Chapter XI

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL. CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

♦1808.State of public feeling in England.♦

These transactions in Spain and Portugal excited the deepest interest in the English people; not so much for the hope, which had thus unexpectedly arisen, of advantages to England, and to the general welfare of Europe, as for the nature of the contest, their detestation of the unequalled iniquity by which it had been provoked, and their sympathy in the instinct and principle by which it was carried on. Every day seemed lost till an army of our own should be co-operating with men engaged in a cause so sacred, so congenial to the feelings of a Briton. Such was the eagerness to participate in the glorious struggle, that the militia almost universally offered themselves for foreign service, and the country with one voice called for an effort equal to the occasion. But the Government was not prepared for such exertions. Our military operations had never yet been carried on upon a scale such as was now required, and since the peace of Amiens they had been almost wholly suspended. Though great and most essential improvements in the army had been steadily and unostentatiously carried into effect by the Duke of York, much remained to be done; and it wanted that efficiency which nothing but experience could give it. That our troops were able to beat the enemy wherever they should meet on equal terms, or even with considerable advantage of numbers on the enemy’s side, no Englishman doubted, unless he wished the enemy success; but the public confidence went no farther. The war had on our part so long been almost exclusively maritime, that the army had suffered something in reality and more in reputation. The French, always fond of war, had become a military people; their military establishment was supposed to be perfect in all its branches, their troops experienced, their officers excellent, their commanders of the highest celebrity: to oppose them we had generals very few of whom had ever been tried in command, and officers of whom the far greater number, like their men, had never seen an enemy in the field. A great effort, however, was now called for by our new allies. The Spanish Juntas with which the British Government had hitherto communicated, preferred assistance in money and supplies to an auxiliary force; they had a brave but undue confidence in their own strength, and perhaps they foresaw that mutual ill will might probably arise between combined armies whose habits and prejudices were widely dissimilar. What they desired was, that a British expedition should be employed against the French in Portugal; this would act as a powerful diversion in favour of Spain; thither we were called by the wishes and groans of the Portugueze people; and it was believed, that when the deliverance of that kingdom should have been effected, a plan of co-operation with the Spaniards might be arranged.

♦An expedition ordered to the coast of Portugal.♦

When the insurrection of the Spaniards began, an armament was preparing at Cork, which, as different prospects opened upon us, had been supposed to be intended at one time against Ceuta, at another for South America. Its destination was now fixed for the Peninsula, and the command was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley. His instructions were, while the fleet proceeded off Cape Finisterre, to make for Coruña himself, and consult there with the Provisional Government of Galicia. He was authorized to give the most distinct assurances to the Spanish and Portugueze people, that his Majesty, in sending a force to their assistance, had no other object in view than to afford them his most unqualified and disinterested support. In all questions respecting their provisional government, should any such arise, he was as far as possible to avoid taking any part; maintaining only these principles, that no act done by Charles or Ferdinand could be considered valid, unless they returned to their own country, and were absolutely free agents there; and that the entire evacuation of the Peninsula by the French was the only basis upon which the Spaniards should be induced to treat. In any arrangements he was directed to act with the utmost liberality and confidence, the object of Great Britain being to assist the people of Spain and Portugal in restoring and maintaining against France the independence and integrity of their respective monarchies.

♦Former services of Sir A. Wellesley.♦

Arthur Wellesley, fourth son of Viscount Wellesley, Earl of Mornington, was born in the year 1769, at Dengan Castle, in Ireland, the seat of his ancestors. After having been a short time at Eton, he was removed, while very young, to the military academy at Angers; for there was not at that time any institution in Great Britain wherein tactics were taught, and the youth who meant to follow the military profession was obliged to go to France if he wished to learn the elements of war. He obtained his first commission about the age of eighteen, in the 41st regiment; and after a series of exchanges and promotions, his elder brother, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, purchased for him the lieutenant-colonelcy of the 33rd, in 1793. He conducted himself in the disastrous retreat from Holland so as to obtain much praise from military men. In 1795 he embarked for service in the West Indies, but being providentially driven back by storms, his destination was altered. In 1797 he went out to India with his brother Lord Mornington, then Governor General; there he distinguished himself in the war against Tippoo, and being appointed Governor of Seringapatam after the capture of that city, and one of the commissioners for disposing of the conquered territories, he discharged his arduous duties in such manner as to deserve and obtain the gratitude of the conquered people. In the subsequent war against the Mahrattas he commanded at the battle of Assye, against an army exceeding his own number in the proportion of ten to one; and whose disciplined troops, under French officers, more than doubled the British force. The action was severe beyond all former example in India: having won the enemy’s artillery, consisting of an hundred pieces, which were served with perfect skill, he had to take them a second time with the bayonet, when men who had feigned death rose from the ground and turned them upon the conquerors as they pressed forward in pursuit. The victory was decisive; the success was followed up, and at the close of that triumphant war a monument in honour of the battle was erected at Calcutta; the inhabitants of that city presented him with a sword, and his own officers with a golden vase; the thanks of parliament were voted him, and he was made a Knight Companion of the Bath. He returned to England in 1805; took his seat in the House of Commons the ensuing year, as member for Newport in the Isle of Wight, and in 1807 was appointed Chief Secretary in Ireland. But his military services were soon required; he accompanied Lord Cathcart in the expedition against Copenhagen, and commanded in the only affair of importance which took place. He was now to be tried in more arduous undertakings; and such was the repute in which his talents were held, that when the armament for the Peninsula was placed under his command, the opinion both of the army and of the public entirely accorded with the choice which Government had made.

♦Sir Arthur lands at Coruña.♦

Sir Arthur Wellesley, having about ten thousand men under his command, sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, and leaving the fleet as soon as he had seen it clear of the coast, made sail in a frigate for Coruña, and arrived there on the 20th. There the Junta of Galicia informed him of the battle of Rio Seco; and that the French, being, in consequence, masters of the course of the Douro, were enabled to cut off the communication between that province and the country to the south and east. The French in Portugal they estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000 were supposed to be at Lisbon; and he was told that the Portugueze troops at Porto amounted to 10,000, and that a Spanish corps of 2000 had begun their march for that city on the 15th, and were expected to arrive there about the 25th. Sir Arthur consulted with them concerning the immediate employment of his army. They explicitly stated that they were in no need of men, but wanted arms, ammunition, and money: ... this latter want was relieved by the arrival of £200,000 from England that very day. They strongly recommended him to employ his forces against the enemy in Portugal, because while that army remained unbroken the Spaniards could never make any simultaneous effort to drive the French out of the Peninsula; and they advised him to land in the north, that he might bring forward and avail himself of the Portugueze troops in that quarter.

♦He proceeds to Porto.♦

Accordingly Sir Arthur sailed for Porto, ordering the fleet to follow him. He arrived there the 24th, and had a conference that night with the Bishop and the general officers. From them, and from Lieutenant-colonel Brown, who had previously joined them, he learnt that the regular Portugueze troops who had been collected amounted to 5000 men, and were posted at Coimbra; that there were about 1200 peasants in advance, and a corps of 2500 Portugueze and 300 Spanish infantry at Porto, besides volunteers and peasants; but all were badly equipped and armed, the peasantry having only pikes. It was concerted that the 5000 should co-operate with him, and the remainder with the Spanish corps, then, so the Spaniards had informed him, on its way from Galicia; and that the peasantry should be employed, part in the blockade of Almeida, part in the defence of Tras os Montes, which province was supposed to be threatened by Bessieres, in consequence of his victory at Rio Seco. Sir Arthur stated, that he should want cattle for draught, and for the supply of his army; the Bishop took pen and ink, wrote down the number which would be required, and replied immediately that they were ready.

Here Sir Arthur received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, advising him to leave the troops either at Porto or at the mouth of the Mondego, and proceed to communicate with him off Lisbon. ♦He goes to the Tagus to confer with Sir C. Cotton.♦ The fleet accordingly was ordered to Mondego Bay, and the general proceeded to confer with Sir Charles. There he found dispatches from General Spencer, stating that he had landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville; but that he had resisted the applications made to him to join Castaños, thinking it advisable to preserve his force unbroken, for the purpose of acting with Sir Arthur. He had, however, consented to take up a position at Xeres, where he might serve as a point of support for Castaños, in case of defeat, and from whence he could re-embark in eight-and-forty hours: and he supposed that Sir Arthur would begin his campaign at Cadiz, implying an opinion that Dupont could not be defeated without English assistance. Sir Arthur, however, being convinced by the Junta of Galicia that his army would be employed with more advantage to the common cause against Junot, ordered General Spencer to join him off the coast of Portugal, unless he should be actually engaged in operations which he could not relinquish without injury to the Spaniards.

