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Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind

ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND James Mill

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Transcriber’s Note and List of Contents

All editions of this text were published in two volumes. This file has combined them. The only consequential change to the original material is that the Contents pages for Volume 2 are repeated immediately after the Contents of Volume 1. Texts have been kindly provided by the Internet Archive. For Volume 1 the source mainly used was analysisofthephe00milluoft and for Volume 2, analysisofpheno02mill.

Footnotes

James Mill’s text had a few footnotes, indicated by single asterisks. His later commentators’ work was printed as footnotes, numbered consecutively through each volume (though there is no note 36 in volume 1), and attributed by an initial (or “Editor’s note”) at the end. James Mill’s notes are here recorded as 1*, 2*, etc. John Stuart Mill made one note in this style, 7* in volume 1. This has not been renumbered, but it has been rendered in J.S. Mill’s colour. Text due to contributors other than James Mill is marked by different text colours: blue for Bain, fuchsia for Findlater, green for Grote, and maroon for J.S. Mill. There are footnotes in Grote’s main footnote, and in a couple of other footnotes, marked as in the original. All footnotes are now placed after the paragraph in which they occur.

Corrections

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Other matters

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Some links have been inserted to provide for cross-references within the two volumes. Infelicities and mistakes here are the transcriber’s fault.

The Commentators' content

Since a large part of the interest of this book relates to the commentaries provided by J.S. Mill and his colleagues, and since no guide is given to them in the actual Table of Contents, a simple list of the more important comments is subjoined (items in bold are more substantial contributions) with the main sections of the original book indicated:

Author Topic Page/Note

Volume 1

Author INTRODUCTION 1

Author CHAPTER I. Sensation 2

Bain muscular feelings and digestive sensibility note 1

Author SECTION 1. Smell 7

Bain arranging the senses note 2

Mill the meaning of ‘smell’ note 3

Author SECTION 2. Hearing 16

Mill the meaning of ‘hearing’ note 4

Author SECTION 3. Sight 21

Mill the meaning of ‘sight’ note 5

Mill the meaning of ‘vision’ note 6

Author SECTION 4. Taste 25

Mill some physiologists’ view of taste note 7

Mill the meaning of ‘taste’ note 8

Author SECTION 5. Touch 28

Bain touch note 9

Bain the subjectivity of the sensations of hot and cold note 10

Mill the meaning of ’touch’ note 11

Bain the sense of touch note 12

Author SECTION 6. Sensations of Disorganization, etc. 37

Mill the meaning of ‘itching’ note 13

Bain organic sensibilities note 14

Author SECTION 7. Muscular Sensations, etc. 40

Author SECTION 8. Sensations in the Alimentary Canal 45

Bain pleasure of opium or alcohol not a matter of association note 16

Bain digestion and not noticing sensations note 17

Author CHAPTER II. Ideas 51

Bain discrimination and retentiveness note 18

Mill the idea of resistance note 19

Bain feelings of muscular action, not primarily a matter of Will note 20

Bain hunger and thirst note 21

Mill meaning of ‘indigestion,’ ‘hunger,’ ‘thirst’ note 22

Bain sensation and idea compared note 23

Mill can we have ideas of ideas? ideas of historical or fictional people note 24

Author CHAPTER III. The Association of Ideas 70

Bain possibility of synchronous sensations note 25

Bain a limitation to association, need for unique link note 26

Bain difference between transient and permanent recollections note 27

Mill vividness note 28

Bain sight note 29

Mill exposition of ‘ideas which it is not in our power to combine’ note 30

Bain emotional reactions more than association note 31

Mill ‘laws of obliviscence’ note 32

Bain visual sensations usually overlooked note 33

Mill accounts of unnoticed feelings note 34

Mill attempted reduction of association by resemblance to association by contiguity note 35

