COPYRIGHT

ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW

I

THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF COPYRIGHT

Copyright, meaning

Copyright (from the Latin copia, plenty) means, in general, the right to copy, to make plenty. In its specific application it means the right to multiply copies of those products of the human brain known as literature and art.

There is another legal sense of the word "copyright" much emphasized by several English justices. Through the low Latin use of the word copia, our word "copy" has a secondary and reversed meaning, as the pattern to be copied or made plenty, in which sense the schoolboy copies from the "copy" set in his copy-book, and the modern printer calls for the author's "copy."

Its two senses

Copyright, accordingly, may also mean the right in copy made (whether the original work or a duplication of it), as well as the right to make copies, which by no means goes with the work or any duplicate of it. Said Lord St. Leonards in the case of Jefferys v. Boosey in 1854: "When we are talking of the right of an author we must distinguish between the mere right to his manuscript, and to any copy which he may choose to make of it, as his property, just like any other personal chattel, and the right to multiply copies to the exclusion of every other person. Nothing can be more distinct than these two things. The common law does give a man who has composed a work a right to that composition, just as he has a right to any other part of his personal property; but the question of the right of excluding all the world from copying, and of himself claiming the exclusive right of forever copying his own composition after he has published it to the world, is a totally different thing." Baron Parke, in the same case, pointed out expressly these two different legal senses of the word copyright, the right in copy, a right of possession, always fully protected by the common law, and the right to copy, a right of multiplication, which alone has been the subject of special statutory protection.

Blackstone

Blackstone in his Commentaries of 1767, in which the word copyright seems to have been first used, lays down the fundamental principles of copyright as follows: "When a man, by the exertion of his rational powers, has produced an original work, he seems to have clearly a right to dispose of that identical work as he pleases, and any attempt to vary the disposition he has made of it appears to be an invasion of that right. Now the identity of a literary composition consists entirely in the sentiment and the language; the same conceptions, clothed in the same words, must necessarily be the same composition; and whatever method be taken of exhibiting that composition to the ear or the eye of another, by recital, by writing, or by printing, in any number of copies, or at any period of time, it is always the identical work of the author which is so exhibited; and no other man (it hath been thought) can have a right to exhibit it, especially for profit, without the author's consent. This consent may, perhaps, be tacitly given to all mankind, when an author suffers his work to be published by another hand, without any claim or reserve of right, and without stamping on it any marks of ownership; it being then a present to the public, like building a church or bridge, or laying out a new highway."

Property by creation

There is nothing which may more rightfully be called property than the creation of the individual brain. For property (from the Latin proprius, own) means a man's very own, and there is nothing more his own than the thought, created, made out of no material thing (unless the nerve-food which the brain consumes in the act of thinking be so counted), which uses material things only for its record or manifestation. The best proof of own-ership is that if this individual man or woman had not thought this individual thought, realized in writing or in music or in marble, it would not exist. Or if the individual thinking it had put it aside without such record, it would not, in any practical sense, exist. We cannot know what "might have beens" of untold value have been lost to the world where thinkers, such as inventors, have had no inducement or opportunity thus to materialize their thoughts.

Are thoughts created?

It is sometimes said, as a bar to this idea of property, that no thought is new—that every thinker is dependent upon the gifts of nature and the thoughts of other thinkers before him, as every tiller of the soil is dependent upon the land as given by nature and improved by the men who have toiled and tilled before him,—a view of which Henry C. Carey has been the chief exponent in this country. But there is no real analogy—aside from the question whether the denial of individual property in land would not be setting back the hands of progress. If Farmer Jones does not raise potatoes from a piece of land, Farmer Smith can; but Shakespeare cannot write "Paradise lost" nor Milton "Much ado," though before both Dante dreamed and Boccaccio told his tales. It was because of Milton and Shakespeare writing, not because of Dante and Boccaccio who had written, that these immortal works are treasures of the English tongue. It was the very self of each, in propria persona, that gave these form and worth, though they used words that had come down from generations as the common heritage of English-speaking men. Property in a stream of water, as has been pointed out, is not in the atoms of the water but in the flow of the stream.

Property in unpublished works

Property right in unpublished works has never been effectively questioned—a fact which in itself confirms the view that intellectual property is a natural inherent right. The author has "supreme control" over an unpublished work, and his manuscript cannot be utilized by creditors as assets without his consent. "If he lends a copy to another," says Baron Parke, "his right is not gone; if he sends it to another under an implied undertaking that he is not to part with it or publish it, he has a right to enforce that undertaking." The receiver of a letter, to whom the paper containing the writing has undoubtedly been given, has no right to publish or otherwise use the letter without the writer's consent. The theory that by permitting copies to be made, an author dedicates his writing to the public, as an owner of land dedicates a road to the public by permitting public use of it for twenty-one years, overlooks the fact that in so doing the author only conveys to each holder of his book the right to individual use, and not the right to multiply copies, as though the landowner should not give but sell permission to individuals to pass over his road, without any permission to them to sell tickets for the same privilege to other people. The owner of a right does not forfeit a right by selling a privilege.

The question of publication

It is at the moment of publication that the undisputed possessory right passes over into the much disputed right to multiply copies, and that the vexed question of the true theory of copyright property arises. The broad view of literary property holds that the one kind of copyright is involved in the other. The right to have is the right to use. An author cannot use—that is, get beneficial results from—his work, without offering copies for sale. He would be otherwise like the owner of a loaf of bread who was told that the bread was his until he wanted to eat it. That sale would seem to contain "an implied undertaking" that the buyer has liberty to use his copy, but not to multiply it. Peculiarly in this kind of property the right of ownership consists in the right to prevent use of one's property by others without the owner's consent. The right of exclusion seems to be indeed a part of ownership. In the case of land the owner is entitled to prevent trespass, to the extent of a shot-gun, and in the same way the law recognizes the right to use violence, even to the extreme, in preventing others from possession of one's own property of any kind. The owner of a literary property has, however, no physical means of defence or redress; the very act of publication by which he gets a market for his productions opens him to the danger of wider multiplication and publication without his consent. There is, therefore, no kind of property which is so dependent on the help of the law for the protection of the real owner.

Inherent right

The inherent right of authors is a right at what is called common law—that is, natural or customary law. The common law, says Kent, "includes those principles, usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature." "The common law or lex non scripta," says Blackstone, "depends upon its having been used time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." So far as concerns the undisputed rights before publication, the copyright laws are auxiliary merely to common law. Rights exist before remedies; remedies are merely invented to enforce rights. "The seeking for the law of the right of property in the law of procedure relating to the remedies," says Copinger in his standard English work on "The law of copyright," "is a mistake similar to supposing that the mark on the ear of an animal is the cause, instead of the consequence, of property therein."

Statutory penalties

After the invention of printing it became evident that new methods of procedure must be devised to enforce common law rights. Copyright became, therefore, the subject of statute law, by the passage of laws imposing penalties for a theft which, without such laws, could not be punished.

Statute of Anne Supersedure of common law right

These laws, covering naturally only the country of the author, and specifying a time during which the penalties could be enforced, and providing means of registration by which authors could register their property rights, as the title to a house is registered when it is sold, had an unexpected result. The statute of Anne, which is the foundation of present English copyright law, intended to protect authors' rights by providing penalties against their violation, had the effect of limiting those rights. It was doubtless the intention of those who framed the statute of Anne to establish, for the benefit of authors, specific means of redress. Overlooking apparently the fact that law and equity, as their principles were then established, enabled authors to use the same means of redress, so far as they held good, which persons suffering wrongs as to other property had, the law was so drawn that in 1774 the English House of Lords (against, however, the weight of one half of English judicial opinion) decided that, instead of giving additional sanction to a formerly existing right, the statute of Anne had substituted a new and lesser right to the exclusion of what the majority of English judges held to have been an old and greater right. Literary and like property to this extent lost the character of copy-right, and became the subject of copy-privilege, depending on legal enactment for the security of the private owner. American courts, wont to follow English precedent, have rather taken for granted this view of the law of literary property, and our Constitution, in authorizing Congress to secure "for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," was evidently drawn from the same point of view, though it does not in itself deny or withdraw the natural rights of the author at common law.

II

THE EARLY HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT

In classic times

Our traditions of the blind Homer, singing his Iliad in the multitudinous places of his protean nativity, do not vouchsafe us any information as to the status of authors in his day. There seems indeed to be no indication of author's rights or literary property in Greek or earlier literatures. But there is mention in Roman literature of the sale of playright by the dramatic authors, as Terence; and Rome had booksellers who sold copies of poems written out by slaves, and who seem to have been protected by some kind of "courtesy of the trade," since Martial names certain booksellers who had specific poems of his for sale. Horace complains that the Sosius brothers, his publishers, got gold while he got only fame—but this may have been a classic "author's grumble." Cicero in his letters indicates that there was some notion of literary property, and it is probable that some kind of payment was made to authors.

