Volume 5 — NELSON’S PLAN OF ACTION FOR TRAFALGAR (1805). Source.—Clowes’ Royal Navy, 1900. Vol. v., p. 127.

After declaring his intention of keeping the fleet in such a position of sailing that the order of sailing should be the order of battle, Nelson went on to say:—

“If the enemy’s fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines ... could fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I should therefore probably make the second in command’s signal to lead through about the twelfth ship from their rear, or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced. My line would cut through about their centre.... The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower [from] two or three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief—supposed to be in the centre—to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose 20 sail of the enemy’s line to be untouched. It must be some time before they could perform a manœuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which, indeed, would be impossible without mixing with the ships engaged.... British to be one-fourth superior to the enemy cut off. Something must be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea-fight, beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as of foes; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear; and then that the British fleet would, most of them, be ready to receive their 20 sail of the line, or to pursue them should they endeavour to make off.... The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point; but, in case signals cannot be seen or clearly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.”

Should the enemy wait in line of battle—as he actually did at Trafalgar—to receive an attack from windward—

“the divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy’s centre. The signal will most probably then be made for the ... lines to bear up together; to set all their sails, even their steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy’s line, and to cut through, beginning at the twelfth ship from the enemy’s rear. Some ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their friends. If any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of 12 sail of the enemy. Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the 12 ships composing, in the first position, the enemy’s rear are to be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the Commander-in-Chief, which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the lee line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief are signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the admiral commanding that line. The remainder of the enemy’s fleet ... are to be left to the management of the Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as possible.”[8]