Bain association of ideas note 38

Mill rejecting contrast as a principle of association note 39

Author CHAPTER IV. Naming 127

Author SECTION 1. Nouns Substantive 134

Findlater origin of names of objects note 41

Mill utility of names of classes note 42

Mill ‘heat’ etc. as names only of sensations not of ideas note 43

Mill Locke’s ‘mixed modes’ note 44

Author SECTION 2. Nouns Adjective 134

Mill class names and utility of adjectives note 45

Author SECTION 3. Verbs 151

Mill omission of predication among functions of general names note 46

Mill verbs note 47

Author SECTION 4. Predication 159

Mill predication note 48

Mill further remark on predication note 49

Mill differentia, proprium and accidens note 50

Mill predication note 51

Findlater predication in non-Indo-European languages note 53

Mill predication and existence-claims note 54

Mill absence of belief in author’s account of predication note 55

Mill criticism of author’s account of syllogisms note 57

Mill names of names, genus and species note 58

Author SECTION 5. Pronouns 194

Findlater relative and demonstrative pronouns note 59

Author SECTION 6. Adverbs 199

Mill adverbial modification note 60

Author SECTION 7. Prepositions 201

Findlater etymology of prepositions note 61

Author SECTION 8. Conjunctions 212

Findlater conjunctions note 62

Findlater ‘but’ note 63

Findlater etymology of ‘if’ note 64

Findlater etymology of ‘because’ note 65

Author CHAPTER V. Consciousness 223

Bain consciousness note 74

Mill consciousness note 75

Author CHAPTER VI. Conception 233

Mill conceptions/general ideas note 76

Author CHAPTER VII. Imagination 238

Bain the imagination note 77

Author CHAPTER VIII. Classification 247

Mill utility of class names note 78

Grote Greek views of classification and abstraction note 79

Mill classification note 80

Author CHAPTER IX. Abstraction 294

Mill general names note 81

Mill rejecting the author’s use of ‘connote’ note 82

Mill abstract names note 83

Findlater etymology of abstract names note 86

Author CHAPTER X. Memory 318

Bain mention of compound association note 88

Mill need for belief as a component of memory note 91

Bain the cessation of sensations note 93

Mill difference between memory and imagination note 94

Author CHAPTER XI. Belief 341

Mill belief as constituent of memory and judgment note 95

Mill different uses of ‘belief’ note 97

Mill why people do not seek a cause for a first cause note 100

Mill inseparable associations note 102

Bain belief in the uniformity of nature note 103

Bain qualification of the author’s remark about sight note 104

Bain terror and belief note 105

Bain testimony note 106

Bain belief note 107

Mill belief note 108

Author CHAPTER XII. Ratiocination 424

Mill reasoning note 109

Author CHAPTER XIII. Evidence 428

Mill evidence note 110

Mill belief in an external world Appendix

Volume 2

Author CHAPTER XIV. Some Names which require a particular Explanation 1

Author SECTION 1. Names of Names 3

Mill names of names note 2

Author SECTION 2. Relative Terms 6

Mill relations note 3

Bain consciousness requiring change, relative names note 4

Bain similarity and difference note 5

Mill similarity note 6

Mill succession, antecedent and consequent note 7

Mill lines, geometrical and physical, note 8

Bain sight and space note 9

Bain the feeling of resistance note 10

Mill casual sequences note 12

Mill the meaning of relative names note 13

Mill quantity note 14

Mill quality note 15

Mill objects note 16

Mill more and less note 17

Mill why the succession of ideas is not the same in all people, simultaneous ideas and memory note 18

Author Abstract Relative Terms 72

Mill abstract relative terms note 19

Mill causation not connoting present time note 20

Mill ‘relative’ and ‘related’ note 21

Author SECTION 3. Numbers 89

Mill connotation and denotation of number words note 22

GroteGreek view of number note 23

Author SECTION 4. Privative Terms 99

Mill author’s use of ‘privative’ note 24

Mill ‘silence’ ‘nothing’ note 25

Mill space note 26

Mill infinity note 27

Author SECTION 5. Time 116

Mill time note 29

Grote Aristotle on time note 30

Author SECTION 6. Motion 142

Bain resistance, motion, etc. note 31

Mill extensive quotation from Herbert Spencer on feelings of motion and extension note 32

Author SECTION 7. Identity 164

Mill personal identity note 33

Author CHAPTER XV. Reflection 176

Mill attention as a separate feature note 34

Author CHAPTER XVI. The Distinction between the Intellectual and Active Powers etc. 181

Bain need for separate consideration of emotion note 35

Author CHAPTER XVII. Pleasurable and Painful Sensations 184

Mill nature of pleasurable sensations note 36

Author CHAPTER XVIII. Causes of the Pleasurable and Painful Sensations 187

Author CHAPTER XIX. Ideas of the Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, and of the Causes of them 189

