Dr. Colenso And The Old Testament. No. II.

The Colenso controversy has entered on a new phase. It appears we must no longer speak of Dr. Colenso as the Protestant Bishop of Natal. He enjoyed this title indeed for a time, in virtue of letters patent issued by the supreme head of the Established Church. But the judicial committee of her Majesty's privy council has sat in judgment on her Majesty's letters patent, and has just pronounced that they are invalid and without effect in law; that her Majesty had assumed a prerogative which did not belong to her, and had been guilty in fact, though inadvertently, of an illegal aggression upon the rights of her colonists.

The history of this remarkable decision may be told in a few words. Dr Colenso was appointed to the See of Natal in the year 1853. In the same year, Dr. Gray, as Bishop of Cape Town, was invested by royal letters patent with metropolitan jurisdiction over Dr. Colenso and the diocese of Natal. Ten years passed away, and each in his own sphere exercised the authority which he was supposed to have received from the crown. At length Dr. Colenso's book appears, and a charge of heresy is preferred against him. The charge is entertained by the supposed metropolitan, who sets up a court, proceeds to try the cause, and finally, in December, 1863, delivers his sentence. By this sentence Dr. Colenso is deprived of his see, and forbidden to exercise his sacred functions within the ecclesiastical province of Cape Town. The deposed bishop refuses to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court, and appeals to the privy council. The controversy was thus reduced to a simple question of law,—was Dr. Gray legally possessed of those metropolitan rights to which he laid claim? To this question the judicial committee of the privy council has given a clear and decisive answer. When a colony is once endowed with legislative institutions of its own, the crown no longer possesses any authority to create sees or to confer ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Now in the two colonies of Cape Town and Natal an independent legislature had been established in the year 1850; and therefore the letters patent of 1853 were null and void in law. Hence it follows that, according to English law, Dr. Gray was never in point of fact the Metropolitan of Cape Town; but neither was Dr. Colenso the Bishop of Natal.

Thus has Dr. Colenso pulled down the whole edifice of the English colonial episcopate. Like Sampson of old, he has been, indeed, avenged upon his enemies, but he has been himself crushed beneath the ruins he has made. Yet, though his jurisdiction [pg 364] as a bishop may be taken away, his moral power and his influence are increased. He now appears not only as an eminent leader of the free-thinking and infidel school of theology, but as a martyr who has suffered in the cause; and this new character gives him an additional claim to the sympathy and veneration of his followers. When the youthful plant is checked in its upward growth by the skilful knife of the gardener, it puts forth new branches on every side, and flourishes with increased luxuriance. And so, according to every human probability, the check which Dr. Colenso has received will but promote the rapid expansion of his views, and their dissemination throughout the Protestant Church. It is therefore all the more important for those who defend the cause of truth to refute his charges against the Bible, and to lay bare the sophistry of his arguments. Let us take the following example:—

“ ‘And Jehovah spake unto Moses, saying, ... Gather thou the congregation together unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation. And Moses did as Jehovah commanded him. And the assembly was gathered unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation’—(Lev., viii. 1-4).

“First, it appears to be certain that by the expressions used so often, here and elsewhere, ‘the assembly’, ‘the whole assembly’, ‘all the congregation’, is meant the whole body of the people—at all events, the adult males in the prime of life among them—and not merely the elders or heads of the people, as some have supposed, in order to escape from such difficulties as that which we are now about to consider. At any rate, I cannot, with due regard to the truth, allow myself to believe, or attempt to persuade others to believe, that such expressions as the above can possibly be meant to be understood of the elders only....

“This vast body of people, then, received on this occasion, and on other similar occasions, as we are told, an express command from Jehovah himself, to assemble ‘at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation’. We need not press the word ‘all’ so as to include every individual man of this number. Still the expression ‘all the congregation’, the ‘whole assembly’, must be surely understood to imply the main body of those who were able to attend, especially when summoned thus solemnly by the direct voice of Jehovah himself. The mass of these 603,550 men ought, we must believe, to have obeyed such a command, and hastened to present themselves at the ‘door of the tabernacle of the congregation’....

“Now the whole width of the tabernacle was 10 cubits, or 18 feet, ... and its length was 30 cubits, or 54 feet, as may be gathered from Exodus, xxvi. Allowing two feet in width for each full-grown man, nine men could just have [pg 365]stood in front of it. Supposing, then, that ‘all the congregation’of adult males in the prime of life had given due heed to the divine summons, and had hastened to take their stand, side by side, as closely as possible, in front, not merely of the door, but of the whole end of the tabernacle in which the door was, they would have reached, allowing 18 inches between each rank of nine men, for a distance of more than 100,000 feet, in fact nearly twenty miles”—(Part i. pp. 31,33).

