Part I. Historical.

I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

More than two centuries and a half have elapsed since the date of the occurrence so well known in Norway as the "Skottetog," or Scottish expedition, of which but little has hitherto been authentically known in Scotland. Notwithstanding, therefore, the conspicuous position which the so-called "Sinclair Expedition" holds in the traditions,[1] and to some extent also in the literature and the art,[2] of Norway, a fresh examination of the subject by the impartial light of historical truth is justified by the recent discovery of several documents in the State Archives of England, Scotland, and Sweden.

Although Mönnichhofen's expedition through Stordalen, and the Scottish invasion of Romsdalen and Gudbrandsdalen which formed an integral but unsuccessful part of that expedition, took place in 1612, no account of the latter appeared in print earlier than the year 1688, when Puffendorff wrote his "Introduction to Swedish History;" and it was only three years later that Widikindi, another Swedish historian, gave a narrative of it in a History of Gustavus Adolphus.

Among Danish historians, Niels Slange was the first of any eminence to reproduce the now palpable errors of Puffendorff and Widikindi, in a History of Christian IV., written in 1732.

In 1782, the subject of the Skottetog first became popularized in Norway by the publication, in a periodical journal called the Dansk Museum, of the spirit-stirring poem by Edvard Storm, which Norwegian children still learn by heart and in song, and which has even been well circulated in the English and German languages.[3]

THE LANDING OF THE SCOTS IN ROMSDALEN, 1612. Page 11. As depicted by the Norwegian artists Tiedemann and Gude.

But the first really important contribution towards the history of the event was made in 1838, when Dean Krag of Vaage dedicated to the descendants of the Bönder[4] who had fought at Kringelen the Sagas, or traditions, he had personally collected in Gudbrandsdalen, annotated with such historical references as were then available.[5]

While the traditions he has so scrupulously preserved for us are of great interest, if only because they indicate plainly the source of the information on which Swedish, Danish, and even Scottish accounts of the expedition into Romsdalen had been chiefly based, he enriched history with copies of the first and only documents that had apparently ever been drawn before his time, from State or other archives, relative to the Scots who landed in Romsdalen. Those documents were: a Report by the Norwegian Stadtholder, Envold Kruse, to the Danish Chancellor, dated Aggershuus, 17th September 1612; and three deeds of gift of land (all dated 3rd September 1613) to Lars Hage, Peder Randklev, and Berdon Sejelstad, for their bravery and loyal devotion on that occasion.

In that laborious little work Dean Krag pointed out that, with the exception of Kruse's first Report (of which he had obtained a copy from Copenhagen), all the writers after Puffendorff (1688) and Widikindi (1691) had repeated, more or less, only what those two historians had related. He also showed that Storm's poem had been preceded by a popular ballad on the same subject, and of which he collected and printed as much as was still extant in Gudbrandsdalen.

More recent historical research resulted in the discovery, also at Copenhagen, of a second Report from Envold Kruse, the Stadtholder, dated 3rd October 1612. It was first published between 1858 and 1860,[6] and was reproduced in a little work printed at Molde in 1877.[7]

The history of the Scottish expedition to Norway in 1612 has, therefore, until this day been supported in Scandinavian accounts by only two documents of indisputable authority—namely, the two Reports of Envold Kruse, of which the second was brought to light less than twenty years ago.

Nor have Scottish and English historians[8] and writers, so deeply interested in the question, been more successful in discovering and making use of authentic contemporary documents. A careful examination of their several descriptions, both of Mönnichhofen's expedition and of that of the Scots, reveals the fact that their information had been derived either from the old Danish and Swedish historians already mentioned, or more recently from the traditions current in Gudbrandsdalen. Those accounts may consequently be dismissed as unworthy of serious attention.

But the Public Record Office in London has at last delivered up its long-hidden treasures, consisting of the correspondence that passed between King James I. of England (VI. of Scotland) and Sir Robert Anstruther, his ambassador or envoy at Copenhagen, on the subject of the Scottish levies for Sweden in 1612.[9] In the General Register House, Edinburgh, have also been preserved[10] the acts and proclamations of the Scottish Privy Council in respect of those proceedings; while the keeper of the State Archives in Stockholm has supplied copies of several documents[11] that have not hitherto been published, amongst which must be mentioned a letter or commission issued by Gustavus Adolphus II.[12] to Sir James Spens of Wormiston, a Scottish officer of high rank, found sometimes in the service of James I., sometimes in that of Sweden.

That commission is of more especial value, since it explains the connection between the expedition of Mönnichhofen and that of the Scots.

The former enterprise—an important part of the famed Skottetog—is not the subject of any Norwegian Sagas, or of any popular ballads, but Scandinavian historians have dealt with it somewhat more correctly than with the Scottish expedition, probably because the Dutch contingent reached Sweden, and thereby supplied living testimony as to the circumstances that attended its march through Stordalen into Jemtland.

Nevertheless, the first documents relating to that daring exploit were not published before 1858, in a Norwegian historical magazine. These were copies of letters from Steen Bilde, amtmand, or prefect; Christian Jensson Jude, burgomaster; and Jacob Pederson, lagmand,[13] all of Trondhjem—addressed to the Danish Chancellor, and dated severally between the 15th August 1612 and the 19th February 1613.

Some years later—namely, in 1877—Dr. Yngvar Nielsen of Christiania published[14] "Some Notices respecting Johan von Mönnichhofen," derived from a series of letters from Swedish agents at Amsterdam which he found in the State Archives at Stockholm.

FOOTNOTES:

II. THE CALMAR WAR, AND SWEDISH MEASURES FOR RAISING MERCENARIES.

Such being the documents and the information at last available in the matter of the Mönnichhofen and Scottish expeditions of 1612, it is time to narrate briefly why auxiliary troops were at that time wanted in Sweden.

