COPYRIGHT (continued 5)
Reading edition
Music transmissal
"Moreover, invention is now developing a series of reproducing mechanisms such as Dr. Cahill's 'telharmonicon' or 'dynamophone,' in which musical compositions will be translated to the ear without the interposition even of a cylinder or disc sound-record; and it seems a common-sense inference that the musical composer should have as full rights in this as in other forms of copying or reproducing his thought. Buda-Pesth is said to have not only a telephone 'newspaper,' but a system of reading novels and other works of literature to telephone subscribers, and if this should reach such proportions as substantially to reduce the sale of the printed copies of a new novel from which the author would receive benefit, it would also seem a common-sense inference that the same or an equivalent royalty should be paid him.
Music notation
"In music writing or notation there are two and only two essentials: relative vertical position, showing pitch, and relative horizontal position, showing duration of notes. The earliest form of our present music writing is the system of the 'large,' 'long,' 'breve' and 'semi-breve' notes, in which the pitch was shown by the vertical relations of the notes, and the length of the note by the length of the black mark, the 'large' mark being twice the length of the 'long' mark. This corresponds closely to the perforated music roll of to-day, which could be read by a practiced eye with and probably without staff lines, to the extent that if every other form of reproduction were destroyed, the melody and harmony of a musical work could be reproduced into the ordinary notation of music writing. I speak from personal knowledge of these music rolls, having had a mechanical instrument for some years. The different kinds of rolls differ in the relative spacing and in distance from the edge of the roll, which gives the standard, but a foreshortened photograph of any, bringing them to the same scale, would pattern closely the early form of music writing above cited. The London postal telegraph system dispatches newspaper material from St. Martin's le Grand throughout the kingdom from continuous perforated ribbons made somewhat in the same way, visible and legible only to an expert, and reproductions by the medium of this device would certainly not vitiate copyright.
The law prior to 1909
"It may be observed that the existing law gives to the author or proprietor of a musical composition the sole liberty not only of printing, but of publishing, copying, vending, performing, or representing a musical composition; that the statute does not restrict 'copying' either to a copy of 'staff notation' or from or in any particular form, but prohibits in general any copy of a musical composition; that there is no suggestion in the statute that the copy must be one to be read, e. g., a copy of a sculpture; that any sound-record is in the wide sense as truly a copy of a musical composition as a printed sheet, which is not a copy, in fact, of the author's manuscript writing; and that as the roll has for its sole purpose the performing by the aid of a mechanism useless without it, of a musical composition, just as a printed sheet of music has the sole purpose of the performing by the aid of the voice, the piano, or the orchestra, of a musical composition, the maker and vendor of the roll is in exactly the same position as the maker or vendor of a printed sheet of music.
Manuscript and copies
"But even if phonograph and perforated records should not be considered, as is sculpture, to be 'writings,' the arguments of the opponents of this bill do not fit the case. The Constitution explicitly provides that authors shall have exclusive rights to their writings. This cannot mean exclusive rights to their written manuscripts, for these are protected by common law and no constitutional provision was necessary. It meant and means evidently that authors shall have exclusive rights to the benefits of their writings, the usufruct of the property they have created, and that means practically a monopoly control over all copies or reproductions from such writings, whether the copies are in handwriting, printing, or any other form. A musical score is definitely a writing, for it is even more than a literary manuscript, originally in the personal handwriting of the composer himself, without the intervention of a stenographer or a typewriting machine. Therefore, if the narrowest meaning of the word 'writings' should be interpreted into the Constitution such as would exclude sculptures and other works which are admittedly proper and legal subjects of copyright, it would still specifically include musical and dramatic as well as literary manuscripts. There is no specification in the Constitution confining the exclusive rights over writings to copies in handwriting or print or any other stated process of reproduction; in fact, the Constitution does not use the word 'copyright' or in any way limit by specification the comprehensiveness of the exclusive rights Congress is thus authorized to secure. Indeed, Congress in the copyright laws has interpreted the Constitution to cover the several artistic or reproductive processes from time to time developed or invented; thus in the law of 1865 the provisions of the copyright laws were extended to include 'photographs,' which did not exist at the time of the adoption of the Constitution—which word specifically means 'light-writings' as phonograph records specifically mean 'sound-writings.'
Protection of the inventor The counter argument
"The position taken by the American Copyright League is that an author is literally entitled to the exclusive right, that is, the exclusive benefit, in his writings, in whatever form the writings, that is, his recorded thoughts, can be reproduced for sale or gain. If Mark Twain writes a book or Bronson Howard a play or Sousa or Victor Herbert a musical composition or Millet makes a painting or French a statue, each is equally entitled to whatever benefit inures from his creative genius. Mr. Sousa has stated clearly that although Caruso has been paid $3000—and the fact widely advertised—for singing into a phonograph record, and his own band (not under his leadership) has also been paid for playing his compositions and those of others into the phonograph horn, he has never received as a musical composer one cent for such use of his creations, though from twenty to a hundred of his compositions are to be found on the catalogues of the several manufacturers of mechanical instruments. Mr. J. Howlett Davis, who properly appeared as an inventor in defense of his own inventions in mechanical instruments, which he mistakenly believes would be rendered useless if the copyright protection were extended to sound-records, really asked that Congress should protect the thing which he had invented, and compel users to pay for it, but should permit him to use the thought which the musical composer had invented and expressed, without paying for it. His argument analyzed presents an even stronger argument for the proposed copyright bill than for the protection of patented inventions. When Mr. Sousa buys a patented cornet he has paid for the use of it, but Mr. Sousa makes no claim either to make another cornet like it or to play copyrighted musical compositions for profit without payment or permission. A piano, a pianola, a music roll or new form of mechanism, is patentable; a musical composition as played on a piano by hand or by mechanism, whether reproduced on a printed sheet or a mechanical roll, is copyrightable; but each should have like protection. I speak from specific knowledge as one who has taken out patents as well as copyrights and as the active head for some years of the Edison Illuminating Company of New York and a participant in successfully defending the Edison lamp patents. Mr. Edison, both as an inventor and as a manufacturer of his own inventions, has profited much more than a million dollars from his patents, and would naturally be expected to be foremost in upholding the right of authors to payment for their brains."
Complete protection
The acceptance by most countries within the International Copyright Union of the Berlin convention, without reservation on this question of mechanical music, sets an example of complete protection of the musical composer which it is hoped may be ultimately adopted by the United States as well as by other countries.
XIII
ARTISTIC COPYRIGHT
Threefold value in art works
The artist-author, by the labor of his brain and hand, produces three classes of property right or a threefold value: he receives recompense from the sale of the original work made by his hand, or from the exhibition of it, or from the reproduction and sale of copies. The new American code is perhaps in advance of legislation in any other country in the protection of the artist, for it assures to him separate values in the right to sell his work and the right to reproduce and sell copies, neither one of which rights is necessarily transferred with the other; it enables him to copyright his original work before the reproduction of copies, though it does not make absolutely clear whether the exhibition without restriction of an uncopyrighted work results in dedication; and it protects his right to control and profit from reproductions, with the simplest possible copyright notice, not including date, though as to lithographic and photo-engraving reproductions it requires manufacture in this country. The literary, dramatic or musical author produces no value in the original work itself, except as his fame may ultimately make his manuscript valuable as an autograph, and in this respect the artist-author has an advantage of practical importance in the general provision separating the copyright from the right in the material object. On the other hand, show-right or right of exhibition is not as specifically treated or as clearly defined and protected as is playright or right of performance in the case of drama or music.
American provisions
The copyright of works of the fine arts and cognate works is specifically provided for in the code of 1909 by including as subject-matter of copyright (sec. 5) the following divisions: "(f) Maps; (g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art; (h) Reproductions of a work of art; (i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character; (j) Photographs; (k) Prints and pictorial illustrations." It is not intended to include under subsection (k) labels or prints of advertising or commercial character which may be registered as trade-marks under the Trade-Mark law in the Patent Office. The proprietor of a work of art is given in addition to the general rights (sec. 1, a) the specific rights (sec. 1, b) "to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art."
Copyright Office classification definitions
The new Copyright Office Rules and Regulations, promulgated 1910, define these classifications in the following language:
"11. (f) Maps.—This term includes all cartographical works, such as terrestrial maps, plats, marine charts, star maps, but not diagrams, astrological charts, landscapes, or drawings of imaginary regions which do not have a real existence.
"12. (g) Works of art.—This term includes all works belonging fairly to the so-called fine arts. (Paintings, drawings, and sculpture.)
"Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character are not subject to copyright registration, even if artistically made or ornamented.
"No copyright exists in toys, games, dolls, advertising novelties, instruments or tools of any kind, glassware, embroideries, garments, laces, woven fabrics, or any similar articles.
"13. (h) Reproductions of works of art.—This term refers to such reproductions (engravings, woodcuts, etchings, casts, etc.) as contain in themselves an artistic element distinct from that of the original work of art which has been reproduced.
