1851-1860

M. VAN BUREN TO TILDEN

"Lindenwald, Jany. 5, '51.

"My dear Sir,—Please let me hear from you at your earliest convenience on the subject of my money as it lies unimproved; also your opinion of the best investments now to be made. What would you think of putting five thousand dollars in Erie income bonds if you do not take it? Explain to me the character of the stock and the principles upon which it has been issued. Don't forget Lawrence. Excuse me for troubling you, and believe me,

"Very truly, "Yours, "M. Van Buren."

The measure for the enlargement of the Erie Canal at an expense of nine millions of dollars, projected by jobbers in what are still known as the canal counties, and which is referred to in the following note of Mr. Burwell, was so effectually resisted by Mr. Tilden, both by speech and pen, that it was put to sleep for more than forty years, when it reappeared and was passed. It resulted even more disastrously than Mr. Tilden had predicted, and to this day no one knows what became of the $9,000,000 that were spent, though no one will pretend that a new canal-boat was built or another ton of freight was ever carried through the canal in consequence of that expenditure.

D. BURWELL TO TILDEN

"Albany, March 30th, 1851.

"My dear Sir,—I presume you have observed the canal bill, which increases the State debt $9,000,000. Will you not devote some time to-morrow to get letters from the money kings—Messrs. Beekman and Morgan and Williams—to have the bill defeated?

"An effort is to be made to press the bill through this week, and it is very important there should be some delay.

"I write you because I know you will feel an interest in defending those constitutional provisions you contributed so essentially to form. I have heard that many of the sound financial men of Wall Street are opposed to this new scheme of debt, and particularly Mr. C. W. Lawrence, of the Bank of the State of New York. I hope you will devote one day more to defend the public faith.

"I should not write, but I really feel it a solemn duty to urge every one I can think of to the defence of the Constitution.

"If you could get up a short remonstrance you would do something worthy of your past labors; but have it sent up by Tuesday or Wednesday.

"Yours truly, "D. Burwell."

By the death of President Taylor, in 1850, the Vice-President, Millard Fillmore, of New York, became Acting President.

Whether, and if any, to what extent, the free State and the slave State partisans in New York, on whose political course the next Presidential election was largely dependent, would be able to act together at the ensuing Presidential election, had become an absorbing question throughout the nation in 1851. Gideon Welles had for many years been prominent among political journalists as editor of the Hartford Times. He had also been a devoted champion of the principles and policies of Presidents Jackson and Van Buren, and was at this time a warm partisan of the Free-soil wing of the Democratic party. He later had the honor to be selected by President Lincoln in 1861 for his Secretary of the Navy, the department of the military service which during the Civil War of 1861-5 proved most uniformly victorious and efficient.

GIDEON WELLES TO TILDEN

"Hartford, 24th Sept., 1851. "Confidential.

"Dear Sir,—I am wanting light on matters political, and write you for guidance and information. It was my expectation to have gone to New York about this time, but as I cannot, excuse my writing. My general views and my peculiar position (peculiar for me) I very frankly gave you, and also the attitude of things here when I saw you in June.

"Your convention is to me somewhat of a mystery, for I have seen no one from your State to enlighten me, and there is no one in the region hereabout better informed than myself. Things have not taken, in all respects, the course I could have wished and, indeed, expected, but it is not uncommon that we are controlled by circumstances rather than circumstances by us.

"My object is to learn from you the course that the Democrats of your State will be likely to take in regard to the Presidential election. I need not say to you that whatever you may communicate shall be in strictest confidence, and shall be submitted to no other eye or ear than mine; but it may be of material benefit for you and for us in Connecticut if I can have some indication of the course which our friends in New York intend to pursue.

"As I remarked to you when I last saw you, I found things in our State in a very unfortunate condition when I returned from Washington, and while I would not commit myself to the schemes on foot, I at the same time did not think it expedient or useful to place myself in exactly an antagonal position to old associates and friends. I have therefore stood somewhat aloof—commenting on and criticising measures and men, to the great annoyance and disappointment of some, who thought it in their power to compel me to take a position as they had done by Niles.

"At this time the party in this State which supported Cass do not mention him. He seems to be dropped by universal consent. His leading friends, the managers of what you call the Hunker party, are generally inclined to Buchanan, but the more efficient and active portion of those who went with him are disinclined to take Buchanan, and, to a considerable extent, avow themselves for Houston. I have been in exactly that position when I did not feel inclined to allay their differences.

"In the mean time, within a few weeks past and since the death of Woodbury, some of the shrewd and cunning friends of Buchanan are talking up Douglas. Without going into speculations on this matter generally, I can well perceive the local design and bearing which those movements may have, and hence my desire to know something of the intentions and ultimate object of the real Democrats of your State, for it is desirable that we should harmonize.

"If I could make the next President, Col. Benton would be the man, although the old man takes occasionally strange freaks. In a late St. Louis Union I read a strong article in favor of Buchanan, backed by an editorial equally strong which surprised me. I am no partisan of Buchanan, whose course on all recent questions appears to me extremely objectionable, and, in fact, his career is not one that I admire generally. Cold, selfish, intriguing, and heartless, he panders to vicious doctrines; he is not a root-and-branch Democrat, and I always doubt his sincerity. I should very much prefer Marcy, especially if he could disentangle himself from a few bad associates. From some of the proceedings of your State convention, and a few odds and ends in the papers, I have been half inclined to think that some of Marcy's warm friends threw their influence with the Barnburners, and defeated the extreme Hunkers. This is mere speculation of mine, without a word from any one, and made perhaps in the absence of any more obvious cause for what then occurred.

"In former years I was accustomed to get from Mr. Wright a letter or two annually that made my pathway clear, and his suggestions enabled me sometimes to do the cause efficient service. At this time I feel the necessity of knowing something of the probable direction our friends in New York will take, and I must rely on you for hints, suggestions, and views. There is quite a disposition to talk up the Presidential question, and our active busybodies seem anxious to connect themselves in season; and without appearing intrusive or actually doing a great deal, I am perhaps in just such a position as enables me perhaps to do more active and substantial service than a much abler man, differently situated. I therefore write to you as an old acquaintance, knowing that you can give me light.

"Where is our friend Genl. Dix, one of your best clearheaded and pure-minded men? I suppose things are in such a condition that he could not be brought forward, but how infinitely superior to most of the men named for Chief Magistrate. Let me hear from you as early as you conveniently can, and believe me,

"Very truly yours, "Gideon Welles."

"P. S.—Your father, as well as Gov. Wright, was an old correspondent of mine, and hence, in part, my claim upon you.

"S. J. Tilden, Esq."

William L. Marcy had been Governor of New York from 1833 to 1839, and in 1852, as will be seen by the following letter, he was already indulging dreams of succeeding Mr. Fillmore at the impending Presidential election, which, however, resulted in the choice of Franklin Pierce. Mr. Marcy had too many friends like Van Buren and Tilden and Dix and Flagg to be trusted at the head of the government by the partisans of slavery, while and because of those friends he was wanted in the Cabinet for his influence with those statesmen in New York; but they took care to put him in the department where he would have least occasion or opportunity to interfere with the policy of the slave-holding class. He was made Secretary of State.

W. L. MARCY TO TILDEN

"Albany, Apl. 2d, '52. "Private.

"My dear Sir,—Though I have heard of nothing calculated to excite alarm, yet I do not feel quite easy as to what may be the result of the delegate meeting on the 7th inst. As Lt.-Gov. Church does not stand entirely unexposed to attacks on account of the canal lettings, I think it would be quite agreeable to him to be selected as one of the State delegates. Should his selection be pressed it may embarrass the proceedings. I have information from Washington that Dickinson's man, Birdsall, is here exhibiting much bitterness towards me, and has distinctly broke ground for Dickinson as a candidate. As he cannot carry the State it will be important for his object, as it would be to Gen. C.'s friends, to create an impression that no one can carry it. He will therefore endeavor to get up a scene of confusion here at the delegate meeting. Though I have no intimation on the subject, yet I do not doubt that he will propose a wholesale endorsement of the compromise. If so, the blow must be skilfully parried.

"I also fear the Hunker delegates favorable to me will stiffly insist on Hunker State delegates, but will go far to gratify the other section of my friends as to the particular persons.

"I allude to these things to enforce the request I make to have you be here a day or two before the delegates meet if you conveniently can.

"If we can surmount the embarrassments which may arise in this matter, I flatter myself that our future course will be more smooth.

"I am inspired with confidence from the information I get from Washington that things, as they appear there, are not worsening for me, and if the business at the delegate meeting is done as it ought to be my prospects will be much improved.

"Yours truly, "W. L. Marcy. "Saml. J. Tilden, Esq."

MARTIN VAN BUREN TO S. J. TILDEN

"Lindenwald, Sept. 17th, '52.