When Gustavus Adolphus, on the 26th December 1611, took into his own hands, at the age of seventeen, the government of Sweden, his first step was to seek the conclusion of peace with Denmark; and with that object he formally surrendered the title of King of the Lapps, the assumption of which by his father had caused so much ill blood between Christian IV. and Charles IX. that it became one of the principal causes of the so-called Calmar War, commenced in the spring of 1611.

The overtures of Sweden and the offered mediation of Great Britain and other powers were rejected by Denmark, and the war was thereupon continued with great vigour, but with varying success on either side. However, in the early summer of 1612 the Danes took the important fortresses of Elfsborg and Gullberg, and having the entire command of the Cattegat and the Belts, cut off Sweden from the sea. Later, the Danish fleet anchored inside the rocks at Stockholm, of which the seizure was averted only by the bold strategy of Gustavus Adolphus.

This abortive attempt on the capital of Sweden practically concluded the war. Peace was ultimately signed at Knäröd, in Halland, January 18, 1613.[15]

During that war the Danish monarch had in his service about eighteen thousand English,[16] French, and German mercenaries; while Gustavus Adolphus, having on his side[17] only one foreign regiment of eight or nine companies, soon found himself "in need of foreign soldiers as well, wherewith to check the attacks of the enemy."[18] Charles IX. had indeed foreseen such a necessity, but no action was apparently taken in that direction until the month of November 1611, when Gustavus Adolphus addressed to Sir James Spens the letter or commission already mentioned, and when also the Queen Dowager of Sweden issued an order[19] for the payment of 10,500 rigsdaller out of a fund at Lübeck to Mönnichhofen, then preparing to proceed to the Netherlands for the enlistment of men, who, according to the letter addressed to Sir James Spens, were to have joined the Scottish auxiliary contingent at Elfsborg. On the 2nd December 1611 Mönnichhofen[20] was appointed commander-in-chief of the Swedish ships-of-war with which he was to have sailed from Elfsborg and brought back his levies. Money being apparently scarce, orders were given that he should be supplied with a certain quantity of ox-hides, for sale on his arrival in Holland, to meet the further expenses of his expedition. But the original plan of fetching and transporting the Netherlands levies in Swedish ships-of-war was ultimately abandoned, and Mönnichhofen reached Holland by another route.

The letters discovered at Stockholm by Dr. Yngvar Nielsen prove that Mönnichhofen had by the 1st June 1612 embarked a force of about twelve hundred men at Amsterdam on board four ships, which were detained for five weeks by contrary winds. Mönnichhofen had, therefore, the Swedish agent writes, incurred "extraordinary expenses, to the extent of at least four thousand thalers, in providing the men in the small ships with food and drink, and had consequently to pledge and mortgage all he possessed." He had "also encountered much difficulty and incurred great expense in keeping his men together even before the ships lay wind-bound."

Although in most Danish and Swedish histories the troops enlisted by Mönnichhofen in Holland are stated to have been Scottish, there is no documentary proof of such having been their nationality. The Netherlands were at the time full of foreign auxiliary troops, the republic having, on the signature of the truce of 17th June 1609, retained in its service 6,000 French, 3,000 English, and 3,000 Germans, but only 2,000 Scots. The absence of all mention of Scottish officers being with Mönnichhofen; the rivalry that existed between the military adventurers of that period; the circumstance that General Halkett,[21] a Scottish officer, was in Amsterdam at about the same period, engaged, not in enlisting Scots, but in hiring a ship to transport levies from Scotland; and more especially the fact that Mönnichhofen had been instructed to procure arms for the men simultaneously levied in Scotland;—all this leads us to infer that Mönnichhofen, himself a Fleming, enlisted Hollanders, and perhaps Germans.

FOOTNOTES:

III. SUCCESSFUL MARCH OF MÖNNICHHOFEN THROUGH NORWAY.

According to the Report of the same Swedish agent, Mönnichhofen sailed at last on the 14th July from Amsterdam,[22] and landed five days later in Stordalen, on the coast of Norway—at that time united with the Crown of Denmark—without combining, as originally intended, with the levies made in Scotland, although measures for their detention were taken only on the 4th August following.

The ships (evidently Dutch) which had transported his troops to Norway returned safely to Amsterdam with the information that Mönnichhofen had disembarked "three or four miles above Trondhjem, in Moersdall," and that his men had landed in such an ill-conditioned state that they "could not reach Sweden without great difficulty and danger."

When read in connection with the Reports of the Swedish agents at Amsterdam, first discovered and made known by Dr. Yngvar Nielsen in 1877, the letters of Steen Bilde, C. J. Jude, and J. Pederson[23] afford a credible and fairly complete account of that expedition. Those collective documents show that it was not composed, as alleged by Niels Slange, of "about fourteen hundred soldiers, or Scots," enlisted in Scotland, but nominally of twelve hundred men raised in the Netherlands under the circumstances already described.

The burgomaster of Trondhjem (who, like Bilde and the other Danish officials, was interested in over-rating rather than in under-rating the strength of the invaders,) reported, on 15th August 1612, that the expedition consisted of "eight hundred soldiers, besides their women and boys;" and according to Cronholm,[24] Gustavus Adolphus himself wrote that the number of those men, when they arrived in Jemtland, out of all further danger, amounted to eight hundred.[25] The four small Dutch ships could scarcely have carried more, especially if the men were accompanied by their women and children, as alleged by the burgomaster.

The Swedish and Danish historians relate that Mönnichhofen took his men to Scotland, and sailed from thence, in command of a combined force, for the coast of Norway; but all these statements only serve to prove yet more conclusively that the true history of the foreign levies made for Sweden in 1612 has until quite recently lain hidden in State Archives.

Mönnichhofen sailed from Amsterdam on the 14th July 1612, and having landed in Norway on the 19th July, could not possibly have carried out the original plan of joining his levies with those made in Scotland. Besides, the documents now brought to light prove that the small portion of the intended Scottish contingent that escaped the vigilance of the Scottish Council of State did not sail for Norway until the 2nd of August.

