servant, BRAITHWAIT WALLIS, His Britannic Majesty’s Consul.

One of the cries of the present day internationalism is “effective occupation”. It is only as a country demonstrates itself able to protect its borders, and to maintain peace within its limits, that it is admitted to justly hold its territory; there are some strange features involved in the expression, but it has a just foundation and is at present generally accepted. It is true, if Liberia is to be recognized as an independent nation, she must guard her borders, must prevent her people from troubling their neighbors, must protect life and property within her area. There is a stipulation in the French treaty of 1907 in regard to this matter; if Liberia cannot maintain a frontier force to protect her boundary, the French claim the right to place their own forces on Liberian territory for that purpose; the English, in their demanded reforms, insist upon an adequate and well trained police force upon the frontier; the demands are not unjust and must be met. In fact, the frontier force is one of the urgent and crying needs of Liberia.

While President Barclay was in London, he was approached by Capt. Mackay Cadell, who had served in the South African War; Capt. Mackay Cadell desired to be put in charge of the frontier force which it was believed that Liberia would organize in response to the British demands; he was not actually engaged by the President, but put in his appearance in January, 1908, ready for business; his employment was opposed by many, but finally, largely in order not to offend British susceptibilities, he was engaged, given the rank of Major—some question has been raised as to exactly how he came to carry the title captain—and was authorized, with the help of two British assistants, to organize the frontier force; he was also given authority to employ ten or more sergeants and buglers from Sierra Leone; it was naturally assumed that the force in general would be composed of Liberian natives. Major Mackay Cadell promptly began active work; barracks were erected upon the edge of Monrovia, and soon 250 men were enrolled for service. Their uniforms, arms, and ammunition were bought from Great Britain—so that the whole enterprise was good for British trade; it is not clear, however, why the caps and other articles were stamped with the crown and other emblems of His British Majesty’s service. Matters were going nicely, but it began to be suspected that a considerable number of the new soldiers were British subjects, and it was asked whether some of them had not served upon the Sierra Leone frontier force. These suspicions and doubts led finally to a protest from the French Vice-Consul who claimed that the force being organized was actually “a British army of occupation” which the Liberian Government was permitting to be organized in Liberian territory; he demanded that an equal number of French officers and of French subjects be added to the force. The Liberian Government inquired of Major Mackay Cadell with reference to the matter; he denied that there were any British subjects on the force, and depending on his answer, the Liberian Government denied the fact to the French official. Meantime, Major Mackay Cadell was making himself variously useful to the Monrovia city government; he undertook without compensation, the command of the city police force as chief of police; in place of the loyal Kru police, he put in Mende soldiers from the barracks; he also performed the functions of street commissioner, tax collector, city treasurer, and other duties until, finally, the citizens decided to dispense with his free services; he declined, however, to resign, and presented a large bill as the condition upon which he would deliver up the city property entrusted to him. (We quote from Ellis.) On October 27th Major Mackay Cadell was further questioned in regard to the composition of his force, and a report was demanded; it was then found that at least 71 out of the little army of 250 were actually British subjects; more than this, no doubt many of the Mende at the post, who were classed as “Liberians”, really came from the portion of that tribe residing on the other side of the Sierra Leone boundary. While this report was rendered, Major Mackay Cadell showed constant objection to supervision by the President of the Republic and to any suggestion of control. The President and his Cabinet, after meeting and discussing the matter, agreed upon the dismissal of Major Mackay Cadell, but out of courtesy gave him the opportunity of resigning his position.

The French Vice-Consul continued to insist on his demands; understanding that Capt. Wallis had given his consent to the appointment of French officers and subjects, the President prepared to make such appointments. Just at this juncture Capt. Wallis returned from an absence, and at his own request, on November 13, had a meeting with the President and the members of the Cabinet, at which he presented to them what purported to be a communication from the British Government. Some mystery seems to be associated with this document, but it is understood that its effect was that, if Frenchmen were appointed to the direction of the frontier force, and French subjects were enlisted in it, Great Britain would unite with France to disrupt and divide the Republic. In December the legislature demanded that the services of Major Mackay Cadell should be dispensed with. He, however, hesitated to hand in his resignation. The legislature ordered a complete re-organization of the frontier force under a Liberian officer, with only two British subjects to be employed in the whole organization—the two assistant officers whom Major Mackay Cadell had employed. On February 1 the Major sent in his resignation. Acting on order of Consul-General Wallis, he turned over the arms and ammunition in his charge to the Elder Dempster Co., and announced the fact to the Liberian Government; at the same time Consul-General Wallis applied for an official guard to protect the property thus placed in private British hands: the Secretary of State, F. E. R. Johnson, expressed his surprise that a consul, without consultation with the proper Liberian authorities, should order property belonging to Liberia (although payment had not yet been made for it) to be turned over into private hands, and refused to accept the responsibility of placing a guard in charge. On February 11, 1909, Major Mackay Cadell sent a remarkable message to President Barclay, informing him that the native soldiers were in serious danger of mutiny on account of arrears in payments; at the same time he sent messages to the two houses of the legislature, requesting that the men be permitted to appear before them and state their grievances; he said that, if some redress were not given, the men could not be blamed for what might be done. Steps were at once taken for public defense; fortunately some 400 of the militia were in Monrovia for quarterly drill. After some seventy soldiers from the barracks had appeared upon the public streets, parading, threatening and menacing the seizure of the arms and ammunition, a force was sent to demand the surrender of the camp; at the same time, notice of this was sent to Consul-General Wallis. Major Mackay Cadell refused to surrender, making conditions which would involve several days’ delay; his immediate surrender, however, was demanded, and other militia forces were sent for. Notice of this new demand was sent to Consul-General Wallis with the request that he should order British subjects out of the camp; this he did; Major Mackay Cadell decided to capitulate; the camp was occupied. At a court of inquiry held to investigate the difficulty, the British sergeants said that Major Mackay Cadell himself had instigated the mutiny; that he had selected a certain number of men to insult the President, to arrest him, and take him to camp. A curious fact in connection with this whole extraordinary procedure is that, on the 4th of February, one week before the President of the Republic was informed of the danger of imminent mutiny, notice of it had been cabled to Great Britain. It was perhaps by accident that a British gunboat was in the harbor on the 10th, the day before the outbreak—the name of this gunboat, by the way, quite appropriately was the Mutin. In closing the account of this strange incident, quotations may be made from the official report of the American Commission which visited Liberia shortly afterwards:

“But if Major Cadell got on very well with his troops, he got on very badly with the Liberian people and the Liberian Government. He was a man of indomitable energy, but guileless of tact. His actions on various occasions affronted the Liberian officials. Through indifference to the law, or by design, he enlisted a considerable number of British subjects among the troops, about one-fourth of his men being natives of Sierra Leone. When called to account for it, he at first denied and afterwards admitted that some of the men might have been born in Sierra Leone, but that he supposed them to be residents of Liberia, and therefore, Liberians. Being called upon to dismiss the British subjects, he neglected to do so. About the beginning of the present year he began to complain that his men were not paid, and demanded further supplies from the Government, though he was very dilatory in presenting accounts for the money already entrusted to him. The dissatisfaction with Major Cadell’s conduct in matters of the camp led to the passage of a law by the Liberian Legislature in January, 1909, re-organizing the force and dismissing its commander. The President, who had upheld Major Cadell, offered him an opportunity to resign, but on one pretext or another, he delayed doing so, and when he sent in his resignation, the Government could not accept it until his accounts had been adjusted. He remained, in the meantime, in charge of the command, and on February 11, 1909, wrote a threatening letter to the President, in which he stated that, if the demands of the troops for the payment of money due them were not met within twenty-four hours, he could not be responsible for the maintenance of peace or for the safety of the President. This remarkable letter naturally created much excitement in Monrovia, but the situation was handled with extreme adroitness by the Liberian Government which demanded that Major Cadell withdraw the British subjects composing his force, and that he turn over the camp to the Liberian authorities who would deal with the Liberian subjects. This order was reluctantly obeyed on the recommendation of the British Consul-General, and it was then discovered that seventy-one of the enlisted men were British subjects. Two or three weeks afterwards, after settling up his accounts, whereby it was revealed that he had involved the Government in a considerable unauthorized debt, he sailed for England and was soon followed by his brother officers.”

Again:

“On February 4, the British in Monrovia cabled to the Foreign Office that the lives of foreign residents in Liberia were in danger, and urged that a gunboat be sent for their protection. . . . On February 10 the British gunboat Mutin appeared and anchored off Monrovia. On February 11 and 12 England precipitated the rupture of the Government. But for the prompt and judicious action of the Liberian Executive, aided by the American Minister Resident, the following would presently have been the situation: A British gunboat in the harbor, a British officer in command of the frontier force, and a large number of British subjects among the enlisted men, a British official in charge of the Liberian customs, a British officer in command of the Liberian gunboat Lark, a British regiment in the streets of Monrovia.”

The fine hand of Consul-General Wallis of course is evident throughout these events. How seriously he was implicated is suggested in the following passage from the report of the Commission: “It is most unfortunate that the Commission has been unable to secure an account of these events from the principal British actors in them. When we reached Monrovia, Major Cadell had left Liberia. The British Consul-General was away on leave of absence. We were the more disappointed in not meeting the latter, as, before our departure, we had been shown in the State Department at Washington a despatch of the Ambassador in London, stating that the British Foreign Office there had instructed its representative in Monrovia to give the American Commission the fullest information about Liberian affairs. The acting Consul-General had no knowledge of the facts, and covered his obvious embarrassment, when asked to explain some of them, by the plea that he had no inside information.”

It has been said that the British Government admits that Consul-General Wallis went beyond his authority. It is, however, significant that he was not reduced in position; he left Liberia, of course—his usefulness there having more than ended; but he was transferred to Dakar, Senegal, the finest consular post in all West Africa.

As for Major Mackay Cadell, he now poses as Liberia’s real and great friend; he has, however, changed his name, and is now known as Major R. Mackay-Mackay. He is associated with the Cavalla River Co., Limited. This appears to be a strange mixture of a commercial, educational, and philanthropical character; always, however, primarily exploitative. Before going to Liberia in connection with his duties with this company, Major R. Mackay-Mackay traveled in the United States; arrived in Liberia, he gives the impression that the State Department of the United States is behind his enterprise, and that Booker T. Washington is deeply interested in its success. He throws the responsibility for all the past upon those “higher up”; it seems that personally he always loved Liberia and was her friend. When he passed through Monrovia on his way down to the Cavalla, he simply showered advice and benevolence along his path. An interview with him was published in The Guide. He says: “Liberia can not go on living on loans as in the past. Why should she be dependent on gold from outside when she has a hundredfold within her own borders, at the very door? Standing at the street corners, discussing politics, or waiting for dollar-bills to grow and fall from the trees around, will not advance the welfare of the Republic, nor attract the genuine sympathy and co-operation from the outside world. Work! work! work! that is what Liberia needs; and there are those who are prepared to create the opportunity, provided all make up their minds to work as they should. Is manual labor considered a disgrace in other countries? Why should it be in Liberia?”

