Volume 4 — THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM, AND ITS PROPER BASIS.

Speech on the Proposition to amend the Basis of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, in the Convention to revise and amend the Constitution of that State, July 7, 1853.

Mr. President,—If the question under consideration were less important in its bearings, or less embarrassed by conflicting opinions, I should hesitate to break the silence which I have been inclined to preserve in this Convention. In taking the seat to which I was unexpectedly chosen while absent from the Commonwealth, in another sphere of duty, I felt that it would be becoming in me, and that my associates here would recognize the propriety of my course, considering the little opportunity I had enjoyed of late to make myself acquainted with the sentiments of the people on proposed changes, especially in comparison with friends to whom this movement is mainly due,—on these accounts, as also on other accounts, I felt that it would be becoming in me to interfere as little as possible with these debates. To others I willingly left the part which I might have taken.

And now, while I think, that, since our labors began, weeks, even months, have passed, and that the term is already reached, when, according to the just expectations and earnest desires of many, they should be closed, I feel that acts rather than words, that votes rather than speeches,—at least such as I might hope to make,—are needed here, to the end that the Convention, seasonably and effectively completing its beneficent work, may itself be hailed as a Great Act in the history of the Commonwealth.

But the magnitude of this question justifies debate; and allow me to add, that the State, our common mother, may feel proud of the ability, the eloquence, and the good temper with which it has thus far been conducted. Gentlemen have addressed the Convention in a manner which would grace any assembly that it has been my fortune to know, at home or abroad. Sir, the character of these proceedings gives new assurance for the future. The alarmist, who starts at every suggestion of change, and the croaker, who augurs constant evil from the irresistible tendency of events, must confess that there are men here to whose intelligence and patriotism, under God, the interests of our beloved Commonwealth may well be intrusted. Yes, Sir, Massachusetts is safe. Whatever the result even of the present important question, whichsoever scheme of representation may be adopted, Massachusetts will continue to prosper as in times past.

In the course of human history, two States, small in territory, have won enviable renown by genius and devotion to Freedom, so that their very names awaken echoes: I refer to Athens and Scotland. But Athens,—even at Salamis, repelling the Persian host, or afterwards, in the golden days of Pericles,—and Scotland, throughout her long struggle with England, down to the very Act of Union at the beginning of the last century,—were each inferior, in population and wealth, to Massachusetts at this moment. It belongs to us, according to our capacities, to see that this comparison does not end here. Others may believe that our duty is best accomplished by standing still. I like to believe that it can be completely done only by constant, incessant advance in all things,—in knowledge, in science, in art, and lastly in government itself, destined to be the bright consummation, on earth, of all knowledge, all science, and all art.

In framing our Constitution anew, we encounter a difficulty which at its original formation, in 1780, perplexed our fathers,—which perplexed the Convention of 1820,—which with its perplexities has haunted successive Legislatures and the whole people down to this day,—and which now perplexes us. This difficulty occurs in determining the Representative System, and proceeds mainly from the corporate claims of towns. From an early period in the State, towns, both great and small, with slight exceptions, have sent one or more representatives to the Legislature. In primitive days, when towns were few and the whole population was scanty, this arrangement was convenient at least, if not equitable. But now, with the increased number of towns, and the unequal distribution of a large population, it has become inconvenient, if not inequitable. The existing system does not work well, and we are summoned to reform it.

And here, Sir, let me congratulate the Convention, that, on this most important question, transcending every other, all of us, without distinction of party, are in favor of reform. All are Reformers. The existing system finds no advocate on this floor. Nobody here will do it reverence. If the call of the Convention were not already amply vindicated, if there were doubt anywhere of its expediency, the remarkable concurrence of all sides in condemning the existing representative system shows that we have not come together without cause.

The orders of the day have been filled with various plans to meet the exigency. Most of these aimed to preserve the corporate representation of towns; some of them, at least one from the venerable gentleman from Taunton [Mr. Morton], and another from the venerable gentleman from Boston [Mr. Hale], favored an opposite system, hitherto untried among us, and proposed to divide the State into districts. The question has been between these hostile propositions; and that is the question which I propose to consider, in the light of history and abstract principle, as also with reference to present exigencies. I shall speak, first, of the origin and nature of the Representative System, and its proper character under American institutions; and, secondly, I shall endeavor to indicate the principles which may conduct us to a practical conclusion in the present debate. Entering upon this service at so late a stage of the discussion, I feel like a tardy gleaner in a well-traversed field; but I shall proceed.