Dr. Colenso revels in figures. When he sets about a problem he delights to look at it from every point of view, and to work out his sum in a variety of ways. By a very simple process of multiplication and addition he has here proved that the Scripture narrative is quite ridiculous and absurd. Yet he is not content. He must lead his readers to the same conclusion by another process:—

“As the text says distinctly ‘at the door of the tabernacle’, they must have come within the court. And this, indeed, was necessary for the purpose for which they were summoned on this occasion, namely, to witness the ceremony of the consecration of Aaron and his sons to the priestly office. This was to be performed inside the tabernacle itself, and could only, therefore, be seen by those standing at the door....

“But how many would the whole court have contained? Its area (60 yards by 30 yards) was 1,800 square yards, and the area of the tabernacle itself (18 yards by 6 yards) was 108 square yards. Hence the area of the court outside the tabernacle was 1,692 square yards. But the whole congregation would have made a body of people nearly twenty miles—or, more accurately, 33,530 yards—long, and 18 feet or 6 yards wide; that is to say, packed closely together, they would have covered an area of 201,180 square yards. In fact the court, when thronged, could only have held five thousand people; whereas the able-bodied men alone exceeded six hundred thousand.... It is inconceivable how, under such circumstances, ‘all the assembly’, the ‘whole congregation’, could have been summoned to attend ‘at the door of the tabernacle’, by the express command of Almighty God”—(pp. 33, 34).

Before we proceed to examine this singular objection, put forward in so plausible and popular a form, it may be useful to describe, in a few words, the general appearance of the tabernacle, and of the court which surrounded it. Our readers will thus be placed in a position to form a clear and distinct idea of the difficulty which Dr. Colenso has raised. And we are satisfied that the more thoroughly it is understood, the more complete and satisfactory will the explanation be found.

The court of the tabernacle was an oblong rectangle, one hundred [pg 366] cubits2 in length, from east to west, and fifty cubits in breadth, from north to south. This space was enclosed by hangings of fine twisted linen, supported by sixty pillars, to which they were attached by hooks and fillets of silver. The entrance to the court was at the eastern end; it was twenty cubits in width; and across the opening was suspended a curtain, embroidered with fancy needlework, and rich with gorgeous colours.

Within the court, and towards the western end, was erected the tabernacle. It was simply a large tent, constructed with elaborate care, and formed of costly materials. Like the court in which it was placed, it was an oblong rectangle, being thirty cubits in length and ten cubits in breadth. The walls were of setim or acacia wood; the roof of fine linen, covered with curtains of goats' hair and skins. The eastern end was open, but was furnished with a rich hanging to serve as a door. Internally the tabernacle was divided by a veil into two apartments;—the Holy Place, twenty cubits in length, which contained the golden candlestick, the table of show-bread, and the altar of incense; and the Holy of Holies, ten cubits in length, in which was placed the ark of the covenant. The Holy Place was appropriated to the priests, who entered it twice a day, morning and evening. The Holy of Holies was forbidden to all but the high priest alone, and even he could enter only once a year, on the great day of atonement.

The argument of Dr. Colenso is now easily understood. According to the Scripture narrative, the whole multitude of the Israelites, or at least six hundred thousand men, were summoned to attend, and actually did attend, “at the door of the tabernacle”. It follows that they must have stood in a line eighteen feet broad and twenty miles long, which is perfectly absurd. Besides, they could not have witnessed the ceremony to which they were summoned unless they came within the court. But this is an absolute impossibility, as the court would only hold five thousand men, even if they were closely packed together.

Here is, indeed, a very serious charge against the credibility of the Pentateuch. But it seems to us a charge which, from its very nature, must refute itself. Dr. Colenso will not deny that the Book of Leviticus was written while the tabernacle was still in existence; and that its author, whoever he may have been, had the tabernacle and its appurtenances constantly before his eyes. If he was not a truthful historian, but an impostor, he was certainly [pg 367] a most skilful impostor. He must have known well, all his readers must have known well—quite as well as Dr. Colenso—that the tabernacle could not hold more than five thousand people. Now it is perfectly incredible that any man of common sense, not to say a most clever and successful impostor, under these circumstances, would have ventured boldly to state that six hundred thousand persons were gathered within its precincts.