♦The Mondego the only place where a landing could be effected.♦

General Spencer represented Junot’s force as exceeding 20,000 men: the admiral, according to the reports of the Portugueze, estimated them at less: Sir Arthur concluded that they were from 16,000 to 18,000, of whom about 12,000 were at Lisbon, and in its vicinity, and 2400 at Alcobaça. Any attempt at landing in the Tagus was considered impracticable: it would be equally so at Cascaes: it was at all times difficult to land an army in the small bays near the rock, and would be now especially dangerous because of the neighbourhood of the enemy: Peniche was garrisoned by the French. There was therefore no choice but to disembark in the Mondego. Thither Sir Arthur returned. He rejoined the fleet there on the 30th, and there he found intelligence of the defeat of Dupont, and advice from his own government, that he would be reinforced immediately with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Acland, and afterwards with 10,000 who had been under Sir John Moore in Sweden, the command being vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple; but he was directed to carry into execution without delay the instructions which he had received, if he thought himself sufficiently strong. He also received accounts that Loison had been detached from Lisbon, to open the communication with Elvas, the patriots in Alem-Tejo having been joined by about a thousand men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and being now formidable.

♦Troops landed in the Mondego. 1808. August.♦

This latter account made him conclude that there was no danger of being attacked by superior numbers before his reinforcements reached him; and he determined to land, both for the sake of the troops, and because he knew that the Portugueze, who were much discouraged at seeing the men remain so long on board after their arrival in Mondego Bay, would suspect either the inclination of the English to contend with the French, or their ability, if the landing were still deferred. It was now found that the Coimbra students had performed a service of real importance in winning Figueira from the enemy; the landing in the Mondego being so difficult, that with all the zeal and ability of the navy, it would have been impossible to effect it without the cordial assistance of the Portugueze. They began to disembark on the first of August. The weather was so little favourable, and the surf so high, that the whole of the troops were not landed till the 5th, and on that day General Spencer arrived, his corps following him the next. He had embarked immediately upon learning the surrender of Dupont, not waiting for instructions. This corps was disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army were in readiness to advance: the march of the main body was, however, delayed till the 10th, at the desire of the Portugueze general officers. Sir Arthur conferred with them at Montemor o Velho, and arranged the plan of operations: he armed and inspected their troops, recommended and superintended their organization, and offered as large a sum as his military funds could afford, to defray the expenses of their equipment: this, however, was declined by their officers. While the troops were landing, a party of the police cavalry arrived at Coimbra, having effected their escape from Lisbon. This hazardous attempt was planned and conducted by Eliziario de Carvalho. A serjeant, by name Gamboa, as soon as their flight was discovered, was dispatched to the French commander at Santarem, with orders to intercept and make an example of them, according to the system of the French tyranny. Gamboa, however, with the party under his command, followed and joined his countrymen; and they accomplished their dangerous march in safety.

♦They advance to Leiria.♦

Sir Arthur determined to march along the road nearest the sea, for the sake of communicating with the store-ships; but as this communication must needs be very precarious, both as depending upon the state of the surf, and also because the army might find it expedient to strike more into the country, arrangements were made for taking with them sufficient stores to last till they should reach the Tagus. The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under Generals Hill and Ferguson. Laborde and Thomieres had collected their corps, to the amount of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leiria; they threatened the magazines formed in that city for the Portugueze army; and Sir Arthur was urged to advance as speedily as possible, for the sake of preserving them. The main body followed on the 10th: on that day Sir Arthur received advices from Coruña, informing him that neither Blake nor Cuesta was in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, nor to follow him, if he should enter Portugal. But at the same time news arrived of the flight of the Intruder from Madrid; and Sir Arthur perceived that Bessieres would be more solicitous to cover his retreat towards the French frontier, than to attempt a diversion in favour of Junot. At all events, there was time enough for his operations against the latter before Bessieres could arrive; and it was to be expected that General Acland, or Sir John Moore, would land before he could come up. These advices, therefore, only determined him to follow up with the utmost celerity the plan which he had concerted. On the 11th the main body joined the advanced guard at Leiria, and the next day the Portugueze force, consisting of 6000 men, including 600 cavalry, arrived, the whole force being now collected there. When the English advanced guard entered that city, they found in one of the convents the dead bodies of several monks who had been murdered by the French; ♦Early Campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, p. 8.♦ the murderers had amused themselves with dipping their hands in the blood of these victims, and printing the red mark upon the wall.

♦Joy of the Portugueze in Lisbon.♦

The arrival of the British troops in Portugal had the immediate effect of putting an end to that anarchy which had already produced so much evil in the northern provinces. Meantime the wildest reports were afloat at Lisbon. The miserable people looking every where for deliverance, believed that an army from Morocco was coming to their aid. The trick of the egg was repeated, not as before, with mysterious initials, referring to King Sebastian, but with a distinct annunciation that the French were speedily to be destroyed. The egg thus inscribed was found ♦Neves, v. 67.♦ upon the high altars of the Patriarchal Church: but the former instance had led the French to discover the easy process by which an inscription in relief may be produced, and on the following morning eggs with a counter prophecy, in the same fashion, were to be seen upon the ♦Thiebault, 170.♦ high altar in every church in Lisbon: at the same time a paper was fixed up, explaining the trick. This was fair matter of mirth for the day; but Junot and his officers well knew that the hostile prediction was not made now without a reasonable and near prospect of its fulfilment; and very soon intelligence came that the only foe of which ♦Neves, v. 62, 65.♦ he stood in fear had actually disembarked. The Portugueze commanders at Coimbra and Pombal used their utmost endeavours that no information of the British movements might reach the enemy, and in this they were assisted by the disposition of the people. But entire concealment was not possible; ... the news came to Lisbon at the same time from General Thomieres, from the agents of the police, by private letters, and by public report; and if Junot could have doubted the accuracy of his dispatches, all doubt ♦Thiebault, 172.♦ would have been removed by the altered appearance of the Lisbonians, who now knew that of a truth their deliverance was at hand.

Loison was immediately recalled from Alem-Tejo, and Laborde, who was supposed to be the ablest of the French generals, was sent with the two brigades of Generals Brenier and Thomieres to manœuvre and delay the enemy till Loison ♦Measures of the French.♦ could arrive, Travot being appointed to the command at Lisbon in Laborde’s stead; ... this general ♦Thiebault, 175.♦ was chosen because having demeaned himself as a man of honour and humanity, he had deserved and obtained the respect and good opinion of the Portugueze. The castle at Lisbon, which had now been strongly fortified, was supplied with more ammunition and stores. The fowling-pieces and other weapons, which had been delivered up in obedience to a former edict, were broken, or rendered useless, ... the bars of silver into which the church plate had been cast, and the other portable plunder, packed for removal, and deposited on board one of the Portugueze ships of war. Whole piles of rich hangings and vestments, the spoils of palaces and churches, were burnt in a building erected for the purpose near head-quarters, and in the sight of the people, for the sake of the gold and silver wherewith they were embroidered. In order to counteract the excitement of hope in the citizens, it was confidently asserted, that 20,000 French had entered Portugal on the side of Braganza; and for the chance, vain as it was, of provoking their bigotry, they were reproached as having brought a stain upon their country by inviting heretics and Mahometans to fight against the French, who, like themselves, professed the true religion. It was indeed actually believed by the Portugueze that the British had brought with them a Moorish force: the Portugueze Consul in Barbary had in fact obtained from the Emperor of Morocco a promise of 200,000 cruzados for the service of Portugal; and this may have given occasion to a belief which was confirmed by the appearance of the Highlanders: ... ♦Observador Portuguez, 402. Neves, v. 65, 118.♦ their dress was immediately pronounced not to be Christian, and for a time no doubt was entertained but that these were the Moorish auxiliaries.

♦Movements of Laborde and Loison.♦

The French apprehended that Sir Arthur would move upon the Zezere and the Tagus, for the purpose of interposing between Loison’s detachment and their main force. Laborde therefore proceeded by Villa Franca and Rio-Maior to Candieiros, where he encamped; from Rio-Maior he might either take the direction of Alcobaça, Leiria, or Thomar, and, it was hoped, co-operate with Loison, in case any attempt were made to prevent their junction. Learning, however, that the British army kept the line of the coast, and that Loison had crossed the Tagus without opposition, and was in no danger of being impeded in his march, he proceeded to Alcobaça, ♦Thiebault, 175.♦ where he found Thomieres. Junot had instructed him to reconnoitre the position of Batalha; ... the last ground, it might have been thought, on which an invader would have risked a battle; for there it was where Portugal, (and then also with English aid,) had achieved her own deliverance in the battle of Aljubarrota, one of the most signal and important victories in the age of chivalry. The country was too open for his force, and he therefore remained at Alcobaça, watching the movements of the enemy, and hoping to be joined by Loison. That general, meantime, had suffered much on his march through Alem-Tejo, from the excessive heat and the want of water. Though there were none to oppose them in the field or harass them, the French felt what it was to be in a country where every inhabitant regarded them with a deadly hatred. Wherever they went the towns and villages were deserted; ... meat, wine, and even bread, were wanting; and the persons who fell into their hands, or perhaps remained in their line for the purpose of deceiving them, sent them out of their way in search of springs or rivulets, which when they reached them were dry; ... or ♦Thiebault, 172.♦ of stagnant waters, wherein hemp was steeped, and of which, nauseous and noisome as it was, the men could not be prevented from drinking greedily. Many died of heat and exhaustion on the way; and they who from fatigue or sickness fell behind, were killed by the peasantry.