"14. (i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character.—This term includes diagrams or models illustrating scientific or technical works, architects' plans, designs for engineering work, etc.
"15. (j) Photographs.—This term covers all positive prints from photographic negatives, including those from moving picture films (the entire series being counted as a single photograph), but not photogravures, half tones, and other photo-engravings.
"16. (k) Prints and pictorial illustrations.—This term comprises all printed pictures not included in the various other classes enumerated above.
"Articles of utilitarian purpose do not become capable of copyright registration because they consist in part of pictures which in themselves are copyrightable, e. g., puzzles, games, rebuses, badges, buttons, buckles, pins, novelties of every description, or similar articles.
"Postal cards cannot be copyrighted as such. The pictures thereon may be registered as 'prints or pictorial illustrations' or as 'photographs.' Text matter on a postal card may be of such a character that it may be registered as a 'book.'
"Mere ornamental scrolls, combinations of lines and colors, decorative borders, and similar designs, or ornamental letters or forms of type are not included in the designation 'prints and pictorial illustrations.' Trademarks cannot be copyrighted nor registered in the Copyright Office."
The question of exhibition
The new law does not specifically make clear the relation between the exhibition of works of art and publication, or define whether or not exhibition may constitute dedication to the public and thus prevent the protection of the copyright thereafter. But in making copyright a sequent to publication (sec. 9) and providing (sec. 2) "that nothing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work," it makes it at least probable that the author of an artistic or cognate work who simply exhibits, does not surrender the right to copyright. The trend of the courts in recent decisions has been, as in the Werkmeister case, cited below, to protect exhibited works, at least where any reservation of rights could be construed into the circumstances of the exhibition; but it is still uncertain whether the exhibition of a work of art at a public museum where there is no regulation against copying or reservation by the artist, might not constitute a dedication and thus prevent later copyright.
Protection of unpublished work
In providing however (sec. 11) specifically "that copyright may also be had of the works of an author of which copies are not reproduced for sale, by the deposit, with claim of copyright ... of a photographic print if the work be a photograph; or of a photograph or other identifying reproduction thereof if it be a work of art or a plastic work or drawing," it gives to the artist or the author of a cognate work an easy means of protecting his production beyond question; and he is not wise who neglects the simple precaution provided in the law.
Copyright notice
It is not made absolutely clear in the new law whether the copyright notice must be attached to the original of a work of art; but again the provision for protection is so simple that it is wise to take advantage of the method of the law, by placing the copyright notice on the original. The copyright notice may be in the form (sec. 18) "'Copyright' or the abbreviation 'Copr.' accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor," the year of publication not being required in the case of an artistic work. It is further provided that "in the case of copies of works specified in subsections (f) to (k), inclusive, of section five of this Act, the notice may consist of the letter C inclosed within a circle, thus: ©, accompanied by the initials, monogram, mark, or symbol of the copyright proprietor: Provided, That on some accessible portion of such copies or of the margin, back, permanent base, or pedestal, or of the substance on which such copies shall be mounted, his name shall appear."
If the copyright notice is attached to the original, it is not made clear whether it should be on the face of the work and visible to the casual spectator; but again the wise artist will take an easy precaution.
Deposit
It is further required (sec. 12) that "if the work is not reproduced in copies for sale, there shall be deposited the copy, print, photograph, or other identifying reproduction" required as above stated, "accompanied in each case by a claim of copyright."
The new Copyright Office Rules and Regulations schedule (17) among unpublished works that may be registered "(c) photographic prints; (d) works of art (paintings, drawings, and sculpture), and (e) plastic works," and states specifically as to the deposit in such cases:
"19. (2) In the case of photographs, deposit one copy of a positive print of the work. (Photo-engravings or photogravures are not photographs within the meaning of this provision.)
"20. (3) In the case of works of art, models or designs for works of art, or drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character, deposit a photographic reproduction."
As deposit in the case of an unpublished work takes the place of publication and deposit in the case of works reproduced for sale, there can be no claim for statutory protection of an unpublished work of art without the deposit of the identifying copy, and the general provision (sec. 13) for fine and for voiding of copyright in the case of non-deposit, has, of course, no bearing on unpublished works. Any action or proceeding in respect to an unpublished work not registered by deposit must therefore be under common law and not under statutory provision.
Summary of requirements
To sum up, the author of a work of art, who is exhibiting his painting or statue or other work and not multiplying copies for sale, will assure himself of full protection if before such exhibition he places on the original work, in some visible but not obtrusive fashion, the letter C inclosed in a circle with his name or mark, and deposits a photograph of such work with the Librarian of Congress or in the mails addressed to him, accompanied by a claim of copyright,—for which an application form (J2, "photograph not reproduced for sale") is furnished on request, by the Copyright Office from Washington,—with inclosure of one dollar.
As soon as the artist multiplies copies for sale, or permits reproduction of his work, as in a newspaper report of an exhibition, for instance, he must then take the precaution of depositing two copies of such reproduction as provided in general by the act, and it is further provided (sec. 18) "that on some accessible portion of such copies or of the margin, back, permanent base, or pedestal, or of the substance on which such copies shall be mounted, his name shall appear." In case two copies are not so deposited, it is probable that a fine and forfeiture of copyright would ultimately ensue, as indicated in section 13.
Material and immaterial properties distinct
It is specifically provided (sec. 41) that copyright is distinct from the property in the material object, which accomplishes for the artist the important result that when he sells his painting he does not transfer the copyright, but retains that for himself unless he specifically contracts with the buyer to include in the sale the copyright or the right to copyright. This adopts into the law the decision of the courts that copyright does not pass with a painting unless distinctly included in the transfer. The provision (sec. 41) is specific that the copyright "is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright constitute a transfer of the title to the material object." Thus the author of a work of art has two separate properties, the painting, statue or other work in itself, on the one hand, and the copyright or the right to copyright on the other, neither of which is transferred by the transfer of the other unless both are specifically included in the transfer.
Manufacturing clause covers lithographs and photo-engravings Foreign subjects excepted
The copyright in certain classes of reproductions of works of art is dependent however on manufacture in this country, as in the case of books. This provision no longer includes photographs as in the preceding law, but is confined specifically (sec. 15) to "text produced by lithographic process, or photo-engraving process," "illustrations within a book consisting of printed text and illustrations produced by lithographic process, or photo-engraving process, and also to separate lithographs or photo-engravings, except where in either case the subjects represented are located in a foreign country and illustrate a scientific work or reproduce a work of art." It is further provided that "in the case of the book ... if the text be produced by lithographic process, or photo-engraving process ... the copies so deposited shall be accompanied by an affidavit ... that such process was wholly performed within the limits of the United States." This affidavit, therefore, is not required in the case of separate lithographs or photo-engravings. The manufacturing provisions chiefly concern the publishers of books, but they imply that artists cannot send works abroad to have reproductions made. But by the opinion of January 9, 1911, approved by the Attorney-General, a design, drawing, or painting made and located abroad intended as "the first step" for lithographic reproduction, may be registered, if a "work of art"—which question of fact is to be determined by the Register of Copyrights; and such lithographic reproductions of it may be imported.
German post cards
It was held by the Attorney-General January 27, 1910, that lithographic reproductions of original paintings in the form of illustrated post cards made in Germany, are subject to registration, provided the original paintings may properly be classified as works of art; and thus importation of such post cards would be permissible.
Artistic merit unimportant
While there must be originality in a work of art, especially under English law, this means little more than a prohibition of actual copying, and as in the case of literary and dramatic works, artistic merit is of little importance.
Application forms Certificates
The Copyright Office furnishes without charge application forms, lettered as indicated, for the following classes of art works: (F) published map; (G) work of art (painting, drawing, or sculpture); or model or design for a work of art; (H) reproduction of a work of art; (I) drawing or plastic work of a scientific or technical character; (J1) photograph published for sale, (J2) photograph not reproduced for sale; (K) print or pictorial illustration. Thus the applicant should send for application blank (G), if for an original work of art, (H), if for a reproduction, or the proper blank in the other specified cases. But it should be noted that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to apply separately under different blanks as (G) and (H), since the single copyright on the original work covers reproductions. Certificates are returned by the Copyright Office on receipt of the application form and of the statutory fee of one dollar, covering the same specified subjects.
Term in unpublished work
When an original work of art is copyrighted, but is not published by reproduction of copies for sale or distribution, it is uncertain under the law, as in the case of dramatic and musical compositions, from what date the copyright protection runs and whether the sole right of reproducing copies for sale terminates at the end of a statutory term beginning with the registration of the original work or with its publication by the reproduction of copies for sale. The Copyright Office issues a certificate of the registration of the original work as covering a period of twenty-eight years and will doubtless base a renewal on the termination of this term; and only a court decision will determine whether the copyright of the original unpublished work exists in perpetuity until publication or whether the right to reproduce copies for sale lapses with the termination of twenty-eight or fifty-six years from the registration of the original work.