Mill desire and aversion note 37

Author CHAPTER XX. The Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or future 196

Mill expectation note 38

Mill ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ note 39

Author CHAPTER XXI. The Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, contemplated as passed, or future 201

Author SECTION 1. The immediate Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations, etc. 201

Mill a problem for author’s account of memory and expectation note 40

Bain distinction between aversion and fear note 41

Author SECTION 2. The Remote Causes of Pleasurable and Painful Sensations etc. 206

Mill notion that there are no ideas without momentary belief in the existence of their objects note 42

Mill pains or pleasures of others note 43

Bain emotions and the tender feeling note 44

Mill author’s dealings with the emotions note 45

Mill pleasure in music note 46

Mill pleasure in colours note 47

Mill beauty and sublimity (with reference to Ruskin) note 48

Author CHAPTER XXII. Motives 256

Author SECTION 1. Pleasurable or Painful States, etc. 256

Mill motives, quotation from another work of the author on motives note 49

Author SECTION 2. Causes of our Pleasurable and Painful States, etc. 265

Mill what intensifies patriotic feelings note 50

Author CHAPTER XXIII. The Acts of our Fellow-creatures, etc. 280

Bain prudence and courage note 52

Bain checks to beneficence note 53

Mill posthumous fame note 54

Mill a motive for suicide note 55

Mill ‘praiseworthy’ as deserving praise, not merely likely to obtain praise note 56

Bain incompleteness of author’s account of the moral sentiment note 57

Mill moral sentiments, with quotation from another work by the author; duty and punishment note 58

Author CHAPTER XXIV. The Will 327

Mill internal bodily actions note 59

Bain winking under threat of a blow to the eyes note 60

Bain ‘fixed ideas’ note 61

Bain shedding tears or laughing note 62

Mill the will note 63

Bain trying to remember note 64

Bain dreams note 65

Mill attention note 66

Mill a gap in author’s account of voluntary action note 67

Bain the will note 68

Author CHAPTER XXV. Intention 396

Mill intention note 69

ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND

BY JAMES MILL

WITH NOTES ILLUSTRATIVE AND CRITICAL BY

ALEXANDER BAIN

ANDREW FINDLATER

AND

GEORGE GROTE

EDITED WITH ADDITIONAL NOTES BY

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · 1 Important points of Psychology are raised in classifying the senses, and in assigning the order of their exposition. The author justly aniNote 2 · 2 The order of exposition of the senses is not a matter of indifference. The author, like Condillac, selected Smell to begin with, as being Note 3 · 3 It may be questioned whether, in the phrases here cited, the word Smell stands for the olfactory organ. It would perhaps be most correct tNote 4 · 4 In the case of hearing, as of smell, one of the ambiguities brought to notice by the author is of questionable reality. It is doubtful if Note 5 · 5 The example given does not seem to me to prove that sight is ever employed as a name of the organ. When an old man says that his sight is Note 6 · 6 Vision, I believe, is used to denote the object of sight, only when it is supposed that this object is something unreal, i.e., that it hasNote 7 · 7 Some physiologists have been of opinion that a large proportion of what are classed as tastes, including all flavours, as distinguished frNote 8 · 8 The statement that “taste” is sometimes employed as a name of the organ, seems to me, like the similar statements respecting the names of Note 9 · 9 The surface of the sense of Touch properly so called is the skin, or common integument of the body, the interior of the mouth and the tongNote 10 · 10 The sensations of heat and cold are, of all sensations, the most subjective. The reason is that they are least connected with definite muNote 11 · 11 It is more true of the word touch, than of the names of our other senses, that it is occasionally employed to denote the organ of touch; Note 12 · 12 Additional Observations on the Sense of Touch.—The author is right in drawing a distinction between Touch proper and the sensibility to HNote 13 · 13 The author, in this passage, uses the word itching out of its ordinary sense; making it denote the pleasant sensation accompanying the reNote 14 · 14 Organic Sensibilities.—The author did well to signalize these sensibilities, so powerful in their influence on human life. They are not cNote 15 · 16 The exact mode of operation of opium and alcohol is still unknown; but the part affected is probably the nervous substance and not the stNote 16 · 17 These effects pass beyond the influence of mere digestion. All the viscera contribute to the condition of high general vigour and comfortNote 17 · 18 Discrimination and Retentiveness (the having of Ideas as the produce of Sensations) are different functions, although mutually involved, Note 18 · 19 Rather, when we will to contract certain muscles, and the contraction takes place, but is not followed by the accustomed movement of the Note 19 · 20 It is unnecessary to advert to the operation of the Will, (in the first instance at least,) in considering the feelings of muscular actioNote 20 · 21 Thirst is a sensation of the fauces and of the stomach; it is also a feeling of the body generally, due to a deficiency of water in the bNote 21 · 22 I venture to think that it is not a philosophically correct mode of expression, to speak of indigestion, or of hunger and thirst, as nameNote 22 · 23 The Sensation and the Idea compared.—Great importance, in every way, attaches to the points of agreement and of difference of the SensatiNote 23 · 24 A question which, as far as I know, has been passed over by psychologists, but which ought not to be left unanswered, is this: Can we havNote 24 · 25 There is here raised the interesting and important question, how far are we able to entertain synchronous sensations; in other words, wheNote 25 · 26 This must be qualified by the fact that the same individual sensation may be found in many groupings, and therefore may not bring up any Note 26 · 27 The difference between transient and permanent recollections turns entirely upon the strength of the association. There is not one specifNote 27 · 28 If it be admitted that in the three cases here specified the word vividness, as applied to our impressions, has a definite meaning, it seNote 28 · 29 We derive through the eye (1) sensations of light in its various degrees, and of colours and their shades; (2) visible form and visible mNote 29 · 30 Some further elucidation seems needful of what is here said, in so summary a manner, respecting ideas which it is not in our power to comNote 30 · 31 There is more than association in the case here supposed. Fear, anxiety, and painful emotions generally, cause disorder in the digestive Note 31 · 32 The law of association laid down in this section ranks among the principal of what may be termed the laws of Obliviscence. It is one of tNote 32 · 33 Perhaps the most remarkable case of sensations overlooked on their own account, and considered only as a means of suggesting something elNote 33 · 34 The reader, it may be hoped, is now familiar with the important psychological fact, so powerfully grasped and so discerningly employed byNote 34 · 35 The reason assigned by the author for considering association by resemblance as a case of association by contiguity, is perhaps the leastNote 35 · 38 This chapter raises questions of the most fundamental kind relating