I.

I begin with the Origin and Nature of the Representative System. This is an invention of modern times. In antiquity there were republics and democracies, but there was no Representative System. Rulers were chosen by the people, as in many Commonwealths; senators were designated by the king or by the censors, as in Rome; ambassadors or legates were sent to a Federal Council, as to the Assembly of the Amphictyons; but in no ancient state was any body of men ever constituted by the people to represent them in the administration of their internal affairs. In Athens, the people met in public assembly, and directly acted for themselves on all questions, foreign or domestic. This was possible there, as the State was small, and the Assembly seldom exceeded five thousand citizens,—a large town-meeting, or mass-meeting, we might call it,—not inaptly termed "that fierce democratie" of Athens.

But where the territory was extensive, and the population scattered and numerous, there could be no assembly of the whole body of citizens. To meet this precise difficulty the Representative System was devised. By a machinery so obvious that we are astonished it was not employed in the ancient Commonwealths, the people, though scattered and numerous, are gathered, by their chosen representatives, into a small and deliberative assembly, where, without tumult or rashness, they consider and determine all questions which concern them. In every representative body, properly constituted, the people are practically present.

Nothing is invented and perfected at the same time; and this system is no exception to the rule. In England, where it reached its earliest vigor, it has been, and still is, anomalous in character. The existing divisions of the country, composed of boroughs, cities, and counties, were summoned by the king's writ to send representatives, with little regard to equality of any kind, whether of population, taxation, or territory. Their existence as corporate units was the prevailing title. The irregular operation of the system, increasing with lapse of time, provoked a cry for Parliamentary Reform, which, after a struggle of more than fifty years, ending in a debate that occupied the House of Commons more than fifty days, was finally carried; but, though many abuses and inequalities were removed, yet the anomalous representation by counties, cities, and boroughs still continued. And this, Sir, is the English system.

Pass now to the American system. I say American system,—for to our country belongs the honor of first giving to the world the idea of a system which, discarding corporate representation, founded itself absolutely on equality. Let us acknowledge with gratitude that from England have come five great and ever memorable institutions, by which Liberty is secured: I mean the Trial by Jury,—the writ of Habeas Corpus,—the Representative System,—the Rules and Orders of Debate,—and, lastly, that benign principle which pronounces that its air is too pure for a slave to breathe: perhaps the five most important political establishments of modern times. This glory cannot be taken from the mother country. But America has added to the Representative System another principle, without which it is incomplete, and which, in the course of events, is destined, I cannot doubt, to find acceptance wherever the Representative System is employed: I mean the principle of equality.

Here in Massachusetts, home of the ideas out of which sprang the Revolution, this principle had its earliest expression. And it is not a little curious that this very expression was suggested by the two evils of which we now complain,—namely, a practical inequality of representation, and a too numerous House.

In the earliest days of the Colony, while the number of freemen was small and gathered in one neighborhood, there was no occasion for any representative body. All could then meet in public assembly, as at ancient Athens; in fact, they did so meet, and in this way discharged the duties of legislation. But as the freemen became scattered and numerous, it was found grievous to compel the personal attendance of the whole body, and, as a substitute, the towns were empowered, in 1634, to assemble in General Court by deputies.[10] Here was the establishment of the Representative System in Massachusetts, which has continued, without interruption, down to our day. The size of the House and the relative representation of towns have varied at different times; but the great principle of representation, by which a substitute is provided for the whole body of the people, has constantly been preserved. Still a feeling has long prevailed that the system had not yet received its final form, while, with more or less precision, has been discerned that principle of equality which is essential to its completeness.

Among the acts of the first General Court of the Revolution was one passed in the summer of 1775, after the Battle of Bunker Hill, "declaratory of the right of the towns and districts to elect and depute a representative or representatives to serve for and represent them in the General Court." By this act all provisions of previous acts denying to certain towns and districts the right of sending a representative were declared null and void, and every town containing thirty qualified voters was authorized to send one.[11] The immediate consequence was the two evils to which I have already referred,—namely, inequality of representation, and a too numerous House: but the whole number of representatives which aroused the complaints of that day was three hundred and five.