Date not required Re-copyright objectionable
The omission of the requirement of date in the copyright notice in the case of a work of art is significant and important, although it has the disadvantage that knowledge of the expiration of the term of copyright can be had only by specific inquiry from the Copyright Office. It has been the mistaken practice of more than one artist, under the old law, to enter copyright on his original sketch or on his original work under date of its beginning, again on the finished original under date of its completion, and possibly again on reproductions under the date of the first publication of copies; and when also the artist changed the name of his work under these progressions, confusion became worse confounded. From this superfluous zeal and mistaken carefulness, serious results have come, as in Caliga v. Inter-Ocean Newspaper Co., decided in 1909 by the U. S. Supreme Court through Justice Day, wherein an artist failed to protect himself against an infringing reproduction, because he brought suit under a second copyright which he had entered on finishing his picture, instead of under the original and lawful copyright, under which he had originally entered his work. The fact that by this second copyrighting he laid claim to a longer term than the law allowed, made the second copyright void and a suit under it of no avail. Under the new law the author of a work of art is not only given specifically the exclusive right "to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art" as in the previous law, so that an artistic work is protected by one copyright from design to completion and reproduction; but he may also protect his original work during its progress or exhibition before publication and thus safeguard his future right to control and benefit from the multiplication of copies.
Exhibition right transfer
In case of the sale of the original work of art, the right to exhibit, of course, passes with the original, although the right to copyright and reproduce copies is expressly reserved to the artist. In view of the uncertainty whether the unrestricted public exhibition of a work of art constitutes dedication and prevents copyright thereof, the carelessness of the purchaser of the original might raise question as to the validity of later copyright of reproductions by the artist. It is therefore unwise for an artist to sell the original of a work of art without affixing to it the required copyright notice and depositing one copy of an identifying photograph or print.
Early English decision
The leading case under English law as to exhibition is that of Turner v. Robinson in the Irish Court of Chancery in 1860, previous to the passage of the act of 1862 which first provided statutory copyright for paintings, and interpretative therefore of common law. Turner's "Death of Chatterton" had been reproduced in a magazine and exhibited at the Royal Academy and in Manchester, and was thereafter exhibited for the purpose of obtaining subscriptions for an engraving, in Dublin, where a photographer copied it and published a stereoscopic reproduction. The Master of the Rolls held that the painting had never been published because the exhibitions were on condition that no copies should be made, and the engraving in the magazine was only a rough representation and not a publication of the picture. The Court of Appeal also held against the defendant, but because of his breach of contract, and declined to decide whether there had been publication in London or Manchester. The Lord Chancellor, however, expressed the opinion that exhibition at the Academy, though conditioned, was publication, though a private view in a studio rather than a picture gallery would not be. The Court of Appeal did not pass on the further opinion of the Master of the Rolls that the publication of a print was not publication of the picture. These confusing opinions left the question in very misty shape and the most important interpretation of English practice has come from an American court.
The Werckmeister leading case
The latest and leading case as to exhibition is that of Werckmeister v. American Lithograph Co., American Tobacco Co., et al., which was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1907, in an opinion written by Justice Day. The English artist Sadler had sold, in 1894, to Werckmeister of the Berlin Photographic Co. the copyright in his picture "Chorus," which he exhibited at the Royal Academy Exhibition of 1894, and the design had been reproduced by the American Lithograph Co. for use on an American Tobacco Co. label, though the photograph had been given protection by copyright. In reply to the claim of the infringers that such exhibition constituted dedication to the public, the Supreme Court's decision quoted from Slater on "The law relating to copyright and trade-marks."
U. S. Supreme Court opinion
"It is a fundamental rule that to constitute publication there must be such a dissemination of the work of art itself among the public as to justify the belief that it took place with the intention of rendering such work common property," the court adding, "and that author instances as one of the occasions that does not amount to a general publication the exhibition of a work of art at a public exhibition where there are by-laws against copies or where it is tacitly understood that no copying shall take place, and the public are admitted to view the painting on the implied understanding that no improper advantage will be taken of the privilege. We think this doctrine is sound and the result of the best considered cases." The court said further: "We do not mean to say that the public exhibition of a painting or statue where all might see and freely copy it might not amount to publication within the statute, regardless of the artist's purpose or notice of reservation of rights which he takes no measure to protect."
Unrestricted exhibition hazardous
In fact, in Pierce & Bushnell Co. v. Werckmeister, in 1896, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Colt, had held that the exhibition of Naujok's painting of St. Cecilia, in Berlin and Munich, without copyright notice on the original work, constituted publication and dedication, and therefore denied protection to photographic copies thereafter copyrighted and published.
Reservation on sale
That the sale of the original work of art as a material object does not involve the transfer of the copyright is a direct application in the new American code of previous judicial decisions. In Werckmeister v. Springer Lith. Co., in 1894, where the defense contended that the purchaser of a painting was the person authorized to become the copyright proprietor, this contention was absolutely overruled, in the U. S. Circuit Court in New York, by Judge Townsend. But it may nevertheless be desirable to include in any contract of sale a specific reservation of copyright, especially in the case of works executed for public authorities or to be exhibited in a public place. In Dielman v. White, in 1900, Judge Lowell in the U. S. Circuit Court in Massachusetts declined to enjoin a photograph of certain mosaics by Dielman in the Library of Congress, the original cartoon for which as sent to Venice, as well as the mosaic work itself, bore copyright notice, on the ground that the correspondence with the government constituting the contract, did not clearly reserve to the artist the right to copyright and prevent copying,—though this decision may be questioned.
Publication construed
The courts are disposed to limit the definition of publication to insure the fullest protection of an author's right. In Werckmeister v. Springer Lith. Co. it was further held by Judge Townsend that the printing in an exhibition catalogue of a cut of a painting was for the information of patrons and was not publication. In the same case the defense contended that the sale of an earlier replica of the plaintiff's painting constituted a publication and forfeited copyright, but the court held that the replica was not a copy but was made beforehand to assist in the preparation of the painting afterward copyrighted, and that there was no publication.
In Falk v. Gast, in 1893, where the defense claimed that the copyright notice was omitted from published copies, referring to a sample sheet of miniature reproductions sent to dealers for their information and convenience, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Shipman, held that this issue of sample sheets did not constitute publication. This doctrine of limitation had a curious application in Harper v. Shoppell, in 1886, in which Judge Wallace, in the U. S. District Court, held, where an electrotyper had sold to a third party an unauthorized electrotype of a copyrighted illustration, that the copyright law was not violated because the illustration had not been printed or published.
Danger of forfeiture
The artist-author or the proprietor of an artistic copyright should be most careful to comply with the statutory requirements as to notice and other formalities, as otherwise copyright may be forfeited. Several court decisions indicate that the copyright notice should be placed on the original when exhibited, even if copies are not then reproduced for sale; and as the question is not made quite clear in the new code, it is wise to follow this indication. In the original trial in 1902 of the Werckmeister case, Judge Thomas in the U. S. Circuit Court held that the omission of copyright notice from the exhibited original waived the copyright, but his decision of the case was reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court on other grounds as previously stated, and this particular point remains unsettled.
Copyright is not forfeited where a notice properly affixed has been omitted in later use beyond the control of the copyright proprietor. "If copied afterwards or put upon a new mount the complainant should not suffer," said Judge Coxe in Falk v. Gast in reference to copies from which the notice had been separated. In Bennett v. Carr, in 1899, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Thomas, non-suited the complainant because he had not deposited a written description, in addition to filing identifying copies, both formalities being required under the old law.
Limited use and license
The principle is especially important regarding works of art that a copyright proprietor may grant specific license for the limited use of his work; and this has many times been upheld by judicial decisions. In the American courts, such cases have usually been settled by preliminary injunction, without further trial, so that most of the cases are unreported in the law digests, as in that of Miles v. American News Co., in 1898, where General Miles obtained a preliminary injunction restraining the distribution by the defendants of "Remington's frontier sketches," including illustrations made for and copyrighted in General Miles' "Personal recollections." In the English case of Nicholls v. Parker, in 1901, it was held that a license to print illustrations in the Graphic did not permit their use in another periodical of the defendant despite the defense of "custom of the trade," which the judge characterized as "ridiculous." In the important case of Green v. Irish Independent, the Court of Appeal held that the newspaper, though acting "in good faith and without knowledge," was guilty of infringement in printing an illustration sent to it as an advertisement which the proprietor had not licensed for such use. Where, in Guggenheim v. Leng, in 1896, the periodical Sports printed and sold as a separate sheet an illustration licensed for use in the periodical, it was held in the Queen's Bench Division that publication and sale of the supplement separately from the paper was beyond the terms of the license and therefore an infringement.
Character, not method of use
Copyright in a work of art is dependent upon character rather than use. "A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement," said Justice Holmes in the U. S. Supreme Court, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lith. Co., in 1903, the leading case on this subject, in which three lithographs designed for a circus poster were protected. In Mott v. Clow, in 1896, Judge Grosscup in the U. S. Circuit Court in Illinois had held that illustrations, in this instance of bathtubs in a trade catalogue, which "are mere advertisements," are not entitled to copyright; and in Schumacher v. Wogram, in 1888, it had been held by Judge Wallace that a picture of a young woman holding a bouquet intended for a cigar label could not be protected as copyright, but should be registered as a trade-mark. "The distinction here," said Judge Wallace, "seems to be that a picture expressly intended as a label should be considered a trade-mark, though a picture which may be used for a label is not for this reason excluded from copyright." An artistic design for paper-box covers was held copyrightable in 1910 in De Jonge v. Breuker & Kessler, in the U. S. Circuit Court, by Judge McPherson, who also held that the same subject could not be protected both under copyright and as trade-mark.
Illustration
That an illustration of a person, incident or scene in a copyright work is not an infringement of its copyright, was indicated in 1909 in Harper v. Kalem Co., in the opinion of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, through Judge Ward, who said: "As pictures only represent the artist's idea of what the author has expressed in words, they do not infringe a copyrighted book or drama and should not be enjoined." That illustrations may be protected as part of a book without reference to the engravings act, was held in Marshall v. Bull, in 1901, in the English Court of Appeal, which held also that though electrotype blocks had been legally sold, unauthorized reproduction from such blocks constituted infringement.
Description of artistic work
Likewise, a description in words of a copyrighted work of art is probably permissible without infringement of copyright, when the work is published or publicly exhibited. But this does not hold good in the case of an unpublished or privately exhibited work, as was held in 1849 in the case of Prince Albert v. Strange, where a descriptive catalogue of unpublished etchings by Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort was enjoined, as well as the exhibition of prints therefrom unlawfully obtained.
Portraits
In the case of portraits, whether by painting, sculpture or photography, an important question as to ownership arises. A portrait paid for by the subject or a person other than the artist is the property, for copyright as well as other purposes, exclusively of that person; but if an artist produces a portrait at his own expense, even if by the suggestion of another person, the right to copyright remains with the artist. The general principle was best stated by Judge Wheeler in 1894, in the U. S. Circuit Court in New York, in Press Pub. Co. v. Falk, where the World was held to have infringed the copyright in the photograph of an actress, copyrighted by the photographer and not paid for by her, though a complimentary copy, given to the actress, had been sent by her to the newspaper. "When a person has a negative taken and photograph made, for pay, in the usual course, the work is done for the person so procuring it to be done, and the negative, so far as it is a picture or capable of producing pictures of that person, and all photographs made from it, belong to that person; and neither the artist nor any one else has any right to make pictures from the negative or copy the photographs, if not otherwise published, for any one else. But when a person submits himself or herself as a public character to a photographer for the taking of a negative, and the making of photographs therefrom for the photographer, the negative and the right to make photographs from it belong to him. He is the author and proprietor of the photograph, and may perfect the exclusive right to make copies by copyright." The same principle was upheld in the closely similar English case of Ellis v. Ogden, in 1894, by Justice Collins in the Queen's Bench Division. But in the case of Ellis v. Marshall, in 1895, Justice Charles in the same court held that where two actors had been invited by a photographer to sit for him in costume and some photographs had also been taken in plain clothes, of which the actors purchased copies, they were entitled to authorize publication in a magazine. It may be noted that New York and other states have statutes forbidding portraiture of persons without their consent; but this prohibition would probably not apply to photographing of a crowd, unless the portrait of a special person were lifted out or made prominent. A photographer may not exhibit a photograph of a patron, as in his shop window, without the sitter's consent.
Right of employer
The employer of an artist in other work as well as portraiture may become ipse facto the copyright proprietor. In 1871, in Stannard v. Harrison, where a wall map had been made by an engraver from rough sketch and material and from directions given by the plaintiff, the English Court of Chancery, through Vice-Chancellor Bacon, held: "That the plaintiff cannot draw himself is a matter wholly unimportant if he has caused other persons to draw for him. He invents the subject of the design beyond all question ... this is a work of diligence, industry, and for aught I know of genius on the part of the plaintiff." This case, which arose under the engravings acts in England, where an engraving may be copyrighted by an employer,—though the engraver of his own original design is the only person entitled to copyright,—is of wide bearing throughout artistic copyright. On the other hand, in 1898, in Bolton v. London Exhibitions Co., Justice Mathew in the Queen's Bench Division held that the employer, who had given to the engraver only a "general idea" of what he desired, was not the party liable for infringement.
Photographs
Photographs, a modern development since the early copyright laws, were first included with negatives in the American act of 1865, in respect to which the action of Congress was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1884 in the decisive case of Burrow-Giles Lith. Co. v. Sarony, and in the English fine arts copyright act of 1862. They are specifically named (sec. 5, j) in the new American code, and are included specifically or impliedly under copyright protection in most countries. The peculiar circumstance that the skill of the photographic artist is not necessarily shown in the composition of the picture taken, but more usually in the selection of subject or point of view and treatment in the process, leads to complexities as to authorship, ownership, etc. It is unnecessary and indeed undesirable to copyright separately a photograph of a copyrighted work, of which the general copyright is comprehensive of all reproductions, but the original copyright notice including the name of the artist must appear on each photograph or its mount. An original photograph of an uncopyrighted or uncopyrightable subject may be copyrighted as a photograph, as was held with respect to natural scenery in 1903, in Cleland v. Thayer, in the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, where a colored photograph of a Colorado pass was protected. Where a photographer had posed a woman and a child characteristically, Judge Wheeler in the U. S. Circuit Court in New York held, in 1891, in Falk v. Brett Lith. Co., where defendant had merely reversed the photograph in a lithographic reprint, that the photograph was copyrightable and that the photographer was the author. And this doctrine, that the posing and treatment of a photograph subject gave justification for copyright, was also upheld in the case of a portrait of an actress in the same year in Falk v. Gast by Judge Coxe. In the English case of Bolton v. Aldin et al., in 1895, Justice Grantham in the Queen's Bench Division held that the photograph of a tiger was infringed by a drawing from the photograph published in the Sketch magazine. But the copyrighting of a photograph of an uncopyrighted subject cannot prevent the photographing of the same subject independently by others, nor can the use of a "general idea" be prevented. Under the new American code, the fee for registering a photograph is but fifty cents, if a certificate is not desired, and the new Copyright Office Rules hold that in moving picture films only one registration is requisite, "the entire series being counted as a single photograph."
Tableaux vivants and moving pictures
Whether living pictures, tableaux vivants, infringe a work of art, is a difficult question, determinable only by the circumstances of each case. Moving pictures telling a dramatic story may infringe a dramatic or even literary work, as well as possibly a work of art, as was decided in the case of Harper v. Kalem Co. But the House of Lords, in 1894, in the case of Hanfstaengl v. Baines, where the proprietor of the copyright in paintings sued the proprietors of the Graphic for reproducing by sketches living pictures exhibited at a music hall, patterned after the paintings, decided that the word "design" in the English law did not cover the tableaux at the music hall. It is probable, however, that an exact reproduction, as nearly as may be, of a painting at a public place, might be held an infringement. In 1903 the Circuit Court of Appeals through Judge Buffington, in Edison v. Lubin, overruled the defense that each picture making up a moving picture series should be separately registered for copyright. But separable parts of a composite design, when used separately, must bear separate copyright notice, as was held in 1910 in De Jonge v. Breuker & Kessler by Judge McPherson in the U. S. Circuit Court.
Exclusions and inclusions construed
A shadow-trick perforated card, giving an outline of the picture "Ecce Homo" when held between a light and a screen, was held by Vice-Chancellor Bacon, in Cable v. Marks, in 1882, not to be subject of copyright. Playing cards have been included as prints by an English decision.
Architectural works
Architectural works are not protected as such under the American code, the decision of the Congressional Committees being adverse to this proposal. They are specifically included in the new British code. It is possible that they might be included under the general designation of works of art, and drawings or models for buildings might be copyrighted as "drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character." The question, however, is one of much doubt. In 1903, in Wright v. Eisle, the Appellate Division of the N. Y. Supreme Court, through Judge Woodward, held, where an architect had filed plans with the building department which he claimed were copied in a house of the defendant, which plans had not been copyrighted, that the filing of the plans in a public office constituted publication and as there were no copyrighted copies, there was no case at common or copyright law.
Copy of a copy
A copy of a copy is an infringement of the original work and incidentally of the direct copy, unless the latter is published without proper copyright notice by authority of the proprietor of copyright in the original. This was held in 1892, in Lucas v. Williams, by the Queen's Bench, where a photograph from an engraving was held an infringement of the original painting; and the decision of Judge McPherson in the U. S. Circuit Court in Pennsylvania non-suiting, in Champney v. Haag, in 1903, the proprietor of a copyright painting because the offending photograph infringed only the copyrighted photograph from which it was directly taken, is not considered good law. A photograph may infringe the copyright in statuary, as was held in 1907, in Bracken v. Rosenthal, in the U. S. Circuit Court.
Alterations
As to altered copies and alterations, there have been many judicial decisions, the gist of which is that a copy is not less an infringement because it alters details, provided there is copying of a substantial part; that a copy in another medium not exactly reproducing the original or a copy of it, is nevertheless an infringement; that a substantial alteration, or adaptation of an existing work, may in itself be copyrightable, but that slight alterations will not justify the copyrighting of a work in the public domain; and that an artist has the right to prevent alteration of his original work by a subsequent owner, as involving damage to his professional reputation. Where a copyrighted portrait of Lillian Russell was combined with a portrait of another actress, the composite photograph was held to be a violation of the copyright, in Springer Lith. Co. v. Falk, in 1894, by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Lacombe. So in the English case of Bolton v. London Exhibitions Co., in 1898, where a lithographer copied the outline of a lion from a copyrighted photograph, and filled in details from natural histories in making a circus poster, Justice Mathew in the Queen's Bench Division held that there had been reproduction of the photograph and that a work of art had been "vulgarized unlawfully." Where certain etchings and engravings had been copied by the Brooklyn Photogravure Co., omitting the tints, plate mark and title, it was held in 1892, in Fishel v. Lueckel, by Judge Townsend in the U. S. Circuit Court in New York that this was an infringement; said Judge Townsend: "The appropriation of a part of the work is no less an infringement than the appropriation of the whole, provided 'the alleged infringing part contains any substantial repetitions of any material parts which are original and distinctive." And where a photograph of Julia Marlowe was reproduced in a lithograph, with many points of dissimilarity, some of them because of difference in process, it was held in Falk v. Donaldson Lith. Co., in 1893, by Judge Townsend in the U. S. Circuit Court in New York, that the differences did not constitute a defense. In Dr. Gaunsaulus's book, "The Man of Galilee," well-known pictures were altered substantially and artistically, as by the omission of a spinning wheel from a picture of the Nativity. Copies made from these illustrations were enjoined, though the original pictures were non-copyrighted, in Monarch Book Co. v. Neil, in 1900, by Judge Grosscup in the U. S. Circuit Court in Illinois. But a slight alteration, by the addition on the negative of a cane, thus put into the hands of a person in a photograph not copyrighted in its original form, was held not to justify copyright, in Snow v. Laird, in 1900, by Judge Woods in the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals. In the N. Y. Supreme Court, in the common law case of Dodge v. Allied Arts Co., in 1903, where the plaintiff had painted four historical scenes on commission which the defendants proposed to have altered, an injunction pending suit was granted by Judge McCall, thus upholding the common law or equity right of an artist to be protected against such misuse of his work.
Remedies
For the infringement of a work of art the copyright proprietor is entitled (sec. 25) to an injunction, the forfeiture of infringing copies and to damages "as well as all the profits ... or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear to be just," not less than $250 nor more than $5000, except that "in the case of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph such damages shall not exceed $200 nor be less than $50." These damages, within the limits stated, may be assessed by the court in the case of painting, statue or sculpture at ten dollars, and in the case of any other works at one dollar, "for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees." Under the old law, damages were confined to copies found in possession, and the courts were constrained to apply this literally though in several recorded cases with evident injustice.
Artistic copyright term
Copyright in artistic works in the United States has always been covered under the general copyright acts, including the code of 1909 providing for copyright for twenty-eight and renewal for a second twenty-eight years, and this is true also in Canada and Newfoundland, where the term is for twenty-eight with renewal for fourteen years. The Australian code of 1905 covers artistic copyright specifically in part IV of the act, which provides for the general term of forty-two years from "the making of the work" or life and seven years, whichever the longer, but confines it to artistic work "which is made in Australia."
British practice
Artistic copyright in Great Britain, on the contrary, has been protected by several concurrent acts beginning with the engraving copyright acts of 1734 and 1767 and including the prints copyright act of 1777, the sculpture copyright act of 1814, the prints and engravings copyright (Ireland) act of 1836 and the fine arts copyright act of 1862 covering paintings, drawings and photographs, previously unprotected,—all forming part of the English law until repealed by the new code. Under these several laws, the copyright term for paintings, drawings and photographs has been the life of the author and seven years, for engravings twenty-eight years from first publication and for sculpture fourteen years from first publishing and renewal for fourteen years. Under the act of 1862—which did not afford protection outside the United Kingdom, as was affirmed by the Privy Council in 1903, upholding a Canadian decision, in Graves v. Gorrie—copyright in artistic works began with the making of the work wherever made (except that a foreigner must be resident in England apparently at the time of making) and did not depend upon publication; but the international copyright act of 1844 nevertheless denied protection in Great Britain where a work was first published in a country outside of treaty relations. Registration at Stationers' Hall, at a cost of one shilling, has been a prerequisite to protection. The right to copyright lapsed when the original work was sold by the artist without previous registration or written reservation, a provision applied in 1909 in Hunter v. Clifford.
Sculpture provisions
An original work of sculpture was protected only if first published within the British dominions, if by a British subject or resident, provided it bore the proprietor's name and date of first publication; and renewal for a second fourteen years was possible only if the author was then alive and held the copyright. Toy soldiers, artistically modeled, were protected in England as a work of sculpture by Justice Wright in Britain v. Hanks, in 1902. Common law protected until and statute law after publication, i. e. when the public in general is first permitted to view the work.
Engraving provisions
An engraving was protected in Great Britain and Ireland, if first published (and probably also made) within the British dominions, provided it bore the proprietor's name and date of publication. Prints, as by lithography or otherwise, were included with engravings; maps, charts and plans were, however, included as books under the general copyright act. Also engravings which are part of a book enjoy the wider protection of the general copyright act. The sale of the plate of an engraving probably does not transfer the copyright, unless intention to do so is clearly evident.
The new British code
The new British code includes as an "artistic work" under the general copyright provisions, "works of painting, drawing, sculpture and artistic craftsmanship, and architectural works of art and engravings and photographs." Architectural works are protected only as regards artistic character or design as distinguished from process or methods of construction. Photographs have the exceptional term of fifty years from the making of the original negative, and the owner of such negative at the time of making is considered the author. Registration is no longer required.
Foreign countries
Works of art are protected in most foreign countries either impliedly or specifically under general copyright legislation, although sometimes by special laws. France covers artistic works "whatever may be the merit, use or destination of the work"; the Scandinavian countries include specifically drawings, etc., "not works of the fine arts"; in India copyright is extended in industrial designs to "some peculiar shape or form given an article, but not the article itself." Architectural works are protected in France, Luxemburg and Brazil, but in most countries only architectural plans, drawings, designs, figures, or models and not buildings are covered. Geographical and topographical drawings and technical drawings, maps and charts, illustrations, engravings, in some cases lithographs, photographs, and negatives are among classes specified in many countries. In some countries the term of copyright is different in the case of artistic works. Luxemburg has the peculiar provision that portraits may not be reproduced until twenty years after the death of the person portrayed. Photographs are in several countries protected for a shorter term, frequently five years from taking, publication or registration as the case may be; in Norway the copyright may not extend beyond the death of the photographer.
Berne convention, 1886
When the International Copyright Union was created at Berne in 1886, artistic works were conjoined with literary works under like protection throughout the convention and they were specified (art. IV) as covering "works of design, painting, sculpture, and engraving; lithographs, illustrations, geographical charts; plans, sketches, and plastic works relative to geography, topography, architecture, or science in general; in fact, every production whatsoever in the ... artistic domain which can be published by any mode of impression or reproduction." In the final protocol it was specifically provided: "(1) As regards article IV, it is agreed that those countries of the Union where the character of artistic works is not refused to photographs, engage to admit them to the benefits of the Convention, from the date of its coming into effect. They are, however, not bound to protect the authors of such works further than is permitted by their own legislation, except in the case of international engagements already existing, or which may hereafter be entered into by them. It is understood that an authorized photograph of a protected work of art shall enjoy legal protection in all the countries of the Union, as contemplated by the said Convention, for the same period as the principal right of reproduction of the work itself subsists, and within the limits of private arrangements between those who have legal rights."
Paris declaration; 1896
In the amendatory act adopted at Paris in 1896, the final protocol of 1886 was modified respecting architectural and photographic works as follows (1, a, b): "In the countries of the Union in which protection is accorded not only to architectural designs, but to the actual works of architecture, those works are admitted to the benefit of the provisions of the Convention of Berne and of the present additional act.
"Photographic works, and those obtained by similar processes, are admitted to the benefit of the provisions of these acts, in so far as the domestic legislation allows this to be done, and according to the measure of protection which it gives to similar national works.
"It is understood that the authorized photograph of a protected work of art enjoys legal protection in all the countries of the Union, within the meaning of the Convention of Berne and the present additional act, as long as the principal right of reproduction of this work itself lasts, and within the limits of private conventions between those who have legal rights."