Let us, however, examine the argument in detail. The foundation on which it rests is clearly enough stated by Dr. Colenso. “It appears to be certain that by the expressions, used so often here and elsewhere, ‘the assembly’, ‘the whole assembly’, ‘all the congregation’, is meant the whole body of the people—at all events, the adult males in the prime of life among them—and not merely the elders or heads of the people”, etc. We deny this assertion. The Hebrew word עדה (heda), which is here translated the assembly, the congregation, comes from the root יעד (yahad), to appoint, and means literally an assembly meeting by appointment. It is quite true, as Dr. Colenso contends, that the word is sometimes employed to designate the entire body of the people. But it is also true, though he ignores the fact, that it is sometimes applied to a select few, invested with a certain authority and jurisdiction. We shall be content with submitting to our readers one remarkable example.

In the thirty-fifth chapter of Numbers we read of the cities of refuge. They were to be six in number—three upon each side of the Jordan; and were intended to afford shelter to those who had unintentionally shed innocent blood. “And they shall be for you cities for refuge from the avenger; that the manslayer die not until he stand before the assembly (עדה) for judgment” (Numbers, xxxv. 12).3 It is then laid down that if the murder have been deliberate, it shall be punished with death (16-21). But if the fatal blow have been struck without enmity or premeditation, or by chance (22, 23), “then the assembly (עדה) shall judge between the slayer and the revenger of blood.... And the assembly (עדה) shall deliver the slayer out of the hand of the revenger of blood, and the assembly (עדה) shall restore him to the city of his refuge” (24, 25). It is quite impossible to suppose that the judicial tribunal here spoken of could be the entire body of the people, or even the 600,000 [pg 368] male adults. The question to be tried was one of the highest moment, involving the life or death of a fellow-citizen. It was also one of extreme delicacy, having to deal, not with the mere external act, but with the motives and feelings of the heart. To the assembly (עדה) it belonged to pronounce, not merely whether one man had killed another, but whether in his heart he had committed the crime of murder. For this purpose witnesses should be examined, evidence should be carefully sifted, and, perhaps, even the domestic secrets of the accused and of his victim should be laid bare. Was this a task that could be entrusted to a mixed multitude of 600,000 men?

Accordingly we find that Rosenmuller, in his commentary on this passage (Num., xxxv. 24), explains the word, the assembly of judges—“cætus judicum urbis in cujus agro contigerit homicidium”. If we apply this interpretation to the passage in Leviticus, every shadow of improbability and inconsistency will at once disappear from the narrative. Now, we ask Dr. Colenso, when a word in Scriptural usage has two different meanings, which must we choose when we come to examine a text in which that word is found? Are we to select the meaning which is in every way suitable to the context and circumstances; or must we rather adopt an interpretation which will make the sense absurd and impossible? Dr. Colenso has preferred the latter course. It appears to us that the former is alone consistent with the instinct of common sense and the principles of genuine criticism.

We think our readers will admit that we have fairly established our point, and proved that Dr. Colenso's argument is utterly destitute of foundation. For the ordinary purposes of controversy it would be unnecessary to go further. But we frankly confess we aim at something more. We are not content with answering the argument of Dr. Colenso; we wish to shake his authority as a trustworthy critic. All that he has written against the Pentateuch is made up of these two elements—first, the meaning which he attaches to the narrative, and, secondly, the process of reasoning by which he labours to show that this meaning is inconsistent or impossible. Now it is plain, from the argument we are considering, that Dr. Colenso is liable to the grossest errors, not only when he undertakes to interpret the sacred text, but also when he proceeds to reason on his own interpretation. If this assertion be established, his authority can have but little weight.

Let us suppose then, for a moment, that by the assembly is meant, in a general way, the entire people of Israel; does it follow, as Dr. Colenso maintains, that, according to the narrative, 600,000 men must have “hastened to present themselves at the [pg 369] ‘door of the tabernacle?’ ” We believe it does not. Nay, more, we believe that the absurdity of Dr. Colenso's opinion is clearly proved by some of the texts which he has himself adduced. For instance:—“Bring forth the blasphemer out of the camp ... and let all the assembly (עדה) stone him” (Lev., xxiv. 14). And again, in the case of the Sabbath-breaker:—“The man shall be surely put to death; all the assembly (עדה) shall stone him with stones without the camp. And all the assembly (עדה) brought him without the camp, and stoned him with stones, and he died” (Num., xv. 35, 36). No one will maintain that the writer here means to say that 600,000 men were engaged in carrying the condemned man, or that 600,000 men threw stones at him. If Dr. Colenso had paused for a moment to reflect on these texts as he copied them from the Bible, we are convinced he would have suppressed his foolish argument. Exactly as it is said that all the assembly was gathered into the door of the tabernacle, so too is it said that all the assembly stoned the blasphemer and the Sabbath-breaker. In the latter case, it is clear that the number of those who were actually engaged in carrying out the sentence of God was comparatively small, but the act is fairly ascribed to the whole community, because all were summoned to take part in it, and those who complied with the summons represented those who did not. Surely there is no reason why we may not apply the same interpretation to the former passage.