"My dear Sir,—Accept my thanks for your attention to my stock affair. Please deposit the balance to my credit in Mr. Worth's bank. I regret your inability to visit me, as I long to have an old-fashioned chat with you.

"In haste, "Very truly yours, "M. Van Buren."

TILDEN TO—— SUGGESTION FOR PRESIDENT PIERCE IN THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF HIS ADMINISTRATION

"New York, Jany. 15th, 1853.

"My dear Sir,—I thank you for the copy of Hawthorne's Memoirs. It would have reminded me, if I had forgotten, that I promised to write you my views on the subject of our conversation when I last had the pleasure to see you. I should have done so earlier, but engagements, which it is no exaggeration to call incessant, have left me no opportunity.

"The preliminary question is, on what general theory is the new administration to be formed? Is the Cabinet to be composed of those who are commonly regarded as Presidential men—who were candidates for the recent nomination—and are surrounded by the affiliations which naturally grow up around those occupying that position? It seems to me that this would be attempting to stand steadily and firmly on a half-dozen different stools. The President might himself look after the success of his administration, while his constitutional helpers were thinking how each measure and each appointment would affect their pretensions to the succession; or he might content himself with the formal honor of presiding over the councils of these heads of factions. But, in my judgment, he ought to be—not what Victoria is in the British government, not a grand Elector, as Sieyès would have made Napoleon, not a mere chooser of the actual rulers—but the real and responsible head of the administration. That he may be such, he should have, as far as practicable, a Cabinet able to perform its duty towards him, faithfully and effectively, and not inviting by the aspirations of its members internal dissension or external hostility. In the last term of an administration, it may be difficult to exclude pretensions to the succession. But why incur the embarrassments which they never fail to generate, during a first term, unless it be certain that it is also the last! And is it to be now assumed that the Democracy will look from the candidate through whom it solved the difficulties of a choice at the last convention, and to candidates through whom it found itself unable to solve those difficulties? It is not clear that the party can, after so recent a disorganization—if it could under other circumstances—be sufficiently consolidated in a single term to be instrumental to any great public service. But it is clear what will become of the family discipline and how the farm will be managed if the old gentleman begins by announcing his own decease and inviting the boys to scramble for the inheritance. Polk tried that, secretly meaning all the while to be his own heir; and while he contrived and they scrambled, the inheritance went to strangers. Let not Gen. Pierce content himself with being a loose and temporary bond of union between factions; but rather let him aim to fuse those factions, and constitute a single, compact party.

"Now what is to be done with New York? Some will say avoid all difficulties by taking no member of the Cabinet from that State. That would be better than to do worse; and, if on due reflection it should be deemed most expedient, I should not personally complain. But it is not a policy after my heart or my judgment; nor does it tend to constitute a party out of the fused elements of factions. An evasion policy, in such a case, is a feeble policy.

"Well, who then shall be taken? The public regard Messrs. O'Conor, Dickinson, Marcy, and Dix as candidates; and therefore I may be justified in remarking upon them as such. The first two I shall not say much about, because I do not suppose their present relations to the prevailing policies of the State will make them regarded as admissible selections.

"Mr. O'Conor is a man of extensive and accurate legal learning, of an acuteness of reason somewhat excessive even for the higher uses of his profession—of great mental activity, indefatigable, vehement and sarcastic in controversy; remarked at the bar as able rather than wise, and remarkable for a want of tact. What these qualities—not weakened by a life almost exclusively forensic—would naturally make him in politics, where they are not counteracted by the large knowledge, long experience, and settled rules and habits that modify their effects in his profession, and where the opposite qualities, the power, not of dissenting or contesting, but of moulding, constructing, and organizing, of determining one's self and representing others, are mainly required, may be imagined. Add inexperience in politics, very limited acquaintance with its subjects, its questions, its history, its methods or its men—unsettled convictions, a tendency to capriciousness, and as little as can easily be found of that capacity which enables a man instinctively to act with others or make them act with him, and you have the political aspects of his character. Whether in personal judgment or action in politics, in administrative council, in a deliberative assembly, or in leading or aiding to lead a party of a nation or a ward, his destiny is to illustrate how little fitted to such purposes may be talents conceded to be eminent in a peculiar sphere. This opinion is the result of many years' observation. It was confirmed when I was associated with him in the convention that formed the present Constitution of this State, and, in an intercourse constant and never unfriendly, was a daily witness of the development of his characteristics. The partiality of his friends would not change the nature, though it might lessen the degree, of this criticism. No one has suggested him except as Attorney Genl.; and for that station, I presume, on the idea that its duties are purely professional. If that office did not share in the general administrative councils of the President; if, as a legal adviser, he were not required to look at the mixed questions that come up before him somewhat with the eye of a statesman as well as that of a mere lawyer—or at least with the largeness and comprehensiveness of a judicial view; if he had no duty or utility beyond conducting the cases in the courts in which he occasionally appears for the United States, certainly there could be no objection to the personal adaptation of this gentleman, and, if that member of the Cabinet from New York need have no relation to the majority of the party there, which has the entire State government, and whose ascendency is every day becoming more complete and solid, and but a very ineffective relation to the minority, if he need represent nobody and be capable of representing nobody, such a selection might not be injudicious as respects the Democracy of the largest State in the Union.

"I ought perhaps to add a matter of information without going into discussion of political antecedents that in our great financial controversy from 1836-7 this gentleman was with the Whigs, and was not again visible in our ranks until 1844.

"Inferior to either of the other gentlemen mentioned in general abilities and acquirements, and to either of them, except Mr. O'Conor, as a politician—and not strong with his State in any of his political antecedents—Mr. Dickinson has brought himself into his present unfortunate relations with a great majority of the party here by the extreme positions he has occupied on questions which have divided the State, and still more by the fatuity with which he has followed Judge Beardsley and Mr. Croswell in a policy which must have been fatal to the party if it had not sooner been fatal to its advocate. I mean the policy of resisting every attempt at an honorable or practicable union of the Democracy of the State—on the chance that, while the prominent men of the section, which formed a majority of the whole and had many sympathizers from the rank and file of that section, could be made through the influence of association with the party in other States; and that, while the Democracy of the Union should take the risks of the experiment, those who got it up would, at least, own the wreck. Fairer and wiser men saw that such an experiment in a party which rarely commands a majority exceeding two or three per cent. of the aggregate vote, even if more successful than could be reasonably hoped for, could have no result but to leave New York as thoroughly federalized as Massachusetts or Vermont for a generation to come. But the folly of the scheme was no less in its personal aspects. It mistook the sentiments as it underrated the sense of the masses of the party. They, as everybody ought to have seen, were in favor of a reunion on equal and honorable terms. And the attempt to resist it—which, if openly made, would have been generally rejected—was sufficiently perceived to break the hold of its authors upon the masses of their own section, who, although sometimes in a collateral question where old associations or prejudices could be appealed to showing a large minority have been drifting from these gentlemen ever since, and many of them resuming relations with the radicals with whom they formerly acted.

"Gov. Marcy and Genl. Dix both possess the important requisite of being of the union Democracy of the State, and are both capable of fulfilling the duties of a Cabinet station with signal ability and distinction. I express my judgment between these gentlemen, not without regret arising from kindly personal disposition towards the one against whom that judgment, under all the circumstances, must be. But I shall state it frankly, and briefly some of the reasons on which it is founded.

"It seems to me, in the first place, that the selection of Genl. Dix is most wise and right in respect to the mutual relations of those who, acting generally with both these gentlemen, since the reunion of the party in 1849, would be divided in preference between them. On the first nomination of Gov. Seymour, in selecting a State candidate for the recent Presidential nomination—in choosing the two State delegates to the national convention on the renomination of Gov. Seymour—indeed, on most of the important occasions since the reunion, the radicals, while constituting far the larger and more effective element of that union, have conceded almost everything. The magnanimity with which they have done so, and the fidelity with which they have carried out the measures in which it has been done, have been strongly recognized by Gov. Marcy and his friends. These concessions have sometimes been not without dissatisfaction at the extent and frequent repetition of them; nor without large demand on the credit and patience of those who have been the means of inducing acquiescence in arrangements, in which, while one side contributed most of the capital of the partnership, the other received nearly its entire benefits. I feel some right to speak on this point without suspicion that I am swerved by personal associations from a fair judgment as respects all parties, as well from the general position I have held on these occasions as from the part I took in some of them.