♦G. Freire separates from the English.♦

Loison reached Abrantes on the 9th, crossing the Tagus by the bridge of boats at that city. He rested there one day, and, leaving 200 men in garrison, proceeded on the next across the Zezere to Thomar, where he arrived on the same day that the main body of the English reached Leiria, the two cities being about thirty miles from each other. Laborde was at Alcobaça, six leagues from the latter city, on the road to Lisbon. Their object had been to join at Leiria, but in this the British army had anticipated them; and as there was no practicable road for carriages between Thomar and Alcobaça, Loison could only effect a junction with Laborde by a circuitous route to the southward, and thus the latter general was exposed to be attacked alone. Bernardim de Freire, the Portugueze commander, in his former conferences with Sir Arthur, had expressed a wish that the British commissariat would supply his troops with British stores during the campaign. The impossibility of complying with so unreasonable a demand was pointed out; and Sir Arthur observed, that it was a new thing to require any army landing from its ships to supply not only its own consumption of meal, but also that of the native army which it was come to assist. He added, however, that he did not expect to have occasion to call upon the country for bread during his march towards Lisbon; but that beef, wine, and forage would be required, all of which the Bishop of Porto had engaged should be supplied. Notwithstanding this explanation, General Freire renewed the subject on his arrival at Leiria; and, instead of pursuing his march, the following morning, at the hour appointed, he sent a message to the British commander, saying, that unless the Portugueze were to be fed by the English commissariat, he would separate them from the English army, and march for Santarem by way of Thomar; urging as his reason, that supplies would be scarce on the straight road, but here there was great plenty, and he should also be in a situation to cut off the retreat of the French from Lisbon. Freire had voluntarily placed himself and his troops under Sir Arthur’s command only the day preceding.

♦Motives for his separation.♦

There was another reason for this conduct, which he did not communicate to the British General. A fear had come upon the Portugueze officers during the night, that Loison, whose arrival at Abrantes they knew, would turn upon the northern provinces; the fate of Beja and Evora was before their eyes, and they trembled for Coimbra. Their apprehensions were confirmed by the arrival that night of dispatches from the Governor of Coimbra, communicating to General Freire, as information of the utmost importance, that Laborde’s orders were to amuse the Portugueze army, in order that Loison might pass in their rear and destroy that city; thus, the Governor added, it had been determined in a council of war at Lisbon, and the advice was sent to him by a person upon whom he had entire reliance. It is very possible that the advice came from the French themselves, for the purpose of deceiving him. General Freire began now to fear not only for his own retreat, but even that the English, if they met with a repulse, would be cut off from the Mondego, and unable to retire to their ships. The truth is, that he was unequal to his situation, and having persons about him of as little experience as himself, they confused one another. Concealing from Sir Arthur this, which was the real cause of ♦Neves, v. 79–81.♦ his vacillation, he chose to separate upon the question of supplies. The danger of the plan was pointed out to him, but in vain: Sir Arthur urged him, equally in vain, to co-operate with the British army in the deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own honour, to the honour of his country, or of his Prince: he then requested him to send him 1000 infantry, with his cavalry, 250 in number, and his 400 light troops, engaging to feed them; and this was done. He advised him, at all events, to remain at Leiria, or Alcobaça, or any where in the rear of the English, that his troops might not be unnecessarily exposed to destruction; but notwithstanding he was now assured that the English General had found resources in the country fully adequate to their subsistence, he said he should persist in his plan. Sir Arthur, considering it of importance, on political grounds, that the Portugueze troops should accompany his march, would have undertaken to feed them, if he could have relied upon his commissariat; but this, he complained, was so ill23composed, as to be incapable of distributing, even to the British troops, the ample supplies which had been procured for them. Freire’s conduct was imputed to an opinion that the English were too weak for the service upon which they were advancing; it was not suspected that he had received intelligence which alarmed him, and which he had withheld from the British commander. He was, however, wise enough to follow the advice which he had at first refused, and remained at Leiria.

♦Skirmish near Caldas.♦

On the 14th, Sir Arthur reached Alcobaça, from which the French fell back the preceding night: the next day he arrived at Caldas. Laborde and Thomieres were now at Roliça, about ten miles off, and their advanced posts were within a league of the Caldas. Four companies of riflemen were ordered to drive them back; they were tempted to an incautious pursuit; a superior body of the enemy endeavoured to cut them off, and would have succeeded, had not General Spencer come to their support. A trifling loss was sustained in this affair, but the village was won, and the French retired entirely from the neighbourhood; their picquets having been driven from Obidos.

♦Laborde takes a position at Roliça.♦

The country between the Caldas and Obidos is a sandy level, with an open pine wood. Obidos itself stands finely upon an insulated hill, and a little beyond a mountainous or hilly region begins, the ascent from the low country being abrupt and difficult. Laborde had retired thither, knowing the strength of the ground, and expecting to be joined there by Loison, who, he knew, would make every exertion to effect his junction in time. That junction had once already been prevented by the timely arrival of the British at Leiria, and Sir Arthur now advanced for the ♦August 17.♦ purpose of a second time preventing it. The enemy were drawn up at the foot of the hill, in front of their position; they retired to the heights, and Sir Arthur, having reconnoitred the ground, and seen how difficult the attack in front would be, determined to attack both flanks. He therefore directed Major-General Ferguson, with 3000 men, to turn the enemy’s right, and Major-General Hill to attack the left, while the Portugueze troops, under Colonel Trant, by a wider movement on that side, were to penetrate to his rear. Meanwhile columns under Major-Generals Crawford, Nightingale, and Fane, were to assemble in the plain, ready to force their way up the passes as soon as it should be seen that the enemy were shaken. This plan, which would have ensured success with the least possible loss, was frustrated by some mistake in the delivery of an order. Ferguson’s brigade was, in consequence of this error, brought into the plain to support the central movement; and the attack was made in front, upon the strength of the position, before the enemy apprehended any danger on the flanks or in the rear, and consequently while they were able to apply their whole force and undivided attention where they were strongest.

Roliça was at that time a large and beautiful village, with more appearance of comfort and welfare about it than was usual in Portugueze villages. The place, with its five dependent hamlets, contained about three hundred families, the larger half of the population being in Roliça itself. Most of the houses had an inclosed garden or orchard, and the country is full of olive grounds, vineyards, and gardens, with stone inclosures. A little beyond Roliça is the hamlet of N. Senhora de Misericordia, a place of fewer houses, but of the same description: just without this village the British artillery was well placed, on a rising ground, where there stood some of those strong and well-built windmills which are common in Portugal; below were olive grounds, and an open grove of ilex or cork, under cover of which our troops were enabled to approach and deploy with little loss, though the French kept up a constant fire from the heights. Laborde had planted his eagle on the highest point of Monte S. Anna, near a wooden cross, which marked the spot of some murder or accidental death. The view from those heights is singularly beautiful, presenting just such objects as Gaspar Poussin delighted in painting, and in such combination as he would have placed them; rocks and hills rising in the valley, open groves, churches with their old galilees, and houses with all the picturesque varandas and porticos which bespeak a genial climate; Obidos with its walls and towers upon an eminence in middle distance, and its aqueduct stretching across the country as far as the eye could follow it; Monte Junto far to the east, and on the west the Atlantic. And till the iniquitous invasion of the country by France, there had been something in the condition of the people here which accorded with the loveliness of the scene wherein they were placed. Such as their lot was, they were contented with it; three and even four generations were found under the same roof: like plants, they grew, and seeded, and decayed, and returned to earth upon the spot where they had sprung up. If this state of things be not favourable to commercial prosperity and the wealth of nations, it is far more conducive to individual virtue and happiness than the stage by which it is succeeded.

♦Battle of Roliça.♦

Upon this beautiful ground it was that the British troops were first to be tried against the soldiers of Buonaparte in the Peninsula. The strength of the enemy’s position fully compensated for their inferiority in numbers. The way by which the assailants had to ascend was up ravines, rather than paths, more practicable for goats than men, so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal, in some parts overgrown with briars, and in others impeded by fragments of rock. Three of these dry water-courses, which appeared the least difficult, were attempted; that in the centre was the most promising, and this the 9th and 29th regiments attacked. They were protected in their advance by the fire of our artillery. The way would not admit more than three or four men abreast, in no place more than six. Near the top there was a small opening, in the form of a wedge, overgrown at the point with a thick coppice of myrtle, arbutus, arborescent heath, and those other shrubs which in this part of Portugal render the wild country so beautiful. An ambush of riflemen had been posted here, and here Colonel Lake, of the 29th, fell, with many of his men. When they had reached the summit, they were exposed to a fire from the vineyards, while they could not form a front to return it. The grenadier company, by a brave charge upon that part of the enemy who were in the open ground, won for them time to form; and though Laborde, with great promptitude, rallied the French as soon as they gave way, and brought them thrice to the charge, they kept their ground. This severe contention had continued two hours, when Brigadier-General Fane, with the light troops, appeared on the right, and Major-General Hill on the left. Laborde then deemed it necessary to abandon his first line and retire into the hamlet of Azambugeira, which was in the rear. Throughout the action this General had shown that the high military reputation which he enjoyed was well founded; all his movements were judiciously planned, and rapidly and well executed, men and officers giving good proof of skill and courage. The superiority of the British troops was therefore finely shown; for, from the nature of the ground, and from unavoidable circumstances, the force which on our side was actually engaged was by no means equal to that of the enemy. A gallant charge, under Major-General Spencer, drove them from this last position in the hamlet; the advantage could not be followed up for want of cavalry, and also because of the difficulty of bringing up cannon and more troops in time. Laborde therefore, making his last stand upon a height beyond Azambugeira, collected his troops on the plain ground behind, formed them into lines, and then retired toward Torres Vedras, leaving his guns upon the field.

