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Christianity and Greek Philosophy

Chapter XI

Reading edition

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF ATHENS (continued.)

THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL (continued).

PLATO.

II. THE PLATONIC DIALECTIC.

The Platonic Dialectic is the Science of Eternal and Immutable Principles, and the method (ὄργανον) by which these first principles are brought forward into the clear light of consciousness. The student of Plato will have discovered that he makes no distinction between logic and metaphysics. These are closely united in the one science to which he gives the name of "Dialectic" and which was at once the science of the ideas and laws of the Reason, and of the mental process by which the knowledge of Real Being is attained, and a ground of absolute certainty is found. This science has, in modern times, been called Primordial or Transcendental Logic.

The process of investigation adopted by Plato thus corresponds with the inductive method of modern times, with this simple difference, that Bacon conducted science into the world of matter, whilst Plato directed it to the world of mind. The dialectic of Plato aimed at the discovery of the "laws of thought;" the modern inductive philosophy aims at the discovery of the "laws of nature." The latter concerns itself chiefly with the inquiry after the "causes" of material phenomena; the former concerned itself with the inquiry after the "first principles" of all knowledge and of all existence. Both processes are, therefore, carried on by interrogation. The analysis which seeks for a law of nature proceeds by the interrogation of nature. The analysis of Plato proceeds by the interrogation of mind, in order to discover the fundamental ideas which lie at the basis of all cognition, which determine all our processes of thought, and which, in their final analysis, reveal the REAL BEING, which is the ground and explanation of all existence.

By the application of this method, Plato had not only exposed the insufficiency and self-contradiction of all results obtained by a mere à posteriori generalization of the simple facts of experience, but he demonstrated, as a consequence, that we are in possession of some elements of knowledge which have not been derived from sensation; that there are, in all minds, certain notions, principles, or ideas, which have been furnished by a higher faculty than sense; and that these notions, principles, or ideas, transcend the limits of experience, and reveal the knowledge of real being--τὸ ὄντως ὄν--Being in se.

We have already seen that, in his first efforts at applying reflection to the concrete phenomena of consciousness, Plato had recognized two distinct classes of cognitions, marked by characteristics essentially opposite;--one of "sensible" objects having a definite outline, limit, and figure, and capable of being imaged and represented to the mind in a determinate form--the other of "intelligible" objects, which can not be outlined or represented in the memory or the imagination by any figures or images, and are, therefore, the objects of purely rational conception. He found, also, that we arrive at one class of cognitions "mediately" through images generated in the vital organism, or by some testimony, definition, or explication of others; whilst we arrive at the other class "immediately" by simple intuition, or rational apperception. The mind stands face to face with the object, and gazes directly upon it. The reality of that object is revealed in its own light, and we find it impossible to refuse our assent--that is, it is self-evident. One class consisted of contingent ideas--that is, their objects are conceived as existing, with the possibility, without any contradiction, of conceiving of their non-existence; the other consisted of necessary ideas--their objects are conceived as existing with the absolute impossibility of conceiving of their non-existence. Thus we can conceive of this book, this table, this earth, as not existing, but we can not conceive the non-existence of space. We can conceive of succession in time as not existing, but we can not, in thought, annihilate duration. We can imagine this or that particular thing not to have been, but we can not conceive of the extinction of Being in itself. He further observed, that one class of our cognitions are conditional ideas; the existence of their objects is conceived only on the supposition of some antecedent existence, as for example, the idea of qualities, phenomena, events; whilst the other class of cognitions are unconditional and absolute--we can conceive of their objects as existing independently and unconditionally--existing whether any thing else does or does not exist, as space, duration, the infinite, Being in se. And, finally, whilst some ideas appear in us as particular and individual, determined and modified by our own personality and liberty, there are others which are, in the fullest sense, universal. They are not the creations of our own minds, and they can not be changed by our own volitions. They depend upon neither times, nor places, nor circumstances; they are common to all minds, in all times, and in all places. These ideas are the witnesses in our inmost being that there is something beyond us, and above us; and beyond and above all the contingent and fugitive phenomena around us. Beneath all changes there is a permanent being. Beyond all finite and conditional existance there is something unconditional and absolute. Having determined that there are truths which are independent of our own minds--truths which are not individual, but universal--truths which would be truths even if our minds did not perceive them, we are led onward to a super-sensual and super-natural ground, on which they rest.