Roman law

The Roman jurist Gaius, probably of the second century, held that where an artist had painted upon a tabula, his was the superior right. And this opinion was adopted by Tribonian, chief editor of the code of Justinian, in the sixth century, and was applied in a modern question in respect to John Leech's drawings upon wood.

Monastic copyists St. Columba and Finnian

In the early Christian centuries, the monasteries became the seats of learning, and the scriptorium or writing room, in connection with the librarium or armarium,—the armory in which the weapons of the faith were kept,—was the work-shop of the monkish copyists, sometimes working as a publishing staff under the direction of the librarius or armarius as chief scribe. The first record of a copyright case is that of Finnian v. Columba in 567, chronicled by Adamnan fifty years later and cited by Montalembert in "The monks of the West." St. Columba, in his pre-saintly days, surreptitiously made a copy of a psalter in possession of his teacher Finnian, and the copy was reclaimed, so the tradition relates, under the decision of King Dermott, in the Halls of Tara: "To every cow her calf." The authenticity of the tradition is questioned by other writers, but the phrase gives the pith of the common law doctrine of literary property and indicates that in those early centuries there was a sense of copyright. Monks from other monasteries came to a noted scriptorium where a specially authentic or valuable manuscript could be copied, and the privilege of copying sometimes became the basis of an exchange of copies or of a commercial charge. Finally different texts of the same work were compared to obtain a certain or standard text, and the multiplication of such copies became the basis of a publishing and bookselling trade, in secular as well as sacerdotal hands, the development of which is traced in detail by George Haven Putnam in "Books and their makers in the Middle Ages."

University protection

This development is illustrated in the statutes of 1223 of the University of Paris, providing that the "booksellers of the University" should produce duplicate copies of the texts authorized for the use of the University, and there is indication that payment was made by the University to scholars for the annotation and proof-reading of such texts. In fact, there existed in France in those days a kind of guild of libraires jurés or legalized booksellers, under regulation of the University, as a body of publishers and writers having jurisdiction over the copying and censorship of manuscripts. "Letters of patent" of Charles V, 1368, specified fourteen libraires and eleven écrivains as registered in Paris, and four chief libraires had jurisdiction over the calling of the librarius and the stationarius. The certificate of the correctness of a copy, and perhaps of the right to copy or sell it, may be considered the primitive form of copyright certificate.

Invention of printing

The invention of printing, prior to 1450, made protection of literary property a question of rapidly increasing importance. The new art raised, of course, many new questions wherever the guardians of the law were set to their chronic task of applying old ideas of right to new conditions. The earliest copyright certificate, if it may be so called, in a printed book was that in the reissue of the tractate of Peter Nigrus printed in 1475, at Esslingen, in which the Bishop of Ratisbon certified the correctness of the copy and his approval. At first "privileges" were granted chiefly to printers, for the reproduction of classic or patristic works, but possibly in some cases as the representatives of living writers; and there are early instances of direct grants to authors, the earliest known being in 1486 in Venice to Sabellico.

In Germany

In Germany, the cradle of the art of printing, whence come the earliest incunabula or cradle-books, printing privileges were developed some decades later than in Italy. Koberger, the early Nuremberg printer, whose imprint dates back to 1473, relied rather on the "courtesy of the trade," and indeed made an agreement in 1495 with Kessler of Basel to respect each other's rights. Yet a suit brought in 1480 by Schöffer, who with Fust had established the first publishing and bookselling business, brought in connection with Fust's heirs against Inkus of Frankfort for the infringement of property rights in certain books, and the issue of a preliminary injunction by a court at Basel, indicated some definite legal status.

The first recorded privilege in Germany was issued by the imperial Aulic Council in 1501, to the Rhenish Celtic Sodalitas for the printing of dramas of the nun-poet, Hroswitha, who had been dead for 600 years, as prepared by Celtes of Nuremberg. The imperial privilege covered only the imperial domain, and Celtes in the same year obtained a similar privilege from the magistracy of Frankfort, then the seat of the book-fair, organized there about 1500, afterwards superseded by that at Leipzig. Later, imperial privileges were issued by the Imperial Chancellor in the name of the Emperor, as one in 1510 to the printer Johann Schott of the "Lectura aurea." In 1512 Maximilian I granted to the historiographer Johann Stab in Lintz a privilege covering "all works" which he "might cause to be printed," under which he issued licenses on particular books for ten years or less. This grant, however, some authorities consider not a privilege or copyright, but an authorization to license, possibly similar to that which had been granted in 1455 by Frederick III and confirmed later by Maximilian I to Dr. Jacob Össler at Strasburg, perhaps the earliest centre of printing and bookselling, as imperial supervisor of literature and superintendent of printing. In 1512 also, copies or imitations or engravings by Albert Dürer, with forged signature, were ordered confiscated by the magistrates of Nuremberg, though perhaps on grounds of fraud rather than of copyright. But in 1528 Dürer's widow obtained from the Nuremberg authorities exclusive privilege for his works, and in that year the magistrates went so far in protecting Dürer's "Proportion" as to restrain another work of the same title and subject, presumably though mistakenly inferred to be an adaptation or imitation, until after the completion and sale of the original work. In 1532 reëngravings of some of Dürer's works were restrained, and when a Latin edition of his "Perspective," printed in Paris, found its way to Nuremberg, the magistrates called the booksellers together, warned them against keeping or selling the unauthorized edition, and sent letters to the magistracy of Strasburg, Frankfort, Leipzig and Antwerp, requesting similar action. Luther in his reforming zeal was the first protestant against authors' wrongs, and in a letter of 1528 complained that "there are many now busying themselves with the spoiling of books through misprinting them," and pleaded for legislation to protect literary producers. In 1531 the city council of Basel enjoined all booksellers from reprinting the books of each other for three years from publication under penalty of one hundred gulden, which illustrates the nature of local legislation, privileging printers as well as other guilds within a city. The protection was usually for short terms and sometimes covered the subject as well as the book, as indicated in the Dürer case.

The coördinate jurisdiction of imperial and local authority continued into the seventeenth century, and besides a special protection of official publications, including church texts and school books, there developed a differentiation between privileged books and protected authors. The imperial city of Frankfort in 1660 passed an ordinance for the protection of "bücher" and "autores" and an imperial patent of 1685 made the curious distinction between "privileged" and "unprivileged" works, which Pütter, reputed the German apostle of the modern theory of property in literary productions, writing in 1764, explains as meaning respectively "non-individual" and "individual" (eigenthümlich) works, the former those issued under printers' privileges, the latter the works of contemporary authors, copyrightable in our modern sense. At the close of the seventeenth century, the book-fair at Leipzig began to assume dominating importance, and the privileges from the Commission of the Elector of Saxony became more authoritative, perhaps, than the imperial privileges issued from Frankfort.

In Italy: Venice

Venice, among whose chief glories were to be the master printers Aldus, was the first and foremost of the Italian states to encourage the new art. The first privilege granted by her Senate, in 1469, indeed ante-dated the first in Germany by thirty-two years, the first in France by thirty-four years, and the first in England by forty-nine years. This was to John of Speyer, a German printer, for a monopoly for printing in Venice for five years, with prohibition of importation of works printed elsewhere, which he did not live to enjoy. The first known author's copyright was granted September 1, 1486, to Antonio Sabellico, historian to the Republic, of the sole right to publish or authorize the publication of his "Decade of Venetian affairs," not limited in time, with a penalty of five hundred ducats for infringement. In 1491 the Senate gave to the publicist Peter of Ravenna and the publisher of his choice the sole right, without mention of term, to print and sell his "Phœnix," usually cited as the first instance of copyright. In 1493 one Barbaro was granted a privilege for ten years in the work of his deceased brother, and in the same year an editor's copyright was granted to Joannes Nigro for his edition of "Haliabas," his application being accompanied by a certificate from learned doctors of Padua of its value for the community, and a publisher's copyright to Benaliis on Giustiniani's "Origin of the city of Venice," both apparently without term. In 1494 a privilege to Codeca contained the condition of fair price, and another privilege required publication within a year or at the rate of a folio a day. In 1496 Aldus himself was given the privilege for twenty years of printing any Greek texts, and in 1501, another for ten years of printing in cursive or italic characters, an invention of his own modeled on the handwriting of Boccaccio, a quasi patent right; and rights for other languages were granted to other printers.

From 1505 renewals were granted for good cause, as in 1508 to Crasso for his edition of the works of Polifilo, because the wars had prevented due return. The privilege dated sometimes from application, sometimes from publication, and varied in term from one year up, averaging perhaps ten years at the beginning and twenty years toward the close of the sixteenth century. Many of the privileges were conditioned on printing within Venice. Copyright to authors became frequent, as in 1515 on his "Orlando" for his lifetime, to Ariosto, on whose poems an extra term for ten years was granted, in 1535, to his heirs. In 1521 Castellazzo obtained a copyright for his engravings illustrating the Pentateuch and for others which he had in plan; and many musical works were also copyrighted.