♦Abrantes occupied by the Portugueze.♦

The loss of the British, in killed, wounded, and missing, was nearly 500. The French24 acknowledge to have lost nearly 600. Laborde was slightly wounded at the beginning of the action. Even during the action he was in hopes that Loison might arrive; but Loison, finding that the English were before him at Leiria, found it necessary to take the line of Torres Novas and Santarem, and so for Torres Vedras. The Portugueze had anxiously watched his movements, and no sooner was it ascertained that he had left Thomar, than they prepared to cut off the small garrison which he had left in Abrantes. Freire had ordered Bacellar to get possession of that city, with the aid of some Spanish troops under the Marques de Valadares, who had arrived at Castello Branco. Captain Manoel de Castro Correa de Lacerda had been sent forward to obtain certain intelligence of the enemy; and he finding circumstances favourable, and adventurers enough to join him, determined, with three priests militant, by name Captain-Father P. Manoel Domingos Crespo, Lieutenant-Father Lourenço Pires, and Ensign-Father José Nicolao Beja, to make the attempt without waiting for the Spaniards. They collected at Villa de Rei some three hundred men, armed with hunting-spears, and a few with firelocks; a considerable number of the Ordenanças joined them during the night on the heights of Abrançalha, which was the place appointed for their meeting; and early on the morning of that day on which the battle of Roliça was fought, they entered Abrantes, leaving Ensign-Father Beja with a party of spearmen in ambush to cut off the enemy if they should attempt to fly. The French, upon the first appearance of danger, retired into the old castle, and fired from the windows, ... for there was no artillery there. Upon this Father Crespo stationed some sharp-shooters upon the roof of S. Vicente’s church, which was opposite. The enemy, then knowing how impossible it was to hold out in their unprovided state, resolved to sally, and make for the river side, where they had four vessels laden with stores, about to fall down the stream for Lisbon; but before they could reach the shore, they were surrounded by such numbers, and lost so many men, that they laid down their arms. They who were on board the vessels, seeing their danger, leaped into the river; some perished in attempting to cross it, they who reached the opposite shore were pursued and hunted down like wild beasts; fifty-two were killed that day, and 117 taken prisoners; the few who escaped for the time had no place of safety near, and fell into the hands of the peasantry. The Corregedor-Mor at this time met with a miserable fate. Because of the office which he unfortunately held, the French had made him the instrument of their exactions: the same constitutional timidity which prevented him from resigning his post rather than obey their tyrannical orders, induced him now to fly, in the unworthy hope of securing himself under their protection. He therefore forded the river, and hid himself in a vineyard; there a peasant discovered him, to whom he immediately offered 200 milreis if he would conduct him to the French army; the villain took the money, led him to a solitary place, stabbed him in five places, then robbed him, and left him to expire. On the third day he was found by some women, still alive, and was carried to Abrantes; no care availed to save his life, and he died rather of inanition and loss of blood, than from the nature ♦Neves, v. 95–105.♦ of his wounds; but he was able to relate what had passed, so that the murderer was apprehended and brought to justice.

♦Movements in Alem-Tejo and Algarve.♦

Among the French effects which were taken at Abrantes were about 200 hides and 1000 bags of cotton, which the state of the intermediate country had prevented them from sending into France: they had carried on a gainful trade while the communication was open. But now they began to feel that the amount of their gains and of their plunder was in danger. In spite of all prohibitions and precautions, some intelligence still found its way to Lisbon. The British squadron and the transports had been seen from the heights, and though the French abated nothing of their high tone, the inhabitants were now well assured that their deliverance was at hand. As the only course which offered any hope of extricating himself, Junot resolved to collect the whole of his disposable force, and give the English battle before their reinforcements arrived, and before they should be ready to act on the offensive. The only places in which he left garrisons were Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche. Setubal had hitherto been occupied by a force under General Graindorge, who had succeeded Kellermann in the command there. His situation had not been tranquil, while Mestre had taken possession of Alcacere do Sal, and an English frigate was off the port. But Mestre was recalled in all haste to Beja, when that city, after the fate of Evora, apprehended a second visitation with fire and sword. The men whom he commanded gave on this occasion proof of that patient and uncomplaining spirit with which the Spaniards and Portugueze endure privations. They started fasting and without provisions, and after a long day’s march reached the little town of Odivella, where no rations had been provided for them. Mestre and his adjutant then went from door to door, to beg bread, and with the bread which was thus obtained they were contented and cheerful. Aware of the alarm which Loison’s operations had excited, Graindorge resolved to clear the neighbourhood, and the Juntas of Alcacere, Santiago de Cacem, and Grandola, fled at his approach. But when Beja was relieved from danger by Loison’s movements to the north, Mestre, who had been dispatched toward Evora, ♦Alcacere do Sal and Setubal abandoned by the French.♦ was ordered to return upon Alcacere, and the same direction was taken by one body of men from Algarve, and by another under Lopes from Beja. Graindorge had now received orders to retire with his troops to Almada; Alcacere therefore was abandoned when the Portugueze arrived there, and Setubal also. Setubal had been singularly fortunate during a time of general rapacity. Perfect order had been maintained there while Solano and the Spaniards possessed it; and when Graindorge succeeded Kellermann, a Portugueze woman, who lived with him as his mistress, had influence enough to prevent him from delivering up that beautiful town to pillage, which his men required, and which, it is said, they had been ♦Neves, iv. 173–179. Observador Portuguez, 291.♦ promised. The Portugueze writers ought not to have passed over in silence the name of one who averted so much evil, and who, it may well be believed, was more to be pitied than condemned for her frailty.

♦Measures at Lisbon.♦

About 300 men were left at Palmella. Graindorge had two regiments under his command at Almada and other places on the left bank of the Tagus. The forts at the Bugio, Trafaria, and St. Julien, were occupied by the French, and they had troops also at Cascaes and Ericeyra. Sufficient force was to be left in and near Lisbon, to keep down the inhabitants, by the presumed aid of the Russian squadron, whose presence in the river was of great importance to Junot at this time. The enemy had recourse also to their usual policy of circulating fabricated intelligence. They affirmed, that 20,000 French had arrived at Braganza, and they produced Badajoz Gazettes which must have been forged for the purpose, relating the defeat and consternation of the Spaniards, and the rejoicings with which Joseph had been received on his triumphant entrance into Madrid. Few persons were deceived by these artifices. On the 15th the Emperor Napoleon’s birthday was celebrated; the guns from the ships and fortresses were fired, Junot gave a grand entertainment to his officers, and appeared afterwards at the Opera in state; but meantime every thing was made ready for his departure. The night was passed in giving orders, and at daybreak the reserve was in motion, with the staff, the military chest, containing a million francs, and the most precious and portable part of their plunder. The Comte de Bourmont, and some other French emigrant officers who had found an asylum in Lisbon during the horrors of the Revolution, on this occasion joined the French army, the Count at his own solicitation being placed upon the staff, to fight against a government by whose bounty they had been supported, and a people who had hospitably received them in their distress: and for this moral treason ♦Observador Portuguez, 406. Thiebault, 187–8.♦ they have been extolled in their own country, with that perversion of principle and utter insensibility to honour, which equally characterise the schools of the Revolution, and of Buonaparte.