Abstraction, then, it will be seen, creates nothing; neither does it add any new element to the store of actual cognitions already possessed by all human minds. It simply brings forward into a clearer and more definite recognition, that which necessarily belongs to the mind as part of its latent furniture, and which, as a law of thought, has always unconsciously governed all its spontaneous movements. As a process of rational inquiry, it was needful to bring the mind into intelligible and conscious communion with the world of Ideas. These ideas are partially revealed in the sensible world, all things being formed, as Plato believed, according to ideas as models and exemplars, of which sensible objects are the copies. They are more fully manifested in the constitution of the human mind which, by virtue of its kindred nature with the original essence or being, must know them intuitively and immediately. And they are brought out fully by the dialectic process, which disengages them from all that is individual and phenomenal, and sets them forth in their pure and absolute form.

But whilst Plato has certainly exhibited the true method of investigation by which the ideas of reason are to be separated from all concrete phenomena and set clearly before the mind, he has not attempted a complete enumeration of the ideas of reason; indeed, such an enumeration is still the grand desideratum of philosophy. We can not fail, however, in the careful study of his writings, to recognize the grand Triad of Absolute Ideas--ideas which Cousin, after Plato, has so fully exhibited, viz., the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.

PLATONIC SCHEME OF IDEAS

I. The idea of ABSOLUTE TRUTH or REALITY (τὸ ἀληθές--τὸ ὄν)--the ground and efficient cause of all existence, and by participating in which all phenomenal existence has only so far a reality, sensible things being merely shadows and resemblances of ideas. This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation with the phenomenal world; as,

1. The idea of SUBSTANCE (οὐσία)--the ground of all phenomena, "the being or essence of all things," the permanent reality.--"Timæeus," ch. ix. and xii.; "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.; "Phædo,"§§ 63-67, 73.

2. The idea of CAUSE (αἰτία)--the power or efficiency by which things that "become," or begin to be, are generated or produced.--"Timæus," ch. ix.; "Sophist," § 109; "Philebus," §§ 45, 46.

3. The idea of IDENTITY (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον)--that which "does not change," "is always the same, simple and uniform, incomposite and indissoluble,"--that which constitutes personality or self-hood.--"Phædo," §§ 61-75; "Timæus," ch. ix.; "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xix. and xx.

4. The idea of UNITY (τὸ ἕν)--one mind or intelligence pervading the universe, the comprehensive conscious thought or plan which binds all parts of the universe in one great whole (τὸ πᾶν)--the principle of order.--"Timæus," ch. xi. and xv.; "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.; "Philebus," §§ 50-51.

5. The idea of the INFINITE (τὸ ἄπειρον)--that which is unlimited and unconditioned, "has no parts, bounds, no beginning, nor middle, nor end."--"Parmenides," §§ 22, 23.

II. The idea of ABSOLUTE BEAUTY (τὸ καλόν)--the formal cause of the universe, and by participation in which all created things have only so far a real beauty.--"Timæus," ch. xi, "Greater Hippias," §§ 17, 18; "Republic," bk. v. ch. 22.

This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the organic world; as,

1. The Idea of PROPORTION or SYMMETRY (συµµετρἰα)--the proper relation of parts to an organic whole resulting in a harmony (κόσµος), and which relation admits of mathematical expression.--"Timæus," ch. lxix.; "Philebus," § 155 ("Timæus," ch. xi. and xii., where the relation of numerical proportions to material elements is expounded).