to our intellectual constitution. The Association of Ideas, comprehenNote 36 · 39 The author and Mr. Bain agree in rejecting Contrast as an independent principle of association. I think they might have gone further, andNote 37 · 41 It is not intended to be understood that all this complex meaning entered into the names as originally given. The process of naming seemsNote 38 · 42 Economy in the use of names is a very small part of the motive leading to the creation of names of classes. If we had a name for every inNote 39 · 43 In strict propriety of language all these are names only of sensations, or clusters of sensations; not of ideas. A person studious of preNote 40 · 44 There is some need for additional elucidation of the class of complex ideas distinguished (under the name of Mixed Modes) by Locke, and rNote 41 · 45 In the concluding paragraph we find the first recognition by the author that class names serve any purpose, or are introduced for any reaNote 42 · 46 There is here a fresh instance of the oversight already pointed out, that of not including in the function for which general names are reNote 43 · 47 The imperfection of this theory of Verbs is sufficiently apparent. They are, says the author, a particular kind of Adjectives. AdjectivesNote 44 · 48 The theory of Predication here set forth, stands in need of further elucidation, and perhaps of some correction and addition. The accountNote 45 · 49 If what has been said in the preceding note is correct, it is a very inadequate view of the purpose for which a generic or specific name Note 46 · 50 The author says, that no very distinct boundaries are marked by the three terms, Differentia, Proprium, and Accidens, nor do they effect Note 47 · 51 I am unable to feel the force of this remark. Every predication ascribes an attribute to a subject. Differentiae, Propria, and Accidents,Note 48 · 53 The account of predication above given is in conformity with the phenomena of the family of languages known as the Indo-European. LogiciaNote 49 · 54 The interesting and important philological facts adduced by Mr. Findlater, confirm and illustrate in a very striking manner the doctrine Note 50 · 55 It is necessary again to notice the consistent omission, throughout the author’s theory of Predication, of the element Belief. In the casNote 51 · 57 I cannot see any propriety in the expression that when we infer the sum of the three angles of a triangle to be twice a right angle, the Note 52 · 58 This exposition of the class of words which are properly names of names, belongs originally to Hobbes, and is highly important. They are Note 53 · 59 There is really no well marked distinction between relative pronouns and demonstrative pronouns, either in their origin or in their use. Note 54 · 60 In many cases, and even in some of the examples given, the adverb does not modify either the subject or the predicate, but the applicatioNote 55 · 61 The ingenious speculations of Mr. Tooke did great service to the cause of philology in England, by awakening a very general interest in tNote 56 · 62 This is according to Tooke’s etymology, who traces and to an Ang. Sax. verb anan, to add. Unfortunately, Anglo-Saxon scholars deny that tNote 57 · 63 This is not strictly correct. But is compounded of the two prepositions or local particles by and out (Ang. Sax. bi utan); and the force Note 58 · 64 That if has no connection with give, is manifest from the cognate forms; Goth. jabai, Frisic jef, Ang. Sax. gif, Old Ger. ibu, Lettish jaNote 59 · 65 The syllable be, in “because,” “before,” &c., is the simple preposition by, Sans. abhi, Gr. επὶ, “near,” “close to.” Therefore is for thaNote 60 · 74 The mistake of Reid in raising Consciousness to a separate faculty has been commented on by Brown, Hamilton, and others. It must be allowNote 61 · 75 Those psychologists who think that being conscious of a feeling is something different from merely having the feeling, generally give theNote 62 · 76 The doctrine of this chapter is as just as it is admirably stated. A conception is nothing whatever but a complex idea, and to conceive iNote 63 · 77 The foregoing analysis of the Imagination brings to view some of the important points of distinction between it and the other faculties; Note 64 · 78 The doctrine that “men were led to class solely for the purpose of economizing in the use of names,” is here reasserted in the most unquaNote 65 · 79 The two chapters (VII. and VIII.) of Mr. James Mill’s Analysis are highly instructive, and exhibit all his customary force and perspicuitNote 66 · 80 Rejecting the notion that classes and classification would not have existed but for the necessity of economizing names, we may say that oNote 67 · 81 The example which the author has here selected of a general name, sets in a strong light the imperfection of the theory of general names,Note 68 · 82 The word Connote, with its substantive Connotation, was used by the old logicians in two senses; a wider, and a narrower sense. The widerNote 69 · 83 After having said that a concrete general name notes an attribute, that this, one of the sensations in a cluster, and connotes the objectNote 70 · 86 The abstracts in -th belong to a very early stage of the language. We cannot now form words like health, truth, as we can abstracts in -nNote 71 · 88 This process seems best expressed by laying down a law of Compound or Composite Association; under which a plurality of feeble links of cNote 72 · 91 The doctrine which the author thinks “will not be doubted” is more than doubted by most people, and in my judgment rightly. To complete tNote 73 · 93 This is a statement that should be qualified. Looking to the change of outward situation, we may say that the difference between the presNote 74 · 94 The only difficulty about Memory, when once the laws of Association are