Also: “I am here on a visit and to let Liberia know that she has more friends than she counts on; and they will increase in proportion to her efforts to help herself. I for my part will do all I can in my humble way to preach ‘Liberia regenerated’ to all, and help where I can without treading on ground other than within my rights as a visitor and friend.” Most touching, however, is this: “Yes” (there are signs of awakening), “since my return I see the most wonderful strides made in many directions, and a keen desire in the citizens of the wider ideas to aid in their country’s advancement. May it continue. In every season is some victory won. Let us bury the past with all its errors, sadness, and regrets.”

It is sad indeed that humanity is not prone to bury the past; even such expressions of affection may be received unkindly. What could be more dreadful, when a man oozes philanthropy from every pore, than to have such things said of him as the following which appeared about that time in Green’s paper, The African League?

“Major R. Mackay-Mackay, whose name stinks in the nostrils of all country-loving Liberians, because of his conduct when in command of our frontier force, is back in Liberia again, this time at the head of a company whose procedure thus far has not inspired the strongest confidence. More is known of this intimacy than the men themselves may think. The last steamer brought intelligence that an agent of Major Cadell’s company, the Cavalla River Co., Limited, is now in Sierra Leone, with 630 natives of that colony who are to be brought to Cape Palmas soon to serve this company. It is very strange that this company finds it necessary to employ natives from the colony of Sierra Leone, when in Liberia is the largest market for unskilled laborers in Western Africa, supplying, as it does, most, if not all, of that class of labor employed in the various enterprises in British, French, and German African colonies. We hope this is no new coup.”

The Frontier Force has continued in its development. The present plans involve the organization of a battalion of 600 men under a major; each of the two companies of 300 soldiers will be under a captain; and each company will have three Liberian lieutenants; the three chief officers will be Americans loaned to the Liberian Government by the United States. The general duties of the force will be those of a constabulary for the maintenance of law and order throughout the Republic and for the prevention and the detection of crime; it will also be used as a customs guard in such numbers and at such places as may be agreed upon by the Secretary of War and the general receiver of customs. Its estimated cost for the year 1913 was $86,159.60. The American officers arrived in the Republic in the spring of 1912. They were Major Ballard and Captains Brown and Newton. In entering upon their new duties of developing and organizing the Frontier Force, they had the great advantage of the advice and interest of Major Charles Young of the United States Army, who was in Monrovia as military attaché of our legation. We had ample opportunity of investigating this Frontier Force. It is composed for the most part of natives fresh from the interior; two hundred of them passed through our hands for examination and measurement; they were fine fellows, well built and in good physical condition; few of them understood English, and among them several languages were represented; they were proud of their position and anxious to improve; they were easily led, particularly by officers who treated them with kindness; we saw two parties of these soldiers started off for service; they made a good appearance. While we were there—as is true indeed much of the time—their payments were behind, and they were expressing some dissatisfaction, but were easily controlled; there is, however, always a danger of mutiny when the Government is behind in meeting its obligations to them; I quote from one who was in Monrovia October 10, 1911; he says: “I heard quite an altercation in the street. Upon going out I saw about 120 men moving through the street in a disorderly mass toward the office of the Secretary of War. Upon arriving at the office, there was quite a demonstration and matters looked serious. After a great deal of persuasion on the part of the Secretary and the one officer from the camp, the men moved away in the direction of Camp Johnson. I was informed that the men were demanding their pay.” There is also great danger of the Frontier Force, when marching through the interior, looting and destroying the fields and villages through which they pass; this is so much in the nature of ordinary native warfare that it must be particularly guarded against; the Frontier Force, however, is necessary, and it seems to be making a promising development.

Compare, you say, the present with the past. Where are the schooners and cutters that were used to be built right here in Liberia, when nearly every responsible man had his own? Where are the tons of sugar that used to be shipped to foreign parts by our fathers, and the barrels of molasses, and the tons of camwood? Where are the financial men of the country that looked upon the holding of public offices almost beneath them, who had to be begged to fill the offices? Where are those who when they (had) made their farms lived off the farms? Oh, where are the honest, upright and loyal government officials of 1847? You answer for yourselves. Where are the great Liberian merchants of Monrovia, Grand Bassa, Sinoe, and Cape Palmas? Gone!—S. D. Ferguson, Jr.

TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION.

Liberia’s very existence depends upon her development of trade. If the Liberians push forward in this direction, her future may be assured. If, however, she neglects it, her neighbors, France and England, can not be expected to permit their opportunity to pass. The area of the Black Republic is far too rich by nature to be overlooked; if its legitimate owners fail to develop it, others will do so.

The past of Liberia was built on trade in wild produce; its immediate prosperity must depend upon the same source of wealth. For the moment the trade of Liberia must be in such things as palm nuts, piassava, and rubber.