It will be seen that before or early in the sixteenth century most of the copyright conditions of later legislation, even in the American code of 1909, had been prophesied in Venice. But the privileges had become so complicated and perplexing that in 1517 the Venetian Senate abolished all printing privileges previously granted and decreed that privileges should thereafter be granted only by two-thirds vote and for a new work (opus novum) "never published before," or works hitherto unprivileged. This attempt at reform proved inadequate and indefinite, and in 1533 the first real copyright code was decreed, under which printing was required within Venice, and publication within a year—later modified for larger works to a folio a day. No publisher could apply twice for the same copyright, and a maximum price was fixed from an advance copy by the Bureau of Arts and Industries. Under the restriction of competition, Venetian printers, once the best in the world, fell into "the ruinous and disgraceful practice," according to a decree of 1537, "for the sake of gain" of using "vile paper that would not hold the ink" or permit marginal notes; and the use of good paper that could be written upon without blotting was required, except for works priced under 10 soldi, on penalty of forfeiture of copyright and a fine of 100 ducats. Under the earlier privileges publishers had printed books without consent of the authors or against their will, but in 1545 it was decreed that no copyright should issue unless documentary evidence of the consent of the author or his representatives had been submitted to the Rifformatori, the commission from the University of Padua, appointed the year before as censors upon non-theological works, not covered by the ecclesiastical censors.

A decree in 1548 established a guild of printers and publishers, antedating the charter granted by Queen Mary to the Stationers' Company in London, though later than the organization of the book-fair of Frankfort and of the libraires jurés in France; and its regulations, aiding the censorship, incidentally defined literary property and protected copyrights. About 1566 there was a provision that works should be registered before publication without charge, and a complete registry of published works was kept in Venice. In 1569 as many as 117 copyright entries were made in Venice, and so few, after the plague years, as seven in 1599. Only two applications are recorded as refused by the Senate. The one recorded instance of punishment for piracy was that on the work of Pappa Alesio of Corfu, wherein the infringer was fined 200 ducats, besides ten ducats for each unauthorized copy printed, and was forbidden to print for ten years.

About 1600 the exodus of printers from Venice was checked by legislation, and in 1603 an elaborate decree provided copyright for twenty years on books first published in Venice, for ten years on books first published in Italy but registered in Venice, or on books not printed in Venice within the previous twenty years, and for five years on books not printed within ten years previous, and also a fine of twenty-five ducats for the false use of "Venetia" in the imprint. Later, as is evidenced by complaints in 1671, deposit copies were required for the libraries of St. Mark and of Padua. By the close of the seventeenth century the provisions for copyright in Venice had become so complicated, according to Putnam, following Brown's historical study of "The Venetian printing press," as to require the following processes, most of them involving a fee: "testamur from the ducal secretary; certificate from the Rifformatori of the University of Padua; imprimatur from the Chiefs of the Ten; revision by the Superintendent of the Press; revision by the public proof-reader; collation of the original text with the text as printed, by the secretary to the Rifformatori; certificate from the librarian of St. Mark that a copy had been deposited in the library; examination by experts appointed by the Proveditori to establish the market price of the book."

Florence

Florence was second only to Venice in the production of books and the protection of authors, and the records of Florentine printing show that in the sixteenth century international privileges were sought and obtained. Thus the printer of a Florentine edition of the Pandects, in 1553, obtained privileges also in Spain, France and the two Sicilies, possibly through a Papal grant.

Control by the Church

By 1515, under Leo X, patron of art and letters, the Holy See had asserted its jurisdiction over copyrights and privileges, not only in its own territory, but throughout Italy and Germany, and elsewhere, under pain of spiritual punishments. Fra Felice of Prato, a converted Jew, had obtained from the Pope a privilege for certain Hebrew works valid throughout all Europe, the denial or infringement of which was punishable by excommunication; but he took the precaution to obtain a privilege also from the Venetian authorities. There is other evidence of a compromise policy involving approval from the Church before a secular privilege was granted, especially of theological works. Throughout Catholic countries the index expurgatorius banned for the most part the printing of forbidden books; and this made Holland later the chief centre of printing, since the placing of a work in the index invited prompt reprint by Dutch publishers. It was perhaps a survival of a requirement for deposit of such books that Holland so long remained the only nation in Europe conditioning copyright on deposit of a copy printed within the country.

In France

In France, after the invention of printing, the functions of the libraires jurés, under the authority given by the King through the University of Paris, naturally came to include books, and this relation was continued until the Revolution of 1789. Copyrights throughout this period seem to have been in perpetuity. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, in the times of Louis XII, "letters of the King" forbade booksellers, printers and other persons to "introduce foreign impressions" of the books to which such letters were appended. They were usually issued to printers. In 1537, under Francis I, a work had first to secure "the King's approval given through the royal librarian," a copy must be deposited in the library of the royal château of Blois, and the selling of foreign works was permitted only after approval as worthy of a place in the royal library,—but for these last the library was to pay the usual price. In 1556 a general ordinance of Henry II defined literary property, and publication of condemned books was declared treason. In 1566 the "Ordinance de Moulins" of Charles IX made further definition; and letters patent of Henry III, in 1576, referred back to these earlier ordinances. Infringement of such privileges was punished with especial severity in France, for, as quoted by Lowndes, such conduct was thought "worse than to enter a neighbor's house and steal his goods: for negligence might be imputed to him for permitting the thief to enter: but in the case of piracy of copyright, it was stealing a thing confided to the public honor." Louis XIV in 1682 visited it with corporal punishment, and for a second offence decreed in 1686 also that the offender should be forever disabled from exercising his trade of bookseller or printer.

Copyrights continued in perpetuity until all royal privileges were abolished in 1789 by the National Assembly, after which in July, 1793, a general copyright law was passed, granting copyright to an author for his life and to his heirs for ten years thereafter.

In England

In England, a Royal Printer was appointed in 1504, and to his successor, Richard Pynson, in 1518, the first printing "privilege" was issued, in the form of a prohibition for two years of the printing by any other person of a certain speech to which this first English copyright notice was appended. Bishop Fell, in his memoirs on the state of printing in the University of Oxford, states that this University had been granted certain exclusive privileges of transcribing and multiplying books by means of writing; and Lowndes in his early "Historical sketch of the law of copyright," published in 1840 and 1842, cites many early privileges, most commonly for seven years, granted after the invention of printing.

An early enactment of Richard III, in 1483, had encouraged the circulation of books by exempting from certain restraints on aliens "any artificer, or merchant stranger, of what nation or country he be, for bringing into this realm, or selling by retail or otherwise, any books written or printed, or for inhabiting within this said realm for the same intent, or any scrivener, alluminor, reader, or printer of such books." But fifty years later, under Henry VIII, this exemption was repealed by an act, "for printers and binders of books," which provided that no persons "resident or inhabitant within this realm shall buy to sell again, any printed books brought from any parts out of the King's obeysance, ready bound in boards, leather, or parchment," or buy "of any stranger born out of the King's obedience, other than of denizens, any manner of printed books brought from any parties beyond the sea, except only by engross, and not by retail"—the buyer to be punished by a fine, of which a moiety was to go to the informer. The act also contained provisions to "reform and redress," through the Chancery judges with "twelve honest and discreet persons," "too high and unreasonable prices."

Book restriction

The quaint preamble of this act of 1533 sets forth as its "whereas," in reference to the act of Richard III, that "there hath come to this realm sithen the making of the same, a marvelous number of printed books, and daily doth; and the cause of the making of the same provision seemeth to be, for that there were but few books, and few printers within this realm at that time, which could well exercise and occupy the said science and craft of printing; nevertheless, sithen the making of the said provision, many of this realm, being the King's natural subjects, have given them so diligently to learn and exercise the said craft of printing, that at this day there be within this realm a great number cunning and expert in the said science or craft of printing, as able to exercise the said craft in all points, as any stranger in any other realm or country; and furthermore, where there be a great number of the King's subjects within this realm, which live by the craft and mystery of binding of books, and that there be a great multitude well expert in the same, yet all this notwithstanding, there are divers persons that bring from beyond the sea great plenty of printed books, not only in the Latin tongue, but also in our maternal English tongue, some bound in boards, some in leather, and some in parchment, and them sell by retail, whereby many of the King's subjects, being binders of books, and having no other faculty wherewith to get their living, be destitute of work and like to be undone, except some reformation herein be had." This is interesting in connection with the American manufacturing clause.