These grievances were the occasion of a Convention of delegates from the towns of Essex County, at Ipswich, April 25, 1776, where was adopted a Memorial, afterwards presented and enforced at the bar of the House by John Lowell. In this remarkable document occurs the first development, if not the first proclamation, of the principle of equality in representation. Here, Sir, is the fountain and origin of an idea full of strength, beauty, and truth. Listen to the words of these Revolutionary fathers.

"If this representation is equal, it is perfect; as far as it deviates from this equality, so far it is imperfect, and approaches to that state of slavery; and the want of a just weight in representation is an evil nearly akin to being totally destitute of it. An inequality of representation has been justly esteemed the cause which has in a great degree sapped the foundation of the once admired, but now tottering, fabric of the British Empire; and we fear, that, if a different mode of representation from the present is not adopted in this Colony, our Constitution will not continue to that late period of time which the glowing heart of every true American now anticipates....

"We cannot realize that your Honors, our wise political fathers, have adverted to the present inequality of representation in this Colony, to the growth of the evil, or to the fatal consequences which will probably ensue from the continuance of it.

"Each town and district in the Colony is by some late regulations permitted to send one representative to the General Court, if such town or district consists of thirty freeholders and other inhabitants qualified to elect; if of one hundred and twenty, to send two. No town is permitted to send more than two, except the town of Boston, which may send four. There are some towns and districts in the Colony in which there are between thirty and forty freeholders, and other inhabitants qualified to elect, only; there are others besides Boston in which there are more than five hundred. The first of these may send one representative; the latter can send only two. If these towns as to property are to each other in the same respective proportion, is it not clear to a mathematical demonstration that the same number of inhabitants of equal property in the one town have but an eighth part of the weight in representation with the other?—and with what colorable pretext? we would decently inquire."[12]

Under the pressure of this powerful state paper the obnoxious law was repealed, and one "providing for a more equal representation" substituted; but the evil was only partially remedied. Then followed an unsuccessful effort to make a Constitution in 1777-8, which failed partly through dissatisfaction with its disposal of this very question. The County of Essex was again heard in another document, now known as the "Essex Result," and among the most able and instructive in our history, from which I take the following important words.

"The rights of representation should be so equally and impartially distributed, that the representatives should have the same views and interests with the people at large. They should think, feel, and act like them, and, in fine, should be an exact miniature of their constituents. They should be, if we may use the expression, the whole body politic, with all its property, rights, and privileges reduced to a smaller scale, every part being diminished in just proportion. To pursue the metaphor, if, in adjusting the representation of freemen, any ten are reduced into one, all the other tens should be alike reduced; or, if any hundred should be reduced to one, all the other hundreds should have just the same reduction."[13]

Mark well these words. Here is the Rule of Three, for the first time in history, applied to representation. This, Sir, is not the English system. I call it, with pride, the American system.

In another place the document proceeds as follows.

"The rights of representation should also be held sacred and inviolable, and for this purpose representation should be fixed upon known and easy principles; and the Constitution should make provision that recourse should constantly be had to those principles within a very small period of years, to rectify the errors that will creep in through lapse of time or alteration of situations."[14]

Then, distinctly, it proposes a system of districts, in words which I quote.

"In forming the first body of legislators, let regard be had only to the representation of persons, not of property. This body we call the House of Representatives. Ascertain the number of representatives. It ought not to be so large as will induce an enormous expense to Government, nor too unwieldy to deliberate with coolness and attention, nor so small as to be unacquainted with the situation and circumstances of the State. One hundred will be large enough, and perhaps it may be too large. We are persuaded that any number of men exceeding that cannot do business with such expedition and propriety as a smaller number could. However, let that at present be considered as the number. Let us have the number of freemen in the several counties in the State, and let these representatives be apportioned among the respective counties in proportion to their number of freemen.... As we have the number of freemen in the county, and the number of county representatives, by dividing the greater by the less we have the number of freemen entitled to send one representative. Then add as many adjoining towns together as contain that number of freemen, or as near as may be, and let those towns form one district, and proceed in this manner through the county."[15]

Mr. Hallett, for Wilbraham (interrupting). Will the gentleman state who was the author of that Essex paper? Mr. Sumner. Theophilus Parsons is the reputed author of the document known as the "Essex Result." Mr. Hallett. Yes, Sir, it was Theophilus Parsons who was the author of that, and John Lowell of the other; and good old Tory doctrines they are. Mr. Sumner. If these be Tory doctrines, I must think well of Toryism.