2. The idea of DETERMINATE FORM (παράδειγµα ἀρχέτυπος)--the eternal models or archetypes according to which all things are framed, and which admit of geometrical representation.--"Timæus," ch. ix.; "Phædo," §112 ("Timæus," ch. xxviii.-xxxi., where the relation of geometrical forms to material elements is exhibited).

3. The idea of RHYTHM (ῥυθµός)--measured movement in time and space, resulting in melody and grace.--"Republic," bk. iii. ch. xi. and xii.; "Philebus," § 21.

4. The idea of FITNESS or ADAPTATION (χρήσιον)--effectiveness to some purpose or end.--"Greater Hippias," § 35.

5. The idea of PERFECTION (τελειότης)--that which is complete, "a structure which is whole and finished--of whole and perfect parts."--"Timæus," ch. xi., xii., and xliii.

III. The idea of ABSOLUTE GOOD (τὸ ἀγαθόν)--the final cause or reason of all existence, the sun of the invisible world, that pours upon all things the revealing light of truth.

This idea is developed in the human intelligence in its relation to the world of moral order; as,

1. The idea of WISDOM or PRUDENCE (φρόνησις)--thoughtfulness, rightness of intention, following the guidance of reason, the right direction of the energy or will.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. vii., bk. vi. ch. ii.

2. The idea of COURAGE or FORTITUDE (ἀνδρία)--zeal, energy, firmness in the maintenance of honor and right, virtuous indignation against wrong.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. viii.; "Laches;" "Meno," § 24.

3. The idea of SELF-CONTROL or TEMPERANCE (σωφροσύνη)--sound-mindedness, moderation, dignity.--"Republic," bk. iv. ch. ix.; "Meno," § 24; "Phædo," § 35.

4. The idea of JUSTICE (δικαιοσύνη)--the harmony or perfect proportional action of all the powers of the soul.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. vi., bk. iv. ch. x.-xii., bk. vi. ch. ii. and xvi.; "Philebus," § 155; "Phædo," § 54; "Theætetus," §§ 84, 85.

Plato's idea of Justice comprehends--

(1) EQUITY (ὶσότης)--the rendering to every man his due.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. vi.

(2.) VERACITY (ἀλήθεια)--the utterance of what is true.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. v., bk. ii. ch. xx., bk. vi. ch. ii.

(3.) FAITHFULNESS (πιστὸτης)--the strict performance of a trust.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. v., bk. vi. ch. ii.

(4.) USEFULNESS (ώφέλτµον)--the answering of some valuable end.--"Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii., bk. iv. ch. xviii.; "Meno," § 22.

(5.) BENEVOLENCE (εὔνοια)--seeking the well-being of others.--"Republic," bk. i. ch. xvii., bk. ii. ch. xviii.

(6.) HOLINESS (ὁσιότης)--purity of mind, piety.--"Protagoras," §§ 52-54; "Phædo," § 32; "Theætetus," § 84.

We are thus brought, in the course of our examination of the Platonic method, to the results obtained by this method--or, in other words, to

III. THE PLATONIC ONTOLOGY.

The grand object of all philosophic inquiry in ancient Greece was to attain to the knowledge of real Being--that Being which is permanent, unchangeable, and eternal. It had proceeded on the intuitive conviction, that beneath all the endless diversity of the universe there must be a principle of unity--below all fleeting appearances there must be a permanent substance--beyond all this everlasting flow and change, this beginning and end of finite existence, there must be an eternal Being, which is the cause, and which contains, in itself, the reason of the order, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency which pervades the universe. And it had perpetually asked what is this permanent, unchangeable, and eternal substance or being?

2. The soul is immortal, because it has an independent power of self-motion--that is, it has self-activity and self-determination. No arrangement of matter, no configuration of body, can be conceived as the originator of free and voluntary movement.