Early English protection

Henry VIII granted many printing privileges, and in 1530 the first English copyright to an author was issued to John Palsgrave, who, having prepared a French grammar at his own expense, received a privilege for seven years. In 1533 appeared the first complaint of piracy, that of Wynken de Worde, who obtained the King's privilege for his second edition of Witinton's Grammar, because Peter Trevers had reprinted it from the edition of 1523. Up to the middle of the sixteenth century copyrights were in form printers' licenses, and even in the case cited Palsgrave seems to have been recognized rather because he published his own book than because he wrote it.

The Stationers' Company

The Stationers' Company, created by Henry VIII and chartered under Queen Mary in 1556, though the development of an earlier guild dating from 1403, was in part a device to prevent seditious printing, by prohibiting any printing in England except by those registered in its membership. In 1558, under a second charter, its by-laws provided that every one who printed a book should register it and pay a fee, and those who failed to do this, or who printed another member's book, were to be fined. In 1562 licenses were declared void "if any other has a right," and in 1573 sales of "copy" are entered. The practice had grown up of granting patents or monopolies to persons for a whole class of books; the Stationers' Company itself held that for almanacs up to a very late period, and the Crown has retained that on the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer to the present day. These monopolies were defied, and the Star Chamber decree of 1566, disabling offending printers from exercising their trade and prescribing imprisonment, did not avail. In 1640 the Star Chamber and all the regulations of the press were abolished by the Long Parliament, but the abuse of unlicensed printing led to a new licensing act in 1643, which prohibited printing or importing without consent of the owner, on pain of forfeiture of copies to the owner, and which renewed the order that all books should be entered in the register of the Stationers' Company. The early registers still exist in Stationers' Hall, near Paternoster Row, London, in quaint and almost undecipherable chirography, and some of them have been reissued in facsimile. It was against the licensing act of this date that Milton, in 1644, printed his "Areopagitica," but he particularly excepts from his criticism of the act the part providing for "the just retaining of each man his several copy, which God forbid should be gainsaid."

Statutory provisions

In 1649 Parliament provided a penalty of 6s. 8d. and forfeiture for the reprinting of registered books, and prohibited presses except at London, Finsbury, York, and the universities, and in 1662 it added the requirement of deposit of a copy at the King's library and at each of the universities. To prevent fraudulent changes in a book after licensing, it was further required that a copy be deposited with the licenser at the time of application—apparently the origin of our record-deposit. With the expiration of these acts in 1679, legislative penalties lapsed and piracy became common. Charles II in 1684 renewed the charter of the Stationers' Company, approved its register, and confirmed to proprietors of books "the sole right, power, and privilege and authority of printing, as has been usual heretofore." The licensing act of 1649-62 was revived in 1685, and renewed up to 1694, although the booksellers now petitioned against it, and eleven peers protested against subjecting learning to a mercenary and perhaps ignorant licenser, and destroying the property of authors in their copies. The law lapsed because of the indignation of the Commons against the arbitrary power of the license, but the result was the abolition of statutory penalties, which left the punishment of piracy a matter of damages at common law, requiring a separate action for each copy sold, usually against irresponsible people. Piracy again flourished. The right at common law seems, however, to have been unquestioned, and the Court of Common Pleas held that a plaintiff who had purchased from the executors of an author was owner of the property at common law. Owners of literary property petitioned Parliament, 1703 to 1709, for security and redress, declaring that the property of English authors had always been held as sacred among the traders, that conveyance gave just and legal title, that the property was the same with houses and other estates, and that existing "copies" had cost at least £50,000, and had been used in marriage settlements and were the subsistence of many widows and orphans. This led to the famous statute of Anne, introduced in 1709, and passed March, 1710, "for the encouragement of learning," said to have been drawn in its original form by Swift, which remains the practical foundation of copyright in England and America to-day.

III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY COPYRIGHT IN ENGLAND

The statute of Anne as foundation

The statute of Anne, the foundation of the present copyright system of England and America, which took effect April 10, 1710, gave the author of works then existing, or his assigns, the sole right of printing for twenty-one years from that date and no longer; of works not then printed, for fourteen years and no longer, except in case he were alive at the expiration of that term, when he could have the privilege prolonged for another fourteen years. Penalties were provided, which could not be exacted unless the books were registered with the Stationers' Company, and which must be sued for within three months after the offence. If too high prices were charged, the Queen's officers might order them lowered. A book could not be imported without written consent of the owner of the printing right. The number of deposit copies was increased to nine. The act was not to prejudice any previous rights of the universities and others.

Its relations to common law The crucial cases

This act did not touch the question of rights at common law, and soon after its statutory term of protection on previously printed books expired, in 1731, lawsuits began. The first was that of Eyre v. Walker, in which Sir Joseph Jekyll granted, in 1735, an injunction as to "The whole duty of man," which had been first published in 1657, or seventy-eight years before. In this and several other cases the Court of Chancery issued injunctions on the theory that the legal right was unquestioned. But in 1769 the famous case of Millar v. Taylor, as to the copyright of Thomson's "Seasons," brought directly before the Court of King's Bench the question whether rights at common law still existed, aside from the statute and its period of protection. In this case Lord Mansfield and two other judges held that an author had, at common law, a perpetual copyright, independent of statute, one dissenting justice holding that there was no such property at common law. The copyright was sold by Millar's executors to Becket, who prosecuted Donaldson for piracy and obtained from Lord Chancellor Bathurst a perpetual injunction. In 1774, in the famous case of Donaldson v. Becket, this decision was appealed from, and the issue was carried to the highest tribunal, the House of Lords.

The Judges' opinions

The House of Lords propounded five questions to the judges. These, with the replies,[1] were as follows:

I. Whether, at common law, an author of any book or literary composition had the sole right of first printing and publishing the same for sale; and might bring an action against any person who printed, published and sold the same without his consent? Yes, 10 to 1 that he had the sole right, etc.,—and 8 to 3 that he might bring the action.

II. If the author had such right originally, did the law take it away, upon his printing and publishing such book or literary composition; and might any person afterward reprint and sell, for his own benefit, such book or literary composition against the will of the author? No, 7 to 4.

III. If such action would have lain at common law, is it taken away by the statute of 8th Anne? And is an author, by the said statute, precluded from every remedy, except on the foundation of the said statute and on the terms and conditions prescribed thereby? Yes, 6 to 5.

IV. Whether the author of any literary composition and his assigns had the sole right of printing and publishing the same in perpetuity, by the common law? Yes, 7 to 4.

V. Whether this right is any way impeached, restrained, or taken away by the statute of 8th Anne? Yes, 6 to 5.

The Lords' decision

These opinions, that there was perpetual copyright at common law, which was not lost by publication, but that the statute of Anne took away that right and confined remedies to the statutory provisions, were directly contrary to the previous decrees of the courts, and on a motion seconded by the Lord Chancellor, the House of Lords, 22 to 11, reversed the decree in the case at issue. This construction by the Lords, in the case of Donaldson v. Becket, of the statute of Anne, has practically "laid down the law" for England and America ever since.

Protests

Two protests against this action deserve note. The first, that of the universities, was met by an act of 1775, which granted to the English and Scotch universities (to which Dublin was added in 1801), and to the colleges of Eton, Westminster and Winchester, perpetual copyright in works bequeathed to and printed by them. The other, that of the booksellers, presented to the Commons February 28, 1774, set forth that the petitioners had invested large sums in the belief of perpetuity of copyright, but a bill for their relief was rejected.

Supplementary legislation

In 1801 an act was passed authorizing suits for damages [at common law, as well as penalties under statute] during the period of protection of the statute, the need for such a law having been shown in the case of Beckford v. Hood in 1798, wherein the court had to "stretch a point" to protect the plaintiff's rights in an anonymous book, which he had not entered in the Stationers' register.

The Georgian period

Meantime, during the Georgian period, there had been much incidental copyright legislation. The provision in the statute of Anne for the limitation of prices was repealed by the act of 1739, which also continued the prohibition of the importation of foreign reprints, further continued in later acts or customs regulations from time to time, until these were disposed of by the statute law revision act of 1867. Copyright had been extended to engravings and prints by successive acts of 1734-5 (8 George II, c. 13), 1766-7 (7 George III, c. 38) and 1777 (17 George III, c. 57); to designs for linen and cotton printing by acts of 1787, 1789 and 1794; to sculpture by acts of 1798 and 1814 (54 George III, c. 56). A private copyright act of 1734 granted to Samuel Buckley, a citizen and stationer of London, sole liberty of printing an improved edition of the histories of Thuanus, and the engravings act of 1767 contained a similar special provision for the widow of Hogarth. In 1814 also, copyright in books was extended to twenty-eight years and the remainder of life, and the author was relieved from delivering the eleven library copies then required, except on demand. The university copyright act of 1775 (15 George III, c. 53), above-mentioned, and the other acts given with specific citation above, still constitute, in certain unrepealed provisions, a part of the English law, although others of their provisions and other laws were repealed by later copyright acts or by the statute law revision act of 1861 or that of 1867.