Sir, notwithstanding these appeals, sustained with unsurpassed ability, the American system failed to be adopted in the Constitution of 1780. The anomalous English system was still continued; but, as if to cover the departure from principle, it was twice declared that the representation of the people should be "founded upon the principle of equality." This declaration still continues as our guide, while the irregular operation of the existing system, with its inequalities and large numbers, is a beacon of warning.

Following closely upon these efforts in Massachusetts, this principle found an illustrious advocate in Thomas Jefferson. In his "Notes on Virginia," written in 1781, he sharply exposes the inequalities of representation;[16] and a short time afterwards, when the victory at Yorktown had rescued Virginia from invasion and secured the independence of the United Colonies, he prepared the draught of a Constitution for his native State, which, disowning the English system, and recognizing the very principle that had failed in Massachusetts, expressly provided that "the number of delegates which each county may send shall be in proportion to the number of its qualified electors; and the whole number of delegates for the State shall be so proportioned to the whole number of qualified electors in it, that they shall never exceed three hundred nor be fewer than one hundred.... If any county be reduced in its qualified electors below the number authorized to send one delegate, let it be annexed to some adjoining county."[17] This proposition, which is substantially the Rule of Three, did not find favor in Virginia, which State, like Massachusetts, was not yet prepared for such a charter of electoral equality; but it still stands as a monument at once of its author and of the true system of representation.

The American system, though first showing itself in Massachusetts and Virginia, found its earliest practical exemplification a few years later in the Constitution of the United States. By the Articles of Confederation each State was entitled to send to Congress not less than two nor more than seven representatives, and in the determination of questions each State had one vote only. This plan was rejected by the framers of the new Constitution, and another was adopted, till then untried in the history of the world. It was declared that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers": not according to property, not according to territory, not according to any corporate rights, but according to their respective numbers. And this system has continued down to our day, and will continue immortal as the Union itself. Here is the Rule of Three actually incorporated into the Representative System of the United States.

An attempt has been made to render this system odious, or at least questionable, by charging upon it something of the excesses of the great French Revolution. Even if this rule had prevailed at that time in France, it would be bold to charge upon it any such consequences. But it is a mistake to suppose that it was then adopted in that country. The republican Constitution of 1791 was not founded upon numbers only, but upon numbers, territory, and taxation combined,—a mixed system, which excluded the true idea of personal equality. At the peaceful, almost bloodless, Revolution of 1848, under the lead of Lamartine, a National Assembly was convened on the simple basis of population, and one representative was allowed for every forty thousand inhabitants. Here, indeed, is the Rule of Three; but the idea originally came from our country.

Mr. Hallett. Will the gentleman for Marshfield allow me to make one more inquiry? Mr. Sumner. Certainly. Mr. Hallett. Do I understand the gentleman to say that the Rule of Three was applied to representation in the United States? Mr. Sumner. I mean to say that the representation in the lower House of Congress was apportioned according to numbers; and this is the Rule of Three.

A practical question arises here, whether this rule should be applied to the whole body of population, including women, children, and unnaturalized foreigners, or to those only who exercise the electoral franchise,—in other words, to voters. It is probable that the rule would produce nearly similar results in both cases, as voters, except in few places, would bear a uniform proportion to the whole population. But it is easy to determine what the principle of the Representative System requires. Since its object is to provide a practical substitute for meetings of the people, it should be founded, in just proportion, on the numbers of those who, according to our Constitution, can take part in those meetings,—that is, upon the qualified voters. The representative body should be a miniature or abridgment of the electoral body,—in other words, of those allowed to participate in public affairs. If this conclusion needs authority, it may be found in the words of Mr. Madison, in the Debates on the National Constitution. "It has been very properly observed," he says, "that representation is an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves is rendered unnecessary, and that the representatives ought, therefore, to bear a proportion to the votes which their constituents, if convened, would respectively have."[18]

The Rule of Three, then, applied to voters, seems to me sound; but whether applied to voters or population, it is the true rule of representation, and stands on irreversible principles. In my view, it commends itself to the natural reason so obviously, so instinctively, that I do not feel disposed to dwell upon it. But since it is called in question, I shall be excused for saying a few words in its behalf. Its advantages present themselves in several aspects.