The oil palm has been the most important source of wealth Liberia has. The tree produces great quantities of nuts, growing in large clusters, from which an oil is easily extracted, which finds enormous use in soap- and candle-making. This oil is derived from the stringy, fleshy coating of the nut; the nuts are thrown into pits dug in the ground, where they are allowed to ferment for some time; the mass of fermented nuts is then squeezed in a sort of press run by hand, and the oil is extracted. This is the primitive, native style of production. The oil may also be produced by boiling and pounding the nuts and then stone-boiling the mass in wooden troughs, the oil being skimmed off from the surface of the water. In Liberia palm oil is chiefly produced in the counties of Bassa and Sinoe. Liberian oil is not the best quality on the market, as carelessness in preparation leaves considerable dirt and impurities in it; it has, however, brought good prices—up to £24.10.0 a ton. Inside the palm nut is a hard kernel which remains after the oil has been extracted; this kernel at first was wasted; to-day it is known to yield a finer oil than the pulp; the idea of exporting palm nut kernels originated with a Liberian, and the first shipment was made in 1850; to-day there is a large demand for palm kernels which sell at prices ranging from $60 to $68 per ton, the oil derived from them selling at $130 to $133 per ton.

Second, certainly, in importance, among the raw products exported from Liberia is piassava; it is the fiber of a palm—raphia vinifera. Large use is made of this extremely resistant fiber for brooms and brushes for street sweeping and the like; its use, too, was suggested by a Liberian in 1889; it was first exported in 1890 and for a time brought the astonishingly high price of from $300 to $350 per ton; as the fiber was easy to prepare and the trees were plentiful, a rapid development took place; Liberia was for a long time the only source of supply; carelessness ensued in the preparation of the fiber, the demand lessened and the price dropped; it went down to £10 per ton; at present the price is somewhat better and is stationary at £20. Sir Harry Johnston, from whom these details are borrowed, says that it is difficult to judge the quality of raphia, that it shrinks in weight, and that trade in it is somewhat speculative and uncertain; still, piassava fiber occupies an important position in the Liberian trade to-day.

Africa appears to be the continent which presents the greatest number of rubber-yielding plants; in Liberia the precious exudation is obtained from some sixteen different kinds of trees and vines, varying as to the quality and character of rubber yielded. The rubber of Liberia is not considered of the highest class, but it is of good grade; the natives of the interior are skilled in its collection; there is no doubt that great quantities of wild rubber are still to be obtained within the limits of the Republic and experiments in rubber-planting have already been made with promise.

Sir Harry Johnston gives a long list of other natural products which have been exported from Liberia at one time or another in varying quantities. There was a time when camwood found a ready market and formed perhaps the most important element in Liberian trade—of course with the invention of other dye-stuffs, the use of camwood, annatto, etc., has practically ceased; the name “Grain Coast” or “Pepper Coast” was long given to this country on account of the malagueta pepper which was exported in great quantities—this, too, has ceased to be a product of practical importance; kola nuts are to some degree exported from Liberia, and with the ever-increasing use of the kola in America and European countries, trade along this line should develop; ivory has always been among the export products of Liberia, though it has never had great significance; vegetable ivory nuts are produced here and to some extent form an article of trade—the demand for them in button-making is large and increasing, and exportation of them may reasonably be developed; hides and oil-yielding seeds complete the list of actual native export products. Sir Harry Johnston calls attention to the fact that the country is rich in ebony, mahogany, and other fine woods, in copal and other gums, in ground nuts, fruits, and minerals; these, however, have never been actual materials for export; all are valuable, however, and trade in them might be developed.

All of these raw products of natural production are valuable, but that they shall form an element in trade depends upon the natives. These things all come from the forests of the interior; if they are to be traded to the outside world, they must be collected and transported by the people within whose territory they are found; this dependence is an uncertain thing. The natives have few needs; in their little towns they take life easily; they have no sentimental interest in the development of trade as such nor in the upbuilding of the country; they care comparatively little for the returns of trade; they will work when necessary, but only as they please; when they need some money for buying wives, they will prepare some piassava fiber or dig a pit, ferment some nuts, and squeeze some oil. When they have enough for the immediate and pressing necessity, work stops, and with it the supply of oil or fiber or whatever they may have seen fit to produce. More than this, the native is little concerned about the quality of his production. So long as he can sell it and raise the resources that he needs, he does not care whether the oil is clean, whether the piassava fiber is of good quality, or whether the rubber contains dirt and stones. Impurity, however, of products is a very serious matter to the outside world; a district which neglects quality loses trade. Liberian oil, fiber, rubber, all are at a disadvantage at present through the carelessness of the producers.

It must, then, be the policy of the Liberian Government to encourage, by every legitimate means within its power, the increase of the production of the natural resources. Nor is the simple question of production the whole difficulty. Transportation is quite as important. The product, no matter how good or how precious, has no value as long as it remains in the bush. There are different methods of dealing with this matter of getting the natural products down to the coast settlements. The simplest and most natural is to let the native bring it out—but the natives are as little inclined to travel and carry as they are to produce; they will fetch down their product when they feel inclined—but the demand from without is constant. Liberians may go into the bush to bring out the products; there are always little traders who divide their time between the settlements and the interior; they travel in, sit down for several days at native towns, trade with the natives for whatever stuff they have on hand, then have it carried out; such traders are usually independent men of small means who are trading on their own account. It is not uncommon for the large trading-houses to hire agents,—Liberians or natives,—and send them into the interior to buy up and bring down products. Another method—which, in the long run, will prove no doubt the most satisfactory,—is to establish here and there in the interior permanent trading stations, supplied with a fair stock of goods, to be traded with the natives against their raw products—trading stations of this kind are already established by the Monrovia Rubber Company and by various of the great trading-houses.

In some way or other the Government should adopt a method of encouraging the natives of the interior to gather, to properly prepare, and to bring in raw produce; a definite scheme of practical education and encouragement must be devised.

