Volume 2 — WALCHEREN EXPEDITION (1810).
Reading edition
A.—A Squib on the Expedition.
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 232.
The following squib was published in the papers at this time on the Walcheren Expedition:
Extract from the Grand Romantic Drama lately performed for the Amusement of the Emperor of France.
Act I., Scene 1.—Cabinet Council discovered; Naval and Military Officers attending.
First Cabinet Minister. We now are met in grave deliberation Upon the plan for Antwerp’s subjugation, That we may not despatch this expedition Without due caution, knowledge and precision. Ye officers of military fame, We wish for your opinion of the same. 1st Mil. Officer. I wrote before my reasons in detail, Why I esteem your plan quite sure to fail. Lord C—gh. You think ’twill fail? 2nd Mil. Officer. And so do I. 3rd Mil. Officer. And I. Lord C—gh. All of you think so: better go and try. But, ere our army sails, ’tis fit we know Something about the place to which they’ll go. Pray, sirs, is Antwerp fortified or no? 1st Mil. Officer. Rumour reports it fortified full well, But I, not having been there, cannot tell. 2nd Mil. Officer. I know no more. 3rd Mil. Officer. Nor I, I do declare. Lord C—gh. Well, well—they’ll see directly they get there. Lord M—ve. But as the chief design of this great feat, Captain, will be to take the Antwerp fleet; Say, can the frigates, or can any ship, Sail up above, and so give us the slip? Naval Officer. Had I been there, I could have told you what The water’s depth; but having ne’er, cannot. Lord M—ve. This is no cause our plan should be forsaken, It will be known as soon as Antwerp’s taken. Lord E—n. But shan’t we lose the fleet? Then there’ll be laughter. Lord M—ve. Lose it? If they go up, mayn’t we go after? Lord E—n. Our friend the smuggler says the troops are few; And then the garrison—Pray what think you? 1st Mil. Officer. Few on the coast may be, and in the town; But from the country they can soon bring down A force too large for us to hope to lick; And all that’s done must be done very quick. Lord Ch—m. Fear not: delay was ne’er a fault of mine; And every morning I’ll get up at nine— Dressed, breakfast done by twelve—no speed I’ll lack, And do it all completely in a crack. 1st Cab. Min. Brave warriors, your advice and information Has now received our full consideration. [Exeunt Mil. and Naval Officers. Lord C—gh. As secrecy’s the soul of expeditions, I see no use in telling the physicians Whither it’s going; but desire they would Send plenty of what physic they think good. Enter Sir Lucas Pepys. (To Sir L. P.) Prepare (I can’t tell rightly against when) Physic enough for forty thousand men, But do it quick; what’s proper you can tell. [Exit Sir L. P. Mr. P—l. Now there’s no fear but all will answer well; So excellent we’ve made each preparation, And all so accurate our information. When Parliament meets next how fine a story Shall we not have to tell of wars and glory. [Exeunt. Manet, Mr. C—g, Solus. Mr. C—g. Most of this plan is gibberish to me, But I shall quietly lie by and see How it goes on; and then, if all succeeds, I share the praise; but if it ill proceeds I’ll try what, leaving this ungoverned crew, Setting up statesmen for myself will do. [END OF ACT FIRST.]
The rest of the play is of so very tragic and horrible a cast, that we think the author will not be justified in bringing it forward, and we decline publishing any further extracts at present.
B.—Debate on the Expedition.
Source.—Diary of Lord Colchester, 1861. Vol. ii., p. 243.
[March] 30th.—House of Commons. Resumed Walcheren debate. At four in the morning divided four times.
I. To censure the policy, 227; against it, 275.
II. To justify it, 272; against it, 232.
III. To censure the retention, 224; against the censure, 275.
IV. To excuse the delay in evacuating it, 253; against that, 232.
Adjourned after seven o’clock.
The second division, the largest in this Parliament except that of June 1807, upon the address of the change of Ministry.
N.B.—It was the general opinion that the only resolution upon this business which was indisputably untrue was the unanimous vote that the failure was not imputable to any misconduct of the officers by sea or land.
My own opinion certainly was contrary to any such resolution. For, first, it was in evidence that the wind and weather did not prevent Lord Huntley from landing in Cadsand, in good time to have destroyed the batteries of Breskens, and opened a passage for the fleet up the Wieling Channel, clear of Flushing. And, secondly, there was no evidence to prove that the whole fleet might not have gone up that channel with Lord Gardner’s squadron, instead of going originally into the Stonediep: the further deviation into the Roompot, which ruined the whole prospect of getting to Antwerp up the West Scheldt, was probably inevitable after the fleet had once missed their entrance by Cadsand and the Wieling Channel.
It suited the Opposition to exculpate the land and naval service, because then the failure (by their reasoning) exclusively followed from the plan, and the plan only. It also suited the Ministers, partly because they had advised the King to tell the City of London that there was no ground for military inquiry (they then not knowing of Lord Chatham’s narrative); and partly from a proper desire to avoid throwing blame upon those who served under them by their own appointment.