Berlin convention, 1908
In the Berlin convention of 1908, artistic works were defined (art. 2, par. 1) by specification as "drawings, paintings; works of architecture and sculpture; engravings and lithographs; illustrations; geographical charts; plans, sketches and plastic works relating to geography, topography, architecture, or the sciences,"—thus covering architectural works under general copyright. It was further provided by the convention of 1908 (art. 2, par. 4) that "works of art applied to industry are protected so far as the domestic legislation of each country allows." And article 3 provided: "The present Convention applies to photographic works and to works obtained by any process analogous to photography. The contracting countries are pledged to guarantee protection to such works."
Exhibition not publication
By the interpretative declaration adopted at Paris in 1896, it was specifically provided (sec. 2): "By published works must be understood works actually issued to the public in one of the countries of the Union. Consequently,... the exhibition of a work of art, does not constitute publication in the sense of the aforementioned Acts." In the Berlin convention of 1908 it was similarly provided (art. 4, par. 4) that "the exhibition of a work of art and the construction of a work of architecture do not constitute publication."
Pan American Union
In the Pan American Union, the Buenos Aires convention of 1910 covers artistic works on the same basis as literary works, without special provisions.
XIV
INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT: PIRACY, "FAIR USE" AND "UNFAIR COMPETITION"
Piracy
The word "piracy," since that gentle craft has disappeared from the high seas, has come commonly into use to mean free-booting with reference to literary property. In this sense it is used as early as 1771 by Luckombe in his history of printing, in which he says: "They ... would suffer by this act of piracy, since it was likely to prove a very bad edition." It was especially applied in America more or less jocularly in the days when there was no legal protection for works by English authors, to the reprinting chiefly of English novels without authority from or payment to their authors, when publishers whose imprints were chiefly on such reprints were commonly known as pirates. This secondary meaning has been accepted by the dictionary makers, and the use by English law authorities, and now in the new American code, of the phrases "pirated works" and "piratical copies," gives the word specific legal status. It is the comprehensive term now in common and legal use to mean the stealing of an author's work by reprinting it in full or in substantial part without the authority of the copyright proprietor, and is in fact an infringement at wholesale or otherwise of the author's exclusive right. This is of course prohibited by the law to the full extent of its jurisdiction and is punishable as prescribed in the law.
Test of piracy
"The true test of piracy," said Judge Shipman in the U. S. Circuit Court in 1875, in Banks v. McDivitt, is "whether the defendant has in fact used the plan, arrangements and illustrations as the model of his own book, with colorable alterations and variations, or whether his work is the result of his own labor, skill and use of common materials and common sources." Judge Story said in 1841, in Folsom v. Marsh: "If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labours of the original author are substantially, to an injurious extent, appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy pro tanto. The entirety of the copyright is the property of the author and it is no defence that another person has appropriated a part and not the whole of any property."
Infringement in specific meaning
Infringement is commonly taken to mean specific invasion of the author's rights rather than wholesale piracy; and the question of what is infringement or "literary larceny" is more often a question of the interpretation of the facts than the construction of the statute. The legal cases arising under infringement constitute a very large proportion of copyright litigation, demanding as they do judicial determination as to the acts complained of in each particular case. It is therefore impossible in this volume to give citations or references for the hundreds of cases recorded in the law reports or in the various works on copyright, but it may be noted that the foot-note citations in MacGillivray's "Law of copyright" cover a very large number of American as well as English cases. No treatise on copyright can apply, however, in advance, the general principles of copyright to the infinite variety of possible cases; and only generalizations and a few illustrative cases can here be given.
Questions of fact and intent
Infringement is a question of fact rather than of intent. It is not a valid defense that the infringer is ignorant; nor, on the other hand, can any one be held for intention to infringe, where the act of infringement has not been accomplished. The new American code, nevertheless, recognizes knowledge and intent in certain cases of punishment or damages by the use of the words "willfully" and "knowingly." The letter of the law is in general that the infringer must be held responsible and must make good any damages suffered by the copyright proprietor, but proof that he had no guilty knowledge or intent may effect mitigation of punitive damages. The trend of court decisions and of judicial opinion does not seem to be evident and consistent in this development; but it may perhaps be said that while copyright law is more closely applied from the letter of the statutes, in the legal aspect, the principles of equity have been given freer play where the statute is not specific and definite. In 1899, in Green v. Irish Independent, the English Court of Appeal held that the proprietors of a newspaper who had printed an advertisement containing an illustration which the advertiser had license to use only for specified purposes, were liable for penalties, though they did not know that the illustration was copyrighted; and in 1902, in American Press Assoc. v. Daily Story Pub. Co., the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals held the defendants liable, though they had innocently copied from a newspaper reprint which had inadvertently omitted the copyright notice. But in 1898 Justice Mathew, in Bolton v. London Exhibitions, declined to hold the defendants punishable, because they did not know that the lithographer from whom they had ordered a poster had infringed the copyright of a photograph.
"Fair use"
"Fair use" means quotation from or other use of an author's work within the evident meaning or judicial construction of the copyright statute, and is the usual answer of the defendant to a complaint that he has taken without authority some portion of the author's work or utilized in some way the result of the author's labors. The borderland between infringement and "fair use" is peculiarly and necessarily one of uncertainty, not so much because of ambiguity in the statute as of difficulty in determining the extent of use within which it is said non curat lex. No statute can be so clear or so complete as to obviate questions of this kind. In general there must be copying of a material or substantial part. What is a material or substantial part, constituting infringement, is a difficult question of fact.
Principle of infringement
"Copying is not confined to literal repetition," said Judge Clifford, in Lawrence v. Dana, in the U. S. Circuit Court in 1869, "but includes also the various modes in which the matter of any publication may be adopted, imitated, or transferred, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the source from which the material was derived; nor is it necessary that the whole, or even the larger portion of the work, should be taken in order to constitute an invasion of copyright." The Chancery Division, through Lord Chief Justice Alverstone, took the extreme course in Trengrouse v. "Sol" Syndicate, in 1901, of holding a work an infringement, though less than a page was taken from the plaintiff's football guide.
Infringement by indirect copying
Infringement may be by indirect as well as by direct copying. In the case of Cate v. Devon in 1889, in the Chancery Court, the defense that the copying was not from the original copyright work but from a newspaper reprint, was rejected. Infringement may be through quite a different medium from the original; thus a shorthand reproduction of a lecture on "The dog as the friend of man," published in a text-book of shorthand, was held in the Chancery case of Nichols v. Pitman, in 1884, to be an infringement of the lecture as much as if in ordinary type.
Exceptions from infringement
The doctrine of infringement cannot be invoked to obtain monopoly of any particular subject, and the authorized biographer of President Garfield was denied relief in 1889, in Gilmore v. Anderson, when he sought to prevent the publication of a life of Garfield by another writer. Nor will mere similarity of treatment of the same subject constitute infringement. A copyright owner cannot prevent another person from publishing the matter contained in his book, if invented or collected independently, or from making "fair use" of its contents. Two map-makers, collecting at first hand the same data, would naturally make the same map, and each would equally be entitled to copyright. In this respect, copyright law differs from patent law, where a first use bars others from the same field. It has even been held that the collected material might be used by a second compiler as a guide in a second compilation, if subjected to original verification, as in the case of a street directory. But in the case of rival Boston directories in 1905, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver Radford Co., that a verification by actual canvass from a list of discrepancies made up from the earlier work was beyond fair use.
Infringement by abridgment and compilation
Abridgments were construed by early English decisions not to be infringements, and this precedent was followed, reluctantly and often with protest, in later cases by English and American judges, as set forth in the chapter on subject-matter. Later copyright provisions,—as by use of the word "retranchements" in the Berne-Berlin conventions, and the specific authorization in the American code "to make any other version thereof," and for copyright of an abridgment of a work in the public domain,—directly or by implication, make abridgment an infringement and free the courts to take this view. Compilations also constitute infringement if they extract substantial parts of a copyright work, beyond the limits of "fair use," or even if they adopt the plan or arrangement or bodily transfer the material of a copyright compilation of non-copyright matter.
Abridged compilations
A curious complaint of infringement by abridgment was made in Gabriel v. McCabe, in 1896, before Judge Grosscup in the U. S. Circuit Court in Illinois, where the plaintiff had licensed the use of a copyright song, "When the roll is called up yonder," in a collection of religious poetry, "The finest of the wheat, no. 2," published by the defendant, who included the song also in an abridged edition of this collection and in a combined edition of this and another collection. Judge Grosscup held that: "Future editions of a book may contain a composition published in an earlier edition by license, even though parts of the earlier edition are omitted.... To hold otherwise would practically forbid any new editions of books of compilations, for the consent of all the authors contributing could not, in many instances, be obtained." But if the collection had been so abridged as to result in the publication of the song alone as sheet music, it would have been an unfair use under the license.