According to the Reports of the Trondhjem officials above mentioned, Mönnichhofen seized two other ships off Giske (which place he plundered), put some of his soldiers on board, and compelled the Norwegian vessels to pilot his own fleet of four ships into Trondhjem roads. In order to prevent the enemy from entering the river, Steen Bilde removed the poles and buoys that marked the channel, brought six iron cannon down to the sea-shore, and hastily made many other arrangements for repelling an anticipated attack on the city. As it grew dark soon after the ships had anchored, the fire opened upon them from the shore was harmless; and at daybreak they set sail again, after firing a few shots in return.

The wind being favourable, they soon rounded a point on which stood a farm called Viig, where the soldiers were quickly disembarked and marched towards Meragerfjeld, four or five Norwegian (twenty-eight to thirty-five English) miles distant.

They reached the summit of the fjeld without much molestation from the three military officers in command of the "frontier guard" of about two hundred soldiers or militia, reinforced by three hundred mounted Bönder. Steen Bilde and the three officers had collected a considerable number of peasants (the burgomaster says fifteen hundred) to repel the invasion; but according to the prefect, when a part of those levies reached the enemy, the captain of the frontier guard "could not get them forward where they were wanted." The enemy kept them off with their muskets, which the peasants mistook for cannon, probably because they were fired from rests, while their own firearms they considered to be relatively "pop-guns" (Snap-bosser).

Moreover, provisions were unobtainable, as the local Bönder had fled on the approach of the troops, after hiding their scanty supplies of food in the woods. A panic ensued, the common people insisting that the invaders were "very strong, and picked soldiers and warriors."

Steen Bilde was subsequently tried and punished for his alleged remissness in not repelling the enemy, and therefore some caution is necessary in receiving the official complaints made by the burgomaster and lagmand against the peasantry on that occasion, and which were to the following effect: "How can we carry on war in this country with peasants? It suffices to see how they conducted themselves against the soldiers." Steen Bilde affirmed that the lagmand had to "ride and walk about the whole of the night to get those peasants and ill-disposed persons into order; and yet nothing can be accomplished with them, as they do not stand, but run away at once when they see the enemy." He urged in his own defence: "I did my best, diligently, according to the counsel and means at hand, and according to what could be accomplished with those peasants. God comfort those who have no other help than peasants on such an occasion!"

It would appear at this distance of time that both Steen Bilde and the peasants were unfairly reproached for their conduct. The sudden landing of so many armed men was quite sufficient to create a panic, while the burning of "four farms in Stordalen, and of all the farms (twelve in all) which lay towards the river at Merager," was well calculated to strike terror into and to paralyze a peaceful population.[26] Under such circumstances, it would have been difficult to drive the men back to their ships, even with the fifteen hundred peasants hastily collected, under the command of three captains, and supported only by two hundred soldiers or militia.

Mönnichhofen's troops appear to have had the same difficulty as the peasant levies in providing themselves with food; for the men sent by Steen Bilde into the mountains as scouts found some of the soldiers dead from hunger, and many pieces of armour as well as pikes and other weapons thrown away by them.

On the other hand, Cronholm[27] asserts that the progress of the troops, which, laden with booty, were driving before them the cattle robbed from farms, was arrested in numerous mountain passes, where the soldiers were slaughtered by a host of peasants. But this statement is not in harmony with the Official Reports made to the Danish Chancellor, or with the punishment inflicted on Steen Bilde. The latter pointed out, on the contrary, that if some armed bands of peasants had understood how to utilize the advantages afforded by the physical conditions of the highlands, the rocks and precipices over which the bold Mönnichhofen and his men made their way "might easily have become their graves."

However, it is on historical record that the expedition reached Jemtland, where it found itself on Swedish soil, the population having previously taken an oath of allegiance to the Swedish Crown, which at the end of the war acquired permanently that Danish province.

Gustavus Adolphus occupied Herjedalen and Jemtland in pursuance of a threat made (March 1612) in a proclamation to the Norwegian peasantry, who yet spurned the idea of seceding from Denmark, and had attacked in force the lands on the Swedish borders, when, according to a contemporaneous writer, Dal and Vemland bore the brunt of the Norse onslaught.[28]

In that proclamation Gustavus Adolphus attributed the war to the Danish king, "whose aim," he said, "was war and bloodshed, and who had caused, menaced, and forced both his late father and himself to have recourse to self-defence." He reminded the Norwegians how "Sweden and Norway had from the most ancient days been united by relationship of descent and language; how there was a time when they had one and the same king; how the bond that should unite Norwegians and Swedes was, after all, closer and more natural than anything that could unite Norwegians with Danes; and how even geographical conditions seemed to witness that it was the will of Fate that Norway and Sweden should be united."

That far-seeing sovereign therefore called upon the Norwegians to submit to him as their lord and king, promising to confirm all their rights and privileges, and to restore to their legitimate position the remnants of the old aristocracy of Norway.

This appeal produced gradually the desired effect both in Herjedalen and Jemtland. The march of Mönnichhofen towards the old Swedish provinces was thus rendered easy; and on receipt of orders from Gustavus Adolphus, he took the direct road to Stockholm, then seriously threatened by the fleet of Christian IV.

Gustavus led in person the Netherlands contingent to Waxholm, a few miles from Stockholm, in order to attack the Danes, and in a month or so the Calmar War came to an end.

FOOTNOTES:

IV. ORGANIZATION OF SCOTTISH LEVIES FOR SWEDEN, AND THEIR FORCED DISBANDMENT.

Having dealt with that part of the general plan of bringing foreign troops to the aid of Sweden which was so successfully carried out by Mönnichhofen, we approach the main subject of this little work—namely, the history of the Scottish levies, and of the disaster that befell the very small portion of them that succeeded in leaving Scotland and landing in Norway.