♦Proclamation to the people of Lisbon.♦

It had been proposed to form a national guard at Lisbon at this time, composed of all who had any property to protect; but this was rejected, less as being impracticable than as dangerous. The Lisbonians had too much reason to execrate their oppressors. Their sufferings, though not of that kind which give a splendour to history, and consecrate the memory of the sufferers, had been more pitiable, for they had been long continued and obscure. The French themselves confessed, that they knew not how the people of Lisbon subsisted during the three months preceding the harvest; ♦Thiebault, 95.♦ for it was known that the consumption of food in that great city was only one-third of what it used to be, and the numbers who had been expelled, who had emigrated with the court, or had found means of following it, were not greater than that of the foreign troops who had been introduced. Impossible as it was to conciliate a people upon whom they had inflicted such deep and irreparable injuries, the French deemed it politic at this time to take the most conciliatory measures in their power; if the popular feeling could be repressed or allayed only for a few days, by that time they should either have obtained a victory over the English, or have placed themselves by treaty under the safeguard of British honour. With these views Junot left a decree, that the heads of the tribunals, and the chief persons among the nobility and clergy, should be invited to assist at the council of government during his absence. He left also a proclamation to the inhabitants of Lisbon, saying, that he was departing from them for three or four days, to give battle to the English, and whatever might be the event, he should return. “I leave,” said he, “to govern Lisbon, a general who, by the mildness and firmness of his character, has obtained the friendship of the Portugueze at Cascaes and Oeyras; General Travot will, by these same virtues, obtain that of the inhabitants of Lisbon. Hitherto you have been tranquil; it is your interest to continue so! do not stain yourselves with a horrible crime at the moment when, without any danger of your own, the lot of arms is about to determine by what power you are to be governed. Reflect for an instant upon the interests of the three nations who are contending for the possession of Lisbon. What the French desire is the glory and the prosperity of the city and of the kingdom, for this is the interest and the policy of France. Spain wishes to invade Portugal and reduce it to a province, that she may again make herself mistress of the Peninsula. And England would domineer over you for the purpose of destroying your port and your navy, and impeding the progress of industry among you. The English regard the magnificence of your port with envy; they will not suffer it to exist so near them, and they have no hope of preserving it. They know that a new French army has already passed your frontiers, and that if this should not be sufficient, another will come after it; but they will have destroyed your naval establishments, they will have caused the destruction of Lisbon, and this is what they aim at, and what they desire: they know that they cannot maintain themselves upon the Continent; but if they can destroy the ports and the navy of any other power, they are content. I depart full of confidence in you. I reckon upon all the citizens who are interested in the preservation of public order; and I am persuaded that it will be preserved. Call to mind the miseries which must necessarily follow, if this beautiful city should compel my troops to enter it by force! The exasperated soldiers would not be then to be controlled; ... fire, sword, all the horrors of war which are practised in a city taken by assault, ... pillage, ... death, ... behold what you would draw ♦Observador Portuguez, 408.♦ upon yourselves! The thought alone makes me shudder. Inhabitants of Lisbon, avert from yourselves these terrible calamities!”

♦Preparations on board the Russian squadron.♦

The tone of the French was somewhat altered in their menaces. There had been no shuddering when the fate of Beja and Evora was announced to the people of Lisbon, nor when the massacre at Leiria was perpetrated. Care was taken to manifest that the French were prepared to execute their threats if needful. The Russian squadron, which lay at anchor in a line from Junqueira to Boa Vista, was made ready for action, the men being stationed at their quarters with lighted matches; they, no doubt, apprehended an attack from the English fleet, but ♦Observador Portuguez, 410.♦ La Garde intimated that they would fire upon the city in case an insurrection were attempted. Justly apprehensive, however, for his personal safety, this Intendant, whom, because perhaps of his office, the people regarded with peculiar hatred, went sometimes to pass the night on board the Vasco da Gama, and General Travot, though he was evidently esteemed by the people for his mild and honourable conduct (so much is a good name worth even in the worst times) thought it prudent not to sleep out of the Castle.

♦Junction of Loison, Laborde, and Junot.♦

Junot went by water to Villa Franca, and leaving Thiebault there to command the reserve, joined Loison at Alcoentre. That General had reached Santarem on the 13th, in a deplorable condition. The weather was intensely hot, without a cloud in the sky, or a breath of air stirring. Whole companies lay down upon the way; many died of thirst, and more would have perished if the officers of the staff, as soon as they arrived at that city, had not gone out with a great number of the inhabitants carrying water to meet them; brandy also was sent out, and carts to convey those who were unable to proceed farther on foot. Each of Loison’s long marches at this time is said to have cost him not less than an hundred men. The troops were so dreadfully exhausted, that he was compelled to remain two days at Santarem. On the 16th he proceeded to Alcoentre, where Junot joined him the next day; they then moved to Cercal, and on the day after the action at Roliça the British army distinctly ♦Early Campaigns, 18.♦ saw their columns in the line of Torres Vedras. To that place Laborde was now recalled, who had retreated beyond it to Montachique; he effected his junction on the 19th, and ♦Thiebault, 190–193.♦ when General Thiebault arrived with the reserve on the 20th, the whole force which Junot could bring into the field was collected there, in number about 12,000 infantry, and 1200 or 1500 horse.

♦The British advance to Vimeiro.♦

Sir Arthur had not pursued Laborde after the battle of Roliça; the line by which the enemy ♦August 18.♦ retired would have led him from the sea. He was beginning his march for Torres Vedras on the morrow, when he received advice that General Anstruther was arrived on the coast. His original intention had been to employ this General’s brigade, and that of General Acland, in besieging Peniche, if that should be necessary; otherwise to land them in some of the bays near the rock, in the rear of the enemy, while he pressed upon their front. But the resistance which he had experienced at Roliça, and his disappointment of any co-operation from Freire, induced him now to land General Anstruther’s troops, and join them to the army. He proceeded therefore to the village of Vimeiro, that being the position best calculated to effect his junction, and, at the same time, a march in advance. Calms prevented the fleet, which was anchored off the Berlings, from standing in, till the evening of the 19th. The brigade was then landed at Maceira, upon a sandy beach, at the foot of a cliff almost perpendicular, the ascent of which is exceedingly steep and difficult. The landing was a measure of extreme difficulty and ♦General Anstruther’s brigade lands.♦ hazard. The boats were almost always filled in going-in by the surf, many were swamped, and a few men perished; the disembarkation, however, by the great exertions and skill of the navy, was effected with less loss than might have been expected. The French could not oppose the landing, but, profiting by their superiority in cavalry, they sent a body of dragoons, in the hope of attacking the brigade on its march. Against this danger due precautions had been taken. The troops, when they had marched about three leagues, found a detachment under General Spencer waiting at Lourinham to receive them, and took their place in the advanced guard.

♦Arrival of Sir Harry Burrard in the roads.♦

The French cavalry were active during this and the preceding day; they scoured the country, and Sir Arthur could obtain no information of the enemy, except that their position was very strong, and occupied by their whole force. On the 20th, at noon, it was announced that General Acland was in the offing; and on the evening of the same day Sir Harry Burrard, the second in command, arrived in Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur immediately went on board, informed him of what had been done, and of the present state of things, and laid before him the plan of operations upon which he had intended to proceed. His purpose was to march on the following morning, push his advanced guard to Mafra, and halt the main body about four or five miles from that place, thus turning the enemy’s position at Torres Vedras. He possessed as much knowledge of the ground as good maps and scientific descriptions could impart; Sir Charles Stuart (a man whose great military talents had never been allowed a field whereon to display themselves) had carefully surveyed this part of the country when he commanded the British troops in Portugal; it had not escaped him, that upon this ground, in case of serious invasion, the kingdom must be saved or lost; and his maps and papers were in Sir Arthur’s hands. The battle would thus be fought in a country of which he had adequate knowledge, and he hoped to enter Lisbon with the retreating or flying enemy. Such was the plan which he had formed, and orders for marching on the morrow had actually been issued, before Sir Harry’s arrival.

♦He alters the plan of the campaign.♦

To Sir Arthur, who had a well-founded confidence in himself and in his troops, no prospect could have been more encouraging; but the new commander did not behold it hopefully. The objections to a forward movement preponderated in his mind; he learnt that the artillery25 horses were inefficient, that our men, for want of cavalry, were kept close to their encampments by the enemy’s horse; and that it would not be possible to go far into the country, because they depended upon the ships for bread. Weighing these things, he was not convinced that Sir Arthur’s intentions were expedient; the decision which he was now to make appeared to him most serious in its consequences; he thought it was impossible to calculate the disasters to which a check might expose the army, and therefore he deemed it necessary to wait for Sir John Moore’s division. Sir Arthur had recommended that that division, when it arrived in the Mondego, should march upon Santarem, a position from whence it might intercept the enemy’s retreat, whether they attempted to make their way to Almeida or to Elvas; but the new commander hearing on his way of the action at Roliça, and disapproving this arrangement, had immediately dispatched instructions by which Sir John Moore was directed to proceed from the Mondego, and join him as speedily as possible in Maceira Roads. In vain did Sir Arthur represent the precious time that would be lost before this division could be landed and become serviceable at Vimeiro; the far greater utility which might be expected from its presence at Santarem; the evil of at once changing their operations from an offensive to a defensive course; and of allowing the enemy to choose their time and ground. For, situated as the two armies now were, it was impossible to avoid an action. If the British troops advanced, they would have the advantage of acting on the offensive; it was his opinion that they might reach Mafra before the French could bring on a general engagement; and in that case they should turn the French position. But these representations were unavailing; an inauspicious spirit of caution prevailed. The whole plan of the campaign was changed; and with the enemy collected within three leagues, the army was ordered to remain stationary, till a corps should arrive, of which no tidings had yet been received. In a general who commands good troops the want of confidence is as great a fault as the excess of it in the commander of an ill-disciplined army.