While raw products offered by nature have been and are the chief element in Liberian trade, another element is immediate, and will ultimately be the chief dependence of the nation. Agriculture, though far from being in a satisfactory condition, has always contributed material for export. The country can not forever count upon a supply of raw products. Gradually the value of the forests will become secondary to that of produce of the fields. There is no reason why the Liberian coffee should not be fully re-established in the foreign market. The tree seems to be a native of the country; Ashmun reported that it was found everywhere near the seacoast and to an unknown distance back from there. Under natural conditions, the tree grew often to a height of thirty feet and a girth of fifteen inches. Coffee berries from wild trees were brought in by hundreds of bushels to the early settlers by the natives. Plantations were soon established, and many of them met with great success; in fact, coffee was once the principal export of the Republic; it was mainly shipped from Monrovia and Cape Mount; the more important plantations were located along the St. Paul’s River. Liberian coffee was much appreciated in the European market; at its period of greatest vogue it used to bring twenty-five cents a pound; the price has now fallen so low as eight or nine cents a pound. This decline is due, in part, of course, to the enormous development of the Brazilian coffee trade; it is, however, largely due to the carelessness of the Liberian planters, who had only primitive machinery for its preparation and who neglected proper care, with the result that the coffee berries reached the market broken and impaired. It is a delicious coffee, of full flavor, and improves with age. Sir Harry Johnston claims that about 1,500,000 pounds are annually produced, and reports that the output is increasing slightly. At the Muhlenberg Mission School, coffee is cultivated; care is taken in its preparation, and the price is rising; if the Liberians will give serious attention to the matter, there is no question that the old importance of the culture may be restored. It will require improved methods of cultivation, the use of better machinery, greater care in the preparation of the berry, and constant attention to proper packing and handling.

Discouraged at the fall in price of coffee, some Liberian planters introduced the culture of cacao, from which our chocolate and cocoa are derived; this culture has long been successful in some of the Spanish possessions of West Africa; in Liberia the plant grows well, and the cacao seems to be of superior quality; it is said that a good price for it may be received in Liverpool. This culture must be considered as only in its infancy, but there appears to be no reason why it should not become of great importance.

The rubber so far sent out from Liberia has been wild rubber; it would seem that a wise policy in national development would be to encourage the establishment of plantations of rubber trees or vines. One such plantation has already been established by an English company, who hoped to gather the first harvest of latex in 1912; one would suppose that the best tree for planting would be the funtumia which is native to the country and a good yielder; it is chiefly this plant which is being set out by the Belgians in the Congo colony; the English company in Liberia, however, claims that their experiments with funtumia were not encouraging, and the species actually planted is the hevea—the one which yields the famous Para rubber. While coffee, cacao, and rubber will no doubt be the earliest important plantations to be developed in the country, other products should not be neglected. Ginger has already been well tested in the Republic—there have been times when it was quite an important article of export; sugar-cane grows well, and from the earliest days plantations of it have yielded something for local consumption—if capital were available, there seems no reason why profitable plantations of cane might not be made; cassava has always been to some degree an article of export in the past,—it is of course the main food product of the natives—it is the source of tapioca and other food materials abundantly in use among ourselves. Liberia at present imports rice from abroad, yet rice of excellent quality is easily cultivated in the Republic and forms a staple food in native towns—effort to increase its local production would be good economy from every point of view; fruits of many kinds—both native and imported—grow to perfection in Liberia; experiments have been made, without particular results, in cotton raising—there are species of wild cotton in the country and experiments with both wild and foreign grades would determine to what degree culture of this useful fiber might be profitably carried on. This list of cultivated vegetable products might be enormously extended; we are only interested here in indicating those plants which would be important as trade products if their cultivation were seriously undertaken. In the matter of fruits, we may add a word; here is the suggestion of a beginning of manufacturing interests in the country; some of these fruits are capable of profitable canning or preservation, others might be dried, while still others yield materials which could be utilized outside; it would seem as if the natural beginning of manufacturing interests in the Republic would be in the establishment of factories to deal with these fruits and various derived vegetable materials.

It is to be anticipated that there will be a development in mining in Liberia; it is not an unmixed blessing to a country to possess mineral wealth; it may be disadvantageous to a little country, of relative political insignificance and actually weak, to possess great wealth of this sort. But there are certainly deposits of gold and diamonds in the Republic; these will in time be known, and their development will be undertaken. When that time comes, ores and other mineral products will form an element in national trade.

Closely associated with the matter of production is the question of transportation. It is one of the most serious that faces Liberia.

If produce can not be taken to the coast, it is of no value in the development of trade. There are practically no roads in Liberia to-day. As in the Dark Continent generally, narrow foot-trails go from town to town. The travel over them is always in single file, the path is but a few inches wide and has been sharply worn into the soil to a depth of several inches by the passage of many human feet. As long as transportation is entirely by human carriers, such trails are serviceable, provided they be kept open. A neglected trail, however, is soon overgrown and becomes extremely difficult to pass; that a trail should be good, it is necessary that the brushwood and other growth be cut out at fairly frequent intervals. Often, however, the chief of a given village does not care to remain in communication with his neighbors and intentionally permits the trail to fall into disuse. There is a feeling too, surviving from old customs, that trails are only passable with the permission and consent of the chiefs of the towns through which they run; chiefs have always exercised the right of closing trails whenever it pleased them; they have expected presents (“dashes”) for the privilege of passing. If now, large trade is to be developed in the matter of native produce, it is absolutely necessary that the trails be kept in good condition and that free passage over them be granted to all. Much of the energy of the Government must of necessity be directed toward these ends. At the best, however, there is a limit to the distance over which produce can be profitably transported on human backs; there must be very large inherent value in such produce to warrant its being carried more than a three days’ journey by human carriers. It is not only the labor involved in the transportation, but the loss of time which renders this problem important. The richest resources lie at a great distance in the interior; even with good trails it is impossible to utilize them.