understood, is the difference between it and Imagination; but thiNote 75 · 95 How is it possible to treat of Belief without including in it Memory and Judgment? Memory is a case of belief. In what does Memory differNote 76 · 97 The difference between Mr. Bain and the author is but in language and classification. It is necessary for the reader of the Analysis to rNote 77 · 100 It is a question worth considering, why that demand for a cause of everything, which has led to the invention of so many fabulous or ficNote 78 · 102 The theory maintained so powerfully and with such high intellectual resources by the author, that Belief is but an inseparable associatiNote 79 · 103 The case that is most thoroughly opposed to the theory of indissoluble association is our belief in the Uniformity of Nature. Our overweNote 80 · 104 More guardedly—’I am affected by certain modifications of light.’ The word ‘see’ carries with it too much meaning for the case put. TherNote 81 · 105 The efficacy of association is not correctly explained in this instance. The influence of Terror on belief is unquestionably great; but Note 82 · 106 The belief in Testimony is derived from the primary credulity of the mind, in certain instances left intact under the wear and tear of aNote 83 · 107 The author has treated in different places several questions intimately allied. These are:— 1. The essential nature of the state of mindNote 84 · 108 The analysis of Belief presented in this chapter, brings out the conclusion that all cases of Belief are simply cases of indissoluble asNote 85 · 109 This chapter, which is of a very summary character, is a prolongation of the portion of the chapter on Belief, which examines the case oNote 86 · 110 This chapter on Evidence is supplementary to the chapter on Belief, and is intended to analyse the process of weighing and balancing oppNote 87 · 2 A right understanding of the words which are names of names, is of great importance in philosophy. The tendency was always strong to belieNote 88 · 3 No part of the Analysis is more valuable than the simple explanation here given of a subject which has seemed so mysterious to some of theNote 89 · 4 The author is here endeavouring to express the most fundamental fact of the consciousness—the necessity of change, or transition from one Note 90 · 5 More properly Similarity is “agreement in difference.” Difference or discrimination is one thing, one element of knowledge or cognition; SNote 91 · 6 The author commences his survey of Relations with the most universal of them all. Likeness and Unlikeness; and he examines these as subsisNote 92 · 7 The next relation which the author examines is that of succession, or Antecedent and Consequent. And here again we have one of the universNote 93 · 8 This conception of a geometrical line, as the abstract, of which a physical line is the corresponding concrete, is scarcely satisfactory. Note 94 · 9 In attaining the ideas of synchronous order, which is another name for Space, or the Extended World, sight is a leading instrumentality. INote 95 · 10 Still, when we apply an analysis to the complex facts indicated by the name, we come to a simple as well as ultimate experience, which isNote 96 · 12 This is surely an improper use of the word Casual. Sequences cannot be exhaustively divided into invariable and casual, or (as by the autNote 97 · 13 It seems hardly a proper expression to say that Physician and Patient, or that Father and Son, are one name made up of two parts. When onNote 98 · 14 After analysing Position and Extension under the head of Relative Terms, the author now, under the same head, gives the analysis of QuantNote 99 · 15 As in the case of Quantity, so in that of Quality, it is needless to add anything to the author’s very sufficient elucidation. I merely mNote 100 · 16 Say rather, in the case of objects, what is named is clusters of sensations, supplemented by possibilities of sensation. If an object is Note 101 · 17 In this passage the author has got as near as it is perhaps possible to get, to an analysis of the ideas of More and Less. We say there iNote 102 · 18 The author may seem to be anticipating a difficulty which few will feel, when he asks how it happens that all trains of thought are not tNote 103 · 19 The exposition here given of the meaning of abstract relative names is in substance unexceptionable; but in language it remains open to tNote 104 · 20 The term Causation, as the author observes, signifies causingness and causedness taken together, but I do not see on what ground he asserNote 105 · 21 The application of the word Relative to Things is not only an offence against philosophy, but against propriety of language. The correct Note 106 · 22 The vague manner in which the author uses the phrase “to be a name of” (a vagueness common to almost all thinkers who have not precise teNote 107 · 23 Here the process of numeration generally, together with the function of numbers carrying their separate names, are clearly set forth; aftNote 108 · 24 The author gives the name of Privative terms to all those which are more commonly known by the designation of Negative; to all which signNote 109 · 25 The analysis of the facts, in all these cases, is admirable, but I still demur to the language. I object to saying, for instance, that siNote 110 · 26 There is great originality as well as perspicacity in the explanation here given of Space, as a privative term, expressing when analysed,Note 111 · 27 This explanation of the feeling of Infinity which attaches itself to Space, is one of the most important thoughts in the whole treatise; Note 112 · 29 As is shewn in the text. Time is a name for the aggregate of the successions of our feelings, apart from the feelings themselves. I objecNote 113 · 30 In this section Mr. James Mill explains Time. He tells us that “it is