♦The battle of Vimeiro.♦

It was soon seen how well Sir Arthur had judged of the enemy’s intentions. Junot was ill supplied with provisions; he could not venture long to be absent from Lisbon: situated as he was, it appeared to him that there would be less evil in an immediate defeat, than must arise from prolonged operations, though they should lead ♦Thiebault, 194.♦ to a victory. His business, therefore, was to bring on an action as soon as possible, and to make the attack; and at the moment when Sir Harry Burrard, resolving upon delay, had countermanded the orders for advancing on the morrow, the French were in motion.

Vimeiro, a name which was now to become memorable in British and Portugueze history, is a village situated nearly at the bottom of a lovely valley, about three miles from the sea, and screened from the sea breeze by mountainous heights, through which the little river Maceira winds its way. The village stands at the eastern extremity of these heights; and on the opposite side, separated from them by a deep ravine, are other heights, over which the road to Lourinham passes, a little town in the Termo or district of which the parishes of Vimeiro and Maceira are included. The western termination reaches the sea-shore. As the army had halted here only for the night, meaning to proceed early on the morrow, they were disposed of, not as expecting an attack, but as most convenient for the troops. Six brigades bivouacked on the height to the westward. The advanced guard was posted on a hill south-east of Vimeiro, to cover the commissariat and stores which were in the village: this height was entirely commanded by higher ground to the westward. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the valley, between the hills on which the infantry were placed; and there were picquets of observation on the hills to the eastward.

♦Aug. 21.♦

The enemy, who had marched all night, and whom some accidents had impeded on their way, first appeared at eight in the morning, forming in strong bodies upon the heights toward Lourinham, thus threatening the advanced guard and the left, which was the weak part of the British position. Sir Arthur had visited the advanced posts early in the day, and had returned to his quarters before the first shots were exchanged with the enemy’s advance. He now moved the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, successively across the ravine to the heights on the Lourinham road. General Anstruther’s brigade took post on the right of the advanced guard, and Major-General Hill was moved nearer, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve, in addition to which our small cavalry force was in the rear of their right. The French army was in two divisions, ... the right, of about 6000 men, under General Loison; the left, about 5000, under Laborde. Kellermann had the reserve, which was intended to connect the two wings, but they were too distant from each other. General Margaron commanded the cavalry.

Laborde came along the valley to attack the advanced guard on the eminence or table hill; he had a column of infantry and cavalry to cover his left flank, and on his right one regiment marched in column to turn the defenders, and penetrate the village by the church; but this purpose had been foreseen, and part of the 43rd had been ordered into the churchyard to prevent it. The French advanced with perfect steadiness, though exposed to a severe fire of riflemen posted behind the trees and banks, and of seven pieces of artillery well directed. They advanced like men accustomed to action and to victory; but suffering more severely as they drew nearer, and especially from the Shrapnell shells, (then first brought into use,) they faltered, and opened a confused fire. Still they advanced, and arrived within a few paces of the brow of the hill, where the 50th regiment, under Colonel Walker, with a single company of the rifle corps on its left, stood opposed to them. That regiment poured upon them a destructive volley, and instantly charged with the bayonet, and penetrated the angle of the column, which then broke and turned. The regiment which was entering the village by the church, was attacked in flank by General Acland’s brigade, then advancing to its position on the heights; and our cavalry, poor in number as it was, charged with effect. The discomfiture of this column was then complete; they fled, leaving about 1000 men on the ground, 350 prisoners, and seven pieces of artillery; and they were pursued for nearly two miles to the plain beyond the woody ground, where they were supported by a reserve of horse, and where Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of the 20th light dragoons, who particularly distinguished himself that day, fell, with many of his men, overpowered by a much superior force of cavalry. The secondary column, under General Brenier, which was to have supported Laborde in his attack, made a side movement to the left, in order to cross the ravine, and thus it was separately engaged by General Anstruther’s brigade; and being charged with the bayonet, was repulsed with great loss. An aide-de-camp of Sir Arthur’s coming up to tell this General that a corps should be sent to his assistance, he replied, “Sir, I am not pressed, and I want no assistance; I am beating the French, and am able to beat them wherever I find them.”

Loison’s attack was made nearly at the same time as Laborde’s: it was supported by a large body of cavalry, and made with the characteristic and imposing impetuosity of French troops. They drove in our light troops, but they were checked by General Ferguson’s brigade, consisting of the 36th, 40th, and 71st, which formed the first line; after some close and heavy firing of musketry, the 82d and 29th came up, and the brigades of Generals Bowes and Acland. The enemy were then charged with the bayonet; this weapon is of French invention, but it was made for British hands. They came to the charge bravely, and stood it for a moment; ... in that moment their foremost rank fell “like a line of grass before the mowers.” This is not the flourish of an historian, seeking artfully to embellish details which no art can render interesting to any but military readers; it is the language of an actor in the scene, who could not call it to mind in after-hours without shuddering; for the very men whose superiority was thus decidedly proved, could not speak without involuntary awe, of so complete and instantaneous a destruction, produced as it was, not by artillery or explosions, but by their own act and deed, and the strength of their own hearts and hands. The bodies of about 300 French grenadiers were counted upon the field, who had fallen in this charge. The enemy were pursued to a considerable distance, and six pieces of cannon were taken in the pursuit. General Kellermann made a vigorous attempt, late in the action, to recover these from the 71st and 82d, which were halted in a valley where the guns had been captured. These regiments retired a little way to some advantageous ground, then faced about, fired, and advancing with the bayonet, drove the French back with great loss. Thus were they every where repulsed, though their whole force had been engaged, while not more than half the British army had been brought into action.

♦Sir Harry Burrard takes the command.♦

Before the action began Sir Harry Burrard and his staff left the ship; they soon heard the firing after they were on shore, and by the time they reached Vimeiro, which is about three miles from the landing-place, the armies were hotly engaged. They found Sir Arthur on the heights, and he explained in few words to the new Commander the position of the army, and the measures which he had taken for beating the enemy. Sir Harry was perfectly satisfied, and directed him to go on with an operation which he had so happily and so well begun. This he did not as giving up his command for the time, but as fulfilling one of the functions of a commander, by directing Sir Arthur to pursue measures which he approved, and holding himself as responsible for the event as if the plan had been originally his own. So far all was well. Toward the close of the action, when the French were beaten on the left, and it was evident that they must be every where defeated, Sir Arthur went to him, and represented that this was the moment for advancing; that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and pursue the beaten enemy with the left. By this movement upon Torres Vedras, the French would be cut off from the nearest road to Lisbon, or if they attempted it, they would find themselves between two bodies of our troops; there remained for them, as the alternative, the circuitous route by Alenquer and Villa Franca; ... they were dispirited, beaten, and in confusion, absolutely, in his opinion, incapable of forming or of appearing again in the shape of an army, if they were followed even at a slower rate by a victorious enemy; and this he said, giving them full credit for discipline and great facility in forming after having been broken. There was plenty of ammunition in the camp for another battle, and provisions for twelve days. But neither these representations, urged as they were with natural and fitting warmth, nor the victory which was before his eyes, could induce the new Commander to deviate from his former opinion. He replied, that he saw no reason to change his purpose, and that the same motives which induced him yesterday to wait for reinforcements, had still the same weight. At this moment the enemy were retiring in great disorder, and most completely disheartened by their defeat. Sir Arthur, grieved at seeing the irrecoverable opportunity go by, made a second attempt to convince the Commander that victory was in his hands. General Ferguson had sent his aide-de-camp to represent the great advantage of advancing, ... he himself could, in fact, have cut off a considerable body of the enemy. Sir Arthur took the aide-de-camp to the Commander. But this second representation was as ineffectual as the first. His Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General Clinton, and Colonel Murray, his Quarter-Master-General, who had coincided in opinion with him the preceding evening, agreed with him now also. He had just heard from an officer who had passed through General Freire’s troops, such an account of them and their proceedings, as precluded any hope of rendering them useful; the artillery horses seemed to him inefficient; but more especially the want of cavalry, he thought, incapacitated the army from following up its success. The 260 Portugueze horse which were with us had shown themselves nearly useless; the British were only 210 in number, and they had suffered severely in the action, ... this was known, though the extent of their loss had not yet been ascertained. These difficulties preponderated with him; he adhered still to his determination; and Sir Arthur, whose sense of military duty would not allow him to act in disregard of orders, as Nelson was accustomed to do, turned to one of his officers, and concealing the bitterness of disappointment under a semblance of levity, said, “Well, then, we have nothing to do, but to go and shoot red-legged partridges,” ... the game with which that country abounds. From that moment he gave up all hope of cutting the French off from Lisbon, inclosing them there, or preventing them, if they thought proper to attempt it, from protracting the campaign by retreating upon Elvas and Almeida.