Separation of infringing parts
The general principles as to quotation beyond "fair use" were well laid down by Lord Chancellor Eldon, in the early English case of Mawman v. Tegg, in 1826: "If the parts which have been copied cannot be separated from those which are original, without destroying the use and value of the original matter, he who has made an improper use of that which did not belong to him must suffer the consequences of so doing. If a man mixes what belongs to him with what belongs to me, and the mixture be forbidden by law, he must again separate them, and he must bear all the mischief and loss which the separation may occasion. If an individual chooses in any work to mix my literary matter with his own, he must be restrained from publishing the literary matter which belongs to me; and if the parts of the work cannot be separated, and if by that means the injunction, which restrained the publication of my literary matter, prevents also the publication of his own literary matter, he has only himself to blame."
Law digests
The difficult question of the extent to which a compiler may utilize the materials of another has come especially to the front in the American courts with reference to law digests and reports, within recent years. In 1896, in Mead v. West Pub. Co., concerning rival annotated editions of "Stephen on pleading," then out of copyright, where the defendant's editor admitted having clipped the text from the complainant's edition and having obtained some ideas or suggestions from it, Judge Lochren, in the U. S. Circuit Court in Minnesota, held that there was no infringement because non-copyright matter could not be protected in a copyright work from such clipping, because the defendant's notes were original even though suggested from the other, and because the few errors and citations in common were immaterial since there were many new citations and the work was on the whole the result of original research. That bodily transfer of citations is beyond "fair use" was emphasized by Judge Ray in White v. Bender, in 1911.
Proof from common errors
As to proof from common errors, it had been held in 1895, in the case of Chicago Dollar Directory Co. v. Chicago Directory Co., that the later work, containing sixty-seven errors found in the other, was evidently an infringement of the earlier compilation. In Bisel v. Welsh, Re Brightly Pennsylvania reports, in 1904, the U. S. Circuit Court held that repetitions of errors in citations were evidence of infringement by the author of his own reports published under an earlier contract by the plaintiffs; and in 1911, in Shepard v. Taylor, Judge Hazel held that common errors were prima facie proof of infringement.
Infringement in part No infringement of piracies or frauds
In the important case of West Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Pub. Co., where a collection of selected cases and a general digest were alleged to be infringements of the plaintiff's reports and monthly digests, Judge Coxe in the U. S. Circuit Court enjoined 303 proved "instances of piracy" but not the remaining portions of the digest, but in 1897 the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Lacombe, held that under such circumstances the burden of proof must be on the unfair user and broadened the decision by issuing an injunction against the work as a whole, excepting those parts which were public property. In 1910, in Park & Pollard v. Kellerstrass, Judge Philips enjoined the whole work because the infringing parts were not separable. In 1903, in Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., where the editor of the defendant's law encyclopædia had made a list of cases cited in complainant's work, which included material "pirated" by the complainant from copyright works, the Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the lower court, held through Judge Coxe that there was no infringement, because the only use made of the list was to guide the defendant to the reports and because the complainant had no standing in equity. "If the defendant was guilty of piracy, so was the complainant; and equity will not protect a pirate from infringements of his piratical work." To like effect in Slingsby v. Bradford Co., in 1905, Justice Warrington, in the Chancery Division, held that the plaintiff could not recover against an evident copying because his own catalogue was fraudulent in advertising as patented articles not so protected, and a fraud will not be protected. In the later case of West Pub. Co. v. Thompson Co., where the publishers of the original reports and digests sought to restrain the Thompson encyclopædias, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that while a compiler may use a copyright digest by making lists from which to run down cases, which is "fair use," extensive copying or paraphrasing of the language of the digest, whether to save literary work or mechanical labor, constitutes an infringement. The case was sent back to the lower court for rehearing and assessment of damages and was settled in 1911 by an agreement involving transfer of the encyclopædia to the plaintiff. Reference to a copyright work giving pagination is not an infringement, as was decided in 1909, in Banks Law Pub. Co. v. Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co., in the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Quotation
Whether simple quotation constitutes an infringement or is "fair use," depends upon extent and in some respects upon purpose. In 1892 Justice North, in the English Court of Chancery, in Walter v. Steinkopff, held that the use by the St. James Gazette of two fifths of an article by Kipling, copyrighted by the Times, was beyond "fair use" of quotations, notwithstanding the newspaper custom of copying from one another. On the other hand, quotations in a review of a book made to reasonable extent for the purposes of criticism, have usually been considered "fair use," provided they do not go to the extent of a description or abridgment which would be measurably a substitute for the book.
Private use
The multiplication of copies by handwriting or other process for private use, as among the members of an orchestra or in a business office, has been held an infringement in English decisions, though prohibition of the making of a single copy for personal use would be an extreme application of this doctrine, and such use is specifically permitted in the new English code.
The doctrine of "unfair competition"
Beyond the purview of copyright law, there is a means of legal remedy for the copyright proprietor which can be enforced by state as well as by federal courts, resting either upon statutes outside the copyright law, or on the general principles of equity. This is the application of the doctrine of "unfair competition" especially in cases involving "fraud" or fraudulent representation, direct or implied, leading the purchaser to buy something other than what he supposes he is buying. Thus if a publisher prints and binds a book with a title and in a style that leads a purchaser to suppose that it is another book which he is buying, the publisher of the other book has the right to obtain equitable relief by an injunction from the transgressor on the ground of unfair competition without any reference to copyright law, although this doctrine is more applied in the case of patents, trade-marks and copyrights than perhaps any other field.
The doctrine of deceptive intent
There is also evident a growing tendency on the part of the courts to protect the public from possible deception especially if done with fraudulent intent, where some distinctive name or symbol or form associated with some line of product is used for another line of product of different origin and character, though there may be here no direct competition; but this comparatively new doctrine is more likely to be used in regard to trade-mark articles than in respect to literary and like property. It might, however, apply in a case where a well-known publishing house had published, for instance, a popular series of school books as Smith's Arithmetical Readers and another firm containing the same name had started to publish a Smith's Algebraic Readers—but the application would be extremely doubtful.
The "Chatterbox" cases
In the Chatterbox cases, 1884-1887, previously referred to, the final decision of Judge Shipman emphasized the view that the use of the title "Chatterbox" on a similar publication was misleading to the public, thus bringing both trade-mark law and common law protection to the rescue against unfair competition.
Encyclopædia Britannica cases
In the series of Encyclopædia Britannica cases, 1890-1904, the English publishers Black or their American representatives Scribner sought to protect in this country the English edition, or an American authorized edition, under the copyright law previous to 1891, copyrighted articles by Americans being included, and under common law because of the alleged fraudulent misuse of the name to mislead the public. In 1893, in Black v. Allen, Judge Townsend held that the use of copyrighted material in a non-copyright work did not vitiate the copyright, that the American author was entitled to secure and protect copyright even though the right to use was assigned to an English house which could not directly secure copyright, and that the fact of discrepancy in the title of the copyrighted articles as registered for copyright on separate publication and deposit and in the cyclopædia, did not endanger the copyright. In 1904, in Encyclopædia Britannica Co. v. Tribune Association, Judge Lacombe in the U. S. Circuit Court enjoined condensations of the copyrighted American articles. But in Black v. Ehrich and other cases, the complainants were not successful in obtaining an injunction against the use of the title Encyclopædia Britannica on reprints of non-copyright material which did not mislead the public.
Webster Dictionary cases
In the Webster Dictionary cases in 1890-1909, a long litigation between the Merriams, as authorized publishers of Webster, and Ogilvie and other defendants, the courts held that the use of the name Webster or the title Webster's Dictionary could not be restrained when used in connection with a reprint of the original Webster Dictionary, then out of copyright, or otherwise in a manner not likely to mislead the public; but injunctions were granted and sustained against the use of these names on dictionaries issued in form so like the Merriam editions as to deceive the public, or in connection with misleading advertisements or circulars.
"Old sleuth" cases
In 1888-1890 George Munro, publisher of the "Old sleuth" detective series, sought in actions against several defendants to protect the use of the name "Sleuth" and was upheld in the N. Y. Supreme Court in separate decisions by Judges Andrews, O'Brien, and Patterson, while in one of the cases Judge Ingraham held that "sleuth" was a dictionary word and could not be protected; in 1889 the N. Y. Court of Appeals through Chief Judge Parker decided that the name "Sleuth" was protectable, and in 1890 Judge Macomber of the N. Y. Supreme Court held that "Sleuth" was properly a subject of trade-mark. But in 1890 also, Judge Shipman in the U. S. District Court dismissed the complaint in another Munro case, as to an illustration picturing "Old Sleuth," on the ground that though of the same subject it was not of the same character. These cases illustrate the difficulty of decisions in this borderland of equity.