4. Beyond all finite existences and secondary causes, all laws, ideas, and principles, there is an INTELLIGENCE or MIND, the First Principle of all Principles, the Supreme Idea on which all other ideas are grounded; the Monarch and Lawgiver of the universe, the ultimate Substance from which all other things derive their being and essence, the First and efficient Cause of all the order, and harmony, and beauty, and excellency, and goodness, which pervades the universe, who is called by way of pre-eminence and excellence the Supreme Good, THE GOD (ὁ θεός), "the God over all," (ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεός).

God is therefore, with Plato, the First Principle of all Principles; the Divine energy or power is the efficient cause, the Divine beauty the formal cause, and the Divine goodness the final cause of all existence.

The eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, and Truth, in an ultimate reality--the ETERNAL MIND, is thus the fundamental principle which pervades the whole of the Platonic philosophy. And now, having attained this sublime elevation, he looks down from thence upon the sensible, the phenomenal world, and upon the temporal life of man; and in the light of this great principle he attempts to explain their meaning and purpose. The results he attained in the former case constitute the Platonic Physics, in the latter, the Platonic Ethics.

I. PLATONIC PHYSICS.

The physical system of Plato being thus intended to illustrate a principle of optimism, the following results may be expected:

3. Another peculiarity of such a system will be an impatience of every merely mechanical theory of the operations of nature.

The application of this fundamental conception of the Platonic system--the eternal unity of the principles of Order, Goodness, and Truth in an ultimate reality, the Eternal Mind--to the elucidation of the temporal life of man, yields, as a result--

II. THE PLATONIC ETHICS.

The attainment of this consummation is the grand purpose of the Platonic philosophy. Its ultimate object is "the purification of the soul," and its pervading spirit is the aspiration after perfection. The whole system of Plato has therefore an eminently ethical character. It is a speculative philosophy directed to a practical purpose.

The two great principles which can be clearly traced as pervading the ethical system of Plato are--

The first of these principles is the counterpart ethical expression of his theory of immutable Being. The second is the counterpart of his theory of phenomenal change, or mere Becoming.

The soul of man is framed after the pattern of the immutable ideas of the just, and the true, and the good, which dwell in the Eternal Mind--that is, it is made in the image of God. The soul in its ultimate essence is formed of "the immutable" and "the permanent." The presence of the ideas of the just, and the true, and the good in the reason of man, constitute him a moral nature; and it is impossible that he can cease to be a moral being, for these ideas, having a permanent and immutable being, can not be changed. All the passions and affections of the soul are merely phenomenal. They belong to the mortal, the transitory life of man; they are in endless flow and change, and they have no permanent reality. As phenomena, they must, however, have some ground; and Plato found that ground in the mysterious, instinctive longing for the good and the true which dwells in the very essence of the soul. These are the realities after which it strives, even when pursuing pleasure, and honor, and wealth, and fame. All the restlessness of human life is prompted by a longing for the good. But man does not clearly perceive what the good really is. The rational element of the soul has become clouded by passion and ignorance, and suffered an eclipse of its powers. Still, man longs for the good, and bears witness, by his restlessness and disquietude, that he instinctively desires it, and that he can find no rest and no satisfaction in any thing apart from the knowledge and the participation of the Supreme, the Absolute Good.

Independent of all other considerations, virtue is, therefore, to be pursued as the true good of the soul. Wisdom, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice, the four cardinal virtues of the Platonic system, are to be cultivated as the means of securing the purification and perfection of the inner man. And the ordinary pleasures, "the lesser goods" of life, are only to be so far pursued as they are subservient to, and compatible with, the higher and holier duty of striving after "the resemblance to God."

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · Footnote 554: (return) : Within "the εἰκότων µύθων ἰδέα--the category of probability."--"Phædo."Note 2 · Footnote 555: (return) "Phædo," § 50-56.Note 3 · Footnote 556: (return) "Phædrus," § 58.Note 4 · Footnote 557: (return) See note on p. 349.Note 5 · We have seen that Plato taught that the human reason is originally in possession of fundamental and necessary ideas--the copies of the archeNote 6 · Footnote 558: (return) "To learn is to recover our own previous knowledge, and this is properly to recollect."--"Phædo" § 55.Note 7 · Footnote 559: (return) "Meno," § 16-20. "Now for a person to recover knowledge himself through himself, is not this to recollect."Note 8 · All knowledge of truth and reality is, therefore, according to Plato, a REMINISCENCE (ἀνάµνησις)--a recovery of partially forgotten ideas whNote 9 · Footnote 560: (return) As in the "Phædo," §§ 48-57; "Phædrus," §§ 52-64; "Republic," bk. x.Note 10 · Footnote 561: (return) "Theætetus," §§ 17-20.Note 11 · Now whilst we readily grant that the instance given in the "Meno" does not sustain the inference of Plato that "the boy" had learnt these geNote 12 · And this was the grand aim of his Dialectic--to elicit, to bring to light the truths which are already in the mind--"a µαίευσις" a kind of iNote 13 · Footnote 562: (return) "Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato," vol. vi. p. 249. "The Platonic Method was the method of induction."--CousinNote 14 · Footnote 563: (return) "Novum Organum," vol. i. p. 105.Note 15 · It is thus, at first sight, obvious that it was a higher and more comprehensive science than the art of deduction. For it was directed to thNote 16 · Footnote 564: (return) Bacon.Note 17 · Footnote 565: (return) Coleridge, vol. ii. p. 413.Note 18 · Now the fact that such an inquiry has originated in the human mind, and that it can not rest satisfied without some solution, is conclusive Note 19 · Footnote 566: (return) "Phædo," § 103.Note 20 · Footnote 567: (return) Suppono, to place under as a support, to take as a ground.Note 21 · Footnote 568: (return) This generic principle, viewed under different relations, gives-- 1st. The principle of Substance--every quality suppNote 22 · Footnote 569: (return) Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. ii. p. 161.Note 23 · Footnote 570: (return) "Timæus," ch. ix.Note 24 · Now this mental initiative of every process of induction is the intuitive and necessary conviction that there must be a sufficient reason whNote 25 · Footnote 571: (return) "The Dialectitian is one who syllogistically infers the contradictions implied in popular opinions."--Aristotle, "SopNote 26 · Footnote 572: (return) "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.Note 27 · Footnote 573: (return) "Sophist," § 33; "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xii.Note 28 · Footnote 574: (return) See the "Phædo," § 119, and "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xiii., where the Law of Non-contradiction is announced.Note 29 · Footnote 575: (return) "Parmenides," § 3.Note 30 · The first business of Plato's dialectic is to demonstrate that the ground and reason of all existence can not be found in the mere objects oNote 31 · Footnote 576: (return) Confutation is the greatest and chiefest of purification.--"Sophist," § 34.Note 32 · Footnote 577: (return) Article "Plato," Encyclopædia Britannica.Note 33 · The dialectic process thus consisted almost entirely of refutation, 576 or what both he and Aristotle denominated elenchus (ἔλεγχος)--a procNote 34 · Footnote 578: (return) Cousin's "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 328.Note 35 · Footnote 579: (return) "Sophist," § 83.Note 36 · Footnote 280: (return) "Phædrus," §§ 109, 111.Note 37 · To determine what these principles or ideas are, Plato now addresses himself to the analysis of thought. "It is the glory of Plato to have bNote 38 · Footnote 581: (return) "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xiv.Note 39 · To reach this