The loss of the enemy in this action was about 300026 killed and wounded, thirteen pieces of artillery, and twenty-three ammunition waggons; that of the English little more than 700 killed, wounded, and missing. The British numbers in the field were 16,000, of which only half had been engaged; the French were about 14,000, including 1300 cavalry, and the whole of this force was brought into action. General Solignac was severely wounded; General Brenier wounded, and left on the field. He was in danger of being put to death by those into whose hands he had fallen, when a Highlander, by name Mackay, who was a corporal in the 71st, came up and rescued him. The French General, in gratitude for his preservation, offered him his watch and purse; but Mackay refused to accept them. When he had delivered his prisoner in safety to Colonel Pack, the French General could not help saying, “What sort of man is this? He has done me the greatest service, and yet refuses to take the only reward which I can at present offer him!” Brenier no doubt contrasted this with the conduct of his countrymen, in whose rapacities and cruelties, it appears by the testimony of the Portugueze, that he had no share; when, therefore, Colonel Pack replied, “We are British soldiers, sir, and not plunderers,” he must have deeply felt the disgrace which had been brought upon the French character. Mackay was immediately made a serjeant by Sir Arthur Wellesley’s express desire; and the Highland Society, at their next meeting, voted him a gold medal, with a suitable device and inscription. The piper to the grenadier company of the same regiment, Stewart was his name, received early in the action a dangerous wound in the thigh: he would not, however, be carried off the field, but, sitting down27 where his comrades might hear him, he continued playing warlike airs till the end of the engagement. A handsome stand of Highland pipes, with an inscription commemorating the manner in which he had deserved the donation, was voted him by the Highland Society.

Most of the wounded French who fell into the conqueror’s hands were young, and of delicate appearance, ... apparently men whose lot would not have fallen in the army, under any other system than that of the conscription, though, having been forced into it, they had acquired the worst vices which have ever disgraced and degraded the profession of arms. They were dressed in long white linen coats and trowsers, their firelocks were about six inches longer in the barrel than ours, their bayonets about three shorter, the locks of their pieces much better finished, and the pans so constructed, that the powder was not liable to fall out, ... an accident which at that time often happened to ours. A chaplain of the British army, as he was endeavouring to render assistance to some of them, while under the surgeon’s hands, addressed himself to one in the language of commiseration, and uttered, at the same time, a natural expression of regret at the horrors of war: but the Frenchman fiercely answered him, with a mixture of pride and indignation, that he gloried in his wounds, and that war was the greatest happiness of life. During the whole day the armed peasantry prowled about the field, taking vengeance upon every wounded or straggling Frenchman whom they could find, for the manifold wrongs of their country, and the aggravated injuries which they had endured. So conscious indeed were the prisoners of the little mercy which they deserved at their hands, that they dreaded lest these men should break in upon them, and massacre them all; and a guard was stationed to protect them. The peasantry, however, passed the night in the field, carousing round a large fire, recounting to each other what they had done, and rejoicing over the day’s work.

♦The French resolve to propose terms.♦

In withholding the army from following up the great advantage which it had gained, Sir Harry Burrard knew how unpopular such a determination must be, and sacrificed his own feelings to his judgement. He thought it not allowable to risk much when the reinforcements which were at hand would make the British force so superior, that any further efforts of the enemy must be vain, and success would be obtained without hazard and with less loss. He erred in judgement; but this honourable testimony was borne to him by Sir Arthur Wellesley, the person of all others by whom that error must have been felt most keenly, that he decided upon fair military grounds in the manner which he thought most conducive to the interests of the country. The French failed not to profit by the respite which was thus allowed them; they formed a rear-guard of four regiments of cavalry, and retired28 at leisure, no attempt being made to harass their retreat. Junot, who is said to have exposed himself at the close of the action so as hardly to have been saved from the British cavalry, summoned Generals Laborde, Loison, Kellermann, and Thiebault, upon the field, and demanded their opinions, whether the army ought again to try the lot of arms, and if not, what course it should pursue. They agreed that they were neither in a condition to give battle, nor to stand one. Their troops were harassed, discontented, and discouraged; their ammunition would not last three hours longer; their provisions were failing, their horses already sinking for want of forage. Their losses were irreparable, whereas the enemy were looking for strong reinforcements; and, in fine, the slightest reverse would now leave them at the mercy of the English and Portugueze. Nothing remained but to preserve the best attitude they could, and retire to Lisbon, the possession of which was now their only safeguard. They retreated accordingly to Torres Vedras. A second council was held there on the morrow; and upon a full view of the difficulties and dangers29 of their situation, and the impossibility of effecting a retreat through so large a part of Spain as must be traversed before they could effect a junction with their countrymen, they resolved to try what could be done by negotiation. General Kellermann, therefore, was dispatched with a flag of truce to propose a convention for the evacuation of Portugal. Meantime Sir Hew Dalrymple had arrived and taken the command of the British army, which thus had three commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours.

♦Arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple.♦

Sir Hew Dalrymple had been expressly chosen for this command because of the zeal and judgement which he had displayed during the whole of those important transactions in the south of Spain on which so much depended, and in which he had acted upon his own responsibility. In a private letter from Lord Castlereagh, then minister for the war department, Sir Arthur Wellesley was recommended to his particular confidence, and a full persuasion expressed that that officer’s high reputation would alone dispose Sir Hew to select him for any service which required great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience; but, above all, that the habits of communication in which Sir Arthur had for a length of time been with his majesty’s ministers, concerning the affairs of Spain, would point him out as an officer of whom it would be desirable for the commander-in-chief, on all accounts, to make the most prominent use which the rules of the service would permit. Sir Hew embarked at Gibraltar on the 13th; and learnt that night from Lord Collingwood, who was off Cadiz, that Sir Arthur’s corps had either landed, or was about to land, in Mondego Bay. Arriving off the Tagus on the 19th, he was informed by Sir Charles Cotton, that Sir Arthur was proceeding along the coast. It was not Sir Hew’s wish to supersede that General in a detached command for which he had been particularly chosen, especially when he was now completely engaged in an enterprise from which it was impossible to recede, and which required all his ability to accomplish. Under these feelings, therefore, the Commander-in-chief resolved to proceed to Mondego Bay, and there join the expected reinforcements when they should land, leaving Sir Arthur meantime to pursue and complete his own plan. Seeing, however, on the way a number of ships under the land, and receiving a vague account of the action at Roliça from a sloop of war, he sent an aide-de-camp on shore for intelligence, ordering him to inform Sir Arthur, if he chanced to see him, that he was proceeding to fall in with Sir Harry Burrard and the main body, and that though he wished to be informed of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command. This was on the evening of the 21st; about midnight the boat returned, bringing intelligence of the battle, and that Sir Harry Burrard was in command. There was now no room for that delicacy toward Sir Arthur, as honourable as it was judicious, which he had resolved to observe. His determination was immediately taken, and in the morning the frigate stood in for the shore.

♦He orders the army to advance. Aug. 22.♦

None of the official accounts which Sir Arthur had addressed to him had been received; he landed therefore with no other information than what had been thus gathered upon the way, and entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army. When he reached the beach they were embarking the wounded for Porto; during the whole night the sailors had been thus employed, wading nearly up to the middle in the sea, and displaying as much humanity as skill. Arriving at Vimeiro, he found the army on the ground which it had occupied the day before, the dead lying on the field, and the carts still busy in removing the wounded. That ground had not been chosen as a military position, but merely as a halting-place, and it was now necessary to remove from it, because of the late action. Sir Hew therefore gave orders for marching the next morning at daybreak toward Lisbon by way of Mafra. Like his predecessor, he thought that Sir Arthur had entered upon a hazardous operation, which, unless it obtained complete success, must end in complete ruin, the British having no prospect of support, nor any thing upon which to fall back in case of disaster, so that on their part the battle would be fought for existence, while the enemy, in case of defeat, would lose only what were killed or taken. But he differed from Sir Harry Burrard in this, that he deemed it imprudent to wait for Sir John Moore’s division, the arrival of which was extremely uncertain, and that he saw the necessity of pursuing active measures. The French, he knew, must either give him battle, for the sake of defending Lisbon, (a chance which he was willing to take, though they were superior in cavalry, and, as he thought, in numbers, and though they would have the great advantage of choosing their ground;) or they would cross the Tagus.