Nor is this mode of speaking peculiar to Sacred Scripture. Every year the members of the House of Commons are summoned to appear at the bar of the House of Lords; every year we are told that they obey that summons. Who is there that questions the truth of this statement? It represents a fact with which we are all familiar. Yet Dr. Colenso with his rule and measure will demonstrate that the fact is impossible and the statement false, because the place in which the Commons are said to assemble cannot possibly hold one-tenth of their number.

So much for Dr. Colenso as an interpreter of the Bible. He is satisfied that if we accept the narrative we must believe that six hundred thousand men were gathered unto the door of the tabernacle. We have seen that he is mistaken; but let us now concede this fact, and let us see how he proceeds to reason upon it. Since the tabernacle was only eighteen feet wide, this immense multitude must have stood in a line eighteen feet in breadth and twenty miles in length. This is certainly a most extraordinary conclusion. No multitude ever yet stood in such a line; no multitude could stand in such a line unless they had been specially trained during many years for that purpose. There is no conceivable reason why the Jews on this occasion should have stood [pg 370] in such a line. And yet Dr. Colenso will have it that they must have stood in this way, if it be true that they were gathered unto the door of the tabernacle.

We are tempted to offer an illustration of the very peculiar manner in which Dr. Colenso here pursues his critical examination of the Bible. Many of our readers will remember the 15th of August, 1843. In the phraseology of Scripture it might be said that upon that day 100,000 Irishmen were gathered to O'Connell on the Hill of Tara.4 To the ordinary reader such a statement would present no insuperable difficulty. It would convey, indeed, a pretty correct idea of what we all know actually to have taken place. But when submitted to the Colenso process, this simple narrative will be found to undergo a very startling transformation. O'Connell did not occupy a space more than two feet broad. Therefore there was just room for one full-grown man to stand in front of him. The second must have stood behind the first; the third behind the second; and so the whole multitude must have extended in a single unbroken line over many miles of country. A little boy at school could tell us that, when we say the multitude was gathered unto O'Connell, we do not mean that the multitude occupied a space which was only as broad as O'Connell. Yet Dr. Colenso maintains that this is the only meaning which the phrase admits. Such principles would make strange havoc with history.

Again, Dr. Colenso contends that all who were gathered unto the door of the tabernacle “must have come within the court”. “This, indeed”, he says, “was necessary for the purpose for which they were summoned on this occasion, namely, to witness the ceremony of the consecration of Aaron and his sons to the priestly office”. Now it is nowhere stated that this was, in point of fact, the purpose for which the people were gathered together. Certainly, if it were impossible they could witness the ceremony, as Dr. Colenso assures us, we are bound to infer that it was not for this purpose they were assembled. Nor is it difficult to find another, and quite a sufficient reason, for gathering the people together on this solemn occasion. It may have been the design of God that, by their presence in and around the court of the tabernacle, they should make a public profession of their faith, and formally acknowledge the priesthood of Aaron. Thus, in the illustration already introduced, it was impossible for 100,000 people to hear O'Connell speak; but their presence was itself a [pg 371] public declaration that they adhered to his principles and accepted him for their leader.

Was it, however, really impossible that those without the court should witness the leading features of the ceremony? Certainly not. We must bear in mind that the court was not enclosed by stone walls, but by hangings of fine linen. Nothing, therefore, could have been more simple than to loop up these curtains to the pillars by which they were supported, and thus to afford a full view of the tabernacle to those who stood without. Dr. Colenso will probably say that in the scripture narrative there is no mention of any such arrangement. Neither, we reply, is it said that those without the court were intended to witness the ceremony. But if we suppose that this was intended, we must also suppose that the means were adopted which would make it possible.