In time, of course, the foot-trails must be developed into actual roads; some other mode of transportation must be devised than that of the human beast of burden. Horses have never prospered in the neighborhood of Monrovia; yet there are plenty of them raised and, it is said, of good quality, among the Mandingo. Serious efforts should be made to introduce their use as beasts of draft and burden; if, as is likely, these experiments should come to naught, attempts should be made to use oxen for hauling produce to the market. Improved trails and roads are of the highest importance to the Republic for several reasons. (a) For intercourse: only by means of them can ready and constant intercourse be developed between the different elements of population; no great development of trade, no significant advance, can be made without constant intercourse; it must be easy for the Government to reach and deal with the remotest natives of the far interior; it is equally important that peoples of neighboring towns have more frequent and intimate contact with each other; it is necessary that the members of different tribes come to know other tribes by daily contact. (b) For transportation; there is no reason why even the existing trails should not be covered with caravans carrying produce to the coast. (c) For protection; at present the movement of the Frontier Force from place to place is a matter of the highest difficulty; if trouble on the border necessitates the sending of an armed force, weeks must elapse before the enterprise can be accomplished; until the present unsatisfactory condition of trails be done away with, Liberia is in no position to protect her frontiers.

The construction by the English of the Sierra Leone Railroad running from the port of Freetown across the colony through the interior to the very border of Liberia, was a master stroke of policy; it not only developed the resources of the British area through which it passed and carried British products to the sea, but it tapped the richest part of the Liberian territory; formerly the production of that wealthy and well populated area found its way to Cape Mount and Monrovia; now it all goes out through a British port, in British hands. No single work would better repay an outlay by the Liberian Government than a good road running from Monrovia up the St. Paul’s River, out to Boporo, and on through the country of the Mandingo to the region where this British road ends. Such a road would bring back into Liberia her part of a trade which has always been legitimately her own. The idea would be to construct upon such a road-bed a light railroad; such an enterprise would very probably soon be upon a paying basis.

With the exception of one or two short stretches built by foreign companies for their own uses, there are neither roads nor railroads at the present time in the Republic. In 1912 the legislature granted a concession to the Cavalla River Company to make roads along the Cavalla River, to negotiate with the inhabitants of those parts for the development of the rice industry, etc. At the same session the right was granted to Wichers and Helm to negotiate a railroad scheme for the construction of a light railway from White Plains to Careysburg, and from Millsburg to Boporo, the right was also granted to construct a railroad from Harper to Dimalu in Maryland County. It is to be hoped that these three enterprises may all develop; they would mean much for the progress of the country.

We have spoken of the exports of Liberia; the imports consist chiefly of cotton goods, hardware, tobacco, silks, crockery, guns, gun-powder, rice, stock-fish, herrings, and salt. Most of these items are the staples which for centuries have maintained the trade of Western Africa. The total value of this import trade is estimated by Sir Harry Johnston at about $1,000,000 annually. It is curious that rice should need to be imported; 150,000 bags, equal to 700 tons are brought in every year; this rice is used entirely by the civilized Liberians; certainly they should be raising their own rice or buying it from natives. That salt should be introduced into a coast district where salt, by evaporation from seawater might be easily produced, is less strange than would appear at first sight; the salt from Europe is, on the whole, better in quality and is more cheaply produced than the local article of Liberia. The stock-fish is brought from Norway and is especially in demand among the Kru. Intoxicating drinks do not occur in the list above quoted; Sir Harry Johnston says that gin and rum are introduced, but that there is not much drunkenness among the people. Measures are taken to prevent the introduction of gin among the natives, but a great deal must be surreptitiously introduced among them; when we were in the Bassa country, our interpreter’s constant regret was that we had not loaded up with a large supply of gin which, he assured us, would accomplish much more with the chiefs of the interior towns than any other form of trade-stuff. The bulk of the cotton goods taken into Liberia is intended for trade with the interior natives; the patterns brought vary but little and are extremely old-fashioned—taste having been long ago established and the natives being conservative in such things.

As to the actual volume of trade and its movement, some words are necessary. Recent figures are supplied in a little table issued by the Republic in a small pamphlet entitled Some Trade Facts; it covers the period extending from 1905 to 1912. As will be seen, during that period of time, the customs revenue of the Republic more than doubled. Part of this favorable result undoubtedly was due to the fact that the administration of the customs service was for that time largely in the hands of a British Chief Inspector of Customs. There is no reason why this encouraging movement of trade should not continue. There is wealth enough in Liberia, if it can only be properly developed. The resources are enormous; the difficulties have been in handling them. The Republic has usually been in financial difficulties; it has been hard work to make ends meet; but there is no question that with good management and legitimate encouragement the national income may be more than necessary to meet all obligations, to pursue conservative policies of development, and to attract favorable assistance from the outside world.