Legislation under William IV

In the reign of William IV the dramatic copyright act of 1833 (3 William IV, c. 15) became, and in part remains, the basis of copyright in drama. The lectures copyright act of 1835 (5 & 6 William IV, c. 65) for the first time covered that field. In 1836 the prints and engravings copyright (Ireland) act (6 & 7 William IV, c. 59) extended protection to those classes in that country, and another copyright act (6 & 7 William IV, c. 110) reduced the number of library copies required to five. These laws also remain in force, in unrepealed provisions, as a part of British copyright law.

The Victorian act of 1842

In 1841, under the leadership of Serjeant Talfourd, author of "Ion" and other dramatic works, a new copyright bill was presented to the House of Commons, in the preparation of which George Palmer Putnam, the American publisher, then resident in London, had been consulted. It provided for compulsory registration and extended the term to life and thirty years. The bill attracted little attention and met with no opposition until the second reading, when Lord Macaulay, a bachelor, interested in fame rather than profit to an author or his descendants, attacked the bill and "the great debate" ensued. Macaulay offered a bill limiting copyright to the life of the author, but finally assented to a compromise, by which the term was made forty-two years or the life of the author and seven years, whichever the longer. The resulting copyright act of 1842 (5 & 6 Victoria, c. 45) presented a new code of copyright, covering the ground of previous laws, but not in terms repealing them. As a result, provisions not specifically repealed or superseded remained in force, and the act of 1842, though serving since as the basic act, has had to be construed with the previous acts in view. The bill practically preserved, however, the restrictions of the statute of Anne. The term of forty-two years or life and seven years is applied to articles in periodicals, but the right in these reverts to the author after twenty-eight years. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council may authorize the publication of a work which after the author's death the proprietor of the copyright refuses to republish.

Protection of designs

In the same year, 1842, there was passed also a copyright in designs act, covering designs for articles of manufacture, consolidating previous laws on this specific subject from 1787 to 1839 (two bills in this last year having extended protection to printing designs for woolen and other fabrics and to articles of manufacture generally), and providing for a registrar for such designs,—in which act the careless use of the word "ornamenting" seemed so to limit the scope that an amendatory act was passed in 1843.

Subsequent acts

An international copyright act, introduced in the first year of the Victorian reign, had been passed in 1838, to protect foreign books reprinted in England, but it proved inadequate and was repealed by the subsequent act of 1844 (7 & 8 Victoria, c. 12), providing more comprehensively for international copyright, on the basis of registration and deposit in London. The colonial copyright act of 1847 (10 & 11 Victoria, c. 95) authorized copyright legislation by any colony, subject to the approval of the Crown, and the suspension for such colony of the prohibition of foreign reprints, which act is therefore often cited as the foreign reprints act. An act of 1850 further covered designs and provided for their provisional registration, and one in 1851 protected exhibits at the international exhibition of that year in London. A third international copyright act was passed in 1852 (15 & 16 Victoria, c. 12) covering translations and including an authorization of a special treaty with France. The fine arts copyright act of 1862 (25 & 26 Victoria, c. 68) extended copyright to paintings, drawings, and photographs, hitherto unprotected, for life and seven years. A fourth international copyright act of 1875 (38 & 39 Victoria, c. 12) protected foreign dramatic works from imitation or adaptation on the English stage, which had been specifically permitted by the previous law, and in the same year "The Canada copyright act" (38 & 39 Victoria, c. 53) gave effect to a Canadian parliament act respecting copyright reprints.

The Royal Commission report of 1878

"The law of England, as to copyright," says the report of the Royal Copyright Commission, in a blue-book of 1878, "consists partly of the provisions of fourteen Acts of Parliament, which relate in whole or in part to different branches of the subject, and partly of common law principles, nowhere stated in any definite or authoritative way, but implied in a considerable number of reported cases scattered over the law reports." The digest, by Sir James Stephen, appended to this report, is presented by the Commission as "a correct statement of the law as it stands." This digest is one of the most valuable contributions to the literature of copyright, but the frequency with which such phrases occur as "it is probable, but not certain," "it is uncertain," "probably," "it seems," shows the state of the law, "wholly destitute of any sort of arrangement, incomplete, often obscure," as says the report itself. The digest is accompanied, in parallel columns, with alterations suggested by the Commission, and it is much to be regretted that their work failed to reach the expected result of an act of Parliament. The evidence taken by the Commission forms a second blue-book, also of great value.

This report and digest covered legislation through 1875, inclusive of the Canada act. They seem also to have regarded, though the act is not specified in the schedule, the consolidated customs act of 1876 (39 & 40 Victoria, c. 36), which incidentally contained the provisions for the prohibition of the importation of copyright books.

Later legislation

Despite the recommendations of the Commission and several later endeavors to pass a comprehensive copyright act,—of which the most important was Lord Monkswell's bill introduced into Parliament on behalf of the British Society of Authors, November 16, 1890, and given in full with an analysis by Walter Besant in George Haven Putnam's "Question of copyright"—later legislation in England has been confined practically to two topics, international copyright and the vexed question of musical compositions.

International copyright

The international copyright act of 1886 (49 & 50 Victoria, c. 43), amending and extending, and in part repealing the earlier international copyright acts and provisions, was intended to enable Great Britain, through Orders in Council, to become a party to international agreements, particularly the Berne copyright convention of 1886, ratified in 1887; this was made effective with respect to the eight other countries which were parties to the original Berne convention by the Order in Council of November 28, 1887, taking effect December 6, 1887. The convention was to extend to the British possessions, though with exceptions in some respects. The revenue act of 1889 (52 & 53 Victoria, c. 42) extended the prohibition of importation to foreign works copyrighted under the act of 1886, "printed or reprinted in any country or state" other than that "in which they were first published," if registered as required by the customs authorities.

Musical copyright

The protection of musical compositions was in such confused and unsatisfactory condition that special legislation was necessary. The recent laws on this subject, described in detail in the chapter on dramatic and musical copyright, include the copyright (musical compositions) act of 1882 (45 & 46 Victoria, c. 40); the copyright (musical compositions) act of 1888 (51 & 52 Victoria, c. 17); the musical (summary proceedings) copyright act of 1902 (2 Edward VII, c. 15); and the musical copyright act of 1906 (6 Edward VII, c. 36),—following the report of the Musical Copyright Committee of 1904,—which successively met imperfections developed in applying the previous law.

Committee report of 1909

After the adoption of the revised international copyright convention signed at Berlin November 13, 1908, modifying the Berne-Paris conventions, a Committee on the law of copyright consisting of seventeen publicists, authors, artists, publishers and others was appointed by minute of March 9, 1909, by the President of the Board of Trade, to consider and report upon the modification of domestic legislation in conformity with the Berlin agreement of 1908. The Committee made a report in December, 1909, strongly advising that domestic legislation be brought into line with international practice and that the copyright term in Great Britain be for life and fifty years. With the report was printed a blue-book of minutes of evidence, containing valuable appendixes which included a projêt de loi type (model bill) on copyright, drafted by the International Literary and Artistic Association, and an artistic copyright bill drafted by the Artistic Copyright Society.

Imperial copyright conference of 1909

In the early part of 1909 an Imperial copyright conference was also held in London, attended by Crown officials and representatives from all of the self-governing dominions, at which certain resolutions for copyright betterment were adopted. Its minutes and resolutions were also presented to Parliament.

The pending bill

As a result of the deliberations and reports of these two bodies, "a bill to amend and consolidate the law relating to copyright" (1 George V) was introduced into the House of Commons July 26, 1910, in the names of Mr. Buxton, Mr. Solicitor-General, Colonel Seely and Mr. Tennant, the adoption of which would provide a copyright code similar in extent to the American code of 1909, and applicable throughout the British dominions, with the proviso that the self-governing dominions may accept or modify the code or legislate separately, and providing also for international copyright. The bill adopted most of the features of the Berlin convention including the term of life and fifty years, covered literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, including architectural works of art, and while distinguishing between first publication and performance, included under copyright acoustic or visual performance or exhibition and control for mechanical reproduction. The bill, somewhat modified, was reintroduced into the subsequent Parliament March 30, 1911, emerged from committee with important alterations July 13, 1911, and was passed with slight additional changes by the House of Commons August 17, and first read in the House of Lords August 18, 1911. On passage of the House of Lords, it becomes effective July 1, 1912, unless earlier date is provided by Order in Council. The bill repeals by specific schedule all existing laws except specified sections in the fine arts copyright act of 1862, the musical copyright acts of 1902 and 1906, and the copyright provisions in the customs consolidation act of 1876 and the revenue act of 1889. The provisions of the new measure are specifically treated and summarized comprehensively in later chapters and the full text is given in the appendix.