Our starting-point in this part of the inquiry must be the commission addressed by Gustavus Adolphus to Sir James Spens, Laird of Wormiston.[29]

It gives an authentic indication of the measures subsequently adopted for obtaining levies in Scotland as well as in Holland. The young warrior and statesman refers to promises made by Sir James Spens to Charles IX., and to the services which his father had required of him, urging him to hasten his return (evidently from Scotland) with the "promised three thousand soldiers of proved faithfulness and bravery." He wished them to be infantry, not cavalry. The main object was the arrival of Sir James Spens at Elfsborg, by the 1st of April 1612, "with the before-mentioned number of troops, properly equipped with the needful accoutrements." Spens was to be paid at Hamburg the sum of 20,000 imperials, and was assured that any further expense he might incur in the matter of the levies would be repaid to him punctually and with the greatest cheerfulness. Gustavus Adolphus added: "Furthermore, we have thought (right) that it should be notified to you that we have arranged with our general (duce), our truly-beloved Johannes Mœnichovius, that he is to transport his thousand infantry, fully furnished with necessary arms, from Holland to Elfsborg, in the beginning of spring. If, therefore, you combine your fleet and army with the ships of the aforesaid Mœnichovius, we shall be extremely glad."

The execution of this part of the plan was subsequently rendered impossible by the fall of Elfsborg and the command which the Danes obtained of the approaches to Sweden by sea.

The proceedings of Spens in this matter are not disclosed in the documents so far discovered,[30] which prove that Colonel Andrew Ramsay was the active organizer of the levies in Scotland. King James I. in one of his letters calls him "the chief of the business, whose brother all men know what place he hath with us." The influence Andrew Ramsay possessed at the Court of King James probably caused him to be engaged by Spens. One of his brothers was Sir John Ramsey, a favourite of King James, and who, while one of the royal pages, in the year 1600, was instrumental in rescuing the king from assassination at Gowrie House, near Perth. It was another brother of his—Alexander Ramsay—who was the leader of the small detachment of Scots destroyed at Kringelen, in Norway, and not George Sinclair, as hitherto assumed.

That the king's name was privately but unjustifiably used in the proceedings of Colonel Andrew Ramsay, was subsequently acknowledged by the latter, and hence the suspicion arose in Denmark that King James was cognizant of those proceedings. But the documents preserved in Edinburgh show that King James did not become aware of what Andrew Ramsay and the officers with him were doing in Scotland until about the 31st July 1612, the date on which the king wrote to his Scottish Privy Council as follows:—

"Whereas it is said there is a colonel and certain captains levying men to go to Sweden, we wonder that any subject of ours dare presume in that kind to serve any foreign prince, not only without our licence but directly against our meaning and special promise made to our dear brother the King of Denmark[31].... It is therefore our pleasure that ye certify as to what that levying of soldiers meaneth; by what authority it is done; and that ye make stay of all proceedings therein till ye shall be advertised of our further pleasure concerning that matter."

Nine days later, the king wrote to his envoy at Copenhagen[32] that he had heard, "by mere accident, of levies in Scotland ready to embark under Ramsay, Steward, and some other captains;" and "being displeased, gave order presently for the stay of the levy. And whereas good numbers of them were already embarked before His Majesty heard the news, or ready to embark, His Highness hath given order to discharge them, and doth utterly disavow any acts of theirs," etc.

But the Danish king was already well acquainted with those proceedings; for the British envoy at Copenhagen wrote to King James on the 10th August 1612 (the king had written to him on the 9th August) that the King of Denmark was informed that "one Menigowe, a Fleming, having in company with him fifteen hundred men, is to meet with Andrew Ramsay in some part of the north of Scotland, about Caithness or Orkney, who has more than a thousand Scottish men with him; and so they mind to join their forces together, and to fall upon Norway and spoil some towns, and so go into Sweden." The King of Denmark, added the envoy, had been informed by persons from Scotland that Ramsay had levied men about Edinburgh and embarked them at Leith; and His Majesty argued that "such levies so near Edinburgh could not be done without permission of the State."

Indeed, the excuses of the Scottish Privy Council, to the effect that the levies had been made secretly, did not satisfy even King James, who wrote to his envoy that, to quote his own expression, he "misliked some dulness of theirs."

The action taken by the Scottish Privy Council immediately on receipt of the peremptory orders of the king was as follows:—

On the 4th August 1612 a proclamation was issued "discharging the transporting of soldiers to Sweden," and another "against the soldiers enlisted for Sweden;" while two acts were passed—the one "charging" or accusing "Captains Hay, Ker, and Sinclair" of having enlisted men for the wars of Sweden, and ordering them to desist from their enterprise, etc.; the other summoning Colonel Andrew Ramsay to appear before the Council to "hear and see His Majesty's will, pleasure, and direction" in respect of the men of war enlisted under his pay and command to be transported to Sweden. Next day the Lords of the Council ordered officers of arms "to pass, command, and charge the masters, owners, skippers, and mariners of ships and vessels freighted for transport of soldiers to Sweden, that they bring in their ships to the harbour of Leith, and there suffer them to lie," and not to set sail until they know the Council's will and pleasure towards them, under pain of being denounced as rebels and "put to the horn."[33]

On the 15th August an act was passed by the Council, ordering that "the companies of men lately enlisted under the charge and commandment of Colonel Ramsay and some other captains, for the wars of Sweden, be broken up, and that they shall in no wise be transported to Sweden;" and on the same day another act, ordaining that the companies under Colonel Ramsay, who had meanwhile professed his willingness to render obedience to the king by disbanding them, should be landed, one half at Leith, the other half at Brunt or Burnt Island, on the other side of the Forth.

The latest document regarding these matters, obtained from the General Register Office in Edinburgh, is dated the 18th September 1612. Colonel Andrew Ramsay had been summoned to appear before the Council on the latter date, to answer regarding the unlawful levying of troops; and having failed to do so, he was forthwith denounced as a rebel.

Those acts and proclamations[34] give a very interesting and, indeed, important insight into the methods Colonel Andrew Ramsay and his confederates had adopted in Scotland.