First. I put in the front its constant and equal operation throughout the Commonwealth. Under it, every man will have a representative each year, and every man will have the same representative power as every other man. In this respect it recognizes a darling idea of our institutions, which cannot be disowned without weakening their foundations. It gives to the great principle of human equality a new expansion and application. It makes all men, in the enjoyment of the electoral franchise, whatever their diversities of intelligence, education, or wealth, or wheresoever they may be within the borders of the Commonwealth, whether in small town or in populous city, absolutely equal at the ballot-box.

I know that there are persons, Sir, who do not hesitate to assail the whole doctrine of the equality of men, as enunciated in our Declaration of Independence and in our Bill of Rights. In this work two eminent statesmen of our own country and England have led the way.[19] But it seems to me, that, if they had chosen to comprehend the meaning of the principle, much, if not all, of their objection would have been removed. Very plain it is that men are not born equal in physical strength or in mental capacity, in beauty of form or health of body. This is apparent to all, and the difference increases with years. Diversity or inequality in these respects is the law of creation. But as God is no respecter of persons, and as all are equal in his sight, whether rich or poor, whether dwellers in cities or in fields, so are all equal in natural rights; and it is an absurd declamation—of which no gentleman in this Convention is guilty—to adduce, in argument against them, the physical or mental inequalities by which men are characterized. Now I am not prepared to class the electoral franchise among inherent, natural rights, common to the whole human family, without distinction of age, sex, or residence; but I do say, that from the equality of men, which we so proudly proclaim, we derive a just rule for its exercise. For myself, I accept this principle, and, just so far and just so soon as possible, I would be guided by it in the system of Representation. But there are other reasons still.

Secondly. The Rule of Three, as applied to representation, is commended by its simplicity. It supersedes all the painful calculations to which we have been driven, the long agony of mathematics, as it was called by my friend over the way [Mr. Giles], and is as easy in application as it is just.

Thirdly. This rule is founded in Nature, and not in Art,—on natural bodies, and not on artificial bodies,—on men, and not on corporations,—on souls, and not on petty geographical lines. On this account it may be called a natural rule, and, when once established, will become fixed and permanent, beyond all change or desire of change.

And, fourthly, this rule removes, to every possible extent, those opportunities of political partiality and calculation, in the adjustment of representation, which are naturally incident to any departure from precise rule. It was beautifully said of Law by the greatest intellect of Antiquity, that it is mind without passion; and this very definition I would extend to a rule which, with little intervention from human will, is graduated by numbers, passionless as law itself in the conception of Aristotle. The object of free institutions is to withdraw all concerns of State, so far as practicable, from human discretion, and place them under the shield of human principles, to the end, according to the words of our Constitution, that there may be "a government of laws, and not of men." But, just in proportion as we depart from precise rule, it becomes a government of men, and not of laws.

Such considerations as these, thus briefly expressed, seem to vindicate this rule of representation. But I would not forget the arguments adduced against it. These assume two distinct forms: one founded on the character of our towns and the importance of preserving their influence; the other founded on the alleged necessity of counteracting the centralization of power in the cities. Now of these in their order.

And, first, of the importance of preserving our towns. Sir, I yield to no man in appreciation of the good done by these free municipalities. The able member for Erving [Mr. Griswold], who began this debate, the eloquent member for Berlin [Mr. Boutwell], and my excellent friend of many years, the accomplished member for Manchester [Mr. Dana], in the masterly speeches which they have addressed to the Convention, attributed no good influence to the towns which I do not recognize also. With them I agree, cordially, that the towns of Massachusetts, like the municipalities of Switzerland, have been schools and nurseries of freedom,—and that in these small bodies men were early disciplined in those primal duties of citizenship, which, on a grander scale, are made the foundation of our whole political fabric. But I cannot go so far as to attribute this remarkable influence to the assumed fact, that each town by itself was entitled to a representative in the legislative body. At the time of the Revolution this was the prerogative of most towns, though not of all; but it cannot be regarded as the distinctive, essential, life-giving attribute: at most, it was only an incident.

Sir, the true glory of the towns then was, that they were organized on the principle of self-government, at a time when that principle was not generally recognized,—that each town by itself was a little republic, where the whole body of freemen were voters, with powers of local legislation, taxation, and administration, and, especially, with power to choose their own head and all subordinate magistrates. The boroughs of England have possessed the power to send a member—often two members—to Parliament; but this has not saved them from corruption; nor has any person attributed to them, though in the enjoyment of this franchise, the influence which has proceeded from our municipalities. The reason is obvious. They were organized under charters from the crown, by which local government was vested, not in the whole body of freemen, but in small councils, or select classes, originally nominated by the crown, and ever afterwards renewing themselves. No such abuse prevailed in our municipalities; and this political health at home, Sir, and not the incident of exclusive representation in a distant Legislature, has been the secret of their strength. I would cherish it ever.