Design patents

The bill does not, however, repeal the previous law as to copyright in designs, which had continued to receive consideration during the Victorian reign in laws, later than those cited, of 1858-1861, and thus finally became merged in the protection of patents. Thus "designs capable of being registered under the patents and designs act, 1907," are specifically excepted under clause 22 of the proposed copyright code.

Common law rights

It seems possible that, under the precedent of the acts of 1775 and 1801, the common law rights practically taken away by the statute of Anne and specifically abrogated by the proposed bill, could have been restored by legislation. These restrictions have not only ruled the practice of England ever since, but they were embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and have influenced alike our legislators and our courts.

IV

THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES

Constitutional provision

The Constitution of the United States authorized Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Previous to its adoption, in 1787, the nation had no power to act, but on Madison's motion, Congress, in May, 1783, recommended the States to pass acts securing copyright for fourteen years.

Early state legislation

Connecticut in January, 1783, Massachusetts in March, 1783, and Maryland in April, 1783, had already provided for copyright, twenty-one years being the usual period. New Jersey on May 27, 1783, and New Hampshire and Rhode Island in December of the same year, followed Madison's suggestion. Pennsylvania and South Carolina in March, 1784, Virginia and North Carolina in 1785, Georgia and New York in 1786, also passed copyright acts, so that all the thirteen States except Vermont had separately provided for copyright,—thanks to the vigorous copyright crusade of Noah Webster, who traveled from capital to capital,—when the United States statute of 1790 made them unnecessary.

The act of 1790

This act followed the precedent of the English act of 1710, and gave to authors who were citizens or residents, their heirs and assigns, copyright in books, maps and charts for fourteen years, with renewal for fourteen years more, if the author were living at expiration of the first term. A printed title must be deposited before publication in the clerk's office of the local United States District Court; notice must be printed four times in a newspaper within two months after publication; a copy must be deposited with the United States Secretary of State within six months after publication; the penalties were forfeiture and a fine of fifty cents for each sheet found, half to go to the United States; a remedy was provided against unauthorized publication of manuscripts.

1802-1867 The revised act of 1870 1874-1882

This original and fundamental act was followed by others—in 1802, requiring copyright record to be printed on or next the title-page, and including designs, engravings and etchings; in 1819, giving United States Circuit Courts original jurisdiction in copyright cases; in 1831 (a consolidation of previous acts), including musical compositions, extending the term to twenty-eight years, with renewal for fourteen years to author, widow, or children, doing away with the newspaper notice except for renewals, and providing for the deposit of a copy with the district clerk (for transmission to the Secretary of State) within three months after publication; in 1834, requiring record of assignment in the court of original entry; in 1846 (the act establishing the Smithsonian Institution), requiring one copy to be delivered to that, and one to the Library of Congress; in 1855, a postal provision for free mailing of deposits; in 1856, securing to dramatists the right of performance; in 1859, repealing the provision of 1846 for the deposit of copies, and making the Interior Department instead of the State Department the copyright custodian; in 1861, providing for appeal in all copyright cases to the Supreme Court; in 1865, including photographs and negatives, and again requiring deposit with the Library of Congress, within one month from publication; in 1867, providing $25 penalty for failure to deposit. This makes twelve acts bearing on copyright up to 1870, when a general act took the place of all, including "paintings, drawings, chromos, statues, statuary, and models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts." This did away with the local District Court system of registry, and made the Librarian of Congress the copyright officer, with whom printed title must be filed before, and two copies deposited within ten days after, publication. In 1873-4 the copyright act was included in the Revised Statutes as sections 4948 to 4971 (also see secs. 629 and 699), and in 1874 an amendatory act made legal a short form of record, "Copyright, 18__, by A. B.," and relegated labels to the Patent Office. In 1879 the Post Office appropriation bill contained a proviso against the transmission of any publication which violates copyright; in 1882 an amendment dealt with the position of the copyright notice on moulded, decorative articles, etc.

International copyright legislation, 1891

In 1891 there was passed, after a long campaign, the so-called international copyright act, extending copyright to the citizens of other nations in case of reciprocal grants by such nations, and providing that the copyright on books and certain other articles should be conditioned on manufacture in the United States. In 1893 an amendatory act gave the same effect to copies deposited "on or before publication." In 1895 the public documents bill provided that no government publication should be copyrighted, and another bill imposed penalties in the case of infringement of photographs and of original works of art. In 1897 an act provided that unauthorized representation, wilful and for profit, of any dramatic or musical composition is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment; another act provided for the appointment of a Register of Copyrights under the direction and supervision of the Librarian of Congress; and a third act provided penalty for printing false claim of copyright and prohibited the importation of articles bearing a false claim of copyright. In 1904 provision was made for protection to exhibitors of foreign literary, artistic or musical works at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition. A bill of 1905 permitted ad interim copyright for one year of books published abroad if registered here within thirty days publication and bearing notice of reservation.

Private copyright acts

A curious incident in American copyright legislation has been the passage of private copyright acts, nine in all, of which the earliest in 1828, as amended in 1830 and 1843, continued the copyright of John Rowlett "in a useful book, called Rowlett's Tables of discount and interest" from its original publication in 1802 till 1858,—curiously the present period of fifty-six years. In 1849 the copyright of Levi H. Corson in a perpetual calendar or almanac was renewed by special act. In 1854 an appropriation of $10,000 was made to Thomas H. Sumner for his new method of ascertaining a ship's position and the copyright was extinguished. In 1859 a special act gave to "Mistress Henry R. Schoolcraft" and her heirs for fourteen years the right to republish her husband's work on the Indian tribes originally published by order of Congress and to make any abridgement thereof, and a similar special copyright was voted in 1866 for Herndon's "Exploration of the Amazon" for his widow. An act of 1874 authorized the validation of William Tod Helmuth's work on surgery which had been imperfectly entered for copyright two years before, and a ninth private act in 1898 validated for like reason the copyright of Judson Jones in a work on orthoepy.

American possessions

In 1900 the act for the government of the territory of Hawaii repealed the Hawaiian copyright act of 1888 and extended United States copyright to Hawaii. In the same year the act providing temporary government for Porto Rico extended the copyright laws to that island. In 1904 the Attorney General rendered an opinion that Philippine authors were entitled to United States copyright but that the book must be manufactured within the United States. Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands, as well as Alaska, were later included by name in the jurisdiction of the code of 1909. American copyright was extended to the Canal Zone by War Department order in 1907.

The American code of 1909

Finally, in 1909, there was passed the new copyright code repealing all previous legislation and providing comprehensively for the whole subject of copyright, literary, artistic, dramatic, musical, or other. Under this code copyright is effected by publication with the statutory notice of copyright and completed by registration of two deposit copies sent to the Copyright Office promptly after publication. The manufacturing clause is continued and extended to require printing and binding as well as type-setting within the United States. The musical author is given control over mechanical reproductions though under provision for compulsory license in case he permits any such reproduction. The copyright term is for twenty-eight years with a like renewal term, making fifty-six years. Rights of performance are included under copyright, and unpublished works are specifically protected by special registration. These are the salient features of the code which is stated and discussed in detail in succeeding chapters.

State protection of playright

In line with the dramatic act of 1897, the dramatic authors between 1895 and 1905 procured state legislation in the States of New Hampshire, New York, Louisiana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Minnesota, California, Wisconsin, Connecticut and Michigan, differing somewhat in form, to give effect to the federal copyright laws in respect to dramatic performance or to apply the principles of common law through the punishment of dramatic companies disregarding performing rights.

Citations Trade-Mark act

Citations of all these laws will be found in Appendix A of the report of copyright legislation from the Register of Copyrights, included in the report of the Librarian of Congress for 1904; and the full text of the United States acts, except the later ones, are given in "Copyright Enactments 1783-1904" issued from the Copyright Office in 1905 as Bulletin No. 3, and in a second revised and enlarged edition, extending to 1906, reissued in 1906. The Trade-Mark act of February 20, 1905, supplemented by an act of May 4, 1906, covers the protection of labels, etc., excluded from copyright by the copyright act, and is given, with a list of trade-mark laws of foreign nations, and trade-mark treaties with them, rules, indexes, etc., in a Government publication, entitled "United States Statutes concerning the registry of trade-marks with the rules of the Patent Office relating thereto."

Common law relations

The act of 1790 received an interpretation, in 1834, in the case of Wheaton v. Peters (rival law reports), at the bar of the U. S. Supreme Court, which placed copyright in the United States exactly in the status it held in England after the decision of the House of Lords in 1774. The court referred directly to that decision as the ruling precedent, and declared that by the statute of 1790 Congress did not affirm an existing right, but created a right. It stated also that there was no common law of the United States and that (English) common law as to copyright had not been adopted in Pennsylvania, where the case arose. So late as 1880, in Putnam v. Pollard, claim was made that this ruling decision did not apply in New York, which, in its statute of 1786, expressly "provided, that nothing in this act shall extend to, affect, prejudice, or confirm the rights which any person may have to the printing or publishing of any books or pamphlets at common law, in cases not mentioned in this act." But the N. Y. Supreme Court decided that the precedent of Wheaton v. Peters nevertheless held. During the discussion of the present copyright code, Edward Everett Hale consulted with other veteran authors whose early works were passing out of copyright, with the intention of bringing a test case for the extension of copyright under common law after the expiration of the statutory period. But on proposing such a case to legal counsel he became assured that such a suit could not be maintained.

Divided opinions

As in the English case of Donaldson v. Becket, the decision in the American ruling case of Wheaton v. Peters came from a divided court. The opinion was handed down by Justice McLean, three other judges agreeing, Justices Thompson and Baldwin dissenting, a seventh judge being absent. The opinions of the dissenting judges, given in Eaton S. Drone's "A treatise on the law of property in intellectual productions," constitute one of the strongest statements ever made of natural rights in literary property, in opposition to the ruling that the right is solely the creature of the statute. "An author's right," says Justice Thompson, "ought to be esteemed an inviolable right established in sound reason and abstract morality." There seems, indeed, to be a sense of natural copyright among the American Indians; an Ojibwa brave will not sing the song belonging to another tribe or singer, and a Chippewa youth may learn his father's songs, on a customary gift of tobacco, but does not inherit the right to sing them.

V

SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT: RIGHTS AND EXTENT

General scope

The scope of copyright, or the nature and extent of the right or privilege, may be said to cover at common law identical rights with those in any other property, to use the phrase which, in Siam, transfers these rights to statutory law, but in statutory law must be taken to depend upon the terms of the statute.

American provisions

The new American copyright code, passed March 4, 1909, and in force July 1, 1909, in its fundamental provision broadly sets forth and specifically defines the scope of copyright, by providing (sec. 1): "That any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this Act, shall have the exclusive right:

"(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;

"(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a non-dramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other non-dramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art;

Oral addresses

"(c) To deliver or authorize the delivery of the copyrighted work in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address, or similar production;

Dramas

"(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama, or, if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever;

Music

"(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition and for the purpose of public performance for profit; and for the purposes set forth in subsection (a) hereof, to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced"—which last clause is, however, limited by an elaborate proviso requiring the licensing of mechanical musical reproductions in case the copyright proprietor permits any reproduction by that means, which proviso is given in full in the chapter on mechanical music.

Previous American law

The American law previously defined the scope of copyright (Rev. Stat. sec. 4952), as "the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending the same; and, in the case of a dramatic composition, of publicly performing or representing it, or causing it to be performed or represented by others. And authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own works." The new code is both broader and more definite.

Unpublished works

The new American code is specific in preserving to an author previous to the publication of his work all common law rights in the comprehensive language (sec. 2): "That nothing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor."

Common law scope

In the Washburn form of the copyright bill it was proposed to include a clause to the effect "that subject to the limitations and conditions of this Act copyright secured hereunder shall be entitled to all the rights and remedies which would be accorded to any other species of property at common law." But this provision was not accepted by the Congressional Committees and does not form part of the copyright code as enacted.

Common law in U. S. practice

The common law of England became the common law of its colonies and finally of the sovereign States of the United States, and common law is therefore administered by the state rather than by the federal courts. In the case of Wheaton v. Peters, the U. S. Supreme Court went so far as to say "there is no common law of the United States," but federal courts accept and apply in each State the common law as accepted in that State, and in later years the U. S. Supreme Court has held, as in 1901, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., that where there is a conflict between the common law as accepted by different States or where the rule adopted is not in accord with federal courts, the United States courts will recognize and enforce the common law of England. This use by the federal courts, as here pointed out by Justice Brewer, is peculiarly applicable to interstate transactions. The effect of section 2 of the copyright code is to give the federal courts the special authority of Congress to accept and enforce the principles of common law and of equity in the case of unpublished works.

Statutory limitations

But in the case of a published work, the courts have denied to copyright works some of the rights and remedies applicable previous to publication, because not specifically granted by statute, in accordance with the established rule that no rights or remedies will be allowed by the courts unless specifically granted. But the common law right of the author is recognized by the courts notwithstanding the publication of his work, if that is done without the author's consent. In 1896, in the case of Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, the doctrine was specifically held by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals through Judge Lacombe, that the unauthorized publisher may be restrained and damages obtained by civil action, and recovery in such an action will not divest the author of any of his rights or invest any of his rights in the infringer or the public.

General rights

Thus the owner of a copyrightable work may (before publication), as with other personal property, preserve his work exclusively for his own use, or he may (1) print, (2) reprint, (3) publish, (4) copy, or (5) vend it; or

If it be a literary work he may (6) translate it, or (7) make any other version thereof, or (8) dramatize it; or

If a work for oral delivery he may (9) deliver or authorize delivery in public for profit; or

If it be a dramatic work he may (10) convert it into a novel or other non-dramatic form or (11) perform or represent it, or (as in 5) vend any manuscript or record thereof, or (12) make or cause to be made any transcription or record thereof; or (13) exhibit, perform, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method; or

If it be a musical work he may (14) arrange or (15) adapt it, or (as in 11) perform it publicly for profit, or (16) make any arrangement or (17) setting of the melody in any notation or by any form of record (the last subject to the license provision of the statute); or

If a design for a work of art, he may (18) complete, execute, and finish it,

—all these being specifically reserved and granted to the author, although in somewhat complex and overlapping phraseology, by the new American code.

Inferential rights

Or, in utilizing his rights at common law or as above granted by statute, he may (19) give, (20) lend, (21) grant, (22) sell, (23) manufacture, (24) lease or license, (25) mortgage, or (26) devise his work or the use of it, or (27) it may pass by inheritance,—as pointed out by Arthur Steuart, chairman of the Copyright Committee of the American Bar Association, in his argument before the Congressional Committees.

Differentiated rights

Or, as also pointed out by Mr. Steuart, he may "impose upon any of these estates any condition or limit," as by limiting the use (28) for special purposes, (29) at a special price, or (30) for a special time, or (31) in a special locality, or (32) to a special person.

Court protection

The rights scheduled, adds Mr. Steuart, the courts will protect (a) "in equity by injunction and the recovery of profits"; or (b) "at law by a civil action for trespass or conversion, with a recovery of special damages for actual injury or punitive damages for injury to reputation, or by replevin for the recovery of possession of the work, as well as by any other form of action known to the common law or statute law and proper to the protection of this class of property."

Division of rights

The owner of the copyright of a book may thus publish a limited edition of his book and sell it to whom he may please, or for a specified market. Such specified or divided rights are recognized in Germany as "getheiltes Verlagsrecht," in France as "édition partagée," and there is specific reference to them in the German copyright law. Some of the specified rights are cognate to the rights of a proprietor of land to sell a piece of land subject to certain restrictions, agreed upon with the purchaser or imposed upon the title in the deed of transfer. As in the frequent practice of restricting use for the purposes of a stable or a shop, or requiring that only one house shall be built on a specified number of lots.

Analysis of property rights

In an elaborate discussion of fundamental principles in his opinion in Harper v. Donohue, in 1905, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in 1906, Judge Sanborn analyzed the property rights of an author before publication, after unrestricted publication and after publication under the copyright acts. Among the rights before publication he mentions "the right to sell and assign the author's interest, either absolutely or conditionally, with or without qualification, limitation or restriction, territorial or otherwise, by oral or written transfer. Such literary property is not subject either to execution or taxation, because this might include a forced sale, the very thing the owner has the right to prevent." "Unrestricted publication," he says, "without copyright, is a transfer to the public to do most of the things the author might do, in common with the author, except all right of transfer and sale, which remains to the author; but without advantage, since the work has become, by the publication, common property." "The copyright acts," he concludes, "substantially give the following additional rights: To copyright, and thus secure the sole privilege of unlimited multiplication and sale of copies; to sell or transfer the unlimited right of reproduction, sale and publication, the limited right of serial publication, the right of publication in book form, the right of translation, the right of dramatization or one or more of these rights in specific territory, and the right to secure a copyright either generally, or in one or more countries whose laws permit it, either in the name of the author or assignee. Also the right to the author to license the sale or other restricted enjoyment of some lesser right, without the power to copyright."

The courts have indeed held to very broad principles as to such rights. In the case of Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, the court said:

Broad interpretation

"The right of property includes the right to transfer the subject of it or any interest in it by gift, grant, or device. And if the fruits of mental effort are regarded as property, like all other possessions, they descend to the legatees, the executors, and administrators of their creditors; they pass by sale or gift to their transferees; the use of them, limited or unlimited, goes to their licensees, and, logically, the power of the State is bound to protect forever the successive owners in the exclusive use and enjoyment thereof."