objective reality on which the ideas of reason repose, is the grand effort of Plato's dialectic. He seeks, by a rigid analysisNote 40 · Footnote 582: (return) Cousin's "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," pp. 57, 58.Note 41 · Abstraction is thus the process, the instrument of the Platonic dialectic. It is important, however, that we should distinguish between the Note 42 · Footnote 583: (return) "Let us declare, then, on what account the framing Artificer settled the formation of the universe. He was GOOD;" andNote 43 · Footnote 584: (return) "At the utmost bounds of the intellectual world is the idea of the Good, perceived with difficulty, but which, once sNote 44 · The first Good 583 (summum bonum) is God the highest, and Mind or Intelligence (νοῦς), which renders man capable of knowing and resembling GNote 45 · Footnote 585: (return) "Republic," bk. vi. ch. v.Note 46 · The final effort of Plato's Dialectic was to ascend from these ideas of Absolute Truth, and Absolute Beauty, and Absolute Goodness to the AbNote 47 · Footnote 586: (return) Alcinous, "Doctrines of Plato," p. 262.Note 48 · Footnote 587: (return) "Timæus," ch. ix.Note 49 · Footnote 588: (return) Maurice's "Ancient Philosophy," p. 149.Note 50 · To the mind of Plato, there was in every thing, even the smallest and most insignificant of sensible objects, a reality just in so far as itNote 51 · Footnote 589: (return) Cousin's "Elements of Psychology," p. 506.Note 52 · This passage from psychology to ontology is not achieved per saltum, or effected by any arbitrary or unwarrantable assumption. There are priNote 53 · Footnote 590: (return) "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xx. and xxi.Note 54 · This, then, is the dialectic of Plato. Instead of losing himself amid the endless variety of particular phenomena, he would search for princNote 55 · Footnote 591: (return) "Republic," bk. vii. ch. xii. and xiii.Note 56 · Footnote 592: (return) "Timæus," ch. xxii.Note 57 · Footnote 593: (return) "Timæus," ch. xxiii.Note 58 · Footnote 594: (return) Ibid., ch. xxiv.Note 59 · Footnote 595: (return) Ibid., ch. xxiv.Note 60 · Footnote 596: (return) Ibid., ch. xxvi.Note 61 · Footnote 597: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 171.Note 62 · Plato had assiduously labored at the solution of this problem. The object of his dialectic was "to lead upward the soul to the knowledge of Note 63 · 1st. Beneath all SENSIBLE phenomena there is an unchangeable subject-matter, the mysterious substratum of the world of sense, which he callsNote 64 · It is this "substratum or physical groundwork" which gives a reality and definiteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for, in their ceaNote 65 · Footnote 598: (return) "Metaphysics," bk. vii. ch. i.Note 66 · Footnote 599: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 178.Note 67 · Footnote 600: (return) "Timæus," ch. xxiii.Note 68 · Footnote 601: (return) Ibid., ch. xiiiiNote 69 · It should, however, be distinctly noted that Plato does not use the word ὓλη--matter. This term is first employed by Aristotle to express "tNote 70 · Footnote 602: (return) See ante, note 4, p. 349.Note 71 · Footnote 603: (return) "Timæus," ch. xiv.Note 72 · Footnote 604: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 171-175.Note 73 · There has been much discussion as to whether Plato held that this "Receptacle" and "Nurse" of forms and ideas was eternal, or generated in tNote 74 · Footnote 605: (return) "Laws," bk. x. ch. vi. and vii.; "Phædrus," § 51; "άρχὴ κινήσεως."Note 75 · Footnote 606: (return) "Timæus," ch. xii.; ταὐτον, θάτερον, and οὐσία or τὸ σνµµισγόµενον.Note 76 · Footnote 607: (return) "Laws," bk. v. ch. i.Note 77 · 2d. Beneath all mental phenomena there is a permanent subject or substratum which he designates THE IDENTICAL (τὸ αὐτό)--the rational elemenNote 78 · There are three principles into which Plato analyzes the soul--the principle of the Identical, the Diverse, and the Intermediate Essence. 60Note 79 · Footnote 608: (return) See ante, note 4, p. 349, as to the Platonic notions of "Time" and "Eternity."Note 80 · Footnote 609: (return) "Timaeus," ch. xliv.Note 81 · Footnote 610: (return) See the elaborate exposition in "Laws," bk. x. ch. xii. and xiii.Note 82 · This doctrine of the eternity of the free and rational element of the soul must, of course, appear strange and even repulsive to those who aNote 83 · Now, that the human soul, like the uncreated Deity, has always had a distinct, conscious, personal, independent being, does not appear to beNote 84 · Footnote 611: (return) See Grant's "Aristotle," vol. i. pp. 150, 151.Note 85 · Footnote 612: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 209, note.Note 86 · That portion of the soul which Plato regarded as "immortal" and "to be entitled divine," is thus the "offspring of God"--a ray of the DiviniNote 87 · Footnote 613: (return) "Phædo," §§ 61-75.Note 88 · 1. The soul is immortal, because it is incorporeal. There are two kinds of existences, one compounded, the other simple; the former subject Note 89 · Footnote 614: (return) "Phædrus," §§ 51-53.Note 90 · Footnote 615: (return) "Phædo," §§ 112-128.Note 91 · Footnote 616: (return) Ibid., §§ 48-57, 110-115.Note 92 · Footnote 617: (return) Ibid., §§ 129-145.Note 93 · Footnote 618: (return) The doctrine of Metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls, can scarcely be regarded as part of the philosophic systeNote 94 · Now that which can not move itself, but derives its motion from something else, may cease to move, and perish. "But that which is self-movedNote 95 · 3. The soul is immortal, because it possesses universal, necessary, and absolute ideas, which transcend all material conditions, and bespeakNote 96 · In the concluding sections of the "Phædo" he urges the doctrine with earnestness and feeling as the grand motive to a virtuous life, for "thNote 97 · Footnote 619: (return) "Phædo," §§ 105-107.Note 98 · Footnote 620: (return) Diogenes Laertius, "Lives," bk. iii. ch. 77.Note 99 · Footnote 621: (return) "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xix.; "Timæus," ch. ix.Note 100 · Footnote 622: (return) "Apeleius," bk. i. ch. v.Note 101 · Footnote 623: (return) "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xx.Note 102 · Footnote 624: (return) "Timæus," ch. x.; "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.Note 103 · Footnote625: (return) "Timæus," ch. ix.-x.Note 104 · Footnote 626: (return) Ibid., ch. xii.Note 105 · Footnote 627: (return) Ibid., ch. ix.Note 106 · Footnote 628: (return) "Phædo," § 105.Note 107 · Footnote 629: (return) "Laws," bk. x. ch. xii.; "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.; "Philebus," § 50.Note 108 · Footnote 630: (return) "Philebus," §51.Note 109 · Footnote 631: (return) "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xix.Note 110 · Footnote 632: (return) "Laws," bk. iv. ch. viii.Note 111 · Footnote 633: (return) "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xxi.Note 112 · Footnote 634: (return) "Laws," bk. iv. ch. vii.Note 113 · Footnote 635: (return) "Philebus," § 51; "Timæus," ch. x.Note 114 · Footnote 636: (return) "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xviii.; "Timæus," ch. x.Note 115 · Footnote 637: (return) "Laws," bk. iv, ch. vii.Note 116 · This SUPREME MIND, 619 Plato taught, is incorporeal, 620 unchangeable, 621 infinite, 622 absolutely perfect, 623 essentially good, 624 unoriNote 117 · Footnote 638: (return) Thompson's "Laws of Thought," p. 119.Note 118 · Footnote 639: (return) Cousin, "Lectures on the History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 415. "There is no quintessential metaphysics which can prNote 119 · Footnote 640: (return) "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.Note 120 · Footnote 641: (return) "Ibid.," bk. vi. ch. xviii. and xix.Note 121 · Footnote 642: (return) "Republic," bk. vii. ch. iii.Note 122 · Footnote 643: (return) Ritter's "History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 275.Note 123 · Footnote 644: (return) "Banquet," § 35. See