There is yet another error of Dr. Colenso which we cannot pass by in silence. It is true, the blunder to which we refer has little to do with his argument. But it has much to do with the question whether he is a competent authority on the sacred text, even when he speaks with special emphasis and with unhesitating confidence. “Supposing that ‘all the congregation’ of adult males ... had hastened to take their stand ... in front, not merely of the door, but of the whole end of the tabernacle in which the door was”, etc. It is clear that the writer of this passage was under the impression (which, indeed, he conveys not only by his words, but still more by his italics—for they are his) that the whole end of the tabernacle was wider than the door. Now if he had taken the pains to read even an English translation of the sacred book which he so rashly presumed to condemn, he never could have fallen into so great a mistake. He would have seen that the whole eastern end of the tabernacle was left open, and that the open space was covered only by a curtain which extended across from side to side. Consequently, if mention were really made of a door, it must have been this curtain itself that was called by that name.

But if Dr. Colenso had gone a little further, and had consulted any Hebrew lexicon, he would have discovered that the sacred writer does not speak of a door, but rather of a doorway. The tabernacle had in fact no door properly so called. The word פתח (pethach), which is used by the sacred writers when speaking of the tabernacle, signifies, as Gesenius explains it, an opening, an entrance. It means, therefore, the whole end of the tabernacle, which was left open to the court when the curtain was drawn. In Hebrew the idea of a door is expressed by דלת (deleth). When treating of this word, Gesenius, having first explained its meaning, pointedly remarks: “It differs from פתח, which denotes the doorway which the door closes”. It is quite [pg 372] certain, therefore, that the door and the whole end of the tabernacle, which Dr. Colenso so emphatically contrasts, were in reality one and the same thing.

It is time, however, that we pass to another of Dr. Colenso's arguments:—

“ ‘And the skin of the bullock, and all his flesh, with his head, and with his legs, and his inwards, and his dung, even the whole bullock, shall he (the Priest) carry forth without the camp, unto a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn him on the wood with fire. Where the ashes are poured out there shall he be burned’—(Lev., iv. 11, 12).

“We have seen that the whole population of Israel at the exodus may be reckoned at two millions. Now we cannot well allow for a living man, with room for his cooking, sleeping, and other necessaries and conveniences of life, less than three times the space required for a dead one in his grave.... Let us allow, however, for each person on the average three times 6 feet by 2 feet, the size of a coffin for a full-grown man,—that is, let us allow for each person 36 square feet or 4 square yards. Then it follows that ... the camp must have covered, the people being crowded as thickly as possible, an area of 8,000,000 square yards, or more than 1652 acres of ground.

“Upon this very moderate estimate, then (which in truth is far within the mark), we must imagine a vast encampment of this extent, swarming with people, more than a mile and a half across in each direction, with the tabernacle in the centre.... Thus the refuse of these sacrifices would have had to be carried by the priest himself (Aaron, Eleazar, or Ithamar,—there were no others) a distance of three-quarters of a mile....

“But how huge does this difficulty become, if, instead of taking the excessively cramped area of 1652 acres, less than three square miles, for such a camp as this, we take the more reasonable allowance of Scott, who says, ‘this encampment is computed to have formed a moveable city of twelve miles square, that is, about the size of London itself,’—as it well might be, considering that the population was as large as that of London, and that in the Hebrew tents there were no first, second, third, and fourth stories, no crowded garrets and underground cellars. In that case the offal of these sacrifices would have had to be carried by Aaron himself, or one of his sons, a distance of six miles.... In fact, we have to imagine the priest having himself to carry, on his back, on foot, from St. Paul's to the outskirts of the metropolis, the ‘skin, and flesh, and head, and legs, and inwards, and dung, even the whole bullock’.... This supposition involves, of course, an absurdity. But it is our duty to look plain facts in the face”—(Part i. pp. 38-40).

[pg 373]

We agree with Dr. Colenso that this is a “huge difficulty”, and that the duties of the priest, as described by him, involve a manifest absurdity. But we contend that the duties of the priest, as described by him, are not to be found in the Pentateuch; that all the circumstances which constitute the difficulty and the absurdity are simply additions of his own. This is indeed a serious charge against a writer who represents himself to the public as an earnest and conscientious searcher after truth. But we hope to satisfy our readers that it is a plain and obvious fact; and it is our duty, as Dr. Colenso truly tells us, “to look plain facts in the face”.