Limits of protection

Where these latter rights are not specifically granted by statute, the rule has been established by the courts that they will be upheld so far as necessarily inferable from the rights granted and not further. It is under this rule that the greater number of the mooted questions in the application of copyright law have arisen in respect to the scope of copyright. Most of these specific rights are in fact necessary inferences from the statute, in the protection of the property rights therein conferred, but the courts will not go beyond fair construction of the letter of the statute.

Differentiated contracts

In respect to the rights to give, lend, grant, manufacture, lease or license, mortgage or devise copyright property, it may be said that these are subsidiary rights conditioned on and essential to the general right of property in copyrightable or copyrighted material. An author may exercise any of these rights in respect to his unpublished work so far as they are applicable to it, or to his copyrighted work after publication; and either the copyrightable manuscript or the copyrighted work may pass by inheritance. Thus an author may manufacture, or cause to be manufactured, his unpublished work, and he may retain exclusive control over the manufactured copies so long as he pleases before publishing the work; and after publication (which involves placing on public sale, or publicly distributing) he may exercise these rights negatively by withdrawing his work from further sale. The English law, however, contains a provision that in certain cases the Crown may require continuance of publication.

Enforcement in limited grants

In respect to the right to limit the use of his work under his sale, gift, loan, grant, lease, etc., for a special purpose or at a special price, or for a special time, or in a special locality or to a special person, these powers of limitation, though implied in the grant of copyright, are dependent for their enforcement rather upon the law of contracts than upon copyright law.

There can be no such thing as a copyright for a special purpose or for a special locality, or under other special conditions, for there can be only one copyright, and that a general copyright, in any one work. But specific contracts can be made, enforceable under the law of contracts, as for the sale of a copyrighted book within a certain territory, provided such contracts or limitations are not contrary to other laws. Although record of assignment in the Copyright Office is provided for by the law only for the copyright in general, the separate estates as a right to publish in a periodical and the right to publish as a book may be sold and assigned separately, and the special assignment recorded in the Copyright Office, though this does not convey a right to substitute in the copyright notice a name other than that of the recorded proprietor of the general copyright, which can only be changed as specifically provided in the law under recorded assignment of the entire copyright.

Copyright as monopoly

Copyright is a monopoly to which the government assures protection in granting the copyright. It is a monopoly not in the offensive sense, but in the sense of private and personal ownership; the public is not the loser but is the gainer by the protection and encouragement given to the author. The whole aim of copyright protection is to permit the author to sell as he pleases and to transfer his rights collectively or severally to such assigns as he may choose. Copyright is a monopoly only in the sense that any ownership is a monopoly. Says Herbert Spencer: "If I am a monopolist, so also are you; so also is every man. If I have no right to those products of my brain, neither have you to those of your hands. No one can become the sole owner of any article whatever; and all property is 'robbery.'" In the copyright debates of 1891, Senator O. H. Platt rightly said: "The very essence of copyright is the privilege of controlling the market. That is the only way in which a man's property in the work of his brain can be assured." And as Senator Evarts pointed out in the same debate: "The sole question is what we shall do concerning something which is the essential nature of copyright and patent protection, namely, monopoly." In discussing patent monopoly and the law of contracts in Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Baker, said, in 1903, that "within his domain the patentee is czar. The people must take the invention on the terms he dictates or let it alone for seventeen years." Thus as the government grants and guarantees the monopoly, it is not to be taken as in restraint of trade or otherwise contrary to law. Said Judge Cullen in the case of Murphy v. Christian Press Association, in the Appellate Division of the N. Y. Supreme Court, in 1899, decisions as to agreements in restraint of trade "have no application to agreements concerning copyrights and patents, the very object of which is to give monopolies."

Limit only in term

Copyright being in essence a monopoly giving to the copyright proprietor "exclusive rights," as the Constitution provides, the only limitation upon it should be that indicated in the Constitution which confines protection to "limited times." The opponents of copyright have frequently taken the course of falling back upon the plea that in the interests of the public the author should not have exclusive right to his writings and to manage his own affairs, but that Congress should prescribe how he should market his property. This commonly takes shape in the licensing scheme known in England as the Farrer plan and in America as the Pearsall-Smith plan, with respect to books; and in the passage of the "international copyright amendment" of 1891 this plan was made the basis of attack upon the measure. An analysis of the scheme as presented by R. Pearsall-Smith of Philadelphia is given by G. H. Putnam, from the book publisher's point of view, in the "Question of copyright." In the work on "The law and history of copyright," by Augustine Birrell, a member of the present British cabinet, this plan is characterized as a "preposterous scheme." In the case of a book, for instance, a publisher often suggests to the author the general idea of the book, so that it would be doubly unjust to permit any other publisher to issue that book on the compulsory license scheme; and this might hold true, although to less extent, in other fields of copyright. In any event, the original publisher makes large investment not only in type-setting, printing, and binding a book, or in the publishing of any other work, but in advertising and making a market, and that a rival publisher should have the benefit of this market without paying the cost is a violation of the very essence of property. This scheme, however, is applied, in a limited way and as a compromise, respecting mechanical music, in the American code of 1909, and constitutes its most serious defect. There is question, indeed, whether the compulsory license and fixed price may not be an unconstitutional provision. This matter is more fully discussed in later chapters.

Altered theory of copyright

It should be noted that whereas the previous American law required certain statutory formalities before publication, the new American code somewhat alters the theory of copyright, and more nearly conforms statutory with common law, by making publication with notice the initial copyright act and registration and deposit secondary acts necessary for the completion of the copyright and its protection under the statute.

Publishing

The definition of the date of publication (sec. 62) as "the earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under his authority" remedies the vagueness of the previous law and adopts into the statute court decisions to the effect that acts not by the authority of the author or proprietor do not constitute publication in the sense of dedication to the public. In other words, it is made clear that the right to publish inheres in the author and that he cannot be divested of it without his consent. This is the fundamental principle of the new law in the vital matter of protecting the author at the critical point at which an unpublished work, absolutely his own, becomes a published work, subject to statute. In this respect the American code of 1909 comes very close to the acceptance of the right in intellectual property as a natural and inherent right.

What constitutes publishing

As to what constitutes publishing, interpretation by the courts based on previous law will in many respects be applicable to the new code. A book which has been sold or leased to subscribers on a contract of restricted use is none the less published, as was set forth in the opinion by Chief Judge Parker of the N. Y. Court of Appeals in Jewellers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewellers' Weekly Pub. Co. in 1898, and in the opinion by Judge Putnam of the U. S. Circuit Court in Massachusetts in Ladd v. Oxnard in 1896, both having reference to credit-rating books leased to subscribers for their individual use.

"Privately printed" works

Publication depends upon sale or offer to the public, and it is a question whether the sale or offer of a copyrightable work, as the proceedings or publications of a society, to the members of that society only, constitutes publication, to be passed upon by the courts in view of the specific facts. A work "privately printed" or with the imprint "printed but not published," given or even sold by the author to his friends, and not sold generally by his authority, would probably not be held to be published; but the courts would probably hold that the sale of a work, though "privately printed," to merely nominal members of a nominal society, made up of the purchasers of the work, would constitute publication and, if without copyright notice, dedication.

Copying

As to the right to copy, this word in the broad sense as interpreted by the courts, covers the duplicating or multiplying of copies within the stated scope of the statute. It was argued in the mechanical music cases that the word copy extends to any form or method of duplication by which the thought of the author can be recorded or conveyed, but, as more fully stated in the chapter on mechanical music, the U. S. Supreme Court in White-Smith v. Apollo Co. in 1908 upheld the decision below that a perforated roll is not a copy in fact of staff notation, and thus limited the statutory use of the word to duplication by similar or corresponding process. It was for this reason that such specific phrases as "to make any other version," "to convert," "to arrange or adapt," "to make transcription or record" were included in the new code, although these would be included in the broader sense of the right "to copy."

Vending

The right to vend covers by a comprehensive word those general rights of sale through which only can the author obtain remuneration for his work. The most important question which has arisen in respect to the application of this word, which is used both in the previous laws and in the present code, has been as to the use of this exclusive right to limit the conditions of sale after the original sale from the author or proprietor as vendor to the immediate vendee. The courts have in general held that the copyright and patent laws, while creating a legal monopoly for the author or original proprietor, do not authorize any continuing control, and have indeed gone so far as to indicate that a sale is absolute and complete unless limited by special contract within the principles of common or statutory law of contracts. In the leading case of Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., the U. S. Supreme Court in 1895, through Justice Shiras, said:

Control of sale

"Upon the doctrine of these cases we think it follows that one who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or place. Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchaser is not a question before us and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect of the patent laws."