STATEMENT OF CUSTOMS REVENUE OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA FOR YEARS 1905-1912 (1st April-31st March)

Port 1905-6 1906-7 1907-8 1908-9 1909-10 1910-11 1911-12

Monrovia $114,098 $129,077 $128,030 $117,524 $135,916 $144,292

Cape Mount, etc. 38,128 31,901 19,327 25,907 27,809 36,125

Marshall 11,195 18,412 16,666 8,211 12,761 23,579

Grand Bassa, etc. 103,494 112,168 105,273 109,876 118,782 140,457

Sinoe, etc. 30,228 32,784 27,172 33,960 28,208 31,784

Cape Palmas, etc. 30,603 41,413 48,314 66,018 78,028 86,615

Kabawana, etc. 166 3,483 1,808 206 1,238 3,841

Rubber Duties collected in London 7,443 8,614 8,725 4,655 4,637

Total $230,580 $327,913 $376,684 $355,208 $370,431 $407,400 $471,335

It is interesting to notice with whom Liberia’s trade is carried on. Britain of course has always led; Germany comes second, Holland third, and other nations follow. Sir Harry Johnston says that in 1904 the total value of British trade with Liberia was £112,779, while the total trade of the British Empire with the Republic was £132,000; the £20,000 difference represent trade with Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast chiefly. On the whole it would seem that Germany is crowding Britain and bids fair to lead. A little table will show this clearly; the first statement shows the amount of British imports, exports, and entire trade for the years 1904, 1908, and 1909 in pounds sterling; a second statement shows the corresponding items for German trade for the years 1908 and 1909 in marks; a third statement changes the totals figures to dollars at the rate of five dollars to the pound and four marks to a dollar, which of course is only approximate. It shows, however, that Germany is actually crowding her longer established rival.

(a) BRITISH TRADE WITH LIBERIA (Soler)

Imports Exports Total

1904 £60,350 £62,710 £123,060

1908 74,348 75,137 149,485

1909 69,511 63,500 133,011

(b) GERMAN TRADE WITH LIBERIA (Soler)

Imports Exports Total

1908 1,177,000 mks. 1,856,000 mks. 3,033,000 mks.

1909 1,095,000 mks. 2,282,000 mks. 3,377,000 mks.

(c) ENGLISH AND GERMAN TRADE (1908-1909)

1908 1909

English $747,425 $665,055

German 758,250 844,250

The Liberian nation is to be made up of the Negro civilized to some extent in the United States and repatriated, and of the aboriginal tribes. At present it is composed of a small number of civilized and a large number of aboriginal communities in varying degrees of dependence. The problem is how to blend these into a national organism, an organic unity.—A. Barclay.

THE NATIVE.

Jore, in his valuable study of Liberia, discusses the question of the actual number of natives in Liberia as follows: “Messrs. Johnston and Delafosse have estimated the number of natives of Liberia at 2,000,000 persons. This figure would appear to-day to be above the actual. In fact, from serious studies which have been made in French West Africa, it results that a density of population superior to twelve inhabitants to the square kilometer, has been found only in Lower Dahomey, Ovagadougou, in Upper Senegal and Niger, in Lower Senegal, and in a very restricted part of Middle Guinea. Generally the density remains inferior to five inhabitants to the square kilometer. But there is no reason to believe that Liberia is, in its entirety, more populous than our own possessions in West Africa. In taking the density at the figure 8, one runs the chance of still finding himself above the reality. Liberia, having to-day 80,000 square kilometers, its population ought scarcely to surpass 600,000 or 700,000 inhabitants. In any case, it certainly does not go beyond 1,000,000 persons.” This estimate seems to us far more reasonable than any other that has been made. Even thus reduced, the native population overwhelmingly outnumbers the Americo-Liberian. More than that, they are at home and acclimated; they enjoy good health and presumably are rapidly increasing. We have indeed no means of actually knowing such to be the fact. But the impression gained from observation is that, while the Americo-Liberians barely hold their own, the Kru, the Mohammedans, and the natives of the interior are flourishing. Even in crowded and unsanitary towns, like those which occur upon the borders of Liberian settlements, the Kru appear to be increasing. Krutown, at Monrovia, suffers from frightful mortality, but those who live are vigorous, hardy, and energetic. The houses are crowded close together, but there are no empty houses falling into ruins and no shrinkage in the area occupied. The schools (that is, the mission schools of the Methodists) are crowded with children; the Kru mission chapel (Protestant Episcopal) is maintained with an energy and interest which could be found only among a people who were looking out upon life with the hope and vigor which comes from physical prosperity. So far as the natives of the interior are concerned, they show every sign of increase. There are of course abandoned towns and villages in plenty, but the towns now occupied are filled with people, and children swarm.

But there are natives and natives. The different natives form distinct problems—it is not just one simple proposition. The Mandingo and Vai are Mohammedan populations; they are independent, proud, aggressive; they are industrious, and their industries render them to a large degree independent of all neighbors. Their towns and villages are large, prosperous, and relatively wealthy. Few visitors have ever penetrated into their country; it is practically unknown to the Liberians. Yet it is in the highest degree important that the Liberians should know them thoroughly, should come into close and intimate contact with them, should co-operate with them in the development and advancement of the country. In their towns and villages boys are taught Arabic and read the Koran; it is true—as in so much religious teaching elsewhere—that they often learn only to repeat the words of the sacred texts without any knowledge of their actual meaning—many, however, read with understanding. It is an interesting fact that the Vai have a system of writing which has been invented by themselves; it is widely known among them and they are fond of writing letters and making records in their own script. Momulu Massaquoi, whose name is well known in this country and in England, is a Vai; he governed a considerable section of his people as chief through a period of years; he has now for some time been located at Monrovia, where he ably fills the position of chief clerk in the Department of the Interior; he is useful to the Government as an intermediary between it and the Mohammedans of the Republic; although himself a Christian, both Mandingo and Vai have more confidence in him than they could possibly repose in a stranger to their customs and languages. There are various ways in which the Government might proceed to develop friendly relations with these people. They should encourage village schools—both religious and secular; in the religious schools, which should be uncontrolled, the Koran and Arabic would continue to be the chief subjects taught; in the other schools there should be the usual subjects taught in the public schools of the Americo-Liberians; these will best be taught through the Vai language, and charts and text-books should be printed in the native characters. Mr. Massaquoi has already undertaken to prepare such text-books. Trade with these peoples should be encouraged; and developed as rapidly as possible. No opportunity should be lost to impress upon them that their interests and those of the Liberians are one, and every effort should be made to gain co-operation. These peoples occupy that portion of the Republic which is most in danger of aggression by the British; surely the natural impulse is for these black peoples, though they be Mohammedans, to unite in common progress with other blacks rather than with any whites. If religion is actually a barrier against friendship and co-operation, it would be as strong against friendship with the British Christians as against Liberian Christians. There is no question, however, that if the Government of the Republic will deal justly, amicably, and wisely with these tribes, they will heartily respond.