Other title decisions
In 1894 Judge Green, in the U. S. Circuit Court in New Jersey, in Social Register Association v. Howard, protected on grounds of equity the title "Social register" as descriptive of a social directory covering Orange, N. J., and enjoined the use of "Howard's Social register" as unfair competition. In 1887 the Harper house, as publishers of the Franklin Square Library, obtained from the U. S. Circuit Court, through Judge Waite, an injunction against the Franklin Square Library Company for violation of their trade-mark rights in the name.
Rebound copies
Where the American Book Co. brought suit against Doan & Hanson, who had restored and rebound used copies of school books, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1901 that there was no violation of law, but required notice that the books were second-hand copies by conspicuous stamp on the cover. In 1891 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Dodd v. Smith, declined to grant Dodd, Mead & Co. an injunction against rebinders who had purchased from them sheets of a fifty-cent paper-covered edition of a novel by E. P. Roe and bound these in cloth to sell at sixty cents in competition with the plaintiff's $1.50 cloth edition.
The Kipling case
In 1899 G. P. Putnam's Sons purchased from Kipling's authorized publishers sheets of twelve volumes, added three volumes of non-copyright or otherwise authorized material and published the fifteen volumes, "Brushwood edition," of Kipling's works, with the design of an elephant's head on the binding. Kipling sought an injunction for infringement of copyright, use of trade-mark and unfair competition with the "Outward bound edition" of his works, which also bore an elephant's head. In 1903 the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, through Judge Coxe, affirmed a decision holding as "a well-recognized principle of law" that "the defendants, having purchased unbound copyrighted volumes, were at liberty, so far as the copyright statute is concerned, to bind and resell them"; that the elephant's head, not being a registered trade-mark, could not be protected as a trade-mark; and that there was no similarity of editions constituting unfair competition. But in 1907, in Dutton v. Cupples & Leon, the plaintiffs obtained damages for a series of books closely imitating the get-up of their "Gem" or "Dainty" series. Passing off, however, cannot be made ground of action when material protectable by copyright has not been copyrighted, as was held in 1908, in Bamforth v. Douglas Post Card Co., by Judge McPherson in the U. S. Circuit Court.
Burlesqued title
The suit to enjoin the use of a reversed or burlesque title, when the Boston Herald printed, under the title of "Letters of a son to his self-made father," a skit on Lorimer's "Letters of a self-made merchant to his son," was denied by Judge Morton in the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1903 as involving no deception.
The Drummond case
In 1894 Henry Drummond, a British subject, obtained from Judge Dallas, in the U. S. Circuit Court, an injunction restraining Henry Altemus from publishing what purported to be exact reports of twelve lectures, of which eight only had been imperfectly reported in the British Weekly, on the ground that the author had a common law right to restrain the publication "of any literary matter as the plaintiff's, which was not actually his creation, and to prevent fraud."
The new British code
The new British measure comprehensively defines infringement as the doing without consent of the owner of the copyright of "anything the sole right to do which is by this act conferred on the owner of the copyright," but specifically excepts (1) fair dealing for private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper summary; (2) use by an artist of sketches, etc., made for a work of which he has sold the copyright, provided he does not repeat or imitate that work; (3) graphic reproduction of objects, or photographing of paintings, etc., in a public place; (4) limited extracts for use in school books; (5) report of lectures unless prohibited by placard; (6) reading or recitation of reasonable extracts.
XV
REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE
Protection and procedure
It was for the protection of copyrights that the statute of Anne was passed and that statutory law thus began to replace English common law—a gain to authors sadly offset by its losses. But it was undoubtedly true that without statutory provision the proprietor of literary and similar property could not obtain the protection necessary for the enforcement of his rights. The new American code is comprehensive, detailed and specific in its legal provisions for protection and procedure, and in respect to punishment far beyond any copyright legislation on the statute books of any other nation.
Injunction
The first protection given by the statute is the injunction usual in equity proceedings, following the precedent of early legislation.
Damages
Under previous American law, damages were levied primarily on infringing copies found in possession of the infringer or his agents, with the unfortunate result that when an infringer was successful in selling his edition, few, if any, copies were found on which to levy damages. The new code thoroughly corrects this defect by providing for specified damages on infringing copies "made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees." The plaintiff is entitled to damages and all profits and is required only to prove sales, while the defendant is required to prove the elements of cost. The damages—assessed as such and not as penalties so as to free copyright litigation from the restrictions of penal proceedings—are stated as one dollar for each infringing copy, except copies of a painting, statue or sculpture on which they are ten dollars per copy; fifty dollars for each infringing delivery of an oral work; one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for each subsequent infringing performance of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, choral or orchestral work; and ten dollars for each infringing performance of any other musical work. These damages shall not be less than $250 or more than $5000 in any one case, with the exception that for a newspaper reproduction of a photograph the minimum shall be fifty dollars and the maximum two hundred dollars, a concession insisted upon by newspaper proprietors.
One suit sufficing
Injunction, damages and profits, and delivery of infringing copies or means of production, are covered in the single suit to protect the copyright.
Deposit of infringing articles
During the pendency of an action the defendant may be required to deposit all articles alleged to infringe copyright, making oath that he has deposited all such, under regulations for his protection prescribed, as the law directs, by the Supreme Court, which regulations are given in full in the appendix of this volume; and when such articles are adjudged to be infringements, he must deliver up for destruction not only such infringing copies or devices, but also all plates, molds, matrices or other means for making such infringing copies as the court may order, making oath that he has delivered up all such.
The text covering these provisions, with the exception of subsection (e), referring to mechanical musical reproductions, given in the chapter on that subject, is as follows:
"(Sec. 25.) That if any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable:
Remedies specified
"(a) To an injunction restraining such infringement;
"(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove sales only and the defendant shall be required to prove every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual damages and profits such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter stated, but in the case of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph such damages shall not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars nor be less than the sum of fifty dollars, and such damages shall in no other case exceed the sum of five thousand dollars nor be less than the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, and shall not be regarded as a penalty:
"First. In the case of a painting, statue, or sculpture, ten dollars for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
"Second. In the case of any work enumerated in section five of this Act, except a painting, statue, or sculpture, one dollar for every infringing copy made or sold by or found in the possession of the infringer or his agents or employees;
"Third. In the case of a lecture, sermon, or address, fifty dollars for every infringing delivery;
"Fourth. In the case of dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or orchestral composition, one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for every subsequent infringing performance; in the case of other musical compositions, ten dollars for every infringing performance;
Impounding
"(c) To deliver up on oath, to be impounded during the pendency of the action, upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright;
"(d) To deliver up on oath for destruction all the infringing copies or devices, as well as all plates, molds, matrices, or other means for making such infringing copies as the court may order;
Supreme Court rules
"Rules and regulations for practice and procedure under this section shall be prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States," for which see appendix.
Court jurisdiction
The Circuit Court, or District or other courts having circuit jurisdiction, of the United States, have original jurisdiction "of all suits at law or in equity arising under the patent or copyright laws of the United States" with appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright cases are brought in the first instance before a single judge sitting in Circuit Court or District Court, and thence are appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals consisting of three or more circuit judges, and thence again to the United States Supreme Court, the final authority. These federal courts have sole jurisdiction under the copyright law as such; but copyright cases are often adjudicated in State courts on questions arising under the law of contracts or other statute or common law, regard being always given to the decisions of the federal courts as to copyright questions proper which may be involved. In other words, the State courts do not pass upon copyright law, but may apply, within the respective states, the copyright decisions of federal courts. Thus in Hoyt v. Bates, in 1897, Judge Putnam in the U. S. Circuit Court in Massachusetts remanded the case back to the State courts because the question was not under the copyright law as such, but regarding the ownership of copyright property. In this case the author of a play "A black sheep," containing a song "Sweet Daisy Stokes," licensed the defendant to print the song. The defendant copyrighted the song and the plaintiff sued to compel him to assign his copyright. The case illustrates the respective jurisdictions of federal and State courts in copyright matters.
Limitation
The United States courts have authority to enter the decrees necessary to enforce the remedies provided by the law. Important provisions of the new code provide that civil action in copyright cases may be brought "in the district of which the defendant or his agent is an inhabitant or in which he may be found"—thus preventing avoidance by the defendant possible under earlier law; and also that any injunction granted in any one district may be operative throughout the United States—a provision adopted into the law from recent legislation intended to prevent the evasion of injunctions, particularly by "fly by night" dramatic companies passing from one state or court jurisdiction into another, but usefully applicable also throughout the whole range of copyright infringements. Criminal proceedings under the copyright act may not be brought after three years from the commission of the offense.
Under the former laws the District courts also had certain—or uncertain—jurisdiction. The distinction between the District courts and the Circuit courts of the United States, both of which are courts of first instance, has been so complicated and uncertain as to be practically impossible of statement—a situation which has led to a measure for the abolition of the distinction and the provision of a single court in each federal district having original jurisdiction in the first instance, from which appeal will go to the Circuit Court of Appeals and thence to the U. S. Supreme Court, or in certain cases direct to the Supreme Court.