♦Kellermann arrives to propose an armistice.♦

Soon after mid-day an alarm was given that the enemy were advancing to renew the attack; the position was taken as on the preceding morning. It proved to be a body of cavalry with a flag of truce; and General Kellermann alighting at head-quarters, proposed an armistice, for the purpose of concluding a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. Sir Hew immediately called for his two predecessors. He himself had no means of knowing, but from them, what the consequences of yesterday’s battle really had been; the responsibility was his, but for the information upon which the agreement was to be founded, he trusted to them, and more especially to Sir Arthur. That General’s plans had been completely defeated by the refusal to follow up the victory, and by the change which Sir Harry Burrard, before he landed, had made in the intended destination of Sir John Moore’s corps. Considering, therefore, that in consequence of these errors the enemy had been allowed leisure to resume a formidable position between the British army and Lisbon, and could not now by any increase of the British numbers be prevented from crossing the Tagus, and occupying in strength the strong place of Elvas, with its stronger fort La Lippe, and Almeida; that the Tagus would not for some time longer be open to the fleet, the army meantime depending upon the ships for supplies, and that its communication with them by the coast must at that season be most precarious: considering also how important it was that the troops should not be delayed by regular sieges in Portugal, but march as soon as possible into Spain, he thought it expedient that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded them. They occupied at that time, in a military point of view, he thought, the whole of Portugal, having every strong hold in their hands; their present situation enabled them still to avail themselves of those possessions, and to strengthen them as they might think proper; and he was of opinion that an army which had its retreat open, and possessed such advantages, had a fair claim to be allowed such terms. He wished, however, to limit the suspension of arms to eight-and-forty hours. Sir Hew preferred that it should be unlimited, as it had been proposed; in this he had a view to the disembarkation of Sir John Moore’s corps, which was not forbidden by the agreement.

♦Terms of the armistice.♦

An armistice accordingly for the purpose of negotiating a definitive convention was concluded upon30 these terms: That the river Sisandre should be the line of demarcation between the two armies, and that neither of them should occupy Torres Vedras; that the English general should bind himself to comprehend the armed Portugueze in the truce, and that their line of demarcation should be from Leiria to Thomar: that it was agreed that the French army should in no case be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals of it should be transported to France with their arms and baggage and private property, and that they should be deprived of no part of it whatsoever: that no individual, whether Portugueze, Frenchman, or of a nation allied to France, should be molested for his political conduct, but be protected, both in person and property, and have liberty to retire from Portugal within a limited time, with all his effects: that the neutrality of the port of Lisbon should be acknowledged for the Russian fleet; that is to say, that, when the English army and fleet should be in possession of the city and port, the Russian fleet should neither be disturbed during its stay, nor stopped when it might choose to depart, nor pursued when it had sailed, till after the time fixed, in such cases, by maritime law: that all the French artillery, and all their cavalry horses, should be transported to France.

A demur was, with good reason, made concerning the baggage and private property which the French were to carry off with them; and Kellermann explained, that the words were only to bear their strict grammatical meaning. The article regarding the Russians underwent more discussion. Sir Hew insisted, that this was a point referable to the Admiral, and that if he did not agree to it, it must be struck out; with this understanding on the part of the French negotiator that article was framed.

♦Junot returns to Lisbon.♦

While Kellermann was thus employed in the British camp, Junot occupied the positions of the Cabeça de Montechique and Mafra, and hastened himself to Lisbon. On the 20th official intelligence had been published in that city that Laborde had sustained an action with the English army, and though he had only 2000 men, had kept his ground against it; in the night he had taken a position conformably to his orders, for the purpose of joining the Commander-in-chief; their junction had been formed, the enemy were in a strait, and would be attacked on the morrow, when they would be made to see what the French could do: two English regiments had been destroyed in the action. The people, however, understood by reports more worthy of belief than any official statements of the enemy, that the English had been successful at Roliça. The news of the battle of Vimeiro also reached them at nightfall of the 22d; it was asserted, not only that Junot had been defeated, but that he was taken prisoner; the people openly congratulated each other in the streets, and the exultation and stir at the Ave Maria hour were such as to indicate an insurrection. None of the French deemed it prudent to appear, except General Travot, who relied, and not in vain, upon that personal good-will which he had obtained by a conduct always humane and honourable. At daybreak of the 23d, a letter from Junot was published, dated from the field of battle, at four in the afternoon. It stated that the English had been attacked at nine o’clock that morning, in the fortified position which they occupied, and that in an instant they had been dislodged from all their advanced points. The left of the French army had obtained from the first complete success; their right having to take a circuitous course, could not arrive in time to decide the action entirely; it had continued till two o’clock, and they should probably finish it on the morrow. At two they had taken a position, and were three leagues nearer the enemy than on the preceding day. The loss of the English had been great. “On our part,” said Junot, “there have been 150 killed, and from 300 to 400 wounded. We are stronger now, fresh troops having reached me ... to-morrow, therefore ...” there the sentence was broken off, and General Travot concluded the bulletin by saying, that many of the enemy’s superior officers had been killed or wounded, that the Commander-in-chief was well, and in a few days would be in Lisbon. He arrived, in fact, that afternoon, with the reserve, and such of the wounded as could be removed. A royal salute was fired from the Castle, as if he had returned victorious; but the countenances of the French, even the generals themselves, belied this manifestation of success. ♦Neves, v. 151–154. Observador Portuguez, 413, 417.♦ It was soon rumoured that a capitulation had been proposed, and no doubt could be entertained concerning this when it was known that an English officer arrived that night in company with Kellermann, and that a boat had been sent off to the English fleet.

♦General Freire dissatisfied with the armistice.♦

The British army marched on the morning after the armistice was signed, and took a position near the village of Ramalhal, this movement being made merely for convenience. The Portugueze General, Bernardim Freire, visited the Commander-in-chief there; and received a copy of the armistice: he was dissatisfied with it, and promised to send a confidential officer to communicate with him thereupon. Accordingly Major Ayres Pintode Sousa soon arrived at Sir Hew’s head-quarters. His strongest objections related to that article which stipulated that no persons should be molested for their political conduct; that being a question, he said, which it was for the Portugueze government to decide. It appeared evident to Sir Hew, that General Freire was offended because there was no mention of the Junta of Porto in the armistice. His answer was, that the government of Portugal, to which the decision of this point would belong, nowhere existed; and moreover the measure was wholly military, and admitted of no delay; he desired, however, that General Freire would state in writing whatever observations he had to make, and promised that they should be most favourably considered in the progress of the negotiation.

♦Difficulty concerning the Russian squadron.♦

There arose a difficulty now respecting the Russian fleet. Notwithstanding the preparations of defence which had been made on board their ships, the feelings of the Russians and of their Admiral were not with the French, and all Junot’s endeavours to make their presence available for the increase of his own means were in vain. Sir Arthur Wellesley had learnt, when he visited the British squadron off the Tagus, that it was Admiral Siniavin’s intention to take no part in the contest between the two contending powers, but claim the protection of a neutral port. It was his opinion, that if they conducted themselves upon this principle, they ought not to be molested, and that it mattered not what became of their ships, so they were not allowed to return to the Baltic. In Sir Hew’s judgement the Admiral was the best, if not the only judge of the question, and to him accordingly the stipulation in the armistice concerning them had been referred. Sir C. Cotton refused to ratify it; and upon this Sir Arthur recommended the Commander to put an end to the armistice, and lose no farther time in advancing, leaving it for Junot to renew the negotiation if he thought proper. The Commander was of a different opinion; good faith, he thought, required that the Admiral’s sentiments should be communicated to General Junot; but he notified to him, at the same time, that the armistice must be at an end in forty-eight hours, and Colonel Murray, who was the bearer of this notice, was authorized to negotiate a convention.

♦Convention of Cintra.♦

The question concerning the Russians was adjusted between the two Admirals. It was agreed that the ships should be held as a deposit by Great Britain, to be restored within six months after the conclusion of peace between Russia and that power; and that the men should be conveyed to their own country at the expense of the British Government, without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services. The definitive convention also was soon concluded. The terms were, that the French army should evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, not be considered prisoners of war, be furnished with means of conveyance by the English government, and disembarked in any of the ports between Rochefort and l’Orient, and be at liberty to serve on their arrival. They were to take with them all their artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun, all their equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; and all individuals of the army were to be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security for the purchasers. The horses of the cavalry and of the officers were to be embarked, those of the former not exceeding 600, those of the latter not exceeding 200; and as the means of conveyance for horses were very limited, facility should be given them for disposing of those which could not be embarked. The garrisons of Elvas, Peniche, and Palmella, were to be embarked at Lisbon, that of Almeida at Porto, or the nearest harbour, and British commissaries were to provide for their subsistence and accommodation on the march. The sick and wounded who were not in a state to be removed were entrusted to the British army, their expenses while they remained to be discharged by the British Government, and reimbursed by France. Should doubts arise as to the meaning of any article, it was to be interpreted favourably to the French. From the date of the ratification of this convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever of the French Government against the subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in that country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, should be cancelled, all sequestrations upon their property removed, and the free disposal of the same restored to the proper owners. All subjects of France, or of powers in alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally there, should be protected, their property respected, and themselves at liberty either to remain in the country, or to accompany the French army. No Portugueze was to be held accountable for his political conduct; and all who had continued in office, or accepted it, under the French Government, were placed under the protection of the British commanders, and were to sustain no injury either in their persons or property, for it had not been at their choice to obey the French or not: if they chose to sell their property and remove, the term of one year should be allowed them for that purpose. The Spanish troops detained at Lisbon were to be given up to the British Commander, and he engaged to obtain from the Spaniards the release of such French subjects, as, not having been taken in battle, nor in consequence of military operations, were now detained in Spain.