Cousin, "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," Lecture IV., also Lecture VII. pp. 150-153; DenNote 124 · Beyond the sensible world, Plato conceived another world of intelligibles or ideas. These ideas are not, however, distinct and independent eNote 125 · Footnote 645: (return) "Phædo," §§ 105, 106.Note 126 · Firmly believing in the absolute excellence of the Deity, and regarding the Divine Goodness as the Final Cause of the universe, he pronounceNote 127 · Footnote 646: (return) "Timæus," ch. ix.Note 128 · Footnote 647: (return) Ibid.Note 129 · Footnote 648: (return) Ibid., ch. x.Note 130 · Footnote 649: (return) Ibid., ch. xix.Note 131 · Footnote 650: (return) "Being is related to Becoming (the Absolute to the Contingent) as Truth is to Belief; consequently we must not marvelNote 132 · Plato accepted this suggestion of Anaxagoras with all his peculiar earnestness, and devoted himself to its fuller development. It were a vaiNote 133 · 1. That it will mainly concern itself with final causes. The universe being regarded chiefly, as indeed it is, an indication of the Divine INote 134 · Footnote 651: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 157.Note 135 · Footnote 652: (return) "Timæus," ch. xxxi.Note 136 · Footnote 653: (return) Ibid., ch. xxvii.Note 137 · Footnote 654: (return) Ibid., ch. xlii.Note 138 · Footnote 655: (return) "It is Plato's merit to have discovered that the laws of the physical universe are resolvable into numerical relationNote 139 · Footnote 656: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 163.Note 140 · Whatever physical truths were within the author's reach, took their place in the general array: the vacancies were filled up with the best sNote 141 · 2. It may be expected that a system of physics raised on optimistic principles will be mathematical rather than experimental. "Intended to eNote 142 · Footnote 657: (return) Psalm lxxxii. I; John x. 34.Note 143 · Footnote 658: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 164.Note 144 · Footnote 659: (return) "Timæus," ch. xv.Note 145 · Footnote 660: (return) Ibid.Note 146 · Footnote 661: (return) "Laws," bk. x.Note 147 · "The psychology of Plato led him to recognize mind wherever there was motion, and hence not only to require a Deity as first mover of the unNote 148 · Footnote 662: (return) In "Euthyphron" especially.Note 149 · Footnote 663: (return) "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.Note 150 · Believing firmly that there are unchangeable, necessary, and absolute principles, which are the perfections of the Eternal Mind, Plato must,Note 151 · And inasmuch as man is a partaker of the Divine essence, and as the ideas which dwell in the human reason are "copies" of those which dwell Note 152 · Footnote 664: (return) "Phædrus," § 145.Note 153 · Footnote 665: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 61.Note 154 · Footnote 666: (return) "Theætetus," § 84.Note 155 · Footnote 667: (return) Butler's "Lectures on Ancient Philosophy," vol. ii. p. 277.Note 156 · Footnote 668: (return) "Timæsus," ch. xlviii.Note 157 · Footnote 669: (return) "Laws," bk. v. ch. i., bk. ix. ch. vi., bk. x. ch. xii.Note 158 · Philosophy is the love of wisdom. Now wisdom (σοφία) is expressly declared by Plato to belong alone to the Supreme Divinity, 664 who alone cNote 159 · 1. That no man is willingly evil. 668Note 160 · 2. That every man is endued with the power of producing changes in his moral character 669Note 161 · Footnote 670: (return) "Laws," bk. ix. ch. vi.Note 162 · Footnote 671: (return) "Gorgias," §§ 52, 53.Note 163 · This, then, is the meaning of the oft-repeated assertion of Plato "that no man is willingly evil;" viz., that no man deliberately chooses evNote 164 · Footnote 672: (return) "Gorgias," §§ 74-76.Note 165 · Footnote 673: (return) "Phædo," §§ 130, 131.Note 166 · How is it, then, it may be asked, that men become evil? The answer of Plato is, that the soul has in it a principle of change, in the power
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