The Kru and related peoples of the coast form a completely different proposition. They are full of force and vigor; Sir Harry Johnston and others call them “cheeky”; they are actually awake. They are ready for progress; they want education; they have for centuries been in contact with white men and know their strength and weakness; they are strong, intelligent, industrious, and want work. They have no dainty fears regarding labor, so that it be paid—but pay they want, and justly. At the present they form the strongest immediate hope in the Liberian population. We have said that they want education; as a matter of fact, they flock into the schools. When Bishop Ferguson was at Cape Palmas, in 1912, four promising-looking native boys walked from Pickaninny Cess, fifty miles to Cape Palmas. They told him they had heard of the big school (Epiphany Hall) and desired to attend; that another of their comrades was coming the following week. The Bishop says: “They are just the age when the inducement to go down the coast to earn money is strong; in fact they had already made several trips; but instead of going again, they had decided ‘to learn book’. I did not have the heart to turn such applicants off, and so wrote to the Principal to admit them under special arrangement.” When in Monrovia, I several times visited the College of West Africa. It is over-crowded and ministers to both Americo-Liberian and native boys. On one occasion I seated myself in the midst of the class in fourth grade arithmetic. The recitation was well conducted and well given. While black-board work was occupying the general attention, I remarked to a boy at my side, “But you are a native boy.” “Yes,” he said, “I am Kru—and so is that boy, and that one, and that one.” As a matter of fact, I was practically surrounded by them. “Well,” said I, “and how do you native boys get on? Do you do well?” “Yes, sir,” was the immediate response, “we do well; we do better than they do.” It was not necessary for me to ask who he meant by “they.” I answered, “It would sound better if some one else said so.” He replied, “That may be so; but it is true.” “How does that happen?” I asked. His reply deserves attention: “We love our country more than they do, sir.” I am not prepared to assert that they love their country more than the Americo-Liberians; it is true, however, that they are passionately fond of their native land. The first time that my personal attention was turned to the black Republic was in 1905 when a Kru boy upon our steamer bound to Congo told me with evident affection of his dear, his native land, and pointed out to me the distant green shore of the villages where his people were located. And whether they love their country more than the Americo-Liberians or no, they are more aggressive, more ambitious, more willing to work that they may achieve their ends. These Kru boys on their way to and from school often, after my visit to the College, dropped in to see me. There is the fixed intention among many of them to visit the United States and complete their studies in our schools. One of these boys informed me that five of them some months ago had entered into an agreement in some way or other to reach our country. All of them have made journeys on steamers along the coast; some of them have been to Europe; all of them can easily reach Hamburg and have money in their pockets; the anxious question with them all is how to go from Hamburg to New York—and whether they will be admitted in the port—and whether they can form connections after they are in our country. There is no foolishness in all these plans; they have thought them out in detail: they will come.

Then there are the pagan tribes of the interior. They are a more serious proposition for the Liberian than the Mohammedans and Kru. They are still “bush niggers”; they live in little towns under the control of petty chiefs; most of them speak only a native language; there is no unity among them; not only are there jealousies between the tribes, but there are suspicions between the villages of one tribe and speech; they live in native houses, wear little clothing, have simple needs; they are ununited and know nothing of the outside world—they know little of France or England, have rarely seen a white man, scarcely know what the Liberian Government means or wants; they are satisfied and only wish to be left alone; they do not need to work steadily—life is easy, they raise sufficient rice and sweet-potatoes and corn and cassava to feed themselves; if they wish to cover their nakedness, they can weave cloth for their own use; there is little which they need from other peoples. Few know anything either of the teachings of the Prophet or Christianity; they practice fetish—“devil-worship”—have their bush schools for the instruction of their boys and girls in the mysteries of life and of religion. They are polygamists, the number of whose wives depends wholly upon the ability to accumulate sufficient wealth with which to purchase them. Among them domestic slavery—which, by the way, is not a matter which need particularly call for reprehension—is common; some of the tribes no doubt still practice cannibalism; it is these tribes in the interior upon which Liberia depends almost completely for the development of wealth; if Liberia shall flourish, it is necessary that these peoples shall produce and deliver the raw materials for shipment to the outside world; it is these peoples who must supply palm nuts, palm kernels, palm oil, piassava fiber, ivory, rubber, gums; it is these peoples who must keep the trails open, and develop them into roads; it is they who must permit the easy passage of soldiers and Government representatives through their territories; it is they who must supply the soldiers for the Frontier Force.