"It may not be improper to mention an instance. When the two State delegates to the national convention were to be chosen, Gov. Marcy, as desiring to be presented as the State candidate for the Presidency, and Gov. Seymour as a candidate before his own party the first time after his defeat before the people, felt their fortunes very deeply involved in the result. Gov. Marcy wrote to me requesting me to attend the meeting of the district delegates at Albany, and I did so. I never knew either of those gentlemen manifest more anxiety or having to confront more serious embarrassments. It had been the settled understanding that one Hunker and one radical should be taken for the State delegates. Most of the votes relied on to make the choice were radicals; and prominent men of that section, some of whom the radicals most desired to send, strongly wished to go. It seemed to Gov. Marcy necessary to take two Hunkers, but he felt the embarrassment of asking it, especially on the grounds that could alone be rendered; and others, who had to make the choice or were in firmer association with those who had to make it, were not easily convinced of the necessity or propriety of such a course. The difficulty was at length solved by our passing our favorite men and assenting to elect Mr. Seymour and another Hunker. Those of us who have, on this and other occasions, felt the strain with our own friends of keeping the elements of the union Democracy working harmoniously and efficiently under such circumstances, have a right to be heard when we express the conviction that the present is a fit time for Gov. Marcy and his friends to evince some mutuality in their relations towards the radicals; and that a more safe, proper, and unobjectionable opportunity to reciprocate the magnanimity with which they have been treated cannot be offered than in assenting to the selection of Genl. Dix for the Cabinet. Such I believe to be the general sense of those who have formed four-fifths of the majorities in our State conventions and elsewhere since the reunion of the party from which Gov. Marcy and Gov. Seymour have received support.

"Regarding the question simply as it affects the party in this State, I think it highly desirable and important that the occasion should be embraced to manifest that mutuality towards the radicals without which the elements of a party cannot be kept in cordial or lasting union, and I think that, on such a question, the general sense of fair men is more wisely conformed to than disregarded. Certainly I do not mean to censure Gov. Marcy for allowing his name to be presented, or that we have any right or disposition to limit the range of selection by Genl. Pierce; but simply to state considerations which, in my judgment, are important in deciding the choice.

"This brings me to the question how the party in New York, as a whole, stand affected as between these two gentlemen? The radicals, who are a full majority in numbers and more in efficiency, are for Gen. Dix, and would, under the circumstances, feel some sense of exclusion in a choice of a different nature. Gov. Marcy and his personal friends, though preferring him, cannot, as the case stands, make any actual opposition to the appointment of Gen. Dix; and, if it be made, will acquiesce—most, if not all of them, with cordiality. The considerations I have alluded to appeal strongly to their judgment and sense of justice, if failing to change their wishes; and with the relations which have grown up with many who are for Genl. Dix, secure this result. The opposition of the extreme Hunkers to Marcy or Dix will be most manifest towards the one appearing most likely at the moment to be appointed; but I think that they are generally less repugnant to the selection of Dix, towards whom there is less of violence and bitterness in individual leaders. So far as this may be supposed to arise from the part Gov. Marcy took in promoting the union of the party, I regard it as a merit; and for that, with a friendly construction of acts and motives, we have handsomely acquitted ourselves towards him. This animosity has other causes, among which is that he has been in the way of other gentlemen who have grown faster in their own esteem than in his appreciation (in which difference I think he is more right than they); and especially that Mr. Dickinson regards him as having, by being a candidate for the Presidency, kept that distinction from alighting on fitter shoulders—which it is certain that Mr. D. confidentially calculated the convention would find, after trying Cass' awhile, to be of exactly his own management.

"Looking to this State, therefore, I think the appointment of Genl. Dix would be the most wise, expedient, and prudent, with his moderation and conciliatory conduct always, and conciliatory disposition, it will prove generally satisfactory. Not that all can be pleased. Still less that a few impracticables in this city will be—who never have been for twenty years, when the party was strong and prosperous—I mean the leading spirits. Their idea of building up the party has been to exclude from it a majority as Barnburners, and the most of the Hunkers as having traitorous sympathies and affiliations with the Barnburners; and, incapable of more than one idea at a time, they have continued faithful to this, until they have pretty much exhausted the credit they acquired in 1848 with the masses of those who voted for Gen. Cass; and have lost their influence in the organization of the party even in this city, while their crotchets are not and have not been shared in by a tenth of those who were nominally classified with them. They may be safely disregarded. There will be no local dissatisfaction in this city arising from appointments, if those which are of a local nature be judiciously made. The truth is the divisions and factions which appear on the surface of our city politics are pretty much confined to the petty leaders, and excite attention or interest in but a very small portion of the masses. They are generated by the very large number of offices, contracts, and other objects of cupidity, municipal, State, and national, which are concentrated here, and perhaps in some degree by the stirring and heterogeneous character of our population. They always exist, and have little to do with any settled general classification. Their effect is to render opinion and individual character less influential than in the more natural and sound condition of the rural districts, and to make the organization of the party, always scrambled for to promote personal ends, a much less true index of the real sentiments of the party. So far as the relations of the administration with the party in this city are to be effected at all by its appointments, assuming them, of course, to be intrinsically proper and reputable, it would be incomparably more by the multitude of little ones than by the large. While the appointments here should be made with primary reference to the honest and efficient discharge of official duties, a judicious care should be had for the harmonizing and conciliating the entire party. The one or two which have extensive subordinate patronage should not be surrendered to the bigotry of clique or of individuals on the idea of a partition between factions, but should be entrusted to persons who have largeness of views, judgments, and local knowledge enough to administer the subordinate patronage on the same principle on which the administration itself acts. With such a policy the disturbing causes will be reduced to a minimum and the party will move on in general unity and strongly ascendant. I will venture what character I have for political judgment that no perceptible obstacle to this result would be found in the selection of Gen. Dix for the Cabinet.

"There is another consideration in respect to that gentleman. He is a model of a Cabinet officer. Able, accomplished, and judicious, capable of doing a given quantity of work in a specified time, not having made himself or been made a candidate for the Presidency, he will serve the administration faithfully, and without aiming to control or manage it to personal ends; and being in nobody's way for the succession, with no affiliations formed to secure it to him, not looked to with any such view by those who present his name, he will draw on the administration no jealousies on that score from those who fear passive not less than active rivals, and will not believe that Presidential ambition, once entertained, can ever be practically relinquished.

"To the force of all these considerations is opposed nothing but an alleged repugnance of the South or portions of it to Genl. Dix's appointment arising from his position in 1848. I do not suppose Genl. Pierce will be disposed to, or can listen to, an objection of this nature, and I think it will be found to have as little real existence as it has cogency. Mr. Dickinson's friends thought before the last convention that they should ruin Gov. Marcy by charging him with having allied with the Barnburners; but it rather proved an element of strength, and the votes he received were, notwithstanding, from the extreme South. Our friends there, as elsewhere, wanted a candidate who could win. Every man of sense, then, must see now that if the party would maintain itself, it must do so by the same policy by which it regained the ascendency. The real difficulty in respect to the South will be in composing their own dissensions, in which all sides there will feel infinitely stronger interest than in any New York question. Such an objection to Genl. Dix may be entertained by bigotry or the narrowness of views of some, or more likely it may be the pretence of men dissatisfied on grounds interesting them personally. If this pretence be wanting to such, others equally available will be found.

"Whatever it be, the sooner the administration shall show that it does not intend to reverse the policy which brought it into existence the better. Without a prompt, firm, and decisive course in this respect, we shall have nothing—from cabinet minister down to tide-waiter—but discussions of past dissensions, which it is the policy and duty of Genl. Pierce, with all his power as the head of the party, to bury. It is a case in which boldness is the highest prudence. If the party cannot be kept large enough to contain all the great divisions of it which have predominated in powerful States or sections of the Union, it cannot be kept in the majority. In the face of the certain results of any other system, I feel courageous in supporting this, on the principle on which Moreau said he rendered his soldiers brave—by making them fear more to run than to fight.

"Asked the other day by a Hunker friend if I thought it prudent to take a man of Gen. Dix's class, I replied, most certainly to take one such. If past positions on the slavery question as it existed among Democrats, are to be the grounds of a classification, it is proper and necessary to represent the divisions to which Genl. Dix belonged as well as others. Can it be done anywhere else as well as in New York? He will be in line with the majority of the party and the entire government in that State, which the minority of the party there, if that classification be the criterion, will still be amply represented in other members of the cabinet, whereas if he be not taken, and the section to which he belongs be not represented elsewhere, as we may presume it will not, the results will be regarded by the country as a practical exclusion of that interest.

"It seems to be, therefore, desirable to take a man of Genl. Dix's relations; and to take one or more of the States-rights Democrats from States in which they stand with a majority of the party, and to represent the other great interests, as there will be abundant room to do, in the rest of the cabinet. A strong administration cannot be made by combining negations. If it be formed, as it should be, by men who have a predominant regard to its unity and success, the more its members have of the confidence and favor of the interests and States they are respectively taken to represent, the better. Of course I mean only men of qualifications and character, and of fitness in these respects and from their Democratic antecedents—and the objection to whom is merely the part they had in the recent Democratic divisions North and South. Let unfriendly critics, if they please, call such a cabinet mosaic. If the joiner work be good, as I believe it may be, and the materials be of the right general character, I do not care how firm the texture or strong the colors of the parts. It will dovetail the party together for a basis on which the administration may stand securely. Certainly, I assume that in this there will be no violation of principle and honor to shock the confidence of the country. Those who think there is, and have acquiesced thus far, might feel some delicacy that their scruples arise for the first time when they are asking for themselves and on this ground a monopoly of the fruits of the wrong. Restitution to the true owner would be more becoming. If the party that elected Gen. Pierce be an alliance of those who cannot honestly act together, it ought to be dissolved; but if it could honestly unite, there can be no objection to proclaiming the intention to continue that union, or to carrying it out in the most effectual way.

"At the late election, the large popular majorities as well as large electoral votes were in the great States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Notwithstanding the clamor about the identification of Scott with Seward, the South did not do equally well, except in States where personal antipathies to that interest or personal commitments of Whig leaders produced systematic defections. No administration or party can stand without the support of at least two of the great free States. And the conceded abandonment at the outset of the canvass of either of the two largest, especially if it be the first in electoral votes, and of metropolitan action or opinion, usually loses one or both of the others. No man has been elected President against the vote of New York in the six successive elections since it has been cast unitedly and by the people; nor, indeed, ever but in a single instance, the circumstances of which scarcely constitute it an exception. Her vote has been often an unnecessary addition to his majority—and a hopeful contest for it would often enable the other States to do without her; but it is not easy to measure the force of her conceded or apprehended loss, representing, as her population does, elements that affect the equilibrium of so many other States.

"The interest, headed by Gov. Seward, which nominated Scott, is a powerful minority in these great States. Carrying almost the whole Whig party against an existing Whig administration and the influence of the great Whig leaders, it may, as an opposition and surviving those leaders, absorb the third party, now almost holding the balance of power, without disintegrating itself. It will be likely to try the experiment. The defection from it last fall, tho' encouraged by the commanding patronage of the administration and the name of Mr. Webster, was scarcely more than one—certainly not two—per cent., and was confined to a few localities. If the previous State elections had not practically decided the contest, that defection would have been inconsiderable. Hereafter, not only are these disturbing causes stilled, but it will have the cementing influence of a common opposition.

"The characteristics of this interest, in our State politics, have been profligate jobbing and reckless enterprise and expenditure. The only effectual barrier to its predominance has been in the radicals. They include the prominent men who, with Wright, Hoffman, and Flagg, fought all our great financial contests; and a majority of the masses who maintained their measures, although large numbers of the latter were—temporarily, as I believe—detached by the divisions of 1848 and bound with the opposite interest about half of the entire party. While the questions on which they separated were occasional and temporary, questions of honest financial policy and administration are ever present. Indeed, in our time the chief political duty seems to be to protect the people from plunder under the forms of legislation and in the abuse of administration.

"On all these questions, as well as doctrines of States'-rights, free trade, and in most general views of government, the radicals of New York (as I should have remarked while speaking of the relations between them and the State-rights Democrats of the South in a composite cabinet) sympathize with the radical Democracy of the South; and, indeed, are the only unflinching coadjutors the latter have had in New York.

"Agreeing in what is the only safe reliance of constitutional rights, as well as the cardinal point of the Democratic faith—embracing, as each does, the flower of the Democratic youth, enterprise, and energy in its own region—without discussing individual views of the course of either, antecedent to the general reunion of the party, and admitting, if you please, that they are somewhat alike in the boldness with which they maintain their opinions, and repel aggressions on what they deem to be their rights—it is obvious that there are points of sympathy between them which make it easy and natural for them to fraternize, when out of the presence of any immediate course of difference, as they did all through the late Baltimore convention and in its result.

"The radicals of New York include as much talent, courage, enterprise, and fearless devotion as can be found in any party. They have the advantage of being, on an average, half a generation younger than the other. These circumstances, as well as those I have before mentioned, mark them as the future of the Democracy of New York. Since Silas Wright's death they have given their affections to no providential man. They fell into the support of Genl. Pierce with alacrity at the convention, and with generous enthusiasm in the canvass, because they recognized in him qualities in common with those of their lamented leader, attested as well by the warm regard generated between them in former years by mutual sympathies, as by the whole career of the survivor.

"As a matter of mere party calculation, I do not think it wise, with reference to the reconstitution and reconsolidating of the party on a comprehensive basis, to leave them the only large and powerful class not represented in the cabinet; nor, in undertaking to represent them, to pass over a statesman of great merit and in all respects unobjectionable, unless because he is one of their number. The administration will, I believe, ensure their support by its principals and measures. But looking to the condition of domestic politics, in New York and the other great States on which the strength of the party mainly depends, I do not think it would be a mistake to add the cordiality that comes from a sense of equality and reciprocity in party relations and the energetic and efficient co-operation which will result. There are other considerations, but my letter has already reached an unconscionable length, my apology for which is, that writing my thoughts as they arose while writing they would not stop, and I could not—I have set them down frankly, not without some delicacy, at seeming so much to advise, but remembering that nobody need follow, while I would be unwilling to mislead. If I can contribute any information or suggestion to the general stock which you have a right to advise, and He whose province it is to judge must needs gather from all quarters, my end will be attained. I am too sensible of the difficulties of filling up a cabinet on principles which seem essential, or any general principal and at the same time securing the highest individual fitness, worth and weight and a reasonable concurrence of our friends in the various localities,—to be willing to increase them. A just and firm policy will solve them, as nearly as is ever attainable in such cases, to the satisfaction of the country. With the best wishes of one who may speculate safely because he is without the responsibility of acting—and who, except as a citizen, a Democrat, and a friend of the new administration, has, and can have, no interest in the result, though not exempt from the influence of sympathies of opinion and association in attempting to take a fair view,

"I remain truly your friend, (Signed) "S. J. Tilden."[19]

TILDEN TO FRANKLIN PIERCE

"Harrisburg, Feb. 23d, 1853. "Confidential.

"My dear Sir,—A little matter of business, which called me here for a day, has brought me again in contact with Gov. Bigler, and his impressions are so strong on a point I casually mentioned to you in New York that I think it not improper to repeat his suggestion more formally. It is that, in case you have decided to take Mr. Campbell[20] into your cabinet, you should, if practicable, put him in the Interior or Navy, rather than the Post-Office. The Gov. says the Catholics are very numerous in this State—enough to make it probable that, in many instances, they may become candidates for appointment as postmasters—and enough to awaken little neighborhood jealousies respecting them. He deems it undesirable that Mr. C., as the head of the department, should be called upon officially to decide on these cases, and be exposed to the suspicion of appointing from religious partiality, or to the necessity of doing injustice in order to avoid that imputation. It is worth considering whether these views have not more force than your own observation in the different condition of things existing in New England would induce you at first to give them. In expressing them, the Gov. can have no motive but the welfare of your administration and of the party here, and his observation of the state of opinion here is entitled to a consideration. He seems to entertain these ideas so strongly, and so much to desire that they shall be presented to you, that I take the liberty of drawing your attention once more to them;—not to press them upon you, but that your mind may pause upon them and take their exact measure before you conclude the question.

"I am not sure that my engagements will permit me to be in Washington at the inauguration; but I hope, at any rate, to have the pleasure of seeing you soon after.

"With great respect, "I remain, truly, "Your friend." "His Exy. Franklin Pierce."

We have here a continuation of suggestions which Mr. Tilden felt called upon to present to President Pierce to guide him in his dispensation of his patronage in the State of New York. It makes one sad to think what an opportunity was lost by this President, and through him by the country, from his failure to see the wisdom of this advice and to adopt it. Had Mr. Pierce respected the public opinion of the State of New York and properly recognized the political sentiments and sympathies of the majority there, as he did in the Southern States, the presumption is that the Nullification party would have been as effectually disarmed under his administration as it was by President Jackson a quarter of a century before. Franklin Pierce, however, was a different man from Andrew Jackson, and the conditions under which he received his nomination did not leave him a free agent.

It was only at this stage of Pierce's administration that Tilden began to indulge in the deplorable error of walking by sight and not by faith. He did not believe, nor did he ever again seem to comprehend, that in the slave States all other questions even the Constitution of our government and the integrity of our territory, were subordinate throughout the South to the preservation and extension of slavery; that every person who ventured publicly to express a doubt of the wisdom of allowing slavery to extend to the free Territories was pronounced there a suspect, and was proscribed as a person who tainted every one who associated with him politically. The Nullifiers saw, and saw correctly, that the anti-slavery sentiment could only be resisted in America as heresy was resisted by Louis XIV. in France—by crushing the heretics or driving them from the country. To reason with Pierce in favor of dispensing his patronage in the State of New York in accordance with the public opinion of the State, was as idle as the lambs reasoning with the wolf in the fable.

The following notes, though without address, were without doubt prepared by Tilden and addressed to Pierce or to some one for his perusal. By the paging of the MS., it appears that thirteen pages, which have not been found, preceded those which are here submitted to the reader.

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE ALLOTMENT [OF OFFICES UNDER THE PIERCE ADMINISTRATION]

"The Collectorship, the Sub-Treasuryship, and in a less degree the Naval Office, have State as well as city aspects. I have therefore set down the Secretary of State and the foreign missions in connection with them.

"Considered in a State aspect, see how much more the Hunkers (Hard and Soft) get, in every view of this allotment, than the Barnburners, who are more than equal in numbers and power to both of them united.

"Considering the Collectorship singly in that aspect, the same result is obvious.

"Be not misled by the apparent predominance of the Hunkers in the city. Up to the moment of the schism in 1848, the Radicals had five-sixths of the masses and nearly the whole party organization. Their old associates have been returning to them ever since. In 1851 the Radicals had a majority of the delegates to the State convention, and there was but a small majority against them in the General Committee of that year. At the last election of General Committee in 1852, they carried a majority; and at the last trial in the Tammany Society their majority was five to one. I grant that a large majority of the party went for Cass in 1848, but I do not think a majority are now in the leadership of Schell, Sickles, etc., or included in the distinctive class of Hards. I entertain no doubt whatever, if the appointments are such as not to affect the question anyway, the Radicals will remain in permanent possession of the organization. The truth is that four-fifths of the rank and file follow the organization, by whichever leaders it is wielded. All this, however, is matter of opinion; I do not claim for it the assent of your judgment, although I have never been known hitherto to over-calculate the strength of those among whom I belong.

"But permit me to say that this point is below the importance and dignity of the general question before you. The most controlling aspects of the case are State aspects and general aspects. If you vest the most powerful and influential trust in the State of New York in a politician of the most vulgar sort—or narrow views, prospective in all save the promise by which that trust is secured, a schemer for personal ends by desperate and fraudulent means, that almost revolted the party at the last election—nay, if you fail to take most ample and certain guaranty against the predominance of any such influence, in the known, tried, and elevated character of the man you select, your appointment cannot fail to be discreditable and disastrous in its results. You should rest that corner of your administration on the sense and moral power of the community, by an appointment which should appeal to them, and draw approval from all disinterested persons. Do this, and you will rise above the altitude of mere politicians; and no disaffection which their disappointments will create can raise a ripple on the surface.

"There is one other consideration. I have recounted to you on a former occasion the series of surrenders by the Radicals to the Softs through which the Union movement of the New York Democracy has been thus far carried on. I could not adequately express to you the painful personal embarrassments by which its recent steps have been marked—the embroiling of old personal relations—and the difficulties with which it has been achieved. These were our main motives to ask in the selection of a Cabinet officer from New York some recognition of the radicals. Again they yielded, and they have looked forward to the most prominent local appointment in the State as a case in which what they felt to be justice—long deferred—would be accorded to them. The impression—whether well or ill founded—has existed that such would be the course of things. I confess that I have shared in that impression. Instead of there being any cause for shrinking or hesitation, I think the occasion ought to be desired to fulfil an expectation so right and reasonable. I clearly think that it is needed. I know I speak the sentiments of the strong men among the radicals when I say that the personal interests, desires, or gratification of Gen. Dix, or any other man whom they have honored, are as dust in the balance in the true gravity of this question. I believe Gen. Dix is the last man who would dissent from this opinion. At any rate, I take the responsibility of expressing it in the name of all his supporters.

"A clear, conspicuous recognition, in a case in reference to which expectation has [been] excited, and which concerns more than the gratification of a single individual, is what is needed. The controlling men of the radicals in all parts of the State are independent men—in condition as in character. They are weary with debating questions of their own equality with the rest of their party. They have not proposed to proscribe anybody. The question has constantly been whether they should be proscribed. They do not rely on instructions contrary to the disposition and whole anterior conduct of the individual intrusted with the power. Such reliance would be an illusion inconsistent with all ordinary experience; and a choice which should imply it will utterly fail of inspiring confidence or producing any valuable effect.

"The programme should be accomplished to this actual condition of facts and sentiments.

"It is with a clear sense and earnest feeling outrunning my power of adequate expression, in the haste in which I write, that I put you in possession of these ideas. I do so only because I think I comprehend the case better than can easily be done from a distance; and because I deem it important that you should be appraised of the sentiments of a powerful class on which the success of the administration, so far as New York is concerned, largely depends. A desire that you should do what is wise for it and for yourself is not less my motive than a desire that you should be just to the class to which I myself belong. I confide entirely in your disposition to do what is fair and right to all; and have a grateful sense of the kindness and consideration with which you have treated me personally. These very sentiments impel me to address you with earnest frankness in respect to a matter, a mistake in which cannot, in my judgment, be easily, if at all, retrieved.

"Very truly, "Your friend, "S. J. Tilden."

J. VAN BUREN TO ISAAC FOWLER, POSTMASTER OF NEW YORK CITY

"New York, Mch. 21st, 1853.

"My dear Fowler,—Yours of yesterday is recd., and I have read it to Kennedy and Waterbury, who have started to get letters—they feel confident that the Mayor will write; Dix is at Rye, but has written, I think, to Tilden. Havemeyer writes for nobody this day. I enclose a note of my own, which, with Marcy friendly, ought to cover ground enough.

"I yesterday wrote O'Sullivan by Benton—also Temple; you will have seen my letters before this. If I had known last week I could be of service I might have run on. Now I start for Albany at 1.15, where I have 3 causes amongst the first 10 in the Court of Appeals, and they now have a rule that they will not strike off or reserve on the first day. If I can get away the last of the week I will run on to Washington, but then I suppose it will be too late. Tallcott came on with Tilden to Philadelphia, and brings accounts corresponding with those in your letter. If I had known exactly how matters stood I would not have alluded in my letter to Temple to my previous letter to Tilden; if he has not read the President my letter to him he may strike out that part, or say that Tilden was afraid the abruptness of it might not be understood, and so retained it. There is nothing in either letter that should be misapprehended between honest men—the President is entitled to frankness and plain-dealing, and so are we.

"In regard to my visiting Washington, I see no good I could do, except to satisfy the President and Govr. Marcy that we mean to deal with them not only fairly but liberally. This can as well be done by yourself, Tilden, Richmond, O'Sullivan, Crosswell, Temple, Cassidy, and any other friends with whom I have no secrets, and without whom I should be powerless, if disposed to differ from them. Marcy must be perfectly aware of this, and I am sure the President is. I am not surprised to hear from all our friends that Marcy behaves well—his natural disposition, old associations, good sense, and obvious policy all combine to take him to the side of sound men, and if he is prudent the party can be made very strong in this State. It is curious, but true, that I have said from the first that the only fear I have about him is that he will be too violent on the hard shells! It is a singular fear for me to have, but it is because such a course would weaken M.'s influence with Pierce, and excite sympathy with the hard shells. That M. would be just to our people I have never doubted since he was selected.

"I left word at Dix's that I had named him for the Collectorship. I had some conversation with him about it the other day, and inferred from what he said he would not decline. On looking over the whole ground this seems to me the best thing the President can do—and I think Dix would be pleased with it. We cannot insist on a mission for him and the collectorship for a Barnburner. We must have the latter, and if Dix, after being gazetted to the Cabinet and to France, should get nothing it would be extremely awkward and almost ludicrous; this would mortify me extremely as well as him and his friends. I have been to see Havemeyer; he says he will not accept. I told him if he declined we would murder him. But it seems to me the President should choose between Kelly and Dix; if he can take Kelly and give Dix a mission that would be best of all. Write me at Albany, and telegraph if anything occurs.

"Truly Y'rs, "J. Van Buren."

"P. S.—If the President gives us a fair man for Collector, and the Navy only, he might put in some Hunker for Marshal, P.-O., Apprsr., Surveyor, etc., leaving room for Dix's mission."

W. L. MARCY TO S. J. TILDEN

"Private and confidl. "Wash., 4 Apl., '53.

"Dear Sir,—The appraisers have been up, but I have got the appts. put off for a few days. Let me know who (you think) ought to be app'd.

"Dickinson is to be here to-morrow—and it is expected by his friends that he will interfere and have a potential voice in N. Y. appts. What of Thompson for Appr. at Large? Redfield has telegraphed me that he shall accept and come on here. See him if you can, as he passes thro' N. Y.

"Yours truly, "W. L. Marcy." "S. J. Tilden, Esq.

"P. S.—Pomeroy is nominated as Appraiser at Large."

The accession of Pierce to the Presidency was soon followed by the retirement of F. P. Blair, who had edited the Globe, a semi-official press since the inauguration of President Jackson, and by the establishment of the Union as the new administration organ, under the editorship of Mr. Ritchie, the proprietor of the leading Democratic print in Virginia. This was the first unmistakable evidence of the deliberatively proscriptive policy of the new Cabinet.

Mr. Forney, who for many years had been the Washington correspondent of a Philadelphia print, was assigned to a prominent command on the skirmish-line of the allied pro-slavery press. Though not a wit himself, the following skit will warrant his friends to claim for him the credit of being once very nearly the cause of wit in another. Its chief interest to the reader now consists in its glimpses of many transitory political issues which only live in the daily press and private correspondence of the period.

PROSPECTUS OF THE "FORNEY-CATERER"

"A daily journal will be established in the City of New York under the title of the Forney-caterer, the first number of which will be issued Jan. 1st, 1854, or on some other first of January.

"This journal will profess radically Democratic principles. Believing in the largest liberty—especially in using the public moneys, it will insist on the extension of that liberty through all the domains of the public treasuries, national, state, and municipal, as the true idea of Democratic progress. It will be in favor of free trade, as practically illustrated in steamship contracts; and will particularly sustain the Sloo contract, and the assignment thereof to George Law, Edwin Croswell, Prosper M. Wetmore, and Marshall O. Roberts; and the Collins contract, which its editor will also personally advocate in the lobbies of Congress for a moderate compensation. Opposed to internal improvement by the general government, it will urge liberal appropriations of the public funds to any private company which shall make satisfactory arrangements for grants in aid of the Pacific Railroad; and will take a small interest in the purchase by the United States of the property of the Hudson's Bay Company, should that beneficent measure be revived with a prospect of success.

"In respect to the foreign policy of this country, it will be equally explicit. Asserting the honor and dignity of this great and powerful people, it will uphold the claims of Messrs. Hargous with firmness, whether against belligerent or bankrupt nations or against refractory or unconvinced commissioners.

"Located at the great commercial centre, this journal will aim to be metropolitan in its character. Not indifferent to the concerns of sister States, it will take a large interest in maintaining the Camden & Amboy monopoly and other domestic institutions, the blessings of which no traveller ever can pass a sister State without feeling.

"Strangers to the city and State of New York, as the editor and founder of this journal both are, it cannot be expected that they should at the outset act without hesitation in purely local matters. In respect to the offal contract and the Broadway railroad, and as to the canal lettings and the timber contracts of John C. Mather, it may be as well to say that they are, as yet, wholly uncommitted. They are, however, not altogether unfamiliar with similar things elsewhere.

"An ample capital has been contributed by gentlemen who are interested in maintaining the great measures to which this journal is to be devoted; and no expedient has been omitted to ensure its success as a business undertaking in behalf of its stockholders and managers. It will be provided with editors, reporters, and other attachés, enough to perform all useful services in the lobbies of Congress, of the State Legislature, and of the city Councils; and with talent and democracy enough in the editorial rooms to make good the ordinary wear and tear of character and influence incident to the other departments of the business.

"As conveyancing will form a large element of the business, expert legal counsel will be provided in the person of Mr. D. E. Sickles, who is recommended for this purpose by his rare skill in taking mortgages.

"Before concluding, it is a painful necessity to advert to the unhappy divisions of the Democracy of New York, which it is the main object of this undertaking to heal. An exact impartiality between those who are for preserving the party and those who are for breaking it up, was intended to be secured by dividing the ownership of the paper equally between them, and then putting its absolute editorial control in the hands of a gentleman whose associations, sympathies, affiliations, and tendencies are entirely and irresistibly—with the latter.

"That equitable and sensible plan having met some unexpected objection, it has been slightly modified; but it will nevertheless be carried out as if unchanged. The business arrangements are most profound and comprehensive. The proprietors who invest a large capital in the enterprise are to have no voice in its editorial management, because that department—the doctrines it maintains, the degree of its ability, its consistency, its integrity, in a word, its whole editorial character—is not supposed to make any difference with the subscription-list or advertising of a newspaper. The modern idea of a complete separation between those who spend and those who pay is to be carried out more fully than in any other joint-stock speculation heretofore known; and gentlemen of first-rate ability in both these departments have been secured. It is not doubted that the result will eclipse anything that has gone before it in the newspaper line. The editor will be paid a double salary for his shares and the sacrifice he will make in relinquishing a lucrative place in the House of Representatives, but without prejudice to his continuance in that post, to which he will be a candidate for re-election.

"The issue of this journal having been postponed from the period first announced, an explanation is due to the public. The paper had become deeply pledged to support the State ticket to be nominated at the Syracuse convention and the regular organization of the Democracy of New York, under the expectation that both would be in adamantine conformity to the principles herein avowed. The editor and founder and their associates were assembled in this city to await the issue of that body; and at the very moment of the bloody scenes of Syracuse were having recourse to the private perusal of the riot act, when, lo! they were themselves thereby incontinently dispersed, and cannot be at once reassembled.

"New York, September 19th, 1853."

TILDEN [INCOMPLETE]

"New York, Sep. 10th, 1853.

"Dear Sir,—Your letter was received yesterday. I do not think there will be any considerable difficulty in respect to resolutions. The general disposition will be to go to every reasonable extent to disarm those who are predetermined to make mischief. The true and only serious difficulty is to get the convention organized. The plan of those who are hostile to the union of the party is to have two conventions, if it be possible to confuse the public mind as to which really represents the party and its organization. All the moderation, prudence, and liberality consistent with the preservation of the convention must be exercised to avoid a disorganization; or, if that cannot be avoided (as it cannot be, if any considerable minority are bent on it), to leave the disorganizers with as little of a case as possible. The danger is in the large number of contested seats—real and pretended. In about half of the cases there is no shadow of claim on the part of the hard-shell contestants; and such cases can be multiplied indefinitely, so as to form with the extreme men in the convention and the contestants out of it a sufficient number to be a quorum of a separate body. I think we can stand the large number of these now known, if the moderate and union Hunkers can be held, as we anticipate. I have heard from various sources that the President feels the same solicitude which your letter expresses, and that he thinks that the defeat of the party here would revive and reorganize the Whigs all over the country. In that he is quite right. On the encouragement of a disaster in this State, the Whig party would spring to new and full life. It was so in 1837 and in 1846, and in both those cases the results spread over the whole country. Neither you nor the President need doubt that we are fully aware of the peril, both to the party in the Union and in this State; or that any reasonable effort will be omitted to avert it.

"But we are put to great odds when 30 or 35 of our districts are neutralized by contested claims, and in all this part of the State the mass of the patronage of the genl. government is used most unscrupulously against us, and—"

WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT TO TILDEN

"New York, Nov. 23, 1854.

"My dear Sir,—I have called at your office twice to-day on some business of my own. Will you oblige me by letting me know when you are in your office, that I may come and bore you?

"Yours truly, "W. C. Bryant."

S. J. TILDEN TO MARCY (PROBABLY)

"New York, Oct. 12, 1853.

"My dear Sir,—I take the first moment I have been able to command to answer your note recd. on Monday.

"There is no truth whatever in the story that Grover[21] voted against or dissented from the resolutions of the late Syracuse convention. As the question was then taken viva voce it is foolish to say that any man actually voted for them unless you happened to see his lips move or distinguished his voice, but as Grover did not express dissent or apparently reserve his vote, I suppose he must be deemed to have concurred in their adoption. I have no doubt that he did so, for in the caucus the evening before he was openly in favor of adopting the Baltimore resolutions. My own knowledge of his sentiments, as expressed before, correspond with this course on his part. I state this as matter of fact, because it is fact; and not that I do not think it idle to expect to silence those clamors in respect to Mr. Grover. They must have something to say. The convictions I expressed to you as the true policy in respect to the collectorship would have been strengthened by subsequent events if they had not been before so clear and strong.

"The safe issue with Bronson was on the charge that he has lent his official character and influence to disorganize the party in this State, and to aid the formation of an organized opposition to the administration, and has abused the appointing power entrusted to him to accomplish those objects both of hostility alike to the Democracy and the administration. He would be easily convicted of the first charge by his overt act in taking part with the bolters from the character of the ticket he sustains and from the declarations of the body of his associates. Indeed, his practical position in that respect is already sufficiently recognized by the general public. The second charge that he had exerted his official influence and the appointing power to further the ends of the new combination into which he has openly entered would be readily believed, and its truth could be abundantly shown at leisure. These charges, if well founded, as they unquestionably are, are of a character to justify and, indeed, demand of the administration, by its duty of self-preservation and its duty to maintain the Democracy as an organized party, to intervene for objects so important and so elevated. It can act on such grounds without loss of dignity, and with a justice that is capable of triumphant vindication. That action should correspond with the nature of the case—the clear legal [obligations] of the Collector to the President and to the character of the administration. In my opinion such action is to be performed only in the exercise of the power of removal. The efforts of the administration to come to an amicable understanding with this 'refractory subordinate,' as the Globe used to say, have all failed hopelessly. Any attempt to coerce his discretion while retaining him in office is inconsistent with every attribute which ought to characterize the action of the administration, as the case now stands, and will entirely fail of results except to weaken and besmirch the administration itself.

"The failures to coerce his discretion, even his unfairness and his infidelity to the policy of the administration in the distribution of the subordinate appointments, are by no means the strongest grounds on which to place his removal. On the contrary, I think it a godsend that he has furnished other grounds proved to your hands, of impregnable strength, on which to justify a removal made necessary by petty wrongs and frauds, but now becomes at once indispensable at the hands of the administration and capable of being done without loss of dignity.

"There is still another ground besides those mentioned where the movement in this State has for its avowed object to compel the President to remove his Cabinet. This object is daily manifest through the press and by speeches and by resolutions. The Collector has taken open part with this movement, and, while disclaiming these objects, he is fairly to be held to concur in them, and I presume nobody has any doubt that he, in fact, does so. He at the same time holds an office of most power and of more importance to the administration than any member of the Cabinet. Now is it possible to suppose that if a member of the Cabinet were taking part in public meetings of men, whose object was to expel the rest of the Cabinet, the administration could omit to interfere in the matter without a total loss of all public respect? The principle that the heads of the departments should be in relations of harmony and confidence with the President has been applied as much to the Collectorship of this port as to the Cabinet offices, and with at least as much reason. Prudence as well as principle has always sustained the President through all change of parties and of individuals in bringing the chief officers of the government into this harmony with it whenever he has found them otherwise. These are the grounds on which the removal of Bronson should be placed, and his unfairness and infidelity to the policy of the administration in appointments only incidental as constituting or being part of a systematic abuse of the appointing power to aid his general object. This latter should be very incidental.

"It is important that the issue should be made on his conduct and in its moral, general, and public aspect, and not on the conduct of the administration in interfering with his appointments. It is important, in a word, that the administration should have the affirmative of the issue—that it should be charging the attacking party, and not the defending.

"You are now pausing on the edge of a marsh, when you should be in full march on solid ground, so at least it seems to me nothing remains but to recover as soon as possible a firm and strong position.

"If Bronson answers at once, his reply will afford the occasion for an instant removal.

"In that event, care should be taken, by a well-considered and powerful article in the Union of a semi-official character to place the removal on the true grounds—and as little as possible on the one by which the correspondence will probably be used by him and by the Whigs to frame; and that article should be especially shaped to carry the war into Africa.

"If, as I fear, Bronson should delay answering in the knowledge that time lost is all in their favor and against us, there is one other resource. Let the administration treat the open avowals of our organized movement to change the Cabinet, which have been made since the correspondence commenced, as a new development of the designs and character of the movement with which Bronson is implicated, and as a new offence which calls for immediate action. I see no difficulty in doing this if the administration is really earnest for action instead of wishing occasion for temporizing. Take an affirmative, energetic course, and the details will work out themselves or be easily brought into conformity with the broad grounds on which you act. The administration is perishing by slow disease, the result of indecision and want of energy. I do not say this because I am willing to think it is the administration's duty to come up to any personal wishes or opinions of mine, but I should be blind if I failed to see the indication of a general and prevalent public opinion.

"If you had not known me, and I have known you more than twenty years, and will not think I speak rashly, I would not speak so frankly, though it is at once the highest office and best testimony of my friendship to convey early what is slow and late to reach the ears of men in power.

"The bolting movement in this State would have utterly failed if it could have been understood at the outset that this administration were united in discountenancing it. We should have carried the State, and the President's policy, wise and right as it was, would have had the double triumph of carrying at once Georgia and New York, and faction would have been silenced in and out of Congress. The main force of the movement here has been the false pretence that it was favored by a part of them, representations of this nature being readily believed when made by local leaders in whom they have confidence. It is idle to say that enough has been done to counteract this evil, when we are daily argued with by respectable men to show the contrary.

"But yesterday John Bowdish, of Montezuma, came to see me on the subject, saying that Thomas B. Mitchell has assured him that the President and part of the Cabinet were with the Hards. I heard also from Putnam Co. that such is the general opinion there. It takes more time than there is before the election to penetrate the localities with the truth, and in the mean time men are getting committed too strongly to change. An unmistakable act at the outset would have saved all and would do infinite good yet. In addition to the general considerations respecting the character of the administration it is desirable [the next three lines undecipherable]. Excuse the haste in which I write.

"Very Truly Your Friend, "S. J. Tilden."

W. L. MARCY TO TILDEN

(This letter is obviously in answer to Tilden's last preceding.)

"Confidential. "Wash., Oct. 16, '53.

"Dr. Sir,—I received yesterday yr. letter of three sheets, and before I read more than one of them the President came in and interrupted me. The tenor of our conversation was such that I thought that yr. letter would be good reading-matter, and I handed it to him. Now, sir, if there is anything wrong in it—not fit for the Presidential eye, the fault will be yours for writing and mine for not guarding agt. yr. confidence in my discretion.

"Bronson's reply is not here, and fears begin to be entertained that it will not come. To tell you frankly what I apprehend, I am bound to say that it is possible there will be no decisive action before election if he does not reply; and perhaps none if he does reply, as I fear he will, that he has fairly divided his appts. among the sections, etc., etc.

"One thing I am much afraid of, and that is the course of J. V. B.[22] He told me at Albany that if the President did not stand by himself, he would not stand by him, and, further, would denounce him. I have just opened a letter from him in which he intimates an intention to carry out this policy. If he does, you may depend upon it the cause will suffer beyond measure. I entreat you and all his friends to warn him of the fatal consequences of such a course. I have good hopes that things here will in the end be brought right—but I shall have none if he carries out his mad suggestion. I beg you will interest yourself in this matter. I see more mischief lowering in that quarter than in any other. I shall write to him, but my warning may not be much heeded.

"Yours truly, W. L. Marcy." "Hon. S. J. Tilden, N. Y."

HORATIO SEYMOUR TO S. J. TILDEN

"Appleton, Wis., Aug. 8, 1854.

"My dear Sir,—I have been upon the point of writing to you for the past two months, but I have been constantly upon the wing. I regret I was not in this State with you. I travelled with Messrs. Corning and Delavan over this region; they were delighted with the crops and the appearance of the country. The wheat is now nearly gathered. The quantity and quality are unequalled by any previous harvest. I think it will give a new tone to affairs here. Your road is making good progress. I wish it was done. It will be of great advantage to this section when the two lines are united. Something will be gained when the Watertown Road is reached. I hear this will be done in about ten days. We must make an united effort to get immigration turned into northern Wisconsin. It now goes to Iowa and Minnesota. A few of the many thousands coming to our country from Europe would give life and riches to the region if they would come here. It is the best country for them. The Wisconsin roads make great efforts to carry them over the length of their lines. This carries the immigrants into other States. You and Mr. Ogden must devise a plan to correct this.

"I am very much disturbed about Secor's note in the Merchants' Exchange Bank. My losses have been very great during the past two years, but I do not like to come short of high honor in my dealings. I do not think I ought to pay the note, but I may be wrong. In my doubt, like most weak-minded men, I have done nothing. I have no right to trouble you, but I must. I send you a letter from the bank. My continued absence from home has prevented me from answering it. This is another offence.

"Get me out of the scrape in the way you think right.

"Very truly yours, "Horatio Seymour." "S. J. Tilden, Esq."

TILDEN TO——

"Newport, (R. I.), Aug. 26, 1854.

"My dear Sir,—Your last letter reached me just as I was hurrying from the city to fulfil a business engagement at Lebanon. I partly wrote an answer, while there, but left suddenly, and have not found another opportunity till I came here for a few days' relaxation and sea-bathing.

"The address of my brother, for which you inquire, is 'Henry A. Tilden, New Lebanon, Columbia Co., N. Y.'

"In my former letter I did not write in respect to politics because I was very busy, tho' I would not postpone acknowledging your letter, replying to the business matter it contained. If that reason had not existed a sufficient one might have been that I had added nothing to the impressions I entertained when there was an opportunity of expressing them more fully than could be done by correspondence.

"The truth is, the moment I return to the routine of my home-life there are, at present, so many business obligations and responsibilities claiming my thoughts and exhausting my activity that I could not, if disposed to do so, give much habitual attention to politics. It may be that, notwithstanding my necessary preoccupation, I should not acquiesce in so practical a retirement if I were able to propose to myself anything satisfactory which I could see a reasonable prospect of accomplishing in the present chaotic state of parties and politics. I have at least reflected enough, and discussed with others enough, to assure me that I cannot, at present, propose to myself any such thing.

"My opinions as to the promotion of a fusion party, whose object should be the restoration of the Missouri Compromise, have been more fully stated to you in conversation than they could be here, and have not been weakened by subsequent reflection. I do not think such a measure of any practical avail to rescue Kansas and Nebraska from slavery. Long before it could succeed, in the most sanguine view of its prospects, their destiny will be settled; and I hope that, through other agencies, it will be settled favorably. That being done, there is nothing in the Missouri Compromise which you or I would wish to have restored. This basis is not, then, broad or permanent enough to found upon it a party organization of much power or durability. So, I think, the public mind will regard the matter. Its action will be through the emigration societies, and to punish those whom it holds principally responsible for the breaking up of the armistice on the slavery question. In these modes Northern indignation will find complete vent, and will exhaust itself; and there will be another general calm. Nor do I now see any other kindred question able to change this result.

"In regard to bringing out Col. Benton as a Presidential candidate. He is very strong with the remnant of the old veterans of 1834 and 1840, and has great general respect from the whole country. But I have not changed the opinions formerly expressed to you in relation to his chances for 1856. The Democratic organization will run a candidate. If an organization, including the Northern Whigs, does the same, I do not see how Col. Benton could get an electoral vote. Presented, in the first instance, as an independent candidate, it would require the concentration upon him of the whole body of the Northern Whigs to give him any prospect of an election. Whether such a state of things can arise, it is too early to foresee.

"I greatly regret Col. Benton's defeat in his district, but cannot say I am much surprised. The Whigs do not seem to have aided him much. When he ran before, denouncing all against us, he was the novelty of the day. The Know-Nothings are that now. If he had been personally in the canvass it is possible he might have saved himself.

"So far as my observation extends in this part of the State, a third-party organization, if attempted, would not, in my judgment, embody a quarter of the force or numbers our movement did in 1848. I do not know a man who bore any considerable share of the heat and burden of that day who would enter actively into a similar campaign now.

"A few who did comparatively little then might wish its labors repeated, if themselves exempted. The general disposition among those most dissatisfied with the course of things at Washington is disgust, indifference, in some cases individual opposition, in many independent personal action; but very little towards organized, affirmative movement. They expect the Democratic party to be broken down for the time. They expect the folly of its leaders to inure to the benefit of the Whigs. Some will look on with indifference; some will frame a ticket to suit themselves; some will, perhaps, aid to produce the result which all look upon as inevitable. Most will expect the Democratic party to rise again, purified, and to resuming relations with it. I know of none—tho' doubtless there are such individuals—who intend permanent union with the Whigs. I know of few who would undertake the formation of a new party outside of existing organizations. The body of those who went with us in 1848 will continue within the organization in which they have since acted."

TILDEN TO——

"N. Y., Sept. 5, 1854.

"My dear Sir,—I did not think I should desire to be at the convention; but as the time approaches, I suppose that, if it were possible, the knowledge that you and some like you are to be there would call me once more to commune with you. But all such uprisings of the old spirit are quelled by a round of engagements here to which I must attend.

"I do not suppose that in the doings of the convention I can be entirely pleased—perhaps no one man will be. I cannot judge, as well as you who are present, precisely what should be done in a state of things at once so chaotic and so complex; and I have great faith in the wisdom that comes up from the counties. It seems to me, however, that there is more not to be done than to be done. It is a safe rule in affairs—and not less so in mere declarations that simply commit you without producing any practical result—that when you are in doubt what to do, do as little as possible. There is nothing to be achieved in this campaign but to preserve, as far as may be, the connections and harmony of the radical Democracy—a confederacy of men that has done some public service and is worth keeping."

M. VAN BUREN TO S. J. TILDEN

"Lindenwald, August 3d, '55.

"My dear Tilden,—I regretted not to see you during my short stay at New York, but was happy to hear that you are about to do what you ought to have done long ago, and if the young lady I had the pleasure to see at Rome is the happy fair one, you have my ready and hearty consent.

"I am engaged in putting my house in order, and will thank you to hand me a statement of my affairs in your hands and the papers by the first convenient opportunity.

"In haste, "Very truly yours, "M. Van Buren." "S. J. Tilden, Esq."

S. J. TILDEN TO——

"New York, August 23rd, 1855.

"My dear Sir,—After I received your letter, some three months ago, proposing to confess judgment to the Bk. of North America for the note due to it, I saw Wm. Henry, who desired me, if possible, to get the matter postponed, in order that some different arrangement might be made. I applied to the bk., and they consented to some further delay, willing to receive part payment and to renew the residue. But no plan of that kind having been acted on, the bk. has been latterly speaking to me every time I meet its officers, and urge some proceeding so strongly that it cannot be further delayed.

"The bk. prefers an action which may bring in all the parties to a confession of judt., and I have had Mr. Green take the proceedings to save any unnecessary expenses. A copy of a summons and complaint is sent, with an admission of service endorsed, which you will please sign and return.

"At the same time, I cannot forbear expressing my regret that the matter has not been put in a shape which would render this course unnecessary. Persuaded in this instance, not without great reluctance, to violate the rule on which I habitually and almost without an exception in my whole life—act, and which requires me to refuse all endorsements and suretyships—I feel that I ought to be prevented from annoyance from this transaction. If I have submitted and am submitting to have the trouble and care growing out of the affairs of the company thrown upon me most disproportionately, it is simply from a friendly disposition, as far as I can within any bounds of reason, to see through a matter in which my friends are involved, and at least to get it in the best shape I may for them. From the beginning I resisted connecting myself with the enterprise, into which I was, nevertheless, drawn; and except, for the considerations mentioned above, I would dismiss the affair from my mind forever. Under the circumstances, it is not strange that I feel that the trouble and care thrown upon me thro' my regard for the interests of friends should not be added to by their omission to take care of their confidential paper.

"Mr. Green has recently spent some days in Vermont in making investigations into the circumstances under which the Stark Bk. became the owner (if it is so) of your acceptance. The results are very satisfactory. It will be necessary to make some additional inquiries of the corresponding banks. I think we shall be able to show that the Stark Bank took the paper for antecedent debt which will dispose of their claims effectually and forever.

"Authority has been given to Mr. Thompson to sell 1,000,000 of the bonds, as W. H. & Co. is dissolved.

"Very respectfully, "S. J. Tilden."

S. J. TILDEN TO——

"New York, Aug. 26th, 1855.

"My dear Sir,—My name having been connected by some of the delegates with a nomination by the Democratic convention for the office of Comptroller, and in the public journals with that of Secretary of State—it is due to those who may do me the honor to think of me for either of these distinguished trusts that they should not be allowed to be under any misapprehension as to the true state of the facts. The old friends whose names I see on the list of delegates will recollect that I have never permitted personal feelings or taste to govern my political action, or been wanting in deference to the general interests or judgment of my associates; and will do me the justice to believe that I act in the same considerate spirit when I say that obligations which I am at present under and have no right to renounce are, in my judgment, incompatible with my undertaking properly to discharge the duties of either of the offices mentioned. As I do not deem it consistent with propriety to be nominated for either of them under such circumstances, you will do me the favor to communicate this determination to any of my friends who may be disposed to present my name to the convention, and in case of its being so presented to withdraw it from the consideration of that body."

JOHN B. MILLER, WM. CASSIDY, THOS. G. ALVORD TO TILDEN

"Utica, Sept. 8, 1855.

"Sir,—Pursuant to the direction of the convention of the Democratic party of the State of New York, assembled at Syracuse on the 29th ultimo, the undersigned were commissioned to notify of their nomination the various candidates recommended by the convention to the people for election. The delegates convened, as above stated, have signified their unanimous desire that the votes of their constituents be cast for your name at the coming election for the office of Attorney General. The Democracy of the State await an official announcement of the acceptance of the candidacy from those upon whom the choice of their representatives has so satisfactorily fallen.

"With great respect, "John B. Miller, "Wm. Cassidy, "Thos. G. Alvord." "To Hon. Samuel J. Tilden, New York."

TILDEN TO DEAN RICHMOND

"New York, Sept. 9th, 1855.

"My dear Richmond,—I expected to find you here yesterday on my return from Lebanon, where I had occasion to go on Sat. But I suppose you stopped at Albany.

"Since our conversation I have thought over the question of my running for Atty. Gen. The ground you put it on—expediency for our friends, without much prospect of success to me—is not one which makes it easy for me to decline. I could not render that reason or, with such friends as you, act on it while rendering another. Nor do I, in truth, care much for any consequences I can conceive as resulting from defeat. But I am worn from overwork. I have upon my hands now more than I can do for the next six months. And if upon the ticket I shall be expected to share in the canvass more than will be possible, and subjected to those special annoyances that are peculiar to a candidate residing in this city. I therefore greatly desire that you should make up the ticket so as to let me off."