We first of all find that Sir Robert Ker had apprehended in the middle shires[35] of Scotland a number of malefactors, part of whom he sent, or rather intended to send, to Sweden. In the second place, the proclamations assert that the Scottish officers therein named "have violently pressed and taken a great many honest men's sons, and have carried them to their ships against their will, of purpose to transport them to Sweden." They are accused of going "about the country in a swaggering manner, awaiting the time and occasion how and where they may apprehend any persons travelling on their lawful adois,[36] and if they be masters of them they immediately lay hands on them and by force and violence convey them to the next shore, where they have their boats in readiness to take them on board of their ships.... So that there is such a fear and dread arising among the common people that none of them dare travel," unless they be "able to withstand and resist the violence and injury of the said persons." ... "And divers young fellows," continues the proclamation, "who were resolved to have come to these parts to have awaited upon the harvest and cutting down of the corn are," for those reasons, "afraid to come here." In the charge against Captains Hay, Ker, and Sinclair, it is alleged that the "honest men's bairns and servants" are detained on board the ships "as slaves and captives."

Any person disobeying the orders of the Council was threatened with the penalty of death. The levies were to be discontinued, the ships seized, their sails taken from the yards, and the men on board set at liberty; but not before the local authorities had visited the vessels, and taken out of them and delivered over to the bailies of Edinburgh "the persons who had been delivered to them by the Commissioners of the late Borders," as well as the persons whom Colonel Ramsay and his captains had received out of the tolbooths of Edinburgh and Dunbar.

The remainder of the companies were ordered to be landed, as already said, at Leith and Burntisland, but on condition that the men should not remain together or travel back in groups of more than two after their disembarkation, under penalty of death, to obviate the possibility of their committing acts of violence on passing through the country.

The remarkable fact that, in all these stringent and detailed regulations for the disbanding and landing of so many men, no mention whatever is made of the most ordinary military precaution of disarming them will be noticed in a succeeding chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

V. ORDERS OF KING JAMES I. DISOBEYED BY A FEW SCOTTISH OFFICERS, WHO PROCEED WITH A SMALL PORTION OF THE LEVIES TO NORWAY.

The vigorous measures of the Council were not, however, adopted in sufficient time to prevent a small contingent of the Scottish levies from crossing over to Norway.

On the 17th September 1612, the Norwegian Stadtholder Kruse announced to the Danish Chancellor the arrival of two Scottish ships at Romsdalen between the 19th and 20th August, and the destruction at Kringelen, on the 26th August, of all the men, except eighteen, that had landed from those vessels.

On the 26th October 1612, Sir Robert Anstruther reported the matter in the following terms to King James:—

"Doubtless your M^tie hath heard of that unfortunate accident, that happened unto 300 of your M^is subjects, which landed in Norroway under the conduct of Alexander Ramsay, Lieutenant-Colonel unto Colonel Ramsay, Captain Hay, and Captain Sinclair. After they had marched six days within the country, pressing to go through to Sweden, (they) were over-charged by the inhabitants of the country, and all killed, except some few, of which the said Lieutenant Ramsay,[37] and Captain Bruce,[38] James Moneypenny,[39] and James Scott[40] these four, were sent to Denmark. After their coming hither a Council of War was called, to have examined them, and afterwards to have given judgment upon them. After I had spoken with them, and found that their journey was enterprysed (undertaken) rashly, and rather simple than well advised, for not one of them had any kind of commission or warrant to show, neither from the late King Charles, neither from Gustavus, neither from Colonel Ramsay; wherein first they would have been condemned of great simplicity or ignorance: and next found to be plain invaders, and ravers of the king's dominions and subjects, and a severe judgment would have followed. In regard the king was much discontented, for eviting of this public censure and danger, I thought good to labour to have them privily examined in the presence only of the Chancellor and Bredo Rantzow, where I was myself (unworthy) present. Their deposition is sent with themselves unto your M^tie, hoping it shall be far better for them to come into the hands of your Royal M^tie, who ever had used grace and clemency unto those that offend of simplicity, not of wilfulness."

In a letter of the same date to the king's secretary, the envoy stated that the 300 Scots had all been "killed and murdered," except some few.

The deposition in question of Alexander Ramsay, made in Latin, was to the following effect:—

He had been appointed to the post of Lieutenant-Colonel by Andrew Ramsay, who, on his part, had declared that he had been appointed to the office of Colonel by a letter from Charles, King of Sweden. Andrew Ramsay had told him that the levying of men in Scotland had been carried on with the knowledge and approval of His Majesty of Great Britain—"that an agreement had been made between himself and two others: George Sinclair and George Hay, each being in command of a hundred infantry."[41] He, Alexander Ramsay, "had embarked at Dundee: but the two aforesaid captains had set sail from Caithness." "They had crossed the sea relying on the words and promises of Andrew Ramsay; and the Council of the Kingdom of Scotland was unacquainted with those matters." "A stopping-place," he further deponed, "had been fixed upon beforehand, off Shetland, where Mönnichhofen with a thousand soldiers and 3,000 arms and General Halkett[42] of Scotland with a thousand infantry, were to meet, the number increasing to 3,000." Lastly, that they had set sail from that place on the second day of August, James Nisbet of Edinburgh having "taken upon himself the risk which the ship" (in the singular—probably Ramsay's) "might incur," and that the Norwegian peasants showed them the way "when they had landed at Romsdal in Iisfiord."

Alexander Ramsay and his three companions were "sent home to their country," King James finding them "no otherwise in fault than as abused by Ramsay." This Colonel Andrew Ramsay, after being a fugitive in Scotland, was apprehended in England on the occasion of his seeking a quarrel (or duel) with Sir Robert Carr of Ancram,[43] whom he accused of having divulged to the king his "gathering of men in Scotland."