It is evident that the whole weight of the objection consists in this: that, according to the sacred narrative, the priest is commanded, first, to carry the bullock himself; secondly, to carry it on his back; thirdly, in doing so, to go on foot. Now there is not the faintest insinuation in any text Dr. Colenso has produced, nor, we may add, in any text the Pentateuch contains, that the priest should go on foot, or that he should carry the bullock on his back. These two ideas are to be found only in the fanciful and rather irreverent gloss of Dr. Colenso.

Neither is it commanded in the sacred text that the priest should himself carry the bullock out of the camp. Even in the English translation there is nothing to imply that he might not, for this duty, employ the service of his attendant Levites. It is said, indeed, “he shall carry forth the bullock without the camp”. But by the common use of language we may impute to a person, as his own, the act which he does by the agency of another. Thus a minister of state is said to write a letter, when the letter is written at his direction by his secretary. In the Fourth Book of Kings it is recorded of Nabuchodonosor that “he carried away all Jerusalem, and all the princes, and all the valiant men of the army, to the number of ten thousand, into captivity:... and the judges of the land he carried into captivity from Jerusalem into Babylon. And all the strong men, seven thousand, and the artificers and the smiths a thousand”, etc.—(IV. Kings, xxiv. 14-16). No one dreams of any difficulty in a sentence like this. Yet, if we admit the Colenso system of interpretation, the difficulty is insuperable, because the meaning of the sentence is, that Nabuchodonosor himself carried that immense multitude on his back from Jerusalem to Babylon.

If we now turn to the Hebrew text we shall find that it is still less favourable to Dr. Colenso and his “huge difficulty”. The word והוציא (vehotzi), which is there used, literally means and he shall cause [it] to go forth, that is to say, he shall have it removed. This will be at once admitted by every biblical scholar, and can be made intelligible without much difficulty to the [pg 374] general reader. In the Hebrew language there are several forms of the same verb, sometimes called conjugations, each of which has a meaning peculiar to itself. The primitive form is kal; and the hiphil form “denotes the causing or permitting of the action, signified by the primitive kal”.5 For example: קדש (kadash) in kal signifies to be holy; in hiphil, to cause to be holy, to sanctify; נטה (natah) in kal means to bow; in hiphil, to cause to bow, to bend. Now, in the passage quoted by Dr. Colenso the word והוציא is the hiphil form of יצא (yatza), to go forth; it therefore means literally to cause to go forth.6 We need scarcely remark that the priest would comply with this injunction whether he himself in person removed the bullock, or whether he employed the Levites to do it; whether he carried it on his back, according to the ridiculous paraphrase of Dr. Colenso, or removed it in wagons provided for the purpose.

And now that our paper approaches to a close, it may be asked what is the result of our labours, and what has been gained to the cause of truth by all the minute and tedious details through which we have conducted our readers? It seems to us that we have directly answered two of Dr. Colenso's arguments, and that we have moreover established indirectly a strong presumption against all the rest. Let us put a case to our readers. A jeweller exhibits for sale a string of pearls. He demands a very high price, but he pledges his word of honour that the pearls are of the rarest quality and of the highest excellence. A casual passer-by is attracted by the glittering gems. He enters the shop; he listens with eager credulity to the earnest protestations of the merchant; but he hesitates when the price is named. At this critical moment a friend arrives, who is happily somewhat versed in jewellery. He selects one or two pearls from the string, and after a brief inspection clearly shows, not merely that the price is far beyond their value, but that they are not pearls at all. What would be thought of the merchant who had offered them for sale? Who would frequent his shop? Who would believe [pg 375] the other pearls to be genuine on the strength of his protestations? It may be indeed that he is not a swindler; but if he is an honest man, he is certainly a very indifferent judge of his business.

Now what this jeweller is in a matter of commerce, such, as it seems to us, has Dr. Colenso been proved to be in a matter of infinitely greater moment. He comes before the world with the prestige of a great name and of a high position. He earnestly announces that he has made a great discovery, and that he is forced by his conscience to speak out his mind. He offers to the public an attractive array of brilliant and plausible arguments; and in return he asks us to surrender the inestimable treasure of Christian faith. At first we are bewildered and perplexed by the novelty and variety of his arguments; but after a little we summon up courage; we select two or three from the number, and these we submit to a minute and careful analysis. We find that they are miserably defective and utterly inconclusive. Facts are misrepresented, the meaning of language is perverted, the principles of sound reasoning are disregarded. May we not then fairly infer that Dr. Colenso's earnest protestations of sincerity and good intention afford a very insufficient guarantee for the accuracy of his statements and the stability of his arguments? We do not say that he is dishonest; but we do say that he has proved himself a very incompetent authority.