This brings me, in the next place, to the objection founded on centralization of power in the cities. It is said that wealth, business, population, and talent, in multitudinous forms, all tend to the cities, and that the excessive influence of this concentrated mass, quickened by an active press, by facilities of concert, and by social appliances, ought to be counterbalanced by allotment to the towns of representative weight beyond their proportion of numbers. Now, Sir, while confessing and regretting the present predominance of the cities, I must be permitted to question the propriety of the proposed remedy. And here, differing in some respects from friends on both sides, I make an appeal for candid judgment of what I shall candidly say.

Let us deal fairly by the cities. No student of history can fail to perceive that they have performed different parts at different stages of the world. In Antiquity, they were the acknowledged centres of power, often of tyranny. In the Middle Ages, they became the home of freedom, and the bridle to feudalism. For this service they should be gratefully remembered. And now there is another change. The armed feudalism is overthrown; but it is impossible not to see that it has yielded to a commercial feudalism, whose seat is in the cities, and which, in its way, is hardly less selfish and exacting than the feudalism of the iron hand. My friend, the member for Manchester [Mr. Dana], was clearly right, when he said that the Boston of to-day is not the Boston of our fathers. Let me be understood. I make no impeachment of individuals, but simply indicate those combined influences proceeding from the potent Spirit of Trade, which, though unlike that Spirit of the Lord where is Liberty, is not inconsistent with the most enlarged munificence. I think, while confessing the abounding charities of the rich men whose eulogy we have heard more than once in this debate, it must be admitted that those pure principles which are the breath of the Republic now find their truest atmosphere in calm retreats, away from the strife of gain and the hot pavements of crowded streets. Sir, it is not only when we look upon the fields, hills, and valleys, clad in verdure, and shining with silver lake or rivulet, that we are ready to exclaim,—

"God made the country, and man made the town."

But, Sir, while maintaining these opinions, I cannot admit the argument, that the centralized power of the cities may be counteracted by degrading them in the scale of representation. This cannot be purposely done, without departing from fundamental principles, and overthrowing the presiding doctrine of personal equality. Cities are but congregations of men; and men exert influence in various ways,—by the accident of position, the accident of intelligence, the accident of property, the accident of birth, and, lastly, by the vote. It is the vote only which is not an accident; and it should be the boast of Massachusetts, that all men, whatever their accidents, are equal in their votes.

Here the hammer of the President fell, as the hour expired; but, by unanimous consent, Mr. Sumner proceeded.

The idea of property as a check upon numbers, which on a former occasion found such favor in this hall, is now rejected in the adjustment of our representative System. And, Sir, I venture to predict that the proposition, newly broached in this Commonwealth, to restrain the cities by curtailment of their just representative power, will hereafter be as little regarded.

II.

Mr. President,—Such is what I have to say on the history and principles of the Representative System, particularly in the light of American institutions; and this brings me to the practical question at this moment. I cannot doubt that the District System, as it is generally called, whereby the representative power will be distributed in just proportion, according to the Rule of Three, among the voters of the Commonwealth, is the true system, destined at no distant day to prevail. And gladly would I see this Convention hasten the day by presenting it to the people for adoption in the organic law. To this end I have striven by my votes. But, Sir, I cannot forget what has passed. The votes already taken show that the Convention is not prepared for this radical change; and I am assured by gentlemen more familiar with public sentiment than I can pretend to be, that the people are not yet prepared for it.

Thus we are brought to the position occupied successively by the Conventions of 1780 and 1820, each of which, though containing warm partisans of the District System, shrank from its adoption—as in Virginia, the early recommendation of Jefferson, and his vehement support at a later day, have been powerless to produce this important amendment. John Lowell, who appeared at the bar of the Massachusetts Legislature in 1776 to vindicate the principle of equality in representation, and Theophilus Parsons, author of the powerful tract which proposed to found the Representative System on the Rule of Three, were both members of the first Convention,—and I know not if the District System has since had any abler defenders. To these I might add the great name of John Adams, who early pleaded for equality of representation, and declared, in words adopted by the Essex Convention, that the Representative Assembly should be "an exact portrait in miniature of the people at large."[20] In the Convention of 1820, the District System was cherished and openly extolled by a distinguished jurist, at that time a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,—Joseph Story,—whose present fame gives additional importance to his opinions. And yet the desire of these men failed. The corporate representation of towns was preserved, and the District System pronounced impracticable. In the Address put forth by the Convention of 1780, and signed by its President, James Bowdoin, these words may be found:—

"You will observe that we have resolved that representation ought to be founded on the principle of Equality; but it cannot be understood thereby that each town in the Commonwealth shall have weight and importance in a just proportion to its numbers and property. An exact representation would be unpracticable, even in a system of government arising from the state of Nature, and much more so in a State already divided into nearly three hundred corporations."[21]

The Convention seem to have recognized the theoretic fitness of an "exact representation," but did not regard it as feasible in a State already divided into nearly three hundred corporations. In the Convention of 1820, Joseph Story, who has been quoted by my eloquent friend [Mr. Choate], used language which, though not so strong as that of the early Address, has the same result.

"In the Select Committee, I was in favor of a plan of representation in the House founded on population, as the most just and equal in its operation. I still retain that opinion. There were serious objections against this system, and it was believed by others that the towns could not be brought to consent to yield up the corporate privileges of representation, which had been enjoyed so long, and were so intimately connected with their pride and their interests. I felt constrained, therefore, with great reluctance, to yield up a favorite plan. I have lived long enough to know, that, in any question of government, something is to be yielded up on all sides. Conciliation and compromise lie at the origin of every free government; and the question never was and never can be, what is absolutely best, but what is relatively wise, just, and expedient. I have not hesitated, therefore, to support the plan of the Select Committee, as one that, on the whole, was the best that, under existing circumstances, could be obtained."[22]

Sir, I am not insensible to these considerations, or to the authority of these examples. A division of the State into districts would be a change, in conformity with abstract principles, which would interfere with existing opinions, habitudes, and prejudices of the towns, all of which must be respected. A change so important in character cannot be advantageously made, unless supported by the permanent feelings and convictions of the people. Institutions are formed from within, not from without. They spring from custom and popular faith, silently operating with internal power, not from the imposed will of a lawgiver. And our present duty here, at least on this question, may be in some measure satisfied, if we aid this growth.

Two great schools of jurisprudence for a while divided the learned mind of Germany,—one known as the Historic, the other as the Didactic. The question between them was similar to that now before the Convention. The first regarded all laws and institutions as the growth of custom, under constant influences of history; the other insisted upon positive legislation, giving to them a form in conformity with abstract reason. It is clear that both were in a measure right. No lawgiver or statesman can disregard either history or abstract reason. He must contemplate both. He will faithfully study the Past, and will recognize its treasures and traditions; but, with equal fidelity, he will set his face towards the Future, where all institutions will at last be in harmony with truth.

I have been encouraged to believe in the practicability of the District System by its conformity with reason, and by seeing how naturally it went into operation under the Constitution of the United States. But there is a difference between that case and the present. A new Government was then founded, with new powers, applicable to a broad expanse of country; but the Constitution of Massachusetts was little more than a continuation of preëxisting usages and institutions, with all dependence upon royalty removed. This distinction may help us now. If the country were absolutely new, without embarrassment from existing corporate rights,—claims I would rather call them,—it might easily be arranged according to the most approved theory, as Philadelphia is said to have been originally laid out on the model of the German city which its great founder had seen in his travels.[23] But to bring our existing system into symmetry, and to lay it out anew, would seem to be a task—at least I am reluctantly led to this conclusion by what I have heard here—not unlike that of rebuilding Boston, and of shaping its compact mass of crooked streets into the regular rectangular forms of the city of Penn. And yet this is not impossible. With each day, by demolishing ancient houses and widening ancient ways, changes are made which tend to this result.

Sir, we must recognize the existing condition of things, remedy all practical grievances so far as possible, and set our faces towards the true system. We must act in the Present, but be mindful also of the Future. There are proper occasions for compromise, as most certainly there are rights beyond compromise. But the Representative System is an expedient or device for ascertaining the popular will, and, though well satisfied that this can be best founded on numbers, I would not venture to say, in the present light of political science, that the right of each man to an equal representation, according to the Rule of Three, and without regard to existing institutions or controlling usages, is of that inherent and lofty character—like the God-given right to life or liberty—which admits of no compromise.

Several grievances exist, which will be removed by the proposed amendments. There is one which I had hoped would disappear, but which is the necessary incident of corporate representation: I mean the unwieldy size of the House.

It is generally said that a small body is more open to bribery and corruption than a large body; but, on the other hand, I have heard it asserted that the larger is more exposed than the smaller. I put this consideration aside. My objection to a large House is, that it is inconvenient for the despatch of public business. There is a famous saying of Cardinal de Retz, that every assembly of more than one hundred is a mob; and Lord Chesterfield applied the same term to the British House of Commons. At the present time that body has nominally six hundred and fifty-four members. It is called by Lord Brougham "preposterously large"; but a quorum for business is forty only; and it is only on rare occasions of political importance that its benches are completely occupied. The House of Lords, nominally, has four hundred and fifty-nine members; but a quorum in this body consists of three only;[24] and much of its business is transacted in a very thin attendance.

The experience of Congress, as also of other States, points to a reduction of our present number. Indeed, for many years this was a general desire through the State. In the earliest Colonial days every town was allowed three deputies; but in five years the number, on reaching thirty-three, was reduced to two for each.[25] At a later day, in 1694, a great contest in the House was decided by a vote of twenty-six against twenty-four.[26] In the agitating period between 1762 and 1773, covering the controversies which heralded the Revolution, the House consisted, on an average, of one hundred and twenty members; and only on one occasion the magnitude of the interest is reported by Hutchinson to have drawn together so many as one hundred and thirteen. At the last session of the Provincial Legislature, in May, 1774, when the Revolutionary conflict was at hand, the complete returns of the Journal show one hundred and forty. In 1776 there was a House of three hundred and five; but this "enormous and very unwieldy size," according to the language of the time, was assigned as a reason for a new Constitution. I regret that we cannot profit by this experience. A House of two hundred and fifty, or, since we are accustomed to large congregations,[27] of three hundred at most, would be an improvement on the present system.

There are two proposed improvements which I hail with satisfaction: one relates to the small towns, and the other to the cities. The small towns will have a more constant representation; and this of itself is an approach to the true principle of representation, which should be constant as well as equal. The cities will be divided into districts, and this I regard of twofold importance: first, as the beginning of a true system; and, secondly, as reducing the power which the cities, by the large number of their representatives, chosen by general ticket, now exercise.

A respected gentleman, now in my eye, has reminded me that in boyhood his attention was arrested in this House by what was called "the Boston seat," reserved exclusively for the Boston members, who sat together on cushions, while other members were left to such accommodation as they could find on bare benches. This discrimination ceased long ago. But it seems to me that this reserved and cushioned seat is typical of another discrimination, which Boston, in common with the cities, still enjoys. Sir, in voting for forty-four representatives, the elector in Boston exercises a representative power far exceeding that of electors in the country; and the majority which rules Boston and determines the whole delegation exercises a representative power transcending far that of any similar number in the Commonwealth. This is apparent on the bare statement, as forty-four sticks are stronger in one compact bundle than when single or in small parcels. Thus, while other counties are divided, the delegation from Boston is united. In all political contests, it is like the well-knit Macedonian phalanx, or the iron front of the Roman legion, in comparison with the disconnected individual warriors against whom they were engaged. This abuse will be removed; and here is the beginning, I had almost said the inauguration, of a true electoral equality in our Commonwealth.

And now, in conclusion, while thanking gentlemen for the kind attention with which they have honored me, let me express briefly the result to which I have come. I have openly declared my convictions with regard to the District System, and in accordance with these have recorded my votes in this Convention. These votes, which reveal my inmost desires on this matter, I would not change. But the question is not now between the District System, which I covet so much for Massachusetts, and the proposed amendments, but between these amendments and the existing system. On this issue I decide without hesitation. I shall vote, Sir, for the propositions of amendment before the Convention, should they come to a question on their final passage, not because they are all that I desire, not because they satisfy the requirement of principles which I cannot deny, not because they constitute a permanent adjustment of this difficult question, but because they are the best which I can now obtain, because they reform grievances of the existing system, and because they begin a change which can end only in the establishment of a Representative System founded in reality, as in name, on Equality. Their adoption will be the triumph of conciliation and harmony, and will furnish new testimony to the well-tempered spirit of our institutions, where