On being examined, on the 27th November 1612, in the presence of the Duke of Lennox and Viscount Fenton, he confessed that he had a commission from the King of Sweden for levying men, and that he had undertaken and gone about to levy men in Scotland out of ignorance, not knowing but that he might lawfully "take such as would go." For his fault, he submitted himself to His Majesty's mercy, "as also for using the king's name to induce others, which he confesseth he did, and promised them to stand between them and any danger." At the same time, he denied ever having had "any leave, oversight, or connivance directly or indirectly from the king, either by himself, or by means or signification of any other body." Nor had he acquainted any member of the king's Council of Scotland with his doings, or "received any encouragement from them or any else."

This deposition was transmitted to Denmark, King James ordering Sir Robert Anstruther to say that Andrew Ramsay's "fault being of that nature as doth not forfeit life or limb, and the custom of declaring Schellum"[44] (which the King of Denmark had evidently suggested as a punishment for the breach of his parole not to serve Sweden) "being not with us in use, we have by our warrant under our hand banished him out of all our dominions; which next unto death is the highest punishment we could inflict."

Having thus disposed of the history of the Scottish levies, we proceed to inquire into the fate of the small detachment that landed in Norway under the command of Alexander Ramsay.

FOOTNOTES:

VI. THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER RAMSAY IN ROMSDALEN.

The Scots disembarked at a place since named Skothammer, or Skotkleven (the Scots' Cliff), in the vicinity of Klognæs farm, in a part of the Romsdal fiord called the Iisfiord, some miles from the present hamlet of Veblungsnæs, which was not then in existence. The Sagas of Gudbrandsdal, collected by Dean Krag, begin with a stirring account of the patriotism of Peder Klognæs or Klungnæs, the occupant of the farm of that name, who is popularly supposed to have prevented the two Scottish vessels from proceeding higher up the fiord, by representing that there was not sufficient water for them. He is therefore credited with the skilful deception of having induced the Scots to march two Norwegian miles (about fourteen English miles) out of their way, round the Iisfiord, over mountains and marshes, and through roadless forests intersected by almost impassable streams; all which delayed their progress, and enabled Peder to send a message to the authorities and to the Bönder, to save their goods in advance of the troops.[45]

It is more likely that the real reason for landing at Skotkleven was the desire of the shipmasters to get back to sea as quickly as possible, and not further endanger their safety by entering into a narrower and more remote part of the fiord.

It is scarcely necessary to follow and criticise the remainder of the Sagas, such as the meeting of Sinclair with the old woman (transformed by Edvard Storm into a mermaid), who predicted he "would come to bite the dust when he met the hardy men of the glen," and the romantic story of Guri, the maiden who made signals to the Bönder, and played a plaintive melody from the summit of a very high and distant cliff. The noble sacrifice another girl is reputed to have made of her lover, whom she sent to save the wife of Sinclair, is a story so very touching that we may be glad if future historical research should lead to the discovery that Captain Sinclair was accompanied on his adventurous expedition, not by "wild Turks" or bloodhounds,[46] but in reality by a wife and baby.

This Captain George Sinclair, whose name has been wrongly given to the Scots' expedition, was a son of David Sinclair of Stirkoke, the illegitimate son[47] of John, Master of Caithness, the eldest son of George, fourth Earl of Caithness. He was therefore a bastard nephew of George, fifth Earl of Caithness, who employed him, while he was preparing to leave for Norway, in the betrayal of Lord Maxwell, and in making him prisoner at Castle Sinclair, near Thurso.[48]

FOOTNOTES:

VII. DESTRUCTION OF THE SCOTS IN GUDBRANDSDALEN.

In his first Report[49] to the Danish Chancellor, dated September 17, 1612, the Norwegian Stadtholder stated that when Lauritz Hage, Lensmand of Vaage in Gudbrandsdalen, heard of the arrival of the Scots in Romsdalen, "he at once roused the Bönder and peasantry in the two parishes of Lessje and Vaage, and went forth against the said Scots and foreign troops. And when he perceived they were too strong for him, he advanced for two or three days and kept before them along the road, without, however, engaging in any skirmish or fight. Meanwhile, he sent messengers to the peasantry in the two adjoining parishes, called Froen and Ringeböe, who quickly came to his assistance; and when they were in this manner gathered they were 405 men strong. Thus he advanced in front" (of the Scots) "along the road until he saw his advantage at a fjeld called Kringelen, situated in Vaage parish, which they were obliged to pass. Thus he hemmed them in between the rock on one side and a large river close by on the other side, in which advantageous position he quietly encamped in the woods, and there lay with his men until the foreign soldiers arrived there, without, however, supposing or knowing aught but that the Norwegian troops were still withdrawing along the road before them. The above-mentioned Lauritz Hage, having made his arrangements and perceived his advantage, attacked, together with another lensmand, Peter Rankleff of Ringeböe, and with all their men together they fired upon the foreign troops and shot them to death during an hour and a half. Those who were not shot jumped into the river to save themselves, but were there drowned; and those of them who got alive over the river were quickly killed by the Bönder on that side; all of which happened and occurred on the 26th of August last. From the Bönder who were themselves present at the battle, and who buried and counted the dead and the defeated, we learn that the foreign soldiers must no doubt have numbered at the least 550 men, although the Scots who remained alive, and of whom there are altogether 18, will not admit that they were more than 350 men strong at the utmost. On the day the battle took place 134 Scots were taken prisoners, who were straightway the next day killed and shot by the Bönder, with the exception of the above-mentioned 18, the Bönder saying to each other that His Majesty had enough to feed in those same 18. Some of these were, however, wounded, and some had bullets in their bodies, when they arrived here. Of the above-mentioned 18 soldiers we now send to you the three principal ones" (mentioning their names—Alexander Ramsay, James Moneypenny, and Henry Bruce). "As regards the remaining 15 persons, some of them have straightway taken service among good folk here in the country; some of them who will willingly serve your Royal Majesty in Jörgen Lunge's Regiment, I sent at once to Elfsborg."