a comprehensive word including all successions, or the whole of sucNote 114 · 31 The author correctly, in my opinion, refers to our muscular sensibility (aided by Touch), the fundamental notions of Resistance, Motion, Note 115 · 32 It will be both useful and interesting to the inquiring reader, if I add to the analysis of these very complex ideas by the author of theNote 116 · 33 The author has avoided an error in the mode and order of the enquiry, which has greatly contributed to make the explanations given by psyNote 117 · 34 To reflect on any of our feelings or mental acts is more properly identified with attending to the feeling, than, (as stated in the text)Note 118 · 35 Instead of “The phenomena of Thought,” substitute the phenomena of Mind, the Subject, or the Subject Consciousness. The use of the word “Note 119 · 36 In the case of many pleasurable or painful sensations, it is open to question whether the pleasure or pain, especially the pleasure, is nNote 120 · 37 The principal doctrine of this chapter is, that Desire, and Aversion, are nothing but the idea of a pleasurable sensation, and the Idea oNote 121 · 38 This is the first place in which the author gives his analysis of Expectation; and his theory of it is, as all theories of it must be, thNote 122 · 39 The author’s definitions of Hope and Fear differ from those offered in my note (p. 194). He considers these words to signify that the pleNote 123 · 40 The difference here brought to notice between the very slight emotion excited in most cases by the idea of a past pain, and the strong feNote 124 · 41 A distinction should be drawn between Aversion and Fear. We may be very much averse to a thing, and yet not fear it. A courageous person Note 125 · 42 This is the place where the author most clearly enunciates the doctrine which is the indispensable basis of his theory of Belief, viz. thNote 126 · 43 That the pleasures or pains of another person can only be pleasurable or painful to us through the association of our own pleasures or paNote 127 · 44 As carrying out the principle of association, in the domain of the Feelings, the foregoing chapters, from XIX. onwards, are unexceptionabNote 128 · 45 The two preceding subsections are almost perfect as expositions and exemplifications of the mode in which, by the natural course of life,Note 129 · 46 What the author thinks himself dispensed from either proving or illustrating because he has no doubt that it will be allowed, is, on the Note 130 · 47 The elements contributed by association are certainly more predominant in the pleasure of colours than in that of musical sounds; yet I aNote 131 · 48 The objection commonly made to the psychological analyses which resolve Beauty into association, is that they confound the Beautiful withNote 132 · 49 A Motive is that which influences the will; and the Will is a subject we have not yet arrived at the consideration of. Meanwhile, it is hNote 133 · 50 It is too limited a view of the effect of “times of great excitement” in intensifying the patriotic feelings, to identify it with the infNote 134 · 52 The virtue of Prudence might apparently have included Courage or Fortitude; we cannot be said to be prudent, if we are unable to face a cNote 135 · 53 The affirmations in this paragraph require to be tested in the detail, in order to find out their limitations. That “we have associationsNote 136 · 54 The case here put, that of the desire of posthumous fame, affords no real support to the author’s doctrines, that a high degree of associNote 137 · 55 They do not seek death to escape from the idea of any consequences of the unfavourable sentiments of mankind. The mere fact of having incNote 138 · 56 This paragraph, unexplained, might give the idea that the author regarded praiseworthiness and blameworthiness as having the meaning not Note 139 · 57 The foregoing analysis of the Moral Sentiment proceeds upon a number of unquestionable psychological data. That we have a strong personalNote 140 · 58 It had been pointed out, in a preceding chapter, that Wealth, Power, Dignity, and many other things which are not in their own nature pleNote 141 · 59 The actions which take place in the interior of the body are not always, nor perhaps even generally, produced by sensations. A large portNote 142 · 60 The act of winking or wincing under the threat of a blow on the eyes is a good example of strong, and even indissoluble association. Any Note 143 · 61 This is a pure example of the “fixed idea,” or of the tendency to work out into full actuality whatever is strongly presented in idea. ThNote 144 · 62 These are emotional and not volitional manifestations. They are the natural signs, expression, or embodiment of a feeling, as feeling, anNote 145 · 63 This analysis of the power of the Will over muscular action is substantially that of Hartley, though more clearly and forcibly stated, anNote 146 · 64 What we have in mind when we will to remember anything, is of course not the thing to be remembered, but some collateral, or something toNote 147 · 65 The author makes frequent reference to dreams, but it may be doubted whether he has seized the explanation of that obscure phenomenon. ItNote 148 · 66 The account here given of Attention, though full of instructive matter, I cannot consider to be at all adequate. When it is said that a sNote 149 · 67 The analysis contained in this chapter affords, as it appears to me, a sufficient theory of the manner in which all that we denominate voNote 150 · 68 This chapter is a remarkably searching discussion of the Will, not as a metaphysical puzzle, but as a leading function of the mind. It isNote 151 · 69 This chapter is devoted to clearing up the confusion and disentangling the ambiguity connected with the word Intention. And it fully atta
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