ROAD AT KRINGELEN.

Reference is made at the end of the Report to the written statements of the prisoners, and to letters found on them, and which the Bönder had kept.

From Envold Kruse's second Report, dated October 3, 1612,[50] we learn that the letters in question were ultimately recovered by the Bailie of Gudbrandsdalen, and transmitted by Kruse to Copenhagen, where, however, they have so far not been available to the historian.

BARN AT QVAM IN WHICH 134 SCOTTISH PRISONERS WERE CONFINED. The bullet holes are still visible in the north wall, marking the spot where 116 of them were shot or cut down the day after the fight.—Page 54.

The latter Report contains the following striking passage, which destroys so entirely the accusations made against the Scots in the Norwegian Sagas and in Edvard Storm's poem:—

"We have also since ascertained that those Scots who were defeated and captured on their march through this country have absolutely neither burned, murdered, nor destroyed anything on their march through this country, either in Romsdalen or in Gudbrandsdalen."

Only one Dane, of the name of Sören Setnæs, had complained that the Scots had taken from him a box or chest of silver objects, such as tankards, belts, etc.; but even this booty the Bönder would not acknowledge having found on the killed or captured Scots.

The end of this valuable document is somewhat damaged, but so far as the injured part can be deciphered, Kruse stated that six[51] of the Norwegian men were killed, and ten or twelve wounded, in the fight at Kringelen.

FOOTNOTES:

VIII. THE COMBAT AT KRINGELEN.

We have seen that the historical facts are as follows:—A detachment of about three hundred Scots, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Ramsay and five other Scottish officers, marched safely, and without committing any acts of murder, pillage, or incendiarism, through Romsdalen and Gudbrandsdalen, as far as Kringelen, where it had opposed to it four hundred and five Bönder and peasants, under the leadership of two civil, not military, officers. Further, that one hundred and thirty-four of the Scots were taken prisoners, and were all killed the next day,[52] except eighteen, who reached Aggershuus, now the fort of Christiania,—the loss of the victorious Norwegians being only six killed and ten or twelve wounded.

Such a remarkable result could certainly only have been attained under very advantageous circumstances, and as existing documents give only the barest outline of the fight at Kringelen, we can only form an hypothesis upon them.

The following conjecture is deduced from an attentive study of all that is so far known or established on the subject.

It must be acknowledged that four hundred Bönder, only partly or imperfectly armed, could not have been an equal match, even in the early part of the seventeenth century, for the smallest admissible number of Scots—namely, three hundred—that documentary evidence will allow us to admit, and especially if they had been well-armed, trained soldiers. Some of those Scots, those raised by Sinclair, were apparently Caithness men, whose principal occupation had no doubt been warfare.[53] Many of them were in all probability descendants of Norsemen who had conquered and held a great part of their country. They were, to say the least, as brave and as ready to defend their lives as the Bönder and peasants of Gudbrandsdal, a province which had moreover been to some extent drained of its younger and more able-bodied men for the purposes of the war of Denmark against Sweden. We have also seen that the attempts made to destroy Mönnichhofen's force of about one thousand men by a levy of one thousand five hundred peasants, mounted and on foot, supported by some soldiers and commanded by three military officers, were quite unsuccessful.

What then were the exceptional circumstances that rendered possible the easy and utter defeat of the Scots at Kringelen?

In traditional accounts of the affair, reproduced by almost every historian, much stress is laid on the deadly effect of the hurling down of rocks, or of what is known in Norway as a "tömmervælte," on the heads of the invaders while they were passing unsuspectingly through a ravine, pass, or defile at Kringelen. To those who have not visited the locality in question such an explanation would perhaps be quite satisfactory; for there have been instances, both in ancient and modern history, of troops being destroyed by such means in mountain passes by an enemy inferior in number and untrained in skilled warfare.

But an inspection of Kringelen, or a study of the accompanying plan prepared for this work from actual survey by Lieutenant Arneberg of the Norwegian army, renders impossible the acceptance of such an explanation. The present road, on which stands the stone pillar that marks the vicinity of the spot where the fighting occurred, dates from the beginning of this century. It is about forty feet below the old road, where it sinks into the "Sinclair Dokka" or hollow, in which the Scots are popularly believed to have been overwhelmed by huge masses of rock, and where human bones, supposed to be those of the Scots, have been dug up.

In an account[54] of a journey from Christiania to Trondhjem in 1733 by King Christian VI. and Queen Sophia the road through Gudbrandsdalen is described as follows:—"Froen Præstegaard (vicarage). About here the road begins to show the difficulties travellers in Norway have to encounter." After passing Zell "is a road called Kringelen, on the side of a fjeld, and so narrow that every precaution is necessary on the part of travellers and drivers." Dr. Yngvar Nielsen states in his interesting work on the "Development of Roads in Norway,"[55] that "in 1766 Kringelen was the worst bit of road in Gudbrandsdalen, as it was so narrow that a carriole could scarcely pass." In fact, it was only a bridle-path on the edge of a precipice fifty to one hundred feet above the Laugen river. This track, which was all that the condition of the country required when produce was transported chiefly in winter on sledges, was quite open and exposed; while above it the almost precipitous cliffs, averaging seven hundred feet in height, left at their base a sloping ledge of about one hundred and fifty feet in breadth. It was neither a pass nor a ravine, and has sometimes been described as a "defile," probably because not more than two men could have walked abreast along it, and certainly only a single file of men could have used it with convenience.

KRINGELEN.

A Old bridle-path along which Scots marched.C Logs and stones partly concealed by wood.

B Present road.D Stone monument marking site of combat.Page 59.

The Bönder concealed themselves on the sloping ledge between the precipitous cliff and the path. The ledge was somewhat thickly covered with wood, which is said to have been washed away by a memorable rainstorm in 1789. At the same time there must have been a clear space in front both of the "tömmervælte" and of the intrenchments which tradition says the Bönder erected there, although Envold Kruse makes no mention of them.

The military officer who carefully surveyed the ground in the autumn of 1884 has shown on the plan the probable position of the celebrated "tömmervælte." It is supposed to have been an accumulation of rocks piled on round beams or trunks of trees, arranged in such a manner as to roll down in a mass as soon as the ropes which held the structure in position were cut.

The depression in the old road known as the "Sinclair Dokka" has a length of about two hundred and seventy English feet between the highest points at its two extremities. It is reasonable to suppose that the object of the Bönder was to hurl down the rocks at the deepest or centre part of the depression, which would be about one hundred feet in length at the utmost, and that the length of the "tömmervælte" was in proportion with the size of the hollow into which it was destined to descend. It could not possibly have been even half as long as the deepest part of the hollow itself; for an artificial structure a hundred feet in length, with a clear space in front of it, would certainly have been observed by the Scots, however unsuspecting they may have been, and however lax their military precautions. Moreover, it would have been strategically unwise on the part of the Bönder to have attacked the invaders until a good part of them had descended into the hollow and were passing through it. It has therefore been assumed on the plan that the "tömmervælte" could not have been more than thirty feet in length, whilst its height above the deepest part of the "Sinclair Dokka" has been fixed at about one hundred and twenty feet, partly as a result of a thorough examination of the configuration of the slope on which it stood, and partly on the conjecture that the structure required elevation in order to attain a sufficient impetus on being let loose, and in order also that it should be as much concealed as possible from the Scots proceeding along the road.

A mathematical question here presents itself. If we assume that the Scots on whom the "tömmervælte" descended occupied the path in the "Sinclair Dokka" along an approximate length of even one hundred feet, how many could possibly have stood there? Giving only three feet to each man, the number could not have been more than thirty-three men if they marched in single file, or about sixty-seven if two abreast, along a path so rugged, narrow, and dangerous. But considering that the rocks must have taken several seconds to roll down the declivity, which could not have had a steeper gradient than forty to forty-five degrees, the men at the extremities of the threatened group must have had time to rush back at one end and forward at the other; and allowing for further chances of escape, we cannot possibly account for the destruction of more than twenty-five or thirty men (even if they walked two abreast) by the sudden descent of an avalanche of rocks and timbers.

How then were the remainder disposed of?

As soon as the "tömmervælte" had been cast loose, it may be taken for granted that the concealed Bönder rushed down on the startled foe, and that a hand-to-hand fight ensued. In fact, we know there was a combat of an hour and a half, in which Sinclair fell, and that six of the Bönder were killed and ten or twelve wounded. A few of the muskets alleged to have been carried by the Scots have been preserved, the arsenal at Christiania possessing five,[56] Horton arsenal one, the descendants of Dean Krag parts of two or three more, and Consul Heftye of Christiania a lock. The earliest English travellers in Norway mention having seen only a few remnants of those arms in Gudbrandsdalen. From the smallness of the number of such muskets that have been preserved or heard of, it must be supposed that the Scots had not many such weapons. Nor could those few have been of much use at close quarters on a sudden emergency such as that at Kringelen, since from the great length of their barrels (about seventy inches) they had to be fired from a rest.

The traditional or popular account of the mode of attack bears on its face a considerable amount of probability. It is to the effect that the "tömmervælte" was not cast loose until the "vanguard" of the Scots had passed.

On the strength of all these facts and considerations we arrive, in all humility, at the conjecture that the three hundred Scots were not all armed, and that the body of men described in the Sagas as the "vanguard" was most likely the contingent of "honest men's bairns and servants," and some of the men out of jails, forcibly pressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, and who were being driven captive into Sweden by Caithness men under Sinclair and Hay, armed, it may be conjectured, principally with swords, the officers perhaps wearing armour and carrying pistols as well as swords.[57]

OLD GERMAN PRINT Representing some of the Scots of Mackay's regiment, landed at Stettin, 1630. Page 65. (Original in British Museum.)

It has been already shown that Mönnichhofen was to have supplied arms for the Scottish levies, with which he failed to combine. Moreover, the Swedish agent at Amsterdam reported that he feared the projects of General Halkett (one of Ramsay's confederates) would fail, "because of the lateness of the season, and because the men had no weapons, while everywhere in Norway the people were up in arms."[58] The deposition, taken at Copenhagen, of Alexander Ramsay, the leader of the expedition, also shows that Mönnichhofen was to have supplied the Scots with arms from Holland. We have moreover seen that in its acts and proclamations against the proceedings of the Ramsays and others, the Scottish Privy Council made no mention of disarming the men who were to be sent home under precautions that were in other respects so careful. Nor is it likely that the men who had been forcibly seized and kept on board the ships would at once have been supplied with arms by their oppressors. The remarkable fact that the Scots committed no depredations in the valleys through which they passed—a forbearance out of keeping with the custom of that age, either in Scotland or in Scandinavia—suggests that the troops under Ramsay were subject to strict discipline on so daring and dangerous a march. This task probably devolved more especially on Captain Sinclair and Captain Hay, who, while in command of the armed men employed in guarding and driving before them the captive "honest men's bairns and servants," were the only officers killed;[59] and this may account for the popular belief that Sinclair was the chief of the expedition.

If therefore the conjecture be correct, that none but the Caithness men were armed at all, and they chiefly with swords, the almost entire annihilation of the three hundred men by four hundred Bönder is seen to have been easy enough under the circumstances that have been described.

Such is the conclusion that results from the premises here submitted; and remembering how important it is that national history should be correctly known, it is to be hoped that the researches already made will lead to the lifting of the cloud confessedly hanging over this episode of the distant past, and that some historian in time to come may be helped by them, however slightly, in directing the light of truth upon the mists that still remain to be dispelled on the subject of the disastrous expedition of the Scots to Norway in 1612.

PRESENT MONUMENT ON HIGHROAD MARKING GRAVE OF GEORGE SINCLAIR.

Page 121.

FOOTNOTES: